Ancient Rome isremembered as one ofthe greatest military powersin history, its fame derivedfrom the fearsome reputationof the empire's legionnaires.Lost in the telling, however,is the important role thatespionage played in Rome'sascent to empire. -

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were meant to be secret-is no smalltask. But it is not an impossible one. Theintelligence business is as old as civiliza-tion itself, and once the steps in theprocess have been identified, they can betraced in almost any civilization that lefthistorical records.

In the days preceding modern "tech-nical" collection-whereby sound re-cording devices, hidden cameras, andsatellites gather data-people were theonly means commanders and politicalleaders had to collect the vital informa-tion they neede<!to§wvive the plots of

stories. Around 300 B.C., for example,during the Etruscan wars, the consul Q.Fabius Maximus sent his brother dis-guised as an Etruscan peasant into theCiminian forest to win over the localUmbrians to the Roman cause. Thebrother was both fluent in Etruscan anda master of disguise. He was sent to re-connoiter areas into which Roman agentswere said never to have penetrated. Themission was a resounding success, andRome was able to bring Umbrian tribes

a warning to other spies. The Carthagin-ian general's ability to disguise himself,to forge documents, to send secret com-munications, and to surprise the Ro-mans became legendary. And his agentsare said to have had secret hand gesturesthat they used as a means of recognizingone another. Hannibal used such inge-nuity to lure the Romans into traps, asat Lake Trasimene, where he caught theRoman army between the lake and thesurrounding mountains. This ruse costthe Romans fifteen thousand killed andan equal number taken prisoner. His fa-mous victory at the Battle ofCannae was another trap-avictory for Hannibal thatcost the Romans dearly inlost manpower. Althoughhistorians have argued overexact figures, when Livytellsus that the rings taken fromdead Roman aristocrats filledthree bushels, we get someidea of the loss to the Romanupper classes.

Not only did Hannibal em-phasize good intelligence, heexacted a high price fromagents who did not performwell. Ascout who had mistak-enly taken him to Casilinumand into a trap, when he hadbeen directed to take him toCasinum, was crucified aspunishment for his error.

Hannibal had the advan-tage of being sole commander of hisforces. As leader of the Carthaginianarmy and its allies, he was his own chiefof intelligence for fourteen years. It wasnot until the Romans put a single com-mander, Scipio Africanus, in charge oftheir armies that they were able to emu-late Hannibal's efficient tactics and winthe Second Punic War.

Among other ploys, Scipio directedspies to reconnoiter enemy camps.When his siege of Utica stalled, he sent alegation to the camp of the Numidianking, Syphax, Centurians disguised asslaves accompanied Scipio's emissaries.The legate Gaius Laelius was fearful theplan would be exposed-that one of thedisguised centurians, Lucius Statorius,might be recognized since he had previ-ously visited the camp. To protect hisagent's cover, Laelius had him publicly

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caned. The persuasiveness of the decep-tive action hinged upon the known factthat the Romans subjected only personslow on the social scale to corporal pun-ishment. To the historian, the episode isof particular interest because it specifi-cally identifies centurions and tribunesas active participants in espionage mis-sions. While the legates were in confer-ence, the "slaves" were to wander aboutthe camp and reconnoiter the premises,making note of entrances, exits, and thelocation of each division. They were tolook for the outposts and sentries and

determine whether the camp was morevulnerable to attack by day or by night.On each visit, a different group of "slaves"made the trip, so that every centurionwould have an opportunity to familiarizehimself with the encampments.

When all the information was at hand,Scipio concluded that a night attackwould be the most effective way to takethe camp, and in addition, he orderedthe Carthaginian and Numidian campsburned. The Carthaginians, thinkingthese were accidental fires, ran out un-armed only to be slaughtered by theRoman column that was ready and wait-ing. In this case, intelligence collectionhad made possible a successful clandes-tine operation. Scipio had delivered acrippling blow to a superior force.

