Toward an Expanded Definition of Adaptive Decision Making

Toward an Expanded Definition of Adaptive Decision Making

Susan D. Phillips

This article draws from the life-span, life-space model (Super, 1980, 1990) of career development to examine the definition of adaptive decision making. First, the existing definition of adaptive decision making as “rational” decision making is reviewed. Next, alternate perspectives on decision making are offered with a n emphasis on the implications for deciding in a life-span, life-space context. Finally, suggestions are made for future directions in theory, research, and practice.

In shifting the focus of career theory, research, and practice from the occupational sphere to multiple life roles, Donald Super (1980) presented the profession with a challenging agenda for considering the nature of individual development and for assisting with individual coping. Coinciding with dramatic shifts in the workplace, this agenda heralds a new generation of career development theory in which individuals seek satisfaction in multiple areas and must be mindful of the complex interplay of life roles over time.

As a consequence, consideration of the nature of adaptive coping has also required expansion. Whereas notions about adaptive coping were once confined to the vocational realm, they must now embrace both vocational and avocational roles. Whereas adaptive coping was once tailored around the predictable choice points of youth, i t must now expand to the less clearly defined segments of growth and exploration, and to the unique and ever-varying circumstances of adulthood. And, whereas it was once enough to prepare for the choice points of entry into the world of work, it is now necessary to define how one negotiates a constellation of roles over a lifetime.

In brief, adaptive coping in the new age of career development theory entails planning, exploring, and deciding in a substantially more

Susan D. Phillips is a n associate professor in the Department of Counseling Psychology at the University at AlbanylSUNY. A ver- sion of this article was presented a t a symposium at the 1995 an- nual convention of the American Psychological Association in New York. Correspondence regarding this article should be addressed to Susan D. Phillips, E D 220, Department of Counseling Psychol- ogy, University at A lbanylSUNY, 1400 Washington Avenue, Al- bany, NY 12222.

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complex field. Although o thers have suggested expanded conceptualizations of planning and exploring (e.g., Blustein, 1997; Savickas, Silling, & Schwartz, 19841, my focus in this article is on what needs to be understood about adaptive decision making in this broadened context. As with planning and exploring, the nature of deciding has become substantially more complex. How do individuals proceed-r how they should proceed-with respect to decision- making tasks when their decisional “fields” shift both with time and with opportunity, and span multiple life roles?

I would like to address these questions in the true Super tradition: by considering and integrating the thinking and the findings of those in different fields. First, 1 outline the definition of adaptive decision making as it was initially conceptualized in the occupational sphere. Next, I offer some alternate perspectives on decision making, with an emphasis on implications for deciding in a life-span, life-space context. Finally, I suggest some promising directions for continued theory, research, and practice for adaptive decision making.

ADAPTIVE DECISION MAKING

For most of the nearly century-long history of career development, the adaptive decider has been considered to be the one who is a n objective scientist, that is, one who has consistent preferences, who is free of cognitive distortions and emotional distractions, and who can obtain and use accurate information about the self, the alternatives, and the future. The adaptive decider is methodical, systematic, independent, and unimpulsive throughout the decision- making process, and maintains as a n ultimate goal the maximiza- tion of personal gain. You will, no doubt, recognize this characterization as that of rational decision making. With few exceptions, theorizing about vocational behavior and ca-

reer development has recommended-or assumed-a rational pos- ture toward individual career decision making. Beginning with Par- sons’ (1909) classic prescription, true reasoning has been advocated as the basis for choice: a choice is rational (or truly reasoned) if the process is one in which the decider carefully gathers information about the self and the array of alternatives that is accurate and thorough, and if the chosen alternative is one that matches the individual’s own unique characteristics and priorities. However, as Super (1980,1990) noted, this prescription offers little detail about the decision-making process or about what one does with the carefully and accurately gathered information about self and alternatives. That is, little advice is offered about how all of the obtained information is weighed and evaluated. Perhaps, as a consequence of this ambiguity, many theorists devoted attention directly to the decision-making process per se: How do people decide? How should they decide?

