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Tokyo Trade-OffsJohn Hemmings & Maiko KurokiPublished online: 28 Apr 2013.

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©RUSIJOURNALAPRIL/MAY2013VOL.158NO.2pp.58–66 DOI:10.1080/03071847.2013.787738

To outside observers of Japanesepolitics, Shinzo Abe’s returnto power as prime minister of

Japan last December was unexpected– unlikely, even. Indeed, the suddenend of his first premiership after onlya year in September 2007 seemed torepresent a final closure on the grandambitions of a leader moulded in thestyleofJapan’sgreatpost-SecondWorldWar prime minister, Shigeru Yoshida,whose emphasis on economic growth,the pacifist nature of the Japaneseconstitution and maintaining a lowdiplomaticprofilecametobeknownastheYoshidaDoctrine.1

Sixtyyears later, in2006–07,Abe’sforeign policy explicitly challenged theYoshidaDoctrine,despitehisreputationas a conservative. Noting that hisflamboyant predecessor JunichiroKoizumi had moved Japanese foreignpolicy away from the central tenetsof the Yoshida Doctrine, Abe strove todistancethecountryfromitevenfurtherinanefforttoreshapeJapanmorefirmlyinto a ‘normal power’: one with allies,national interests and hard as well aseconomicpower.Inordertoachievethis,Abesoughttodevelopamorebalancedrelationship with Japan’s principal ally,theUnitedStates,whilealsodevelopingstrongtieswithotherAsia-Pacificmiddle

powers like IndiaandAustralia.Healsotriedtore-buildpoliticaltieswithChina,while simultaneously hedging againstits growing regional assertiveness.Domestically, Abe had to balance hiscomplex policy programme in 2006–07 with deeply riven party factions.Abe’s revisionist approach towards theconstitution has been both a source ofuneaseandasourceof leveragewithinhis party, the Liberal Democratic Party(LDP),whilehisreputationasahard-linerhasaffordedhimanincredibleamountoffreedomwithinhispartywithregardtohispoliciestowardsChina.2

Abe’s secondpremiershiphas thusfar been marked by a host of urgentlyneeded economic reforms such asdevaluing the yen, setting negativeinterestrates,radicalquantitativeeasing,andrestructuringofthebankingsector.However, he has a short timeframe inwhich to get this done before beingtaken to account by the voters in theJulyelectionfortheupperhouseoftheNationalDiet.ShouldAbegetthepublicvoteofconfidencethathispartyneeds,he will likely turn to a strong foreign-policyplatform,similartothatwhichtookshapeduringhisfirstpremiership.TheUSwill remain Japan’s security partner ofchoice,but it is likely thatAbewillalsocontinuetoexpandthecountry’ssecurity

tieswith India andAustralia, aswell aswith othermiddle powers in SoutheastAsiaandtheMiddleEast.Perhapsmostimportantly, it is probable that Abewill seek todevelopamorerobustanddynamic policy vis-à-vis China, whichremainsacentralpartofhisconceptionofJapan’sroleintheworld.

Abe 1.0When Shinzo Abe succeeded PrimeMinisterJunichiroKoizumiinSeptember2006,Japan’srelationswithChinawereat a low point. This dip was primarilycaused by Koizumi’s controversial visitstotheYasukuniShrine,3awarmemorialin Tokyo that commemorates, amongothers, those who fought and diedduring the SecondWorldWar. Perhapsunsurprisingly,thesevisitsweregreetedwith popular outrage in China,4 wherethey were interpreted as evidence ofJapanese denial of any wrongdoingduring this period. Upon taking office,therefore, Abe immediately undertookstepstomendrelationsbyvisitingBeijingand establishing a ‘mutually beneficialrelationshipbasedonstrategicinterests’.5Confounding both his critics and hissupporters, Abe’s careful diplomacyput Sino-Japanese relations back ontrack and saw a revitalisation of thepolitical dialogue between Beijing and

TOkyO TRAdE-OffS SHINzO ABE’S HEdgINg STRATEgy AgAINST CHINA

JOHN HEmmINgS ANd mAIkO kUROkI

On becoming Japan’s prime minister for the second time, Shinzo Abe has set himself the task of reviving Japan as a regional power, by repairing years of economic and political stagnation. However, his foreign-policy intentions vis-à-vis China, Japan’s largest neighbour, are not yet clear. John Hemmings and Maiko Kuroki argue that Abe’s first premiership in 2006–07 provides clues which suggest that he will seek rapprochement with China, while simultaneously developing strong regional ties and fortifying the US-Japan alliance.

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TheleaderofJapan’sNewKomeitoPartydeliversapersonalletterfromJapanesePrimeMinisterShinzoAbetoChineseCommunistPartyGeneralSecretaryXiJinpingduringameetinginBeijing,January2013.Courtesy of AP Photo/Ng Han Guan.

Tokyo. In particular, his success wentagainst general expectations becauseof his long-standing reputation as a‘staunch nationalist’ and one of themostprominentanti-Chinesepoliticiansin Japan.6 Nevertheless, to bring thisrapprochement with China to fruition,Abehadtoovercomesignificantobstaclesand negotiate a difficult domesticpoliticallandscape,whichentailedtoughdecisions and trade-offs, particularly intheforeign-policysphere.

Abe’s policy of rapprochementtowards China largely developed outof the debates which arose within theLDP as it became clear that Koizumi’spremiershipwascomingtoanendinthesummer of 2006 and as LDPpoliticiansviedtosucceedhimasleaderoftheparty.Duringthistime,callsforthegovernmentto improve ties with China increasedin frequency, and the petitioning bybusinesslobbygroups,suchasKeidanren(the JapaneseBusinessFederation)andKeizaiDoyukai(theJapaneseAssociationof Corporate Executives), in particularturned the policy into a source ofpoliticalcapitalamongtherivalfactions

within the LDP. As the party’s mostprominentpro-Chinesepolitician,YasuoFukuda, Koizumi’s former chief cabinetsecretary, led the way in this regard,7swiftly becoming Abe’s most seriouschallengertotheleadershipintheparty’spresidential election that summer. Atthesametime,theDemocraticPartyofJapan (DPJ), then in opposition, addedits voice to the debate, criticising thegovernment’shandlingoftheimportantbilateral relationship with China underKoizumi. Given this confluence offactors, the question of improvingrelationswithChinahadclearlybecomea significant point of contentionfor Japanese politicians across thespectrum. Therefore, Abe, to avoid theissuebecomingonethathisrivalscouldexploit to his disadvantage, developedandadoptedapolicyofrapprochementwithChinaduringthepartypresidentialelection of the LDP, which he thenpursued,havingassumedthepositionofprimeministerinSeptember2006,witha view to taking a firm grip on power,silencinghisinternalandexternalcritics,andwinningtheelectionsfortheDiet’s