By the time Rome conquered theHellenistic kingdoms in the East and

fought the Third Punic War (149-146B.C.), the republic on the Tiber had be-come the center of a Mediterranean em-pire. Historians still marvel at how muchterritory Rome ruled during the middlerepublic with the sparse infrastructurethat it had. For example, there was nopostal-communications system, no gov-ernment intelligence service, no perma-nent foreign service, and no decision-making body other than the cumbersomethree-hundred-man Senate. The Romanshad nothing resembling a diplomaticcorps. They did not send permanent rep-

resentatives abroad, nor didthey establish offices forforeign-area specialists athome. In fact, they did noteven install occupying forcesin the East prior to the latesecond century B.C. Therewas no diplomatic presenceabroad to implement foreignpolicy, to provide cover forcovert operators, or to act asintelligence gatherers for thegovernment back in Rome.

The primary means of as-sessing problems overseasbecame the embassy. TheSenate dispatched small mis-sions of inquiry or advice,composed usually of three tofive senators of varying qual-ifications and experience.They traveled in naval vesselsbut without military escort.

These men acted as Roman agents butwere by no means permanently sta-tioned abroad. Embassies were usuallysent to visit kings who had previouslysent deputations to Rome to ask for as-sistance. Only in times of crisis wouldthe Senate initiate a mission of inquiryon its own.

Roman envoys were briefed with in-structions and told to deliver warnings,to give advice, to arbitrate settlements,to check reports, or simply to lookaround. Most of this was done in theopen, but there was always the possibilityof information being clandestinelyslipped to the envoys by interested par-ties. We do not know how many retainersthey brought with them who, unnoticed,could eavesdrop.

While it is reasonable to assume theRomans sent the emissaries to collect

intelligence, there is no question thatthe emissaries were considered spies bytheir targets. On his grand tour of theEast in 166 B.C., Tiberius Cracchus andhis entourage were referred to askataskopoi (spies) by the Greek historianPolybius. Appian, another Greek histo-rian, bluntly stated that envoys sent toAntiochus IV, ostensibly to bring aboutreconciliation between him and Ptolemy,really intended to find out his plans. An-tiochus gave these spies such a warmreception that they sent back glowingreports. Yet we know from other recordsthat Antiochus in fact harbored a greatdeal of antipathy toward Rome and pur-sued a policy quite different from theone he confided to the envoys.

Because rulers in the East had a longhistory of using formal intelligence serv-ices, they often assumed the Romanswere playing the same game. Genthius,an IIIyrian king, sometimes chained am-bassadors sent by Rome and chargedthem with espionage. Other examples ofRoman ambassadors or traders beingsuspected, arrested, or executed on espi-onage charges are not hard to find. EvenRomans traveling in a non-official ca-pacity were mistrusted by provincials.Roman grain buyers making purchasesfrom Cumae and Sicily were accused ofspying, and consequently were treatedwith extreme hostility by the localauthorities, even to the point of findingtheir lives in danger. When MithridatesVI, king of Pontus, went to war againstthe Romans, the first thing he did waskill all the Romans and Italians in themain cities of Asia Minor as members ofa possible fifth column. An estimatedeighty thousand Roman and Italian ca-sualties show how seriously Mithridatestook his security problems.

Part of Rome's reluctance to develop aformal intelligence service stemmed fromthe unique way its republican govern-ment had developed. The Senate, com-posed of scions of wealthy, upper-classfamilies, acted with a certain amount ofclass loyalty that allowed the state topush its interests and expand overseas.But the senate was not of one mind.There was always tremendous personalcompetition among individuals and fami-lies for the wealth and glory that suchconquest created. In order to furthertheir parochial ends, these men needed

to know what others were doing andplanning, and so they used their privateintelligence networks to advance theirown careers. Much of the behind thescenes cloak-and-dagger work of senato-rial politics is forever lost to us, but it isnot hard to imagine what forms it took.Certainly political scandal played its partin launching as well as sinking the ca-reers of numerous senators.

