Toward a Theory of Deception

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Toward a Theory of DeceptionJ. Bowyer Bell a

a International Analysis Center, New York City.

Online Publication Date: 01 January 2003

To cite this Article Bell, J. Bowyer(2003)'Toward a Theory of Deception',International Journal of Intelligence andCounterIntelligence,16:2,244 — 279

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J. BOWYER BELL

Toward a Theory of Deception1

Deception is an aspect of human perception that is in turn shaped byobjective reality along with physiological and psychological factors.Humans apparently require consistency and cohesion in perception. Thus,sense is made of reality by the translation of the real world into agreedpatterns. Physical—objective—reality consists of the accepted patterndetermined by both physiological and psychological means. A generalconsensus has been reached on the nature of colors, the touch of water orthe presence of a moon. Although one observer may see the moon as asatellite of the earth in a small solar system on the edge of a minor galaxy,and another as the largest body in the sky circling in a crystalline spherethe earth at the center of the universe, both agree that the moon exists.

Deception is the conscious, planned intrusion of an illusion seeking to altera target’s perception of reality, replacing objective reality with perceivedreality: gamblers mark cards, magicians make an elephant disappear onstage to delight the audience. Deceiving, cheating, offering the false is anintegral aspect of human society. Loaded dice have been found inEgyptian tombs, and audiences are fooled by magicians the same way theywere five hundred years ago—and with variations of the same tricks.

Deception may also be imposed by nature. An optical illusion createsambiguities or contradictions in an observer’s perception. A stick thrustinto water is seen as crooked. Lines can be made to appear longer orshorter. Some drawings are first seen as two profiles, and then as a vase,and cannot be made stable by the observer. All of these arise from thestructure of the brain that translates data into image.

Dr. J. Bowyer Bell is President of the International Analysis Center, New YorkCity, and a member of the Editorial Board of Studies in Conflict & Terrorism:The author of numerous books and articles on terrorism and guerrilla warfare,his most recent work is Murders on the Nile : The World Trade Center andGlobal Terror (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2003).

International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 16: 244–279, 2003

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DOI: 10.1080/08850600390198742

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But the most common examples in nature are those illusions that haveevolved over time, to the advantage of a specific species. The deceptivecharacteristics or behaviors are patterns that deceive enemies, attractfriends, encourage breeding, or offer some advantage. A zebra’s stripes,very visible in broad daylight, hide the animal at the twilight huntinghours. The cuckoo finds a surrogate mother for its egg. The evolutionaryprocess has resulted in an adaptation that aids in survival, but the cuckoodid not plan the coloring of the egg or the zebra the stripes.

These natural phenomena lie outside deception planning concerns. Theymay be useful as examples or analogies for the planner, just as opticalillusions may be useful; but deception is a human construction, not aproduct of physiology or evolution. Deception may also be the result ofself-deception when a congenial illusion is preferred to objective reality.The observer sees what he chooses to see. Then the process channels apattern onto a mirror, so that the illusion is both sent and received by thesame individual. Desired reality becomes perceived reality, and is taken asobjective reality. What is seen is not only what is expected—as is mostlythe case—or what someone wants seen, as is the case with deception, butalso what is wanted.

An illusion is thus imposed unconsciously on reality. A general may seekand then create evidence of his opponents’ weakness. His enemy may ormay not exploit such predilections to hide their formations and reinforcethe illusion. A deception planner thus can exploit natural deception asexample and self-deception as opportunity but, in most cases, must fashiona compelling ruse, and channel the results, hoping that the target willaccept the illusion and act on the new pattern.

A universal means of such planned deception has been lying, i.e., adjustingthe spoken word to advantage. Easy to do, cheap to do, and often visiblyeffective. The goal of the lie—the ruse accepted as illusion—may vary.Those who lie to themselves are involved in self-deception and need onlythe planner’s encouragement. Those who lie may be seeking only thegratification on the acceptance of a lie—a frisson of control. Any lie willdo if believed. A lie may be a social lubricant, validation of a swindle,a means to achieve a special end, a way to hide motive or guilt, to sell astock or to win a lady. The lie is part of a process that adjusts reality, aprocess that sells the stock or wins the lady.

This deception process is a cycle that is valid for all ruses, no matter howconstructed. The ruses may include the effects of optical illusion, and thehope that the delusions of the target can be manipulated to advantage, butthe construct is largely shaped to be a compelling pattern that will imposean alternative reality that will lead to the planner’s advantage: the enemygeneral defeated, the armada saved, the stock sold, and the lady won.Something is hidden, something shown, a pattern composed and the target

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deceived, manipulated. The investment in the deceit may be enormous ormerely a cloud of dust to simulate an army, a bit of mud to hide thesoldier. In the summer of 1941, the British camouflage expert JasperMaskelyne hid the city of Alexandria and created another, hid the SuezCanal, and in 1944 the Allied deception planners offered the Germans ahuge notional army through a combination of ruses and channels. A fibmay serve to deceive, or a coat of paint, but each is integrated into ageneral deception cycle.

DEFINING DECEPTION

Deception is the transformation of a target’s perceptions by a plannerchanneling one or more ruses, composed of simulative (showing) anddissimulative (hiding) constructs, that once accepted as an illusion changesobjective reality and the target who accepts the false as real, and responds.The planner analyzing the result, the response of the target; may maintainthe first channeled ruse or devise other validating ruses to channel ordiscontinue the effort. In sum, deception is the process of advantageouslyimposing the false on a target’s perception of reality.

Understanding this deception process has been clouded by those whodeceive naturally, do so without theory or contemplation, by a lack of aspecific vocabulary to refer to the dynamics involved. A wide variety ofterms that have long been in everyday usage have overlapping andambiguous meanings. No clear difference in usage exists between ‘‘wile’’and ‘‘ruse,’’ and there is considerable confusion as to the nature of‘‘surprise’’—often taken as a goal when actually the byproduct of thetermination of an illusion. For example, many words in everyday usageare used variously, and the dictionary definition is often of limitedassistance in distinguishing between a copy and a forgery, or an artificeand a trick. Magicians have their own extensive language to describe theirdeception activities with special meanings: a ‘‘method’’ is the means bywhich a trick is done and the ‘‘illusion’’ is what the magician creates andthe audience accepts. The military uses congenial terms. And in matters ofdeception, no matter the long ancestry of practice, the wheel is regularlybeing reinvented.

In deception planning, any theory must not only have a specific, agreedvocabulary but also adjust to objective reality—the real world. Deceptionis essentially by a qualitative not quantitative activity—often a matter ofjudgment, predilection, personal prejudice, the contingent, and convenient.Much deception depends on perspective and interpretations. Many vintagephotographic prints were not done at the time by the photographer orauthenticated. The buyers saw what they chose to see—some stayedcontent and others in time became outraged that their ‘‘vintage’’ print was

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not as vintage as imagined. The art world is replete with painters copyingtheir earlier and more valuable work, denying earlier work they no longerlike, and galleries running off unauthorized prints. What is seen is a matterof desire and consensus rather than objective reality.

In fact, all realist paintings are illusions: perspective or likeness achieved bythe ruses of paint on a flat surface, optical illusions in the service of art. Andlike the art world, the real world is not easily modeled, categories merge, anddistinctions have muddled edges. The contemporary artist Kosabi has astudio assistant paint ‘‘his’’ paintings and limits himself to deciding on thetitle. An assistant who tried to sell his own ‘‘Kosabi’’ work wassuccessfully sued. Dan Flavin made light sculptures out of fluorescenttubes easily purchased at a hardware store but offered with a certificate ofauthenticity: the fluorescent bar was the same in all ways, but withFlavin’s imprimatur, worth $150,000 rather than $30. The buyer must havea document that tells him what is being seen lest he be deceived. Not onlybeauty, but worth, may be in the eye of the beholder.

Deception can engender a change in a target’s perception that can berigorously analyzed but not precisely quantified. Much is a matter ofdegree. A target may respond to deception in ways that lie along an arc ofintens i ty— a l ine of increas ing presence of the e lement underconsideration—or a ruse increasingly composed of simulative elements.The response to an illusion or the degree of a ruse is either simulative ordissimulative, shows or hides, is not always sharp-edged. The ruse and anillusion mesh in varying ways at varying speeds. Objective reality is editedby individuals or monitors when received into perceived reality, subject toqualitative factors and entangled with the contingent, the unforeseen, andthe muddle of time.

DECEPTION PROCESS

Deception is a conscious process that mingles the psychological and, in somecases, the physiological to offer a target an alternative reality—if accepted, anillusion—to achieve advantage. The illusion may be a Man Ray print boughtas vintage, gaming dice shaved in ancient Egypt, or the Arab assumption inJune 1967 that the Israelis would not attack. An individual may buyworthless stock or visitors may be impressed with the powerful voice of theWizard of Oz. They are deceived about the nature of reality. And thedeception planner anticipates gain—a sale or power and influence in Oz.

Objective reality is the physical world as perceived. What is really there.Perceived reality is determined by the observer, and may be identical withobjective reality, or an illusion, or a mix. In all cases, observers seekcoherence, want patterns, continuity, certainty. They prefer to see what




they expect to see, so much so that at times, when the ruse is revealed, theypersist in believing the illusion.

The familiar has an enormous hold on perception. Even novelty is apt tobe adjusted to a congenial pattern or simply ignored. Deception planners canoften rely on the target to adjust to expectations of arena, pattern, andpreference, or to absorb as illusion, even novelty, without discovering theruse. Even the alert have a predisposition to accept perceived reality—almost any ‘‘surprise’’ attack, even against the forewarned, comes as asurprise: the conviction is that tomorrow will be like yesterday.

Even in the physical sciences, the perception of patterns—usually assumedas a facet of objective reality—there is a tendency to adjust the accepted torepel or absorb new evidence. Old patterns and expectations persist.Everyone ‘‘knew’’ that larger objects fall faster because Aristotle said so—and so no further experimental data was needed. The new data, theparticular means of acquisition, and the implications of challengingauthority are questioned rather than the old pattern. The consensus-realityis constantly adjusted to absorb any new data until such a processbecomes too complex. In astronomy, the acceptance that the earth was notthe center of the universe came slowly. Data was adjusted until, over time,the consensus and so the pattern changed—the illusion was that the suncircled the earth, the consensus became that the earth orbited the sun.Some scientists never give up the comfort of the old theory, no matter howflawed as a description of reality. And the long-held illusion of the sunrising and setting on an orbit around the earth remained a popularperception for centuries. Like old soldiers, old certainties fade away, oftenslowly, and over long periods of time. In fact, there are still those whobelieve the earth is flat and evolution a delusion.

