TMR36_Oct2003_Fire Resistant Design for Offshore Structures(USA)

For further information on FABIG Technical Meetings or any other FABIG activities please contact:

Rest of World

Fadi Hamdan or Martin HomerThe Steel Construction InstituteSilwood ParkAscot, Berkshire SL5 7QN United KingdomTelephone: +44 (0) 1344 623 345Fax: +44 (0) 1344 622 944

E-mail: [email protected] Site: http://www.fabig.com

The FABIG Technical Meeting on “Fire Resistant Design for Offshore Structures”, held on 15 October 2003, included the following presentations:

The enclosed review of the meetings includes, where available, copies of overheads and other additional information.

FABIG TECHNICAL MEETING REVIEW

Fire Hazard AssessmentHazard assessment John Alderman, Risk, Reliability and Safety

Engineering

Risk Based PFP Design Using New Fire Tools Kameleon-FAHTS-USFOSRisk based PFP design

John Baik, Det Norske Veritas

Fire fighting Risk Assessments – Lessons LearntFire fightingKen Smith, J. Connor Consulting

Passive Fire Protection Methods for Marine StructuresPassive fire protectionTom Dearing, Thermal Designs

USA

Darrell BarkerABS Consulting15600 San Pedro, Suite 400San Antonio, Texas 78232USATelephone: +1 210 495 5195Fax: +1 210 495 5134

Overview of FABIG Information on Fire Protection for OffshoreFABIG fire informationFadi Hamdan, Steel Construction Institute

John Alderman

Risk, Reliability and Safety Engineering

Fire Hazard Assessment


For further information please contact:John AldermanRisk, Reliability and Safety EngineeringTelephone: +1 281 334 4220E-mail: [email protected]

Page 1COPYRIGHT ©2001 by RRS Engineering, LLC

R i s k , R e l i a b i l i t y a n d S a f e t y E n g i n e e r i n g

Practical Approach

To

Fire Hazard Analysis

John A. Alderman, PE, CSP

Duncan Smith

R R S E N G IN E ERIN G

2525 South Shore Blvd, Suite 206 League City Texas 77573 USATEL 281.334.4220 FAX 281.334.5809 www.rrseng.com



Old Approaches to FP

Do it like last time• Over protect• Under protect

A fire is a fire is a fire

Company standard

Fire Hazard Analysis used to feed QRA



Problems with QRA

Complex and costly

Does not deliver timely results

Large projects move quickly

Detailed design phase or later before QRA results available

Results often too late to make cost effective changes (economically feasible)



What is needed

Approach that can be applied early in the design

Provides accurate, credible results

Enables costly and important decisions to be made early in the design process with some confidence

Provides input required to design safety systems

Can quickly evaluate alternative design features



Managing Fires

An effectively managed fire is one that:

Does not escalate and cause failure of equipment in adjacent modules

Does not cause primary structural steel failure

There is at least one credible escape route for all fires

Integrity of primary refuge and muster areas is maintained



Equipment Failure

Process equipment and steel structures can fail if subject to high heat loads for a given period of time

Failure of equipment can lead to escalation of the incident and additional loss of life

Focus on prevention of escalation (i.e., no equipment or structural failures)

Without escalation, risk should be acceptable



Scenario Based Approach

Reduces number of cases analyzed

Allows for detailed analysis of hazards

Focuses on maintaining facility integrity in place of calculating the number of fatalities

Provides detail required to design safety systems

Takes into account reliability of systems



Basic Methodology

Selects only credible severe hazards - the “design basis”

Focuses on prevention of escalation

Minor hazards well covered by normal engineering design practice

Many catastrophic events are not credible and do not require mitigation

Requires the use of experienced personnel



Selection of Scenarios

Define credible severe release scenarios based on company and industry experience

Divide up process into isolatable sections based on the position of shutdown valves and blowdown valves

Typically, there will be around 10 to 20 isolatable gas/oil sections on an average offshore platform

Evaluate basic scenarios for each gas/oil section



Basic Scenarios Analyzed

Basic scenarios• Small, medium and large gas/oil leak in which

primary safety systems work according to design• Small leak with partial failure of primary safety

systems

Since the second scenario involves some degree of system failure, the medium and large leaks are outside the design basis



Use One Line Equations

Calculate mass of gas in section

Bernoulli's equation for release rate

Use non-ideal gas equation to calculate blowdown from release rate during time step

Jet Flame Length ~ 22.8 (release rate) 0.46

Use simple multipliers to calculate extent of radiant heat hazard zone

Fatality hazard zone = 1.2 x flame length

Can be applied using spreadsheets



Typical Blowdown Curve(15 minute Blowdown)

IP Separator - Train 1 - Blowdown Curve (15 minutes from start of blowdown to 100 psig)

0.0

50.0

100.0

150.0

200.0

250.0

300.0

350.0

400.0

450.0

500.0

0 600 1200 1800Time (seconds)

Pres

sure

(psi

g)

No leak0.5 inch leak1 inch leak2 inch leak0.5 inch leak partial failure



Typical Blowdown Curve(5 minute Blowdown)

IP Separator - Train 1 - Blowdown Curve (5 minutes from start of blowdown to 100 psig)

0.0

50.0

100.0

150.0

200.0

250.0

300.0

350.0

400.0

450.0

500.0

0 600 1200 1800

Time (seconds)

Pres

sure

(psi

g)No leak0.5 inch leak1 inch leak2 inch leak0.5 inch leak partial failure



Screening Failure Criteria

Use flame dimensions for screening criteria

250 kW/m2 jet flame impingement• Failure of small bore piping and other unprotected

equipment and structural items in 5 minutes• Major structural elements fail in 10 minutes

Equipment outside of flame envelope does not fail

Use flame dimensions at 5 and 10 minutes to calculate dimensions of failure zones



Flame Time History (15 min blowdown)

IP Separator - Train 1 - Flame sphere diamters

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

0 600 1200 1800

Time (seconds)

Fire

ball

diam

ter (

feet

)

0.5 inch leak1 inch leak2 inch leak0.5 inch leak partial failure



Flame Time History(5 minute blowdown)

IP Separator - Train 1 - Flame sphere diamters

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

0 600 1200 1800

Time (seconds)

Fire

ball

diam

ter (

feet

)

0.5 inch leak1 inch leak2 inch leak0.5 inch leak partial failure



Risk Reduction Measures

Automatic verses manual blowdown

Various blowdown rates (e.g., 5, 10 or 15 minutes)

