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The Philippine 2001 National Election V. Umali, L. Portus, F. Paragas & A. San Joaquin
Page 1
TOWARDS A DISCOURSE ON POLITICAL COMMUNICATION: THE CASE OF THE 2001 PHILIPPINE NATIONAL ELECTION1
VIOLEDA A. UMALI, FERNANDO D.C. PARAGAS, ALEXANDRA M. SAN JOAQUIN & LOURDES M. PORTUS 2
Introduction
This paper examines the dynamics between mass media and politics in the
Philippine context, using the 2001 national election as its specific case. The paper draws
from data on the Philippine media’s coverage of, and the voters’ decision-making for, the
2001 election to elucidate on the features of political communication in the Philippines
and to evaluate how the Philippine mass media have aided or hindered democratic
processes in the country. The results are subsequently evaluated in the light of the
broader issues on the role of the mass media in a democracy.
The study on which this paper is based employed content analysis and key
informant interviews to answer two main questions: 1) How did the media cover the 2001
Philippine national election, and 2) How did the mass media figure in the voters'
decision-making for the said election? For the content analysis, on the one hand, the
study looked at election messages that appeared a week before and after the national
election in two national broadsheets, two national tabloids, two evening primetime TV
news programs, and two early-morning radio public affairs programs3. On the other hand,
28 focus interviews were conducted with key informants from a rural and an urban area.
1 Paper to be presented at the 23 rd Conference of the International Association of Media and Communication Research (IAMCR) to be held on 20 – 26 July 2002 in Barcelona, Spain. 2 Faculty of Communication Research, University of the Philippines College of Mass Co mmunication 3 The broadsheets are the Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Philippine Star; the tabloids, People’s Journal and Abante; the TV stations, ABS-CBN Channel 2 and GMA Channel 7; and the radio stations, DZMM and DZRH.
The Philippine 2001 National Election V. Umali, L. Portus, F. Paragas & A. San Joaquin
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The 2001 National Election: Overview
The May 14, 2001 national election involved 17,000
candidates competing for 3,600 posts – 13 seats in the Senate;
all 216 Congressional seats; party list slots; and local
government posts at the provincial, city, and municipality levels
(Philippine Daily Inquirer, 13 May 2001, p.1;
http://www.congress.gov.ph/members). These statistics are,
however, the least of the reasons why the 2001 election was
especially significant for the socio-political life of the country.
Several important developments served as a backdrop for this
election (see inset), most prominent of which are the
impeachment trial of former President Joseph Estrada in
December 2000, and the two massive citizen mobilizations in
January and May 2001 (popularly called People Power II and
People Power III, respectively).
For the 13 senatorial seats, there were 36 candidates. Of
these, 13 were independent candidates; the rest belonged to one
of the nine political parties that fielded candidates for the
election. Effectively, however, the senatorial race was between
two coalitions – the People Power Coalition (PPC), which is
identified with Gloria Arroyo, current Philippine president, and
Chronology of Events
2000 Oct 9 – Ilocos Sur governor Luis Singson reveals President Joseph Estrada gets millions from illegal gambling operations in the country Oct 11 – Cardinal Sin calls for Estrada’s resignation Oct 12 – Vice President Gloria Arroyo quits Estrada cabinet Oct 17 – Former President Corazon Aquino asks Estrada to consider resignation Oct 18 – Three congressmen and 24 multi-sectoral groups file an impeachment case against Estrada Oct 25 – Vice President Arroyo joins the call for Estrada’s resignation Oct 28 – Business sector calls for Estrada’s resignation Nov 3 – House Speaker Manuel Villar and 45 other congressmen bolt the ruling party and support the impeachment complaint Nov 13 – The House of Representatives impeaches Estrada and endorses the impeachment case to senate Nov 17 – Retired generals call for Estrada’s resignation Dec 7 – Estrada’s impeachment trial begins, on charges of bribery, graft and corruption, culpable violation of the Constitution, and betrayal of public trust. Rep. Joker Arroyo reveals the existence of a Jose Velarde account, allegedly owned by Estrada, at the Equitable-PCI Bank Dec 22 – Clarissa Ocampo, senior vice president of Equitable, testifies that Estrada owns the Velarde account 2001 Jan 16 – Senator-judges identified with Estrada, on an 11-10 vote, succeeded in preventing the opening of the Velarde account. Anti-Estrada groups gather in EDSA4 to protest the senators’ vote Jan 17 – Protests escalate and spread to key cities outside Metro Manila; impeachment trial suspended after House prosecutors resign en masse Jan 18 – About 75,000 protesters march close to the presidential palace, demanding Estrada to quit
Cont’d.
