Toward an Anthropology of State Failure

7232019 Toward an Anthropology of State Failure

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Social Analysis Volume 55 Issue 3 Winter 2011 115ndash142 copy Berghahn Journals

doi103167sa2011550307

TOWARD AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF

lsquoSTATE FAILURErsquoLebanonrsquos Leviathan and Peace Expertise

Nikolas Kosmatopoulos

Abstract The sizable amount of academic and policy-oriented literatureon socio-political violence in Lebanon could be said to have rendered

the country a lsquoprestige zonersquo for theorizing on the powerful image ofthe Leviathan the Hobbesian idea that a secular social order is achiev-able only within a strong sovereign state Building on the insights of theanthropology of the state this article argues for the necessity of a criticalassessment of contemporary expert discourses of lsquostate failurersquo Basedon archival research and anthropological fieldwork the article addressesthe metaphor of the failed Leviathan as an empirical question Overallit seeks to explore its productivity as an applied expert category and to

highlight both the conditions of its construction and dissemination aswell as some of its particular effects

Keywords lsquofailed statersquo Hezbollah Hobbes Lebanon Leviathan peaceexperts state building

Le savant nrsquoest pas lrsquohomme qui fournit les vraies reacuteponses crsquoest celui qui poseles vraies questions1 (Leacutevi-Strauss 1964)

On 7 May 2008 deadly clashes between armed wings of rival political partiesbroke out in Lebanon Major streets of the capital city Beirut densely populatedneighborhoods of the northern city of Tripoli and main roads in the mountain-ous eastern Shouf region turned into battlefields literally overnight The govern-mentrsquos declared will to dismantle the telecommunications network operatedseparately by the strongest party of the opposition Hezbollah (Party of God)

and to remove the security officer in charge at Beirut International Airport whowas believed to be affiliated with the same party prompted a violent responseIn the past Hezbollah had often signaled that such a move would be perceived



116 | Nikolas Kosmatopoulos

as an existential threat to the infrastructure of what it calls lsquoAl Mukawamarsquo (theResistance) and a casus belli with regard to the internal conflict (Bahout 2008)

That evening Hezbollahrsquos secretary-general Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah deliv-ered a televised message from an undisclosed location calling upon membersof the Resistance to protect the latter and to ldquocut off the handsrdquo that threatenit2 In the aftermath of the speech armed groups were deployed around govern-ment buildings (Parliament and the presidentrsquos office) residences of govern-ment figures (the prime minister and party leaders) and strategic streets inthe capital and elsewhere in order to force the government to withdraw thedecrees These groups engaged in deadly clashes with armed pro-government

fighters and relatively soon thereafter the government conceded defeat Inwhat had lasted for three days and later became known as the lsquoMay Eventsrsquo(aHdath ayyar ) 80 people had died and more than 200 had been injured3

During the entire year of 2008 I was conducting fieldwork among peaceexperts in Beirut As destiny would have it a few days before the May Events Itraveled to Greece for a university talk As soon as Beirut International Airportreopened I was on the first flight from Athens I entered my flat located inthe district of Hamra which was the epicenter of the clashes only to find that

all of the windows had been broken the walls were replete with bullet holesand a critically injured air conditioner was dangling hazardously4 Withoutlosing much time over the casualties at home I resumed what one might callfieldwork in a post-violence environment Now that the fighting with machineguns was over it was time for heated debates mutual accusations and ofcourse peace talks In the previous period I had already established cordialrelationships with Lebanese as well as lsquointernationalsrsquo who were regardedmdashbythemselves or by othersmdashas lsquoexperts in peacersquo Among them were analysts for

peace or crisis think tanks employees in peacebuilding NGOs and officers ofdifferent UN agencies Needless to say their views differed on many issues

Despite this an overall consensual response toward the May Events wasstriking At the core of such surprising unanimity was the imaginary of alsquostrong statersquo as the ultimate solution as the antidote to perils such as cor-ruption civil strife and armed violence Notably the recent surge in violencebetween opposing camps prompted comparisons with the countryrsquos civil warwhich had lasted 15 years from 1975 to 1990 Behind the rhetorical effect ofsuch historical comparisons was the idea of a failing and absent state Althoughnot explicitly referred to as such the image of Lebanonrsquos failing Leviathan wasable to unite politicians who would otherwise fight over almost everything5 The image-cum-argument basically reiterates the familiar Hobbesian conceptaccording to which humans are always ready to resort to violence in order todefend personal and group interests and civil wars can be avoided only throughthe establishment of strong sovereigns6 Further expressions such as ldquoMah fih

dawleh bi Lubnanrdquo (There is no state in Lebanon) or rhetorical questions suchas ldquoWen el dawlehrdquo (Where is the state) dominate the popular discourse andhave their sophisticated counterparts in academia Books with telling titlessuch as The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon (El Khazen 2000) or Coexis-

tence in Wartime Lebanon Decline of a State and Rise of a Nation (Hanf 1993)



Toward an Anthropology of lsquoState Failurersquo | 117

and reports by peacemaking organizations7 effectively disseminate the imageof lsquostate failurersquo premised on the Hobbesian metaphor8 Overall a prolific bodyof academic and policy-oriented studies renders Lebanon a lsquoprestige zonersquo oftheorizing concerning the Leviathanrsquos failure in the Arab world9

In this article I argue for a radically different approach toward the powerfulimage of Lebanonrsquos failing Leviathan To begin with I consider the latter to bea category open for empirical scrutiny rather than a normative and irrefutableprinciple that is inherently linked to successful state building democratizationprosperity and development In doing this however I do not wish to offer yetanother epistemological critique of the category on the basis of whether or not

it is analytically useful This deconstructive approach quite popular amonganthropologists and critical theorists alike should not be underestimated notleast due to the relatively meager theoretical reflection on the widespread uses(and abuses) of the notion of lsquostate failurersquo Still I do not wish to engage in abattle over definitions of essential concepts In fact I am more interested in theways in which particular concepts are utilized as well as the often unintendedand unexplored effects of their use in contemporary debates ParaphrasingAppadurai (1986b) it is basically the lsquosocial lifersquo of the concept that I am con-

cerned with because as with things and products the circulation of conceptsproduces value that has to be accounted for politically In the words of MarilynStrathern (1992 xvii) ldquoI wish to demonstrate how ideas behaverdquo

In approaching the category of lsquofailed statersquo as an empirical problem I wishto challenge the commonly accepted idea that it is merely an effort to addressissues of state sovereignty Although I do not deny this altogether instead Iseek to explore ethnographically how the concept works and how it producesunexpected effects that are highly political and relevant I do this through the

perspective of a relatively recent development namely the rise and institutionalexpansion of the professionalized field of peace expertise in Lebanon in particu-lar and in the world at large after the end of the Cold War I regard this field asstrategically crucial inasmuch as it has become integral to the business of craft-ing definitions circulating tools and theories and applying a number of practicesin the name of peace in a variety of ways in different regions In the processpeace experts have assumed a vital role in efforts to redefine and reconfigureother essential notions as well such as civil society democracy developmentand last but not least peace Although as I argue elsewhere (Kosmatopoulosnd) I consider the field of peace expertise to be relatively autonomous andcharacterized by a unique combination of a universalistic moral stance and atechnical understanding of peace I do not mean to say that it is in any waymonolithic For example in the direct aftermath of the May Events the diver-sity of the fieldrsquos practical performance was striking Mediators mainly Qatarior other foreign high-ranking diplomats organized so-called Track-1 negotia-

tions between rival party leaderships within guarded luxurious spaces outsideLebanon Peacemaking NGOs arranged trauma-healing workshops for the civilsociety Crisis researchers in peace think tanks had to strike a delicate balance aslocal informants who would able to supply international media with informa-tion and as crisis experts who would gather their own data for upcoming lsquocrisis




reportsrsquomdashbrief but elaborate analyses of the situation which would includerecommendations to all political stakeholders involved

During my fieldworkmdashthe bulk of which involved interviews with expertsparticipant observation at public and semi-public events (conferences work-shops closed meetings) and historical research in the archives of think tanksUN representations in Lebanon and relevant NGOsmdashI often noted the specialconceptual affinity between Leviathanrsquos image and peace expertsrsquo ideas andpractices I contend that this sort of expertise constitutes an important topicfor social scientific investigation not only because it is a relatively novel andunexplored domain within a much older and well-researched field of expertise

in post-colonial state building10

but alsomdashand mainlymdashbecause the fieldrsquoslegitimacy is premised on an emerging moral-technical rereading of Hobbesianconceptions of order that largely remains unquestioned

In more general terms I argue for a methodological shift of attention thatwould place expertise at the center of anthropological inquiry11 Such a con-ceptual move facilitates a radically different perspective on the debate overthe uses and abuses of the notion of the lsquofailed statersquo It allows for a numberof inquiries into the productivity of the concept as an expert category and

renders another set of questions possible How is the concept of the lsquofailedstatersquo imagined and produced within expert practices and discourses Whatkind of knowledge does such a reproduction make use of and what kinds ofknowledge does it render irrelevant Which are the crucial institutional sitesfor the proliferation of a particular understanding of lsquostate failurersquo What arethe practical and discursive effects of the dissemination of the image of lsquostatefailurersquo What other questions approaches and ideas are silenced or hiddenbehind the overwhelming conceptual shadow of the powerful metaphor of the

failing LeviathanIn what follows I take up these questions separately First I begin with a

brief discussion on the anthropological response to the Hobbesian conundrumin Lebanon and elsewhere In this section I present some helpful insights to myown approach which could be situated at the interstices of the anthropologiesof state and expertise Second I sketch a typology of the major discursivepractices applied by peace and other crisis experts in Lebanon in their effortsto define the problem and to intervene accordingly I argue that the practicesof isolation pathologization sectarianization and alienation are crucial forany imagining of the failed Leviathan in Lebanon In the next section I tellthe stories of two peace expertsmdashRobert a crisis analyst for a think tank andSamir an employee of a peacebuilding NGO12 Both accounts show that expertsare often well-aware of the complexities of the situation on the ground and aretherefore wary of oversimplifications Nevertheless institutional constraintsthe drive toward universal compatibility and not least a familiar sense of self-

evidence lead them back to Hobbesian patterns This means that they oftenhave to ignore their critical capacities and adapt to the necessities inherent intheir professional role as experts I consider this to be a distinctive element ofthe mode of subjectivation of experts and thus a major thrust of my overallargument In the conclusion I briefly explore the productivity of the concept




of the lsquofailed statersquo regarding fields and ideas other than those that are usuallyanalyzed in connection with it such as sovereignty for example Here I sug-gest that these effects of lsquostate failurersquo need more study

Encountering the Leviathan An Anthropology of lsquoState Failurersquo

While much of the anthropological literature on Lebanon seems to subscribe tothe imaginary of lsquostate failurersquo it would be somewhat unfair to claim that thisis done in an explicitly Hobbesian spirit Rather these accounts are often pre-

occupied with questioning Western paradigms and binaries At the same timethey seek to provide broader and more inclusive understandings of the conceptof the state For example Lebanese anthropologist Suad Joseph (2000 4) con-siders the state through the lenses of ldquocivic mythsrdquo (citing Smith 1997) Thusaccording to the ldquohidden hegemonic civic myth hellip of extended kinshiprdquo thestate is ldquoweak unreliable and unable to afford citizens protection from socialeconomic and even political insecuritiesrdquo (Joseph 2000 109) To this effect