Perception at Work

Perceived reality can even repel hard evidence. In 1921, The New York Timesrevealed that the widely circulated document The Protocols of the Elders ofZion that offered evidence of a malevolent Jewish plot for worlddomination was a forgery. The motor car magnate, Henry Ford, who hadlong cited the work, noted after the revelation that ‘‘The only statement Icare to make about the Protocols is that they fit with what is going on.They have fitted the world situation up to this time. They fit now.’’ Thusto Ford, what ‘‘fitted’’ his predisposition was true—or at least valid.

The pattern expected is the pattern perceived. The innocent eye does notnotice that there is a bonding design in brick walls composed of theheaders (short ends) and stretchers (the long side), but sees merely‘‘bricks.’’ When the pattern is disclosed, the eye is no longer innocent andno subsequent brick wall is perceived the same. Perception of reality haschanged. For a millennium, no one perceived that women had the same

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number of ribs as men, since all knew that Adam had lost a rib for Eve. Therewas no need to adjust to the problem of the unexpected rib, only to see whatwas expected. In the first case, the observer did not observe closely, out ofhabit, and in the second, need not observe, because reality was alreadyknown.

The Arab states in June 1967 felt no need to go on alert, in part becausetheir own threat was not intended to lead to a real war, and so Israelideception ruses had a ready audience. In fact, the deception planner mayrely on not only the power of existing patterns, but the predilections of thetarget—in some cases so intrusive as to be delusory. So, there is alwaysthe prospect that the target of any deception plan will be self-deceived, orat least predisposed to accept an illusion made appealing. Hitler believedin his imaginary divisions in the spring of 1945 because the alternative wastoo distasteful, not because the Russians went to great effort to deceivehim. He was predisposed to anticipate the Calais area as the focus of anyAnglo-American invasion of Europe in 1944, and so eased the task of theAllied deception planners.

The perceptual advantages for a deception planner are often coupled withlow cost: deception can be made to work and work cheaply. One horsebehind a hill dragging a blanket to raise a cloud of dust can mimic anarmy on the move, just as one hat on a stick can mimic a target. Ofcourse, some illusions, once accepted, may engender only minimalresponses, but others can engender a vast strategic transformation. Thecourse of battle could be changed by a cloud of dust. The runner infootball, feinting one way and going the other, hardly invests eitherthought or effort, but yet may reap a highly satisfactory return, just as afew horses raising a cloud of dust may win a battle.

Classic Ruses

For a generation, the Soviet Union largely destroyed British intelligencebecause of the reports of a few hidden agents working only for ultimatesanctuary. On the other hand, for two years the Allies invested enormouseffort in hiding the nature of Operation Overlord, the invasion of France,offering false options, using hundreds of channels for thousands of ruses.Plan Bodyguard created notional armies, deployed illusory radio networks,false documents, used captured spies as channels and constructed tanksand airplanes out of canvass, rubber, and plywood. Some of the rusesbecame classics: Monty’s Double or the Man-Who-Never-Was and, inOperation Fortitude’s ‘‘Quicksilver’’ plan—the ‘‘Army Group Patton’’(FUSAG), seemingly based in East Anglia waiting—even after D-Day—tostrike at Calais. There were rigid constraints: the Germans knew that aninvasion could use only certain beaches at certain times of the year, andonly when the tide was right. Unlike the Arabs in 1967, the Germans knew




there would be an attack in 1944, and were aware of the need for both keenobservation and counterdeception. Many in the Allied command did notbelieve it possible to ‘‘hide an invasion’’—just as there are those whobelieve that space is too empty to hide a satellite, or that magicians canmake an elephant disappear on stage.

For the Allies, a successful invasion meant the war would be won, and forthe Germans, lost. Deception was worth the price—and advocated on thehighest level. Thus, Allied deception was strategic, complex, and extensive,offered many ruses and channels. Yet, the deception effort was a bargain:one percent of the D-Day effort, according to Barton Whaley’s estimate.The results were well worth the investment. Even after D day, the impactof the accepted illusion of another thrust by FUSAG remained a factor inGerman headquarters’ considerations for sixty-six days.

Balancing Expectation and E¡ort

The complexity of the ruse does not necessarily determine the scope ofthe response: one little lie can transform an empire. Generally, how-ever, the response sought is commensurate with the effort expended:the planner anticipates a reaction related to the assets invested in theruse. A lie may win a lady, but usually only after the deceiver invests in along prologue. Still, nearly always, the investment is assumed to havedisproportionate results: more for less, a force multiplier, or the falsestock sold for far more than the cost of printing the certificate. The Alliesfelt the success of Bodyguard came cheaply. Generally, the level of ruseand response, however determined, strategic or tactical or technical, issimilar in scope and complexity. But what is wanted by the planner maybe that the offered ruse, accepted as an illusion, simply maintains existingconditions. Such an accepted illusion may produce no change at all on thepart of the target: if the illusion hides the armada, then the enemy remainsoblivious. Objective reality appears to be the same to the enemy admiral,and the ruse successful.

To contrive and deploy ruses, to seek to deceive a target, is, more oftenthan not, done without recourse to theory or even a clear understanding ofthe deception process. In a sense, in some affairs—military especially—deception is always possible, but not always on the checklist of desiredactions. The military often deploys deception in response to a specialopportunity or obstacle, rather than as a conscious and integrated part ofdoctrine. Football coaches have no theory to deceive their opponents, butspend great effort in devising deceptive formations and procedures. AnAmerican football game is, in part, a contest in opposing ruses that arisefrom experience and necessity.

The nature of reality, the predisposition of the involved, standardoperating procedures, and past experience shape all planners’ approaches

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to deception. In fact, only magicians, operating in a closed universe andguaranteed an observant audience, have a consistent doctrine of deception.Mostly, in real life, beyond the stage, the deception planning is usuallydetermined as much by experience and necessity as doctrine. In somesocieties, what others call cheating is merely prudent behavior. Americanstend to assume that deception is cheating and cheating unethical—atrick—and, in any case, unneeded.2 In 1943, Admiral Ernest J. King, inturning down the advantage of surprise that miniature submarines offered,said it was the tool ‘‘of despair of have-not-nations . . .not for us.’’

Thus, once those Americans involved in Bodyguard returned to civilian lifeor retired from the military, so did their grasp of deception planning. In fact,in the United States, any resort to deception is widely considered an indicatorof weakness, and somehow also unethical. Funding deception researchengenders ethical opposition by those who hold government to ‘‘high’’ andconventional standards: swindlers cheat, not the just and righteous. On theother hand, deception was institutionalized in the Soviet Union and GreatBritain, and at times even incorporated into the Pentagon structure. Theapparent U.S. reticence to deploy deception has been taken abroad as stillanother example of Washington’s deceptive policies. The Chinese considerAmerica the most duplicitous country. In any case, in war and underpressure, the advantages of deception become more obvious, even to theAmericans who find cheating distasteful.

National characteristics are merely one of the factors that encourage orshape deception planning. And such planning may address major nationalpolicy interests—rearmament, undeclared war, appeasement—that need tobe hidden or exaggerated, or merely the concerns of a patrol into enemyterritory where mud is applied as camouflage. In all cases, the processfollows an inevitable cycle, and in only a few cases is that cycleincorporated into a doctrine.

Power and capacity, as in real life, can make deception unnecessary.Napoleon, as the power of his armies increased, relied more on force andless on cunning and misdirection. In an invasion of a small country, thelarger aggressor need only dispatch overwhelming power: how couldGrenada repulse the forces of the United States? Even in the Desert Stormoperation, deception was almost unnecessary, and employed soconventionally as to deceive few. In sports, a vastly stronger team need notinvest in the unnecessary deception effort. Capacity will override all else. IfMiami were to play Harvard, trick plays, fakes, and misdirection would beunnecessary—included in the Miami quarterback’s repertoire only becausethey were in the playbook. American military strategy has often beenbased on deploying maximum power and technological capacity withoutrecourse to duplicity—‘‘more’’ is more and force needs no enhancing, andas expected, the Iraqi military implodes.




For generations, military journals have offered articles by majorsand colonels on the advantages of deception without changing thepriorities of the generals and admirals. The deception-wheel, oftenlopsided, has been invented over and over, without greatly influencingUnited States military preferences. For strategic planners, More hasremained More—and assumed better or good enough. Yet, neither thepredilections of national character, perceived need, nor lack of formaldoctrine have prevented the repeated recourse to deception in mostfields—American generals still hide their intentions. In fact, the Americanmilitary has often generated work on the value and application ofdeception and has employed deception, but without the need of a basictheoretical foundation, just as football quarterbacks fake to the runner,and oil stocks are printed in the basement. And, each and every time,deception follows a predetermined cycle, from the planner’s concept to theplanner’s analysis of the result.

DECEPTION CYCLE

In deception, the first step is the recognition by a potential planner of theneed or opportunity to deceive a target. What must be done in deception,and often is not, is to determine the result desired from a successfulillusion. Mere acceptance of a ruse as an illusion may not be advanta-geous, and may in fact prove costly. Thus, to deceive is not sufficient.What is wanted is a proper response—the target to do something ornothing. To this end follows the planning and construction of a ruse thatcan be channeled within a decision-arena. The channel can be as complexas the ruse, and both will be entangled in the decision-arena. There, thetarget either accepts all or part—or none—of the ruse as an illusion. Thereis a spectrum of responses to the illusion that can be discerned by thedeception planner only through feedback.

The planner’s analysis of the target’s response through a spectrum offeedback may lead to immediate success or failure, or the construction offurther ruses, a shift in channels, new and parallel ruses, the persistentdispatch of the existing ruse that may or may not be altered, or elaboratedpassing through the channel that, in turn, may or may not be adjusted bythe analysis of the feedback. Thus, a cycle moves from the desire todeceive by means of a ruse that is channeled to establish an illusion, on tothe planner’s response to the success or limitations of the target’s responseto the illusion.

