Topoi Volume 5 Issue 2 1986 [Doi 10.1007%2Fbf00139229] Izchak Miller -- Husserl on the Ego

8/12/2019 Topoi Volume 5 Issue 2 1986 [Doi 10.1007%2Fbf00139229] Izchak Miller -- Husserl on the Ego

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158 IZCHAK MILLERan impression that the 'interconnectedness' the earlyHusserl had in mind is a 'me rely' causal one. But thiswould be a wrong impression. Indeed, the earlyHusserl did believe that the unity o f consciousness is aproduct o f natural laws, but he also took the ph enom-ena governed by these laws to be irreducibly i n t e n -t i o n a l : the laws in question had to account not o nly forthe d e f a c t o unity of consciousness but also for thee x p e r i e n c e of the unity of consciousness. In a tradi-tional jargon made contemporary, he took them to belaws that govern the occurrence an d conte nts of a per-son's presentations, or representations, in such a wayas to produ ce both the unit y and the experience of theunity of consciousness. The discovery and specifica-tion of these laws would be the task of experimentalphenomenological psychology. Probably the earlyHusserl countenanced something like Brentano'spsychological laws of' prim ordi al association'.4

In his later writings, Husserl makes a completeturnabout regarding the ego. Commenting on hisearlier inability to find an ego reflectively, Husserlfootnotes the above paragraph in the second edition ofthe L o g i c a l I n v e s t i g a t i o n s , saying, 'I have sincemanaged to find it'. The view which he embraces nowis this:

So much is clear from the outset, that after carrying [the tran-scendental] reduction hrough, we shall never stumble across thepure Ego as an experience among others within the flux ofmanifold experiences which survives [the transcendental reduc-tion]; nor shall we meet it as a constitutive bit of experienceappearing with the experience of which it is an integral part andagain disappearing. The Ego appears to be permanently,evennecessarily, here, and this permanence is obviouslynot that of astolid unshiftingexperience, of a 'fixed dea'.... In principle, atany rate, everycogitatio can change ... But in contrast the pureEgo appears to be necessary in principle, and as that whichremains absolutely self-identical in all actual and possiblechanges of experience, it can in no sense be reckonedas a reellpart orphase of the experiences hemselves Ideas, p. 156].

This looks like a radical departure by Husserl from hisearlier position on the ego. Not only has he mana gedto find it , but he takes it now to be necessary inprinciple ,

We get an idea from this passage as to why Husserlfailed earlier to discover such an ego reflectively.Having been convinced that consciousness is 'nothingbut' a sequence of interconnected events (acts),Husserl declared his failure to find an abiding con-scious act (an i d e a f i x ' ) , let alone one that can o ccupy

the ontological and phenome nological 'un ifying' rolesan ego was supposed to occupy with respect to its acts.Thus, the early Husserl closed rank with Hume, whodeclared his own failure to find a correspondingabiding impression. But Husserl never retracts thisfeature of his earlier position. Th e ego that Husserl hassince 'managed to find', and now considers to be'necessarily there', is n o t itself an act (idea, impression- abiding o r otherwise) among others. 5 The reason hefailed to find it earlier is that he was looking in thewrong direction. His scientific convictions regardingthe nature of persons distorted his earlier phenom-enological conclusions. In particular, his (ontological)conviction that consciousness is 'not hing but' a seriesof experiences led him to adopt a p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a lpresupposition: namely, that the s e n s e of self-unitym u s t be acco unted for solely by some sort of psycholo-gical 'interconnectedness' among a person's experi-ences, an 'interconnectedness' conceived by him in asense that e x c l u d e d from the outset the noti on of con-sciousness as an e n d u r a n t . It is this presuppositionthat made him look reflectively (tongue-in-cheek) foran ego-qua-act among other conscious acts, declaringhis inabi lity to find it.

