18
To what extent does international security involve a ‘state of exception’? Discuss in relation to the contemporary security environment A state of exception is a concept that by no means can only be applied to the current global security environment. Throughout history spaces of political exception have existed during various processes and locations. The two world wars are a case in point. Nonetheless, the contemporary security environment not only involves a state of exception, but arguably, it is governed by one. So much so, that Agamben declares that the state of exception ‘has today reached its maximum worldwide deployment’ (2005, p.87). In so doing, the exception has become the norm. The events of 9/11 had a profound effect on liberal governance, with a major shift from defence to national security taking place. The terrorist attacks were immediately framed as apocalyptic; accordingly, the response was portrayed as one required for the salvation of modernity, freedom and democracy (Reid 2006 p.82). As such, the boundaries of politically acceptable action expanded (Chappell 2006, p.314), giving way to what O Tuathail describes as a Jacksonian response. The 9/11 attacks required immediate redress, therefore international aggression was justified as necessary and moral (2003, p.862). Thus, the space for a state of exception was quickly created by the Bush administration, and it is still very much apparent in the field of international security today. 1

To what extent does international security involve a ‘state of exception’

Embed Size (px)

Citation preview

Page 1: To what extent does international security involve a ‘state of exception’

To what extent does international security involve a ‘state of exception’?

Discuss in relation to the contemporary security environment

A state of exception is a concept that by no means can only be applied to the current global security

environment. Throughout history spaces of political exception have existed during various processes and

locations. The two world wars are a case in point. Nonetheless, the contemporary security environment

not only involves a state of exception, but arguably, it is governed by one. So much so, that Agamben

declares that the state of exception ‘has today reached its maximum worldwide deployment’ (2005, p.87).

In so doing, the exception has become the norm. The events of 9/11 had a profound effect on liberal

governance, with a major shift from defence to national security taking place. The terrorist attacks were

immediately framed as apocalyptic; accordingly, the response was portrayed as one required for the

salvation of modernity, freedom and democracy (Reid 2006 p.82). As such, the boundaries of politically

acceptable action expanded (Chappell 2006, p.314), giving way to what O Tuathail describes as a

Jacksonian response. The 9/11 attacks required immediate redress, therefore international aggression was

justified as necessary and moral (2003, p.862). Thus, the space for a state of exception was quickly

created by the Bush administration, and it is still very much apparent in the field of international security

today.

In the context of the war on terror, contemporary security has been redefined. Not only does it allow

liberal states to create states of exception, which undermine the very liberal ideals they supposedly

represent. The war on terror has also given way to an increasingly biopolitical form of government. If

the works of Schmitt and Foucault on sovereignty are considered together, the concept of biopolitical

sovereignty arises (Debrix and Barber 2012 p.27). Biopolitical sovereignty can be said to manage and

regulate life in order to pre-empt contingency. Though the debate regarding the biopolitical control held

by governments today has been extensive in the last decade or so, there is also a sense that due to the

exceptionality of the current global political situation, such a level of biopower may be justified. In order

to highlight the way in which the state of exception has become normalised as a result of the war on

terror, this essay will begin by exploring the theoretical concepts that have been at the forefront of the

works of Agamben, Schmitt and Foucault. It will then analyse contemporary biopolitics, and how since

the events of 9/11, a state of exception has been prevalent. Not only in the way liberal states are governed,

1

Page 2: To what extent does international security involve a ‘state of exception’

but also in the way they wage war against the terrorist ‘other’. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq will be

considered, as will the detainee camps, cause of much controversy and clear examples of zones of

exception. This will all lead to the conclusion that international security does indeed involve a state of

exception, so prevalent today, that perhaps it is no longer exceptional at all.