Entry at the planning stage of the cycle offers the opportunities andlimitation of objective reality, the dangers of self-deception, and thecounter-deception actions of the target, as well the impact of past

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experience, standard operating procedures, flawed cost-benefit analysis, thepressures of time, and the limits of existing resources, the contingent andunforeseen. The process to deceive may be adjusted by the changing needsof the deception planner or the changing perceptions of the target, by theintrusion of objective reality. It may succeed or fail, in all or in part; mayimpose unexpected change—baleful, benign, or advantageous; may suggestfurther ruses; or may in a few cases persist without further reinforcement.Defining the terms further:

(1) Deception Planning: objective goal, cost benefit, commitment, and choice ofboth ruse and channel. The goal may be to protect airplanes againstantiaircraft fire and so, if painted to blend with the sky, should be invisible.

(2) Ruse Construction: the combination of factors necessary. These factors—characteristics (charcs)—when combined generate a basic ruse. For example,to suggest great strength, radio traffic is created that mimics a larger army.What is needed is the time or radio operators and the false messages, butwhat is crucial is the channel, i.e., the radio broadcast.

(3) Channeling Selection: the projection of the ruse by use of effective means. Thechannel (the medium as message) entangles the constructed ruse with a meansof display that may be contrived or natural or both: e.g., a radio broadcastmeant to be monitored, codes that are meant to be broken, gossip spread, oran open safe filled with false documents. An effective channel may validatean ineffectual ruse, or the reverse.

(4) Ruse-Channeled: at this point the ruse is projected to impose a change in theperceived reality of the target.

(5) The Decision-Arena: where the ruse, visible to the target, is offered for receptionas an illusion. The illusion is not dispatched but created within the decision-arena. For example, an army emerges out of radio broadcasts or airreconnaissance photographs or the reports of false spies.

(6) The Illusion is accepted, and the target thus adjusts to the imposed pattern as anaspect of objective reality-acceptance. This automatically assures some sort ofadjustment, even doing nothing—sometimes, especially doing nothing. Here,the planes will be hidden from the radar, and so the antiaircraft guns cannot fire.

(7) The Target-Response and Response-Spectrum: to the intended imperatives of theillusion or to the perceived imperatives of the illusion. The crews flying the‘‘hidden’’ bombers report that antiaircraft fire is at times directed effectivelyat the camouflaged airplanes.

(8) The Illusion-Impact and Analysis of the Feedback is conducted by the deceptionplanner of the target response.

(9) A Decision to Respond to feedback: The weather, the angle of the sun, and theheight of the planes must be considered when the camouflage is chosen. If theillusion is to be effective, changes will have to be made. In all cases, the ruse canbe adjusted, confirmed, or discarded. Further channels and ruses can beconsidered.

(10) The Cycle Continued, with the deception planner adjusting or maintaining thegoal. Further planning and commitment can be given to additional, parallel,




congruent or maintained ruses, or monitoring the ruse as long as the necessaryillusion as accepted persisting, without further change.

(11) or the Cycle Closed, usually on the revelation or discovery by the target that itsperceived reality is an illusion. Most ruses have a built-in termination date;when hiding is no longer necessary the illusion self-liquidates.

The key transition in the cycle is the transformation of the channeled ruseinto an illusion and out of control of the planner until the return of feedbackthat suggests an appropriate response. The planner anticipates that theillusion will exert control on the target, thus manipulated at a distance.Such manipulation may be intended to have a very short existence, as doesa hat on a stick, or can be one without a final date, as was the case withthe Protocols of Zion.

Counter-Deception

The planner hopes that the target may not be in a position to exploit therevelation of the illusion, having already responded, according to theaspiration of the deception planner; but at times the target can initiate aduplicitous response to the illusion, and so not only counter the deceptionbut also exploit it. Thus, there can be a counter-cycle by the target whenthe illusion is revealed or discovered. The now-former target can seek toproject a counter-ruse that will offer an illusion to the original planner asto the impact of the original ruse.

An illustration of this follows. The spy dispatched is taken as a recruit until abackground check reveals that, in reality, he is an enemy of the state, but then,instead of execution, the spy is either monitored or turned, and so continues tooffer to the original planner the illusion that the ruse has been maintained, thespy is secure, and his report valid. Deception has been countered and analternative cycle, no different in structure, initiated by the target.

DECEPTION PLANNING

Deception planning begins with the aspiration to adjust existing reality to theadvantage and the agenda of the planner. What is wanted is perceived as adeception-goal, achieved through duplicity, guile, and cunning. What theplanner seeks from the beginning is a means to offer a convincing option—a pattern—that will impose a new reality on the target, and so manipulate adesirable response.

The planner must define what is wanted, what ruse may work to that effect,the costs related to the benefits, and the appropriate means to offer a changein pattern that will be accepted as an illusion, and thus manipulate the targetto respond as desired. The less information about the planner in thepossession of the target, generally the better. Secrecy is necessary to guard

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the nature of the ruse. If the target possesses an insight into the planner’scapacity and habits, deception is more difficult, but such knowledge may beof advantage if properly exploited.

Formal planning stresses the need for secrecy, the cost of deception, themeans, and the returns. On the other hand, the runner in a football gamemerely and without thought offers options—misdirection—to avoidtacklers: soldiers hide if possible when under fire, and poker playersprotect their hand, both physically and psychologically. At times there islittle planning, an almost spontaneous display of a ruse that is immediatelyaccepted as an illusion that provokes target response, and so a swiftanalysis of the response. The deception cycle may be all but instant, barelyplanned, and yet effective for the planner or the work of hundreds over aperiod of months, as was the Bodyguard plan.

A planner may be able to predict the possible response to a specific ruseby the target through analyzing past practice and predilections. Finally, aclever ruse may create a cunning illusion, but the new reality must alsoconvince the target to respond to the advantage of the planner: what iswanted is to shape a reaction to the illusion, not merely to have an illusionacceptance. At all times, the pleasure of deceit may hide the vital necessityof the purpose of deceit. And only a desired reaction indicates successfuldeception planning.

There is, as well, self-deception when an illusion is preferred over objectivereality, or otherwise compelling evidence to reality, by the target. The returnsof the investment in a pyramid scheme may be so compelling that caution isdiscarded—and logic. Then, as noted, the potential target prefers thereflection from a mirror to the confusion of objective reality. A deceptionplanner may be aware of the target’s propensity for certain illusions, butmust still create and deploy a ruse to generate a compelling illusion. Theinvestment must come with a certificate, and be sold with enoughconviction to convince even the greedy. But the dynamics of self-deceptiondiffer from those of deception, and are often irrelevant to most deceptionplanning. This is not true with the target’s specific prejudices, experience,habits, and predilections. These may be of vital use to the planner inunderstanding the target. These predispositions may arise from aninstitutionalized self-deception, may be the universals of perception, ormay arise from personal and private perspectives. The deceiver can thuscount on the natural attraction of apparent gain or reassurance, theparticular habits of the target, at times the target’s commitment to apreferred reality, as well as the skillful composition of the channeled ruse.

Rarely does a planner examine existing problems with a deceptionchecklist to hand. Most deception appears to the involved to comenaturally, but not to the magicians who have a doctrine, not to those whopaint camouflage, or to those selling fake oil stock or offering three-card




monte as a means to riches on the street corner. Deception is their trade. Atsome early stage, however, the planner opts for the perceived advantages thata successful illusion offers, and so devises a ruse to that purpose. Many rusesappear obvious to the planner: hide the location of troops, the point of amilitary attack, the strength of the cards held, or the health of an athlete,the lack of resources of the company, and always the intention of theplanner, in love or war. Only a few military commanders deny their forcesthe seeming advantages of using some ruses, and social lies make societywork. What is often forgotten, however, is that for it to work the illusionmust impose a desired response.

In Britain’s World War II campaign to seize Italian Abyssinia, GeneralArchibald Wavell intended to attack in the North, and so devised a plan topersuade the Italians he would attack in the South. Time and effort wentinto the creation and channeling of ruses, each taken as illusions by theItalians. However, instead of reinforcing the South and thus weakening theNorth, the Italians moved their troops away from what the accepted-illusionoffered—an attack in the South—and moved them to ‘‘safety’’ in the Northin the path of the real attack. Wavell had his ruse accepted as an illusion,but had lost his investment, and compromised his prospects in Abyssinia.

Many deception planners tend to focus on the ruse that will fool the target,less to the channel, and often little, as did Wavell, to the result. So, somedeception planners give great thought to the means—the channel—thatcan most effectively present the ruse to the target, and many do not seemto realize that the ruse and channel become integrated when perceived bythe target. A successful channel may even validate a dubious ruse.In FUSAG, the investment in cardboard and lumber or rubber planesand tanks could be effective only if the German air reconnaissancephotographed the ruses. The channel was crucial. Only over time is adoctrine of deception likely to be available that, knowing or not, replicatesthe deception-cycle as a basis.

Deception planning varies, running a spectrum from simple to complex,from strategic to technical. Planning may be spontaneous, halting, andwithout doctrine, as well as thoughtful, integrated with goals and ends,cognizant of the purpose of the illusion and the nature of the target, andaware of the need for feedback.

The Fly Fisherman as Deception PlannerA trout fishermen is engaged in deception from the construction of the flyto the analysis of the creel. The tied fly, like any effective ruse, must havea high allure component: there is no point in offering a ruse that isunwanted.

What is attempted is to deceive the generic trout (a few flies may betied to deceive a specific fish but this is unusual) that the ruse is either

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a real fly and so worth sampling or else a novel offering equally worthsampling. In the first case, the deception planner creates a fly that it isassumed will, to the trout, look like what has been delightful in thepast: mimic reality and so engender the desired response, a bite. In thesecond, the fly-maker devises a lure-ruse that is assumed attractive tothe generic trout and, if this proves to be the case, is reused or refined.The lure-ruse is channeled by an invisible line tossed into harm’s way.

The problem for the deception analysis is that the illusion taken by thetrout can be analyzed only by uncertain feedback. The trout may betaking any small objects, not the specific fly offered, or the trout maynot be striking any object, no matter how appealing. What is clear isthat the trout either does or does not strike. If the trout does not, thenthere are a variety of adjustments that the deception planner can maketo the ruse or to the arena: (a) retie the fly or (b) reconsider the impactof the time of day, the weather, the cycles of the moon, the degree ofweed, the temperature of the water, the wind, or the noise level.

What is attractive to the deception planner is the careful constructionof a ruse, the skills required to channel it by casting, and the problematicresults that set in motion further deception cycles. The uncertainly offeedback and the impact of intangibles and variants assure a constantchallenge to be met with skill, cunning, and flexibility.