As he neve r retracts his rejection of an ego qua ' i d e af i x ' , so Husserl never gives up the (correct) idea thatthe s e n s e of self-unity must be accounted for by aninterconnectedness among a person's experiences.What he d o e s reject now is his earlier concept~n ofthe natu re of that interconnectedness. He is resolvedto let his p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l account of self-experiencebe dictated exclusively by phenome nologic al observa-tion - wi thout any naturalistic preconception. As apart o f that resolve, he requires of his pheno menologi-cal theory o f self-experience that it accommo date twopheno menolog ically observed facts: the e x p e r i e n c e ofcross-time sameness of consciousness, and the e x p e r i -e n c e of cross-time conscious change. It is in the courseof his attempts to accommodate these phenomen a thatHusserl comes to the conclusion th at not hing less thanthe e n d u r a n c e of consciousness, its numerical identityacross time, c a n account for the unity of conscious-ness. Indeed, the newly discovered Ego is not an enti-ty 'inside'consciousness, it is 'reduced' consciousnessitself. Thus, Husserl changes his conception of thenature o f the interconnec tedness required for the unityof consciousness and for the experience o f the u nity ofconsciousness. That interconnectedness involves now,irreducibly, a tacit (intentional) reference by each of a


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1 6 0 I Z C H A K M I L L E R

d e p e n d s o n a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f hi s n o t io n o f p h e -n o m e n o l o g i c a l r e d u c t i o n . I a m a s s u m i n g t h a t t h er e a d e r i s f a m i l i a r w i t h H u s s e r l ' s c o n c e p t o f r e d u c ti o n . 7

S e c o n d , a n o b v i o u s q u e s t io n i s w h y n o t p r o c e e dd i r e c t l y f ro m ( a ) , t h e c l a i m o fe p i s t e m i c p r i v i l e g e , ( b )a n d ( c ) t o t h e c o n c l u s i o n (d )? W e l l , t h e r e i s n o t h i n gt h a t p r e v e n t s t h e later H u s s e r l f r o m d o i n g s o . F o r h e isn o w c o n v i n c e d o f t h e t r u t h o f ( a ) . B u t t h e f a c tr e m a i n s t h a t t h e r e w a s a t i m e i n w h i c h h e w a s n ' t c o n -v i n c e d o f i t. H i s i n c l i n a t i o n , e a r l i e r , w a s t o s a y t h a t i ti s n o t t h e endurance o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s t h a t w e r e f l e c -t i v e l y e x p e r i e n c e , b u t i t s unity; a n d t h a t t h e l a t t e r c a nb e a c c o u n t e d f o r b y s o m e ' i n t e r c o n n e c t e d n e s s ' a m o n ge x p e r i e n c e s , o n e t h a t d o e s n o t p r e s u p p o s e t h ee n d u r a n c e o f c o n s ci o u sn e s s. T h e p h e n o m e n o n o fc o n s c i o u s change, o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , c a n n o t b e a sr e a d i l y ' a n a l y z e d a w a y ' , a n d i t is h i s t h i n k i n g a b o u tc o n s c i o u s change t h a t l e d t o h i s c o n v e r s i o n . S o t h ea r g u m e n t a s p r o c e e d i n g f r o m ( a ') , r a t h e r t h a n f r o m(a ) , r e f l e c t s , i n m y o p i n i o n , t h e a c t u a l t h e o re t i c a lro u t e t h a t H u s s e r l t o o k .

Th i rd , i t i s i m p o r t a n t t o n o t e t h a t , e v e n i f s o u n d ,t h e a r g u m e n t I r e c o n s t r u c t e d a b o v e f o r H u s s e r l i s n o t ,b y i t se l f, st r o n g e n o u g h t o y i e l d t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h eEg o i s a n u m e r i c a l l y i d e n t i c a l Eg o a c ro s s a p e r s o n ' sl i fe - t ime. S t r i c t ly speak ing , a l l tha t i t y ie lds i s an E got h a t e n d u re s through the period occupied by the reflec-tively observed change. B u t r e f l e c t i v e o b s e rv a t i o n i sl i m i t e d t o t h e t e m p o r a l n e i g h b o r h o o d o f t h e ' p r e s e n tm o m e n t ' . S o t h i s s t i l l l e a v e s o p e n t h e t h e o re t i c a l p o s -s i b i l i t y t h a t n u m e r i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t Eg o s e x i s t i n d i f -f e r e n t s e g m e n t s o f a p e r s o n ' s l i f e - t im e . H u s s e r l r u l e so u t t h a t p o s s i b i l i t y t h ro u g h a n a d d i t i o n a l a rg u m e n t ,d e r i v e d f r o m h i s a c c o u n t o f experiential memory.B r i e fl y , H u s s e r l a r g u e s t h a t a m e m o r y o f a p a st e x p e r i -e n c e p r e s u p p o s e s t h e i d e n t i f ic a t i o n o f t h e p a s t a n dp re s e n t Eg o s a s b e i n g o n e a n d t h e s a m e . I l e a v e t h e d i s-c u s s i o n o f H u s s e r l ' s a c c o u n t o f e x p e r i e n t ia l m e m o r yt o a n o t h e r o c c a s i o n .

