To Explain Political Processes - Charles Tilly

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To Explain Political ProcessesAuthor(s): Charles TillyReviewed work(s):Source: American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 100, No. 6 (May, 1995), pp. 1594-1610Published by: The University of Chicago PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2782682 .

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To Explain Political Processes1CharlesTillyNew Schoolfor Social Research

Analysts f arge-scale oliticalprocesses requentlynvoke nvari-ant models that feature elf-containednd self-motivatingocialunits.Few actual political rocesses onform o such models.Revo-lutions provide an important xample of such reasoning nd ofits pitfalls. ettermodelsrest nplausibleontologies, pecify ieldsof variation for the phenomena n question,reconstruct ausalsequences, and concentrate xplanation n links within hosese-quences.

Asked to explainparticular nstances f vigilante iolence, ocial move-ments, itizenship, ars, nationalism,r transformationfstates, ociol-ogists earch almost nstinctivelyorgeneral, nvariantmodels of thosephenomena o which hey an assimilate he cases at hand. Reflectingnwhythedisintegrationf theSoviet Unionand itsWarsawPact allies sosurprisedWestern nalysts, ociologistsmmediately onder: ntowhatgeneralcategory f recurrentvents shouldtheyhave put the EasternEuropean experiencefthe1980s?Does itbelong orevolution, ational-ism,democratization,oliticalmodernization,mperial isintegration,rsomething uite different?ociologists upposethat ftheyhad recog-nized the categorywhen the processbegan theywould have been abletopredicttsoutcome.S. N. Eisenstadt1992, p. 21), for xample,places the breakdowns fcommunistegimesnparallelwithother evolutions: Aretheserevolu-tions greatrevolutions'-theEnglishcivilwar, theAmerican,French,Russian, and Chineserevolutions-which nmanyways ushered nmo-dernitynd created hemodern olitical rder?Arethey ikely o lead-aftera possiblyturbulent eriodof transition-to a relatively tableworldofmodernity, ith iberal constitutionalismeralding ome kindof end ofhistory'? r do they ell us somethingf the vicissitudes ndfragilitiesfmodernity,ven of democratic-constitutionalegimes?"1Correspondenceaybe addressedoCharles illy, enteror tudiesfSocialChange, ew choolor ocial esearch,4Universitylace,NewYork,NewYork10003-4520.? 1995 yTheUniversityfChicago. llrightseserved.0002-9602/95/10006-0007$01501594 AJS Volume100Number6 (May 1995): 1594-1610


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Symposium: illyEisenstadtrepliesthatsomepart of each of thesequestions s true.The Eastern European transitions ualify s revolutions, e says, but

unlike theirpredecessors hey et theirfaces against,rather han for,modernity.n thevery rocess f dentifyingifferences,isenstadt ein-forces he idea that a usefulmodel of revolution pecifies imilarities,invariant eneral rocesses. here he oins themajorityfother nalysts.As Eisenstadt oes, moreover, ociologists sually ssumethat hepro-cesses in questionoccur within self-containedocial units-societies,states, aggrieved populations, or something f the sort-in a self-propelledway. They assume coherent, urablemonadsrather hancon-tingent, ransitoryonnections mong ocially onstructeddentities.Wecanhardly lame them ort; we veterans aught hem o do it ngraduateschool,because that s also whatwe learned to do in graduateschoolyears earlier.We learnedand in turn taughta practiceof this sort:(1) assume a coherent, urable, elf-propellingocialunit; 2) attributegeneral ondition rprocess o thatunit; 3) invoke r nvent n invariantmodelofthat condition r process; 4) explain thebehaviorof theuniton the basis of tsconformityo that nvariantmodel.The most gregious xamples f nvarianthinkingppear ncompara-tive-historicalnalyseswherenations, states,or societies erve as theobjectsofcomparison. venmethodologicalndividualistsrequentlyol-low the samelogic, albeiton a smaller cale. Theymodel thenecessary/sufficientonditions nderwhich rationaldecisionmaker or, n otherversions, he follower f a unitary ision, llusion,or impulse)wouldtakestepsto create state, tart war, rebel, ecede,vote, oin a socialmovement, rcarry n someotherwell-definedoliticalperformance.Similar easoning ppears frequentlyn studies fnationalism, emoc-ratization, he disintegrationf empires, ocialmovements, ransforma-tions fstates,wars, revolutions,nd otherarge-scale oliticalphenom-ena. In the case of nationalism, available theories range fromprimordialistoconstructivist,rom ealist osubjectivist, uta surpris-ing proportion f them laim not to accountfor hevariable degreesorqualitiesofnationalism ut toplacemostor all nationalismsnthesamebox (forconvenient urveys, ee Anderson1991; Comaroff nd Stern1993; Connor 1987; Feschbach 1987; Gellner 1983; Haas 1986; Hobs-bawm 1990; Kearney 1991;Lerner1991;Lowi 1992;Lowy 1989; Segal1988;Williams1989).The study f ocial movements ffersmorepromis-ing recenttrends, ince a numberof scholars have taken to relatingvariationn theorganizationfmovementsystematicallyodifferencesand fluctuationsnpolitical pportunitytructuree.g.,Duyvendak 1994;Giugni nd Kriesi1990; Koopmans 1993;Kriesi1993;Tarrow1993).Yeteven nthis rea much heorizingasproceeded s if ll social movementsfell nto usttwo nternally omogeneous ategories: ld and new Cohen