Joseph argues ldquo[t]he state has been decentered from critical social action To

the degree that the state has been seen as having agency it is often negativeThe state has existed for the extraction of resources Most citizens have felt theyhave to guard against the state for its arbitrary and corrupt uses by others andkinship has been seen as their primary protection against the staterdquo (ibid)

Michael Johnson (2001) makes a somewhat similar albeit altogether moreessentialist argument about the inability of the state to lsquopenetratersquo societySuch accounts present the state in Lebanon as unable or unwilling to lsquoreachoutrsquo to the needs and demands of its citizens who often experience the state

through a quasi-schizophrenic concurrent sense of weakness and menace(Obeid 2010) Such accounts do produce a much differentiated picture by rely-ing on citizensrsquo images of lsquostate failurersquo But is that the entire picture Is this asfar as an anthropology of the state may go

In general anthropology seems decisively to have overcome a long-stand-ing reluctance to engage in theoretical debates over the question of the state

(cf Gupta and Sharma 2006) A burgeoning body of literature has addressedsuch diverse aspects as processes of state formation (Alonso 1994 LrsquoEstoileNeiburg and Sigaud 2006) nationalism (Anderson 1991 Gellner 1983) law(Comaroff and Comaroff 2006 Latour 2009 Merry 1992) bureaucracy (Herz-feld 1992) state terror (Aretxaga 2003 Feldman 2003 Sluka 2000) citizenship(Joseph 2000 Nguyen 2005 Ong 1999) democracy (Paley 2002) and ritualsof statehood (Bowie 1997) Other studies have analyzed the nation-state in theera of globalization (Durrenberger 2001 Eriksen 2003 Inda and Rosaldo 2008)corporate power (Kapferer 2005) and the rise of the corporate state (Kapferer

and Bertelsen 2009) Beyond these more general themes there has been par-ticular anthropological focus on issues of state margins (Das and Poole 2004)and state borders (Alvarez 1995)

Anthropology along with critical political science has also contributed totheoretical debates on the state as a conceptual or empirical object Gupta and




Sharma (2006) refer to a handful of scholarsmdashAbrams (1988) Corrigan andSayek (1985) Mitchell (1991) Nugent (1998) Radcliffe-Brown (1940) andTrouillot (2003)mdashwho have convincingly questioned the statersquos presumed fix-ity as a category of analysis Gupta and Sharma (2006 8) caution against anyassumptions of the state ldquoas a givenmdasha distinct fixed and unitary entity thatdefines the terrain in which other institutions functionrdquo They suggest a researchagenda that is primarily preoccupied with the study of the state as a ldquoculturalconstructrdquo (ibid 173 see also Steinmetz 1999) in order to understand both theparticular modalities of state construction (through the study of everyday prac-tices and representations) and the effects that this construction has on politics

(such as the operation of power in society) In addressing the constructed domi-nation of the state other critics have inquired into the qualities of the state thatfacilitate its appearance as a ldquomessage of dominationrdquo (Abrams 1988 82) a lsquofan-tasyrsquo (Navaro-Yashin 2002) or a lsquomagicalrsquo entity (Coronil 1997 Taussig 1997)

I build extensively on these insights Yet instead of asking how the potency ofthe state is constructed I pose an inverted question how is the failure of the stateconstructed What would a study of failure as a cultural construct look like At thecenter of my explorations lie two main assumptions first that the image of lsquostate

failurersquo can be the product of cultural work and construction and second thatthis image can have multiple productive effects on various levels These assump-tions may also lay the cornerstone for the development of an anthropology oflsquostate failurersquo Less concerned with normative studies of state incompleteness itscritical task would be to question the assumptions behind presumed failures

Over the past two decades the term lsquofailed statersquo has penetrated both academicand policy-making agendas The Failed States Index published annually since2005 by the US think tank Fund for Peace and the magazine Foreign Policy has

become a significant tool in ldquothe making and carrying out of public policy and isfrequently referred to in the making of decisions by the US State Department andUSAID as to how aid is allocatedrdquo (Manjikian 2008 336) Since the mid-1990s thesurge in books published on the topic continues unabated (see fig 1)

Notably critics of the concept have emerged pointing out its normative andEurocentric roots (Boas and Jennings 2005 Gutieacuterrez Saniacuten 2010 Hameiri 2007)Some reject the state-centric bias toward lsquoregime securityrsquo and propose insteadthe precept of lsquohuman securityrsquo against which lsquostate failurersquo should be measured(Boas and Jennings 2005 UNDP-AHDR 2009) These critics draw primarily onthe observation that within a state some actors could have reasons to cultivatea weak state Thus what matters is not which states are failing but rather for

whom and how (Boas and Jennings 2005) A second strand of critics argues for alsquohybridrsquo type of statehood as opposed to clear-cut Weberian ideal types (Boegeet al 2008) Every individual state formation is somewhat unique they sayand hybrid state forms are equally legitimate historical products These critical

approaches suggest that the category lsquofailed statersquo has itself failed Yet instead ofsimply denouncing it why not first ask for whom the category is failing and inwhat way What would be the productive effects of failure in this case

It could be argued that the first task of such an epistemological enter-prise would be a theoretical engagement with the contours of the Hobbesian



F I G U R E

1

N u m b e r o f P u b l i c a t i o n s o n

lsquo F a i l e d rsquo lsquo F r a g i l e rsquo a n d

lsquo R o g u e rsquo S t a t e s

1 9

6 0

1 9 6 5

1 9 7 0

1 9 7 5

1 9 8 0

1 9 8 5

1 9 9 0

1 9 9 5

2 0 0 0

2 0 0 5

f r a g i l e s t a t e

f a i l e d s t a t e

r o g u e

s t a t e

0 0

0 0 0 1 0 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 9 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 8 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 7 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 6 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 5 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 4 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 3 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 2 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 1 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0

S o u r c e

h t t p

b o o

k s g o o g

l e c

o m

n g r a m s




conceptions as they find their application in contemporary academic and policydiscourses on lsquofailed statesrsquo Marshall Sahlins (2008) has recently taken up thischallenge albeit not that explicitly He embarks on a critical interrogation of theldquoculture-nature antithesisrdquo (ibid 14)mdashless directly with reference to Hobbesand rather in the ways that these concepts have helped formulate contempo-rary political doctrines He traces the overwhelming power of the Leviathanrsquosimage in the manner that this binary is operated as a political tool Thus therealm of the state is often identified as the realm of nomos which includes thecultural efforts of humanity to counter the antithetical forces within it namelyinherently violent natural dispositions ( physis) Sahlins claims that this ldquototal-

ized metaphysics of orderrdquo which supposes an opposition between cultureand nature is ldquoa specifically Western metaphysicsrdquo (ibid 1ndash2) Crucially thismetaphysics is omnipresent in Western politics but it can be also found inother fields such as the organization of the universe and in therapeutic con-cepts of the human body (ibid)13

Coming from the perspective of an anthropology of peace and war PaulRichards (2005) demonstrates how a Hobbesian reading of the culture-naturebinary permeates much of the ideological foundations of contemporary debates

on war In particular he laments the ldquodecontextualized ways that serve to setup a dichotomy between war as some kind of inherent lsquobadrsquo (the world ruledby instincts and base desire) and peace as an ideal lsquogoodrsquo (the world ruled byprinciple and law) With this kind of approach war itself becomes the enemymdashindeed the common enemy of human kindrdquo (ibid 3) To be sure conceptualdualisms and ontological binaries are central to modernist thought (Mitchell1990 van Krieken 2002) Yet the Hobbesian dichotomy of order has arguablyplayed a constitutive role for much of the dualisms that have followed As with

Gupta and Sharma (2006) however I do not seek to decry the false ideologybehind the thought rather I aim to draw attention to the political processes andthe discursive techniques that make the Hobbesian concept authoritative

The Failing Leviathan A Typology of Practices

In what follows I attempt to develop a typology of some distinct discursivepractices that are often applied by peace experts in their efforts to depict afailing Leviathan In this analysis I am more interested in pointing out whatI see as the essential material and ideological aspects of the proliferation anddissemination of those practices I am also concerned with the ways in whichthey work as rhetorical devices within particular contexts

Isolation The Divided World of the Middle East

Some three weeks after the May Events TIME magazinersquos front page featured thefollowing title ldquoSpecial Report The Divided World of the Middle Eastrdquo One halfof the page showed against a white background the skyline of a modern Gulfcapital reminiscent of Manhattan on a sunny day On the other half a handful




of bullets were displayed against a black and gray background of fire smokeand turmoil (see fig 2) The caption underneath the bullets read ldquoWhile Leba-non burns a new economy and society takes shape in the Gulfrdquo Indeed sucha Manichaean juxtaposition between a lsquoburningrsquo Lebanon and a lsquoblossomingrsquoGulf is a recurrent topic in Western reporting on the Middle East Yet as Said(1978) showed the plausibility of Orientalist images is possible only after aconsiderable amount of work has been done that involves a series of selectiveentanglements and disentanglements These practices often result in the depic-tion of an object as isolated from its immediate social or historical environmentAfter having been submitted to this crucial decontextualization the object at

hand is placed on a wide open path to idealization and exoticization

FIGURE 2 Lebanonrsquos May Events Depicted on the Cover of TIME




Lebanonrsquos alleged lsquostate failurersquo is no exception to such a dynamic Thepractice of isolating the country from highly relevant economic political andhistorical contexts when analyzing its lsquofailurersquo is widespread among differentkinds of experts in Lebanon One way that this is achieved is by neglecting ordownplaying the crucial connection between the booming Gulf economies andthe unstable Lebanese political environment Another way is by omitting thelatterrsquos direct relationship to the conflict over Palestine

At the level of the economy it is truly hard to deny the degree of penetra-tion of Gulf-based capital into vital domains of the Lebanese economy suchas real estate tourism and banking14 According to a high-level World Bank

official in Lebanon there is a crucial connection between real estate specula-tion and political instability15 In fact the growing influence of the Gulf statesover Lebanon is manifested on many levels For example it is quite telling thatafter the May Events the emir and president of Qatar successfully mediatedbetween the conflicting Lebanese parties More generally though Lebanonrsquoseconomy is highly internationalized with foreign investments emigrant remit-tances development aid illicit trade and other forms of lsquoshadows of warrsquo(Nordstrom 2004) playing essential roles that remain largely unexplored at the

scholarly and journalistic levels In the face of such complexity it is analyti-cally faulty to depict the country as an isolated island of chaos in an otherwiseblossoming neighborhood16

Still the discursive practice of isolating Lebanon from its wider historical-political context can best be understood with reference to the ways in whichsome peace experts handle Lebanonrsquos relationship to the Israeli-Palestinianconflict A striking case at hand is the declared policy of a global peacebuild-ing think tankmdashwhich is headquartered in Washington DC and maintains a

local branch in Beirutmdashnot to include this major conflict in its analyses of theregion This policy an unwritten law seems inconceivable to at least one of thefemale Arab researchers at the center