Th e r e d u c e d e g o i s a l t e rn a t i v e l y r e f e r r e d t o b yH u s s e r l a s the pure Ego, the transcendental Ego, o r a sthe phenomenological Ego. S o m e o f t h e p u r e E g o ' sa t t r i b u t e s a r e a b i d i n g p ro p e r t i e s , s u c h a s c h a ra c t e rt r a i t s ; o t h e r s a r e e p i s o d i c p ro p e r t i e s ( i n t e n t i o n a le v e n t s ) i n t h e f o r m o f "cogito'. T h e l a t t e r a r e a c t s o fc o n s c i o u s n e s s .

H u s s e r l ' s d i s ti n c t io n b e t w e e n t h e p u r e E g o a n d t h ee m p i r i c a l e g o h a s l e d s o m e o f hi s r e a d e r s t o c o n c l u d et h a t H u s s e r l i s c o m m i t t e d t o a C a r t e s i a n m i n d - b o d y

d u a l is m . W h i l e I o f f e r n o o p i n i o n a b o u t H u s s e r l 'se x t r a - p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l s e n t i m e n t s , I d o i ns is t t h a tH u s s e r l ' s p h e n o m e n o l o g y d o e s not entail m i n d - b o d yd u a l i s m . In f a c t , H u s s e r l e x p l i c i t l y c r i t i c i z e s D e s -c a r t e s ' c o n c l u s i o n t h a t h i s r e d u c e d e g o i s a substantiacogitans a s b e i n g a c o n c l u s i o n t o w h i c h D e s c a r t e s w a sn o t e n t i t l e d b y h i s o w n e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l p r i n c i p l e s ,a n d a s a v i e w w h i c h c a n n o t b e d e r i v e d f r o m p u r e l yp h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . [CM, p . 24 ] Al -t h o u g h I d o n o t a rg u e fo r t h is v i e w i n t h i s e s s ay , I i ns i s tt h a t H u s s e r l ' s p h e n o m e n o l o g y i s c o m p a t i b l e w i t h ( a tl e a st s o m e v e r s i o n s o f ) b o t h m i n d - b o d y d u a l i s m a n dm i n d - b o d y m o n i sm .

In s a y i n g t h a t o u r a c t s a r e i n t h e fo rm o f cogito (t h i n k , I p e r c e i v e , I r e m e m b e r , e t c .) , H u s s e r l i s m a k i n g ,i n m y o p i n i o n , a t w o fo l d c l a i m . T h e f i rs t i s a n onto-logical c l a i m , n a m e l y , t h a t t h e p u re Eg o i s l i t e r a l l y int h e a c t a s i ts s u b j e c t (i t l i v e s i n th e a c t - a s H u s s e r ls a y s ) , a n d t h a t o n e a n d t h e s a m e p u re Eg o i s in a l l m ya c t s. Th u s , m y ' s t r e a m ' o f a c t s is a u n i t a ry s t r e a m o fa c t s d i s t in c t f r o m o t h e r s t r e a m s o f a c t s s i n c e o n eu n i q u e p u re Eg o i s ' i n ' ( i s t h e s u b j e c t o f ) e a c h a n de v e ry a c t o f t h a t s t r e a m . Th e s e c o n d c l a i m i s a phe-nomenological o n e , n a m e l y , t h a t e a c h a n d e v e r y o n eo f m y a c t s , a p a r t f r o m b e i n g o b j e c t -d i r e c t e d , i s a l s o -i n a p a s s iv e , a p p e rc e p t i v e , w a y - E g o -d i r e c t e d . I t i s i nv i r t u e o f t h e l a t t e r t h a t I a m ' p r e - r e f l e c t i v e l y ' c o n -t i n u a l l y a w a re - a g a i n , i n a p a s s i v e , a p p e rc e p t i v e , w a y- o f m y o w n c o n s c i o u s s i n g u l a ri t y a s a n endurings i n g u l a r i t y . Th u s , t h e p u re Eg o , a c c o rd i n g t o H u s s e r l ,i s n o t a m e re o n t o l o g i c a l p o s t u l a t e . I t i s a s e l f - a w a reEg o ; it ' a n n o u n c e s ' i t s e l f i n i ts c o n s c i o u s a c t s, o r - a sH u s s e r l t e c h n i c a l l y p u t s i t - i t i s a s e l f - c o n t i n u i n g Eg o :