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AmericanJournal f Sociology1985; Diani 1992; Eyerman and Jamison 1991; Mayer 1991; Melucci1985, 1989).

In analyses f democratizationnd stateformation,imilar implifica-tionsprevail for urveys, ee Alker1992; Barkey nd Parikh1991;Brat-ton 1989; Caporaso 1989; Dahl 1989; Diamond and Marks 1992; DiPalma 1990; Gurr 1988; Gurr,Jaggers,ndMoore 1990;Hall and Iken-berry 989; Held 1987; Kirby nd Ward 1991; Krasner 1984; Lee 1988;Mann 1990; Mitchell 1991; O'Donnell and Schmitter 986; Poggi 1990;Rueschemeyer,tephens, nd Stephens1992; Schmitternd Karl 1991).Most and Starrhave longsinceofferedhesame kindof complaint boutstudies fwar (1983; see also Levy 1989; Starr1994). n short, nvariantmodels oncerningelf-motivatingocial units ontinue o wind ikehon-eysuckle hroughhestudy f arge-scale oliticalprocesses.If it is examined losely, he standardpracticemakes ittle ense.Co-herent, urable, self-propellingocial units-monads-occupy a greatdeal of political heory ut noneof politicalreality.Ostensiblegeneralconditionsuchas revolution, ationalism,rwaralwaysturn utto fallnot at a singlepointbut to stretch long a whole range ofpositions nsome ntersectinget of continua.The employmentf nvariantmodels,furthermore,ssumes a politicalworld n which whole structures ndsequencesrepeat hemselvesime fter ime nessentiallyhe sameform.That would be a convenientworldfor heorists, ut t does notexist.Although he assumption f sharplybounded, self-motivatingocialunitsdeserves qual criticism,WilliamH. Sewell, Jr. 1992),MargaretSomers 1992),HarrisonWhite 1992),and others averecentlyriticizedmonadicthinkingo effectivelyhat-however much I disagreewithsome of their roposedremedies-I have little o add to their ritiques.Let me thereforeoncentrate ereon the assumption f nvariant ondi-tions nd processes.The general tructure uns ike this:1. AllA's have characteristics , Y, and Z.2. CaseotisanA.3. Therefore xhas characteristics, Y, and Z.A can translate s "revolution, "nationalism," war," or somethingelse, whileX, Y, and Z can constitute ecessary onditions, ufficientconditions, tandard equences, orrelates,rconsequences.A statementinthisform an easilyreduce o a definition, erely ffirminghatthereexists setofinstances haringproperties , Y, and Z. The statementneed not reduce o a definition,owever, incethe argumentan readilyincorporateausal, sequential, r transactionalinks mong he lements.The argument oes notassert hat ll instances fA are identical,but tdoes assert hatthey hare essentialproperties etting hemoff rom llcases ofnon-A; hose ssential niversalsmark nysuch modelas invari-1596