Those involved often find the actual construction and channeling ofthe ruse equal to evidence of effect; the difficulty for the deceptionplanner is that the reasons for refusal can only be extrapolated andnever discovered, given the secretive nature of a trout’s decisionmakingprocess. The fly may not have been seen, may have been noted by atrout not feeding, been denied because of the time of day, the degree oflight, the flow of the current, the amount of weed in the water, thetemperature, the ambient noise—or the contingent and unforeseen.

At rare times the trout can be seen to deny the lure, but this offers littleexplanation as to why. Repeated refusals of the same lure are taken asevidence that the ruse cannot create an illusion, just as repeated strikesindicate to the planner that the lure works, the deluded trout strikingat an illusion.

Each stage offers the planner desirable opportunities: the skilldeployed to tie the fly, the skill displayed in channeling the lure with acasting rod—and the intellectual challenge of when and where andhow this is done and then the analysis of the limited feedback result—and so the effort to build a better trout fly.

For the fly fisherman, as well as the Allies with Operation Bodyguard, forthe card shark, the philanderer, the officer charged with hiding the SuezCanal, for the liar or the magician, planning usually shapes the ruse to aperceived need. In all cases, the ruse is created by a planner deployingskill, analysis, guile, cunning, ingenuity and practice—and at timesinnocence, desperation, and ignorance.




RUSE-CHANNEL PLANNING

If some ruses are offered nearly spontaneously, naturally, without greatthought, many require detailed planning. The planner should have aninsight into what ruse would be most effective to achieve the desiredpurpose, not merely to have the ruse channeled and accepted as illusion. Amilitary planner, for example, must, as well, take into account the existingreality: the weather, the terrain, the course of battle, the attitude of allies,the tides, and troop morale, the habits of the senior commanders, and theenemy’s dispositions, as well as his position. The liar lies almostautomatically, denies the truth, hides past action or future intention, andoffers a simple ruse, a falsehood. The falsehood, appealing or unappealing,relies on acceptance in part by the reputation of the channel, the liar. Thechannel may be as important as the ruse—the liar as convincing as the lie.And, the channel must be not only acceptable and convincing, but alsocapable of imposing a ruse within the decision-arena.

The British could hide the Suez Canal from the Germans with Maskelyne’sruses because the channel—aerial reconnaissance—was vulnerable tomanipulation. A channel is at times more crucial than the ruse, and moreeasily neglected by the planners. There is no use in sending duplicitoussemaphore signals to the blind, or building dummy tanks that are notnoticed by enemy air reconnaissance.

Some channels are, in fact, composed of ruses: the ambassador’s safe at theembassy, regularly rifled by a spy, is filled not with secret papers but forgeriesto achieve advantage. The authenticity of the false documents is acceptedbecause the channel is very convincing. In World War II, the British-controlled German agents reported back through their usual channels sothat their false information was validated by the means of transmission. Inthe course of a complex deception effort, some channels may contradictothers, some may be compromised, and some may work as intended.

The combined impact of the channeled-ruse, no matter how complex, isalways found in the response; contradictory ruses may be taken asauthentic because they are contradictory, and so the whole illusion isaccepted. A ruse may be intended to create an illusion that, for the target,will be unnoticed, benign, desirable, unappealing or dangerous: eachinitiating a desired response.

(1) To be unnoticed the illusion must integrate the illusion into the existing pattern ofperceived reality: all continues to appear normal, no new troops on the move, noships at sea, no break in the routine or standard operating procedures. The spyas clerk—a mole—does nothing, has no control, no communication with hisleaders, is merely a clerk until activated. This special clerk, until activated, isno different from other clerks, one penny among a pile, absolutely hiddensince there is nothing to hide but potential.

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On the other hand, inept ruse planning may lead to swift discovery: Recently,Canadian forces in the Afghanistan campaign used camouflage uniforms thatmade them more rather than less visible.

(2) Deception is often used to transform something into an irrelevant form, ratherthan simply hide one’s assets or intentions. A military ship may be made notinvisible by camouflage, but rather into an irrelevant tramp steamer.

(3) A mirage of an oasis is a natural illusion that offers a desirable illusion(salvation) to the desperate traveler. False battleships may offer the enemy airforce a target, absorbing their interests and assets—and, perhaps, allowingsecret maneuvers by the real battleships. Most forgeries and fakes hope to betaken as desirable and thus generate same advantage for the planner: sales,prestige, vengeance.

(4) A planner can operate through a ruse intended to create an unappealing illusion.A mine field may be marked as such to deflect an enemy’s line of advancebecause removal of the ‘‘mines’’ is not worth the effort. The channel may be‘‘coded’’ but easily penetrated to give further authenticity: no signs on themine field but its position leaked by agents.

(5) The planner may also seek the acceptance of an illusion that will be perceivedas dangerous by the target and so generate a desired response: a false secret-weapon, a false armada, or merely a football formation organized for a passwhen the defense is prepared for a run. A feeble lion with a large growlmay deceive a hunter who on past experience takes the decibels as anindication of power.

RUSE-ILLUSION TAXONOMY

Within each major division in a deception taxonomy, the spectrum runs fromthe least complicated to the most complex, but can more effectively be shapedto the three stages: mimicry, innovation, and ambiguity. The most effectiveruse is simply a clone of reality—exactly the same but different, one moregrain of sand in the Sahara. Denial, however, is often less compelling as ameans to force a target response, so that innovation is often a planner’schoice, just as is ambiguity, if the target is aware that a ruse is beingoffered. A clone—an almost exact copy of a Picasso, easy to commissionor compose, offered through a legitimate dealer—risks comparison withthe real. An innovative creation of a ‘‘new’’ Picasso, when the style iscopied, has a better chance of success, as long as the channel is convincing,the provenance being as important as the impact of the image. And, ifneither the talent nor provenance is available to the planner, he may offerpatent fakes with false signatures at an auction where ‘‘bargains’’ areavailable and the bidding dazzling—the target becomes involved in theprocess of acquisition and the ‘‘Picasso’’ becomes less visible.

The three states might be to hide by offering a ruse of one grain of sandamong many, and then hiding, by creating a false cactus and finally by




relying on a ‘‘mirage’’ to confuse existing reality. Thus the ruse may (1) copyreality, or (2) create a novel reality, or in the last resort (3) blur reality. To doso, each illusion will either hide or show and, in all cases, the ruse and theillusion may be composed of a few simple elements—the hat-on-a-stick—or a huge and complex bundle of ruses employing various channels, andso a complex, strategic illusion.

In the placement of a ruse in a taxonomy, a key factor is the degreeof change in perceived reality. While it is obviously more productive ofthe investment of assets to opt for a simple ruse to shape a simpleillusion—one hat on one stick—there is an intellectual challenge in seekingto impose a greater change on the perceived reality of the target: all rusesmay not be economical. But all ruses seek to create an illusion that willoffer varying degrees of change in the pattern perceived by the target: fromnothing generated by effective camouflage to a major strategic initiative—in World War II the Allied attempt to hide the time, location, and strengthof the 1944 Normandy invasion, or in the twenties the Germans’ hiding oftheir air capacity to evade a treaty obligation, and later the Nazi regimeexaggerated the Luftwaffe’s capacity so as to intimidate potential enemies.These strategic ruses are bundles of other ruses, often so many that thediscovery of a few does not prevent acceptance of the one-great-ruse. Infact, in some cases, discovery may assist in validation.

The planning, composition, and deployment of deception-ruses mayincorporate an enormous investment: with each ruse composed of acomplex of ruse-factors, and those as well rising from more basicstructures. Such an investment, however, is almost always less than thecost of having no illusion accepted. The deception planner is aware that hecan multiply his forces or hide them, confuse or intimidate an enemy witha smaller investment than the advantages of an increase in his forces, thelack of secrecy, or a prepared enemy will cost.

Each ruse, as well, once channeled into the decision-arena, will alsointeract with objective reality before an illusion is accepted or rejected.This pattern of simulative and dissimulative factors, the intrusion ofreality, and the contingent and unforeseen, varies in each case, but can beplaced close to one of the three foci of a long spectrum from the least shiftin the pattern of perceived reality to the greatest shift. The ideal for thedeception planner is the core-mimicry, with ambiguity on one side withreality blurred, and innovation on the other with reality created.(1) In the first example what is seen is what is expected—nothing but

rocks or normal radio traffic or a beach without defenses. The best lie isthe truth. The deception planner hardly plans at all in some cases, soobvious is the necessity to hide the moment of attack, to rig for silentrunning when the destroyers are searching for the submarine, to appear assmall as possible when under fire: ‘‘naturally,’’ in World War I, all those

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who had to attack across an open field leaned forward to reduce theirapparent size—blurring that proved futile but persisted for four years as anatural response.(2) In the second case, what is seen is beyond expectation: the addition of

new but mock rockets in a parade to reveal nonexistent capacity.In all cases, the ruse and so the illusion can fit into a taxonomy that offers

spectrums of simulation and dissimulation, and the primary means to shapesuch a pattern. No pattern is pure, but the categories contain all the potentialruses and illusions.

DISSIMULATION AND SIMULATION

Mimicry

To transform the real by offering a false copy of the real transforming what isto be hidden. Mimicry tends to hide by displaying a pattern that resembles inall necessary ways perceived realty (an illusion): tanks camouflaged as trucks,airplanes painted to blend with the ground when seen from above, or with thesky when seen from below. The target of the ruse looks up or down andperceives what is expected. The real is repackaged as another sort of reality.

Innovation

The creating of an illusion that changes unexpectedly the objective reality ofthe target, offering novelty to either disguise the real or to adjust perceivedreality. A false army, an undiscovered Picasso, a dangerous shoal, or aleaked battle plan are innovations created to appear real. What is hidden isthat they are false.

Ambiguity

When the target is aware, in whole or in part, of an effort to impose analternative pattern on objective reality, the planner may choose to confusethe observer—blur the edges, suggest other valid options, display adistraction, increase the noise or the data or the number of channels. Thetarget, thus, may be aware that a channeled-ruse is being offered but theillusion and reality flicker.

Misdirection

Hiding the real within groups of the potentially real.

Dazzle

Showing real distractions to blur reality.