4 EDSA is the acronym for Epifanio delos Santos Avenue, a major thoroughfare in Metro Manila, where the first massive people’s demonstration took place in 1986. People Power I toppled the Marcos dictatorship. Since then, EDSA has stood as a symbol of the Filipinos’ fight for freedom and democracy.
The Philippine 2001 National Election V. Umali, L. Portus, F. Paragas & A. San Joaquin
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the Puwersa ng Masa (literally, Force of the Masses) or
PnM,which is composed mainly of supporters of former
President Estrada. Forming the core of the PPC was the Lakas
NUCD-UMDP5 party composed of five members; members of
three other political parties and four independent candidates
completed the line-up. PnM’s core group came from the seven-
member Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP)6. The eighth
member was the lone senatorial candidate fielded by the
People’s Reform Party, and the remaining five members were
independent candidates. Against the backdrop of the events that
preceded it, it does not come as a surprise that the 2001 election
became another setting for Arroyo and Estrada, along with their
respective supporters, to each assert their right to serve as the
leader of the country and to undermine the other’s right to the
same.
As in past elections, the 2001 election witnessed a heavy
voter turn-out. It is estimated that 85% of the country’s 36.5
million voters participated in this election (Philippine Star, 15
May 2001, p. 1). When the last ballots came in for canvassing,
and after a bitter competition for the 13th slot, the verdict was:
eight for PPC and five for PnM.
Chronology of Events(cont’n.)
Jan 19 – Military and other government officials join EDSA protesters Jan 20 – Estrada leaves presidential palace; Arroyo takes her oath as president Jan 29 – Estrada asks Supreme Court to nullify Arroyo’s assumption to the presidency Feb 1 – Three new plunder cases filed against Estrada Feb 12 – Passage of Fair Elections Act, which allowed political advertising in the mass media Mar 2 – Supreme Court, in a 13-0 vote, rules that Arroyo is the legitimate president Mar 25 – Estrada lawyers file a motion for reconsideration of the Supreme Court’s decision Apr 10 – In another unanimous vote, the Supreme Court dismisses Estrada’s motion for reconsideration Apr 25 – Arrest of Estrada after anti-graft court issues warrant for non-bailable offense; Estrada supporters occupy EDSA Apr 28 – Military discovers opposition plot to overthrow Arroyo May 1 – Estrada supporters storm presidential palace. Arroyo declares a state of rebellion and orders the arrest of the alleged brains of the coup attempt, among them Gregorio Honasan and Panfilo Lacson, both senatorial candidates in the May 14 election May 14 – National election Sources: Doronila, A. 2001. The Fall of Joseph Estrada: The Inside Story. Philippines: Anvil Publishing, Inc. and Philippine Daily Inquirer, Inc. http://www.time.communication/time/asia/feature/photoessay/estrada_impeachment/frame1.html http://sg.web/lycosasi.com/infocus http://www.philstar.communication/philstar/1_trial.html http://www.comelec.gov.ph http://www.chanrobles.communication/comelecrulesofprocedure/html http://www.time.communication/time/world/article/08599/0763100.html http://www.philcongela.org/content.asp http://www.asiaweek.communication/asiaweek/magazine/2000/0121/net.phil.dirtyharry.html
5 President Gloria Arroyo’s political party 6 The coalition that former President Estrada joined when he ran for presidency in 1998
The Philippine 2001 National Election V. Umali, L. Portus, F. Paragas & A. San Joaquin
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The Philippine Mass Media: A Brief Profile
The Philippine mass media system, which is patterned after the US mass media
system, is recognized as one of the freest in Asia. Freedom of speech is guaranteed as a
constitutional right, and media practitioners have always zealously guarded this right.