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Symposium: illyant. Analystsoften rrive at this sort of argument hrough mpiricalcomparison fcases ox,f,F, and so on, searching or hecases' commonproperties hatqualify hem ll as A's. In the domainof arge-scale oli-tics, at least,suchreasoning o badlydescribeswhatactuallyoccurs asto hinder ociological nalysis."Invariant" does not equal "general." Laws concerningvariationsometimes overa verygeneral ange.For an example, onsiderBoyle'slaw: at a given emperaturehepressure fa certainmass ofconfined asvaries nverselywith ts volume.Althoughwe have no well-establishedsociological aws with the eleganceof Boyle's formulation, road androbust mpirical eneralizationsoncerning ariation-for example, hatover argepopulations nfantmortalityeclines s literacy ises-aboundin differentealmsofsocial life. am not challenging hepossibility fmoreexplicitly ausal laws of extremely eneral cope, just so long asthey tipulate ariation. am insteadchallenginghe common, foftenimplicit, laim for ssential, nvariant niversals.Such claims appear frequentlyn macrosociology. ake the case ofrevolutionsforhelpful eviews, ee Berejikian 1992; Boswell 1989; De-Fronzo 1991; Dunn 1989; Goodwinand Skocpol 1989; Hobsbawm 1986;Keddie 1992; Kimmel 1990; Knight 1992; Outram 1992; Rice 1990;Schutzand Slater1990; Taylor 1984; Wickham-Crowley991;Zimmer-man 1983). Generations fscholarshave pursuedthechimera f an in-variantgeneralmodelof revolution. ixationon invariantmodelsgivesriseto a common ut ogically eculiar ociological erformance e maycall "improvinghe model." t consists f 1) outlining widely cceptedmodel of phenomenon , (2) identifyingn instance fA thatfailsto fitthe model n one or moreways, 3) modifyinghe model so that tnowaccommodates hepreviously xceptional nstance s well as those n-stances hat lreadybelonged o ts domain.Most often he crucialmodi-fication especifies conditionpostulated s necessary n the model'spreviousversion.Thus improvinghemodelexpandstheclaimed scopeofthe lleged nvariance. he procedurespeculiarbothbecause tmakesimplausible llegations f nvariance nd becauseitattenuateswhateverempirical rasp hepreviousmodel ttained.Yet as a reviewer or rofes-sional ournals read a half-dozen rafts achyearthatfollowust suchreasoning.Similarreasoningmotivateswhole books. WhenFarideh Farhi com-pares the Iranian and Nicaraguanrevolutionshatbegan in 1979, forexample,she explicitlyets up the analysisas an extension f ThedaSkocpol'sStates and Social Revolutions n thegrounds hatSkocpol'sbook is "perhapsthemostcomprehensivettempt o bring ogetherhenew concerns bouttheroleof the tate, he tructurefpeasantcommu-nities, nd theroleof nternationalactorsnunderstandingheprocesses

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AmericanJournal f Sociologyand outcomesof revolutions" Farhi 1990, p. 5). Her methodologicaldeclarationruns thisway: "The essence of comparativehistorys tomaintain heparticularityf each case while ccepting hat ach particu-larity s shaped by general orces perating t the ocietalor global evel.Accordingly, he intentions to expose these forces s they mpingeonquite specific nd unique circumstancesn the hope of shedding ight nhistorical pecificitiess well as the changing tructuresn the largerworld-historicalontext hatmake contemporaryevolutions ot utterlyunlike classic' revolutions ut also not totally imilarto them" Farhi1990, p. 2). Thus all revolutions hare attributes , Y, and Z, even iftheydifferwithrespect o a great manyother ttributes; n effectiveanalysis ombines pecificationf universalswith numeration fpartic-ulars.True to the challenge,Farhi works with a checklist rawn directlyfromSkocpol: conditions avoring lass coalitions gainst the regime,circumstances romotinghe mobilization f thosecoalitions orrevolu-tionary ction,factorsmaking he statevulnerable o attack, nd so on.Almost nexorably, his eads her to proposeone-for-oneubstitutes orthefactors kocpol emphasized-for example,Farhi offershe connect-edness and proximityopowerofcapitalcities s a substitute orSkoc-pol's solidarity fpeasant villages. She finally eeks to build a bridgefrom kocpol'smodeltoherown by a) showinghowthe worlddevelop-ment fcapitalism as altered lass structuresince hetimes f Skocpol'srevolutions nd (b) attributing ore mportance o ideology, ncludingreligious elief, hanSkocpolwas ready o concede n 1979.Such an analysisaims to generalize kocpol'smodel rather han toextract romtprinciplesfvariation.But tmisses hemark: hecollaps-ing agrarianbureaucracy verburdened y international ressures ndtheautonomouspeasantcommunitiesligned againsttheir andlords-keystonesfSkocpol'stheory-disappearfrom iew,withtheir eplace-mentsnFarhi'sanalysisbyno means members fthe same causal cate-gories.Thus Farhidrawsuseful uestions rom kocpol,butin pursuitof thosequestions acitly bandonstheefforto generalize n invariantmodelofrevolution.ndeed,shehas no choice;themodel willnot,can-not, generalize hatfar.Another ecent xamplemarks venmoreprecisely heblindalley ntowhich thequestfor nvariantmodels has led analysts f revolution. ntheir xcellent ompilationn ThirdWorldrevolutions, ack Goldstone,Ted Gurr, nd FarrokhMoshiri 1991)offern "analytical ramework"that continues hequestfor nvariance.En route,however, heymaketwo turns that send them n precisely he opposite direction, owardbroadand incessant ariation.In his theoreticalntroduction, oldstone ingles ut a trio f recurrent1598