upper house to be held the followingsummer.8

Therewere a numberof obstaclesfor Abe to overcome as he shaped hispolicy,however,includinghisownpublicstatementscriticisingChina,hissupportbaseamongtheLDPpolitical right,andhissupportivestanceovertheYasukuniShrine issue. In the first instance, Abehad been one of China’s fiercest criticsintheKoizumigovernment,labellingtheregime ‘authoritarian’, ‘militarist’ and‘untrustworthy’.9 With regard to Abe’ssupport within his own party, it wasexpected that anti-Chinese politiciansin the LDP might strongly oppose anyattemptsatrapprochementwithChina.10Moreover, a policy of rapprochementwithChinaseemedtofly in the faceofAbe’s own right-leaning tendencies,epitomisedbyhisstrongsupportofPrimeMinisterKoizumi’svisitstotheYasukuniShrine.11 In response to an April 2006offerbyChinesePresidentHu Jintao toresumeofficialleader-to-leadermeetingsifthePrimeMinisterKoizumiendedthecontroversialvisits,Abecommented,‘WecannotaccepttheChinesepositionthat

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the entire responsibility of the currentdifficulties that Japan and China facetodayfallsontheJapaneseleaders’.12

As a result, following his decisiontoadvocateapolicyof rapprochement,Abe worked hard to present anon-confrontationalviewpointregardingChina during the leadership contest.For example, he softened his languageabout China in his speeches, avoidingobvious anti-Chinese rhetoric, while healsomaintained a deliberate ambiguityoverwhetherhewouldvisittheYasukuniShrine should he succeed Koizumi asprimeminister.13However,thispolicyhaditspoliticalcostsforAbewithinhisownparty,ashewascompelledtoadoptanuncompromisingpositionvis-à-visNorthKoreainordertoappeasetheright-wingfactions of the LDP,14 which otherwisesupportedhisrevisionistpolicyregardingthe Japanese constitution and hiscorrespondingdesiretoturnJapanintoa‘normalcountry’.FortunatelyforAbe,hisdesiretorevisetheJapaneseconstitution,underpinned by conservative values,not only dampened criticism from theright,butalsoultimatelyensuredstrongsupport forhisadministrationfromthiswingoftheLDP.15

Inmanyways,thiswasabalancingactinwhichright-leaningDietmembersconceded Abe’s China policy as adiplomatic achievement that wouldhelpwinAbe theupperhouseelectionin 2007. Furthermore, and perhapssomewhat paradoxically, the ease withwhich Abe was able to implement apolicy of rapprochement with Chinawas due to the fact that he was wellknown for his hawkish, anti-Chineseviews. As a result of this, right-leaningLDP factions were willing to give himthepoliticalspaceheneededtopursuehis policies on China that they wouldnot have afforded his rivals. This wasreminiscentofRichardNixon’s freedomto pursue a rapprochementwith Chinainthe1970s,whichlargelyrestedonhissupportwithintheright-wingblocoftheRepublicanPartyandhard-lineviewsoncommunism.16

Therewereotherelementsatplayin this grand bargain, through whichAbesought toeasethediscomfort thathispolicy towardsChinaevokedamonghis more conservative supporters. For

example, Abe’s choice of Taro Aso asforeign minister and their joint pursuitof ‘proactive diplomacy’ and a values-based foreign policy – implemented inco-operation with India, Australia andthe US – could also be regarded as ameasure for dampening criticismof hispolicytowardsChina.

Althoughpost-warJapaneseforeignpolicy, which traditionally focusedon optimising economic gains, wasoften characterised by its unassuming,low-profile nature,17 Abe firmly andopenly sought another direction forforeignpolicy in his first termas primeminister, with political slogans such as‘the Departure from the Post-War Era’and‘ProactiveDiplomacy’.Abebelievedthat Japan should move on from itsso-called ‘apology diplomacy’, whichhad previously coloured so much ofits dealings in Asia because Japan – hereasoned–hadmademorethantwentyofficial apologies since the end of theSecondWorldWarandshouldbeproudof itspeacefulpost-wardevelopment.18Atthesametime,ForeignMinisterTaroAsoadoptedaframeworkknownas‘theArc of Freedom and Prosperity’, whichsignalled the new values-based foreignpolicyoftheAbeadministration.19Boththepoliciesof‘ProactiveDiplomacy’and‘theArcofFreedomandProsperity’putemphasis on enhancing relationshipswithcountriesthatsharedthe‘universal’,fundamentalvaluestowhichJapanhadcome to subscribe since 1946, suchas the prevalence of democracy, basichuman rights and the rule of law. Thispolicy manifested itself in the Abeadministration’s dedicated efforts tostrengthen its relationships with otherdemocraticcountriesandregionalblocs,including theUS, the EU, Australia andIndia.

Indeed, reinforcing diplomatic tieswithAustraliaandIndiabecameintegralcomponents of Abe’s foreign policy in2006–07, responding to the perceivedneed to hedge against China, in someways,andalsotobolsterexistingnationalnarratives. For example, moving closertoIndia–acountrytraditionallywithoutstrongtiestoJapan–wasjustifiedinbothof these ways. Perhaps India’s primaryimportancelayinitsgeopoliticalroleasaregionalcountertoChina,thethirdnode

maintainingatriangularbalanceofpowerwith China and India.20 However, Abealso characterised India as the ‘mothercountry’ofJusticeRadhabinodPal,whowastheonlyjudgeoftheelevenpresidingattheTokyoWarCrimesTrials,1946–48,to find all of the Japanese defendantsinnocent.Thisacthascontinuedtoholdadeepsymbolismforright-wingfactionswithin the LDP, even in 2006, and itappearedtoconfirmtheirnarrativeaboutthelegitimacyofthepost-warorderandJapan’s diminishment as a power as aresult.Abeexplicitly acknowledged thisnarrative when he visited Justice Pal’ssonPrasantaduringastatevisittoIndiainAugust2007.Inotherwords,forAbe,strengtheningtieswithIndiawasnotonlyameansofhedgingagainstChina–akeyelementofJapaneseforeignpolicy;italsoserved a significant domestic purpose,boosting his personal credibility amonganti-ChinasupportersinsidetheLDPwhoharboured revisionist historical viewsand perceived the increasing closenesswithIndiathroughthelensofJapanesenationalism.

