Upload
leonard-bennett
View
228
Download
6
Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
Torkel Soma25. August 2010
Can safety culture be measured?
DNV Solutions DNV contact person:
© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved.
01 April 2009
A simple model of key business elements
Ambition
Framework conditions
Resources How the work is done
© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved.
01 April 2009
Is safety going the wrong direction?Navigational accident frequency for various ship segments
0
0,002
0,004
0,006
0,008
0,01
0,012
0,014
0,016
0,018
0,02
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Year
Se
rio
us
acc
ide
nt
fre
qu
ency
(N
um
ber
of
acc
ide
nts
/ n
um
ber
of
ship
)
Crude oil tankers over 100,000 dwtChemical tankers over 10,000 dwtContainer vessels over 20,000 dwtRoRo cargo ships over 10,000 dwtBulkers over 50,000 dwt
© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved.
01 April 2009
Studies in various industries demonstrates that more than 90% of all serious accidents are triggered by at least one unsafe human act
An unsafe act or condition is an incident that did, or potentially could have, caused damage
Unsafe human acts (96%)
Unsafe conditions(4%)
To improve operational performance, the key is to understand how to improve
Violation of procedures is a typical unsafe act
© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved.
01 April 2009
Cross industry studies summarise some circumstances that increases likelihood of violations
Perceived low likelihood of detection
Inconvenient to follow procedures
Status to violate and override instructions
Copying behaviour
No disapproving authority figure present
Expectations to obey authority figure
Gender (Male)
Perceived group pressure
How often do you break procedures?
0 %
10 %
20 %
30 %
40 %
50 %
60 %
Never (0-20% of occations) Often (20-60% of occations) Mostly (60-100% of occations)
Pe
rce
nta
ge
of
res
po
nd
en
ts
Procedures in general
There is a relationship between violations and risk behaviour implying that there is a significant improvement potential in safer shipping
Surveys for 15 000 seafarers shows that roughly 50% admit that they break procedures on a general basis
© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved.
01 April 2009
Is ISM implemented?
Distribution of non-conformities- Mapping of 8000 ISM non-conformities- 54% are of a “Plan” character
0 %
20 %
40 %
60 %
Plan Do Check Act·Development of plans for shipboard operations·Objectives and functional requirements·Maintenance system·Document control
·Maintenance of vessel & equipment·Familiarisation and training·Emergency preparedness·Promotion of reliability
·Reports and analysis of non-conformities, accidents and hazardous occurences·Internal audits·Inspection intervals·Ensuring vessel is maintained·Investigation and analysis
·Implementation of corrective actions·Corrective action·Timely corrective action
© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved.
01 April 2009
Safety culture in shipping
“The captain has the last
word”
“Safety is our first priority!”
Observable circumstances: Visible behaviors such as organizational structures, practices and processes, technology, routines, and language
Expressed truth: Is a set of beliefs on “what ought to be”
Behavioral drivers: Underlying assumptions that are unconscious, taken-for-granted
§ The captain has the overriding
authority
Risk assessment is completed
before start-up
An incident reporting system
is in place
“Safety First” is painted on the
bulkhead
“It is important to be proactive!”
“We have a no-blame
policy”
If I report that I have failed, I will be
sanctioned
To stop the job is not an acceptable
option
The procedures are there only to reduce management responsibility
It is only fools that causes accidents
To speak up is an offence to the person in charge
© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved.
01 April 2009
There are different maturity levels of safety culture …
Safety performance
Saf
ety
Cul
ture
Mat
urity
Bureaucratic Culture
Ignorant Culture
Ad-hoc Culture
Aware Culture
Learning Culture
Safety is something you have or not. The greatest threat is seen as . human error. Safety is dependent on HSE department.
Safety is documentation of rules. Ignores warning signs, many audits, focus on PPE. Safety is dependent on rules.
Accidents are part of the business. Blame and train, sack the idiot. Reactive approach to safety.
Safety is seen as business critical and must actively be created by everyone independent of HSE departm.
Ability to learn and actively avoid and recover from critical situations. Interdependent/just culture
© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved.
01 April 2009
© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved.
01 April 2009
Significant safety improvement achieved by addressing safety culture
Rapid improvement on safety performance is achievable
Annual insurance claims down from 10 to 1
50% reduction serious accident frequency over three years
An annual saving of 10 million dollar
Improved safety reputation
Improved organisational learning
© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved.
01 April 2009
So… can safety culture be measured?
Ambition
Framework conditions
Resources How the work is done
There are variances in the efficiency of safety cultures
It is possible to assess these variances IF the people involved is willing to “open up”
So, yes to that extent we can measure safety culture
© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved.
01 April 2009
Safeguarding life, property and the environment
www.dnv.com