Reducing the size of isolatable inventories

Adding Passive Fire Protection (PFP)

Changing the physical location of process equipment

Changing the location of escape and evacuation routes



Use on Offshore Structure

Initial fire time histories developed

Some minor modifications to the design made (blowdown time, inventory size, etc)

Fire time histories used early in design to provide estimates for PFP on structural steel

The initial PFP estimate still required considerable• Installation time and cost • Future maintenance costs• Added significant weight onto the facility



PFP Optimization

Select reduced set of five of the most severe fire scenarios

Use linear structural and missing member analysis

The linear structural response was used as a screen for the detailed non-linear structural analysis

Significant reduction (80%) in initial PFP estimates for structural steel after some slight structural design changes



Remaining Issue

One scenario involved a gas export riser that was located in the center of the SPAR facility

Miles of high pressure export gas pipeline

Small release could result in significant damage

Could not be moved to edge of platform due to stresses

Initial recommendation to install a subsea isolation valve• Difficult to maintain • Difficult to meet emergency shutdown valve integrity

requirements• Since one mile to sea floor inventory could still cause

significant damage to the facility



Solutions

1. Insert the export pipe into an outer pull tube that would provide dropped object protection and act to vent pipeline leaks within the center well to the flare

2. Employ all welded construction up to the bottom of the primary Emergency Shutdown (ESD) valve and remove all connections (e.g., instrument taps and injection points) on the downstream side of the ESD valve

3. Locate the ESD valves up in the structural I-Beams. 1. The massive I-beams on all sides of the ESD valves were

coated with PFP. This prevents a release from one export ESD from directly impacting the adjacent ESD and equipment

2. The jet fire heat loading could be absorbed and managed with existing PFP and with deluge for cooling



Why it Works

The solutions were only economically feasible because they were identified early in the project

Project team buy-in to the FHA approach

FHA results were delivered early enough (as apposed to typical QRA) to allow many options for consideration



Summary

Simplification is good

Apply as early as possible

Results available early in design cycle

Hazard understanding at time when design is still flexible

Results comparable to full QRA with significantly lower cost

Enable changes to be made economically

Reduce last minute costly surprises

John Baik

Det Norske Veritas

Risk Based PFP Design Using New Fire Tools Kameleon-FAHTS-USFOS


For further information please contact:John BaikDet Norske VeritasTelephone: +1 281 754 7215E-mail: [email protected]

26. november 2003

Risk Based PFP Design Using New Fire Tools

Kameleon-FAHTS-USFOS

John Baik, Ph.D.Det Norske Veritas

FABIG Meeting-HoustonOctober 15, 2003

26. november 2003

Contents

• Objectives and Background• New improved fire analysis tools

– Geometry – Kameleon FireeX, KFX– FAHTS– USFOS

• Application areas • Probabilistic fire analysis• Conclusions

26. november 2003

Objectives

• To present improved fire analysis:– Integrated combustion, radiation, structure heat-up, and

collapse analysis– Effects of geometry are included in all steps– Transient structure collapse models– Efficient data handling gives robust analyses

• Ultimately:– Reduce Passive Fire Protection (PFP) coverage– Improve fire protection systems– Improve safety– Reduce cost

26. november 2003

Why reduce PFP?

• PFP on process equipment cause increased leak frequency

• PFP causes more volume blockage and therefore higher explosion pressures

• PFP causes increased inspection and maintenance activity and hence increased ignition sources

• Reduced PFP reduces weight• Reduced PFP reduces costs

26. november 2003

Background • DNV has performed fire simulations since 1995

using CFX• DNV was heavily involved in developing the

probabilistic explosion procedure applied in the North sea

• DNV has been a pioneer in developing risk analysis tools for the Oil and Gas industry (Neptune, Phast, Safetti, etc.)

• DNV has now aquired Kameleon/FAHTS/USFOS codes

• DNV is developing a probabilistic procedure for risk based fire protection design

26. november 2003

Development of fire tools

• Open area jet and pool fire models are traditionally used for offshore modules

• New CFD models gives a more accurate representation of the fires

“Thomas formula”

CFD model

26. november 2003

Selected reference projects DNV

• Chevron Texaco, Fire and explosion risk analysis AGBAMI FPSO

• ConocoPhillips, Fire and explosion risk analysis, Magnolia TLP

• Petrobras, Explosion analyses, P-40, P-50, P-51, P-52, PRA-1, P-36

• Shell, Fire and Explosion analysis, Bijupira Salema• Phillips, North Sea, Fire and Explosion risk analyses, 5

platforms on Ekofisk• Statoil, Fire and explosion analyses, QRA, Norne,

Kvitebjoern, Aasgard, Hammerfest LNG, • Technical papers (ERA 2002)

26. november 2003

New Fire tool Kameleon-FAHTS-USFOS

• Kameleon Fire eX, KFX– CFD tool including – Combustion, fire in 3D complex geometries– Jet and pool fires– Radiation integrated with flow models– Deluge in same model

• FAHTS Finite element tool – Heat-up of 3D complex framework structure

• USFOS Finite element tool– Stress and collapse analysis of same 3D complex structure

• All developed by Sintef Norway

26. november 2003

Kameleon FireEx (KFX)

• KFX is a three dimensional transient numerical simulator for – fire development, mitigation and extinction, gas dispersion, flame

propagation

• KFX reads geometry from standard CAD systems:– PDS, PDMS and Flacs models

• KFX operates in interface with the finite element structure response program USFOS

• Kameleon FireEx is one of the most advanced CFD codes world wide for simulation of gas dispersion and fire development

• Kameleon FireEx is tailored for offshore use

26. november 2003

Kameleon owners

• Partners:– Statoil, Norway – Ruhrgas, Germany– Gaz de France,– France Elf, France– ENI-group (SNAM,AGIP), Italy

• Associated Partner:– Sandia National Laboratories, U.S.A.