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Symposium: illycauses forrevolution: Declining tateresources elative o expenses ndthe resources f adversaries, ncreasing lite lienation nd disunity, ndgrowing opular grievances nd autonomy" Goldstoneet al. 1991, p.49). The list echoes Goldstone'sRevolution nd Rebellion n the EarlyModern World,published he same year as the editedvolume,but writ-tenover many previousyears. n that book, Goldstonegives a strongtoneof breakdown o his mostdramatic tatements:

Thecauses frevolutionsnd major ebellionsperatenways hat eemremarkablyimilaro the orceshat uild p to cause arthquakes.hatis, ntheyears eforeuch revolutionrmajor ebellion,ocialpressuresfor hange uild.Yetthe xistingocial ndpoliticaltructuresor ometime esisthangeeven houghressuresnddeformationsay evisible).Suddenly, owever,omeresponse o themounting ressure-a statebankruptcy,regional ebellion-occurs hichweakens hatresistance(like block reakingff long he ault). tthat oint, heres a suddenrelease f he ent-uporcesnd crumblingf he ld ocial tructures-arevolutionr major ebellion. ore oncretely,heScots nd rish ebel-lions n Great ritainn 1637-1641,nd the tate ankruptcynd callingof heEstatesGeneralnFrancen1789,were hemselvesesponsesothemountingocial ndfiscal ressuresnthose ocieties. et these articularevents lso served o unleash argreaterocialpressures, hich ver-whelmedhese tates nd edto revolutions.Goldstone991, . 35)Note severalfeatures f this tatement:tsemphasison suddencollapsein response o long-termhange, ts claimsto generality,ts nsistence nuniformityather han variation.In his firstontributiono Revolutions ftheLate Twentieth entury,Goldstone laimscontinuitynthese erms: In myworkonearlymodernrevolutions, identify hreeconditionswhose conjunction ed to statebreakdown: iscal istress, lite lienation nd conflict,nd a highpoten-

tial formobilizationfthepopulace. Although heparticular orces hatcreatethese conditionsmaybe quitedifferentn contemporaryocietiesthan in earlierones, I believe theseconditions emain centralto thedevelopmentfrevolutionaryrises"Goldstone 991, pp. 37-38). Leap-ing nimbly ast the problem f specifying owan observerwouldknowin advance of a revolution's ctual occurrencewhen thethreebundlesof causes were approaching riticalmass, Goldstone mmediatelyon-cedes that theseconditions maybe produced by a varietyof forces,depending n how they nteractwiththe institutionsnd structuresnparticular ocieties" p. 49). Populationpressure, hatpowerful ropel-lant ofstate breakdown n Goldstone'sRevolution nd Rebellion,nowfizzlesto a forcethat "may have eitherpositiveor negative mpact"(Goldstone t al. 1991, p. 40).Goldstone t al. also proposethreegeneral tagesof revolution: tatecrisis,the struggle orpower,effortst reconstruction. hese stages,