. .. w e . . . d i s t i n g u i s h - d e s p i t e t h e n e c e ss a r y i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p - t h eexper ience i t se l f f rom t h e p u r e E g o o f t h e e x p e r i e n c i n g p r o c e s s ;a n d a g a i n : t h e pure sub jec t ive phase o f the way o f exper ienc ingf r o m t h e r e m a i n i n g Ego d iver ted con ten t o f the exper ience so t os p e a k . T h u s t h e r e is a c er t a i n e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y im p o r t a n t t w o -s i d e d n e ss i n t h e e s s e n t ia l n a t u r e o f t h e s p h e r e o f e x p e r i e n c e c o n -c e r n i n g w h i c h w e c a n a l s o s a y t h a t i n e x p e r i e n c e w e m u s t d i s -t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n a subjectively and an objectively orientedaspec t . . . [ Ideas p p . 2 1 4 - 2 1 5 ]

Th e Eg o i s h i mse l f existent for himself i n c o n t i n u o u s e v i d e n c e ;t h u s i n h i mse l f h e i s c o n t i n u o u sl y c o n s t it u t in g h i m s e l f a se x i s t in g . . . . T h e E g o g r a s p s h i m s e l f n o t o n l y a s a f l o w i n g l if e b u ta l s o a s / w h o l i v e s t h i s a n d t h a t s u b j e c ti v e p r o c e s s w h o l i v e st h r o u g h t h i s a n d t h a t c o g i t o a s t h e s a m e I [ C M p. 66].

To s a y t h a t t h e p u re E g o c o n s t i t u t e s i t s e l f a s e x is t e n t i snot t o s a y t h a t i t c a u s e s i t s e l f t o b e , o r t h a t i t o t h e rw i s e


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H U S S R L O N T H G O 161brings about its own being, but just that certainfeatures of its acts are interconnected in such a way soas to produce a continuous (passive) awareness of itsenduring singularity.

The o n t o l o g i c a l and the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l claimsabout the nature of the pure Ego made by Husserlshould n ot be confused with one another, despite someoccasional ambiguities in his text. For instance, bysaying that the pure Ego 'lives' in its acts, Husserlsometimes seems to intend the ontological point,namely, that the Ego is 'in' the act as its subject; butmost of the time he intends, instead, the phenome no-logical point, namely, that the Ego constitutes itselfthrou gh its acts.

The ontological point about the Ego is that it is ac o n s t i t u e n t of its acts in a sense similar to that inwhich, say, a bouncing ball is a c o n s t i t u e n t of theevent of its bouncing. In both these cases we dis-tinguished the 'subject' of the event from the eventitself. Phenomenologically, however, an act is con-ceived of as a 'pure' (intentional) episode, an eventwhose 'content' designates its Ego, on the one 'end',and its (purported) object, on the other. When Husserlinsists that the pure Ego can in no sense be reckonedas a real [reell] part o r phase o f the experiences th em-selves , he is n o t denying the ontological point thatthe Ego is a constituent of its acts. He is asserting,instead, that the pure Ego, unlike its acts, is n o t i t s e l fa n e v e n t , an abiding act, an impression, an 'idea fix'.

Husserl insists that my Ego is continually experi-enced by me as an e n d u r i n g singularity, as one and thesame T. I maintain tha t Husserl thoug ht of the 'I'comp onen t of the no ema in terms singular to those inwhich he tho ught of the determinable-X. In particular,he conceived of the T comp onen t as a 'purely re-ferring' element in the noema which determines thesubject p e r s e , in abstraction from its Ego-properties,as the subject of the act. For symmetry's sake, I willrefer to that subject-determining component of thenoema as 'the determinable-I'. Furthermore, Husserlthought of the structure of my continual s e n s e ofpersonal identity in terms singular to those he though tof the structure of my continual experience of theidentity of(purport ed) 'external' objects.