• Commercial Rights:– ComputIt Norway

26. november 2003

Validation of Kameleon

Side view of flame in cross wind

Measured Kameleon

26. november 2003

Geometry modeling and data transfer

• Efficient modeling with direct links:• Kameleon uses the same geometry models as

FLACS• Can read from CAD systems used for offshore

structures (Microstation PDS, PDMS)• FAHTS and USFOS uses geometry from DNV

SESAM structure models, or equivalent • Automatic data links between Kameleon-FAHTS-

USFOS

26. november 2003

Kameleon demos

• Pool fire on FPSO• Pool fire in riser area with wind, Jacket platform• Pool fire in riser area without wind, Jacket platform• Pool fire seen from above, (Flacsfire) • Fire in riser shaft with deluge

26. november 2003

Pool fire on FPSO

26. november 2003

Pool fire in riser area with wind

26. november 2003

Pool fire in riser area without wind

26. november 2003

Pool fire seen from above, (Flacsfire)

26. november 2003

Fire in riser shaft with deluge

26. november 2003

FAHTS

• Fire And Heat Transfer Simulations (FAHTS)• Developed in Sintef, Norway• Finite Element program• Calculates transient heat transfer in complex

framework structures• Reads geometry from most Finite element programs

(Sesam, etc.)• Direct link input from Kameleon• Direct link output to USFOS

26. november 2003

USFOS

• Nonlinear Finite Element program • Developed by Sintef Norway• Models framework structures• Continues calculation after elements have broken• Used to find redundancy in structures• Widely used in collapse analysis

– Wave loads– Fire loads– Earthquakes

• DNV is vendor of USFOS

26. november 2003

FHATS demo

• Pool fire in process area• Only primary structure framework is shown

26. november 2003

Temperature in main steel t = 0 s

Pool fire starts here on solid deck

26. november 2003


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26. november 2003

FAHTS-USFOS Demo

• Pool fire in process area, focus on beams

26. november 2003

Detail t = 0 sUSFOS

Steel deformation

FAHTS

Steel temperature

26. november 2003

Detail t = 15 sUSFOS

Steel deformation

FAHTS

Steel temperature

26. november 2003


Steel deformation

FAHTS

Steel temperature

26. november 2003


Steel deformation

FAHTS

Steel temperature

26. november 2003

USFOS demo

26. november 2003

Application areas

• Risk based design in different phases of development• PFP lay-out cost optimization• Find minimal PFP coverage

– Large saving may be obtained by optimizing PFP coverage– Less PFP causes reduced weight– Less PFP causes reduced leak frequency– Less PFP causes reduced explosion pressures

• Deluge design• Plating/grating and firewall lay-out design• Shutdown and blowdown design

26. november 2003

Risk based design in different phases• Concept design

– Major Lay-out arrangement– Solid/grated decks, firewalls etc

• FEED– ESD and shutdown philosophies– Minor lay-out arrangement– Decide design explosion loads, PFP, gas detectors

• Detailed design– Operation procedures may be changed– Verify design loads, PFP, gas detectors– May do small lay-out arrangement changes

• As Built/Operation phase– Verify that risk level is according to criteria– Identify “risk bottlenecks”– Modify operation procedures, inspection, maintenance, etc.– Optimize gas detection/Shutdown/Blowdown– Can install Deluge on gas detection (?)

What can be improved at

different stages of the

development?

26. november 2003

Overall risk based design procedureStart

Risk based designPFP, Explosion DAL, Gas detectors

Is design feasible?

QRA using risk levels from Risk based design

Improvedesign

Is total riskAcceptable?

Yes

No

No

Yes

Stop

26. november 2003

Governing effects included in analysis

ESD segment behaviour

Heat to structure, PFP

Hole size and Leak profile

Heat to equipment, PFP

Deluge

Weather

ENERGY FLOW FROMHC TO STEEL

ENERGY“LOSS”

Segment data

26. november 2003

Major variables in analysis

Time from leak starts

Capacity in structure

(blue)

Rate of energy (red)

Reduced by wind, leak location, ESD,

BD, PFP, deluge

Design improvement

Rate of energy in HC leak

Heat-transfer rate received by

structure

26. november 2003

PFP lay-out design steps• Use realistic fire loads from several Kameleon

simulations• Model heat-up and collapse with no PFP• Find critical load bearing element• Apply PFP on critical elements and elements that

collapses first• Run heat-up analysis and collapse analysis again with

PFP only where it is needed• Continue until minimum PFP is found which gives

acceptable time to collapse

26. november 2003

Probabilistic fire analysis development

• A new probabilistic procedure is being developed• Similar to probabilistic explosion procedure which is

standard in the North Sea• Development project with Statoil, DNV Norway,

and DNV Brazil– 2001, development probabilistic fire analysis integrated

with QRA– 2002 pre-project show how a procedure can be developed– 2003 plans to develop probabilistic procedure

26. november 2003

Flowchart Probabilistic fire analysisStart

Critical surveyVessels, Beams, Nodes, Firewalls...

Geometry modellingfrom CAD or FLACS

Select fire scenarios

CFD fire simulationsKAMELEON

Heat dose on each element

Probabilistic analysis

Heat dose vs. frequency gives

DAL loads

Geometry modelling FEFrom Structure model

FE simulationsfor DAL load picture

USFOS

Stop

Leak Wind

Ignition

Shutdown philosophy

deluge

Timeto impairment

OK?

Passive fire protection

No

Yes

Steel heat-up simulationsFAHTS

26. november 2003

Conclusions• New CFD and FE fire tools are recommended because

– Integrated analysis with all important physical effects– Effects of geometry are included– Transient structure collapse models points where to put PFP– Efficient data handling gives robust and in-time analyses

• Risk based design to give optimum fire and explosion protection:– Detailed location of Passive Fire Protection (PFP)– Dimensioning of PFP– Dimensioning of Deluge– Grating/Plating and firewall lay-out design– Improved safety– Reduced weight and cost

26. november 2003

Conclusions (cont.)

• Analyses at an early design stage give large savings later

• Combined fire and explosion analysis gives optimal use of computer models

• Detailed, probabilistic approach gives less need for conservative assumptions

• Probabilistic approach ensures that the results are consistent from project to project

For further information please contact:Ken SmithJ. Connor ConsultingTelephone: +1 281 578 3388E-mail: [email protected]

Ken Smith

J. Connor Consulting

Fire fighting Risk Assessments –Lessons Learnt


Firefighting Risk Firefighting Risk Assessments Assessments –– Lessons Lessons LearnedLearned

Kenneth J. SmithKenneth J. SmithHSE ManagerHSE ManagerJ. Connor Consulting, Inc.J. Connor Consulting, Inc.

Presentation Topics

BackgroundFires at seaRoute to current regulations

Risk AssessmentsRequired format

Lessons LearnedApplicabilityAssessment ProcessHuman FactorsEscapeAlternative ProtectionAssessment Conclusions

Background

Fire at sea, whether on a ship, a drilling rig or a production platform, is an extremely urgent event.Why? Besides the obvious reasons, there usually is nowhere else to go except the sea and that can be as bad as the fire itself.