With regards to Australia,meanwhile, Abe worked hard to fosternew ties with Canberra and was ableto forge strong military-to-militaryties during his year as prime minister,resulting in the 2007 Australia-JapanDefence Declaration. This allowed theJapaneseandAustralianmilitariestotakepart inannualstrategictalks,whilealsopromoting equipment interoperabilityand mutual support in peacekeepingmissions. In line with Washington’semerging policy position that the Asia-Pacificneededgreater regional securityintegration,Abesupportedtheupgradingof the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue tothe ministerial level between Japan,the US and Australia, the first meetingof which had already taken place inSydney in2005.Thisnewgroupingwaswelcomed by the Howard government,which strongly supported the move asgiving Australia’s alliance with the USequal prominence to that of Japan. Italso allowed Abe to upgrade Japan’smoveintotheroleofaregionalsecurityplayer,somethingthatpreviousJapaneseleadershadbeenhesitant todo.Whilethe purpose of the Trilateral StrategicDialogue was partly to balance against

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China, it also served as a vehicle fornon-traditional security undertakings,such as humanitarian assistance anddisaster relief. These suited Abe’spromotionofJapanasavalues-orientedpower.

While this policy of seeking closerrelationships with regional powersbased partially on shared values andpartially on the need to hedge againstChina’s growing influence did not siteasily with the Abe administration’spolicyofrapprochementwithChina,thetwoarenotentirelycontradictoryeither.However, upon analysis, the emphasison ‘universal values’ as an underlyingprincipleofJapaneseforeignpolicyduringPrimeMinisterAbe’sfirstadministrationserved to maintain a distance fromChina; through its focus on developingpartnershipswithlike-mindedcountries,thepolicyonlyservedtohighlightChina’s‘other’ nature, a dissenter from thecommon values represented by Japanand its allies. Inmanyways, Abe’s firstterminofficewastooshorttoestablishmeaningfulresultswithChina.Abe’srealaccomplishmentwasthathewasabletohalt the steady decline of political tiesthat had taken place so precipitouslyunderhispredecessor,JunichiroKoizumi.

The Sino-Japanese Relationship in 2013ThebilateralrelationshipbetweenChinaand Japan is perhaps one of the mostimportant relationships both for theregionand for theworldeconomy.Thefalloutfromthetwocountries’economic,political and security dealings has thepotentialtoaffecttheinternationalordersignificantly,butdespitethehighlevelofinterdependencebetweenthetwo,theirrelationship remains highly erratic. Inthe forty years since Tokyo and Beijingrestoreddiplomaticrelations,thepoliticalrelationship has swung wildly betweenhighpointsand low,between ‘thawing’and freezing winters,21 promptingdiplomatic relations to be thrown backintohibernation.

Nevertheless, regardless of thison-and-off-againpoliticalcycle,economicdealingshavesurgedover thepast twodecades. Although across-the-boardgrowth inChina’seconomy inthattimehasbeenofgreatbenefit to Japan, the

news, at the beginning of 2011, thatChina’s economy had surpassed thatof Japan tobecome theworld’s secondlargest was confirmation of a shift inthe uneasy balance of power betweenthetwocountries.Furthermore,China’simproved economic prospects allowedBeijing to undertake an incrediblemilitarymodernisation.AccordingtotheStockholmInternationalPeaceResearchInstitute (SIPRI), Chinese militaryspending increased from US$30 billionin 2000 to $130 billion in 2010, withmuchofitbeingspentonthecountry’srapidlymodernising air force and navy.Should this rate of increase continue,Chinese defence spending will reach$240 billion by 2015, more than thetotalsumspentondefencebyallof itsregionalneighbourscombinedand fourtimes that spent by Japan.22 Driven tobuild a military that can fight modernwarfare under ‘the conditions of theinformationage’,23Chinahasdevelopeda number ofweapons systems,24 and acorresponding doctrine,25 to increaseits control of its maritime periphery –including,potentially,thewatersaroundthe Japanese archipelago. Perhapsunsurprisingly,thishasledtoarenewalof tensions between the two powers,centeredaroundthemaritimeterritorialconflictoverislandsintheEastChinaSeaknownas theSenkaku Islands in Japan,andastheDiaoyuIslandsinChina.

Abewillthereforehavefounduponre-taking office thatmuchhas changedin the economic and military balancebetween China and Japan since 2007.Tradehascontinuedtogrowapace,whilepolitical tensions have worsened. Thefact that thedisagreement surroundingtheSenkaku/DiaoyuIslandshasemergedas thepredominant issueof contentionbetweenthetwocountriesmarksoutashiftfromthepreviouscycleofon-and-off dialogue. Unlike past sources oftension, such as Koizumi’s YasukuniShrine visits or textbookswithdifferingaccountsofthetwocountries’historicalinteraction, the objects of dissent area group of islands, visible, accessibleandperfectlysituatedbetweenthetwonations. Furthermore, the porous andungovernednatureofthemaritimespaceincreases the number of civilian actorswho can interact around the islands,26

turning the East China Sea aroundthemintoapoliticalamphitheatre,withnationalist audiences on both sides.Significantly, both capitals have backedthemselvesintodiplomaticcorners,withlittleroomtonegotiatetheissuefurtherwithout losing face domestically. Thesecrucial differences of opinion regardingmaritime jurisdiction, historical usageandunderseacontinentalshelfallocationhavecombinedwithanumberofotherkey factors, suchasunderseagasfieldsand the People’s Liberation Army’s(PLA) current naval doctrine, makingthis dispute easy to inflame and nearimpossible to extinguish. The resultingincrease in nationalism among thepopulations of both countries – andtheattendantdemonstrationsinBeijingand,toa lesserextent,Tokyo–hasthepower to seriously derail the bilateralrelationship, which has been carefullyre-built since the normalising of tiesin 1972. Moreover, continued mediaattention and intrusions by Chineseaircraftandmaritimesurveillancevesselsinto waters around the islands sinceSeptember2012 indicate that thecrisisismerelydormant,ratherthanresolved.