Take an interval of time along which I continuallyexperience mysel f as being one and the same. At a nygiven moment of the duration of that experience Ihave a 'grand' noema corresponding to my totalexperience at that moment which contains a determi-

nable-I. Let us focus on two different moments alongmy experience, tl and t2. 8 The way I understandHusserl's view, he maintained (and I concur) that myexperience of mysel f as being the same person at t2 asat t~ does n o t consist in an attributive 're-identifica-tion' of myself, based on my attributes at ti and t2.Instead, it consists in a straightforward i d e n t i f i c a t i o nof the T of the present experience with the T of theprevious experience by p r e s c r i b i n g t h e i d e n t i t y of thepresently experienced subject with the earlier experi-enced one. What I have in mind is represented by thefollowing schematic 'state-description' of what Hus-serl would call my phenome nologicall y-reduced self att2, i.e. the description of the content of my senseof self at t2:(A) I(t2) [=l (tl ) [Sl, s2 . . . . ] , s~ , s~ . . . . ] ,to be informally understood as the content of thepredicates self-ascribedby me at t2, viz. identity withmyse lf at fi, i nclud ing the attributes s~, s2 .. .. that Itake at t2 to have ascribed to myself at t~, followed bys~, s~ .... which are the attributes I currently ascribeto myself.9

This is, in the broadest of outlines, my view ofHusserl's conception of the structure of my s e n s e ofpersonal identity. The details still need to be workedout.Husserl's view of the pure Ego does put some strainon his distinction between the i m m a n e n t and thet r a n s c e n d e n t . In being a constituent of its act which'survives' the reduction, the pure Ego seems to qualifyas an i m m a n e n t entity. However, according toHusserl, our pure Ego is never adequately given to usat any given mo ment of our awareness of it. There ispast 'activity' of the Ego which is not retained orremembered, as there is future 'activity' which is notyet experienced, not to mention its abiding disposi-tional properties. Thus, the Ego is, in some legitimatesense, always given to us as from a l i m i t e d point-of-view, from which not all that there is to the Ego isrevealed to us. In being, thus, inadequat ely given to us,our pure Ego seems to qualify as a t r a n s c e n d e n tentity. ~

The pure Ego, considered together with its ha-bitualities and its full 'stream' of intentional episodes,Husserl calls t h e E g o i n i t s f u l l c o n c r e t e n e s s , and forthe Ego in its full concreteness Husserl proposes theLeibnizian name m o n a d . [ C M , pp. 67-68] Indeed,the Ego in its full concreteness is much like a Leib-


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62 I Z C H A K M I L L E R

n i z i a n m o n a d . I t i s a n E g o w h i c h ' c o n s c i o u s e s ' f o ri t s e l f ( p u r p o r t s f o r i ts e l f) i n g r e a t d e t a i l a w o r l d i nw h i c h i t i s a n e m b o d i e d s e lf , a n d i n w h i c h t h e r e a r eo t h e r e m b o d i e d i n d i v i d u a l s j u s t l ik e i t s e lf w i t h w h o mi t i s e n g a g e d i n a n e t w o r k o f r e l a t io n s . H o w e v e r , w em u s t b e c a r e f u l , a s H u s s e r l i s, n o t t o i m p o r t i n t o p h e -n o m e n o l o g y w i t h t h e t e r m 'm o n a d L e i b n i z ' s p h e -n o m e n a l i s t i c c o n v i c t i o n s .

9 T h e f o r m a l i s m f o l lo w s a s c h e m a t i c f o r p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l d e s cr i p -t i o n s d e v e l o p e d a n d d i s c u ss e d i n m y b o o k Husserl , Perception, andTemporal Awareness (1984), op. cit.l0 Husse r l seems to be aw are o f th is d i f f icu lty , even though the w ayin which he s ta tes i t i s no t ve ry c lea r . C f . Ideas, p. 157.D e p t . o f P h i lo s o p h yU n i v e rs i ty o f P e n n s y l v a n i aP h i l a d e l p h i a , P A 1 9 1 0 4, U . S . A .