Most media establishments in the country are privately owned, primarily by big
businesses that also have huge stakes in industries such as manufacturing,
telecommunications, agri-business, etc. As such, mass media in the Philippines has a
strong commercial orientation.
At present, there are approximately 876 media establishments throughout the
country: 14 TV stations, 643 radio stations, 15 national newspapers, 85 provincial papers,
104 other publications (magazines, comics), and about 15 film companies (4As Media
Factbook 2002). Most of these establishments are located in Metro Manila, the
administrative and business center of the country. However, every regional center of the
country (the Philippines has 16 regions) has media establishments.
The Philippine Media’s Coverage of the 2001 National Election
The 2001 national election was held on May 14. The content analysis covered
media coverage one week before and after this date, or a total of 15 days. The materials
collated were limited to those that focused on the senatorial candidates and on election
issues of national concern. For the newspapers, all types of articles – whether news items,
columns, features, editorials, etc. – that met these criteria were included in the sample.
The TV sample came from the early evening news programs of Channels 2 and 7, while
the radio sample came from the early morning programs (6 – 8 a.m.) of DZMM and
The Philippine 2001 National Election V. Umali, L. Portus, F. Paragas & A. San Joaquin
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DZRH. All in all, the sample is composed of 855 newspaper articles, 100 TV news
program segments, and 238 radio public affairs program segments.
The Patterns of Election Coverage across Different Media Types
To determine the patterns in the media’s coverage of the 2001 election, the
content analysis considered several variables, among which are the format of the media
messages, the main topics and the specific issues discussed under each main topic, and
the main actors with the corresponding slant or treatment for each. The results of the
content analysis are found in Tables 1 and 2 (please see Annex A).
Format of media messages. The election messages were presented primarily as
news items, regardless of the medium that they came out in. Around 51% of the media
materials analyzed were news items. Those that explicitly carried an opinion or stand on
an election issue – e.g., editorials, columns, commentaries, man-on-the street interviews –
accounted for around 40% of the election messages. The remaining nine percent
consisted of other media formats (e.g., comic strips, cartoons, photos and graphics).
Main topics. In terms of the broad topic of the messages, the various media gave
greatest attention to reporting about the election process itself. Ranking second were
items about the candidates’ profile, followed by those discussing the candidates’
predicted and actual performance in the polls; stories involving the other stakeholders in
the election (e.g., the Commission on Elections (COMELEC); the various religious,
socio-civic and media organizations; the school teachers who are in charge of manning
the polls, etc.); and analyses of the election as it related to various societal issues.
The Philippine 2001 National Election V. Umali, L. Portus, F. Paragas & A. San Joaquin
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Specific issues under each main topic. Among the activities and issues
surrounding the election process, prominence was given to actual and anticipated
instances of election irregularities and violence including padded voters’ list, flying
voters, ballot snatching, cyber fraud, vote buying, tampering of canvass results, and
election-related killings. Admittedly, such incidents – whether real or imagined – are a
staple ingredient of Philippine elections. It is almost a given that contending parties take
turns accusing their opponents of underhanded activities to swing the election results in
their favor.
From all the media, there was a strong call for people’s participation and vigilance
during the election. Voters were also exhorted to vote wisely, and to let the lessons of
recent political events guide their choices. Most of the commentators and columnists
were, not surprisingly, explicit in their endorsement or non-endorsement of particular
candidates, with the PPC party and its candidates getting more endorsements than those
from the PnM. The newspaper editorials were less partisan and focused more on the
criteria that voters should consider when choosing their candidates.