Few ruse planners have a neat checklist to mix a bit of dazzle with somemimicry. Most shape a ruse or a channel pragmatically. Some recognize




that there are factors involved other than the characteristics of the ruse or thecunning of the channel to consider. And the purpose of the ruse oftendetermines the components and the result. A desirable, dangerous, orunappealing illusion is more likely to offer the planner a visible responseby the target than those intended to be unnoticed or benign. Thus, as longas the Birnam Woods merely hid MacBeth’s enemies, no response wasnecessary or visible—but when the ‘‘woods’’ began to move on him,dazzling him with the improbable, he had to respond. In any case, each ofthe categories of illusion arises from the effectiveness of the ruse, and theruse from the skills and insights of the planner choosing from items withinthe taxonomy.

The chosen ruse may, as well, exaggerate or minimize reality, create oreradicate reality, in each case seemingly transform objective reality in sucha way either to evade notice or to offer the target an effective pattern andforce a desired response. The effective planner’s ruse is always offered inhopes that it will be accepted as an illusion and that this acceptance willproduce the desired response. The planner chooses what to show and whatto hide, what to channel and what is wanted. The change in the target’sperception of reality may be achieved by enhancing or exaggerating,diminishing or debasing, or in some way altering the target’s perception.Intent may be hidden or strengthened, disguised or novelty introduced, thearena may be secretly extended or weakness transformed into strength by asuccessful ruse on every level between a single, simple characteristicdispatched, or by the investment in a massive cluster of ruses in the serviceof one great illusion.

For the construction of a ruse, the actual rather than the perceived realityof any arena may encourage success. A magician often relies on theaudience’s assumptions of an arena—the stage—and so a maestro canmove from one side of the brick wall built on stage on a carpet to theother—waving to the audience on one side, the curtain drawn and thenopened to reveal the maestro on the other side waving to the audienceapparently having walked through the brick wall. What the audience doesnot perceive is that by opening a trap door under the carpet and the brickwall, maestro can use the actual rather than perceived arena to squeezethrough and appear to have managed the impossible. In the case of magic,the intent is to amuse and awe, and so an audience does not feel‘‘betrayed,’’ but delighted. They come anticipating compelling illusion.

Once the means of the effect are known, appreciation of the trick repeateddrops appreciably, since there is no longer the amazement of the impossibleoccurring on stage. All that is left is an impressive technique, skilled cardhandling, a no-longer secret compartment, the mirrors and wires, howeverunexpected and well made, are not as compelling as the elephantdisappearing on stage.

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Thus all targets have a limited perception of reality—the world asimagined and many a predisposition to accept certain illusions ascongenial. The magician’s audience accepts the illusion knowing it is false.The bigoted target accepts the illusion because it fits existing prejudices.The deception planner in both cases has fashioned a ruse to appeal to thetarget or, like the target general who assumes no one can cross the river inthe rain, a ruse that takes advantage of the nature of the arena.

The planner must wait on events, wait to discover the impact of the ruse, inorder to respond effectively—to accept failure, to adjust present ruse andchannels, or to dispatch parallel and congruent ruses. Swift, decisivefeedback is often possible, but sometimes the planner needs access to moredetailed information in order to estimate the success and impact of theruse. In deception, the purpose and planning of deception, the ruseconstruction, the choice of channels, and the projection into the decisionarena are controlled. Control within the cycle is not reasserted until thefeedback is analyzed—this may be swift, with the hat shot off the stick, orambiguous, with the hat untouched. The hat may not have been noticed, aflawed channel, or may have been noticed but ignored because of othermatters, or because the target had penetrated the ruse. In any case, theresult sought did not occur, and the planner might consider further ruses,repeating hats on sticks or some other decoy, to draw fire—or give up andmove on with the battle.

For example, the planner may deploy a ruse intended to hide the navy bycamouflaging the vessels as rocks, thus both showing the false rocks andhiding the real warships to any enemy observer. The intent is to concealstrength and so lure the enemy into battle. The target may accept theillusion, the reality of the rocks—a not unexpected aspect of perceivedreality—but respond counter to the deception planner’s aim. Since the‘‘rocks’’ are previously uncharted (a novel intrusion into perceived reality),the target judges them a danger and withdraws out of reach of theplanner’s navy.

The ruse was shaped to hide through mimicry. Seemingly real ‘‘rocks’’ wouldbe visible when the enemy fleet arrived. The illusion was accepted, but thati l lus ion was ‘ ‘unexpectedly’ ’ taken as showing danger throughthe unanticipated presence of navigation hazards. The result wascounterproductive. Often, of course, camouflage does hide as intended and thetarget responds as expected; but there is always a difference between the rusedispatched and the illusion accepted. And, again, once the illusion is acceptedthe target is in control—more ruses to create more illusions to further alterbehavior may not be able to adjust the original impact of the illusion.

All ruses can be placed into a taxonomy but in real life such ruses are aptto contain a variety of elements—both mimic and create—and all are bothsimulative and dissimulative: some that hide need show nothing, but all that




show must hide something. And each ruse may contain aspects of one of thethree major categories in the taxonomy: a military message in code, whenmonitored, can offer the dazzle of other broadcasts and the reality ofencrypted message—the listener knows that he hears a military messagebut the content is hidden. Thus the radio orders to the Patton ‘‘divisions’’dazzled—to counter-dazzle, the target must discover which messages arereal and which false, and then what is the content of the messages—thelast may be difficult, but deploying past patterns of broadcast behaviormay give an insight on which Patton army is which. The urgency of thetask—delay meant that discovery would be too late for an effectiveresponse—was thus hampered by a ruse that combined hiding and showing.

RUSE-CHANNEL CONSTRUCTION

Each ruse is composed of a variety of characteristics (charcs) that offer apattern meshing simulation and dissimulation—hiding or showing. Anadmiral in the eighteenth century may have painted extra gun ports on hisships to deceive the target as to his fleet’s firepower. The enemy would‘‘see’’ capacity where none existed. A forger may also forge the documentsthat authenticate a copy of a painting—a copy made real by using oldcanvass, an antique frame, paint without modern chemicals, as well as thestyle of the artist—and to make the ruse more effective by planning thenew provenance within a museum’s records, a channel that offers spuriousauthenticity where even the suspicious would look only for reassurance. Inthe first case, the planner expects the target to respond to the illusion ofpower, and in the second, not to respond at all to the possibility that thelandscape is a forgery. Both ruses hide the real—the capacity of the shipsand the forgery, and sow the false: more guns and another masterpiece.One hides the weakness of the navy, and the other shows the buyer ameans to acquire, if at cost, a masterpiece. In each case, the predominantintent of the ruse is intended by the deception planner and, if accepted, theillusion is defined by the target.

Camouflage is meant to hide and, if it does not fail, be a ruse ofdissimulation, while the Trojan horse devised by the Greek warrior Epeuswas meant to offer a new reality, simulate novelty as well as hide theGreek soldiers, and was so accepted by the Trojans. The creator and theobserver determine if the ruse or illusion is dissimulative or simulative,although all ruses and all illusions offer both components.

Each ruse must involve both hiding and showing, but the planner usuallyoffers a construct that is intended to either hide reality from the target oroffer an alternative reality, hide the fake painting or show the false gunports. The planner and then the target’s assumptions tend to make theruse either simulative or dissimulative—a matter of degree.

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A great deal of analysis focuses on how a ruse is constructed, the narrative ofplanning and deployment. Even the simplest ruse is composed of charcs, andmost are in fact bundles, not only of charcs, but also of other ruses. Themoose may be attracted by a simple moose call, but the hunter is alsohidden by camouflage gear and hiding where a lady moose might be apt toappear. Lies are simple ruses, but often channel with great effect, and may beassociated with other lies—other ruses—to create the desired illusion. Simpleruses—the hat on the stick or mud as camouflage—follow the same courseas do the most costly: and some deception planners become involved withenormously costly ruses in large part because the returns seem so appealing,even if not easy to weigh in currency or even results.

THE HIDDEN PLANE

The United States’s Stealth F-117 was hidden from enemy radar by recourseto a hundred billion dollar technology, but also, while on the ground, washidden from Soviet satellites by a coat of camouflage paint. Each ruse,given the anticipated capacities of detection, were part of a generaldissimulative ruse, a cluster of ruses that formed a protected image forvery different targets.

In each case, the F-117 was transformed so as to produce no reaction onthe part of the target—one by evading the existing means of radar discoveryby offering a change in perceived reality so profound that there was norealization that the nature of objective reality had been altered but hidden,and the other simply by use of paint to mimic the ground.

When the existence of a stealth plane had become public, alteredphotographs were offered to blur existing reality, offering an alternativereality that might, even if not fully accepted, still alter the reality of the F-117.

Stealth technology, in conventional theaters of war, assured invisibility—adrop of water in an ocean mimicking all other drops—thus the target couldnot perceive objective reality. Camouflage paint, given the Soviet satellitecapacity, blending the fighter with the background, mimicked what wasexpected. The doctored photographs offered to target observers a newlayer of cover when the airplane became more vulnerable to discovery.

These and other denial techniques of the total stealth ruse were alldissimulative, some contained in the first ruse-projection into the decision-arena, and others added to maintain as much of the cover as possible. Thephotographs were simulations of reality, just as the camouflage paint, butshaped to hide by the deception planner.

If a ruse is either largely simulative or dissimulative because of the aim ofthe deception planner, in the case of the F-117, the false was being offered todeny access to the real. The entire strategic ruse to hide the existence andcapacity of stealth technology made use of a variety of lesser ruses,




a bundle, as did each ruse composed of groups of characteristics. Over timeand as need was perceived, additional ruses were deployed. A ruse need notbe static or restricted to a single effect.

A ruse must always be channeled to have any effect at all. As was the casewith the forged masterpiece painting, the channel is as important as the ruse.Some of the ruses of the Allied Plan Bodyguard were ineffectual simplybecause the Germans never noticed them. In effective deception, the ruseand the channel may be shaped to the physiological capacities andpsychological preferences and predisposition of the target, or may be aspontaneous response to need. Without experience or a doctrine, there is atendency among planners to be fascinated with shaping the actual ruse,accumulating the charcs, exhibiting cunning, and spending less time on thechannel, unless it too is perceived as a clever ruse. In retrospect, theanalytical focus is often on the actual construction of the ruse—the falsegun ports, a notional Allied invasion of Norway, or an attack through theBalkans—all the tricks and wiles, the romantic ‘‘charc’’ of rubbertanks and dazzling radio traffic, the rubber paratroopers dropped overNormandy, or the false documents leaked.

