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Towards 2020
Operational Capability Review: Specialist rescue This is a Technical Appendix to the 2013 Safety Plan
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Contents
Contents ............................................................................................................................... 3
Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 5
Project Assumptions .......................................................................................................... 5
Section One: Line Rescue .................................................................................................... 6
Background ....................................................................................................................... 6
Why does the Authority provide a line rescue service? ...................................................... 6
How the Authority currently provides line rescue ............................................................... 7
Line rescue incidents undertaken by the Deal line rescue team ........................................ 8
Options for Improvement ................................................................................................. 12
Base Option: Existing arrangements ............................................................................ 12
Option One: Move line rescue to USAR and remove capability from Deal .................... 15
Option Two: Maintain Deal and utilise USAR for line rescue incidents outside the USAR
environment ................................................................................................................. 19
Option Three: Outsource line rescue ............................................................................ 21
Evaluation ....................................................................................................................... 23
Recommendation ............................................................................................................ 23
Section Two: Animal Rescue .............................................................................................. 24
Background ..................................................................................................................... 24
Review findings ............................................................................................................... 26
Should the Authority continue to provide a large animal rescue capability? .................. 30
SWOT Analysis ............................................................................................................ 31
Costs of Providing Animal Rescue ............................................................................... 33
Summary ..................................................................................................................... 33
Evaluation .................................................................................................................... 33
Recommendation ......................................................................................................... 34
Section Three: Chainsaw provision ................................................................................. 35
Background .................................................................................................................. 35
Review findings ............................................................................................................ 36
Options for Improvement ................................................................................................. 42
Base Option: Existing arrangements ............................................................................ 42
Option One: Enhance the current chainsaw capability by training and equipping
additional staff .............................................................................................................. 44
Option Two: Remove Larkfield as a provider of this capability (USAR to be sole
provider) ...................................................................................................................... 45
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Introduction
1. In 2011 Kent and Medway Fire and Rescue Authority commissioned a project to review
how it responds to emergencies from the point of call, to the delivery of services at the
scene. The three year project, known as the Review of Operational Capability, is part of
the second phase of a programme of activity which looks to bring about improvement in a
more challenging financial climate.
2. By exploring innovations in technology and challenging our current policies and
procedures the Review looks at ways to work more efficiently and maximise the use of
resources acknowledging that ‘one size doesn’t fit all’. It assessed what equipment and
staff are needed to deal with an incident, how it should be used, how it is transported and
where it’s based. The Review focused on providing the best outcome for those involved in
the incident whilst being realistic about the current financial climate.
3. This document describes the findings of the workstream exploring some of the more
specialist rescue services provided by the Authority, specifically line rescue, use of
chainsaws and animal rescue, and sets out a number of options for improvement.
4. Impact assessments have been completed for the Review and have been considered
when developing and assessing the strengths of each of the options presented. In order to
make a comparison between each of the options, strengths and weaknesses of current
arrangements have also been explored; this includes costs associated with each option.
Project Assumptions
5. The following assumptions have been made when developing any option:
The emergency cover model is 61 fire engines available during the day and 75 at
night1 is maintained;
The Authority continues to operate with the current crewing models – full-time shift,
day-crewed shift and on-call;
Special appliances are crewed alternately2;
The financial climate will become more complicated with the additional need for
savings in the future; and
New fire stations at Ash-Cum-Ridley and Rochester are open.
1 The current agreed operational model is set at 61 fire engines during the day and 76 at night. Work
conducted through another project has resulted in a recommendation that sees the reduction of one
fire engine at night. Although this is still in proposal stage this project has worked on the assumption
that this fire engine is no longer part of the fleet. 2 Alternate crewing is when the firefighters on station operate both a front line response vehicle (fire
engine) plus at least one special vehicle, taking whatever vehicle is the most appropriate. The
vehicles therefore share the same crew.
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Section One: Line Rescue
Background
6. Line rescue incidents are incidents where firefighters need to use specialist ascending or
descending equipment to access and rescue casualties. Examples of such incidents
include when people have fallen over cliffs or down mine shafts. While all full-time3
firefighters are trained to ensure their own safety when working at height using safety
harnesses and lines, the ability to rescue people in situations where firefighters are
required to be suspended from lines requires additional specialist training. It is this
additional capability that this report refers to.
7. The assessment of the Authority’s line rescue capability has been undertaken by utilising a
wide range of quantitative and qualitative data. This data was gathered from various
sources including, but not limited to, data gathered from the Authority’s Incident Recording
System (IRS) and relevant operational personnel. The resulting empirical evidence was
used to identify and analyse various options in order to establish which option presented
the best value to the Authority in terms of effective service delivery and cost.
Why does the Authority provide a line rescue service?
8. The current line rescue capability is provided in accordance with section 11 of the Fire
and Rescue Services Act (FRSA) 2004 which permits a FRS to take action it considers
appropriate and make provision to respond to other eventualities (not statutory
responsibilities) where life or the environment is at risk of harm. This action includes the
provision of equipment. Such provision can be deployed outside the Authority’s area.
9. The only other agency currently providing such rescues in Kent is the Maritime and
Coastguard Agency (MCA), which provides a volunteer Line rescue capability for rescues
from sea cliffs only. The MCA does have a statutory responsibility to co-ordinate rescues
within the littoral zone (defined by the MCA as between the low tide mark and the cliff top),
but no such responsibility to conduct the rescue itself, as such this capability cannot
guaranteed.
10. The high profile Galston Mine incident (Strathclyde) in 2008 highlighted the need for such
rescues to be undertaken, and identified issues that arose when the Fire Service was
required to wait for another agency to provide the line rescue capability (in this case the
Police). Additionally the recent CFOA Circular 024/2012 (Coal Authority Mine Entry
Inspection and Disclosure Programme) encourages FRAs to undertake specific actions,
including the review of standard operating procedures, and to mitigate risks posed to
firefighters when responding to an incident that may involve an abandoned mine/mine
entry.
3 A full-time firefighter always responds to an emergency incident from a station base. They do not
provide on-call cover.
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How the Authority currently provides line rescue
11. The Authority currently has two ways of providing line rescue. The first is via firefighters
based at Deal fire station, whilst the second is via the Urban Search and Rescue Team
(USAR) based at Maidstone.
12. Deal fire station is home to two fire engines [a rescue pump ladder (RPL)] and a standard
pump) and a four wheel drive transport vehicle which carries the specialist line rescue
equipment. The RPL is crewed by staff working the day-crewed duty system4, whilst the
standard pump is operated by an on-call crew.
13. A total of 14 staff (all day-crewed) are trained to provide a line rescue capability and have
the ability to descend to a maximum depth of 800 meters. The line rescue team respond to
incidents above and below ground and are mobilised via either the RPL or the four wheel
drive off road vehicle. Deal’s line rescue staff also currently deliver the Authority’s safe
access training to all full-time personnel, enabling crews to comply with legal requirements
when working at height. This training was initially undertaken by an external company at a
significantly higher cost.
14. Deal has no specialist confined space5 working capability other than that which complies
with the generic statements made within Technical Bulletin (TB) 1/97.