Election preparations and procedures also took up a significant proportion of the
airtime and space devoted to the coverage of the elections – primarily the provision of
appropriate logistical support systems and security measures to ensure that the election
would proceed smoothly and peacefully. Apart from these routine matters, the
newspapers devoted considerable space to news and commentaries about the appropriate
arrangements for President Estrada so that he could cast his vote on election day.
With regard to the coverage of the candidates themselves, the various media
almost seemed preoccupied with two opposition candidates – Gregorio Honasan and
The Philippine 2001 National Election V. Umali, L. Portus, F. Paragas & A. San Joaquin
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Panfilo Lacson7 – and their alleged involvement in People Power III, as well as in a plot
to overthrow the Arroyo government. This kind of coverage overshadowed other, more
important issues such as the candidates’ qualifications and program of action.
Additionally, little attention was given to the other candidates, especially those who were
not allied with PPC and PnM.
Items dealing with predicted and actual election results were almost always
framed as a ‘race’ between the PPC and PnM candidates. Again, little attention was given
to how candidates outside these coalitions would fare/actually fared in the elections.
Figuring prominently in the ‘race’ coverage were pre-election speculations and post-
election updates on the number of candidates from each party who will be/are in the
‘Magic 13’. Of particular interest to the media (and by extension, the public) was how the
13 slots would ultimately be divided between the two coalitions – 13-0, 9-4, 8-5, etc. – in
the light of particular scenarios, trends indicated by straw polls, and tallies reported by
the COMELEC and other organizations doing their own ‘quick count’ of election results.
The division of the 13 seats would determine who will control the Senate majority – i.e.,
the administration or the opposition – hence the keen interest shown by the media in the
issue.
Turning to the coverage of election stakeholders (other than the candidates), the
COMELEC got the highest coverage. Most of the items were straightforward reports
about the Commission’s role in the election; however, where there were evaluative
reports, most of them did not speak well of how the Commission was doing its job.
7 Gregorio Honasan, an army colonel, led the mutiny of the young officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the 1986 people power revolution against Ferdinand Marcos. Panfilo Lacson was the chief of the Philippine National Police during Estrada’s term as president.
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Finally, items that dealt with the broader social implications of the election were found
only in the newspapers content analyzed; this topic was not brought up in the TV and
radio programs studied. Among the newspapers that tackled this topic, the most common
focus was the impact of the election on business and the economy, and on certain
individuals and groups (e.g., the church, movie stars, political dynasties, etc.).
Main actors and slant for main actors. Across the various media, the coverage of
the election was dominated by three actors: the COMELEC, Gregorio Honasan, and
Panfilo Lacson. Also given considerable coverage were the National Movement for Free
Elections (NAMFREL), whose quick count of the election results has gained wide
acceptance and credibility among many sectors; and collectively, the PPC and PnM.
Overall, Honasan and Lacson got more coverage than the PnM, the PPC, and the other
individual senatorial candidates. Only the COMELEC, among the other main actors, got
higher coverage than the two candidates. As mentioned, items on Honasan and Lacson
were often in connection with their involvement in the alleged coup attempt against the
Arroyo administration. A few other opposition candidates were implicated in this coup
but attention was focused on Honasan and Lacson because of their strong links with the
military.
How did the media portray these two candidates? The data indicate that the
coverage was largely neutral. However, this neutrality was not in terms of a ‘detached’
approach to the issue of these candidates’ involvement in the alleged coup attempt. On
the contrary, the neutrality was, in many instances, the consequence of a ‘heads-on’
approach to the issue: simultaneously presenting both sides of the argument and letting
the clashing information fight it out for the audiences’ attention and acceptance. This was
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especially evident in the broadcast programs, which featured back-to-back interviews
with the candidates or those who believed they were not guilty of the charges, on the one
hand, and those who believed they were, on the other.