There is bias in everything hellip [including] the selection of the topic hellip As anexample [the think tank henceforth TT] has made a choice not to conductstudies about the Arab-Israeli conflict Itrsquos one domain that TT has chosen notto interfere in and the reason why is that they want to spare themselvesmdashyou

know the Israel lobby in America is very strongmdashthey just want to spare them-selves the hassle of being called anti-Israel This is something that we found verystrangemdashthat is having a center in the Middle East and turning a blind eye tothe Arab-Israeli conflict which we believe as Arab researchers as locals here tobe the main problem in the Middle East Rather than addressing the Arab-Israeliconflict TT papers just focus if you have noticed on any work on Palestine andPalestinian policy But there is no work on Israelrsquos policy for example OK if youdonrsquot want to tackle the Arab-Israeli conflict and you are trying to tackle internal

issues you might as well focus on Israeli policies or Israeli domestic policiesBut that is not being done We have been referring this issue and there hasnrsquotbeen any response I think they havenrsquot made up their minds yet on what to doabout that issue All of a sudden Israel is very much there and yet it is not therein TTrsquos papers They focus on Iran for examplemdashthey are doing a program on




Iran But how is it that Iran is part of the Middle East while Israel is not TheArab-Israeli conflict lsquodoesnrsquot existrsquo as Israel lsquodoesnrsquot existrsquo as well This is whyI say that knowledge is not neutralrdquo17

To be sure there is an ongoing lively scholarly debate on the influence of whatsome call the lsquointernalrsquo and lsquoexternalrsquo parameters of the Lebanese conflictWhether it is possible to draw a rigid line between the two without running therisk of oversimplification is debatable (cf Yacoubian 2009)

Isolation as a common expert practice is not unique to Lebanon JamesFerguson (1990) has shown how development experts tend to depict Lesotho

in isolation from its wider regional environment as well as historically decon-textualized Having said that it is important to highlight the particular waysin which such a practice takes place in each different context Thus the imageof lsquostate failurersquo in Lebanon is further re-enforced by those expert discursivepractices that tend to disentangle the Lebanese conflict not only from the Gulfeconomies and societies but also from the historical and everyday realities ofthe Israeli-Palestinian conflict

Pathologization Conflict-Affected Countries

The unit for Emerging and Conflict Related Issues (ECRI) is a recently estab-lished UN agency within ESCWA (Economic and Social Commission for WesternAsia) the regional arm of the United Nations in Western Asia18 It was estab-lished ldquoin response to political tensions and conflicts facing the region the lastof which was the July 2006 War in Lebanonrdquo (UN-ESCWA 2011) According toECRIrsquos own description the new unit aims to ldquoreduce the impact of conflict

and tensions on socio-economic and political development in Western Asia aswell as to promote the concept of development under crisis conditionsrdquo (ibid)ECRIrsquos mandate extends to five conflict-affected countries Lebanon Iraq Pales-tine Sudan and Yemen Since its inception in 2006 ECRI has decidedly focusedon lsquoweak statersquo institutions These are considered to be both the ldquoroot causesrdquo(ibid) and the consequence of most of the challenges that the region faces Theargument goes that the affected countries already weakened by conflict andpolitical tensions now face numerous challenges such as poor or malfunction-ing economies insecurity and lawlessness human rights violations low socialcohesion and the lack of essential social services In turn all this fuels yet moreconflict and political tensions These countries are also lsquosufferingrsquo from a goodgovernance lsquodeficitrsquo19 This circular ideamdashthat weak state institutions produceconflicts that in turn weaken state institutionsmdashfeatures in many ECRI publi-cations as well as in the mind of at least one among its senior staff20

The notion of conflict-affected countries is crucial here It designates those

nations that are thought to be undergoing similar pathologies despite hav-ing very dissimilar features and differing violent trajectories For examplethe conflicts in Sudan and Yemen are strongly characterized by secessioniststruggles Lebanonrsquos conflict is directly linked to the neighboring struggle overPalestine as well as the problematic aftermath of a 15-year-long civil war and




the violence in Iraq and in Palestine is at least partly attributable to the con-tingencies of foreign military occupations Lumping these rather incompatiblecases together under the label lsquoconflict-affected countriesrsquo makes sense onlywhen a circular abstract and ahistorical notion of conflict is applied and whenradically different socio-historical situations are classified solely according tosymptoms (weak state institutions instability good governance deficit etc)Arguably symptomatology as the privileged analytical frame provides a short-cut to decontextualized discussions on violence underdevelopment and otherwidely circulated notions that strongly allude to failure Further a conceptualcorrelation between the discursive practices of pathologization and isolation

can be noted here inasmuch as a symptoms-based conflict analysis appearsperhaps more credible and useful only after other analytical frames (historicalregional etc) have been rendered irrelevant

Sectarianization Communal Tensions

In 2009 ECRI published a pilot study seeking to shed light ldquoon the causesof and challenges posed by communal tensionsrdquo (UN-ESCWA 2009)21 It was

hoped that an analysis of youth perceptions on those issues would ldquoinitiatea debate among researchers and policymakersrdquo and ldquoserve policymakers andpeacebuilding specialists to extrapolate operational strategies or programmesrdquo(ibid 2) The authors stated that the study did not attempt to address ldquoallaspects of the root causes of communal tensionrdquo (ibid 5) but instead to focusldquoon the perception of youth on the issues of reproduction of identity inter-communal relations and the political systemrdquo (ibid) The study was furtherpremised on the assumption that ldquocommunal tensions hellip are the root causes of

conflictrdquo (ibid iii) In order to collect those perceptions the facilitators selected113 young Lebanese men and women aged 18ndash25 and placed them into fifteenldquofocus group discussionsrdquo (ibid 4)22 The participants were selected from ldquothefour main communities in Lebanon Sunnis Christians Shiites and Druzes hellipfrom all parts of the country aiming at fair urban-rural representationrdquo (ibid)The organizers paid special attention to the fair representation of women andmen as well as of low- and middle-income levels (see table 1) The study addsexplicitly that participantsrsquo profiles were checked so as ldquoto make sure that eachmet the required criteriardquo (ibid)

In general the study makes extensive use of a highly technical languageand aesthetic of objectivity (tables diagrams selection criteria fair representa-tion) Still the description of the details of the discussion groups reveals thestrategic role that the concept lsquohomogeneous youth groupsrsquo played in theirformation ldquoSignificantly homogeneous youth groups conducted the discus-sions The selection of the members of each group was deliberate that is each

participant was selected from a single community in order to avoid such biasesas social complacency or political correctness that might emerge from mixing

the groups Putting together homogeneous groups helped the participants feelcomfortable in discussing views and perceptions of their own community and

of other communitiesrdquo (UN-ESCWA 2009 5 emphasis added)




Thus despite the fact that a variety of criteria (sex communities incomelevel region) guided the participantsrsquo selection in general the discussiongroups were formed solely on the basis of belonging to a single communityThe idea of mixing the groups that is bringing people from different communi-ties into a common discussion team was perceived as something that wouldtaint the studyrsquos purity and produce undesired biases such as social compla-

cency or political correctness The perceived benefit of making the participantsfeel at ease thus led to the decision to form homogeneous groups This practiceand the rhetoric of cultural homogenization demonstrates that the frame oflsquocommunal tensionsrsquo was present in the organizersrsquo perspective rather thanthat of the participants The methodological conceptual and political prob-lems arising from such perceptions are countless For one thing the possibilitythat the participants may identify the notion of homogeneity very differentlyis a priori excluded Equally excluded is the otherwise frequent occurrence inLebanon of people who cannot be categorized into homogeneous groups (egwhen each parent stems from a different community) Notoriously inclusion isalways also exclusion (cf Caduff 2010) Vested with the aesthetic of objectivitybut deeply flawed in their empirical assumptions such lsquostudiesrsquo may lead toself-fulfilling prophecies at best if not to hurtful experiences of peer pressureto lsquohomogenizersquo at worst

This case of evidently constructed communal homogeneity is although

excessive not exceptional A close analysis of the conceptual frame of ESCWArsquosstudy reveals that its ideological roots lie in the academic discourse of lsquoethnicconflictrsquo which was popularized during the early 1990s23 It did not take long topermeate the way that higher officials at the UN would perceive the postndashColdWar world In a report entitled An Agenda for Peace then Secretary-General

TABLE 1 Summary of Criteria for Participation in Survey

Profile Number of Focus Groups

Sex Male 55

Female 58

Communities Sunni 4

Shiite 4

Maronites 3

Druze 2

Mixed Christians 2

Income Level Middle 9 Low 6

Region Mount Lebanon 3

North 5

Bekaa 2

Beirut and suburbs 5

Source UN-ESCWA (2009 5)




Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992) declared that the cohesion of modern states isoften ldquothreatened by brutal ethnic religious social cultural or linguistic striferdquoThe concept lsquoethnic conflictrsquo was largely elaborated and disseminatedmdashat leastinitiallymdashwithin the much larger discursive framework that was characterizedby what one could call the lsquoculturalization of violencersquo Arguably also part ofthis discourse albeit much more extremist and problematic was the thesis onthe lsquoclash of civilizationsrsquo produced by neo-Orientalist historians and politi-cal scientists such as Bernard Lewis (1990) and Samuel Huntington (1998)Tellingly the study at hand quotes one of Huntingtonrsquos staunchest supporterswho contends that conflicts must be seen as situations in which ldquoculture is

pitted against culture people against people tribe against triberdquo (UN-ESCWA2009 3 citing Barber 1992 emphasis added)This practice which I call lsquosectarianizationrsquo tends to identify sectarian

identities as a single frame of identification when there are none or many morethan one It works through a series of selective and circular assumptions at theend of which stands what the study perceives as lsquostate failurersquo Failure is thendefined as the result of the inability of different pre-modern sectarian groupsto work together toward the establishment of a modern secular state24

Alienation Non-state Actors

On 13 March 2008 only two months before the May Events a panel discussionentitled ldquoThe Mughniyeh Assassination and the Hezbollah scholarshiprdquo tookplace in one of Beirutrsquos luxurious hotels25 The event was hosted by two Beirut-based institutions Conflicts Forum a think tank with offices in Beirut Londonand Washington and MideastWire an Internet-based Arabic news translationagency The speakers were Lebanese scholars and Western journalists believedto be lsquoexpertsrsquo on Hezbollah The facilitators aimed at tackling the issue ofscholarly production on the structure of political parties and its role in Leba-nese and Middle Eastern politics in general The audience was composed offoreign journalists diplomats development experts and Lebanese researchersand activists During the QampA section participants in the audience intensivelyquestioned both the label lsquoHezbollah scholarshiprsquo and the assumptions behind

it They objected to the tendency in both academic and journalistic circles tocarve out a distinct domain of knowledge production that focuses exclusivelyon Hezbollah Crucially they regarded this domain as being situated in a grayzone between academia and intelligence and thus raised questions about theintentions and the rationale behind it

The existence of a lsquoHezbollah scholarshiprsquo seems to be an undeniable factEspecially after the partyrsquos successful military campaign against Israelrsquos occu-pation of southern Lebanon the production of books articles and reports on

Hezbollah took off exponentially26

Needless to say there is hardly any consen-sus among these scholars about how best to label Hezbollah The list rangingfrom the most dismissive to the most embracing includes designations such aslsquoterrorist entityrsquo lsquoextremist grouprsquo lsquostate within a statersquo lsquonon-state actorrsquo lsquoShi-ite movementrsquo and lsquoresistance grouprsquo Most experts do not wish to have their




neutrality questioned by either side and thus prefer middle-of-the-road catego-ries such as lsquostate within a statersquo and more often lsquonon-state actorrsquo27 Keepingin mind that the terms lsquoterrorismrsquo and lsquoresistancersquo are both highly politicizedand thus contested it can be assumed that the use of the latter constitutes aneffort to pose the problem in a rather objective way However this does notmean that negative connotations are excluded since according to at least somescholars the distance between the two concepts lsquonon-state armed groupsrsquo andlsquoterrorismrsquo is rather short28