15. The four wheel drive vehicle used by Deal to transport the line rescue equipment was due
for replacement in 2015/16. As the cost of replacement would be a significant
consideration concerning future options, the feasibility of extending the vehicle’s life was
explored. The engineering department conducted a survey of the vehicle and concluded
that its life could be extended for another five years. As this means that no replacement
vehicle would be required within this period, costs originally estimated to be required for
this purpose, and contained within the Vehicle Equipment and Replacement Programme
have not been included within this review.
16. The Authority’s Urban Search and Rescue Team is one of 20 strategically placed USAR
teams within England and Wales which was provided under the UK Government's New
Dimension Programme to respond to major incidents locally and internationally. The team
provide a wide variety of specialist search and rescue functions, specifically employed
within an urban environment, one of which is line rescue.
17. The line rescue capability provided as part of the USAR team’s operational requirements
is more limited to that provided by Deal and is known as Line Access Casualty Extrication
(LACE). LACE equipment allows crews to safety pull (or lower) a casualty from a
4 The day-crewed system provides a mix of positive and on-call cover. Crews respond to incidents
from a station during the day and are on-call at night. 5 A confined space is defined by the Confined Spaces Regulations (CSR) 1997 as “any place,
including any chamber, tank, vat, silo, pit, trench, pipe, sewer, flue, well or other similar space in
which, by virtue of its enclosed nature, there arises a reasonably foreseeable specified risk”.
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precarious situation up to a depth of 27 meters. By the end of 2014/15 all 14 USAR team
members will be LACE qualified (this being a recent national requirement change).
18. USAR’s confined space working capability is compliant with both the generic statements
within Technical Bulletin (TB) 1/97, CSR 1997 and the nationally agreed confined space
working SOP.
19. Given the differences within the two capabilities, USAR is not normally mobilised to
incidents requiring line rescue unless the incident requires additional USAR capabilities
such as heavy lifting or cutting equipment.
Line rescue incidents undertaken by the Deal line rescue team
20. In order to understand how the line rescue team is used, data for the period January 2006
to December 2012 was extracted from the IRS and analysed. This identified that during
this period the line rescue team based at Deal were mobilised to 140 incidents, 57 of these
within the Dover/Folkestone and Ramsgate reporting station areas (see Map 1). As figure
1 shows demand has been fairly consistent over the past 7 years. Whilst mobilisations
tend not to vary greatly by time of year, 62.9% of activity occurred between the ‘day’ hours
of 09:00 and 18:00 (see figure 2). There were no recorded mobilisations over the border
during this time.
Map 1: Geographical spread of line rescue mobilisation - Jan 2006 to Dec 2012
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Figure 1: Mobilisations of the line rescue team by year
Figure 2: Mobilisations of the line rescue team by time of day – Jan 2006 to Dec 2012
21. As table 1 shows the line rescue team were mobilised to a variety of different incidents
between January 2006 and December 2012, the majority of which were incidents falling
into the ‘special service’ category. The team were most commonly mobilised to incidents
requiring a rescue or to assist other agencies. As table 2 shows on 46% of occasions
when the line rescue team were assigned to incidents, they remained so for at least 30
minutes.
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Table 1: Breakdown of incidents the line rescue team were mobilised to – Jan 2006 to
Dec 2012
Incident Type Total
False Alarm 11
Good Intent False Alarm 8
Malicious False Alarm 3
Fire 3
Dwelling 1
Industrial and Commercial 2
Special Service 126
Animal Rescue 15
Assistance to Other Agencies 28
Hazardous Materials 4
Rescue from Below Ground 9
Rescue From Height 28
Rescue Other 27
Retrieval of Body 1
RTC 5
Service Not Required 4
Suicide/Attempts 4
Water Rescue 1
Grand Total 140
Table 2: Duration of mobilisation
Incident Duration Total
0-15 Mins 30
15-30 Mins 35
30 Mins - 1 Hour 33
1-2 Hours 27
2+ Hours 15
Grand Total 140
22. Although the line rescue team was mobilised to a total of 140 incidents between January
2006 and December 2012 the team attended only 53, the majority of which being within
the East of the County (see Map 2). While the data is not able to definitively identify why
the line rescue team only attended 38% of the incidents they were mobilised to, a
reasonable assumption can be made that either the line rescue capability was
inappropriately mobilised in the first place, or alternative rescue methods were used before
their arrival. On average it took the line rescue team 30 minutes to book in attendance
(Table 3).
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Map 2: Incidents where the line rescue team booked in attendance – January 2006 to
December 2012
Table 3: Average times taken for the line rescue team to book in attendance
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Average
total
Minutes 16 27 30 25 34 39 32 30
23. As previously outlined the line rescue team attended 53 incidents between January 2006
and December 2012. Of these incidents, 12 involved the rescue of dogs, 15 required
people to be rescued (three had to be rescued following their unsuccessful attempt to
rescue their pets), and one bariatric casualty. Three bodies were also recovered. At 19 of
these incidents, Deal utilised their specialist line rescue equipment.
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Options for Improvement
Base Option: Existing arrangements
Description
24. All technical appendices contain a base option against which any changes can be
compared. This option reflects the Authority’s current approach to line rescue. It would
mean that both Deal and USAR maintain their existing line rescue capability. Deal would
continue to be mobilised as the primary resource to line rescue incidents, with USAR only
being mobilised to provide additional support with (for example) the stabilisation of a
structure or to enhance the ability to deal with confined space. USAR would also continue
to provide a line rescue capability at incidents that occur within a USAR environment.
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SWOT Analysis
Strengths Weaknesses Opportunities Threats
Deal continue to provide the
Authority’s working at height
training for all staff
Staff are already trained and
qualified
High level of rescue capability
provision
Line rescue is available 24/7
Maintain public confidence in
the Authority ability to perform
rescue function
Requires no change
Good geographical spread
provided by two teams
Resilience of having two
teams capable of undertaking
line rescue
Deal line rescue team unable to carry out rescue from confined space without additional training.
Limited ability of current rope rescue personnel to use additional specialist technical rescue equipment that may be required to support rescues/incident conclusion.
Cost of maintaining capability (initial/refresher training, PPE and equipment).
Scope to extend the role of
USAR in terms of line rescue
Scope to enhance training of
staff at Deal to deal with more
‘confined space’ rescues
Change in legislation could
affect provision requirements
Retention of sufficient trained
staff members key to
provision
Retaining line rescue
provision could detract from
key role.
Possible negative publicity
from unsuccessful rescues
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Indicative costs
25. The following table illustrates indicative costs for maintaining this option. All costs stated
are Per Annum.
Current Cost
Additional Staff Costs for Capability £
Workwear and PPE 6,000 (allocated within VERP6)
Additional responsibility allowance 7,000
Total Staff Costs 13,000
Vehicle and Equipment Costs
Annual revenue contribution for
replacement
4,917
Services, Maintenance & Repair 1,180 (3 year average)
Estimated Fuel Costs 1,000
Line Rescue Equipment 5,660
Total Vehicle and Equipment Costs 12,757
Training Costs
Current on-going training costs 3,150 (3 year average)
Total Training Costs 3,150
TOTAL COSTS 28,907
NB: An additional cost of £6,401is currently incurred by Deal for training to provide safe access training, but has not been
included above as it is not a requirement for their line rescue capability provision.