Thus, the channel is often assumed to be part of the ruse, and at othertimes fails. German aerial reconnaissance was flown over the notionalPatton Army Group in East Anglia but the analysis of the result was neverdone, and bad weather can hide the most cunningly painted gun ports.

In real life, the ruse and channel become entangled in the decision-arena. Allruses must have a channel, but once the ruse is channeled, then the deceptionplanner loses control, acceptance depends on the effectiveness of theconstruct and the analysis of the target. In all cases, the deception processfollows a clear path from perceived need and/or possibility, and the decisionto construct and dispatch a ruse. Since a ruse requires not only commitment,time, and effort but also offers the planner the sense of power, constructiontends to overshadow the other aspects of the deception cycle. What is wantedseems obvious, but how to persuade the target to make this possible is morechallenging, and the challenge within reach is the construction of the ruse—and the channel. Acceptance of a ruse as an illusion ends control, and forsome, foresight. To deceive seems sufficient. With or without a doctrine,others recognize the key is the response of the target, and knowledge of thatresponse. A ruse may be costly and clever and ineffectual and so on to thechannel. What matters is what is made to matter.

TARGET RESPONSE

The Action-Arena: Denial, Ignorance, Acceptance

The ruse or the channel may be unconvincing—the magician’s fingersfumble, the painted gun ports improbable given the size of the vessel, or

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the trick play used too often to confuse the defense. Even if the ruse ischanneled into the decision-arena, the target may simply overlook theoffered change of pattern, and not notice the honey or the pot. The targetmay benefit from a conscious and cunning counter-deception policy, fromthe ineptitude of the planner, from an advantageous change in objectivereality within the decision-arena, or from the contingent and theunforeseen, and so be immune to the proposed illusion.

A variety of factors may facilitate the acceptance of a ruse as an illusion—one that will generate the desired response. Each case varies, but thepredilections of the target, the reputation of the planner, and the apparentdirection of reality can be exploited or disguised.

A ruse stands a better chance of being transformed into an acceptableillusion if the target is not aware of the actual arena of potentialpenetration. Thus, someone may assume that his friend would not lie tohim, and when he discovers that this has happened, feels betrayed. He hadmisinterpreted the limits of perceived reality. The same may occur in a warwhen an enemy assumes that there is only one route of attack, but theresponse to the discovery is resignation or response, and at times the feelingof having been ‘‘cheated.’’ Deception is not seen to be ‘‘fair’’—the resort ofthe weak, the powerless, the amoral, and the sinner—since the rules arebroken. The IRA killing from a ditch, the Japanese ‘‘sneak’’ attack onPearl Harbor, the evasions of an unfaithful wife are betrayals, unfair, inviolation of the rules—or the rules as imagined.

But it is not the nonexistent ‘‘rules’’ that are broken, but rather actionbeyond the target’s assumption of permitted action. One is betrayed by aunfaithful lover. The IRA acted outside the rules of conventional warfare,and the Japanese those of international practice. The lies and evasions thatmake possible an effective channeled-ruse are discovered only when theillusion collapses because of discovered evidence—counter-deception—orwhen the deceiver so chooses.

Thus, a moral value is often attached to perceived reality—only thisshould be the battlefield, my lover is true, my friends would not lie, normy enemy organize a sneak attack. In general, Americans have doubtsabout the legitimacy of deception, and the Chinese or Russians none—infact both assume that the Americans are duplicitous.

The Action Spectrum

An illusion, taken as perceived reality, will always generate a response alongan action-spectrum—even no action may be considered a successfulresponse. Thus, the target may not notice that the rocks are really battlecruisers because the camouflage is so successful in hiding them, and sail onby; but the admiral may decide that they represent a danger and sail awayfrom them, thus frustrating the trap: what matters is what the planner




made happen. In the case of the enemy ships, the hidden admiral could seethe response—the enemy sailing where wanted or unexpectedly in thewrong direction. It was more difficult to decide how effective World WarII’s Plan Bodyguard was at any given moment: there were so many ruses,so many channels, so many illusions to monitor, and the feedback couldnever be precise: some Germans believed some illusions at some times, andsome action was often taken, adjusted, canceled. Others, for variousreasons, were not deceived, even if they accepted the illusions. What couldbe seen—the position of troops, the content of the coded traffic read byEnigma, the thousands of bits and pieces of evidence acquired by theresistance, by observation, by assumptions—gave encouragement but notassurance that the great illusion was effective: the Germans had notaccepted Normandy as the site of the invasion.

Once there is feedback on the response to the deception, the planner mayinitiate a further deception-cycle. In the case of Plan Bodyguard, this was aconstant process. In the case of a football play, the result is instant: thefeedback arrives in a gain or a loss. The deception planner then mustconsider the new reality. The quarterback may adjust his play calling, andthe planners of Bodyguard continued to devise new ruses and channels.

At some stage, the illusion fails or is revealed too late for the target to acteffectively. If the ruse succeeds, the planner moves on and the illusiondisappears. This may take longer than imagined, as was the case with PlanBodyguard, shaped to work until a day or two before 6 June 1944, that inpart lasted for eight weeks after D-Day. Most illusions are thus self-liquidating, some are exposed. In a few cases the illusion persists, becomespart of objective reality. The creating of the Piltdown Man ruse soughtacceptance of a revolutionary, evolutionary discovery, thus revealing thelimits of the target scientists—the planner gained private pleasure once theillusion was accepted and the scientists were involved, and knew as wellthat at any time in the future, when the ruse was revealed, there would befurther evidence, and so further pleasure at the flaws within the scientificcommunity. Acceptance would assure pleasure as well as ultimaterevelation—The Donation of Constantine lasted for a millennium—because the pattern was congenial, and The Protocols of Zion still circulateamong anti-Semites because some always choose to see what they want.For a deception planner, success or failure is apt to come swiftly.

Eye of the Beholder

Essentially what determines the nature of the ruse is not the arrangement ofcomponents, but the intent of the planner and of the illusion is the perceptionof the receiver. Both ruses and illusions are composed of elements thatshape a pattern within perceived reality that exists along a spectrum of

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simulation-dissimulation. And this spectrum offers illusions that range fromthe difficult to deny—one grain of sand hidden among many—to thosedifficult to interpret—a quarterback running the option.

All channeled ruses are constructions of an alternative reality—whetherthe ruse channeled or the illusion accepted—and always depend ondissimulation—the hiding of reality, the hiding of the nature of theillusion, the hiding of intent. A ruse, by definition, denies the target accessto objective reality. There can be no deception without hiding, althoughevery illusion contains factors that display the false. In contemporaryusage, denial is often considered a separate form—as in Deception andDenial (D&D)—but, in actuality, denial is simply hiding—every rusedenies the target-observer insight into objective reality.

Thus, denial is the device that hides objective reality from an observer—anentire underground pursuing an armed struggle may be shaped so as to denytransparency, penetration, or at times its very existence, or a few splashes ofpaint may make it more difficult to see a tank and so deny its position to theenemy.

In the case of the Greeks at Troy, the deception goal was to hide theGreek soldiers from the Trojans so as to allow the ten-year siege to bebroken by unexpected access within the walls to the locked gates.

(1) The Greeks might have chosen to hide their soldiers’ exact numbersand location from Trojan observers by mixing them with civilians, settingup clouds of dust, creating ambiguities of number and place over time, soas to make Trojan choices less certain: introduce ambiguity into objectivereality.

(2) Then, a more complex option would be to disguise the soldiers ascivilians, and so permit their arrival at the gate to be hidden because theymimicked the existing patterns observed by the Trojans. The Greekswould be adding more to reality and thus hide their army until theillusion collapsed (a moment of surprise) and swords were drawn.

(3) A far more complex and compelling ruse was actually employed tocreate a new reality that would, as illusion, produce the desired response.The Greeks would apparently withdraw for good, sail over the horizon,and yet leave behind a giant horse—a horse that the Trojans had beenwarned should not be taken into the city. The Greek soldiers would behidden in a giant, wooden horse that, assumed benign and desirable,would be taken into the city because the warning was assumedduplicitous. Then the Greek navy would return the army just as thesoldiers in the great horse opened the gates.

The purpose of the ruse was to create an accepted illusion that wouldhide the real by offering a Greek withdrawal of an appealing illusion anda novel creation—the horse—as an additional and acceptable aspect ofperceived reality. Warnings would parallel the revelation of the horse tovalidate Trojan prejudices.




In the theoretical cases, the Trojans’ perception of reality was blurredby the confusion and dazzle of the Greek soldiers’ movements, or theywould have been deceived as to the existence of an army moving onthe walls, seeing only what they expected. Instead, the Greeks offered amore complex bundle of ruses. In the case of the Trojan Horse, simplemimicry seemingly would have risked discovery of camouflaged Greeksoldiers and disaster, while introducing ambiguities would not haveassured breaching the walls. And the Trojans accepted the TrojanHorse ruse as an illusion, supported by the withdrawal of the Greekarmy and the ‘‘false’’ warning. The accepted illusion, as in all cases,transformed perceived reality.

Thus, the crucial categories are those arising from the degree of change inobjective reality imposed by an accepted illusion. The planner chooses a rusethat is largely simulative or dissimulative, and channels it into the decisionarena where the target accepts it, convinced by the simulation or thedissimulation. The involved determine the category of the ruse and theillusion.

The target response in all cases is to the illusion, not to the ruse, and soacceptance is beyond reach of the deception planner who must rely onfeedback, visible or not, to determine the impact. The illusion as accepted,then, need not be the intent of the ruse as deployed, nor initiate theresponse intended. Effective deception is, then, a category of intentionaldeception that may be shaped by target self-deception, flaws in creationand transmission, and the contingent and unforeseen. The differencebetween ineffectual deception is that the latter initiates an unwanted oruseless—unexpected—response to the illusion as accepted.

The deception planner’s goal of manipulating the target through thecreation of the illusion—an alternative reality—by means of channeling acompelling ruse is achieved only if the illusion generates, or largely so, thedesired response by the target—and, in rare cases, generates an unexpectedbut advantageous response.

CHANNELS

The dispatched ruse-image, to have any effect, must arrive through channelscreated, adapted, or integrated by the planner. These channels are integratedinto the transmission, and so the illusion may be quite conventional: a line ofsight, or a vast complex of allied strands—each a special ruse—offeredthrough a spectrum of real and notional devices.