Many writers have directed their attention to these questions, borrowing heavily from the literature on decision making found in the literature of economics, philosophy, sociology, and mathematics. Within the career domain, some have sought to describe, broadly,

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the entire process of career decision making. The work of Tiedeman and O’Hara (1963) and Harren (1979) are illustrative of this perspective. In these models, the individual is seen as progressing from a period of awareness and exploration, through identification of alternatives, choice, and clarification of how the chosen alternative will be implemented. Although this broad description of decision making does not necessarily prescribe rationality, it is suggestive of the thorough and systematic qualities of a rational decision-making process. A second perspective on how decisions a r e - o r should be-made is

found in the work of those who have sought to detail the specific steps or tasks that should be involved in quality decision making. In these writings, the characteristics of the rational model are more pronounced. One example of this perspective is that of Gelatt (1962), who suggested that the necessary activities of the decision-making process included estimating likely outcomes, weighting the value of those outcomes, and selecting an appropriate course of action. He portrayed this as the application of the scientific method, likened it to Dewey’s (1933) reflective thinking, and issued warnings against individual errors such as selective perception.

The model proposed by Krumboltz and Hamel (1977) also characterized this perspective. In their view, rational decision making would reflect the following “DECIDES” steps: defining the problem, estab- lishing a plan of action, clarifying values, identifying alternatives, discovering probable outcomes, eliminating alternatives systemati- cally, andstarting action. Advocating similarly careful analysis and procedure, Janis and Mann (1977) and DZurilla and Goldfried (1971) have also detailed the methodical and thorough aspects of quality decision making and have emphasized the necessity of the decider’s guarding against informational inaccuracy, misuse, or avoidance. These models differ from the broader descriptions I previously de- scribed in that good decision making is thought to depend not only on the deliberateness of the procedure, but also on the extent to which the decider can avoid cognitive errors or distortion.

Although the broad process perspectives suggest a systematic and thorough approach to the decision-making process, and the step or task models further advocate reducing inaccuracy and error, neither offers specific advice in terms of the criteria by which alternatives are eliminated or chosen. For such advice, many have drawn from a third prescriptive perspective, that of classical decision theory. In classical decision theory, the principles of expected utility are frequently advocated as the decision criteria (Pitz & Harren, 1980; Savage, 1954). Given that the expected utility model is often considered synonymous with rational decision making, it is worth taking a close look at what i t means. As detailed by Pitz and Harren (1980), the expected utility model

of decision making presumes that individuals possess knowable preferences and values, that at least two alternative courses of action are present, and that each alternative has various outcomes that differ in terms of their attributes. To arrive at the optimal choice, the decider evaluates each possible outcome with respect to his or her preferences and values. This evaluation yields the utility

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of those outcomes. Objectiv-r, more commonly, subjective-probabilities are then assigned to each possible outcome, resulting in quantified estimates of the likelihood that each outcome would occur. Combining the utilities and the likelihood estimates then re- veals which alternative would maximize the combination of appeal and probability. This expected utility model, and variation on the basic theme, has served as the basis of several models of career decision making, including those of Vroom (1964) and Katz (1966).

Taking these three perspectives together (broad process, steps or tasks, and expected utility), the following picture of adaptive decision making emerges: (a) Once the individual is aware of and defines the decision to be made, all possible alternatives are identified; (b) information is obtained about individual tastes and preferences, as well as about the possible outcomes of each alternative; (c) the assembled information is scrutinized repeatedly for accuracy in fact and in usage, and is translated into terms-probably numerical-that reflect meaningful scalar differences in terms of preferences and outcomes; (d) computational combinations of these terms are figured in such a way that tradeoffs are made between preferences and likely outcomes, and global figures are yielded for each alternative; (e) the optimal alternative-that is, the one with the highest global fig- ure-is targeted for selection, implementation, and subsequent ad- justment. Overall, the process is a methodical one, carried out with care, deliberation, independence and thoroughness.

ALTERNATIVE DECISION MAKING MODELS

Although this picture of adaptive decision making reflects the basis for most of the advocated approaches to adaptive career decision making, the literature has also illustrated alternatives to this rational model that have some interesting implications for deciding in a life-span, life-space context. The depicted alternatives have largely come from those who have sought to describe (rather than prescribe) the nature of human decision making.