Summary
26. This option maintains current capability provision. The main benefit is that Deal could
continue to provide in house safe access training for the cost of £6.4k (training they
currently undertake in order to hold the required qualifications necessary deliver this
training). To outsource this training would incur an additional budget pressure of
approximately £20k.
6 VERP = the Authority’s vehicle replacement programme, funded from capital and revenue budgets
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Option One: Move line rescue to USAR and remove capability from Deal
Description
27. USAR would become the sole provider of the Authority line rescue capability. They would provide a reduced line rescue capability to that
provided by Deal, but the ability to utilise additional skills and equipment used within their core role would add value. Deal would not maintain
their current line rescue qualifications so would not be able to support USAR if required.
SWOT Analysis
Strengths Weaknesses Opportunities Threats
Will be complimented with
additional specialist technical
rescue equipment including
tool operation whilst
suspended
No cost for provision of USAR
capability as centrally funded
Saves cost of training and
equipment for Deal
Reduced rescue capability as USAR currently limited to 27m suspended vertical operations
Delayed mobilising out of office hours due to it taking up to one hour for crews to attend the station when paged.
Reliant on LACE working principles limits rescue options
Increased costs for mobilisations that occur out of office hours
Increased usage could detract from USAR core provision training
USAR may need to be released from an incident if required for their core role
Risk of loss of government grant towards provision
Risk that the Authority
Development of USAR profile
Reduction in whole life costs
Change in legislation could
affect provision requirements
Possible perception as a
reduction in capability due to
cost cutting
Reliant on retention of USAR
capability and central funding
Possibility of detrimental
press coverage if USAR
unable to complete rescue
due to limited capability
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Strengths Weaknesses Opportunities Threats
responsible for additional USAR costs ie use of consumables
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Indicative costs
28. The following table illustrates indicative costs for this option, providing a comparison with
the current cost of delivering services.
Current cost Option 1Cost Difference
Staff Costs £ £ £
Workwear and PPE 6,000 (allocated
within VERP)
N/A (centrally
funded via section
31 grant, so no
cost to the
Authority)
-6,000
Additional responsibility allowance 7,000 N/A -7,000
Safe access training costs 6,401 26,666* +20,265*
Total Staff Costs 19,401 26,666 +7,265
Vehicle and Equipment Costs
Annual revenue contribution for
replacement
4,917 N/A (centrally
funded via section
31 grant, so no
cost to the
Authority)
-4,817
Services, Maintenance & Repair 1,180 (3 year
average)
N/A (centrally
funded via section
31 grant, so no
cost to the
Authority)
-1,180 (3 year
average)
Estimated Fuel Costs 1,000 1,000 N/A
Line Rescue Equipment 5,660 N/A (centrally
funded via section
31 grant, so no
cost to the
Authority)
-5,660
Total Vehicle and Equipment
Costs
12,757 1,000 -11,657
Training Costs
Cost of moving to option N/A N/A (centrally
funded via section
31 grant, so no
cost to the
Authority)
N/A
Current on-going training costs 3,150 (3 year
average)
N/A (centrally
funded via section
31 grant, so no
cost to the
Authority)
-3,150
Total Training Costs 3,150 N/A -3,150
TOTAL COSTS 35,308 27,000 -8,208
*Based on previous outsourcing costs prior to Deal undertaking this training
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Summary
29. This option shows a cost saving against the base option. It should be noted however, that
due to current contractual agreements, USAR will incur additional costs to those incurred
by Deal when responding to line rescue incidents out of office hours
.
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Option Two: Maintain Deal and utilise USAR for line rescue incidents outside the USAR environment
Description
30. Both Deal and USAR would maintain their current line rescue capabilities, qualifications and equipment. Deal and USAR would be mobilised
to line rescue incidents depending on who is available and where they are. USAR would continue to provide the sole line rescue capability at
incidents that occur within a USAR environment. USAR would also support Deal at incidents where their specialist skills would add value,
such as the enhancement of their confined space access capability.
SWOT Analysis
Strengths Weaknesses Opportunities Threats
Greater geographical
coverage across the Authority
reducing attendance times in
West Kent during office hours
Capability available when
alternative provider is
committed to other Incidents
Additional line rescue
capability coverage at no
extra cost
Possible over provision of
capability
Differing capabilities may
cause mobilising issues
(which capability to
request/mobilise)
Development of USAR profile
within organisation
Possibility of Deal and USAR
developing new rescue
capabilities
Change in legislation could
affect provision requirements
Reliant on retention of USAR
capability and central funding
Possibility of detrimental
press coverage if USAR
unable to complete rescue
due to limited capability
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Indicative costs
31. The following table illustrates indicative costs for this option, providing a comparison with
the current cost of delivering services.
Current Cost Option 2 Cost Difference
Additional Staff Costs for Capability £ £ £
Workwear and PPE 6,000 (allocated within
VERP)
6,000 (allocated
within VERP)
0
Additional responsibility allowance 7,000 7,000 0
Safe access training costs 6,401 6,401 0
Total Staff Costs 19,401 19,401 0
Vehicle and Equipment Costs 0
Annual revenue contribution for
replacement
4,917 4,917 0
Services, Maintenance & Repair 1,180 (3 year
average)
1,180 (3 year
average)
0
Estimated Fuel Costs 1,000 1,000 0
Line Rescue Equipment 5,660 5,660 0
Total Vehicle and Equipment Costs 12,757 12,757 0
Training Costs 0
Cost of moving to option N/A N/A 0
Current on-going training costs 3,150 (3 year
average)
3,150 (3 year
average)
0
Total Training Costs 3,150 3,150 0
TOTAL COSTS 28,907 28,907 0
Summary
32. This option shows a zero cost difference. This is due to the fact that USAR is currently
centrally funded by government, so no costs are incurred for specialist training/equipment
provision when used within their current capabilities. It should be noted however, that due
to current contractual agreements, USAR will incur additional costs to those incurred by
Deal when responding to line rescue incidents out of office hours.
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Option Three: Outsource line rescue
Description
33. Deal would cease to provide a line rescue capability, and USAR would only conduct line rescues as part of its key role. A private company of
other Fire and Rescue Service (FRS) would be employed to undertake line rescue on behalf of the Authority.
SWOT Analysis
Strengths Weaknesses Opportunities Threats
Removal of training
commitment for line rescue
personnel
increased availability to
perform core role
Difficult to budget for provision
unless contract is based on
annual fee.
Partnership working
championed
Availability of provision
dependant on market forces
Change in legislation could
affect provision requirements
raising costs
An increase in incidents may
cause budget pressure
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Indicative costs
34. This option would require the outsourcing of the Authority’s safe access training currently
provided by Deal, which would realise a budget pressure of £20,265 (as identified within
option one). While the option of USAR conducting this training on the same basis as Deal
was considered, this was ruled out on the basis of their different working pattern.
Considering that the current cost of line rescue provision totals £28,907, in order to be
financially beneficial, any company providing a line rescue capability would need to do so
for less than £8,642per annum. As it is not realistic to provide a line rescue provision
within this price constraint, no further costs have been obtained.
Summary
35. Given the information regarding costs above, and the issues regarding budget
management, this option would not provide financial savings, and may incur a significant
budget pressure.
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Evaluation
36. The line rescue capability currently provided by Deal is a valuable service to the
community. Such a service is not currently provided by any other organisation (other than
the volunteer cliff rescue service provided by the MCA). Removal of this rescue capability
would reduce the Authority’s ability to support the community. The lack of Deal’s ability to
work in confined spaces may limit the ability for the crew to undertake some rescues.