The key concern in channels is that they neither exist separably from theruse nor play a lesser role: all are integrated into the ruse, and some maybe more deceptive, more complex, and even more effective than the ruse. Aruse-image cannot be transformed into an illusion without effective

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channels. The fly must be cast so as to appear before the trout naturally. Ifaccepted in whole, the illusion is automatically and seamlessly integratedinto perceived reality, or if in part, there is still a shift in perceived reality.The trout bites if so inclined and if not, not.

Ruse-Illusion Transformation

For the planner, the key moment is, when in transit within the transmissionchannel, the illusion is perceived by the target within a decision-arena (partphysical and part psychological). The ruse-image offers an alternativereality. The reality received as an illusion is never exactly the ruse fullyaccepted as dispatched, since it has become integrated into objective realityand into the target’s perception. The integration—acceptance—may bepossible even when the ruse is warped in transmission, violates commonsense, reality, experience, or habit.

TARGET REACTIONS

Experience, standard operating procedures, prejudice and habit, the power ofinertia, the congenial and comfortable, and the deception-assumptions of thetarget will shape responses to projected reality, to the acceptance of the ruseas illusion and the subsequent response. The deception planner has or has notfactored this into the ruse. A planner wants an imperative illusion, one thatmanipulates, not merely one that is accepted.

The ruse may offer unconvincing or confusing patterns, appear anomalousto experience and expectation. A target is apt to be suspicious of perceivedreality, containing anomalies and paradoxes. Most effective are integrativepatterns, even for novel constructs, rather than incongruities. A variant isin the intentional construction of ruses of misdirection or dazzle, where theincongruities of the pattern are intended to blur reality—a group of purplecows driven across a battlefield may attract the eye and so hide themovement of the cavalry. If the cavalry are to be disguised as cows, purplewould not be the most effective choice of color to achieve mimicry. Duringthe battle of Bastogne, orders were sent from headquarters to two‘‘different’’ Patton Third Armies, thus dazzling the Germans monitoringAmerican radio signals.

It is possible to change the arena without the target’s knowledge—focusedon the probable course of action, the target ignores less likely options. Thus,troops can be moved in impossible weather, attack from unexpecteddirections, go to war while offering peace. In this case, the planner exploitsthe assumed predilections of the target, but, in many cases, more complexstratagems must be devised and constructed. The deception planner must




assume greater and greater risks of discovery by offering substantial changesin the pattern of objective reality.

Complicated ruses, usually bundles of ruses composed of varyingcharacteristics, may also fail to be convincing if a single bundle provesflawed: a scout might notice that one of the ten men waving a hat on astick is doing so, and consequently the other nine mimicking a target are aruse that will no longer sustain an acceptable illusion. And the morecomplex the ruse, usually the more complex the channels, and so thegreater the opportunity for premature revelation.

In any ruse, reinforcement is possible through parallel and subsidiary rusesintended to buttress the emerging illusion. The deception planner may useother channels as well. This secondary projection may be complex orsimple, may relate to the first response or merely undertaken because it ispossible and potentially effective. Once the illusion has been accepted, thestrategists may contrive second generation evidence of illusionary reality toextend the life and impact of the original ruse.

Thus, the target must cope, not with a single alteration in perceivedreality, but a continuous arrival of compell ing and convincingauthentication-ruses. And so, too, the planner as the target responseevolves over time. For the planner, the worst possible outcome of aninvestment in a ruse is a counterproductive response. That was the casewith General Wavell in Abyssinia, when he persuaded the Italians that hewould attack in the South, but they responded so as to hamper his realattack in the North. Wavell would have been better off to have donenothing instead of offering a ruse without considering the nature of thetarget’s response beyond accepting an illusion. The most commonresponse is either=or—either the ruse is transformed into an illusion or isnot. Denial of the ruse as an objective pattern may occur because offlawed channels, lack of attention, or personal predilections, without thediscovery that a ruse is involved at all. But the target may discover theruse as the core of a deception plan and act accordingly. If the target’sdiscovery is hidden from the planner, then an enemy cycle of deceptioncan be undertaken. If not, if the failure of the illusion is to be accepted asnatural, or failure of the illusion to initiate a desirable action occurs, thedeception planner may either withdraw or seek to adjust the existingillusion or project others.

Thus, many planners deploy new parallel and validating ruses, otherchannels, or fine-tuning during a constant ruse-dispatch in hopes that theillusion, reinforced with the additions and corrects, will engender theproper action—or in many cases maintain the desired response. Thereoccurs a dialogue of deception: ruse-illusion-perceived response-analysisand action. Generally, however, especially with tactual or technicaldeception ruses, revelation ends the cycle.

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Most important, the cycle, as described, is an artificial analytical conceit.Quite often, the ruses and illusion are in constant motion, perceptionsshift, adjustments are constant, and at times incoherent. Divisions are notclear, not even the distinctions of ruse and illusion, or ruse and channel, asobvious in the real world.

At times, for example, a cycle may persist without further reinforcement orfurther target action. The illusion has become an aspect of reality for theobservers—the forgery becomes crucial evidence, the lie accepted as thetruth. At times, the ruse is a momentary matter, discovered immediately,and hardly a factor in the course of events: an obvious lie.

DECEPTION CYCLE PATTERNS REVIEWED

A deception cycle is an analytical conceit, but the complexities introducedwithin the real world do not change the validity model. The cycle is howdeception works, how a fib works, and how the Allies arrived off thebeaches of Normandy at dawn on 6 June 1944, to the ‘‘surprise’’ of theGermans. A cycle may overlap others, may be interrupted at any time,may blur and blend with other events.

The ruse may prove too costly to construct and=or maintain, in violationof norms and existing agendas, or not as appealing as a more directapproach. The construction and choice of channels may offer unexpectedobstacles to acceptance of the ruse—the dispatch may be delayed orcanceled, the channels may prove inappropriate. The target may ignore ordiscount the ruse and the channels. There may be early discovery by thetarget, even before the ruse is channeled.

There may, in fact, be discovery at any point, and so the implosion of theillusion. Once an illusion is accepted, there may be unexpected orinappropriate responses that require further ruses to impose varianti l lus ions , or that end the ent i re effort . The response may becounterproductive or irrelevant to the purpose. There may be no revealingfeedback, and so no information on the effect of the illusion. When thereis feedback, it may suggest an end to the deception-ruse, the continuationand=or elaboration of the ruse, and so the illusion, the construction ofcongruent and parallel ruses or the need for a entirely different ruse. Andan illusion may simply persist.

Most deception-cycles are short, revealed through success or error,although some illusions continue for some time. In a few cases, like new‘‘Picassos,’’ the planner may hope that the target may be deceived ordenied access to objective reality far into the future—for years, never todiscover the faker, or find the location of key facilities, or discover theweakness of a weapons system. A few of these steady-state illusionscontinue on and on, without need of adjustment, because they are




perceived as too appealing to discard or to examine closely, despite anyemerging flaws. In fact, the planner and his intention may have moved onto other matters and no longer bother to or be capable of reinforcing theillusion, while the target simply ignored the new pattern created by theillusion, without penalty, advantage, or interest.

Deception planners are goal-oriented: the illusion must work onlywithin the scope of their needs. Thus, except in rare cases, once the illusionis acted upon by the target, there will be no need for the planner tomaintain or reinforce the ruse. In any case, objective reality has movedon as well—the battle won and the war lost, the ‘‘Picasso’’ sold andresold, lost to sight, the poker hand played out and discarded withoutrecord. In a few cases, the target may hide the discovery of the illusion, andexploit the continuing convictions of the planner that the illusionis still taken as real. A new cycle begins, but the target is the original planner.

Agents are turned and kept reporting, as the Germans did in World War IIwith nearly all of the British agents dropped into Holland. Their codedmessages back to headquarters were accepted as real by British control,even when hidden warnings were included. The desire of the deceptionplanners for a network overrode the disaster that the warnings implied.The evidence of German control was taken as ambiguous—and toodreadful to imagine—and discounted.3 So more agents were sent, capturedand were soon reporting back. Revelation of the German deception wasconstantly enforced by further ruses. The process of British realization wasslow, not swift, and so, at the end, not a surprise. Mostly, however, thereis surprise and consternation of the collapse of an illusion, and in a fewcases, a feeling of betrayal or outrage.

In a deception-cycle, when the illusion collapses, surprise is almost alwaysa collateral result: reality is suddenly not as previously perceived. The targetis surprised. The purpose of a deception ruse, however, is not ‘‘surprise,’’ butrather that the target responds to the illusion as intended. ‘‘Surprise’’ ismerely the reaction of the target to revelation, a by-product. A magicianoffers ruses to an audience eager to accept illusions, and to be awed and‘‘surprised’’ at the seeming violation of objective reality by the skill of theperformer. The audience knows that the elephant did not really disappearonstage, but yet there is no longer an elephant: the surprise is at the skill,not the illusion, and the goal of the magician to delight is so achieved.

A military deception planner wants the illusion accepted as a matter ofcourse, and the target so manipulated—surprise may come when theillusion is discovered for whatever reason. The deception-goal is not‘‘surprise,‘‘ but an advantageous disposition of enemy forces because theillusion has been accepted as real. The Greeks did not care whether theTrojans were surprised when the soldiers came out of the horse, only thatthe gates were opened to victory.

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One of the great examples of modern surprise was the preemptiveIsraeli air attack on Arab air bases at the beginning of the June Warin 1967—preemptive, almost totally effective, and quite unforeseen.The Israeli air force wanted to destroy the Egyptian air force on theground and so their deception planners used ruses, their ownexperience, and their assumption about Egyptian attitudes andpractices to do so. In so doing, they inevitably also ‘‘surprised’’ theEgyptians, but the end result would have been just as satisfactory ifthe Egyptians had not been surprised but simply vulnerable. Wheredeception is necessary, absolute power is perceived by the plannernot to be available. The general with a huge preponderance of forceneed not be evasive, duplicitous, or secretive: power will crushopposition.

The identification of surprise with deception is to misunderstand thenature and intent of the illusion that creates an alternative reality—‘‘surprise’’ comes when the illusion is no longer needed to achievedeception goals or implodes for any other reason. The key is the responseto the illusion that relies on secrecy until revealed, and so surprises thetarget.