Piper AlphaJuly 6, 1988, 167 lives ended on the Piper Alpha Platform, located in the North Sea. The worst offshore oil accident in history, the Piper Alpha disaster quickly revolutionized the offshore oil industry.

Background

Minerals Management Service (MMS) regulations require that operators equip OCS platforms with firewater systems that protect all areas where production equipment is located.However, they allow using chemicals in lieu of water if the MMS District Supervisor determines the system provides equivalent fire protection & control for personnel egress

Background

Previously, simple departure requests were routinely approved by MMS Notice to Lessees (NTL) No. 2001-G09, issued November 21, 2001, specifies the current requirements for receiving approval for chemical-only firefighting systems by providing a Risk Assessment

NTL No. 2001-G09

Requires:Corporate Philosophy Risk Assessment

Corporate Philosophy

Two Common types:1. The company equips and trains its

personnel to fight all fire stages.2. The company only equips and

trains its personnel to fight “incipient” fires. (The most common approach)

Incipient Fires

Incipient Fire - A fire that is in the initial or beginning stage, that can be controlled or extinguished by portable fire extinguishers

Risk Assessment

Consists of:Platform Description, Facility-Specific Hazard Assessment, Human Factors Assessment, Evacuation Assessment, Alternative Protection Assessment, Conclusion of Risk Assessment

Platform Description

Type & quantity of hydrocarbons that are produced, handled, stored or processedThe capacity of any tanks that store either liquid hydrocarbons or other flammable liquids (bulk storage)Other (non-bulk) flammable liquid storage

Paint lockersStoreroomsDrums


Whether facility is manned or unmanned

Manned, max number of personnel onboard & anticipated length of stayUnmanned, number of days per week facility visited, average length of stay, transportation mode, whether transportation available at facility while personnel on board


Proximity of platform to other OCS platforms (safe harbors). For each include:

Heading, distance, operator, manned or unmanned, whether PF equipped with a heliport and/or craneFactors used (e.g., prevailing seas, manned status, accessibility) to determine safe harbor platforms


Diagram that depictsQuarters locationProduction equipment locationFire prevention & control equipment locationLifesaving appliances & equipment locationEvacuation plan escape routes to primary evacuation equipment

Facility Hazard Assessment

Identify all likely fire initiation scenarios

Potential severityIgnition & fuel sources

Estimate the fire/radiant heat exposure that personnel could be subjected to

Consider designated muster areas & evacuation routes near fuel sourcesDemonstrate proper flare boom sizing for radiant heat exposure

Human Factors Assessment Describe fire-related training of workersDescribe training workers have received:

Fire preventionControl of ignition sourcesControl of fuel sources

Describe instructions given to workers concerning actions if fire occurs

EvacuationHow conveyed

Evacuation AssessmentGeneral discussion of Evacuation Plan

Muster areasEscape routesMeans of evacuation

Lifesaving appliancesType, quantity & location

Types & availability of support vesselsWorst case evacuation time needed

Alternative Protection AssessmentDiscuss reasons you are proposing to use alternative fire prevention & control systemList standards used to:

Design the systemLocate the equipmentOperate the equipment/system

Describe the proposed alternative system:

Type, size, number & location of equipment

Alternative Protection Assessment

Describe the testing, inspection & maintenance system you will useSpecify inspection types and:

Personnel who will conduct inspectionsInspection proceduresDocumentation & recordkeeping

Conclusion of Risk Assessment

Provide a summary of the technical evaluation demonstrating that the alternative fire system provides an equivalent level of personnel protection for the specific hazards located on the facility.

Lessons LearnedLessons Learned

Applicability

Applies to major or manned platforms:Major – A structure with either 6 or more completions or 0-5 completions with more than one item of production process equipmentManned – Attended 24-hours a day or personnel quartered there overnightMinor – A structure with 0-5 completions with one item of production process equipment

Applicability

“Item of production process equipment”This has been interpreted by MMS to mean major components of the production process:

CompressorsSeparatorsHeater treatersSkimmers

Applicability

Applies to new platforms or existing platforms (with existing departures) that undergo “significant” modification

“Significant” modification:MMS only example is placement of a storage vessel of 100 bbls capacity or more on the existing platformWe have found that “significant modification” also means placement of a new piece of production process equipment

Applicability

“MMS Gulf District Supervisors are not likely to approve requests to use chemical-only fire prevention and control systems on large or complex manned platforms with densely clustered equipment”

Hazard Assessment

•Conduct a thorough analysis of equipment layout and P& I drawings

•Identify all activities that couldresult in a fire. Note: The NTL says activities that are likely to result in a fire

•Requires identifying fuel sources and ignition sources.

Hazard Assessment

Lightning strike or crane load drop.

Control valve failure or line break could result in fuel release.

Fuel Gas Scrubber -Instantaneous fire would be significant but would rapidly diminish as the wells’ SDVsactivate..

Lightning strike or human error (hot work, smoking, etc.)

Dump valve failure or line break

Test Separator - Significant fire until pressure bleeds down from the wells SDVs

POTENTIALIGNITION SOURCES

POTENTIAL FAILURESEQUIPMENT / POTENTIAL SEVERITY

Hazard Assessment

Radiant heat calculationsPrepared to determine how heat from flares and other fires might hinder the escape or firefighting activities of personnelCommonly use the Buettner Pain ScaleHeat radii drawn around each liquid hydrocarbon-bearing vesselTry to draw escape routes away from high heat areas

Hazard Assessment

MMS’ Fire Prevention and Control Systems Evaluation Sheet (Matrix)

Used to quantify riskAssigns point values to hazards and offsetsThe higher the point total the betterNot currently available to lessees

Human Factors Assessment

Fire training of personnelHow often?Curriculum?How much is hands on?How much is classroom?

Evacuation Assessment

Even unmanned platforms must have plans for evacuation of personnel

Available escape apparatus must be thoroughly evaluated based on equipment placement, escape routes and radiant heat informationOften we recommend the placement of additional escape ropes, life floats, etc. for corners that working personnel may be trapped in

Alternative Protection Assessment

A detailed review of the proposed chemical-only system must be made

Must comply with USCG and API RP 14G size, type and placement requirementsSystem should be beefed up to offset any added risk

Example: One 350 lb fire extinguisher will offset one compressor (Matrix)

Conclusion of Risk Assessment

This is where you make your most persuasive arguments for a chemical system

Fire extinguisher placement meets or exceeds USCG and MMS standardsPersonnel are only trained & expected to fight incipient level firesEtc.