USAR however, does provide a line rescue capability, including rescues within confined
spaces. Whilst this cannot always be relied on due to possible national mobilisations of the
team, USAR provides the Authority with a different capability to Deal and is located within
a different part of the county. Therefore having the Deal line rescue team and USAR line
rescue capability provides a capability across a wide scope of rescues in different
circumstances.
37. The differences between the two line rescue capabilities have affected the ability to
change service provision in order to realise financial savings without a change in service
delivery. The main issues relate to confined space rescue compliance and depth of
descent capability.
Recommendation
38. Following an evaluation of each option, it is recommended that Deal maintain their current
line rescue capability, and that USAR are also mobilised where appropriate to line rescue
incidents.
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Section Two: Animal Rescue
Background
39. The Authority responds to a range of small and large animal rescue incidents (large
animals being broadly categorised as any animal suspected to be large enough to cause a
manual handling hazard such as sheep, cattle, horses, etc.). The Authority does not
respond to incidents involving wild animals. Requests for small animal rescues from the
public are, in the first instance, referred to the RSPCA. If required, an officer would be
mobilised to make an assessment. If following this assessment a rescue is required, this
will be undertaken by a local crew responding in a fire engine.
40. The rescue of large animals however, requires specialist knowledge and equipment. Such
rescues are performed by firefighters utilising a vehicle known as the ARU. It is important
to note that the ARU is not only used for animal rescue, it also used for a number of other
things including supporting the ambulance service in attending a bariatric patient.
41. The ARU provides the following, in terms of animal rescue:
Off-road capability
Hiab 060-3 hydraulic crane, with a lifting range of between 3 tonnes at 2m and
300kg at its maximum extension of 12m
Fixed winch system with a capacity of 1.2 tonnes and a cable length of 38m
Various animal related rescue equipment
Bespoke animal rescue personal protective equipment
Specially trained personnel.
42. The additional training required is in line with national training guidelines. The minimum
training requirement to undertake large animal rescues is to Animal Rescue 2 (AR2) level.
In order to achieve this standard, personnel undertake the following training:
2 day Animal Awareness
2 day Animal rescue techniques
1 day Slingers / Signaller CITB-City & Guilds (5 year certificate)
2 day Extended Water & Mud Safety course
43. The animal awareness and rescue qualifications are each maintained via a one day
refresher training event held every two years. Two additional personnel (the watch
managers of the two watches at Faversham) are trained to AR3 level, which consists of an
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AR2 course, plus one day of veterinary awareness input. Holders of this qualification are
referred to as animal rescue specialists.
44. It must be noted that these qualifications are required by firefighters dealing with large
animals which may be encountered at any operational incident (such as fires in the open
adjacent to farmland). This requirement has been recognised within regional risk
assessment documentation.
45. Firefighters required to drive the ARU receive the following additional training:
Manual LGV driving course including Emergency Fire Appliance Driving (EFAD)
One day on and off road driving course
1 day Plant Operator HIAB (Lorry Loader) CITB-City & Guilds (5 year certificate)
46. All ARU drivers also undertake a three year EFAD refresher as do all drivers of emergency
response vehicles.
47. While large animals can be rescued manually by using firefighters to drag the animal from
the place of confinement or danger, there are occasions where it is in the animal’s best
interest to lift it using mechanical aids. There is also guidance within the Manual Handling
Operations Regulations 1992 (as amended) which recommends that if, so far as is
reasonably practicable, the handling of a load cannot be avoided, then consideration
should be given to undertaking the operation by automated or mechanical means. The
ARU provides this capability.
48. As all firefighters may encounter small animals at the wide range of incidents they attend,
there is a requirement for them to receive animal awareness training. This training
requirement is therefore not dependant on their attendance at animal rescue incidents.
There is also no requirement for the supply of bespoke specialist equipment to deal with
small animal rescues.
49. Therefore, small animal rescues are not considered within this review which concentrates
solely on issues relating to the rescue of large animals, and as a consequence, the
provision of the ARU and its personnel.
50. The assessment of this capability was undertaken by utilising a wide range of quantitative
and qualitative data. This data was gathered from various sources including, but not
limited to, the national IRS, the Authority’s analyst data sources, relevant operational
personnel and focus groups. The resulting empirical evidence was used to analyse various
options in order to identify which presented the best value to the Authority in terms of
effective service delivery and cost.
51. Given that there is no statutory requirement for the Authority to provide an animal rescue
capability, it was necessary to clarify the basis on which this capability was currently
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provided, whether this requirement remained, and if so, the basis on which it should be
provided in the future.
52. The current animal rescue capability is provided by full-time personnel based at
Faversham fire station, which operates on the day-crewed system. The provision consists
of 14 trained personnel, specialist equipment, and the ARU (call sign 84R2).
53. The station is also home to a rescue pump ladder (RPL) which is also crewed by the full-
time personnel, and a second standard fire engine whose availability is maintained utilising
a combination of on-call, annualised hours and full-time personnel.
54. The full-time personnel are available on the RPL to attend most incident types as well as
animal rescue incidents. When responding to large animal rescues, they use the ARU. As
this is a two seat vehicle, the remaining personnel accompany the ARU in the RPL. On-
call personnel based at Faversham are not qualified to conduct large animal rescues.
55. As East Sussex has a similar large animal rescue capability, a cross border agreement is
in place (established under section 16 of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004), allowing
them to attend large animal rescues on our behalf within specified locations in the County,
and us on their behalf within East Sussex.
56. The ARU became operational in January 2003. However, only data from the January 2006
to DATE has been used for this review.
Review findings
57. It was clarified that the current animal rescue capability is provided in accordance with
section 11 of the FRSA 2004 which permits the Authority to take action it considers
appropriate make provision to respond to other eventualities (not statutory responsibilities)
where life or the environment is at risk of harm. This action includes the provision of
equipment. It was also confirmed that any such provision can be deployed outside the
Authority’s area.
58. While the capability is primarily provided for the saving of animal life, it also serves to
prevent harm to human life. Animal owners will often try to rescue their animals, with most
having no specific training or experience in doing so. Our intervention prevents this and
therefore as a result, protects these persons.
59. Between the period January 2006 and December 2012, the ARU was mobilised to a total
of 443 incidents, and booked in attendance at 312 of these. A breakdown of these
incidents by category is shown in Table 4 (Incidents actually attended in brackets).
Page 27 of 47
Table 4: ARU mobilisations and attendances (Jan 2006 to Dec 2012)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Grand
Total
Fire 2 (2) 1 (1) 0 (0) 2 (2) 3 (2) 0 (0) 0 (0) 8 (7)
False
Alarm 2 (0) 8 (0) 3 (1) 5 (0) 6 (4) 3 (0) 5 (1) 32 (6)
Special
Service 61 (47) 28 (20) 44 (35) 80 (60) 59 (39) 71 (52) 60 (46) 403 (299)
Grand
Total 65 (49) 37 (21) 47 (36) 87 (62) 68 (45) 74 (52) 65 (47) 443 (312)
60. Of the 299 special service incidents attended, 289 were animal rescues. All of the eight
mobilisations to fire incidents were where the ARU was required for access off road, and
the remaining 32 false alarms were to animal rescues that were either resolved or not
required before the ARU’s attendance.