Those who have considered what actually happens in the decision- making process have offered the nearly unanimous conclusion that rational decision making simply does not reflect the decider’s reality. That is, individuals decide in many ways, only some of which are compatible with the rational model previously detailed. Some decision-making experts have further argued that individuals are simply not capable of executing the intricate, exhaustive process implied by the models of rational decision making. And, still others have suggested that rationality can have various definitions, not only the one detailed above. As reviewed in the following sections, these conclusions are evident in both the literature on decision theory and the literature specific to career decision making.

ObservedVariations in Decision Making

Recognition that all deciders do not necessarily approach or behave in decisional situations in the advocated rational manner led a number


of investigators to attempt to classify the varying ways in which individuals proceed in career decision situations. These are taxonomies of career decision-making style, or alternately, decision- making strategy.

Commonly cited as the first-devised taxonomy of decision-making style, Dinklage (1968) suggested that there were not only rational planners, but alsoagonizers, delayers, intuitives, fatalists, and those who wereparalyzed, impulsive, or compliant. Similar taxonomies have been proposed by Arroba (1977), Harren (1979), Jepsen (19741, Johnson (1978), Krumboltz et al. (1979), and Walsh (1985), using such terms as hesitant, emotional, no-thought, rational, impulsive, dependent, internal, external, thinking, feeling, spontaneous, and systematic.

Considering these various styles, i t is clear that there are many ways in which people decide that do not conform to what is known as “rational.” Furthermore, i t would be tempting to characterize the planning, logical, rational, systematic, thinking individual as “rational,” and to designate the agonizing, delaying, paralyzed, hesitant, impulsive, no-thought, intuitive, emotional, fatalistic, compliant, dependent, and externally oriented individuals as “irrational.” A more complex perspective, however, would recognize the observed variability on such dimensions as active-passive, individual- collaborative, fast-slow, cognitive-affective, and public-private.

Capacities of the Human Decider

Herbert Simon (1955,1957) is credited with launching a major chal- lenge to the rational model of decision making by pointing out that all human behavior is enacted within the constraints of limitations in human capacity, and that this circumstance renders a phenom- enon he referred to as “bounded rationality.” Under the rational model in general, and the expected utility model in particular, individuals are required to have vast and complete amounts of information about the available alternatives; extraordinary perception, memory, organization, and prediction skills; and an enormous computational capacity. Furthermore, for the expected utility model to yield optimal outcomes, the preferences of the decider must be precise, stable, consistent, and unaffected by the choices that they have helped to shape. Indeed, March (1978) summarized the dilemma of rational decision making as requiring two accurate guesses: what will hap- pen and how will we like it. However, he points out that predicting the future is subject to considerable error, and the guess of how one will evaluate a future outcome depends on individual tastes that are not necessarily precise, consistent, or stable.

These general observations about the nature of human decision making have been derived from, and bolstered by, demonstrations of the myriad of ways in which actual human decision making devi- ates from the rational prescription. For example, Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky (1982) have documented the now well-recognized heuristics (such as anchoring, availability, and representativeness) that highlight the limitations in an individual’s capacity to absorb and

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use all relevant information. Tversky and Kahneman (19881, and many others, have further documented evidence about the failure in practical reality of the assumptions underlying the expected utility model. Such deviations from the assumptions of rational decision making have pointed to the inevitable tendency of deciders to behave in other than rational ways, to use shortcuts to manage and simplify decisional information, to vary their perspectives on both probabilities and preferences, and to be affected by the context in which the decision is placed.

Alternate Models of Decision Making

Observations about the capacity of the human decider have led decision theorists to propose a number of alternatives to the classical model of expected utility. One such alternative is drawn from Simon’s (1955,1957) notion that rather than optimizing, humans decide in ways that are sensible and “good enough.” Using observations about natural processes of elimination in decision making, Tversky (1972) suggested an “elimination-by-aspects” model in which alternatives are seen-and eliminated-in terms of the aspects they represent. Those aspects of most importance to the decider are used to elimi- nate the alternatives in which the aspect falls beyond a satisfactory level. Thus, instead of a comprehensive evaluation of all alternatives across all aspects (as in the expected utility prescription), the decider narrows the field of viable alternatives by eliminating those that are unsatisfactory on the more important criteria.