For Agamben, the state of exception is a paradoxical concept. It represents the legal form of something

that is extrajuridical. Therefore, he sees it as a ‘no-man’s-land between public law and political fact’

(2004, p.1). Though the extrajuridical nature of the state of exception is highly problematic, what is of

more concern is the fact that in the context of what Agamben describes as a ‘global civil war’ (ibid, p.2),

it is the way in which administrative power is being executed today (Welch 2008, p.258) and is rapidly

becoming the leading paradigm of government (Agamben 2004, p.2). As such, Agamben describes it as a

constitutional dictatorship (ibid p.8). With the power to suspend the law whilst remaining in control of it,

in declaring a state of exception the sovereign is able to moderate life (de Larrinaga and Doucet 2008,

p.522). It is today the case as it was during the two world wars, that distinctions between war and

criminality and war and security have been blurred, and in consequence violence has become key in order

to hold control (Jabri 2006, p.48). This will be further explored in a later analysis within the context of the

global war on terror. However, it must be noted that the state of exception today provides states with the

possibility to kill without committing murder (Duffield 2007, p.36). Thus, once the state of exception has

been declared, the sovereign holds power over life itself. Never is this more apparent than in prisoner, or

‘death camps’. Lives lived within the confines of these camps are famously described by Agamben as

bare life. For him, life is rendered bare when it is reduced to its biological minimum, when it is devoid of

any political standing, when it is killed or allowed to die (de Larrinaga and Doucet 2008, p.521). Camps

are therefore zones of exception that are not only beyond the law but also beyond morality (Duffield

2007, p.227). Tragically, modern ‘death camps’ find themselves at the forefront of security practices

today. Thus, the implication of the relationship between sovereign power and violence must be

considered.

For Agamben, Schmitt’s Political Theology presents the theory of the state of exception as a theory of

sovereignty (Agamben 2004, p.35). This observation is evident from the introductory sentence of

Schmitt’s work, in which he famously declares ‘sovereign is he who decides on the exception’ (Schmitt

2

Page 3: To what extent does international security involve a ‘state of exception’

[1922] 2005, p.5). For him, what the exception truly brings to light is the fundamental nature of the state’s

power (ibid, p.13). Schmitt’s theory of the state is grounded upon secular theological concepts, so if

divine sovereignty can intervene in the natural workings of life, so can the sovereign secular state suspend

the law by declaring a state of exception (Thacker 2011, p.145). Furthermore, Schmitt highlights the role

of the sovereign in deciding who is a friend and who an enemy of the state (Debrix and Barder 2012,

p.54). Looking at the contemporary security landscape since the beginning of the war on terror, it is

evident that the US government has created its own set of rules in order fight terrorism, whilst declaring

war against any state they deem an enemy to liberal democracy. As such, both of Schmitt’s principles of

sovereign authority are evident in today’s global power configurations.

Foucault too speaks of sovereign power, though he addresses it within the discourse of biopolitics.

Biopolitics is what deals with the population, as a political and biological problem (Foucault [1976] 2004,

p.245). For Foucault sovereign power, though still present, is displaced by biopower as the dominant

modality of power in modern western societies (de Larrinaga and Doucet 2008, p.520). Through the

mechanisms of biopower, biopolitics takes control of life, not of man-as-body, but of man-as-species,

holding the power to make live and let die (ibid. pp.241-247). Biopolitics regulates life, and in order to

achieve a massified outcome for the population as a whole, coordination and centralisation of the state is

necessary (Duffield 2007, p.5). As such, it is a means of control of society. Foucault describes it as

technology that tries to control all random events that may occur to populations, attempts to predict their

probability and seeks to compensate for their effects ([1976] 2004, p.249). Reid summarises the lives

lived under biopolitical control as a transformation of the life of the human body into a ‘logistical life’

(2006, p.20). For Reid, logistical life implies a

‘life lived under the duress of the command to be efficient, to communicate one’s purposes transparently

in relation to others, to be positioned where one’s required, to use time economically, to be able to move

when and where one is told to, and to be able to extol these capacities as the values for which one would

willingly, if called upon, kill and die for’ (ibid).

Logistical life as described by Reid is in my opinion evident in the post 9/11 political climate, where by

according to the state of exception we find ourselves in (as declared by the US and other Western states),

3

Page 4: To what extent does international security involve a ‘state of exception’

society is subjected to increasing levels of control and scrutiny, leading to what Reid deems a crisis of

liberal modernity (ibid)

In contrast to Foucault, Agamben does not separate sovereignty and biopower. Instead, bringing together

Schmitt’s theory of sovereignty and Foucault’s concept of biopower, he creates a conceptual bridge

between the state of exception and regimes of biopolitical governance, forming a new modality of power

– biopolitical sovereignty (Debrix and Barder 2012, p.31, p.27). It is this biopolitical sovereignty, in the

context of the war on terror, which has led to the aforementioned crisis. Since the attacks on the World

Trade Centre took place, Northern states, and the US in particular, have become obsessed with security.