Given the growing tensions overthe islands, it would seem likely thatSino-Japanese relations will continueto decline. Of course, leadershiptransitions inboth countriesmightalsohave been partly responsible for theincrease in tensions in the autumn of2012, perhaps explaining some of thenationalist posturing over the islands.The18thNationalCongressoftheChineseCommunistPartyinBeijinginNovembersawXi JingpingandLiKeqiangunveiledassuccessorstoPresidentHuJintaoandPremierWenJiabao.Furthermore,whileboth Xi and Abe are known for theirconservative views, it is not yet clearwhether they favour their countriestaking a firmer stance with regard tothe other. Therefore, how Abe handlesthe dialogue about these issues withthe Japanesepublic, hisownparty andwithChinawill significantly shapeSino-Japanese relations for some time tocome.Commentsmadeathisfirstpressconference upon winning the electionreveal Abe’s approach: he warned that‘China is challenging the fact that theislands are Japan’s inherent territory.

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Our objective is to stop the challenge’.However,hewenton tosay: ‘Wedon’tintend to worsen relations betweenJapanandChina’.27

Despite his right-wing views, Aberemains an enigmatic figure and it isdifficult to predict howhewill proceedovertheislands,giventhestancehetookonChinaduringhisfirstpremiership.Atthattime,Abecame topower similarlyconfronted by a bilateral crisis –instigatedbyJunichiroKoizumi’svisitstotheYasukuniShrine–andsetabouttryingto repair ties by quelling anti-ChineserhetoricandsendingoutpersonalenvoystomeetwiththeChineseleadership.Hemade a point by making his first statevisit to China (even before the UnitedStates) and initiated the ‘mutuallybeneficial relationship with mutualstrategic concerns.’ Abe’s conciliatoryattitudeatthattimecannotbeexplainedwithout understanding the high levelof interdependence between the twoeconomies. In essence, Shinzo Abe’s2006–07foreignpolicycanbeunderstoodif one seeshimas apragmatist aswellas a nationalist: his prime concern isto develop a strong and independentJapan,28buthemustdealwiththerealityof the interconnected nature of themodernAsia-Pacific, a systemdesignedmore than sixty years ago by then-USSecretary of State John Foster Dulles.Thesystem intentionallybindsUSalliesinanumberofoverlappinginstitutionaleconomic, political and securityrelationships, keeping the Chinese out,the Japanese economically focusedand the Americans in, to paraphrase adescriptionoftenusedaboutNATO.Theproblem is that the premise on whichDullesbuilthisorder–thatChinawouldremainanoutsidertothesystem,closedtoUSandalliedmarkets–haschangeddramatically,andJapan’sfortuneswithit.JapanisnowmuchmorecloselytiedtoChina’seconomythantothatoftheUS,andthisrealityaltersthelogicofTokyo’ssubordinationofitsforeignandsecuritypolicy to Washington. At the sametime,italsobarsTokyofromadoptingacompletely antagonistic policy towardsBeijing, despite the increase inChineseassertiveness. Rather, Abe is obliged totry tomanage the relationshipwithoutconcedingJapaneseinterests.

Economic TiesMuchofAbe’spolicy in this regardwillbeshapedbyquestionsofwhatisatriskin the Japanese relationshipwithChinaand how closely knit Sino-Japaneseeconomic interdependence actually is.Abe iswell aware that China is Japan’slargest tradingpartner, followedby theUS and EU. The two economies havegrownclosersincethe1980s,whentherewasa‘grandbargain’inwhichJapaneseautomotive and appliance industriesoutsourcedmuchoftheirproductiontothemainlandinadrivetosecure lowerlabour costs. In turn, China benefitedfrom the investment, managementand organisational techniques, andtechnologies brought through jointventuresbytheseworld-classcompanies.

Three indicators are frequentlyused regarding economic ties: bilateraltrade figures, foreign direct investment(FDI), and official development aid(ODA). InthecaseoftheSino-Japaneseeconomicrelationship,thefirstofthese,trade, witnessed a phenomenal rateof increase between the two countriesfrom1972to2004.Inthatperiod,Sino-Japanesetradeincreased161-fold,from$1.04billionin1972to$167.89billionin2004.29Furthermore,between1994and2003, JapanwasChina’s largest tradingpartner, although it has now slippeddown to fourth place, behind the EU,theUSandASEAN.Indeed,currenttradeis more significant than official METItradefiguressuggest,giventhenumberof transshipments from Japan to themainlandviaHongKong.DirectChineseexports to Japan were worth $183.4billionin2012whileJapaneseexportstoChinawerevaluedat$161.5billion.30

The second indicator, FDI, showsthepivotalrolethatJapanhasplayedinChinesegrowth.Japanesefirmsinvestedonly $282million inChina in 1986,butby 2012, this had risen to $83.4 billion– a staggering increase.31 Furthermore,Japanese FDI accounts for 8.24 percentof all investment inChina,makingit the third-largest investor in ChinabehindHongKongandTaiwan.Perhapseven more importantly, the initialgrand bargain that benefited Japanesecompaniespursuingcheaplabourshiftedover the course of the late 1990s to aChinesehome-marketapproach.

Thethirdindicator,ODA,isbecominglessandlessrelevant,butiscitedinthisarticle for its role in shaping the LDP’snarratives around China. According tomanywithin theLDP, Japanese rightistsrejectChinesecalls for Japan to ‘atone’foritshistoricalmisdeedssincetheyfeelthatTokyohasalreadydonesothroughthe provision of substantial ODA loansto China. Indeed, Japanese loansmadeupmore thanhalf of the total aid thatChinareceivedbetween1979and2006.Furthermore,Japanofferedthreeenergyloans between 1979 and 1995, and afurthertwoloansthroughtheJapanBankforInternationalCooperation.32JapannolongerprovidesODAtoChina,recognisingtheincongruityinsendingdevelopmentaidtoacountrywithadevelopedspaceprogramme,butitsinitialcontributiontoChinesegrowthwassignificant.Thefactthat this contribution has been sweptaside by Chinese politicians is a sourceof deep disappointment to Japanesepoliticalleaders.

Inrecognitionoftheimportanceofthesestrongties,bothTokyoandBeijinghavemadeeffortstoinstitutionalisethiseconomic interdependence in the formof a free trade or common currencyzone, incorporating other partners inthe region, such as South Korea. WiththemostrecentmeetingstakingplaceattheASEANsummitinCambodiain2012,the stakes involved in such a trilateralagreement could not be higher: theresultant economic zone would have acombinedGDPof$14trillionandwouldaccount for more than 20 per cent ofglobalGDP.