Risk Assessment Future

Future PossibilitiesMMS may issue an additional NTL which will apply to existing (pre-NTL) structures. Chemical-only approvals will likely be handled in one of two ways:

Blanket suspension of approvals for certain classes of structures with a deadline for applying for approval under the new risk assessment criteria, orMMS will notify the operator of any structures for which they are suspending existing approvals.

Questions?Questions?

Kenneth J. SmithKenneth J. SmithJ. Connor Consulting, Inc.J. Connor Consulting, Inc.281.578.3388281.578.3388kenneth.smith@jccteam.comkenneth.smith@jccteam.comwww.jccteam.comwww.jccteam.com

Tom Dearing

Thermal Designs

Passive Fire Protection Methods for Marine Structures


For further information please contact:Tom DearingThermal DesignsTelephone: +1 713 433 8110E-mail: [email protected]

The Use of Passive Fire Protection To Protect Marine Structures and Systems

By:T.H. Dearing PE CSP

PresidentThermal Designs, Inc.

Houston, Texas U.S.A. / Bath, England / Edmonton,Canada001-713-433-8110www.tdius.com

Passive Fire Protection (PFP) means insulating systems designed to deter heat transfer for a period of time from a fire to a structure or component being protected. PFP do not require any external power or interaction of humans to provide the desired protection.

PASSIVE FIREPROOFING MATERIALS

Objective of Fireproofing

• Allow for safe egress of inhabitants• Allow for safe access for Fire Fighters• Protect the structure from collapse• To do no harm to existing structural materials and systems• Preserve Assets

PFP’s are typically:

• Mineral based - rock wool, ceramic fiber, cementatious• Organic Resin based - intumescent coatings, mastics• Composites

Typically used in conjunction with “active” fire systemsto provide desired protection levels

Brief History of Fire Rating

•ASTM E-119•UL 263•BS 476, Part 21•ISO 834

Fire conditions simulating cellulosic fire- UL 17091984 UL “Rapid Rise Fire Test of Protection Materials for Structural Steel”

- ASTM E-84, UL-723Is conducted to determine flame spread and smoke generation

- Jet Fire TestOffshore Technology Report OT195 634

* There is no currently recognized standard jet fire test although Lloyds, DNV are issuing letters of compliance.

Structural Fire Protection

- When exposed to fire all commonly used structural materials losesome of their strength. This relationship is a direct function of:

1. The amount of energy exposure (heat flux)2. Time3. Mass of material4. Any mitigation systems

Example:- Cement cracks, spalls and loses integrity- Wood depletes by charring- Steel loses its load bearing capacity (75% @ 538°C or 1000°F)

* Ratings on steel are defined as number of hours exposure to firewhile maintaining steel temperatures below 1000°F

Key Protection Concepts

- What are you trying to protect?Structural PFP typically seeks to prevent collapseof weight bearing structures and process systems.Loss or collapse of these would cause further damageby their collapse and would GREATLY add to thefuel load due to loss of containment of processsystems.PFP materials are provided to assure time to instituteemergency operations and/or safe evacuation of the area.

DEFINING THE NEED FOR PFP

Define Fire Hazard

Define / Calculate Thermal Response

Predict Failure Times

Consequence Analysis of System Failures

Identify Protection Needs

Define Performance Criteria for PFP

Verify Performance Claims

Key Protection Concepts- Protection to achieve some standard of performance or to achieve some

desired outcome

* Note: UL1709 or BS476 mostrecognized test standardrepresentative of a rapid risehydrocarbon pool fire indepth.Most representative of realworld scenario.


Critical Temperature - based on one of the following:

• Collapse - The temperature at which a structural member loses its load bearingcapacity. Steel loses about 75% of its strength at 538˚C. Steelbecomes elastic at 1000˚F. For heavily loaded structuralcomponents, 400˚C has unofficially been adopted as a standard.

• Insulation (for offshore and marine) - Although a rating (eg. A-60 or H-90) maybe imposed by a designer or statutory requirement, the insulationcriteria is always the same. the back face temperature shall notexceed an average temperature rise of 139˚C within the designated time period nor at any one point exceed a temperaturerise of 180˚C.

• Hazardous process requirements - the temperature depends on the vessel wallthickness, construction details, and contents.


How do you ensure PFP’s achieve the performance criteria desired ?


Key Concept - The rate of heat transfer over PFPmedium over time.

• Thickness of PFP is defined by assumption of heat flux, time,heat transfer, and material characteristics

• Insulation is not fireproofing! Refractory is not fireproofing!

Key PFP Protection Considerations

• Corrosion Resistance• Real estate requirements (3 dimensional footprint)• Weight• Blast Resistance• Vibration resistance (earthquake)• Maintenance / Operation• Weatherability• Accessibility• Compatibility• Proven performance (Remember Laws of Physics)• Operating Environment• Total Installed Cost• Maintenance repair cost

There is no universal PFP

Each PFP family has strengths and weaknesses

- Cementatious products- Fibrous- Composites- Intumescents

CEMENTATIOUS+

- Hard and Durable- Inexpensive material cost- Easy to install and repair

_- Heavy- Installation costs are high- Will spall during a fire- Risk of hidden corrosion. Weather proofing is a necessity.

FIBROUS

+- Attractive appearance- Ease of installation- No special surface preparation required- Lightweight

_

- Not suited for exterior use due to poor weatheringcharacteristics

- Will hold moisture- Can be blown off by blast overpressure

* Mineral Wool rated to 850°C (1560°F)Ceramic Fiber rated to 1150°C (2100°F)

INTUMESCENTSMastics+- Hard, Durable- Corrosion Resistance- Resistant to abrasion, impact, vibration, and blast

-- Expensive- Surface preparation needed- Smoke generation precludes use indoors

Films (paints)+

- Inexpensive- Easy to apply- Wide range of colors

-- Limited to combustible

COMPOSITEMade from different fire resistant classes like steel sandwichedbetween ceramic fibers or gypsum. Generally banded to structural members or boxed around object to be protected.