Consequently, state power has emerged beyond the limits of liberal law in order to address potential risk

with an overwhelming force (Chappell 2006, p.317). Therefore, all aspects of public life are controlled in

order to fight any potential threats, whether they are internal or external (Jabri 2006, p.54), and as such

the global emerges as an arena of control subject to the administrative raison d'être of the modern state

(ibid. p.59). Rights such as liberty and privacy, in theory characteristic of liberal western states, are

currently being undermined. However, society is persuaded that this is done in the name of greater human

and national security.

In the current political climate, the use of affect is an effective tool used to convince populations that

illiberal practices are necessary in order to avert risks. Anderson (2010) describes the use of ‘affective

geographies’ that are used in an effort to secure life. Attempts are made to anticipate disaster in order to

pre-empt it or to prepare for it. The design of terror alerts is a case in point. Producing affects of fear and

anxiety, a communal sense of vigilance becomes incorporated into everyday practices (pp.222-3). Other

scholars go further in their analysis of affect within the state of exception we currently find ourselves in.

Parisi and Goodman for instance, discuss the use of ‘mnemonic control’, which they describe as a refined

mode of pre-emptive control (2011, p.165). This sort of control colonises the memory, producing unlived

memories and future pre-emptive ones (ibid). Western contemporary society is bombarded with images

and messages of risk and theat. If we consider the fact that the war on terror is often described as

amorphous and virtual in nature (Campbell 2005, p.943), it comes as no surprise that states use this form

of control for biopolitical purposes. The more we feel threatened, the more we will feel the need to be

protected by the state.

4

Page 5: To what extent does international security involve a ‘state of exception’

The enemy, we are told, is everywhere. Therefore the war on terror requires new and exceptional

techniques to monitor the life of liberal societies as well as the movements of many others (Reid 2006,

p.ix). Foucault described the concept of ‘dispositif’, which can be translated as ‘apparatus’ (Debrix and

Barder 2012, p.60). The post 9/11 security practices include a form of governmentality, which no doubt,

makes use of these apparatus as a mode of biopolitical control. Didier Bigo originated the concept of

‘Banopticon’, which includes a disciplinary omnivoyance over targeted individuals, as well as

normalising the exclusion of certain persons (ibid. p.61). Within a ‘banoptic’ state, anyone and everyone

may be subject to the various apparatus of control employed in the name of security (ibid. p.62).

Counterterrorist measures are undeniably in conflict with certain liberal values. However, these measures

that in 2001 seemed so out of the ordinary have today become commonplace and part of our everyday

routine. Still, the fact that our liberty and privacy has been restricted must not be forgotten. CCTV

cameras control our every move; airport security has changed the way we travel, and government

agencies are free to infringe on our privacy through the collection and exploitation of financial, travel or

any virtual data (Pillar 2013, p.469). Prior to the attacks of September 11 th, the provision of human

security was an end in itself (de Larrinaga and Doucet 2008, p.530), but in its aftermath the security

environment took a sharp turn in the direction of national security. The Bush administration went to great

lengths to ensure this was the case. Accordingly, a state of exception had to be created in order to justify

the future actions and measures of the US and other western states involved in the global civil war.

According to Neocleous, the events of 9/11 have been presented as the collective trauma of our time, and

in order to mobilise us to integrate within the security measures of the war on terror, this trauma had to be

mobilised (2012, p.195). As such, we have been trained to be prepared for the future violence that is yet

to come. He describes this as the security crisis of an endless war (ibid, p.189). For the global war on

terror is one that may never end due to the nature of a stateless and relentless enemy that is potentially

everywhere (Federman and Holmes 2011, p.59). Consequently, in declaring a war on terror President

Bush committed liberal societies to a war without end, not only in a temporal sense, but also spatially and

politically (Reid 2006, p.3). Though the war was publicly declared in the name of security, freedom and

democracy, critics highlight the convenience of this endless war. It has created a state of exception that

5

Page 6: To what extent does international security involve a ‘state of exception’

has allowed the US to exercise unlimited force in order to ensure its own national security, and in

pursuing its own geopolitical interests.