Abe 2.0Predicting Sino-Japanese relations overthecomingtwelvemonths is inherentlydifficultduetotheir increasinglyerraticnature. There is a very great possibilitythat the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands issuewillflareupagainand lead relations todeterioratefurther.Indeed,anumberofWestern media have recently reportedconcernsthatanescalation in incidentscould lead to open conflict betweenJapan and China.33 However, despitethis, and despite Abe’s own nationalistleanings, one can deduce fromhis firstpremiership an extreme pragmatismunderlying his foreign-policy principles.

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There are even some similar internaldynamics inside Tokyo, which suggestthat Abe will again attempt to rely onpragmatisminhisdealingswithChinainhissecondpremiershipaswell.However,before he is able to carry out a strongforeign-policy initiative vis-à-vis China,AbemustconsolidateJapan’seconomicbase and his own power base. Gettingthose two right at the same time willpresenthimwithrealdifficulties.

Election PressuresIn less than six months after assumingoffice, Abemust face his first electoralchallengeintheformofanupperhouseelection, due to take place in late July.Inmanywaysthissituationmirrorsthatof his first administration in September2006, inwhichAbewas constrainedbythe need for a two-thirds majority inthe upper house in order for his policyofrevisingtheconstitutiontosucceed.34StabilisingtheSino-Japaneserelationshipatthattimebecameanimportantwayofgeneratingpolitical support in theDiet,beyond the small coterie of anti-ChinaDietmembers. However, this time Abeis facedwithseriousnationaleconomicproblems and he must prioritise thisissue in order to win the upper houseelection. Japan faces cripplingdeflationand an overvalued currency, and hasoneofthelargestbudgetdeficitsinthedevelopedworld,largerthanthatoftheUnited States, spending nearly 10 percentmorethanitraisesintaxrevenues(itstotaldebtisroughly230percentofGDP).Thusfar,ithasborrowedthroughpublicofferingsofJapaneseGovernmentBonds,buttheappetiteofJapan’spublicto continue bailing out its governmentiswaning.Abe’s initial focuson Japan’seconomy largely reflects the voters’desires: according to a poll by Asahi Shimbun, a Japanese newspaper, 48per cent of respondents expected Abeto focuson ‘economy-boostingpolicies’and ‘employmentmeasures’,whileonly11 per cent wanted the administrationto step up its ‘diplomacy and security’policies.35 In other words, economicrecovery is currently more importantthansecurity concerns,andparticularlyinrelationtoChina,forJapanesevoters.In addition, Abe himself reasoned thata significant factor in his re-election

mighthavebeenhispasttrackrecordofimproving the relationship with China,rather than allowing, or causing, it todeteriorate.36

Asaresult,Abehasdrawnacurtainoverhis own ‘hawkish’ and ‘anti-China’politicalinclinationanddevotedhisentireattention to ‘safe driving’ in order tomaintainastablegovernment.Speakingat his post-election news conferencein December 2012 and as he openedthe Diet in January 2013, Abe clearlyindicatedthatJapan’seconomicrecoveryis his first priority,37 and stressed hisdesire for better relations with China.Furthermore,inaninterviewwithAsahi Shimbun,oneofShinzo’saidesexplainedthat the administrationwould focus ontheeconomy inordertowintheupperhouseelection,therebyavoidingbotha‘twistedDiet’andthehumiliatingsetbacksufferedbyAbe inhisfirstpremiership,when he lost the upper house to theDPJ.38

Given these calculations, basedonboth the need to strengthen economicrelations for the greater good of theJapaneseeconomy,anddomesticpoliticaldynamics,itisclearlyinAbe’sinteresttoavoid escalating tensions with China atthistime.Forthetimebeing,therefore,he is likely to take a more diplomaticstancevis-à-visChina,togainbothtimeandspacewithwhichtowintheupperhouse election and take a firm grip onpower.

Interestingly, however, it shouldbe noted that such considerations donotseemtohaveaffectedAbe’sstancetowards North Korea, whose recentnuclear testhas confirmed its statusasan imminent and important securityconcernamongtheJapanesepopulation.Furthermore,asinhisfirstadministration,adopting a non-compromising posturetowardsNorthKoreamaywellhelpAbeas a way of offsetting the expectationsofhis anti-Chinagroups. Indeed,at thetimeofwriting,ithasbeenreportedthatthe Abe administration is consideringtighteningunilateralsanctionsonNorthKorea in order to apply more pressureon Pyongyang to account for fourteenmissingJapanesecitizenswhoitadmittedto abducting in the 1980s and 1990s.39In this sense, North Korea’s recentmissile launchandnuclear test,aswith

its nuclear test in 2006, has workedfavourablyforAbe,justifyinghishard-lineapproachinthisinstance.

The Democratic Security DiamondThereareother indicatorsthatAbewillfollowasimilargameplantothatwhichhe pursued in his first administration.He has used the same expressions indescribinghisforeignpolicy,sayingthathe is pledged to pursuing a ‘proactivediplomacy that defends our nationalinterests’ at his post-election pressconferenceinDecember2012.40Asnotedpreviously,Abeimplementedapolicyof‘proactive diplomacy’ in tandem withhis China-rapprochement policy in abidtoconsolidatehisdomesticpoliticalconstituency.Inaspeechabouthis‘fiveprinciples for building the future’, Abehighlighted his intended emphasis on‘universal values’ in his assertion thatthefirstprincipleis‘protectingfreedomofthought,expression,andspeechinthisregion…Theseareuniversalvaluesthathumanityhasgainedand theymustbeallowed to flower to the fullest’.41 In afurtherechoofthecharacteristicswhichhadunderpinnedforeignpolicyinhisfirstterm,theprimeministeralsohighlightedtheneedtocreateclosertieswiththosecountriesthatsharefundamentalvalues,noting that ‘it is necessary to considerstrategy from a panoramic perspectiveof theworldmap, including theUnitedStates, Russia, India, the countries ofASEAN,andothers’.42

Perhapsmostinterestingly,however,Abehasalsolaunchedanewframeworkfor his second-term foreign policy: the‘Democratic Security Diamond’. In anarticle published in Project Syndicate immediately after his election as primeminister inDecember,heexplained theconcept and its impact on his Chinapolicy:43

Japanisamaturemaritimedemocracy,and itschoiceofclosepartnersshouldreflect that fact. I envisage a strategywhereby Australia, India, Japan, andtheUSstateofHawaiiformadiamondto safeguard the maritime commonsstretchingfromtheIndianOceanregiontothewesternPacific.Iampreparedtoinvest, to thegreatest possible extent,Japan’s capabilities in this security

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diamond…I,forone,admitthatJapan’srelationship with its biggest neighbor,China,isvitaltothewellbeingofmanyJapanese.Yet,toimproveSino-Japaneserelations,Japanmustfirstanchoritstiesontheothersideof thePacific; for,atthe end of the day, Japan’s diplomacymust always be rooted in democracy,theruleof law,andrespectforhumanrights. These universal values haveguidedJapan’spostwardevelopment.