61. The annual demand for an ARU attendance at animal rescue incidents remains fairly
consistent, with only a dip in demand being seen in 2007 (see Table 5).
Table 5: ARU attendances by year (Jan 2006 to Dec 2012)
Year Incidents
2006 47
2007 19
2008 32
2009 57
2010 38
2011 51
2012 45
Grand Total 289
62. The types of animal rescued were analysed. They were broken down by animal size,
animal type and assistance type. The analysis showed that of all the incidents attended by
the ARU, 96.9% were to large animal rescues (see Table 5).
Table 6: Animals rescued by type and method of rescue (Jan 2006 to Dec 2012)
Small Animal Large Animal Grand Total
Row Labels Bird Dog Other Cow Deer Horse Sheep Other
Special Service - Lift heavy animal 0 0 0 15 0 111 12 8 146
Special Service - Animal Rescue/Release (Pre-IRS data)
0 5 1 19 0 72 13 2 112
Special Service - Rescue from water/mud etc
0 0 0 3 0 7 3 0 13
Special Service - Other 0 2 0 1 2 3 1 1 10
Special Service - Trapped animal 0 0 2 0 3 1 0 7
Special Service - Rescue from below ground
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Grand Total 1 7 1 40 2 196 30 12 289
Page 28 of 47
63. The analysis shows that the rescue of horses accounts for 70% of all large animal
rescues, with cow and sheep accounting for a further 25%.
64. In terms of identifying which of the ARU’s two main specific capabilities were utilised
(lifting, off road) the analysis available has identified that of the 289 incidents, 146
employed the lifting capability of the ARU. While it is not possible to identify from current
incident data at which incidents the off road capability was required (as no field for this
data currently exists), anecdotal evidence from the personnel crewing the ARU suggest
that a requirement in the region of 60-70% would be a fair assessment.
65. All but five of incidents attended remained as a level one incident (fewer than four fire
engines), the remainder only reaching level 2 (four to six fire engines). This shows that the
majority of incidents were able to be concluded without additional resources being
required. This is in part due to the fact that the lifting capability is available on the ARU.
Lifting by mechanical means (HIAB on the ARU) utilises fewer firefighters than manually
dragging the animal, which by necessity requires additional personnel.
66. Monthly demand varies with dip in demand between March and May (see figure 3)
Figure 3 ARU attendances by Month (Jan 2006 to Dec 2012)
67. There is a spread of animal rescue incidents across the 24 hour period. Unsurprisingly, it
can be seen that the number of incidents increase through the “waking hours” of 8am to
8pm (87%), with 31.8% of all incidents occurring between 8am and 11am (see figure 4).
Page 29 of 47
Figure 4: ARU attendances by time of day (Jan 2006 to Dec 2012)
68. The time the ARU remained at incidents (duration) was analysed (measured from the time
the call was received to the time the incident closed). It can be seen from this analysis
that the vast majority of duration lasted for longer than one hour, with 51.2% of incidents
lasting between 2- 4 hours. There are no incidents that last for 30 minutes or less (see
Figure 5 and Table 7).
Figure 5 ARU incident duration chart (Jan 2006 to Dec 2012)
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Table7: ARU incident duration table (Jan 2006 to Dec 2012)
Incident
Duration
0-15
Mins
15-30
Mins
30 Mins - 1
Hour
1 - 2
Hours
2 - 4
Hours
4 +
Hours
Grand
Total
Incidents 0 0 7 89 148 45 289
% Of Total 0.0% 0.0% 2.4% 30.8% 51.2% 15.6% 100.0%
69. Since 2006 there have been a total of eight Freedom of Information (FOI) requests
submitted to the Authority regarding animal rescues. These are as follows:
Feb 2011 – BBC
Requested the cost of animal rescues in 2008,’09,’10, how many animals were
rescued, have you charged, do you employ an animal rescue specialist?
May 2011 – Mason’s News Service
Requested the number of call outs for animal rescues in 2008,’09,’10, hours
attending these incidents, cost per emergency call out.
Three in 2012.
Two regard mobilisations within the Canterbury area (individual and KM request)
requesting total costs, type of animal, number of Ff’s and appliances committed,
and if KRFS employ/have employed an animal rescue specialist. These are for
attendances in 2012.
The third (KM request) was for total mobilisations to all incidents in first six
months of 2011, and how many of these were to rescue animals in distress.
April 2013 – Kent Messenger
Requested how many Incidents of small and large animal rescue were there in
the last 12 months, details of rescues, crews and stations attending, comparison
with previous 12 months.
70. Incidents where the Authority rescues large animals attract a significant number of positive
correspondences, and have prompted contributions to the Firefighters Charity as a means
of thanking the Authority for their professional and compassionate intervention.
Should the Authority continue to provide a large animal rescue capability?
71. Currently the Authority provides a large animal rescue capability with the ARU. This review
considered only if this current provision should be continued.
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SWOT Analysis
Continue to provide animal rescue Stop providing animal rescue
Str
en
gth
s
Established and qualified personnel
High level of rescue capability provision provided by ARU
vehicle (off road capability, Lifting capability via HIAB)
24/7 availability (Day-crewed shift pattern)
Maintain public confidence in the Authority ability to perform
rescue function
Requires no change
Maintains existing coverage of capability.
Existing comprehensive compliment of dedicated animal
rescue equipment
Cost savings can be made
Removal of training commitment for animal rescue personnel
Ability for Faversham personnel to undertake other functions
More availability for core role
Weakn
esses
Cost of maintaining capability (initial/refresher training, PPE and equipment).
Vehicle replacement due within next few years which may present a significant budget pressure.
No financial savings opportunity.
Loss of well used and respected rescue capability
No rescue capability for a rescue requirement that exists
The Authority will have no capability to respond to rescue of
persons getting into difficulty when trying to rescue animal
themselves due to our lack of animal rescue capability.
Opport
un
itie
s
The possibility of outsourcing capability
Adds unique selling point (USP) to the Authority
Increases competitive advantage
Possibility of creating additional funding streams for provided
capability
Reduction in whole life costs
Page 32 of 47
Continue to provide animal rescue Stop providing animal rescue T
hre
ats
Change in legislation could affect provision requirements
Retention of sufficient trained staff members key to provision
Retaining animal rescue provision could detract from key role.
Market forces for this type of rescue capability may lead to
forced cost for provision
Removes a unique selling point from the Authority
Reduces the Authority’s competitive advantage
Page 33 of 47
Costs of Providing Animal Rescue
Current Cost
Staff Costs £
Salaries (including on-costs) N/A*
Workwear and PPE N/A*
Total Staff Costs N/A*
Vehicle and Equipment Costs £
Estimated new vehicle purchase price 200,000**
Annual servicing, maintenance & repair of existing
vehicle
8,400
Current annual fuel costs 2,433
Training Costs £
Specialist Training Costs (2005-2012) 9,653
*Staff salary costs are not specific to attendance at animal rescue incidents, and animal rescue specific PPE has been
supplied to all trained personnel and is fit for purpose so these costs are not included.