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AmericanJournal f Sociologyhowever, onstitute o verifiable heory; heyfollow autologically romthebook's definitionf revolutions "theforcibleverthrowf a govern-mentfollowed y the reconsolidationf authorityy new groups, ulingthrough ew political and sometimes ocial) institutions"Goldstone tal. 1991, p. 37). At the end of the first urn, hen, our voyagershavelittlemorebaggage than the explication fa definition.Then they rrive t thesecond urn: recognitionhatpost-1945 evo-lutions occur in quite different ays from heirpredecessors ecausegeopolitical ettings, ominantdeologies, nd internationalnterventionhave changed undamentally.ndeed, thecases they onsider-Vietnam,Nicaragua, ran, Poland, Afghanistan,hePhilippines, ambodia, Zim-babwe, South Africa, nd Palestine-amply demonstrate ifferentat-terns rom hegreatrevolutionsfEngland,France, Russia, or China."We thinknow that a statecrisis should not be defined s a specificobjective ondition ut rather s a situationnwhich ignificantumbersofelites ndpopulargroups elieve hat hecentral uthoritiesreactingin ways that are fundamentallyneffective,mmoral, r unjust" Gold-stoneet al. 1991, pp. 330-31). Thus one of thethreegeneral onditions(relativedeclineof state resources) ollapses into the other two (elitealienation nd popular grievances)while njustice,previously nvisible,squeezes itsway into theargument. y thistime, he nitialpromise fan invariant eneralmodelhas vanished.Just s theonce-hot earchforcrisp predictors f earthquakeshas givenway to moregeneraldebateabout the variableoperation fplatetectonicsActon nd Gordon1994;Girdler ndMcConnell1994), he earchforunique, nvariant ropertiesofrevolution as cededto theconceptionf a variablefieldwithinwhichrevolutions ccur.I have not chosen my example because I thinkGoldstone t al. areobtuse rempirically istaken. n the ontrary,heyhave drawncorrectconclusions rom heirevidence: the conditions orrevolution re notuniform,utvaryfrom egion oregion nd period operiod.The condi-tionsvaryas politics n generalvaries. Because within given regionand periodmany tates harepolitical rrangements,ational nd inter-national,rough imilaritiesnd explicablevariations ppear in the expe-riences fconnected tateswithrevolution. he searchforcomparisonsclose at hand thereforedvances understanding, hile the attempt obuild transhistorical odels of revolutions doomed to eternalfailure.Goldstone t al. only rr nrefusingorecognize hegeneral mplicationsformethod nd theory ftheir wncompellingnalyses.Similar onditions revail n thestudy f socialmovements, ational-ism, democratization,nd a widevariety fotherpoliticalphenomena,as wellas inthezones oforganizational ehavior, rime, rurban struc-ture.Over andover ociologistsssumecoherent, urable, elf-propelling1600


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Symposium: illysocial units, ttribute eneral onditions r processes o thoseunits, n-voke or invent nvariantmodelsof the relevant onditions rprocesses,then explain the unit's behavioron the basis of its conformityo thatinvariantmodel. t is time o expunge hat ntellectual rocedure.I am makingno plea forhistorical articularism, uch ess for piste-mological elativism r postmoderninguisticism.amarguing hatregu-larities n political ife re verybroad, ndeed transhistorical,ut do notoperate ntheform f recurrenttructuresnd processes t a largescale.They consistof recurrent auses which n differentircumstances ndsequences compound into highlyvariable but nonetheless xplicableeffects. tudentsof revolution ave imagined theywere dealingwithphenomena ike ocean tides,whose regularitieshey ould deduce fromsufficientnowledge f celestialmotion,whentheywereactuallycon-frontinghenomena ike great loods, qually coherent ccurrences roma causal perspective, ut enormously ariable in structure, equence,and consequences s a function fterrain, reviousprecipitation,uiltenvironment,nd humanresponse.For hydrologists, flood s a wave of water that passes throughbasin; a severe flood s one in which a considerable hare of the wateroverflowshebasin'sperimeter.or ourpurposes, heequationshydrolo-gists se to computewaterflownfloods ave three evealing haracteris-tics:they educefloods ospecialcases ofwaterflowwithin asinsratherthanmaking hem uigeneris,heir esults ependheavily nthehydrol-ogist's elineation fthebasin,whileestimationftheflood's arametersrequires xtensive mpiricalknowledge f thatbasin. Yet the equationsembodyverygeneralprinciples, hephysics fincompressibleluids nopen channels Bras 1990, pp. 478-82).Note several mplicationsf theanalogy. First,every nstanceof thephenomenon-flood r revolution-differsrom very ther ne;the testof a good theorys therefore ot so muchto identifyimilaritiesmonginstances s to account ystematicallynd parsimoniouslyor heir aria-tion.Second,in differentombinations, ircumstances,nd sequences,the amecauses thatproduce loods rrevolutionslsoproduce numberofadjacent phenomena: moothly lowing ivers nd stagnant wampson the one side, coupsd'etatand guerrillawarfare n the other.Third,time,place, and sequence stronglynfluence ow the relevant rocessesunfold; n that sense, theyhave an inescapablyhistorical haracter.Fi-nally,theevents n question re farfrom elf-motivatingxperiences fself-containedtructures;hey re ocalmanifestationsffluxes xtendingfarbeyond heir wnperimeters.loodsand revolutions ave no naturalboundaries;observersdraw lines around them for theirown analyticconvenience. n theseregards, hey esemble number fother omplexbut awfulphenomena: rafficams, earthquakes, egmentedabor mar-

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AmericanJournal f Sociologykets, orest ires, nd manymore. suppose, ndeed, hatmost nterestingsocial phenomenahave exactly hesecharacteristics.