Although the essence of a hedgingstrategywithregardstoChinacanclearlybediscernedinthisstrategy,theconceptsoutlined in his article do suggest thatAbe’s policy towards Beijing during hissecond administration will be similarto that which he pursued in his first.Rapprochement isbalancedwithvalues-oriented relationships further afield.Closer ties to China are balanced withstrongerrelationswithAustralia,IndiaandtheUnited States. Similar to ‘theArc ofFreedomandProsperity’,the‘DemocraticSecurityDiamond’isAbe’slargerstrategicframeworkinwhichhecanresthispolicyofrapprochementwithChina.

Abe and China in 2013One can already see positive signalsfromtheAbeadministrationintermsofimprovingtheSino-Japaneserelationship.WhilehehasbeenaccusedoffillinghisCabinet with ‘radical nationalists’ bysome in theWesternmedia,44 Abe hasbeencarefulwithregardstothekeypostsresponsiblefordiplomacy.Forexample,Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida is wellknown for his moderate views. KishidabelongstotheKochi-kai,amajorliberaland pro-China faction in the LDP, andhismentor isMakoto Koga, a powerfulpolitician with strong connections toChina. The new ambassador to China,MasatoKidera,displayedhiswillingnessto mend Sino-Japanese ties in hisstatementthathisprimarymissionwasto improve and develop the friendshipbetweenJapanandChina.45Inaddition,Abe appointed Shotaro Yachi, thearchitectofthepreviousrapprochementwithChinaandhis ‘ArcofFreedomandProsperity’ policy, as special adviser to

theCabinet.According to the Japanesepress, Abe’s decision to visit SoutheastAsia first in his role as prime ministerwas made on Yachi’s advice, whichemphasisedtheimportanceofforgingasolidfootingintheregion.46

In addition to these Cabinetappointments, Abe has displayed awillingness to improve the relationshipwith China in his remarks since takingoffice;incommentstoAsahi Shimbunon22December, he said that he favoureda‘mutuallybeneficialrelationshipbasedon common strategic interests’,47 adeliberate return to the language thatheestablishedsixyearsago.48Theprimeminister has clearly determined thatthe Sino-Japanese bilateral relationshipis one of themost important to Japanand argued that no discrete problemshould harm the entire relationship.Furthermore,inavisitintendedtosignalAbe’s willingness to improve relationswith China, Natsuo Yamaguchi, theleader of the New Komeito Party, theLDP’sleadingcoalitionpartner,delivereda personal letter from Abe to China’spresident-in-waitingXiJinping.49Inotherwords,despitetheescalationoftensionsover the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, Abehas demonstrated that he is ready forconstructivedialoguewithChina, ashewasduringhisfirstadministration.Giventheseinitialsigns,itseemsplausiblethatthe Abe administration will follow thesame foreign-policy path as it took in2006–07, seeking rapprochement withChina, while simultaneously hedgingagainstitbyforgingstrongregionallinksinordertomeetbothexternalneedsandinternaldemands.

ConclusionAlthoughShinzoAbeholdsconservativeviews and is demonstrablyon the rightwing of the party political spectrum inJapanas leaderoftheLDP,he isclearlyalso a pragmatist and has shown, timeand time again, a willingness to shelvehispersonalanti-Chinaattitudesinordertoaccomplishhisnationalforeign-policygoals.

Recognising the fact that Japan’seconomic health and well-being are

inextricably connected to Beijing, hehas already shown, in his first andsecond administrations, an ability bothto accommodate China and to hedgeagainst it through a series of nuancedforeign policies. The first has been toreachouttoChinainanefforttoplacatehostile opinion there among Chineseelites. The secondhasbeen todevelopstronger relationships with traditionalalliesliketheUSandAustralia,andwithnot-so-traditional allies like India. In2006–07, Abe promoted this hedgingstrategy as a form of values-basedforeignpolicy,anareawhichbydefinitionexcluded China. His new ‘securitydiamond’, articulated at the beginningofhissecondadministration,appearstoseektodothesame.

Inmanyways, therefore, it isclearthat Abe is a pragmatist but that heis also unwilling to jettison his beliefsentirely.Inboth2006andnowin2013,Abe has shown willingness to workwith China in order to improve Japan’seconomyforreasonsofdomesticpolitics.HeisalsoabletobalanceagainstChinawithalliesabroad,andatthesametimebalancehispolicieswith the rightwingandmoremoderateelementsofhisownpolitical party at home. Therefore, thequestion now is not howAbe can savethe relationship with China, but ratherwhether China is willing to prioritisethe relationship with Japan above itsown domestic considerations. For thesake of regional security and economicprosperity,onecertainlyhopesso.

John Hemmings is a non-resident SPF Fellow at Pacific Forum, CSIS and a PhD candidate at the London School of Economics. Prior to that, he spent four years as a researcher in RUSI’s Asia programme.

Dr Maiko Kuroki recently completed a PhD in the Department of International Relations at the London School of Economics. Her dissertation analysed the relationship between contemporary Japan’s nationalism and its foreign policy.

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Notes

1 ShigeruYoshida,inofficebetween1948–54,wasresponsibleforthe‘YoshidaDoctrine’,whichcharacterisedJapaneseforeignpolicyformuchoftheColdWar.Thedoctrineeschewedanormalmilitary,andreliedonastrongalliancewiththeUSinadditiontostrongeconomic-growthpolicies.

2 ThismightbecomparedtotheleewayaffordedtoUSPresidentRichardNixoninhisChinapolicybytheRepublicanPartyduetohisconservativecredentials.