Indeed there is a growing body of studies on non-state actors that stretchesfrom more academically oriented political science analyses to policy-oriented

conflict and terrorism research A large part of lsquoHezbollah scholarshiprsquo couldbe said to belong to this strand To be sure the term lsquonon-state actorsrsquo meansdifferent things to different people (Clapham 2009) That being said it is hardnot to notice two major features that is the negative marker and the state-centrism The entities at hand are defined according to their position vis-agrave-visthe state which is a priori considered to be antithetical if not hostile to it Itcan be argued that the term lsquonon-state actorrsquo has become popular because itis both abstract enough to include a wide variety of heterogeneous political

formations but also concrete enough to signify an undeniable threat that thesame formations pose to the state As opposed to the unmarked prototype ofthe state it constitutes a negatively marked term an inherently inconceivablethreat to the established order and an abnormal developmentmdashin other wordsa true Hobbesian nightmare

More generally in contemporary expert analyses on terrorism and lsquoglobalinsurgency networksrsquo the notion of the non-state actor delineates the model pat-tern of threat29 In the Lebanese context the use of the term within many strands

of lsquoHezbollah scholarshiprsquo is often punctuated with presumptions of threat anddisloyalty Hezbollah is perceived to pose an existential menace to the Lebanesestate due to the partyrsquos unwillingness to conform to the state monopoly overorganized means of violence Instead it follows its own lsquoparochialrsquo interests andthus threatens the coherence and cohesion of the state It can be argued that thisdiscursive practice which I propose calling lsquoalienationrsquo is an extreme versionof the previously discussed practicemdashthat of sectarianization Through the useof presumably neutral and descriptive terms such as non-state actor imagesof lsquointernal aliensrsquo are constructed These alien bodies are believed to have noloyalty to the official state and thus constitute an essential threat to all of itscitizens As ldquomatter out of placerdquo in Mary Douglasrsquos (1966 41) sense Hezbol-lah produces ambivalence that can be both a threat (terrorism) for some and apromise (civil society) for others Yet both forms remain defined solely in relationto the state The practice equals a rhetorical device of lsquoOtheringrsquo through whichparticular citizens or parties are depicted not only as isolated from the whole

but often as radically different and dissimilarmdashand thus as dangerous to the restArguably the strong sense of danger and the contours of unquestioned state-centrism that such notions tend to reproduce could explain a scholarly tendencyto understand the existence of non-state groups as causes rather than symptomsof lsquostate failurersquo (cf Boas and Jennings 2005)




lsquoState Failurersquo State Talk and the Switching Expert

Samir

ldquoItrsquos a game a way of testing each otherrsquos limitsrdquo Samir a Lebanese man inhis mid-twenties who was working for a peace NGO told me about similar butmuch less bloody instances of violence that had taken place before the MayEvents ldquoThey all agree that they will not go too farrdquo he added I wonderedif he would have considered that they had gone too far in May Samir onceagain proved able both to downplay the incidents and to offer an alternative

and perceptive analysis of the appeasing aspects of that sort of violence in theLebanese context ldquoNow that Hezbollah has used its weapons everybody isrelieved At least we know how far their threats correspond to the realityrdquo Thiscomment on the lsquorelievingrsquo effects that this form of violence had came as nosurprise to me Not only was it similar to the opinions that many Lebanese heldat that time it was also characteristic of Samirrsquos overall political ideas

During my fieldwork I became quite familiar with Samirrsquos thoughts andviews as he did with mine Throughout the months leading up to May 2008

we spent long nights discussing Lebanese and international politics Samirrsquosanalyses of the performative uses of violence reminded me of highly sophisti-cated anthropological accounts to the extent that I often urged him to studyanthropology whenever he should decide to go back to school He had an eyefor the symbolic and the ritualized elements in those exchanges of violenceVery rarely did he regard them as a mere means to a single end such as thecontrol of resources or the building of the state for example Rather he sawthem as embedded in a complex grid of social relations performative actions

and ritualized exchanges For instance during one of our discussions Samirspoke to me with great excitement about the insights that he had gained fromhis work with lsquofocus groupsrsquo made up from participants of different (mainlyreligious) communities in Lebanon This work was part of a reconciliation pro-gram run by an international NGO His task was to coordinate the discussionand to collect participantsrsquo views on different topics of interest such as citizen-ship reconciliation development and so forth He described at length how

fascinated he was by the ways that the leaders of these communities wouldoften exchange threats and small acts of violence as vehicles of an intimate sortof communication as a way to interact based on many elements of playfulnessand absurdity In fact Samirrsquos views reminded me strongly of Gilsenanrsquos (1996)ethnography on the feuding landlords of rural Lebanon Gilsenan describeshow irony subversive commentary and honor-based claims constitute essen-tial political tools in the hands of powerful elites but are also elements avail-able to non-elites in their efforts to criticize the excessive use of power by the

former (ibid) Yet Samir had never read GilsenanAfter the May Events Samir was featured as a commentator for a leftistnewspaper in the German-speaking part of Switzerland30 As I was to discoversoon afterwards a piece that he had written about the recent events lackedwhat I have often experienced as his eloquent analysis An otherwise informed




perspective seemed to have given way to a rather normative discourse on lsquostatefailurersquo ldquoWhat happened showed that there was maybe no state to start withThe Lebanese who put down their weapons in 1990 to begin a new phase ofthe country have not learned anything The state is just another club in Beiruta place for the warlords to meet and play cards hellip The choice is between thecorrupt proxy politicians and radical Islamic movements Unfortunately nei-ther of these two builds a staterdquo31 In the piece Samir attributed Mayrsquos violencesolely to the absence of a ldquostrong staterdquo His self-evident recourse to Hobbesstruck me engendering a strong feeling of estrangement How could I makesense of the radical difference between Samirrsquos creative opinions in our discus-

sions and the reductive reproduction of a Hobbesian account on failure in thenewspaper Was it due to the fact that the journalistic genre does not allowmuch space for more than the lsquobasicsrsquo Do format restrictions lead to relativelysimplistic explanations of complex issues Or was it due to Samirrsquos ability todifferentiate between talking to an anthropologist and publishing a piece as alocal analyst for a foreign newspaper Could the difference be interpreted as anintervention by the newspaperrsquos editors

After having read his articles I asked Samir whether the Swiss editors had

imposed any guidelines on his writing This is what he told me ldquoWell they letme express my thoughts but they also need a substantial part of political infor-

mation includedrdquo (emphasis added) Was it this need to provide some lsquopoliticalinformationrsquo that could explain the difference Are there particular kinds oflanguages and approaches that appear to be more political than othersmdashthatis more compatible for the pages of a foreign press

Robert ldquoAfter and during the May Events I had to give around 80 interviewsrdquo Roberttold me in excitement A Swiss-born and -educated sociologist Robert wasthe lsquoanalyst on the groundrsquo in Beirut for a global crisis think tank that is head-quartered in Brussels During that May he was contacted by all sorts of mediaoutlets from all over the world and by foreign embassies in Lebanon He wasasked to give his expert opinion on the situation and this is a good part of Rob-

ertrsquos job description However his essential task is data collection for his ownresearch which then flows into the writing of crisis reports Such reports con-stitute the major product of crisis experts today Occupying a middle groundbetween academic and journalistic analysis they usually include the lsquofactsrsquo aninterpretation of the events and some recommendations to the parties involved(local actors global powers etc)

Robertrsquos crisis report on the May Eventsmdashthe fastest he had ever writtenas he told memdashcame out only one week later Entitled Lebanon Hizbollahrsquos

Weapons Turn Inward it was mostly an analysis of the partyrsquos stance before and(principally) after the May Events Encapsulated in the title the reportrsquos mainargument was that the partyrsquos decision to turn its weapons lsquoinwardrsquo (as opposedto lsquooutwardrsquo ie toward Israel) will severely injure its self-cultivated image as aldquonational resistancerdquo and will inflame ldquosectarian tensionsrdquo The commentary on




Hezbollah continued as follows ldquoOutside its own constituency it is seen morethan ever as a Shiite militia brutally defending its parochial interests ratherthan those of a self-proclaimed national resistance The blatantly confessionalaspect of the struggle has deepened the sectarian divide something the Shiitemovement long sought to avoid (International Crisis Group 2008 1) In typi-cal fashion a number of recommendations for all sides were given in order toachieve a resolution of the crisis The report was written in the language of party politics parochial interests political strategies and rational calculationsconstituted the lsquodatarsquo In this sense the piece most probably fulfilled the read-ersrsquo expectations

However the story behind the reportrsquos style is somewhat more complexIt can be said to begin in Egypt where Robert spent almost a decade beforecoming to Lebanon His research on religion and the market in Egypt shapedhis general approach to Islamist movements As he told me the differencesbetween academic research and political expertise were clear to him

Robert Basically at that time hellip I was refusing any idea of compromising researchwith political interest So the idea of expertise I refused completely I wasnrsquot so

much political science oriented [I was] focused on social issues anthropologyThe thesis published as a book now was about how militant experience can bemarketized I wasnrsquot focusing on the movementsrsquo strategies etc I was nevermdashand

still [am] notmdashan expert on the Islamic groups I donrsquot want to be

NK Why

Robert Because I donrsquot consider them as an object My research was about theprocess of Islamicization sometimes studying tendencies inside the Muslim

brothers but not about the Muslim brothers as a militant group [My book] isabout the process of demobilization but the real project is not about religionand politicsmdashrather it is about religion and the market both inside the Muslimbrothers but also outside hellip [I]t was such a subject on which I was workingwhen the switch happened (Interview Beirut 2008 emphasis added)32

Robert was adamant in rejecting the idea of being an expert on Islamic groupsHe preferred rather to explore ldquoempirical questionsrdquo as he would call them the

marketization of religion the Islamicization of consumption and the demobi-lization of political Islam So what forced Robert to change his approach Heexplains ldquoI used to live in Egypt 12 years before I came here hellip My aim at thattime was to reach the public academic sector in France hellip I was classified Iwas short-listed you know the process of classification you have two threepeople at the end and then you take one I was classified once as number 5twice as number 2 and finally I came back from Egypt [I spent] one year look-ing for a job in Switzerland and I ended up at the [name of the think tank] in

Beirutrdquo When Robert decided to apply for the position in the think tank manythings about the job disturbed him the idea of expertise sounded unattractivethe salary was not perfect and the writing style was alienating On the otherhand he would be able to support his newly expanded family until he couldfind something else Upon taking up the job he was admonished by an older




colleague ldquoNow that you are with us you have to forget academic style andstart thinking politicallyrdquo Robert took the advice to heart and began producingreports that he considers to be lsquodryrsquo but at least lsquopoliticalrsquo