The Romans had no qualms aboutusing espionage on a personal level.Every Roman aristocrat had his privatenetwork of business associates, inform-

ers, clansmen, slaves, or agents (male orfemale) who could keep him informed onthe latest happenings in the Senate or hisown home. Even Roman architects builtprivate homes with counterintelligencein mind. Livius Drusus' architect askedhim whether he would like his housebuilt "in such a way that he would be freefrom public gaze, safe from all espionageand that no one could look down on it."

Espionage on a small scale becameespionage on a national scale when thenobility took its family interests into theforeign-policy arena. But because eachsenatorial family had its own private in-telligence network, no one group wouldhave sanctioned the creation of a singlecentral intelligence organization thatmight fall into the hands of a rival fac-tion. Such a collection of individual in-terests was simply not fertile ground for

spawning a single institution that wouldmonitor Rome's overseas interests plussegments of Roman society itself. Even ifsuch a centralized intelligence bodywere assigned only foreign targets, theremight have remained a residual fear thatsooner or later such an apparatus wouldbe used to advance the interests of onegroup over another.

The fact that the intelligence net-works were privately owned and operatedcan be seen clearly in the late republic.Sallust, who wrote an account of theCatiline conspiracy, one of the mostnotorious threats to the late republic,said it was put down by Cicero usingbodyguards, who learned of it throughthe consul's wide-ranging espionagenetwork that included bodyguards.Pompey and Caesar each had intelli-gence networks that they used againsteach other in the civil war that ultimatelybrought down the republic.

Caesar's agents in Rome kept a closewatch on his enemies. Cicero, for exam-ple, mentions in a letter that his epigramswere reported to Caesar, who could dis-tinguish between the authentic ones andthose falsely attributed to him. As longas Caesar held control of Rome duringthe civil war, the city's populationrejoiced with his victories and mournedhis losses, at least publicly. They knew fullwell there were spies and eavesdroppersprowling about, observing all that wassaid and done. Caesar's military cou-riers, the speculatores, were kept busydelivering intelligence but were alsogiven espionage assignments.

Caesar coordinated his intelligenceassets well. In this he stands out as anindividual who could make the best ofthe republican system. He established arapid message and information trans-port system via couriers, and he also hadscouts and spies who used counterintel-ligence techniques, such as codes andciphers, to prevent his military plansfrom falling into the hands of the enemy.His successor Augustus had a betteropportunity to develop the system Cae-sar had started. Augustus may have beenheir to Caesar's ideas, or perhaps he justinstinctively knew what the new empireneeded. But in any case, he was shrewdenough to realize that such intelligencereforms were long overdue. Augustus'first intelligence-gathering and dissemi-

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nation-related innovation was the estab-lishment of a state postal and messengerservice called the cursus publicus, whichreplaced the inadequate republican sys-tem of private messengers.

By furnishing a means of transportand communications, Augustus builtthe rudiments of what was to becomethe imperial security service. Now therewould be an official, permanent, andreliable way to communicate politicaland military intelligence. Like the Baby-lonians and Persians before them, theRomans combined their road networkwith a centrally administered com-munications system to help ensurethe security of the emperor and thestability of the empire.

Although the cursus publicusprovided a reliable means of trans-mitting important intelligence,sending dispatches by this methoddid not ensure sufficient security ifthere was a traitor within the sys-tem. Secret and not-so-secret com-munications often played a criticalrole in political events.

The emperor Caracalla (A.D.211-217) was warned of a plotagainst his life as the scheme wasbeing hatched by his successorMacrinus (217-218). The warningcame from Materianus, the officerin charge of the urban cohorts dur-ing Caracalla's frequent absencesfrom Rome on campaign. The mes-sage was sealed and given withother letters to the courier of the imper-ial post. The courier completed his jour-ney at normal speed, not realizing whathe was carrying. Caracalla received themail, but instead of reading it himself,turned the daily dispatches, includingthe warning from Materianus, over toMacrinus, who promptly disposed of theincriminating letter. Because he wasafraid Materianus might try a secondcommunication, Macrinus also decidedto dispose of Caracalla.