3 TheYasukuniShrine(literally‘PeacefulCountry’)isashrineinTokyodedicatedtoJapan’swardeadandcontainstheashesofformersoldiers.AnumberofofficersconvictedofwarcrimesaftertheSecondWorldWararealso‘consecrated’intheshrine.Officialvisitswouldthereforeseemtocondone,evencelebrate,Japan’smilitarypast.TheshrinehasthereforebecomereveredbyrightistswithinJapanandreviledbyneighbouringcountriesChinaandKorea,whichsufferedJapanesemilitarism.

4 Forinstance,PengErLam,‘Japan’sDeteoratingTieswithChina:TheKoizumiFactor’,China: An International Journal(Vol.3,No.2,September2005),pp.275–91;CarolineRose,‘Stalemate:TheYasukuniShrineProbleminSino-JapaneseRelations’,inJohnBreen,Yasukuni, the War Dead and the Struggle for Japan’s Past(NewYork,NY:ColumbiaUniversityPress,2008),pp.23–46;andPhilipSeaton,‘PledgeFulfilled:PrimeMinisterKoizumi,YasukuniandtheJapaneseMedia’,inJohnBreen,Yasukuni, the War Dead and the Struggle for Japan’s Past,pp.163–88.

5 Thisexpressionwasfirstusedbythetwocountries’leaders,PresidentHuJintaoandPrimeMinisterShinzoAbe,ontheoccasionofthelatter’svisittoBeijinginOctober2006.

6 Withafewexceptions,however,thereappearstobelittlecoherentdiscussionwhichexaminesforeignpolicytowardChinaundertheAbeadministration.FormoredetailonAbe’spolicytowardChina,seeMaikoKuroki,‘NationalisminJapan’sContemporaryForeignPolicy:AConsiderationoftheCasesofChina,NorthKorea,andIndia’,PhDthesis,

LondonSchoolofEconomicsandPoliticalScience,2012.

7 KeizaiDoyukai,‘ProposaltotheJapaneseandChineseGovernment’,2006,<http://www.doyukai.or.jp/policyproposals/articles/2006/pdf/060509.pdf>,accessed25February2013.

8 Inaddition,thefactthatChinademonstratedunderstandingandappreciationofJapan’spost-wardevelopmentasapeacefulnationmightcontributetothetentativesettlementoftheidentitycrisis,whichhadbeenhighlightedintheYasukuniShrineissueduringthepreviousadministration.Theeffortsofbothgovernmentsdidnotproducesocialantagonism,sothatAbe’ssoft-linepolicytowardChinawaslegitimised.SeeKuroki,‘NationalisminJapan’sContemporaryForeignPolicy’,Chapter6.

9 Ibid.

10 Therewereseveralcasesinwhichanti-ChinesepoliticiansintheLDPhamperedthedevelopmentofSino-Japanrelationsinthepost-warera.FordetailsseeSadakoOgata, Sengo Nicchu/Beichu Kankei [Postwar Japan-China/US-China Relationship] (Tokyo:TokyoDaigakuShuppankai,1992).

11 ShinzoAbe,Utsukushi Kuni He [Toward a Beautiful Country](Tokyo:BungeinShunju,2006),pp.66–74.

12 Taipei Times,‘ShinzoAbeSaysHeWouldContinueYasukuniVisits’,4April2006.

13 GeneParkandStevenVogel,‘Japanin2006’,Asian Survey(Vol.47,No.1,January/February2007),p.29.

14 Kuroki,‘NationalisminJapan’sContemporaryForeignPolicy’,Chapter6.

15 InMay2007,forinstance,forty-threeofAbe’ssupporterslaunchedtheDietMember’sGroupforPromotingValue-OrientedDiplomacy.Thisgroupofficiallyendorsed‘universalvalues’suchasfreedom,democracyandtheruleoflawinaccordancewithAbe’s‘values-orienteddiplomacy’tocounterChina.LDPlawmakerKeijiFuruya,thepresidentofthisgroup,clarifiedthatthepurposeofthisgroupwastosupport

theAbeadministrationinrevisingthecurrentconstitution.KeijiFuruya,‘TheEstablishmentoftheDietMember’sGroupforPromotingValue-OrientedDiplomacy’,18May2007,<http://www.furuya-keiji.jp/blog/archives/98.html>,accessed25February2013.

16 ThomasUBerger,‘ThePoliticsofMemoryinJapaneseForeignRelations’,inThomasUBerger,MikeMMochizukiandJitsuoTsuchiyama(eds),Japan in International Politics: The Foreign Policies of an Adaptive State(Boulder,CO:LynneRiennerPublishers,2007),p.202;seealsoMikeMMochizuki,‘Japan’sShiftingStrategytowardtheRiseofChina’,Journal of Strategic Studies(Vol.30,No.4–5,2007),pp.730–76.

17 KentECalder,‘JapaneseForeignEconomicPolicyFormation:ExplainingtheReactiveState’,World Politics(Vol.40,No.4,July1988),pp.517–41,SusanJPharr,‘Japan’sDefensiveForeignPolicyandthePoliticsofBurdenSharing’,inGeraldLCurtis(ed),Japan’s Foreign Policy after the Cold War: Coping with Change(NewYork,NY:M.E.Sharpe,1993);KennethBPyle,The Japanese Question: Power and Purpose in a New Era, 2nded,(Washington,DC:AEIPress,1996).

18 ShinzoAbe,Abe Shinzo Taironshu [Dialogues with Shinzo Abe](Tokyo:PHP,2006),pp.68–69.

19 ItwasoriginallypresentedinForeignMinisterAso’sspeechon20November2006andwasstipulatedintheDiplomaticBlueBookof2007,althoughitwasdiplomatShotaroYachiwhooriginallyelaboratedtheconceptsof‘theArcofFreedomandProsperity’.

20 VictoriaTuke,‘Japan’sForeignPolicyTowardsIndia:ANeoclassicalRealistAnalysisofthePolicymakingProcess’,PhDthesis,UniversityofWarwick,2011.

21 See,forexample,Jing-DongYuan,‘HopesRiseforChina,JapanThaw’,Taipei Times,11April2007;JohnHemmings,‘AnEasternThaw’,RUSI Newsbrief,June2007;CNN,‘China’sandJapan’sLeadersMeet,SignalaDiplomaticThaw’,5October2010.

22 DavidLagueandCharlieZhu,‘Insight:

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ChinaBuildsitsOwnMilitaryIndustrialComplex’,Reuters,17September2012.

23 USDepartmentofDefense,‘AnnualReporttoCongress:MilitaryandSecurityDevelopmentsInvolvingthePeople’sRepublicofChina’,2012.