The Political

But just what is the lsquopoliticalrsquo My story shows how both Samir and Robert twometiculous analysts of ritualized violence and marketized Islam respectivelyexperienced the political as a state-centric and rather static discourse withinwhat they perceived to be expectations bestowed upon them by their colleagues

and audiences In the new understanding of the political the discourse on lsquostatefailurersquo becomes the chiefmdashif not the solemdashframe of reference This says a greatdeal about the compatibility of the Hobbesian metaphor within contemporaryexpert discourses on peace crisis violence and state building33

A last point of clarification is necessary here Although I suggest that theshifts in the ways that experts (like Samir and Robert) adjust or contextualizetheir knowledge must be accounted for I do not mean to construct a rigid divi-sion between an academic and an lsquoexpertrsquo perspective as Ferguson (1990) pro-

poses The institutional entanglements and the discursive borrowings are toomany to support the idea of two distinctively separate domains of knowledge

An alternative reading of Samirrsquos and Robertrsquos lsquoswitchingrsquo experiences mightfollow Gilles Deleuze and Feacutelix Guattarirsquos (1986 21) discussion about theldquotwo kinds of sciencemdashnomad war machine science and royal State sciencerdquoThese are two distinct and almost antithetical domains of knowledge the warmachine is projected into an ldquoabstract knowledgerdquo while the State scienceldquodoubles the State apparatusrdquo (ibid 19) Their tools are radically different(ie theorems versus problems) and inevitably tensions arise As a resultnomad science is ldquolsquobarredrsquo inhibited or banned by the demands and conditionsof State sciencerdquo (ibid) Through a continuous appropriation the latter oftenimposes its ldquoform of sovereignty on the inventions of nomad sciencerdquo (ibid)In the end State science often prevails and the perspective put forward is thusstatic ldquosubjected to a central black hole divesting it of its heuristic and ambu-latory capacitiesrdquo (ibid 22) In Lebanon as elsewhere this lsquoblack holersquo often

takes the form of a particular discourse on lsquostate failurersquo thus divesting it ofexpert critical capacities

Conclusion The Productive Effects of Failure

In this article I have argued that a particular use of the discourse of lsquostate fail-urersquo plays an essential role in contemporary conceptions of Lebanese politics

Lebanonrsquos lsquofailed statersquo is depicted as a real risk not only to its own citizensand the neighboring states34 but also to the world system at large Further thediscourse of the lsquofailed statersquo puts into place particular geographies of threat andresponsibility it tends to depict the world as a construction site populated bynumerous Leviathans in urgent need of repair35 At the same time lsquofailed statesrsquo




are conceived as rather rare cases within an otherwise functioning system ofrobust and healthy states The binary image that depicts healthy states againstthe lsquoWild Restrsquo (Kosmatopoulos 2011) albeit translated into technical termsconstitutes a powerful political instrument that effectively distributes moralresponsibilities rewrites historical trajectories and reinscribes power relations

On another level the generic label lsquofailed statersquo contributes to the con-struction of an atmosphere of constant crisis in Lebanon and beyond Thisparticular version of a crisis imaginary provides the opportunity to analyzeand reframe given socio-historical developments in different terms Hence theMay Events are perceived to be both the result and the cause of lsquostate failurersquo

small-scale wars or military aggressions by antagonistic neighbors (such asIsraelrsquos 2006 war on Lebanon) are often translated into humanitarian emergen-cies36 and complex socio-historical situations local antagonisms and globalpower games are reinterpreted as opportunities that ldquotransnational terroristand guerrilla groupsrdquo may use to turn weak states into ldquohavensrdquo (Atzili 2010757) In sum such perceptions not only introduce a vision of history andgeography through the frames of failure deficit and lack but alsomdashand morecruciallymdashpresent contemporary world affairs within an increasingly bellicose

atmosphere Hence omnipresent crisis is translated into a critical battle against constantly emerging threats

Finally as the stories of Samir and Robert clearly demonstrate the notion ofthe lsquofailed statersquo crucially revitalizesmdashboth in epistemological and in politicaltermsmdashwhat Wittgenstein would call lsquothe grammarrsquo of the state In this theyseem to be in line with much of contemporary social science Michel Callon andBruno Latour (1981) have convincingly argued that modern sociology is preoc-cupied with constructing Leviathans ldquoExperts of societyrdquo they say seek to ldquocon-

struct a unity define a group attribute an identity a will or a project each timethey explain what is happening the sociologist sovereign and authormdashas Hob-bes used the termmdashadd to the struggling Leviathans new identities definitionsand willsrdquo (ibid 298) Famously as the sole embodiment of a secular orderthe state has provided much of the epistemological basis for modern social sci-encemdashand hence the contemporary Leviathans Even when perceived as failingthey nevertheless succeed in impeding the disenchantment of the state

Acknowledgments

This essay is based on ethnographic and archival research conducted during 18months of fieldwork (summer 2007 summer and fall 2008 spring 2009) whichwas generously supported by the Asia Europe Research Program at the University

of Zurich An earlier version of this article was presented at the symposium entitledldquoEurope at across and beyond the Bordersrdquo which was held 27ndash29 November 2008and was hosted by the Department of Social Anthropology at Panteion UniversityAthens Greece Subsequent drafts were presented to audiences at the EASA con-ference in Maynooth (2010) and at the University of Zurich (2011) I would like to




thank Carlo Caduff Helena Nassif Rania Astrinaki and Karine Landgren-Hugen-tobler the editors and reviewers of Social Analysis and the students of my classldquoSociety againstwithoutthrough the Staterdquo University of Zurich (spring 2011) In

particular I would like to thank my informants Robert and Samir who so gener-ously shared with me their thoughts and experiences

Nikolas Kosmatopoulos is currently a Visiting Scholar in the Departments ofAnthropology at Columbia University and the City University of New York Before

that he was a Junior Lecturer in the Department of Anthropology at the Universityof Zurich His dissertation project explores how peace became an expert object afterthe end of Lebanonrsquos civil war From 2008 to 2010 he headed the collective researchproject ldquoExpert Institutions Peacemaking in Lebanonrdquo supported by the SwissCommission for Research Partnerships with Developing Countries

Notes

1 The wise man is not he who provides the right answers it is he who poses the rightquestions

2 Text cited from televised speech given by Secretary-General Nasrallah in Lebanon on 8May 2008 httpnowlebanoncomNewsArchiveDetailsaspxID=41861

3 In 2005 the dates 8 March and 14 March were marked by huge demonstrations in favorof and against the Syrian presence in Lebanon respectively They came only weeks after

the assassination of Lebanonrsquos prime minister Rafiq al-Hariri The 14 March demonstra-tion labeled by (mostly Western) observers as the beginning of the lsquoCedar Revolutionrsquoled to the end of the long Syrian military presence that dated back to 1976 The 14 Marchcoalition was regarded to be pro-Western supported by the US and Saudi Arabia whilethe 8 March coalition was backed by Syria and Iran For a relatively representative selec-tion of the diametrically opposing opinions on the May Events see Saghiyeh (2008) andSalem (2008) See also ldquoThe Lebanon Crisisrdquo Bitterlemons 22 May 2008 httpwwwbitterlemons-internationalorgpreviousphpopt=1ampid=228

4 For a somewhat novelistic account of my return to the flat see Kosmatopoulos (2008)

5 Theorists in both opposing coalitions largely agree on this notion of the troubled state Seefor example Fragile States by Ali Fayyad (2008) A sociology professor at the LebaneseUniversity Fayyad is affiliated with Hezbollah and an elected member of Parliament

6 The literature both on Hobbes ([1651] 1991) and on Leviathan is gargantuan See forexample Carmichael (1990) Schmitt (2008) Shapin and Schaffer (1985) and State(1987) However there is no consensus on the Hobbesian position regarding lsquohumannaturersquo (van Krieken 2002) Nevertheless Hobbesrsquos influence on modern theorizingabout state war and peace is immense (Trainor 1985) Note the importance of theso-called Hobbesian problem of order for much of the Parsonian structuralist sociology

(Parsons 1937 see also Alexander 1988 van Krieken 2002)7 For example one section of a report for the Working Group on Development and Peace

by Kraft et al (2008) is titled ldquoA Country without a Staterdquo 8 See De Cauter (2011) for an even more graphic adaptation of the Hobbesian nightmarish

prediction that is based solely on a weeklong visit to Lebanon




9 On the concept of prestige zones of theorizing see Appadurai (1986a) For an applicationof the concept on the Arab world see Abu-Lughod (1989)

10 This does not mean to say that there are no critical appraisals of the field regarding

either its universalist claims or the UN peacekeeping operations See for example Paris(2002) and Rubinstein (1998)

11 In my approach I am building heavily on the strands of a recently blossoming domainof critical work on experts both within and outside of anthropology (Boyer 2005a 2005b2008 Carr 2010 Ferguson 1990 Mitchell 2002) Needless to say much of this field isdrawing inspiration from the work of post-colonial and post-structuralist authors such asEdward Said (1978) and Michel Foucault (1980)

12 These are not the real names of these individuals13 Strathern (1980) goes beyond the idea that the binary is the only flaw in this train of

thought 14 In Lebanon Gulf investors have reportedly invested a total of $35 billion in local real

estate constituting 40 percent of total realty investments The large players include AbuDhabi Investment House Dubairsquos Habtoor Group and Dubai Islamic Bank as well asprivate Saudi investors (Hertog 2007 61 see also Eid and Paua 2002)

15 Off-the-record communication in 2009 from a high-ranking official at the World Bankoffice in Beirut

16 Significantly banking another main sector of the Lebanese economy continuedunabated throughout the May Events As Saad Andary the deputy general manager of

Bank of Beirut and the Arab Countries aptly noted ldquoMost of our branches in Beirutwhich was [the] scene of two days of clashes opened their doors in the morning andclosed in the afternoonrdquo He added that the majority of the bankrsquos employees reported towork and that the banks were conducting ldquobusiness as usualrdquo (Habib 2008)

17 Interview with researcher in Beirut March 2007 To my knowledge the think tank organizeda single event concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict the Israeli assault on Gaza in January2008 ldquoThey were dragged into thisrdquo one of the think tankrsquos young researchers told me

18 ESCWA is one of five regional commissions of the UNrsquos ECOSOC (Economic and SocialCouncil) The other four are as follows (1) the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA)

(2) the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) (3) theEconomic Commission for Europe (ECE) and (4) the Economic Commission for LatinAmerica and the Caribbean (ECLAC)

19 Medical metaphors on the conflict are common in many expert publications on LebanonFor example in the report of a US-based peace institute Lebanon appears to have ldquodefi-cienciesrdquo to ldquosuffer challengesrdquo to be ldquoweakenedrdquo and ldquounable to coperdquo (Yacoubian2009) As Talal Asad (2010) shows medical metaphors (eg al-Qaeda as a lsquocancerrsquo) havebeen widely applied by both the Bush and Obama administrations in their rhetoric of thelsquowar on terrorrsquo

20 Interview with ECRI staff member Beirut March 2008 21 The UN study entitled ldquoUnpacking the Dynamics of Communal Tensions A Focus Group

Analysis of Perceptions among Youth in Lebanonrdquo was co-sponsored by the Heinrich-Boumlll-Stiftung in Berlin See httpwwwescwaunorginformationpublicationsedituploadecri-09-5pdf