** Note option exists to lease new vehicle to spread costs if not purchased outright
Summary
72. The estimated annual cost of maintaining the current provision (servicing, maintenance,
repair of vehicle, training and fuels) is currently in the region of £12,212 per annum. The
replacement cost of £200,000 is included due to the ARU being due for replacement in
2015, with no current provision within VERP for its replacement. It has been identified that
the life of the ARU vehicle can be extended for a further year (with a possibility to do so for
further years depending on future use), at no additional cost.
Evaluation
73. The ARU is a resource that has a proven track record of use. While the provision of the
ARU vehicle to provide an off road and lifting capability would be costly to replace, it
enables fewer firefighters to conduct the rescue. If this vehicle was removed, we would
have to train significant numbers to maintain an effective animal rescue capability, or
remove it altogether.
74. While this is not a statutory duty, if we removed this capability, it is conceivable that we
would be mobilised to rescue a person trapped by an animal they have attempted to
rescue, with no capability to do so.
75. The current animal rescue team provide a highly skilled, capable and respected service to
the community. This has been recognised by the submission of significant amounts of
positive correspondence from the community.
76. While the majority of animals rescued are cows and horses, the review identified that there
is currently no information available to the public advising them how to prevent situations
that lead to rescues being required. The development and delivery of such information will
assist in raising public awareness and thus reducing incident numbers.
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77. The extension of the life of the ARU vehicle for no additional cost provides an opportunity
to conduct further work regarding alternative uses for the vehicle prior to deciding on its
potential removal. This will ensure that its use is maximised, and provide additional
information for a future review.
Recommendation
78. That the animal rescue capability currently provided by Faversham with the ARU be
retained, and the provision of this capability reviewed again within five years.
79. The ARU be considered for use at other incident types to achieve greater value for money
from this resource, and allow a more diverse service to be provided to the community.
80. Community information packs regarding incident prevention methods and general animal
safety advice are to be developed. These are to target identified risk groups in an effort to
improve animal safety and reduce incident demand.
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Section Three: Chainsaw provision
Background
81. Currently the Authority provides a chainsaw capability. This capability is delivered from two
sources;
Personnel stationed at Larkfield
The Urban Search And Rescue Team (USAR) based in Maidstone
82. The chainsaw capability at Larkfield fire station is provided by the full-time personnel who
operate the day-crewed system. The majority of equipment is carried on the water safety
unit which tows the fire launch, also located at Larkfield. The station is also home to a
RPL which is crewed by the full-time personnel (and carries a chainsaw), and a pump
whose availability is maintained utilising a combination of on-call, annualised hours and
full-time personnel.
83. Larkfield personnel work at the station between the hours of 09:00 and 18:00, and respond
from home (five minute response requirement) outside of these hours.
84. The capability at the technical rescue centre is provided by full-time USAR trained
firefighters (one of 20 strategically-placed USAR teams within England and Wales,
provided under the government's New Dimension programme to respond to major
incidents locally and internationally) as part of their national capability, who operate a two
watch on-call shift system.
85. USAR personnel work out of the USAR station between 09:00 and 18:00 during which
time they are able to provide a rapid turnout. USAR personnel have a maximum one hour
turnout time during their on call hours from 18:00 to 09:00. This is a maximum period and
it should be noted that frequently turnouts are quicker however this does vary dramatically
on a person to person basis. Being centrally located in Maidstone, USAR personnel when
at this location are able to reach the majority of the country within a one hour period.
Therefore the expected attendance time at an incident is either maximum of one or two
hours depending on the time of day and location of USAR personnel.
86. Both capabilities consist of chainsaws, associated equipment and Personal Protective
Equipment, with personnel at both locations receiving specialist training.
87. While both teams provide a similar attribute, and are qualified to work on trees, the USAR
team’s capability is focused on incidents that occur in the built environment (the removal of
wooden elements of construction within structures to assist with the rescue of persons).
Whereas the capability provided by Larkfield focuses on the cutting of trees (standing and
fallen).
Page 36 of 47
88. Currently, Larkfield is mobilised to all incidents requiring the cutting or felling of trees at all
operational incidents, with USAR only being mobilised when other specialist capabilities
they posses are required.
Review findings
89. While USAR and Larkfield’s chainsaw training is broadly similar, there are some
differences in terms of attainment, content and resultant capability.
90. Larkfield qualifications are gained through internally sourced and funded courses. The first
stage is an initial course entitled “Prepare and maintain the chainsaw” which is NPTC
awarded CS30. This course is a basic course which focuses on safety and maintenance
aspects of working with chainsaws.
91. The next level course is entitled “Fell and process small trees” which is NPTC awarded
CS31. This enables the cutting of trees whose effective diameter is between 200mm and
380mm. The third level course is entitled “Fell and process trees over 380mm” which is
NPTC awarded CS34. The final standard industry course is entitled “Sever individually
uprooted trees” which is NPTC awarded CS34. This covers single windblown trees which
are still attached to the root plate.
92. As an additional piece of continuation training Larkfield has sourced a bespoke course
entitled “Windblown trees and vehicle rescue”. This course is delivered by LANTRA
(National Training Organization for the Land Based Industries) qualified instructors and is
specifically designed to increase their ability to rescue of casualties trapped by trees on a
vehicle.
93. USAR qualifications are gained through a combination of National Resilience supplied and
funded courses and internally sourced bespoke rescue training.
94. The initial course is run at the Fire Service College and is funded through National
Resilience. The course is designed to qualify personnel to work in USAR and FRS
environments. This qualification is equivalent to the National Proficiency Test Council
(NPTC) CS30 as held by Larkfield personnel. Nationally USAR teams are to have 60% of
their personnel trained in the use of chainsaws however due to the availability of courses
all of the Authority’s full-time USAR personnel have gained, or are planned to acquire, this
qualification.
95. The second level of qualification gained by the USAR team is a Sector Skills Council for
Environmental and Land Based Sector (LANTRA) approved qualification for dealing with
small trees up to 200mm. This is equivalent to the National Proficiency Test Council NPTC
CS31 as held by Larkfield personnel.
96. The final level of USAR training is a course entitled “Incidents Involving Fallen Trees and
Casualty Extraction”. This course has been written in consultation with the Health & Safety
Executive (HSE). All techniques on the course are industry Best Practice and have been
Page 37 of 47
designed specifically to target and develop USAR and FRS operational skills when
working in a FRS operational environment. Nationally Kent, Essex, Buckinghamshire,
Hampshire, Devon and Somerset and Northern Ireland Fire Services have adopted these
courses as Best Practice.
97. A direct comparison between the training courses delivered to Larkfield and USAR can be
found in Table 8.
98. Larkfield is equipped with a total of eight chainsaws. These are accompanied with a
variety of lifting, stabilising, and cutting equipment allowing safe use of the chainsaws. The
equipment is supplied and maintained by the Authority.
99. USAR is equipped with a total of four chainsaws. Two are supplied as part of the standard
USAR inventory (a 500mm Rescue Saw and a 400mm standard chainsaw). Additionally
two additional 380mm standard chainsaws and ancillary equipment have been purchased.
100. This equipment is accompanied by the full capability of the USAR team (when available)
which can be mobilised in part or full depending on incident assessment and
requirements. USAR has the capability and capacity to simultaneously attend two
separate incident requiring chainsaws.
101. All equipment USAR has was funded through a National Resilience Section 31 grant at no
cost to the Authority.