How, then, should we searchforthe causes of revolutions?ArthurStinchcombe as long since describedone version of the explanatoryprogram: o identify eep causal analogies across detailed features fostensibly ifferent istorical equences. (The cause of eventX is theminimum et of antecedents hat 1] actually occurred, 2] is generallysufficiento produceeventsoftypeX, and [3] withoutwhichX wouldnot have occurredn this etting.)Conceptsrethe hingshat apture spects f he acts or theory;heyare the exicon hat hegrammarftheoryurns ntogeneralentencesabout heworld. hearguments that hepowerndfruitfulnessf hosesentencess determinedy therealism nd exactness f the exicon fconcepts,ndnotby he heoreticalrammar.heproblemf liminatingfalse entencesyresearch,he raditionalroblemf pistemology,snotas problematics theproblemfhavingentencesnterestingnough obeworth cceptingrrejecting.nd his sdeterminedywhetherr notour onceptsapturehose spects frealityhat nternto owerfulndfruitfulausal entences.Stinchcombe978, . 115)

For thispurpose,Stinchcombe ecommendsgnoring he "epochal theo-ries" nvokedby a Trotsky r a Tocqueville nfavor fthecausal reason-ing by which hese hinkershaintogether arratives. hatmeansbreak-ing down big events nto causally connected equencesof events, andexaminingach ink nthechain.Moregenerally,tinchcombe dvocatesa shift f attentionwayfrom priori heorizingowardrigorousxami-nation nd reduction fanalogies, tep by stepwithin ausal sequences(Stinchcombe 978, p. 28). At that evel, says Stinchcombe,muchof theapparentdisagreementetween Trotsky nd a Tocquevilledissolves.Greathistorical nalysts mployfar more similar ausal accounts thantheir ompeting pochal pronouncementsuggest.Stinchcombe tresses pistemology,onditions orthe generation fknowledge. am stressing ntology, he natureof that which s to beknown. But ourprograms ovetail. f the social worldactuallyfell ntoneatly ecurrenttructuresnd processes, henepochal theories,nvari-antmodels, nd thetesting f deductivehypotheses ouldbecomemoreparsimoniousnd effective eans ofgenerating nowledge.Because thesocial world does not conform o thatprescription, e need otherpro-gramson bothontological nd epistemological rounds.Our programsconvergenthehistoricallymbedded earchfordeepcausesoperatingnvariablecombinations, ircumstances,nd sequenceswithconsequentlyvariable outcomes.Mostofthe workthereforeoncerns otthe dentifi-cation fsimilaritiesverwhole tructuresndprocesses ut theexplana-tion ofvariability mongrelated tructuresnd processes. n studiesof1602


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Symposium: illyrevolution, he workentailsexplainingwhyand how differentortsofsocial settings roducedifferentarieties f forcible eizures of powerover states.There is hope. Not everyonewho analyzes revolutions nd relatedphenomena esorts o nvariantmodels. n a wide-rangingynthesis rit-tenbefore heSovietUnion collapsed,David Laitin sketched promisingtheory f variation n the readiness f differentational elitesto breakwithMoscow. It argued npartthat

thehistoricalimensionhat ccountsor istinctionsetweenhenationalmovementsnthe oviet nion s based pon single ariable-the egreeto which litesntheperipheralationalitieseceivedmost-favored-lordstatusnRussia.Thehistoricalatashow hat nthe erritoriesest fMoscow,most-favored-lordtatuswas readily ranted,venwhen herewere o ndigenousords. ordsntheTurkic reaswere ften iven liteprivileges,uttheywerenotgiven ccess o positionsf high tatus yright.n intermediateases ikeGeorgia nd Estonia, litemobility aspossibleut ircumscribed.ertain redictionsollow rom his:1) nthemost-favored-lordegionshere ould epowerfulymbolicnity mongtitulars or ull ndependenceuta waning f resolve s theconflictfinterestmong wobranchesfthe itularlites eginso manifesttself;and 2) nthenon-most-favoredord egions,he ressureorndependencewould omemore lowlybutonceset nmotion,herewouldbe unityamong he itularlites,with nly ettledminorityopulationseekingoslowtheprocessdown). (Laitin 1991, p. 157)