22 Discussion topics included the ldquonature of clientelism and the political systemrdquo and theldquodynamics of intercommunal relations and animosityrdquo (UN-ESCWA 2009 4) The discus-sions were moderated by ldquotrained facilitatorsrdquo from the Focus Group Research Centre atthe Lebanese Centre for Policy Studies The focus groups also included in-depth discus-sions with people who had ldquoextensive empirical experience in communal tensions andconflict resolution hellip Two focus groups were conducted with (i) mayors and municipalmembers of Shiyah and Ain El Remmaneh identified as hot zones in civil conflicts and(ii) civil society activists who work on related projectsrdquo (ibid)

23 In a section entitled ldquoCommunal Tensions Multilateral and Regional Perspectivesrdquo theECRI study traces back the discourse on communal tensions within the United Nations




to ldquoa landmark report by the Secretary-General entitled Agenda for Peacerdquo (UN-ESCWA2009 7 see also Boutros-Ghali 1992) For a discussion on how the term lsquoethnic conflictrsquodominated diverse problematizations of socio-political violence in Lebanon during the

1990s see Kosmatopoulos (nd)24 For an excellent repudiation of the idea that sectarianism in Lebanon is a pre-modern

trait see Makdisi (2000) Like Makdisi I do not seek to say that there are no sectarianidentifications in Lebanon I am rather interested in looking into the ways that theseexisting tendencies become certainties fixations and self-fulfilling prophecies withinexpert discourses and practices

25 Imad Mughniyeh a high-ranking member of Hezbollah was assassinated in Damascusthree months before the May Events Some analysts link these two events claiming thatMughniyehrsquos killing in Syria ldquostrongly aggravated the partyrsquos reflexes of paranoia and

suspicionrdquo (Bahout 2008) 26 For a small selection of these publications see Alagha (2006) Azani (2008) Haddad(2006) Harik (2005) Jaber (1997) Nasr (2006) Norton (2009) and Saad-Ghorayeb(2002) During my Beirut fieldwork I encountered numerous scholars mostly foreignwho came to Lebanon to lsquostudy Hezbollahrsquo

27 For an overview of how these labels are typically used by political experts see ldquoThe LebanonCrisisrdquo 22 May httpwwwbitterlemons-internationalorgpreviousphpopt=1ampid=228

28 Here is a common depiction of expert domains as presented by the Carnegie Endowmentfor International Peace a visiting scholar is described as ldquoan expert in insurgency and ter-

rorism and the evolution of non-state armed groupsrdquo See httpcarnegieendowmentorg 20110503media-call-after-bin-laden4q0l (accessed 17 April 2011) 29 Here one must note the radically different use of the same term in expert discussions

on civil society market and community governance In studies such as these non-stateactors are usually perceived as positive alternatives to a corrupt and patronizing state Ithank the editors of Social Analysis for pointing out this interesting contrast

30 Samir was offered this opportunity by a Swiss friend whom he had met through hiswork as a peacemaker As an insider Samir contributed a few pieces on Lebanon

31 This piece was published in German and the translation into English is mine Due to

my decision to keep Samirrsquos identity undisclosed I do not provide the source Thusalthough it is a public document I treat the article as part of my fieldwork archive32 Robert was exceptionally open to me about his work Upon invitation I often visited

him at home or joined him in meetings with colleagues in Beirut He could have done sobecause at the time of my research he had already submitted his resignation and waspreparing to take up another job in Switzerland (The person who followed Robert inthe post a social scientist from France refused to give me any interviews) On the otherhand Robert kept telling me how fascinated he was by my research not least becausehe could express his own reflections as a trained social scientist and as a lsquocolleaguersquo (inthe sense of lsquoparaethnographyrsquo see Holmes and Marcus 2005)

33 The phenomenon of lsquoswitchingrsquo among experts in development peacemaking andother fields constituted one of the major findings of my research Needless to say therewere different ways to deal with discrepancies and failure Cynicism was definitely oneof them Some United Nations stuff disenchanted by the organization and given therestriction to publish without permission they would often use pseudonyms for the dis-semination of their critical views

34 Compare this notion of the lsquofailed statersquo with the expert notion of lsquospillover effectsrsquo 35 As a Berlin-based peace expert once told me ldquoThere are so many construction sites in

this worldrdquo 36 For an insightful analysis of the use of the social imaginary of lsquoemergencyrsquo in modernity

see Calhoun (2004) For Israelrsquos 2006 war on Lebanon see Achcar and Warschawski(2007) and Hovsepian (2007)




References

Abrams Philip 1988 ldquoSome Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the Staterdquo Journal of His-

torical Sociology 1 no 1 58ndash89Abu-Lughod Lila 1989 ldquoZones of Theory in the Anthropology of the Arab Worldrdquo Annual

Review of Anthropology 18 no 1 267ndash306Achcar Gilbert and Michel Warschawski 2007 The 33-Day War Israelrsquos War on Hezbollah

in Lebanon and Its Consequences Boulder CO ParadigmAlagha Joseph Elie 2006 The Shifts in Hizbullahrsquos Ideology Religious Ideology Political Ide-

ology and Political Program Amsterdam Amsterdam University PressAlexander Jeffrey C 1988 ldquoParsonsrsquo lsquoStructurersquo in American Sociologyrdquo Sociological Theory

6 no 1 96ndash102

Alonso Ana M 1994 ldquoThe Politics of Space Time and Substance State Formation Nation-alism and Ethnicityrdquo Annual Review of Anthropology 23 379ndash405Alvarez Robert R Jr 1995 ldquoThe Mexican-US Border The Making of an Anthropology of

Borderlandsrdquo Annual Review of Anthropology 24 447ndash470Anderson Benedict 1991 Imagined Communities Reflections on the Origin and Spread of

Nationalism London VersoAppadurai Arjun 1986a ldquoTheory in Anthropology Center and Peripheryrdquo Comparative

Studies in Society and History 28 no 2 356ndash361______ 1986b The Social Life of Things Commodities in Cultural Perspective Cambridge

Cambridge University PressAretxaga Begontildea 2003 ldquoMaddening Statesrdquo Annual Review of Anthropology 32 393ndash410Asad Talal 2010 ldquoHuman Atrocities Human Rightsrdquo Keynote lecture presented at the

annual meeting of the European Association of Social Anthropologists 24 August May-nooth Ireland

Atzili Boaz 2010 ldquoState Weakness and lsquoVacuum of Powerrsquo in Lebanonrdquo Studies in Conflict

amp Terrorism 33 no 8 757ndash782Azani Eitan 2008 Hezbollah The Story of the Party of God From Revolution to Institutional-

ization New York Palgrave Macmillan

Bahout Joseph 2008 ldquoMay 2008 Birthday of Lebanonrsquos Latest Civil Warrdquo Bitterlemons International 22 May httpwwwbitterlemons-internationalorginsidephpid=936Barber Benjamin R 1992 ldquoJihad vs McWorldrdquo Atlantic Online (March) httpwww

theatlanticcommagazinearchive199203jihad-vs-mcworld3882Boas Morten and Kathleen Jennings 2005 ldquoInsecurity and Development The Rhetoric of

the lsquoFailed Statersquordquo European Journal of Development Research 17 no 3 385ndash395Boege Volker Anne Brown Kevin Clements and Anna Nolan 2008 On Hybrid Political

Orders and Emerging States State Formation in the Context of ldquoFragilityrdquo Berghof Hand-book for Conflict Transformation Dialogue Series No 8 Building Peace in the Absence ofStates httpwwwberghof-handbooknetdocumentspublicationsdialogue8_boegeetal_leadpdf

Boutros-Ghali Boutros 1992 An Agenda for Peace Preventive Diplomacy Peacemaking and

Peace-Keeping Document A47277 - S241111 17 June New York Department of PublicInformation United Nations httpwwwunorgDocsSGagpeacehtml

Bowie Katherine A 1997 Rituals of National Loyalty An Anthropology of the State and the

Village Scout Movement in Thailand New York Columbia University PressBoyer Dominic 2005a ldquoVisiting Knowledge in Anthropology An Introductionrdquo Ethnos

Journal of Anthropology 70 no 2 141ndash148______ 2005b ldquoThe Corporeality of Expertiserdquo Ethnos Journal of Anthropology 70 no 2

243ndash266______ 2008 ldquoThinking through the Anthropology of Expertsrdquo Anthropology in Action 15

no 2 38ndash46Caduff Carlo 2010 ldquoPublic Prophylaxis Pandemic Influenza Pharmaceutical Prevention

and Participatory Governancerdquo BioSocieties 5 no 2 199ndash218




Calhoun Craig 2004 ldquoA World of Emergencies Fear Intervention and the Limits of Cosmo-politan Orderrdquo Canadian Review of SociologyRevue canadienne de sociologie 41 no 4373ndash395

Callon Michel and Bruno Latour 1981 ldquoUnscrewing the Big Leviathan How Actors Macro-structure Reality and How Sociologists Help Them to Do Sordquo Pp 227ndash303 in Advances

in Social Theory and Methodology ed Karin Knorr-Cetina and Aaron Victor CicourelLondon Routledge amp Kegan Paul

Carmichael D J C 1990 ldquoHobbes on Natural Right in Society The Leviathan AccountrdquoCanadian Journal of Political ScienceRevue canadienne de science politique 23 no 13ndash21

Carr E Summerson 2010 ldquoEnactments of Expertiserdquo Annual Review of Anthropology 39no 1 17ndash32

Clapham Andrew 2009 ldquoNon-state Actorsrdquo Pp 200ndash212 in Post-conflict Peacebuilding A Lexicon ed Vincent Chetail Oxford Oxford University Press

Comaroff Jean and John L Comaroff 2006 Law and Disorder in the Postcolony ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press

Coronil Fernando 1997 The Magical State Nature Money and Modernity in VenezuelaChicago Chicago University Press

Corrigan Philip and Derek Sayek 1985 The Great Arch English State Formation as Cultural

Revolution Oxford Basil BlackwellDas Veena and Deborah Poole eds 2004 Anthropology in the Margins of the State Santa

Fe NM School of American Research PressDe Cauter Lieven 2011 ldquoTowards a Phenomenology of Civil War Hobbes Meets Benjaminin Beirutrdquo International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 35 no 2 421ndash430

Deleuze Gilles and Feacutelix Guattari 1986 Nomadology The War Machine Trans Brian Mas-sumi New York Semiotext (e)

Douglas Mary 1966 Purity and Danger An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and TabooLondon Routledge amp Kegan Paul

Durrenberger E Paul 2001 ldquoAnthropology and Globalizationrdquo American Anthropologist 103 no 2 531ndash535

Eid Florence and Fiona Paua 2002 ldquoForeign Direct Investment in the Arab World TheChanging Investment Landscaperdquo Working Paper Series Beirut School of BusinessAmerican University

El Khazen Farid 2000 The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon 1967ndash1976 Cambridge MAHarvard University Press

Eriksen Thomas H 2003 Globalisation Studies in Anthropology London Pluto PressFayyad Ali 2008 Fragile States Dilemmas of Stability in Lebanon and the Arab World

Oxford INTRAC (International NGO Training and Research Centre)Feldman Allen 2003 ldquoPolitical Terror and the Technologies of Memory Excuse Sacrifice

Commodification and Actuarial Moralitiesrdquo Radical History Review 85 58ndash73Ferguson James 1990 The Anti-politics Machine ldquoDevelopmentrdquo Depoliticization and

Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho Cambridge University Press CambridgeFoucault Michel 1980 PowerKnowledge Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972ndash