The American people, as well as the citizens of other Northern states, have grown accustomed to a new

identity as nations under attack (Chappell 2006, p.314). Moreover, a statistical profile of the enemy has

been constructed within the discourse of the war on terror. This has arguably given way to what has been

described as ‘cultural racism’, which plays a key affective role in the production of fear towards profiled

populations (Ticineto Clough and Willse 2011, pp.51-2). In Society Must be Defended, Foucault touches

upon this notion of racism, maintaining that within biopower, killing or the imperative to kill is

acceptable if it results in the elimination of the biological threat to the species ([1976] 2004, p.256).

Following this line of thinking within the context of the current global civil war, the space for equal

citizenship before the law is rendered obsolete. Counter terrorist measures including the UK’s Terrorism

Act 2000, or the US Patriot Act have led to the culturally marked other as the source of danger (Jabri

2006, p.61). As O Tuathail declares, in the wake of 9/11 many have come to view certain regions, peoples

and faiths as hostile, and those opposed to US global superiority have come to be construed as either

terrorists or tyrants by many Americans (2003, p.860). This was no doubt aided by President Bush’s

State of the Union address in September 2001. He famously declared ‘either you are with us, or you are

with the terrorists’ (Bush 2001) in his impassioned speech. This can be said to constitute the official

declaration of the war on terror, as well as the moment that the state of exception came into being. It is

also important to note, that during this time, Bush chose to refer to himself as ‘Commander in Chief of the

Army’. According to Agamben, his assumption of the title entails a direct reference to the state of

exception (2004, p.22). It signifies Bush’s ambition to turn the exception into the rule by blurring the

boundaries between peace and war. The subsequent analysis of the war on terror and the state of

exception that prevails still today will aim to prove that Bush was in fact successful in his efforts.

In light of the events of 9/11, the invasion of Afghanistan and overthrow of the Taliban regime in 2001

enjoyed widespread popular support. At this point, the war on terror was not subject to the public scrutiny

and controversy that surrounds it today. The toppling of Saddam Hussein and subsequent war in Iraq in

2003 however, signified a major shift in public perception. Whilst the immediate response to the al Qaeda

terrorist attacks on US soil was mostly accepted as an adequate response, the war on Iraq quickly become

6

Page 7: To what extent does international security involve a ‘state of exception’

subject to extensive condemnation. The state of exception created by the Bush administration to justify

the war on terrorism soon began to be questioned, particularly since no weapons of mass destruction were

found in Iraqi territory and no links were established between Saddam’s regime and any branch of Islamic

terrorism. The US’s geopolitical interests in the region became transparent. With the Middle East holding

vast amounts of the global oil reserves, and the US’s prevalent preoccupation with securing its supply, oil

was soon widely accepted to be the real reason behind the invasion of Iraq (Campbell 2005, p.951). The

decision, shamelessly framed within the discourse of the war on terror is regarded as incoherent,

inconsistent and illegitimate (O Tuathail 2003, p.863). As such, some academics consider that the events

of 9/11 enabled the triumph of affect over intellect in US foreign policy (ibid).

What renders the above more tragic still, is that fighting under the flag of defeating terrorism, US interests

have subjected modern society to a state of perpetual war. This should perhaps come as no surprise, since

according to biopolitical thinkers, war is the best tool for governmental agents to promote a preferred way

of life (Debrix and Barder 2012, p.39). This certainly holds true within contemporary global relations.

However, it does not detract from the fact that war against terrorism is a ‘savage war of peace’ where the

exception is what rules and a wayward disregard for international humanitarian law prevails (Welch,

2008, pp.259-261). In a 2004 speech, Bush further justifies the state of exception by declaring that legal

measures are not enough to fight the terrorist enemy (Bush, 2004). Extraordinary rendition, enhanced

interrogation techniques or the detention without trial of detainees in camps such as Abu Ghraib, (all

practices outside the law, yet still legal through the state of exception that suspends the law) is what the

terrorist enemy faced instead.