Although decision theory has supplied several alternatives to the rational model, few of these have found their way into the career decision-making literature. Although a few of the early descriptions of career decision making reviewed by Jepsen and Dilley (1974) proposed notions unlike the expected utility model (e.g., Fletcher, 1966; Hilton, 1962), the rational, expected utility model has remained vir- tually unassailed regarding career decisions. There are a few recent notable exceptions, however.

First, actual career decision-making behavior has been examined in two recent studies. These have demonstrated that deciders may well search for information in ways characteristic of an elimination- by-aspects model (Gati & Tikotzki, 1989), and the that the eventual alternative selected is very likely to reflect the “good enough” rather than the optimal criterion (Lichtenberg, Shaffer, & Arachtingi, 1993). Second, two important conceptual articles have been presented. In

the first, Gati (1986) proposed an alternative prescriptive model for career decision making based on the work of Tversky (1972). In his sequential elimination model, aspects are identified and ranked by importance, and an acceptable range is established for each aspect. Occupations with characteristics outside the established acceptable range are discarded, and this process is repeated with successively less important aspects until few alternatives remain. In the second article, Gelatt (1989) proposed a dramatic departure from his origi- nal (Gelatt, 1962) rational propositions. Responding to the questions

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that have emerged from the literature of decision theory and of philosophy of science concerning objectivity and predictability, Gelatt (1989) asserted that assumptions about the objectivity of individuals and the predictability of events should be replaced by a broader and more tentative perspective. He issued guidelines for decision making in the context of uncertainty, including the advice to recognize (a) that information is limited, changing, and subjectively per- ceived and (b) that decision making is a process that both facilitates and creates goals. He recommended both retaining rationality in decision making and also adding (judiciously) imagination, intuition, and flexibility.

In sum, alternate models of decision making provide useful perspectives on actual, human decision making. That is, decisions seem to evolve in a sequential, interactive fashion. Deciders may be pur- poseful, although not particularly accurate. Maximizing may be neither possible nor necessary, and there may be systematic ways to pursue desired but less than optimal goals.

Alternate Definitions of Rationality

Although he maintained that human behavior is largely rational, Simon (1978) argued that the definition of rationality may legiti- mately extend beyond the tenets of the expected utility model. That is, just because descriptions of decision making render the view that individuals are not rational (in expected utility terms) does not mean that their choices are unintelligent or unreasonable.

Indeed, March (1978) pointed out that a number of alternative ra- tionalities have been identified. Some of these are in the general category ofcalculated rationality, or those models in which the individual is seen as intelligently calculating which action will lead to desired goals. These include limited rationality (in which human limitations require simplification of the decision), contextual rationality (focusing on the extent to which choice problems are embed- ded in a particular context),gume rationality (in which two or more individuals pursue their own ends in relation to each other), and process rationality (in which i t is the procedure, rather than the outcome, that renders the decision rational). Other alternate ratio- nalities are less observable, and perhaps less explicable by the decider. These March (1978) termedsystemic, or that which is endo- genous to the individual or organization. These unintentional ratio- nalities include adaptive rationality (in which it is suggested that the lengthy accumulation of experience and knowledge will render decisional behavior closely approximating that which would occur under conditions of perfect knowledge), selected rationality (in which there is a Darwinian presumption that what is considered rational is deemed so by virtue of the survival of the institutions that engen- der it), and posterior rationality (in which goals are derived from actions taken, rather than the reverse). These systemic versions of rationality suggest that experience, learning, convention, and ret- rospection can also produce decisional behavior that is sensible, intelligent, and reasoned.

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DECIDING WITHIN THE LIFE-SPAN, LIFE-SPACE CONTEXT

I t is clear from this review of alternative models of decision making that real-life decisions are not rational, at least in the classical sense of the term: deciders seem to use many different strategies, they are not comprehensive in their search and choice, their choices are shaped by limited and changing information, they are selective in how they use information and inconsistent in what they prefer, and their choices tend not to reflect the maximizing principles of expected utility. Indeed, although classical rationality may be appealing in the ab- stract, i t seems to be beyond human capacity and inclination.