+- Perform well in certain applications

_

- Heavy- Installation sensitive- Surface preparation required- Labor intensive installation- real estate requirements

Where are PFP typically used?• Key weight bearing structures• Quarters, TSR’s, Control Room, Egress Paths• Key riser isolation valves• Riser legs• Key process isolation actuators and valves• Key power, control, and safety circuits• Instrument, electrical, piping wall and bulkhead openings• Riser tensioners• Power stations• Vessel skirts, pipe rack supports• Anywhere defined by hazard analysis

Using Intumescent Epoxies to Protect Critical ControlSystems for High Value Equipment in Hazardous

Environments.

Intumescence is a complex chemical process in which, under theheat of flame, the solid coating is converted into highly viscousliquid. Simultaneously, endothermic reactions are initiated thatresult in the release of inert gases with low thermal conductivity.These gases are trapped inside the viscous fluid where cross-linkingreactions take place between the polymer chains. The result is the expansion or foaming of the coating, sometimes up to 8:1, to forma low density, carbonaceous insulating char. This layer of char absorbsa large part of the heat generated by the fire thus maintaining the protected structures temperature within the critical limit establishedfor the specified time. The coating continues to react in a sacrificialmanner until all of its components are used up. Consequently, therating or fitness for service is dependant on the operating parameterstemperature rating and the material thickness.

Why is Protection of Critical Control Systems DifferentThan Protection for Structural Systems?

1. No Defined or Recognized Performance Criteria- Typically most severe criteria selected

(either UL 1709 or BS 476)- Times range 15-30 minutes

2. Critical temperatures for failure vastly different- Steel - 400˚C- Electrical Systems - 105˚C <approximate>

* Heat Transfer across the media -vs- time is key issue

Why Protect Critical Control Systems?

Control is the Objective

- Minimize fuel loads by isolating fuel sources andde-inventorying or depressurizing systems. (The sizeof the fire and the amount of damage is directly relatedto the surface area of the fuel available.)

- The Key Loss Control Methodology and RiskAbatement Strategy is isolation and reduction of energy sources.

- “Keep the Genie in the Bottle” Fail safe valves and logic do not replace control

What fails in Emergency Control Systems and How Fastis Failure?

Power and Signal cables located in the hazard zone and exposed tofire fail almost immediately.

- Water spray systems not effective(No longer recommended by API 2030)

Radiant heat exposure affects critical systems out of the fire zonejeopardizing their availability for emergency operation. Anticipatedfire spread and heat load is an inexact science and therefore must be planned for.

What types of Critical Control Systems are at Risk?

- Electric, pneumatics, hydraulic actuators• Limit switches, bleed valves, positioners, controls associated

with actuators• Actuator mounting brackets, gearboxes• Declutching systems

- Soft seal valves used for isolation- Energy circuits (electric, pneumatic, hydraulic)- Control circuits- Local control station- Remote control station- Critical control cables in pipe/cable rack- Process control valves in dual use for EIS- Plastic sprinkler piping- PLC controllers and analyzers in the fire zone

Any part of an Emergency Control System that is locatedin the fire zone is subject to failure from flame or radiant heat and thereby the benefits of other protected componentsis negated.

Why Molded Intumescent Epoxy PFPs are the best solution forprotection of critical control systems ?

- People proof design always available for service- Low K value of K-Mass® in virgin state dissipates heat- Low real estate requirement- Low weight requirement- High corrosion resistance- Easily accessible for operation or maintenance- Lowest total installed cost- Best expected working life

The K-MASS Solution:

- Proprietary Formulation of moldable intumescent epoxy

- Molded design matching OEM appearance

- Engineered design confirmed by fire test

- Each design concept for all worldwide brands tested toUL 1709 for 30 minutes and includes operation of devicethroughout test

- 26 year old company with manufacturing in Houston,Bath, and Edmonton. We Cover the World.

- Extensive worldwide client list

®

Mold design objective is to minimize heat transfer acrossPFP so as to maintain operability of Emergency Control Device.

Protecting Critical Control Systems is not an exact science and requires extensive testing to achieve designcriteria and performance.

* TDI has an extensive history working withthe world’s major manufacturing companies to protecttheir assets exposed in hazardous environments worldwide.

Representative Internal Fire Test Temperatures

Figure 12A. Temperatures at Three Locations inside

Biffi Icon 2000-020 UL1709 Fire Tested January 25, 2002

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

0 5 10 15 20 25 30

Time, minutes

Tem

per

atu

re, C Temperature inside Electronics Cover

Temperature in Gearcase

Temperature inside Terminal Cover

Figure 11AFlame Temeratures during Biffi Icon 2000-020

Fire Test on January 25, 2002.

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

0 5 10 15 20 25 30

Time (minutes)

Tem

pera

ture

C

Flame#1

Flame#2

Thermal Designs, Inc.5352 Prudence Street

Houston, Texas U.S.A. 77045Tel.(001)713-433-8110Fax (001)713-433-5227E-mail: [email protected]

Thermal Designs, U.K. Ltd.Unit 5A Fiveways Industrial Estate

Corsham, WiltshireUnited Kingdom SN 13 9RG

Tel.(44)01225-811141Fax (44)01225-811447

Email: [email protected]

www.www.tdiustdius.com.com

Fadi Hamdan

Steel Construction Institute

Overview of FABIG Information on Fire Protection for Offshore


For further information please contact:Fadi HamdanSteel Construction InstituteTelephone: +44 (0) 1344 623 345E-mail: [email protected]

www.fabig.com www.fabig.com

Fire and BlastFire and BlastInformation Information GroupGroup

Fadi Hamdan (Steel Construction Institute)FABIG TECHNICAL MEETING on Fire Resistant

Design for Offshore Structures – Overview of FABIG Information on Fire Protection for Offshore, 15

October, Houston, Texas, USA

SYNOPSISSYNOPSIS

Overview of FABIGDemonstrate background & depth of FABIG knowledge, and provide specific information of design procedures Future Guidance

FABIG: The Fire and FABIG: The Fire and Blast Information GroupBlast Information Group

International, independent member-based groupFormed in 1992 after a major research project in the wake of the Piper Alpha disasterMembers from all industry sectors

FABIG’s MissionFABIG’s Mission

To promote the protection of life, property and the environment through the development and sharing of expert knowledge on hydrocarbon fires and explosions

FABIG Members by FABIG Members by Industry SectorIndustry Sector

6

165

7

18

Oil CompaniesUniversities / ResearchConsultantsManufacturersCertifier / Regulator

Limited organised design guidance for blast and fire applied to offshore installationsGeneral practice assumed 0.5 bar (50 kN/m2) as maximum blast overpressureNo guidance on passive fire protection, only fire ratings for dividing walls