Quite frequently intelligence couriersdoubled as political assassins. The em-peror Gordian sent a secret letter that isdescribed by the historian Herodian ashaving been folded in a manner that was"the normal method used by the emperorto send private, secret messages." No fur-ther details are given, but evidently suchmessages were sealed in a certain way and

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carried by special messengers. In Gor-dian's case, the message was sent to thegovernor of Mauretania Caesariensis aspart of a covert operation. The agentswere disguised as messengers from Max-iminus, the emperor's enemy. The gov-ernor, Vitalianus, usually went to a smallroom, off the public court, where hecould scrutinize the dispatches carefully.The agents then were instructed to in-form him that they were bringing secretinstructions from Maximinus and to re-quest a private audience in order to passthese secret instructions on personally.

While Vitalianus was examining theseals, they killed him with swords hid-den under their cloaks.

As the system of the cursus publicusdeveloped, the couriers were drawn in-creasingly from the army, especiallyfrom the speculatores. The duties of thespeculatores were not limited simply tocarrying messages. They could also beused for undercover activities such asspying, arresting political figures, guard-ing suspects and detainees, or executingcondemned men. The Gospel of st. Mark6:27 indicates that it was a speculatorwho was sent to the prison with an exe-cution order for John the Baptist.

With the reign of Domitian (A.D.81-96), or possibly Hadrian (117-138),came another innovation that addedmore manpower to this intelligence net-work. The supply section of the imperial

general staff provided personnel whocould work as intelligence agents. Supplysergeants, called frumentarii, whoseoriginal functions had included the pur-chase and distribution of grain, were nowturned into intelligence officers. Becausethese men were constantly traveling onlogistical assignments, they were in aposition to watch over the army, the im-perial bureaucracy, and the local popu-lation. They could report back on anysituation that was 'of interest to the em-perors. That emperors came to rely onthis system is shown by the fact that the

frumentarii began to replace thespeculatores as intelligence cou-riers and eventually as secret police.Although their three main dutieswere as couriers, tax collectors, andpolicemen, like the speculatores be-fore them these officers were used inmany capacities involving state secu-rity. By the third century there is ex-tensive evidence of their use as spies.No one seemed to be immune-prominent generals, lowly Chris-tians, senators, and subversives allcame under their scrutiny.

In the city of Rome the frumen-tarii worked closely with the urbanpolice force. Their secret serviceduties, besides investigating andarresting, eventually came to in-clude political assassination. Notonly did the emperor avail himselfof their services, but pretenders tothe throne, such as Macrinus, used

the frumentarii to further their careers.How the service was used or abuseddepended on the emperor. AlexanderSeverus is praised for choosing onlyhonest men, but at other times com-plaints arrived about their corruption.

Assecret police agents, the frumentariiparticipated in the persecution of Chris-tians. They were among the chief agentswho spied on Christians and had themarrested. The soldier who supervisedSaint Paul in Rome while he was awaitingtrial was a frumentarius. Early Churchhistorian Eusebius reports the tale of aChristian named Dionysius who wasbeing hunted by the secret police. He hidin his house for four days. Meanwhile theIrumentarius was searching high and lowbut never thought to search the man'shouse. Dionysius made his escape withthe help of the Christian underground.

In another incident, a frumentariuswas sent to arrest Cyprian, later sainted,but the Christians, who had their ownintelligence network during the perse-cutions, found out about the arrestorder and warned him to go into hiding.

Many ancient sources mention "sol-diers without uniforms" arresting Chris-tians or performing other secret serviceduties, but it is not always possible toknow if these were trumentarii. Since anysoldier could be seconded for police du-ties, the imperial government had a largerange of personnel from which to choosefor these kinds of duties.