102. As Larkfield’s qualifications are nationally recognised, they are valid in a commercial
environment, whereby USAR’s qualifications are only valid within a USAR environment or
in connection with Fire and Rescue Service’s work.
103. Both teams provide a rescue element with their chainsaw capability. The additional rescue
equipment immediately available to Larkfield is limited to that provided on fire engines, and
is used in accordance with the competences contained in the firefighters’ role map.
104. USAR’s rescue training is supported by competencies regarding casualty rescue and
confined space working that are in addition to those contained within the respective
operational role maps. They can also utilise enhanced rescue equipment supplied as part
of their national resilience role.
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Table 8: Training course comparisons
Comparison of chainsaw training courses
Relevant training
course
Comparison
LANTRA CS30 : 1
day (Larkfield)
USART 7 : 4 days
(USAR)
The training for the above courses has comparable elements, but the
overall training appears to be tailored different ways.
The LANTRA course concentrates on chainsaws, maintenance, safety and
working with timber and its associated hazards.
The USAR course cover elements of chainsaw safety, maintenance,
working with timber and hazards but it also builds on these skills to identify
safe systems of work for using chainsaws at height as well as in a collapsed
structure environment.
It is difficult to identify and compare different skills and knowledge acquired
across these courses but they would appear to be a bias with the LANTRA
course to forestry works whereas the USAR course caters for use in other
environments and situations.
LANTRA CS31: 2
days (Larkfield)
Lantra Basic Felling :
2 day (USAR)
The courses have similar content.
The LANTRA CS31 maintains a focus on forestry industry requirements and
allows the holder to fell trees up to 380mm in diameter.
The LANTRA Basic Felling Technique course appears to cover the same
basic techniques but does not appear to have as much detail, this however
may be due to the course description available. This course also only allows
the operator to fell up to 200mm in diameter.
LANTRA CS32 : 3
days (Larkfield)
The LANTRA CS32 course offers the operators greater knowledge and skill
to enable the felling of larger trees.
The course content appears similar to the CS31 but with an emphasis on
dealing with trees larger than 380 mm in diameter but less than 760mm.
This is also done with a guide bar of no greater then 380mm.
There appears to be no USAR course that is aligned to or comparable with
the LANTRA CS32?
LANTRA CS34 : 1
day (Larkfield)
Fallen Trees and
Casualty Extraction : 4
days (USAR)
Both courses deal with casualty extraction for incident involving vehicles
and windblown trees.
The LANTRA CS34 Course focuses on how to deal with single windblown
trees and the bespoke parts have been added to deal with vehicle incidents.
This course appears to focus on forestry industry standards with added
content to extend the capability for fire service work.
The Fallen Trees and Casualty Extraction course appears to offer some of
the areas from the CS34. The course deals with windblown debris and
fallen crowns. The course does not cover dealing with windblown trees that
are still attached to the root plate. It does however, appear to offer a greater
degree of training related to incident in which casualty extraction is required.
This is also not limited to vehicles as with the bespoke course for Larkfield
but also deals with structures. It only provides certification for technicians
using a chainsaw in an USAR environment or in connection with Fire
Service Operations.
Page 39 of 47
105. Over a four year period (Jan 2009-Dec 2011) there have been 11 incidents where the use
of chainsaws has been recorded (see Table 9).
Table 9: recorded use of chainsaws at incidents (Jan 2009-Dec 2011)
Incident
number
Date Details of chainsaw use Who attended
586 06/08/2009 Used to gain access to fire in tree Larkfield
2959 22/09/2009 Used to gain access for animal rescue Larkfield
488 05/11/2009 Used during fire in a tree Larkfield
2080 24/12/2009 Used to gain access for animal rescue Larkfield
1131 15/02/2010 Chainsaw used to gain access for animal
rescue
USAR
2219 28/02/2010 Used to remove wind blown tree from roadway Larkfield
2432 26/04/2010 Used in recovery of fatal casualty under tree USAR
1566 17/06/2010 Used to cut away thatch and close boarding USAR
315 05/02/2011 Used to fell a tree in a dangerous position Larkfield
2073 28/02/2011 Used to fell a hollow tree with deep seated fire Larkfield
3234 28/05/2011 Used to gain access to fire in a tree stump Larkfield
106. The only incidents attended that we have a statutory requirement to do so (under section
seven of the Fire and Rescue Services Act (FRSA) 2004) were the five relating to fires.
There is no statutory requirement to conduct rescues other than from fires or road traffic
collisions (section 8 of the FRSA). Section 11 of the FRSA (power to respond to other
eventualities) allows us to respond to other non statutory incidents, and it is under these
powers that we responded to the other six incidents.
107. Chainsaws have historically been requested in order to access fires that are deep seated
within trees. New capabilities now exist within the Authority (such as Cobra cold cut) that
allows an alternative approach to this issue. Given the small number of incidents of this
nature, the requesting of an external tree specialist to undertake this function may prove to
be a cost effective alternative.
108. The removal of unstable trees and those blocking roadways is the responsibility of the
landowner or relevant authority. This will either be a land owner, the local authority or
Highways agency. Therefore, they could be requested to attend the incident and supply
Page 40 of 47
the chainsaw capability. As such, there is no requirement for us to maintain a chainsaw
capability for this purpose.
109. Additional costs would be incurred if incidents occurred between certain hours of the day
due to the duty systems of the responding crews. Larkfield personnel would attract
additional payments if mobilised between the hours of 18:00 and 05:00, which would
comprise an attendance fee and flat rate hourly payment for each hour worked.
110. USAR would attract additional payments if mobilised between the hours of 18:00 and
09:00. This would be in the form of a contracted recall to duty payment equivalent to three
hours pay (flat rate) for all persons responding (regardless of the incident duration, or if
used at all), and then flat rate hourly payment for each hour worked in addition to this.
111. In order to assess this financial impact, the times incidents occurred was analysed (see
Figure 6). This showed that only one historical incident had attracted additional cost by
Larkfield personnel. Due to the low number of incidents, and the low financial impact as a
result, this is not considered not to be a major consideration in terms of where this
capability should be located.
Figure 6 Chainsaw incidents by time of day
Page 41 of 47
112. The estimated time taken to mobilise to historic incidents was plotted for both Larkfield and
USAR to identify the effect changing the location of response may have on attendance
times. The following assumptions were made when doing this:
There is no difference in vehicle speeds between fire engines or specials
Any width, height and weight restriction applied is applied to all vehicles equally
irrespective of type
The equipment is considered to be at base at time of mobilisation and there are
no other delaying factors to increase turnout times
The turnout time between mobilisation and departure to incident has been
estimated as follows:
Base Location On Station Delayed Response
Larkfield 1 min 5 min
USAR 5 min 60 min
113. When the resultant estimated attendance times were averaged and compared (see Figure
7), there was little difference when both Larkfield and USAR were located at their station.
The main difference being out of hours when crews would have to respond from home.
Figure 7 Average response times to historic chainsaw incidents
114. Given the small number of incidents, this data should not be considered to be significant
when considering the future location of this capability.
Page 42 of 47
Options for Improvement
Base Option: Existing arrangements
Description
115. With this option, Larkfield would remain the main provider of this capability, with USAR providing additional support when required, and a
chainsaw capability only where the incident has occurred within a USAR environment.