Before the IGNBefore the IGN

Assist the Industry in the move away from a prescriptive approachProvide guidance on approaches that may be used to demonstrate that following an incident:

Background & Background & Objectives of the IGNObjectives of the IGN

Sufficient structural integrity is available to theTR, escape routes, embarkation points andlifeboats to minimise exposure for personnel

Background & Background & Objectives of the IGNObjectives of the IGN

Phase 1 delivered 26 reports and the IGNIGN issued in January 1992 based on the then current knowledgeRecognition that the Guidance was INTERIM because of:

Rapidly changing knowledgeIntroduction of new

legislation

Introduction to QRADesign guidance for explosion resistance

Scenarios, blast loads, layouts, structural resistance

Design guidance for fire resistanceScenarios, heat flux loads, temperatures, protection systems, response

Integrated design strategy for explosion and fire

Areas coveredAreas covered Areas CoveredAreas Covered

Design Procedures

Example designprocedure for minimisingrisk to personnel fromexplosion and fire events

Areas CoveredAreas CoveredExample: Fire Response

Equipment Loading

Guidance given on the...

- Reduction in yield stress

- Reduction in Young’s modulus (stiffness)

.... under elevated temperature

Areas Covered Areas Covered -- Fire Fire Design GuidanceDesign Guidance

Stiffness and strength of carbon steel

at elevated temperature

Stress-strain relationship for steel at elevated temperature (EC3)

Examples of North Examples of North Sea Projects which Sea Projects which used the IGN & used the IGN & TNsTNs

Andrew (BP)Liverpool Bay (Hamilton Oil Co.)Armada (BG plc)Shearwater (Shell)Britannia (Chevron/Conoco)ETAP (BP)Schiehallion (BP)

UpdatesUpdatesThe IGN were recognised as interimThe Fire and Blast Information Group (FABIG) was established in 1992One of the aims of FABIG is to:

Maintain and support the IGN, preparingand distributing amendments and newissues as required.

UpdatesUpdates

•Issued an amendment to IGN (April 93)•Issued 36 Newsletters•Arranged and issued reviews of 38 Technical Meetings•Issued 7 Technical Notes to update available guidance

Updates Updates –– The The Technical Notes Technical Notes covercover

Fire resistant design of offshore topside structuresExplosion mitigation systemsUse of ultimate strength techniques for fire resistant design of offshore structuresExplosion resistant design of offshore structuresDesign guidelines for stainless steel blast walls

1993

1994

1995

1996

1999

Updates Updates –– The The Technical Notes coverTechnical Notes cover

Design guide for steel at elevated temperatures and high strain ratesSimplified methods for analysis of response to explosion loading

2001

2002

Fire resistant design guidelines in FABIG Technical Notes

Background & depth of FABIG Background & depth of FABIG knowledge knowledge –– FABIG Technical FABIG Technical Notes Notes -- Fire Resistant DesignFire Resistant Design

Update to IGNSection 4.4: Determination of component temperaturesSection 4.6: Response to Fire effectsExamples on all aspects of fire resistant design


Procedures for Fire Design

• Heat flux • Component temperature • Material properties • Critical structural members• Acceptance criteria• Methods of Analysis• Code checks


Defining Fire Scenarios

Fire diameterFlame lengthDurationFuel typeVentilationPool v.s. jet fires

Step 1: Fire Scenarios & heat flux loadingSpecific scenarios better


Fire scenariosDurationIntensityVariationWindLocation

Heat balance equationεqir + qic = qre-rad + qconv + qcond


Procedures to calculate heat flux loading:

1. Flame length 2. Discretise points along flame3. Determine heat flux per point4. Determine Variation w. angle5. Sum contribution of points

Step 1: Fire Scenarios & heat flux loading

Example


Step 1: Fire Scenarios & heat flux loading


High Hp+Low A=Fast Heating

Low Hp+High A=Slow Heating

Step 2: Component temperatures

Assumptionsfunction only of surface area, thickness and incident heat flux

All exposed surfaces receive the incident heat flux and have the same insulation

Rate of temp of steel rise is a function of Hp/A ratio

Simplified Hp/A methodSection factors

Equation for


Hp/A MethodHeat flux of 100kw/m2

Circular hollow cross-section Do = 323mm, t = 20mm25mm protection

Step 2: Component temperatures –Example

Ins

Unins

300 °C

940 °C

2 hours

20 min


reduce σy

reduce EIncrease deflections

Buckling problems

100EC200EC300EC400EC500EC600EC700EC

50 1 2 3 4

350

300

250

200

150

100

50

0

Strain (%)Step 3: Structuralresponse Effect of Fire on member failure


σσLL

ε

σσuu

σσFCFC

σ

Structural configurationRedundancy

Member surface areaTime to reach temperature T

sizeCapacity

b/tDuctility

ParameterCharacteristic

Effect of Fire on global failure

Step 3: Structuralresponse


Procedures for Fire Design

Heat flux Component temperatureMaterial properties Critical structural membersAcceptance criteriaMethods of AnalysisCode checks


Material properties:•Advanced analysis•Code checks


0

100

200

300

400

0 1 2 3 4 5Strain %

Stre

ss N

/mm

2

20 C 200 C 400 C 600 C

0.5% 2.0% 5.0%

Data for code checks


00.10.20.30.40.50.60.70.80.9

1

0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800

Temperature OC

Redu

ctio

n fa

ctor

Effective yield strength

Slope of elastic range

Proportional limit

Data for code checks


0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

1.2

0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700Temperature OC

Stre

ngth

Fac

tor

0.5%1.0%1.5%2.0%3.0%5.0%


Strain ε

α

Stressσ

θf y,

p, θf

ε p, θ ε θu,ε θε θy, t,

E = tan θa, α


Data for advancedanalysis


S235, S275, S355 and S460S355M, S420M and S460M355EMZ and 450EMZ1.4301 (304) and 1.4404 (316)1.4462 (2205) and 1.4362 (2304)Piping and pressure vessel steels


Acceptance criteriaDepends on method of analysisStrength:

Temperature, strain, deformationbeams, columns, tension members

Collapse: deformationResidual strengthRe-distribution, load paths…

0.5%

0.5%

1.5%

tension

columns

beams

Strain Limits

Background & depth of FABIG Background & depth of FABIG knowledge knowledge –– FABIG Technical FABIG Technical Notes Notes -- Fire Resistant DesignFire Resistant DesignMember based methods1. Limiting temperature method2. Code check methods