Their activities did not endearthe trumentarii to the generalpublic. Roman administratorscould be arbitrary, authoritarian,and corrupt. When they becameinvolved in tax collecting anddetecting subversion, the temp- !!!tations to corruption were even ~ggreater. A third-century writer ~described the provinces as "en- ~slaved by fear," since spies were ~

aeverywhere. Many Romans and s~people in the provinces found it ~impossible to think or speak ~

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freely for fear of being spied ~upon. The snooping of the fru- ~meniarii became rampant by thelate third century, and their be-havior was compared to that of aplundering army. They wouldenter villages ostensibly in pur-suit of political criminals, searchhomes, and then demand bribes fromthe locals.

The emperor Diocletian disbanded thetrumentarii because of the massivenumber of complaints he received fromhis subjects, but he actually had nointention of giving up such an essentialintelligence source. He simply replacedthem with members of another organi-zation, who would perform the samecounterintelligence and security tasksbut under a different name. These newmen were called agentes in rebus-general agents. The blandness of the titlebelies their actual secret functions. Theyperformed a wide range of intelligenceactivities almost identical to those of theIrumentarii. The two major differenceswere that the agentes were civilians, notsoldiers, and they were not under thejurisdiction of the praetorian prefect, the

commander of the Praetorian Guard;rather they were directed by an officialcalled the "master of offices." Since themaster of offices controlled other groupsthat had intelligence functions-such asthe notarii, the imperial secretaries-bythe mid-fourth century the master ofoffices became, in effect, the minister ofinformation. The new corps of agentswas also more numerous than it hadbeen under the previous system, reach-ing as many as twelve hundred men.

The growth of bureaucracy in the lateempire created another use for spies:

surveillance of other ministries of state.The central government would sendintelligence officers from the imperialcourt to other departments of the bu-reaucracy to spy on both their superiorsand subordinates alike. Instead of re-maining loyal to the emperor, they co-operated with, rather than spied on, thesuperiors they thought could help theircareers. Often charges of treason werehurled at political rivals rather than realtraitors, with the consequence that thesecurity of the empire was compromised.

During the late empire, the Romangovernment institutionalized its infor-mation services and espionage activitiesto an extent unknown during Augustus'time. And yet can we say intelligenceactivities kept the emperor any safer?Probably not. Only a minority of emperorsdied a natural death. Seventy-five per-

cent of them fell to assassins or pre-tenders to the throne. In order to besafe, the emperor relied on many groupsto provide him with intelligence. The dis-tinguishing characteristic of espionage inthe late empire is that no one depart-ment carried it out alone. Many groups,civilian and military, were assigned tasksthat involved some surveillance.

Did all this spying make Rome moresecure on its borders or make its leaderswell informed about its enemies? Againthe answer is no. Foreign intelligencecontinued to be collected by the tradi-

tional means, that is, by the mili-tary scouts-the exploratores andspeculatores. Large mobile unitsof exploratores were stationed inborder areas, where they wereused to monitor enemy activitybeyond the empire's limits. Thiswas straightforward military re-connaissance. There is little evi-dence to suggest that the Romansplaced their own agents amongforeign powers. The one exceptionis a passage from the fourth-century Roman historian Ammi-anus Marcellinus in which hetalks about a group called theArcani who evidently were paidby the Romans to "snoop amongthe savages" and report what theysaw. Even they eventually be-came corrupt and had to be re-moved. Unfortunately for us, thedetailed description of these ac-

tivities was lost with Ammianus' historyof Constans, which has not survived.

Despite their protestations to the con-trary, the Romans were heavily involvedin espionage, but it cannot be said thatthey ever established a formal intelli-gence service. The closest they came wasin using groups like the trumentarii andthe agentes in rebus for various internalsecurity tasks. Protecting the emperorand keeping him on the throne becameso crucial after the third century thatmost of Rome's intelligence activitieswere focused inward. Ironically, for alltheir reputation as empire builders, theRomans were never as good at watchingtheir enemies as they were at watchingeach other.

ROSEMARySHELDONis professor of ancienthistory at the Virginia Military Institute.

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