1977 Ed Colin Gordon New York Pantheon BooksGellner Ernest 1983 Nations and Nationalism Oxford BlackwellGilsenan Michael 1996 Lords of the Lebanese Marches Violence and Narrative in an Arab

Society Berkeley University of California PressGupta Akhil and Aradhana Sharma 2006 ldquoIntroduction Rethinking Theories of the State

in an Age of Globalizationrdquo Pp 1ndash41 in The Anthropology of the State A Reader edAradhana Sharma and Akhil Gupta Oxford Blackwell

Gutieacuterrez Saniacuten Francisco 2010 ldquoEstados fallidos o conceptos fallidos La clasificacioacuten delas fallas estatales y sus problemasrdquo Revista de Estudios Sociales 37 87ndash104

Habib Osama 2008 ldquolsquoBusiness as Usualrsquo for Banks as Fighting Shakes Lebanonrdquo Daily

Star 13 May




Haddad Simon 2006 ldquoThe Origins of Popular Support for Lebanonrsquos Hezbollahrdquo Studies in

Conflict and Terrorism 29 no 1 21ndash34Hameiri Shahar 2007 ldquoFailed States or a Failed Paradigm State Capacity and the Limits of

Institutionalismrdquo Journal of International Relations and Development 10 122ndash149Hanf Theodor 1993 Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon Decline of a State and Rise of a

Nation London IB TaurisHarik Judith P 2005 Hezbollah The Changing Face of Terrorism London IB TaurisHertog Steffen 2007 ldquoThe GCC and Arab Economic Integration A New Paradigmrdquo Middle

East Policy 14 no 1 52ndash68Herzfeld Michael 1992 The Social Production of Indifference Exploring the Symbolic Roots

of Western Bureaucracy Chicago University of Chicago PressHobbes Thomas [1651] 1991 Leviathan Cambridge Cambridge University Press

Holmes Douglas R and George E Marcus 2005 ldquoCultures of Expertise and the Manage-ment of Globalization Toward the Re-functioning of Ethnographyrdquo Pp 235ndash252 in Ongand Collier 2005

Hovsepian Nubar ed 2007 The War on Lebanon A Reader New York Olive Branch PressHuntington Samuel P 1998 The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order

New York Touchstone BooksInda Jonathan X and Renato Rosaldo eds 2008 The Anthropology of Globalization

A Reader 2nd ed Oxford BlackwellInternational Crisis Group 2008 Lebanon Hizbollahrsquos Weapons Turn Inward Middle East

Briefing No 23 BeirutBrussels 15 May Jaber Hala 1997 Hezbollah Born with a Vengeance New York Columbia University Press Johnson Michael 2001 All Honourable Men The Social Origins of War in Lebanon Lon-

don IB Tauris Joseph Suad 2000 Gender and Citizenship in the Middle East Syracuse NY Syracuse Uni-

versity PressKapferer Bruce 2005 ldquoNew Formations of Power the Oligarchic-Corporate state and

Anthropological Ideological Discourserdquo Anthropological Theory 5 no 3 285ndash299Kapferer Bruce and Bjoslashrn Enge Bertelsen eds 2009 Crisis of the State War and Social

Upheaval New York Berghahn BooksKosmatopoulos Nikolas 2008 ldquoIl Harb bi Gawwarrdquo [War in the Neighborhood] As-Safir 5 November

______ 2011 ldquoVahsi Oumlterdquoyi Insa Etmek Antropoloji ve Oumltesinde Ccedilatısma Kuramı vePratigirdquo [Constructing the lsquoWild Restrsquo Conflict Theory and Practice in Anthropologyand Beyond] In Sınırlar I ˙ majlar Kuumlltuumlrler Antropolojik Accedilıdan Avrupalılıgı Yeniden

Duumlsuumlnmek [Borders Images Cultures Thinking Europeanness from an AnthropologicalPerspective] ed Hande Birkalan-Gedik trans Sibel Oumlzbudun Istanbul np

______ nd ldquoPacifying Lebanon Violence Power and Experts in the Middle Eastrdquo Unpub-lished dissertation

Kraft Martin Muzna Al-Mazri Heiko Wimmen and Natascha Zupan 2008 Walking the

Line Strategic Approaches to Peacebuilding in Lebanon Working Group on Developmentand Peace (FriEnt) German Development Service and Heinrich-Boumlll-Stiftung

Latour Bruno 2009 The Making of Law An Ethnography of the Conseil drsquoEtat CambridgePolity Press

LrsquoEstoile Benoicirct Federico Neiburg and Lygia Sigaud 2006 ldquoEmpires Nations and NativesAnthropology and State-Makingrdquo Journal of Latin American Anthropology 11 no 2 432ndash434

Lewis Bernard 1990 ldquoThe Roots of Muslim Ragerdquo Atlantic Monthly September httpwwwtheatlanticcommagazinearchive199009the-roots-of-muslim-rage4643

Leacutevi-Strauss Claude 1964 Mythologiques Vol 1 Le Cru et le cuit Paris PlonMakdisi Ussama S 2000 The Culture of Sectarianism Community History and Violence in

Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon Berkeley University of California PressManjikian Mary 2008 ldquoDiagnosis Intervention and Cure The Illness Narrative in the Dis-

course of the Failed Staterdquo Alternatives Global Local Political 33 no 3 335ndash357




Merry Sally E 1992 ldquoAnthropology Law and Transnational Processesrdquo Annual Review of

Anthropology 21 357ndash379Mitchell Timothy 1990 ldquoEveryday Metaphors of Powerrdquo Theory amp Society 19 no 5

545ndash577______ 1991 ldquoThe Limits of the State Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Criticsrdquo Ameri-

can Political Science Review 85 no 1 77ndash96______ 2002 Rule of Experts Egypt Techno-Politics Modernity Berkeley University of Cali-

fornia PressNasr Vali 2006 The Shia Revival How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future 1st ed

New York W W NortonNavaro-Yashin Yael 2002 Faces of the State Secularism and Public Life in Turkey Princeton

NJ Princeton University Press

Nguyen Vinh-Kim 2005 ldquoAntiretroviral Globalism Biopolitics and Therapeutic Citizen-shiprdquo Pp 124ndash144 in Ong and Collier 2005Nordstrom Carolyn 2004 Shadows of War Violence Power and International Profiteering

in the Twenty-First Century Vol 10 in California Series in Public Anthropology BerkeleyUniversity of California Press

Norton Augustus R 2009 Hezbollah A Short History Princeton NJ Princeton UniversityPress

Nugent David 1998 ldquoThe Morality of Modernity and the Travails of Tradition Nationhoodand the Subaltern in Northern Perurdquo Critique of Anthropology 18 no 1 7ndash33

Obeid Michelle 2010 ldquoSearching for the lsquoIdeal Face of the Statersquo in a Lebanese BorderTownrdquo Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 16 no 2 330ndash346Ong Aihwa 1999 ldquoClash of Civilizations or Asian Liberalism An Anthropology of the State

and Citizenshiprdquo Pp 48ndash72 in Anthropological Theory Today ed Henrietta Moore Cam-bridge Polity Press

Ong Aihwa and Stephen J Collier eds 2005 Global Assemblages Technology Politics and

Ethics as Anthropological Problems Malden MA BlackwellPaley Julia 2002 ldquoToward an Anthropology of Democracyrdquo Annual Review of Anthropology

31 469ndash496

Paris Roland 2002 ldquoInternational Peacebuilding and the lsquoMission Civilisatricersquordquo Review of International Studies 28 no 4 637ndash656Parsons Talcott 1937 The Structure of Social Action New York Free PressRadcliffe-Brown A R 1940 ldquoPrefacerdquo Pp xindashxxiii in African Political Systems ed Meyer

Fortes London International Institute of African Languages Oxford University PressRichards Paul 2005 ldquoNew War An Ethnographic Approachrdquo Pp 1ndash21 in No Peace No

War An Anthology of Contemporary Armed Conflicts ed Paul Richards Athens OhioUniversity Press

Rubinstein Robert A 1998 ldquoPeacekeeping under Fire Understanding the Social Construc-tion of the Legitimacy of Multilateral Interventionrdquo Human Peace 11 no 4 22ndash29

Saad-Ghorayeb Amal 2002 Hizbursquollah Politics and Religion London Pluto PressSaghiyeh Khaled 2008 ldquoHamla Tarsquodibiyyardquo Al-Ahkbar 15 MaySahlins Marshall 2008 The Western Illusion of Human Nature Chicago Prickly Paradigm

PressSaid Edward 1978 Orientalism New York Pantheon BooksSalem Paul 2008 ldquoHizbollah Attempts a Coup drsquoEtatrdquo Carnegie Endowment for Interna-

tional Peace May httpcarnegieendowmentorgfilessalem_coup_finalpdfSchmitt Carl 2008 The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes Meaning and Fail-

ure of a Political Symbol Trans George Schwab and Erna Hifstein Chicago University ofChicago Press

Shapin Steven and Simon Schaffer 1985 Leviathan and the Air-Pump Hobbes Boyle and

the Experimental Life Princeton NJ Princeton University PressSluka Jeffrey A ed 2000 Death Squad The Anthropology of State Terror Philadelphia

University of Pennsylvania Press




Smith Rogers M 1997 Civic Ideals Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in US History NewHaven CT Yale University Press

State Stephen 1987 ldquoHobbes and Hooker Politics and Religion A Note on the Structuring

of lsquoLeviathanrsquordquo Canadian Journal of Political ScienceRevue canadienne de science poli-tique 20 no 1 79ndash96

Steinmetz George ed 1999 StateCulture State-Formation after the Cultural Turn IthacaNY Cornell University Press

Strathern Marilyn 1980 ldquoNo Nature No Culture The Hagen Caserdquo Pp 174ndash222 in Nature

Culture and Gender ed Carol P MacCormack and Marilyn Strathern Cambridge Cam-bridge University Press

______ 1992 After Nature English Kinship in the Late Twentieth Century Cambridge Cam-bridge University Press

Taussig Michael 1997 The Magic of the State New York RoutledgeTrainor Brian T 1985 ldquoThe Politics of Peace The Role of the Political Covenant in Hobbesrsquos

Leviathanrdquo Review of Politics 47 no 3 347ndash369Trouillot Michel-Rolph 2003 ldquoThe Anthropology of the State in the Age of Globalization

Close Encounters of the Deceptive Kindrdquo Pp 79ndash96 in Global Transformations Anthro-

pology and the Modern World New York Palgrave MacmillanUN-ESCWA (United Nations-Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia) 2009

ldquoUnpacking the Dynamics of Communal Tensions A Focus Group Analysis of Percep-tions among Youth in Lebanonrdquo httpwwwescwaunorginformationpublications

edituploadecri-09-5pdf______ 2011 ldquoEmerging and Conflict Related Issues (ECRI)rdquo httpwwwescwaunorgdivisionsmoreaspdivision=ECRI

UNDP-AHDR (United Nations Development Programme-Arab Human Development Report)2009 Challenges to Human Security in the Arab Countries httpwwwarab-hdrorgpublicationsotherahdrahdr2009epdf

van Krieken Robert 2002 ldquoThe Paradox of the lsquoTwo Sociologiesrsquo Hobbes Latour and theConstitution of Modern Social Theoryrdquo Journal of Sociology 38 no 3 255ndash273