Non linear analysis1. Simple: repeated linear analysis,

changing model as members fail2. Advanced FE to get progressive

collapse


FlexureCompression

Examples


TN Example: Different Simplified methods Methods of Thermal response Analysis

300°C580/595°CSimple Nonlinear analysis

535°C595°CBS5950: Part 8

540°C580°CAISC permissible stress

400°C400°C400°CTemperature method

Compression ProblemFlexure problemAnalysis method


Examples for determining heat flux loading & component temperatures

Heating of steel remote from fire sourceHeat flux variation with location relative to fireConduction along member (flux, temperature & time)Manual application of heat balance equationsComputer solution of heat balance equations & Hp/A methodStructural response of walkway & strengthening

Background & depth of FABIG Background & depth of FABIG knowledge knowledge -- ConclusionsConclusions

• The IGN and the FABIG updates have provided much needed direction

• The IGN are referred to in ISO 13819 & API Topsides Design and are widely used

• Gaps exist as discussed and they should be addressed in future Technical Notes

Background & depth of FABIG Background & depth of FABIG knowledge knowledge -- ConclusionsConclusions

Piping response to fires and explosionsHuman FactorsMethods for calculating fire loadingSimplified methods for explosions & fire

In particular, guidance should address:

www.fabig.comwww.fabig.com

Fire and BlastFire and BlastInformation Information GroupGroup

… promoting the protection of life, property and the environment through

the sharing of expert knowledge …

DISCUSSION


FABIG DISCUSSION

Presented below is a summary of the questions addressed to each speaker at the recent FABIG Technical Meeting on Fire Resistant Design for Offshore Structures. Presentation 1: Fire Hazard Assessment John Alderman, Risk, Reliability & Safety Engineering Q. What is the cost of assessment versus passive fire protection (PFP) system savings, which may result from the assessment results? A. Assessment if $10-30k depending on size and complexity. Savings in PFP can be hundreds of thousands of dollars. Q. How do you select the controlling or design scenario? A. Based on experience, this is limited to a 2” leak because scenarios larger than this have a low enough frequency to preclude producing the highest risk, even though the consequence if higher. Q. Do detailed fire analysis, conducted late in the design, yield significantly different results than the preliminary, simplified analysis? A. Not if the preliminary assessment is done properly with an experience view of potential scenarios and consequences. Q. Is a cost-benefit analysis feasible or appropriate? A. Not typically because the answer is usually very evident but perhaps this should be done. It will require quantitative risk assessment to develop quantifiable benefits. Q. Are there gaps in the research for fire hazard assessment? A. Yes such as a.) Where can fireproofing be stopped? b.) Where should water deluge be used? Not sure if research can be done economically. Requirements/needs have not been established. Q. How are simultaneous blowdown calculations done in the early assessments? A. Simplifications are made and results should be conservative compared with the more detailed analysis. Presentation 2: Risk Based PFP Using New Fire Tools, Kameleon-FAHTS-USFOS John Baik, Det Norske Veritas Q. Do you choose the highest probability leak source or highest consequence? A. For QRA we select representative scenarios which produce consequences on the upper end of expected results. We select several scenarios with different probabilities and combine them to calculate the total risk. For PFP design, we select scenarios (for dimensioning) that give the total risk below the risk tolerance criteria. This is a typical risk based approach. Q. Is escalation of the scenario (to involve other sources) included in the analysis? A. Not automatically but can be included. The escalation probability is obtained with higher accuracy than traditional methods.

FABIG DISCUSSION

Q. How do you determine how much fuel is consumed? A. For oil pool fires, all that can be evaporated should be included in the calculation. For gas jet fires, the total amount of gas in the segment minus what is blown down is assumed to burn. The transient development is important. Q. Are the analysis models proprietary and have they been validated? A. Yes they are proprietary and they have been validated to test data (Ref: “Benchmark Testing of Kameleon Fireex” Computit report no. R0114, 2001. Open report). Q. How are deluge effects modeled in the analysis? A. Incorporated into the CFD formulation. Extinguishing effects as a function of the droplet size is modeled directly. The droplets are released from nozzles and modeled as evaporating particles. It is most relevant for pool fires. Can be applied in each CFD fire scenario and effect of deluge will be directly incorporated into the analysis results. Q. Does the MMS agree with or require this detailed CFD approach to fire analysis? A. MMS doesn’t require this approach. Q. Are 3-D geometry models generally available for incorporation into the model? A. Yes in most cases. Q. How do you determine scenario size? A. We usually use 3 or 4 different hole sizes in QRA. The leak rates and durations are calculated using DNV’s proprietary software Neptune. Neptune can calculate leak rate and duration for different cases such as success or failure of isolation and blow down. Q. Is there any data on the increased leak frequency for piping with PFP? A. No. Statoil is working on a way to estimate this. Q. How are probabilities of leaks or event established? A. With historical databases. Presentation 3: Firefighting Risk Assessments - Lessons Learned Ken Smith, J. Connor Consulting Q. How long does it take to get MMS approval? A. Can vary form 1 week to 1 month depending on complexity. Q. What percent is rejected in first draft? A. About 20% but varies. Usually due to lack of adequate equipment in the layout. Q. How have the requirements changed? A. The required analysis has changed somewhat as MMS has reviewed assessment plans and additional items now have to be addressed.

DELEGATES FABIG

Fire Resistant Design for Offshore Structures – Registered Delegates

John Alderman Risk, Reliability and Safety Engineering

John Baik Det Norske Veritas

Darrell Barker ABS Consulting

Gareth Burton ABS Consulting

Paul Ceeney Conoco Magnolia

Jim Coffey Thermal Designs

Tom Dearing Thermal Designs

Ed Draper Century Dynamics

Stanley Fan Marine Engineering Systems

Peter Fletcher Granherne Inc

Sharma Gaurav Granherne Inc

Fadi Hamdan Steel Construction Institute

Bob Major ABS Consulting

Ann Meek Atkins

Carol Newell ABS Consulting

Frank Puskar ABS Consulting

Harvey Schulz Baker Engineering and Risk Consultants

Carlos Serna ABS Consulting

Robert Shepherd ABS Consulting

Tom Siddall SBM-Imodco

Steve Simoni Atkins

Ken Smith J. Connor Consulting

Paul Versowsky ChevronTexaco

Mark Whitney Analytical and Computational Engineering

Documents

TMR36_Oct2003_Fire Resistant Design for Offshore Structures(USA)