Furthermore, this model of decision making does not seem to be well suited to adaptive coping with respect to the tasks of developing a career in a life-span, life-space context. As previously suggested, the rational model seems to work best when choice points are predictable, when the field of options is stable, when information about those options is readily available, and when the decider is clear and consistent. Although it is known from both theory and experience that some decision-making tasks present themselves predictably over the life span (for example, when one moves from one occupation or life stage to another), there is also reason to believe that many (perhaps most?) choice points appear without warning. Furthermore, actual decisional events typically include neither a known and stable field of alternatives, nor the complete and consistent information that are necessary for rational decision making. And, it is quite certain that individual preferences will shift as the consequences of choice are experienced and as new life tasks are faced. Finally, once the context of career development is seen to include multiple roles, an exponentially greater complexity is confronted; it is not possible, for example, to predict when the junctures of life roles will call for decisional action, or when or how a decisional event in one role will alter the options or shape the preferences for another. In brief, decision making in the life-span, life-space context needs to contend with considerably greater uncertainty and complexity than is man- ageable under the old definition of adaptive coping.

Definitional problems such as these were foreseen by Super over a decade ago. In highlighting the changing social, technological, and labor market contexts in which the individual functions, Super and Knasel(1981) raised questions about whether i t is reasonable to hold individuals to a single, normative blueprint for their behavior. Given the nonnormative nature of adult work and nonwork roles, these authors suggested an alternative characterization of the individual as a “responsible agent acting within a dynamic environ- mental setting” (p. 199). Adaptability was advanced as the critical skill needed to confront such novel circumstances. Although Super did not elaborate further on notions of adaptability, Goodman (1994) offered an analysis of the construct as seen in the conceptual and empirical literature. Emerging from this analysis was a conceptual cluster best characterized by resilience, positivity, and flexibility with respect to internal and external changes.

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Redefining Adaptive Career Decision Making

Although these concepts seem promising for mapping out adaptive coping in a complex and shifting career space, they say little about what adaptive decision making would look like. As demonstrated in the previous section as well as in the lives of clients, an alternate definition of adaptive career decision making is clearly needed.

Some of the alternate definitions of rationality previously noted suggest ways in which actual decision making can be regarded not as irrational, but rather as intelligent, reasoned, sensible, and adaptive. Moreover, there has also been speculation that there may be more intelligence in other-than-rational decision-making behavior than is commonly presumed. Consider the possible value of some quite common other-than-rational decisional strategies.

The intuitive (“I just knew it”) decider, at the simplest level, is merely using a strategy of substituting “one guess for two” (March, 1978, p. 604). Simon (1983) suggested that such intuitive judgment may simply reflect the decider’s capacity for the quick retrieval of relevant information-or, perhaps, in other terms, this is a fast rational decider. Alternatively, Isenberg ( 1984) outlined adaptive features of using intuition to identify a problem, to generate a plau- sible solution, to evoke automatic sequences of learned behavior, to integrate isolated parts of experience, and to evaluate the rightness of a rationally constructed solution. Although these adaptive features are not necessarily rational, they certainly seem to be useful. They may serve the individual well in identifying when a choice point is approaching, and may also be quite relevant in those circumstances in which a quick decisional response is necessary.

An analogous argument can be made for the emotionally expres- sive decider (“It felt right”). Not to be confused with intuition, emotion is regarded in classical terms as something that clouds decisional objectivity. However, it is difficult to imagine even the most strict rational process or expected utility function without affect defining at least part of the decider’s estimates of preference (Simon, 1983; Zey, 1992). Simon (1983) further argued that emotion also serves a preemptive function in decision making in that it directs the decider’s attention and alerts him or her to the critical decisions to be addressed+learly a useful tool in a complex and rapidly shifting decisional environment. And, Etzioni (1988) suggested that affective el- ements should dictate the circumstances in which logic should and should not be used-a stance relevant, perhaps, to the decisions that occur in the junctures between life roles.