In sum, a deception-cycle occurs when the planner’s agenda suggests theuse of deceit as a means, and ends, if at all, when the deception processaborts, ends, or continues without adjustment. At times, a variety of rusesemploying various channels are used to engender a variety of illusions that,in whole or in part, will impose a new pattern on the target’s sense ofperceived reality. This illusion then requires an extensive and=or extendedresponse, constant reinforcement and validation, additional channels,fine-tuning, and repeated feedback. There are a variety of obstacles to anydeception-planner’s success: flawed analysis, lack of resources, persistentillusions about objective reality, ignorance, excess optimism, a poorlydesigned ruse or channel, and the defenses of the target. Of these, the useof counter-deception parallels a deception cycle, and may indeed initiate atarget’s deception cycle, but also may persist, not as a mirror image ofdeception, but as an independent process.

COUNTER-DECEPTION

The dynamics of counter-deception are not the same as those of the deceiver,but are usually integrated into any deception planner’s considerations. Likedeception, counter-deception is a conventional aspect of everydayperception; one weighs the card player’s bid, seeks to discover the pathhidden in the dark, or the implication of the social lie. An individual mustconstantly scan objective reality to discover potential harm hidden byintent or nature, and to prosper, to focus suspicion on likely deceit—a




quarterback’s intentions, the inexpensive rare stamp, or bargain high-techstock. The counter-deception process is both positive and negative, passiveand active, planned and natural.

Passive counter-deception is composed of a repeated scan of perceivedreality, seeking false patterns, hidden threats, anomalies, and evidence ofdeception planning, rather like a radar sweeping an arena, seeking an enemyin a blip. Governments install security systems to prevent being deceived byhidden penetration, just as individuals watch to be sure the road is as clearas it seems. Active counter-deception measures seek out those who mightplan deception, based on their record or their aspirations. Agents waitoutside embassies to observe personnel who might be more than they seem,devise codes that cannot easily be broken, or analyze the unforeseen andunusual, the break in pattern, or the emergence of a new patter.

Counter-deception focuses not simply on offered illusions, but on thepossibility of deceit, the existence of deception ruses and channels, and theprospect of an illusion. After the siege of Troy, many were wary of Greeksbearing gifts, just as during the Cold War most Western security serviceswere wary of any Soviet bloc initiative that could hide duplicity.Obviously, the most effective defense would be a successful penetration ofdeception planning—a spy who could offer feedback; but, althoughdeception is universal and common, and deception planning a constant,only a limited number of illusions is offered. The target is in many casesaware that such illusions are available—the enemy camouflage, theirmaneuvers misleading, the flood of radio traffic dazzling—and so thesweep through objective reality focuses on previous experience, on ananalysis of the agenda and capacity of the suspected deceiver, and onunexpected aberrations—a Trojan horse or a confidential clerk whopurchases a luxury car. Passive counter-deception is precautionary.Everyone in the department is given a lie detector test, the guerrillacountry is swept with infrared sensors to find what might be hidden, anddiplomatic codes are updated. A lie detector may be used to scaneveryone, or merely some, or only the suspect: each and all are potentialagents, and so are illusions in place.

The most active measures seek to counter the particular rather than thegeneral, focusing on patterns that may be ruse-generated. The lie detector isused as one among many means to determine if a suspect is, indeed, loyal.And, on a more complex level, counter-deception seeks to discover majorthreats. Can Moscow read Washington’s mail? What kind of access mightexist? What kind of agents would be involved? What do Russian movesindicate? Can a Russian be suborned or their own communications invaded?What are the odds? How great should the investment in discovery be?

The most effective counter-deception prospect is to have penetrated theenemy planning, or at least to be able to monitor the creation of a ruse.

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A traditional counter-deception strategy is to deny potential enemies anyknowledge—the Marxist world during the Cold War was largely closed: notourists, no visitors, no telephone directories or road maps, no statistics, nointerviews or insight into decisionmaking. Chinese diplomats abroad duringthe more radical Maoist times often refused to talk to anyone aboutanything. The nature of Communist society could be examined onlythrough very limited means—overflights, history books, a few refugees,and the actual, visible policies—the occupation of Tibet as seen by thosewho became refugees, or the construction of a new forced-labor campvisible to satellites. The West had to extrapolate from very limited andoften suspect data. Their scenarios of potential deception prospects weredata-weak. Denial is always evoked to counter, not only discover, reality—camouflage or cover—but also sophisticated ruse-analysis.Counter-deception is not so much about hiding reality as finding illusions.

A criminal organization or a revolutionary underground seeks to create anillusion of normality, to deny external probes by offering a pattern ofnormality: today a construction worker, and tonight a hit man or terrorist.For the authorities, the challenge is to find the anomaly, discover theillusion that denies transparency.

Discovery by passive or active measures, by radar reports, content analysisof internal communications, by the purchase of information, or thedeployment of an advanced technological means—the hard imagery ofsatellite photography allows the involved counter-deception operatorsvarious options. The illusion can be destroyed publicly, or ignored, or attimes manipulated—the spy–diplomat can be expelled and advantagegained or seemingly accepted, and a new deception cycle initiated, usingleaks to the spy–diplomat’s sources.

The problems for counter-deception are enormous, none more so than theproblem of projected motives and behavior by those seeking illusions. Howwould a spy act? Would not a lack of evidence in fact be evidence for areality so far successfully hidden? Not finding evidence of a mole–spywould thus indicate a clever mole–spy. If the enemy is malign, then shouldnot illusions have been created, illusions too cunning or too appealing tohave been discovered? No evidence becomes evidence, and the counter-deception force enters a wilderness of mirrors. The deceiver knows whathas been dispatched, and to a considerable degree what the target responsehas been, but much of counter-deception must focus on potential.

Counter-deception becomes tangled with deception—for filters and probesmust be hidden, discoveries may be kept secret, and, most important, arevealed illusion may allow the initiation of a deception-cycle against theoriginal planner. Counter-deception is an inherent obstacle to the acceptanceof an illusion. The shrewd deception planner will consider this factor, and thewise will be aware that a counter-deception planner may be involved in




deception through the shaping of a ruse-of-response: manipulating the imageseemingly received, and so turning the ruse on the deceiver.

There is thus an element of counter-deception in both dispatching the ruseand in responding to the illusion. At times, the prudent or the innocent cancounter deception by error, by chance, by luck, but a counter-deceptioncapacity and deployment is a matter of filters and analysis consciouslydirected at an assumed or realized potential.

The effective deception planner factors such a target-defense into theconstruction of the ruse and the choice of the channel. Again,dissimulation plays a basic role in deception to counter those who mightseek to discover the illusion. In fact, some ruses are dispatched to bediscovered and thus create a deeper illusion—the ruse will not work unlesschanneled to be make discovery likely—a piggyback ruse. Counter-deception, then, tends to be involved in the construction of defensesagainst the prospect of duplicity, and measures shaped to seek outpotential illusions that, when successful, may lead to deception planning.Counter-deception, unlike deception, is focused mainly on maintaining thenormal arena of perception—perceived reality—cleared of illusions, whiledeception-planning, unlike many counter-deception actions, seeks to adjustthat arena by establishing illusions that make objective reality into falselyperceived reality for the target.

A FORCE MULTIPLIER

Deception is a means to adjust perceived reality to the advantage of theplanner, by the creation of a compelling ruse and an effective channel thatwill offer an illusion acceptable to the target and, if effective, a desirableresponse. Such a strategy may benefit from the attitudes of the target—self-deception—and the lack of counter-measures—counter-deception. Butthe key component is to assure a desirable target response to the illusion:merely to deceive, or have an illusion accepted is insufficient for acompetent deception-planner.

To assure such a response, parallel and congruent ruses and channels maybe employed, adjustments made to shifting conditions and the deception-cycle adjusted, expanded, changed, and continued. Thus, the originalchanneled-ruse may be elaborated, reinforced, or multiplied to maintain anillusion or reinforce the original. Almost surely, in time the illusion will berevealed, to the surprise of the deceived, but, if successful, after the desiredresponse has been achieved.

This cycle may offer at any one time a continuum of action, adjustments,the imposition of changing objective reality, and contradictory andambiguous actions. The contingent and unforeseen will assure, at times, animpact on the cycle, as can the delusions and flawed interpretation of the

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target. And, at times, the target may counter such deception by passive oractive responses, and then may initiate another deception-cycle. Theplanner estimates effects and special costs, the target may deny or acceptan illusion in whole, in part, or through error, as well as by rationalanalysis. Some among the target decisionmakers may deny the illusion, inall or in part. Others, however, may have the power to respond to anillusion taken as reality. The deception planner may be of dividedcounsel—the cycle is seldom static, if for no other reason than objectivereality assures constant, if often minor, adjustments to the perceptionprocess of all concerned. The cycle takes place within a large perceptualcontext that often imposes adjustments. Even success or failure may be amatter of degree imposed by the participants in the cycle.

Despite the theoretical difficulties in any model of the deception process,there is, indeed, a process or cycle, from concept through creation toreaction, that focuses on an effective illusion that largely simulates realityor dissimulates it for the planner’s purpose. Force and fraud in war—andin much else—are the cardinal virtues. Deception is deployed andcountered by the shrewd, and rarely fully understood by the involved.Deception can multiply forces, confound power, delude an opponent, lurea trout, or reassure a lady, often at moderate cost, but always within theuniversal cycle from the idea to the advantage.

REFERENCES1This text toward a theory is based in part on the work done in Dublin andWashington between 1979 and 1981, funded by Mathmatica, by the author andDr. Barton Whaley who published the preliminary results as ‘‘Toward aTheory of Deception,’’ The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 178–192; also see J. Bowyer Barton (Bell and Whaley) Cheating, New York, St.Martin’s Press, 1982, and now in print as Cheating and Deception (NewBrunswick, NJ: Transaction Press, 1991). See also Whaley’s earlier seminalwork in Deception and Surprise in War (Cambridge, MA: Center ofInternational Studies, MIT, 1969).This text has benefited from the comments of Professor Robert Jervis, ColumbiaUniversity; Jim Yuill, North Carolina State; and Barton Whaley, San Diego andPalm Springs, who are consultants on an analysis of deception as a means todefend electronic communications funded by the Office of Net Assessment,United States Department of Defense.

2The original title of the Whaley=Bell book Cheating was How to Cheat until themajor bookstore chains indicated that they would not order a book with such atitle.

3A most compelling narrative of the entanglement of bureaucracy and deceptionplanning in this matter can be found in Leo Marks, Between Silk and Cyanide,A Codemaker’s War, 1941–1945, (London: HarperCollins, 1998).




Documents

Toward a Theory of Deception