Detainee camps have and continued to play a central role in debates concerning the war on terror and its

legality. They therefore need to be discussed in some detail. For Agamben, the camp represents the zone

of exception beyond morality and the law (quoted in Duffield 2007 p.227). The US Patriot Act issued in

2001 erases all legal status of the ‘unlawful combatants’ of the war on terror, who are not to enjoy the

status of prisoners of war defined by the Geneva Convention (Agamben 2004, p.3). As such, detainees

captured first in Afghanistan, then in Iraq and later worldwide, are cast beyond the legal boundaries of

warfare (Johns 2005, p.617). Captives become denationalised, stripped of their political status and

deprived of any rights; consequently, any harm committed against them within the boundaries of the state

7

Page 8: To what extent does international security involve a ‘state of exception’

of exception that the camp represents is no longer seen as a crime (Federman and Holmes 2011, p.73).

Anderson’s depiction of life in centres of detention is particularly illustrative. He describes camps such as

Guantanamo Bay or Abu Ghraib as death-worlds – places of intentional suffering where bare life has

been abandoned to the law and by the law (2010, p.222). This view is shared by others, who declare that

even though they may remain alive, within the confines of the camp detainees are more cut off from the

world than if they were dead (Debrix and Barder 2012, p.121). Agamben goes further in stating that the

situation of detainees resulting from the war on terror can only be compared to that of the Jews in the

Nazi concentration camps (2004, p.4). How can such illiberal practices be the product of a liberal state

that claims to be fighting an unending war in the name of democracy?

The end of the Bush administration signified for many a change in direction of US foreign policy. In

2009, President Obama denounced and banned the use of harsh interrogation techniques (Ticineto Clough

and Willse 2011, p.1), no doubt an encouraging step towards positive change in security policy.

Nonetheless, the Obama administration has remained under public scrutiny, and has been condemned for

other activities. The Bush-era military tribunals in Guantanamo Bay have been revived (Pearse 2009), the

use of drones in Pakistan is an ongoing issue, and Obama has defended certain rules of exception in place

during his predecessor’s administration (Massumi 2011, p.41). Therefore, even though there appears to

be some changes in counter-terrorism strategies, the state of exception remains firmly in place. Moreover,

it is bound to remain so for the foreseeable future in light of the growing instability in the Middle East

and the emergence of extremist groups such as the Islamic State (IS).

Ironically, in their fight against terrorism, Northern states, and the US in particular, have in all likelihood

deepened the security problems they face, since millions have become hostile to the policies carried out

under the state of exception that emerged within the context of the war on terror (O Tuathail 2002, p.868).

Over ten years of fighting, along with over 100,000 people detained without trial have no doubt led to an

increased support for radical Islamist movements, and contributed to the creation of a new generation of

jihadists (Rogers 2013, p.231). The current rise of IS with its devastating effects in the Arab world is a

case in point. International security today appears to be stuck in an all-encompassing catch-22. As liberal

states aim to pre-empt risks and secure their nations, their security practices ostracise those who they seek

to be protected from, hence increasing the risk of hostilities. Within this vicious circle of enmity, the 21 st

8

Page 9: To what extent does international security involve a ‘state of exception’

century appears to be in a cycle of perpetual war, and thus, it has become a time of always seemingly

necessary exceptions (Rai 2011, p.309). The state of exception today does not only represent the wars

fought in countries such as Iraq, or the existence of detention centres like Guantanamo Bay. The

contemporary security environment involves a state of exception that is virtual as well as material.

Through the biopolitical sovereignty of modern liberal states we all find ourselves within the state of

exception. Whether it be in CIA black sites of torture, public places such as the London underground,

phone lines and online communication networks under constant surveillance or digital records available

for downloading or hacking (Debrix and Barder 2012, p.88), the state of exception encompasses us all.

Accordingly, the state of exception is not really exceptional at all. Rather, it has become a permanent tool

of governmentality for liberal states committed to an unending global civil war.

9

Page 10: To what extent does international security involve a ‘state of exception’

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Agamben, G., (2004). State of Exception. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press

Anderson, B., (2012). ‘Morale and the affective geographies of the ‘war on terror’’. Cultural

Geographies. Vol.17, no.2, pp.219-236

Bush, G. W., (2001). ‘Address to the Nation’. Presidential Rhetoric.com Available from:

http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/09.20.01.html Accessed on: 23.12.14

Bush, G. W., (2004). ‘State of the Union Address. Presidential Rhetoric.com Available from:

http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/01.20.04.html Accessed on: 23.12.14

Campbell, D., (2005). ‘The Biopolitics of Security: Oil, Empire, and the Sports Utility Vehicle’.