Laitinsimplifiesis workby groupingovietregionsnto wocategories,but he clearly nvokes continuous rinciple fvariation.He does not,obviously, rovide complete ccount f theprocessbywhich heSovietUnion collapsed, or by whichany particular tate emergedfromthecollapse.On thecontrary, e offers promisingandidatefor ne of themany general principles properly onstructed ausal accountwouldinvoke.By his rationalchoice analysis of conditions or secession, MichaelHechter pens nother venue. Hechter rgues hat ecession esults romthe ntersectionffourpartly ndependent rocesses: 1) creation f re-gions, 2) mobilization orcollective ction, 3) development fsupportfor ecessionist rograms, 4) acceptanceofindependence y theprevi-ouslydominant tate Hechter 992,p. 269). In each case Hechter denti-fies conditions ffectinghe extentof two factors: hared or imposedinterestn acting o facilitate ecession nd thecapacity o do so. Undertheheadingof supportforsecession,forexample,he proposes a) lowregionaldependence n the hosteconomy nd (b) perception f the hoststate'sweakness as major promotersf nterestnd capacity.Hechteremploys modeloflogicalconcatenation ather hanof se-quenceorpoliticalprocesses; xcept n the sense of ogical necessity, e

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AmericanJournal f Sociologyneither ffers ropositionsoncerninghe nteractionfhis four rocessesnor postulates dynamic n which dentities, onnections,nterests, ndcapacities lter as a function fstruggle r accommodation.Within hestandard a priori limits of rational choice analysis, nevertheless,Hechter'sdiscussiondoes provide a framework hat ends itself o theanalysisof choicemaking n territorialegmentation,ivilwar, and re-gionallybased revolution Berejikian 1992; Connor 1987; Gurr 1993;Licklider1993; Lustick 1993; Strang1990, 1991). By depicting ecessionas a highly ontingentutcome f nteractingolitical rocesses,Hechterbreakssharplywith nvariantmodels.In an inquiry hat deals more explicitly ith structure nd sequencethan Hechter'sdoes, Peter Bearman (1993) looks closelyat changingrelations mong gentryn Norfolk, ngland, during he century eforethe Civil War, whichbegan in 1640. Using the formal echniquesofnetwork nalysis,Bearman hows hat kinship-based egional tructureof power gave way to one based much moreheavilyon patron-clientchains connectingocal actorsto nationalcenters f power, that gentryexperiencinglocked r downwardmobilitylusteredogether ispropor-tionatelyn patron-client etworks orming istinctive, ntiregimeeli-gious identities, nd thattheseshared dentities-cum-networksecamemajor bases of political mobilization Bearman 1993; Bearman andDeane 1992). At no pointdoes Bearman suggest hatblockedmobility,patron-clientetworks,rtheother actors eanalyzesgenerally roducerevolution; e promulgates o invariantmodel. But he does provide n-other llustrationf a program hat nvokespowerful eneral auses in aparticular econstructionfrevolutionaryrocesses.My own versionof thatenterpriseoncentratesn variationwithinEuropeover the ast five enturiesTilly 1993). t distinguishesetweenrevolutionaryituationsmoments fdeep fragmentionn statepower)and revolutionaryutcomes rapid, forcible, urable transfers f statepower), nd itdesignatess a full-fledgedevolutionnyextensive ombi-nation of the two. Chronologies frevolutionaryituationsn multipleregions fEuropedemonstratehegreatvariation nd change nrevolu-tionary rocesses ince 1492. The changes nclude,forexample,an im-pressiverise in frequency f"national"revolutionaryituations: tate-fragmenting obilizationsnwhich t least one partymade its claim tostatepower on the grounds hat it represented coherent, ulturallydistinct opulation hatwas currentlyeceiving njusttreatment.More important, he revolutionary hronologies llustrate-provewould be too strong word-how regionallynd temporally ariableforms f internationalelations, tatepower,administrativetructure,militaryctivity, xtraction,ndrepressionhapedthe haracter fEuro-pean revolutions, ot tomention ther orms fpolitical onflict. o the1604