o t e s

l T h is pap er i s a seque l to a sec t ion in Chap te r 9 o f my boo k ,Husserl . Perception, and Temporal Awareness, Bradfo rd Books ,The M IT Press , 1984.2 F o r a n e x c e l l en t h i s t o r i c a l a c c o u n t o f H u s s e r l ' s c o n c e p t o f e g o, s eeD o u g l a s H e i n s e n ' s ' H u s s e r l ' s t h e o r y o f t h e p u r e e g o ' , i n Husserl,Intentionality and Cog nitive Scien ce, e d . b y H u b e r t D r e y f u s ,Bradfo rd Books , The M IT Press, 1982.3 I a m u s i n g h e r e t h e v e r b ' t o r e m e m b e r ' i n a n experiential sense,i . e ., in a sense which , u n l ike the relational v e r si o n o f ' t o r e m e m b e r ' ,d o e s n o t a d m i t o f e x i s t e n t ia l g e n e r a li z a t i o n .4 F o r a s u b s e q u e n t d i s c u s s io n b y H u s s e r l i n w h i c h h e e n d s u pr e j e ct i n g B r e n t a n o ' s t h e o r y o f p r i m o r d i a l a s s o c i a t io n a s a n a d e q u a t ea c c o u n t o f t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f t e m p o r a l c o n t i n u i t y , s e e h is The Phe-nomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness.5 I n t h e t e r m i n o l o g y of ldeas: t h e e g o i s n o t a ' r e e l l ' c o m p o n e n t o fconsc iousness . 'Ree l l ' i s a rea l i ty p red ica te Husse r l inven ts tocharac te r ize , exc lus ive ly , consc ious s ta tes and even ts .6 T h e o u t p u t o f t h a t s t u d y is a m a s s i v e a m o u n t o f m a n u s c r i p t n o t es ,m o s t o f w h i c h a r e n o t y e t p u b l i s h e d . I n t h e m i d - t w e n t i e s h e a s k e dM a r t i n H e i d e g g er t o e d i t s o m e o f t h es e n o t e s f o r p u b l i c a t i o n .T h e p r o d u c t o f H e id e g g e r' s l a b o r a p p e a r e d i n t h e Jahrbuch J~rPhilosophic und phdnom enologische Forschung (1928), Halle a .S. ,M a x N i e m e y e r , p p . 3 6 7 - 4 9 8 . T h i s i m p o r t a n t , b u t l i m i t e d , c o l l e c -t i o n o f p a p e r s w a s t r a n s l a t e d i n t o E n g l i s h a n d a p p e a r e d u n d e r t h et i t le The Phenom enology o f Internal Time-Consciousness (1964)t r a n s , b y J . S . C h u r c h i l l , I n d i a n a U n i v e r s i t y P re ss , a n d u n f o r t u n a t e l yi t i s cu r ren t ly ou t o f p r in t . A m ore sa t i s fy ing se t o f Husse r l ' s no tes ,u n d e r t h e t i t l e Zu r Phdnom enologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins( 1 8 9 3 - 1 9 1 7 ) , w a s p u b l i s h e d i n 1 9 66 b y M a r t i n u s N i j h o f f ( D e nH a a g ) a s V o l u m e 1 0 ( B a n d X ) of Husserliana.7 In pa r t icu la r , I am assum ing fami l ia r i ty wi th the in te rp re ta t iono f t h e r e d u c t i o n a s a d v a n c e d b y D a g f i n n F o l l e s d a l i n h i s ' H u s s e r l ' sn o t i o n o f n o e m a ' ( 1 9 6 9 ) , The Journal of Philosophy L X V l ,6 8 0- -6 8 7. T h a t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n w a s f u r th e r e l a b o r a t e d u p o n b y D a v i dS m i t h a n d R o n a l d M c I n t y re i n t h e i r Husserl an d Intentionality. AStud) , of Mind, Mean ing and Language ( 1971 ) , D. Re ide l Pub l . Co . ,D o r d r e c h t , a n d b y m y s e l f i n Husserl , Perception and TemporalAwareness (1984), op. cir.8 A g a i n , t h es e t w o m o m e n t s a r e m o m e n t s i n m y ' i n t e r n a l t i m e ' , i .e .,i n t h e t e m p o r a l o r d e r i n g o f m y e x p e r ie n c e s . A f u r t h e r a s s u m p t i o n i st h a t m y e x p e r i e n c e a t t h e f ir s t m o m e n t i s s ti l l w i t h i n m y ' r e t e n t i o n a ls p a n ' a t t h e s e c o n d m o m e n t .

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Topoi Volume 5 Issue 2 1986 [Doi 10.1007%2Fbf00139229] Izchak Miller -- Husserl on the Ego