The consultative or imitative decider (“Fred says it is the best choice”) seems to present more of a concern to those in the vocational domain than to those in the domain of decision theory. Whereas in the former, consultation is dangerously close to dependency and denial of responsibility, in the latter, it is regarded as a strategy that minimizes individual cognitive error. To be sure, few would argue that others can set preferences or live with the choices of another. However, when the decision field includes many life roles, each of which have co-occupants, collaborative decision making seems

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to be an advisable strategy. Furthermore, consulting (imitating, depending on) others seems t o be a form of seeking assistance that has some value, particularly if “Fred” is a decision analyst, a coun- selor, or even simply one who has walked that particular path be- fore. March (1978) echoed this view in his suggestions that the value of the consultative, imitative strategy seems to rely on the compe- tence of the consultant, and that i t does not necessarily reflect a failure on the part of the decider to behave in an intelligent way.

From these perspectives, there is considerable wisdom in other- than-rational decision making, particularly for those circumstances in which decisional fields shift with both time and opportunity, and span multiple life roles. One might further argue that adaptability under such conditions might well include having access to any number of these useable and useful decisional strategies.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS

My comments here have suggested that the rational model bears little resemblance to the realities of human decision making and that this model places rather severe limitations on what kind of behavior can be considered to be intelligent and adaptive. Particu- larly in a life-span, life-space context, maintaining the rational model as a prescriptive ideal is likely to obscure the wisdom of other-than- rational strategies. Super‘s work (Super, 1980,1990; Super & Knasel, 1981) stands as an invitation for the profession to think more broadly about how individuals can best address their decisional tasks.

Given this invitation, there are many possible directions for future theory, research, and practice. Several have already been discussed; I focus here on others that seem particularly noteworthy.

First, I encourage scholars in the area of career development to follow the lead of Gati (1986) and Gelatt (1989) in borrowing from the literature on descriptive decision theory to expand current thinking about decisions in the career domain. Therein lie rich ideas, exquisite arguments, and compelling views of the realities of deciding that would be of enormous benefit to thinking about vocational decision making. Similarly, the ingenious studies conducted by Gati and Tikotzki (1989) and Lichtenberg et al. (1993) serve as excellent examples of the kind of research that is needed to understand more fully what actually goes on in the process of career decision making. Expanding such studies to capture simultaneous decision making on multiple fronts would also provide information about how people decide in complex decisional fields.

Second, and relatedly, it is clear that relatively little is known about career decision making from the decider’s perspective and experience. What do deciders do when they have limited information? Does a decision in one life domain affect decisional events in other domains? Even less is known about why people decide in the ways that they do. Indeed, deciders have rarely been asked this kind of question without prescriptive assumptions and decisional taxonomies being imposed on their answers. There is a need to ask this kind of question better, and to listen very carefully to the infor-

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mation that is revealed. Particularly intriguing in this regard will be information obtained about the processes, strategies, and rea- sons that underlie other-than-rational career decision making.

Third, if it is possible that there is intelligence and wisdom in various alternate forms of rationality, or in other-than-rational decisional strategies, then the circumstances under which these might be beneficially used should be discovered. Where, in the architec- ture of the life span and space, do different kinds of decisional strategies seem to work best? Once identified, practical attention could be directed to how to help people recognize such circumstances and apply these alternate strategies.

Finally, much of the theoretical, empirical, and practical work in the area of decision making has focused on the hard mechanics of deciding, and on the deficits and dangers of poor decision making. Deciding is clearly a topic that is taken very seriously in the field of career development, and about which there are grave concerns. Per- haps as a consequence, little attention has been paid to how people make decisions well, nor have the less mechanical aspects of deciding been examined very closely. It is likely that there is much to be learned from the many ordinary, nonexpert, individuals who decide in untroubled ways. Similarly, more understanding is needed about the aspects of decision making that are less routine and that ex- ploit-perhaps even requi rdec iders ’ inventiveness, imagination, and creativity as they proceed through life stages and roles.

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Toward an Expanded Definition of Adaptive Decision Making