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Symposium: illyextenthatgovernmentaluccession epended nwarrior-kingsecruitedfromntermarryingoyalpatrilineages, or xample,revolutionaryitua-tionswere concentratedt thosepointswhena childor an incompetentcame tothethrone. n regions f ntense ommercialctivity, or notherexample, evolutionaryituations ommonlyook heform furbanresis-tanceto princely uthority. evolution urns ut to be a coherent he-nomenon, ut coherentn tsvariation nd in tscontinuity ithnonrevo-lutionary olitics,not in any repetitious niformity.ts sequences andoutcomes urn ut to be path,time, nd situation ependent, otconstantfrom ne revolution o thenext.I do not claim to have beenthefirst o notice hisdegreeofvariation;intheir racticalwork, s opposed o theirntroductionsnd conclusions,moststudents f real revolutions roceed as iftheywere dealing withpath-, ime-, nd situation-dependenthenomenawhose ndividualfea-tures-but perhapsnotwhosetotality-can be explainedby generalpo-liticalprinciples, iven ufficientnformationboutthe context.Nor doI claim that my own recentwork providesall the answers to the bigquestions hat tudents frevolution ave beenpursuing or enturies.makeonly hree imple laims: 1) The constructionf nvariantmodelsofrevolution-whichremains major activity mongAmerican ociolo-gists-is a waste of time. 2) The poor fitbetween uch models and theactual character frevolutions elpsaccountfor heslow accumulationofknowledge n the ubject, problem boutwhichRod Aya 1990)andJamesRule (1989) have recentlynd properly omplained. 3) The sameconclusions old for wide rangeof social phenomena, ncludingmostor all large-scale oliticalprocesses.How, then,can we recognize seful lternatives o invariantmodelsofpoliticalprocesses?Valid analyses fpoliticalprocesses estfirst f allon plausible ontologies-representationsfwhat is to be explained nterms fa givenprocess'sboundedness, ontinuity,lasticity,nd com-plexitye.g., recognizing hatnationalism onsists fsome actors'claimtoactauthoritativelyn behalf f a coherent nd solidary eople,a claimwhose origins,makers,forms, nd effects aryenormously ver timeand space). For variantphenomena, alid analyses pecify hefields fvariationwithinwhichtheyfall,which meansspecifyingheirrelationto connected utdifferenthenomena e.g., delineating hecontinuumalongwhich ie army-to-armynterstate ar, covertmilitarynterven-tion,full-scale ivilwar,guerrilla ctivities, nd terrorism).hese validanalysesbreakcomplex equences ntoevents, ach of which nvokes tsownconfigurationfcauses includinghecumulative ffectsfpreviousevents e.g., separating he conditions nderwhicha cycleof intensesocialmovementctivity egins r ends from heconditions nderwhichone movement ranother ees someof ts demandsrealized).Theirgen-

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AmericanJournal f Sociologyeralpropositionsonsist fprinciplesfvariation or nalyticallyepara-ble aspectsofthephenomena nder xaminatione.g., after oticinghatdemocracy ntailsbroad, relatively qual citizenship hatgrants itizenssubstantial ollective ontrol vergovernmentalersonnel nd policies swell as significantrotectionrom rbitrarytateaction,formulatingrinvoking eparate heories fbreadth, quality, ontrol, ndprotection).Suchanalyses mmediately ield ounterfactuals,pecificationsfwhatelse could havehappened fthe causal configurationad occurred iffer-ently; hus a valid theory f democratization ields propositions boutthe conditions or authoritarianismnd oligarchy.Within imits, uchanalysesof variation lso yield contingent redictions. y this do notmean the unconditional redictions f invariantmodels, n which theappearanceof sufficientonditions , Y, and Z invariably roduceout-comeA, but contingent redictions pplyingphrasessuch as "insofaras" to variable conditions, heir nteractions,nd theiroutcomes. ninstances uch as EasternEurope's struggles f 1989, then,we mightreasonably ope to specify hefields f variationwithinwhichtheywereoccurring, hen to anticipatethe likelyoutcomes under various still-contingentonditions.Mine, then, s no counselofperfectionr cryofdespair. For, takenseparately,hesemethodologicalnjunctions ave the same comfortablefamiliaritys invariantmodels. For all theirother weaknesses-vul-nerability o spatial autocorrelation,ssumptions f boundednessandindependence f observations, ommitmentso linearity, nd so on-standard amplingdesigns nd multivariate tatistics ctuallypresumesome such world.Within hese imits,which theories f causality ndvariation nalysts hould hooseremainsustas openas before heelimi-nationof nvariantmodels.

Fortunately, e have no obligation o chooseright ow; we can waitfor esults f a productive ivalry, erhaps ven of a synthesisrom hesecontentions. or thepresent, nyonewho believeswhat havesaid aboutinvariant eneralmodels nd who caresabout thevalidity fbroad politi-cal analyseshasplenty fwork o do. The crucial heoreticalnd empiri-cal work shouldeventually educe the likelihood hat the nextmajorchange nworldpoliticswill baffle ociologists.REFERENCESActon,G. D., and R. G. Gordon. 994. PaleomagneticestsofPacific lateRecon-structionsnd mplicationsorMotion etween otspots." cience March ), pp.1246-54.Alker,Hayward. 1992. "The HumanisticMomentn Internationaltudies:Reflec-tionson Machiavelli nd Las Casas." InternationaltudiesQuarterly6:347-72.1606


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To Explain Political Processes - Charles Tilly