Yacoubian Mona 2009 Lebanonrsquos Unstable Equilibrium United States Institute of Peace

Briefing httpwwwusiporgfilesresourceslebanon_equilibrium_pbpdf




as an existential threat to the infrastructure of what it calls lsquoAl Mukawamarsquo (theResistance) and a casus belli with regard to the internal conflict (Bahout 2008)

That evening Hezbollahrsquos secretary-general Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah deliv-ered a televised message from an undisclosed location calling upon membersof the Resistance to protect the latter and to ldquocut off the handsrdquo that threatenit2 In the aftermath of the speech armed groups were deployed around govern-ment buildings (Parliament and the presidentrsquos office) residences of govern-ment figures (the prime minister and party leaders) and strategic streets inthe capital and elsewhere in order to force the government to withdraw thedecrees These groups engaged in deadly clashes with armed pro-government

fighters and relatively soon thereafter the government conceded defeat Inwhat had lasted for three days and later became known as the lsquoMay Eventsrsquo(aHdath ayyar ) 80 people had died and more than 200 had been injured3

During the entire year of 2008 I was conducting fieldwork among peaceexperts in Beirut As destiny would have it a few days before the May Events Itraveled to Greece for a university talk As soon as Beirut International Airportreopened I was on the first flight from Athens I entered my flat located inthe district of Hamra which was the epicenter of the clashes only to find that

all of the windows had been broken the walls were replete with bullet holesand a critically injured air conditioner was dangling hazardously4 Withoutlosing much time over the casualties at home I resumed what one might callfieldwork in a post-violence environment Now that the fighting with machineguns was over it was time for heated debates mutual accusations and ofcourse peace talks In the previous period I had already established cordialrelationships with Lebanese as well as lsquointernationalsrsquo who were regardedmdashbythemselves or by othersmdashas lsquoexperts in peacersquo Among them were analysts for

peace or crisis think tanks employees in peacebuilding NGOs and officers ofdifferent UN agencies Needless to say their views differed on many issues

Despite this an overall consensual response toward the May Events wasstriking At the core of such surprising unanimity was the imaginary of alsquostrong statersquo as the ultimate solution as the antidote to perils such as cor-ruption civil strife and armed violence Notably the recent surge in violencebetween opposing camps prompted comparisons with the countryrsquos civil warwhich had lasted 15 years from 1975 to 1990 Behind the rhetorical effect ofsuch historical comparisons was the idea of a failing and absent state Althoughnot explicitly referred to as such the image of Lebanonrsquos failing Leviathan wasable to unite politicians who would otherwise fight over almost everything5 The image-cum-argument basically reiterates the familiar Hobbesian conceptaccording to which humans are always ready to resort to violence in order todefend personal and group interests and civil wars can be avoided only throughthe establishment of strong sovereigns6 Further expressions such as ldquoMah fih

dawleh bi Lubnanrdquo (There is no state in Lebanon) or rhetorical questions suchas ldquoWen el dawlehrdquo (Where is the state) dominate the popular discourse andhave their sophisticated counterparts in academia Books with telling titlessuch as The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon (El Khazen 2000) or Coexis-

tence in Wartime Lebanon Decline of a State and Rise of a Nation (Hanf 1993)





















































F I G U R E

1




1 9

6 0

1 9 6 5

1 9 7 0

1 9 7 5

1 9 8 0

1 9 8 5

1 9 9 0

1 9 9 5

2 0 0 0

2 0 0 5



r o g u e

s t a t e

0 0

0 0 0 1 0 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 9 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 8 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 7 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 6 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 5 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 4 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 3 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 2 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 1 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0

S o u r c e

h t t p

b o o

k s g o o g

l e c

o m

n g r a m s

































































Sex Male 55

Female 58

Communities Sunni 4

Shiite 4

Maronites 3

Druze 2

Mixed Christians 2



North 5

Bekaa 2





























Samir




























NK Why










The Political



















Acknowledgments










Notes























































References






6 no 1 96ndash102


















































Star 13 May
















































31 469ndash496




















































































F I G U R E

1




1 9

6 0

1 9 6 5

1 9 7 0

1 9 7 5

1 9 8 0

1 9 8 5

1 9 9 0

1 9 9 5

2 0 0 0

2 0 0 5



r o g u e

s t a t e

0 0

0 0 0 1 0 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 9 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 8 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 7 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 6 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 5 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 4 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 3 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 2 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 1 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0

S o u r c e

h t t p

b o o

k s g o o g

l e c

o m

n g r a m s

































































Sex Male 55

Female 58

Communities Sunni 4

Shiite 4

Maronites 3

Druze 2

Mixed Christians 2



North 5

Bekaa 2





























Samir




























NK Why










The Political



















Acknowledgments










Notes























































References






6 no 1 96ndash102


















































Star 13 May
















































31 469ndash496










































































F I G U R E

1




1 9

6 0

1 9 6 5

1 9 7 0

1 9 7 5

1 9 8 0

1 9 8 5

1 9 9 0

1 9 9 5

2 0 0 0

2 0 0 5



r o g u e

s t a t e

0 0

0 0 0 1 0 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 9 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 8 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 7 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 6 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 5 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 4 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 3 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 2 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 1 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0

S o u r c e

h t t p

b o o

k s g o o g

l e c

o m

n g r a m s

































































Sex Male 55

Female 58

Communities Sunni 4

Shiite 4

Maronites 3

Druze 2

Mixed Christians 2



North 5

Bekaa 2





























Samir




























NK Why










The Political



















Acknowledgments










Notes























































References






6 no 1 96ndash102


















































Star 13 May
















































31 469ndash496






























































F I G U R E

1




1 9

6 0

1 9 6 5

1 9 7 0

1 9 7 5

1 9 8 0

1 9 8 5

1 9 9 0

1 9 9 5

2 0 0 0

2 0 0 5



r o g u e

s t a t e

0 0

0 0 0 1 0 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 9 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 8 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 7 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 6 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 5 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 4 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 3 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 2 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 1 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0

S o u r c e

h t t p

b o o

k s g o o g

l e c

o m

n g r a m s

































































Sex Male 55

Female 58

Communities Sunni 4

Shiite 4

Maronites 3

Druze 2

Mixed Christians 2



North 5

Bekaa 2





























Samir




























NK Why










The Political



















Acknowledgments










Notes























































References






6 no 1 96ndash102


















































Star 13 May
















































31 469ndash496















































F I G U R E

1




1 9

6 0

1 9 6 5

1 9 7 0

1 9 7 5

1 9 8 0

1 9 8 5

1 9 9 0

1 9 9 5

2 0 0 0

2 0 0 5



r o g u e

s t a t e

0 0

0 0 0 1 0 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 9 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 8 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 7 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 6 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 5 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 4 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 3 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 2 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 1 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0

S o u r c e

h t t p

b o o

k s g o o g

l e c

o m

n g r a m s

































































Sex Male 55

Female 58

Communities Sunni 4

Shiite 4

Maronites 3

Druze 2

Mixed Christians 2



North 5

Bekaa 2





























Samir




























NK Why










The Political



















Acknowledgments










Notes























































References






6 no 1 96ndash102


















































Star 13 May
















































31 469ndash496


































F I G U R E

1




1 9

6 0

1 9 6 5

1 9 7 0

1 9 7 5

1 9 8 0

1 9 8 5

1 9 9 0

1 9 9 5

2 0 0 0

2 0 0 5



r o g u e

s t a t e

0 0

0 0 0 1 0 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 9 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 8 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 7 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 6 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 5 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 4 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 3 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 2 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 1 0 0

0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0

S o u r c e

h t t p

b o o

k s g o o g

l e c

o m

n g r a m s

































































Sex Male 55

Female 58

Communities Sunni 4

Shiite 4

Maronites 3

Druze 2

Mixed Christians 2



North 5

Bekaa 2





























Samir




























NK Why










The Political



















Acknowledgments










Notes























































References






6 no 1 96ndash102


















































Star 13 May
















































31 469ndash496
































































































Sex Male 55

Female 58

Communities Sunni 4

Shiite 4

Maronites 3

Druze 2

Mixed Christians 2



North 5

Bekaa 2





























Samir




























NK Why










The Political



















Acknowledgments










Notes























































References






6 no 1 96ndash102


















































Star 13 May
















































31 469ndash496




















































































Sex Male 55

Female 58

Communities Sunni 4

Shiite 4

Maronites 3

Druze 2

Mixed Christians 2



North 5

Bekaa 2





























Samir




























NK Why










The Political



















Acknowledgments










Notes























































References






6 no 1 96ndash102


















































Star 13 May
















































31 469ndash496














































































Sex Male 55

Female 58

Communities Sunni 4

Shiite 4

Maronites 3

Druze 2

Mixed Christians 2



North 5

Bekaa 2





























Samir




























NK Why










The Political



















Acknowledgments










Notes























































References






6 no 1 96ndash102


















































Star 13 May
















































31 469ndash496


































































Sex Male 55

Female 58

Communities Sunni 4

Shiite 4

Maronites 3

Druze 2

Mixed Christians 2



North 5

Bekaa 2





























Samir




























NK Why










The Political



















Acknowledgments










Notes























































References






6 no 1 96ndash102


















































Star 13 May
















































31 469ndash496






















































Sex Male 55

Female 58

Communities Sunni 4

Shiite 4

Maronites 3

Druze 2

Mixed Christians 2



North 5

Bekaa 2





























Samir




























NK Why










The Political



















Acknowledgments










Notes























































References






6 no 1 96ndash102


















































Star 13 May
















































31 469ndash496









































Sex Male 55

Female 58

Communities Sunni 4

Shiite 4

Maronites 3

Druze 2

Mixed Christians 2



North 5

Bekaa 2





























Samir




























NK Why










The Political



















Acknowledgments










Notes























































References






6 no 1 96ndash102


















































Star 13 May
















































31 469ndash496


























































Samir




























NK Why










The Political



















Acknowledgments










Notes























































References






6 no 1 96ndash102


















































Star 13 May
















































31 469ndash496














































Samir




























NK Why










The Political



















Acknowledgments










Notes























































References






6 no 1 96ndash102


















































Star 13 May
















































31 469ndash496




































Samir




























NK Why










The Political



















Acknowledgments










Notes























































References






6 no 1 96ndash102


















































Star 13 May
















































31 469ndash496




















































NK Why










The Political



















Acknowledgments










Notes























































References






6 no 1 96ndash102


















































Star 13 May
















































31 469ndash496








































NK Why










The Political



















Acknowledgments










Notes























































References






6 no 1 96ndash102


















































Star 13 May
















































31 469ndash496




































The Political



















Acknowledgments










Notes























































References






6 no 1 96ndash102


















































Star 13 May
















































31 469ndash496









































Acknowledgments










Notes























































References






6 no 1 96ndash102


















































Star 13 May
















































31 469ndash496







































Notes























































References






6 no 1 96ndash102


















































Star 13 May
















































31 469ndash496












































































References






6 no 1 96ndash102


















































Star 13 May
















































31 469ndash496























































References






6 no 1 96ndash102


















































Star 13 May
















































31 469ndash496



































References






6 no 1 96ndash102


















































Star 13 May
















































31 469ndash496




























































Star 13 May
















































31 469ndash496















































































31 469ndash496


















































31 469ndash496




















































Documents

Toward an Anthropology of State Failure