SWOT Analysis
Strengths Weaknesses Opportunities Threats
Requires no change
maintains existing coverage of
capability
No protocol of deployment (USAR or Larkfield) which leads to ineffective mobilising.
Chainsaw capability may be unavailable due to Larkfield being on a fire call
Requirement to maintain both capabilities (initial/refresher training, PPE and equipment).
No financial savings opportunity.
The possibility of outsourcing
capability
Adds unique selling point
(USP) to the Authority
Increases competitive
advantage
Change in legislation could
affect provision requirements
Retention of sufficient trained
staff members key to
provision
Retaining chainsaw provision
could detract from key role.
Page 43 of 47
Indicative costs
116. The following table illustrates indicative costs for personnel training and supply of PPE.
The costs quoted are for Larkfield personnel only. USAR is currently centrally funded by
government, so no costs are incurred for specialist training/equipment provision when
used within their current capabilities. No equipment costs are quoted as current equipment
provision is adequate, and will not require replacing in the immediate future.
Current Cost
Additional Staff Costs for Capability £
Work wear and PPE (initial issue) 656
Training Costs
Initial training cost per person 2,150
Refresher training total year 1 and 2 1,155
Average annual refresher training cost 577
*Vehicle costs are not included as the chainsaws are carried on the RPL and water safety unit and not a dedicated vehicle.
Summary
117. The Predicted costs for maintaining the chainsaw capability at Larkfield for 2013/14 is
£18,567 (based on the requirement for 9 x refresher training, 5 x Initial training and 4 x
initial PPE issue). For 2014, the estimated cost is £8,078 (based on the requirement for 14
x refresher training).
Page 44 of 47
Option One: Enhance the current chainsaw capability by training and equipping additional staff
Description
118. This option would involve adding to the personnel already trained to undertake chainsaw related work in order to ensure wider delivery of this
capability.
SWOT Analysis
Strengths Weaknesses Opportunities Threats
Provides greater coverage of
capability
Possibility to outsource
capability to realise financial
benefit
Cost of developing further capability
(initial/refresher training, PPE and
equipment).
Additionally trained operational crews
availability to respond to statutory
duties reduced marginally.
Less flexibility in equipment carried
on appliances being based on area
risk profile.
Small number of incidents where
capability is required.
The possibility of
outsourcing capability
Adds unique selling
point (USP) to the
Authority
Increases competitive
advantage
Change in legislation could
affect provision requirements
Retention of sufficient trained
staff members key to
provision
Additional chainsaw provision
could detract relevant
personnel from key role.
Indicative costs
119. Due to the significant cost of this option this section has not been completed as this is not considered as viable.
Summary
120. Due to the lack of operational demand for this capability, and the fact that significant additional cost would be incurred rather than saved, this
option has been dismissed as not being viable.
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Option Two: Remove Larkfield as a provider of this capability (USAR to be sole provider)
Description
121. This would involve removing the chainsaw capability from Larkfield and utilising USAR for all forthcoming incidents where chainsaws are
required.
SWOT Analysis
Strengths Weaknesses Opportunities Threats
Immediate cost savings
realised (initial/refresher
training, PPE and equipment).
Larkfields availability to
respond to statutory duties
enhanced.
More flexibility in equipment
carried on Larkfield appliance
being based on area risk
profile.
No requirement to establish
an equipment replacement
programme.
Small number of incidents
where capability is required.
Capability not lost when USAR
deploy out of County due to
additional non deployed
personnel providing this
capability.
Could be negatively perceived
by the public as cuts to
service provision being made.
Possible delay in mobilising to
life critical incidents between
18:00 and 09:00hrs.
Reduction in chainsaw
capability coverage.
Would require additional
vehicles to be used by USAR
personnel if theirs are
deployed out of County
Greater use of USAR
capability providing enhance
image of capability
Adds unique selling point
(USP) to the Authority
Increases competitive
advantage
Cost savings allowing for
additional capability
development to improve
service delivery
no possibility of outsourcing
capability
Removal of USAR capability
due to political change
affecting new dimensions
provision would leave the
Authority with no chainsaw
provision.
Removal of USAR central
funding.
Page 46 of 47
Indicative costs
122. The following table illustrates indicative costs for this option, providing a comparison with
the current cost of delivering services.
Current Cost Option 2 Cost Difference
Additional Staff Costs
for Capability
£ £ £
Work wear and PPE
(initial issue)
656 N/A (centrally funded
via section 31 grant, so
no cost to the
Authority)
-656
Training Costs
Initial training cost per
person
2,150 2,485.61 (centrally
funded via section 31
grant, so no cost to the
Authority)
-2,150
Refresher training total
year 1 and 2
1,155 110.61 (centrally
funded via section 31
grant, so no cost to the
Authority)
-1,155
Average annual
refresher training cost
577 110.61 (centrally
funded via section 31
grant, so no cost to the
Authority)
-577
Summary
123. Given the predicted costs for maintaining the chainsaw capability at Larkfield for 2013/14
and 2014 totals £26,645, this option provides a significant opportunity for annual cashable
savings to be generated.
124. USAR is currently centrally funded by government, so no costs are incurred by the
Authority for specialist training/equipment provision when used within their current
capabilities. It should be noted however, that due to current contractual agreements,
USAR will incur some additional costs to those incurred by Larkfield when responding to
chainsaw incidents out of office hours. Given the small number of incident attended, this is
not considered a significant issue.
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Evaluation
125. The analysis clearly shows that there is little demand for a chainsaw capability within the
Authority. However, a previous incident requiring the rescue of a person when a tree fell
on their vehicle highlights that this provision may be required in the future. Given that this
type of incident would be traumatic to those concerned; requesting this capability from an
external provider may not be practicable.
126. Given that there is no statutory requirement to have such a capability, and the analysis
identifies that responsibility the removal of this capability, and the cost savings that would
bring, has to be a consideration considering the current financial climate.
127. In terms of cost savings, the removal of the Larkfield capability would generate projected
savings of £18,567 in 2013/14 and £8,078 for 2014/15.
128. As the chainsaw capability provided by USAR cannot be removed as it is required for their
core role, and both providers have similar capabilities, the loss of Larkfield would not affect
current provision.
129. The location of the capability may be an important consideration for rescue incidents
where short attendance times would be important. Given that the USAR capability is more
centrally located, this seems the better location. This location is problematic with
mobilisation out of hours, as the duty system employed by USAR would mean that up to
60 minutes may be added to incident attendance times within these time periods. This
would be the worst case scenario however, and the adaptation of mobilising protocols may
reduce this time significantly.
130. While USAR mobilisations out of hours would incur additional costs to that incurred when
Larkfield are mobilised out of hours, this is not a considerable impact due to the small
numbers of incidents involved.
Recommendation
131. While chainsaws are rarely used at incidents, but may be required for those involving the
saving of life, it is recommended that this capability be retained within the Authority.
132. It is also recommended that the chainsaw capability be removed from Larkfield. This would
realise cost savings without a loss of capability as USAR could provide this a little or no
cost.
133. In order to facilitate this, the mobilising system should be amended to reflect this change,
and all operational personnel informed of the new mobilising protocols.
134. Alternative mobilising methods for USAR out of hour should also be explored to reduce
attendance times during this period.