24 NewweaponssystemsfieldedbythePLAincludeanew‘anti-carrier’ballistic-missilesystem,theDF-21D;ananti-satelliteweapon,theSC-19;anewfleetof‘stealthy’air-independentpropulsionsubmarines,theYuanandQingclass,acarrierfleet(threearesaidtobeplanned);andtheJ-20stealthbomber.Thesecouldallbecombinedtocarryoutanti-access,areadenial(A2AD)inthewatersaroundJapan’shomeislands.

25 Suchpoliciesareknowncollectivelyas‘anti-access,areadenial’(A2AD)intheWest,anamewhichcamefroma2003USCenterforStrategyandBudgetaryAssessmentsreportcalled‘MeetingtheAnti-AccessandAreaDenialChallenge’.

26 ThisisdespitethenatureofUNCLOS,whichisarguablyfailingtocreatethemaritimeruleoflawforwhichitwasdesigned.Thisispartlythefaultofsignatorystateseschewingdisputemechanismbodiesandpartlyduetotheweakbindingnatureofthosedispute-resolutionmechanisms.

27 HarshVPant,‘JapanChairPlatform:ShinzoAbeandDelhi-TokyoTies’,CenterforStrategicandInternationalStudies,24January2013.

28 ShinzoAbe,Utsukushi Kuni he.

29 MingWan, Sino-Japanese Relati ons: Interacti on, Logic, and Transformati on (Washington,DCandStanford,CA:WoodrowWilsonCenter/StanfordUniversityPress,2006),p.45.

30 South China Morning Post,‘Factbox:HowMuchisatStakeBetweenChinaandJapan?’,19September2012.

31 Ibid.

32 ThencalledtheExport-ImportBankofJapan.

33 Forexample,seeJustinMcCurry,‘JapaneseHawk’sElectionVictoryPromptsFearsofRegionalTension’,Guardian,16December2012;TheEconomist,‘TheDrumsofWar’,19January2013.

34 Kuroki,‘NationalisminJapan’sContemporaryForeignPolicy’.

35 Thisopinionpollwasconductedon26and27December2012:Asahi Shimbun,‘Abenaikakusijiritsu59%[ApprovalratingfortheAbecabinetis59%]’,28December2012.

36 Washington Post,‘TranscriptofInterviewwithJapanesePrimeMinisterShinzoAbe’,20February2013.

37 Asahi Shimbun,‘DainijiAbenaikakuhossoku,keizaisaiseiyusen[TheSecondAbeCabinetAssumesPower,withTopPriorityonEconomicRecovery]’,5January2013;ReijiYoshida,‘AbeOpensDiet,SkipsHawkishRhetoric’,Japan Times,28January2013.

38 Asahi Shimbun,‘Shushosaninsenhejicho[PrimeMinisterwillbeCarefulabouthisWordsandDeedsfortheElection]’,5January2013.WhatisknowninJapanasa‘twistedDiet’isasituationinwhichtherulingpartydoesnothaveenoughpowerineitherchamberofparliamentforlawstobepassed.

39 Asahi Shimbun Digital,‘AbeseikenKitachosenhenoseisaikyokawokentou[TheAbeAdministrationConsidersPuttingFurtherSanctionsonNorthKorea]’,13January2013.

40 PressconferencebyPrimeMinisterShinzoAbe,26December2012,<http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/96_

abe/statement/201212/26kaiken_e.html>,accessed13March2013.

41 SpeechbyShinzoAbe,‘TheBountyoftheOpenSeas:FiveNewPrinciplesforJapaneseDiplomacy’,18January2013,Jakarta,Indonesia.ThisspeechwassupposedtobedeliveredduringhisstayinJakarta,butwasnotbecauseofsomeunavoidablechangesinhisitinerary;see<http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/pm/abe/abe_0118e.html>,accessed13March2013.

42 PressconferencebyPrimeMinisterShinzoAbe,26December2012.

43 ShinzoAbe,‘DemocraticSecurityDiamond’,Project Syndicate,27December2012,<http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/a-strategic-alliance-for-japan-and-india-by-shinzo-abe>,accessed13March2013.

44 The Economist,‘Japan’sNewCabinet:BacktotheFuture’,5January2013.

45 Asahi Shinbun‘Chugokutonokankeishufukuniiyoku[ANewAmbassadorDisplayedaWillingnesstoMendtheRelationshipwithChina]’,26December2012.

46 Daily Yomiuri Online,‘YachiAdvisedAbetoVisitS.E.Asia’,15January2013.

47 Asahi Shimbun,‘NicchukankeikaizenniiyokuAbe-shi“Senryakutekigokeikankeinidoryoku”[MrAbeShowedhisWillingnesstoImproveaJapan-ChinaRelationship,Seekinga“MutuallyBeneficialRelationshipbasedonStrategicInterests”]’,22December2012.

48 NationalDiet,RecordsofProceedings,30January2013.

49 Asahi Shimbun,‘Shu-shitonokaidanfutomeiYamaguchi-shidaihyohochu[DimmingProspects:TheVisitofPresidentYamaguchitoChina]’,24January2013.

Members’ Events 2013

A presentation by Michael Davis, Chief Executive, UK Commission for Employment and Skills and Nigel Whitehead, Group Managing Director of Programmes and Support, BAE Systems plc, focusing on the macro picture and the importance of developing employment and skills in the UK defence industry.

Developing Employment and Skills in UK Defence 1300, 26 June 2013

For more information, visit www.rusi.org/events

A lecture by Professor Michael Clarke, Director-General, Royal United Services Institute, to commemorate the founding of RUSI in June 1831 by the Duke of Wellington.

RUSI Founder’s Day Lecture – The Battle of Waterloo: The Human Face of Grand Strategy 1300, 18 June 2013

Angus Robertson MP, Rt Hon Lord Browne of Ladyton, Rt Hon Sir Malcolm Rifkind KCMG QC MP and Rt Hon Sir Menzies Campbell MP will debate the security implications of Scottish independence.

Members’ Discussion Panel – The Security Implications of Scottish Independence 1245, 13 May 2013

Dr Thomas Rid PhD, Reader in War Studies, King’s College London, will take a fresh look at computer security and focus on winning the real challenge of cyberspace: non-violent confrontation that may rival or even replace violence in surprising ways.

Cyber War Will Not Take Place 1300, 17 May 2013

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