American Quarterly. Vol.57, no.3, pp.943-972

Chappell, B., (2006). ‘Rehearsals of the Sovereign. States of Exception and Threat Governmentality’.

Cultural Dynamics. Vol.18, no.3, pp.313-334

Debrix, F. and Barder, A. D., (2012). Beyond Biopolitics. Theory, violence and horror in world politics.

Oxon: Routledge

De Larrinaga, M. and Doucet, M.G., (2008). ‘Sovereign Power and the Biopolitics of Human Security’.

Security Dialogue. Vol.39, no.5, pp.517-537

Duffield, M., (2007). Development, Security and Unending War. Governing the World of Peoples.

Cambridge: Polity Press

Federman, C. and Holmes, D., (2011). ‘Guantanamo Bodies: Law, Media and Biopower’. Media Tropes.

Vol.3, no.1, pp.58-88

Foucault, M., ([1975-76] 2004). Society Must be Defended. Lectures at the College de France 1975-76.

London: Penguin Books

Jabri, V., (2006). ‘War, Security and the Liberal State’. Security Dialogue. Vol.37, no.1, pp.47-64

Johns, F., (2005). ‘Guantanamo Bay and the Annihilation of the Exception’. The European Journal of

International Law. Vol.16, no.4, pp.613-635

Massumi, B., (2011). ‘National Enterprise of Emergency: Steps Towards an Ecology of Powers’. In

Ticineto Clough, P. and Willse, C., (2011). Beyond Biopolitics. Essays on the Governance of Life and

Death. Durham and London: Duke University Press

10

Page 11: To what extent does international security involve a ‘state of exception’

Neocleous, M., (2012). ‘“Don’t Be Scared, Be Prepared”: Trauma-Anxiety-Resilience’. Alternatives:

Global, Local, Political. Vol.37, no.3, pp.188-198

O Tuathail, G., (2003). ‘“Just Out Looking for a Fight”: American Affect and the Invasion of Iraq’.

Antipode. Pp.856-870

Parisi, L. and Goodman, S., (2011). ‘Mnemonic Control’. In Ticineto Clough, P. and Willse, C., (2011).

Beyond Biopolitics. Essays on the Governance of Life and Death. Durham and London: Duke University

Press

Pearse, D., (2009). ‘Obama to revive Guantanamo military tribunals’. The Guardian. Available from:

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/may/15/barack-obama-revives-guantanamo-tribunals Accessed

on 23/12/14

Pillar, P. R., (2013). ‘Counterterrorism’. In Williams, P. D., (2013). Security Studies. An Introduction. 2nd

Ed. Oxon: Routledge

Rai, A. S., (2011). ‘Here We Accrete Durations: Towards a Practice of Intervals in the Perpetual Mode of

Power’. Ticineto Clough, P. and Willse, C., (2011). Beyond Biopolitics. Essays on the Governance of Life

and Death. Durham and London: Duke University Press

Reid, J., (2006). The biopolitics of the war on terror. Life struggles, liberal modernity, and the defence of

logistical societies. Manchester: Manchester University Press

Rogers, P., (2013). ‘Terrorism’. In Williams, P. D., (2013). Security Studies. An Introduction. 2nd Ed.

Oxon: Routledge

Schmitt, C., ([1922] 2005). Political Theology. Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty. Chicago:

Chicago University Press.

Thacker, E., (2011). ‘Necrologies; or, the Death of the Body Politic’. In Ticineto Clough, P. and Willse,

C., (2011). Beyond Biopolitics. Essays on the Governance of Life and Death. Durham and London: Duke

University Press

Ticineto Clough, P. and Willse, C., (2011). Beyond Biopolitics. Essays on the Governance of Life and

Death. Durham and London: Duke University Press

Welch, M., (2008). ‘Ordering Iraq: Reflections on Power, Discourse & Neocolonialism’. Critical

Criminology. Vol.14, no.4, pp.257-269

11