This heads-on approach also manifested itself in the coverage of the other election
actors caught in issues perceived to be as controversial as the coup attempt: the
COMELEC and its officials, with their squabbles over certain election rules and
regulations; NAMFREL, whose quick count system had been alternately praised and
downgraded by certain sectors; PnM and PPC representatives, who were only too happy
to give their arguments and counter-arguments about the legitimacy of the Arroyo
government. All the media analyzed carried this format in presenting the controversial
election issues; however, the broadcast programs’ coverage – with their audio and/or
video components – definitely had more color and intensity than the newspapers’.
Narrative Frameworks in the Coverage of the 2001 National Election
It is said that the mass media construct a political reality that subsequently shapes
the kind of political reality – the subjective political reality – that becomes ingrained in
the minds of their audiences (McNair, 1999). To grasp what this constructed reality is, it
is helpful to look at the “narrative frameworks” that underlie the political messages that
the mass media disseminate. Narrative frameworks “develop over time in the interaction
and competition between different news media, and between the various actors in, or
sources of, a story” (Ibid., p. 73). Thus, to be able to identify these frameworks, one
needs to look at how media messages from various sources, media and time period ‘hang
together’ to create a story.
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McNair also points out that in constructing news stories, there are competing
frameworks. However, over time, a dominant framework emerges and “once established,
provides the structure within which subsequent events are allocated news value, reported,
and made sense of” (Ibid., p. 74).
The rivalry continues…. Examining the election messages in the various media
one week before and after election day, it is quite clear that this political exercise was
largely narrated as an episode in the yet-to-be-concluded competition for legitimacy
between the Arroyo and Estrada administrations. The political rivalry between Joseph
Estrada and Gloria Arroyo started out tentatively, cautiously before and during the
December 2000 impeachment trial, concretized after the January 2001 People Power II,
and became more intense after the May 1, 2001 People Power III. Not a few people had
hoped that the May 14 election would put this rivalry to rest, but this was not to be. The
drama was destined to play on much longer than that.
The May 2001 election was not purposely designed as a possible solution to the
political rivalry between Estrada and Arroyo. It was meant to elect a new set of officials
to replace those whose terms were to expire during that year. But there was no way it
could be dissociated from the events that preceded it. The media simply had to take the
Estrada-Arroyo political rivalry as one of the threads of its election narrative for two
main reasons. The more immediate reason is that these two factions fielded candidates in
the election. The more substantive reason is that this election could potentially settle the
leadership crisis in the country, and how this crisis is going to be resolved has serious
implications for the future of the country.
The Philippine 2001 National Election V. Umali, L. Portus, F. Paragas & A. San Joaquin
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There was, thus, nothing intrinsically wrong with including the political rivalry
between Estrada and Arroyo as part of the parameters around which the election coverage
would revolve. What was disturbing was the way the media had built its stories around
this framework, to the neglect of the other equally important issues that the election was
supposed to address. Almost every story was selected to sustain the drama of this
political rivalry. This explains why among the senatorial candidates, attention was
focused on Honasan and Lacson – not on their persona as senatorial aspirants, but rather
on their involvement in the alleged coup attempt against Arroyo. Election outcome
predictions, updates on election tallies, and analyses of final election results were
similarly framed in the context of the rivalry. Even reports on election irregularities were,
more often than not, portrayed as part of a whole conspiracy designed to assure that either
of the two rivals would come out the winner in the elections. Likewise, exhortations for
people to participate, exercise vigilance, and cast their votes wisely almost always carried
implicit and explicit recommendations for choosing one party over another.
It cannot, of course, be denied that the media’s preoccupation with the political
rivalry was partly motivated by their search for the ‘truth’ and their concern for the long-
term implications of the 2001 election. But perhaps it is also not unfair to say that the
media seized this narrative framework and used it for their election coverage because it
was a proven blockbuster among their audiences. The impeachment trial, People Power II
and People Power III were all best-seller episodes in this real-life soap opera; if the
election could be constructed as the next episode in this rivalry, it would surely be
another box-office hit. And so it was – but it was a construction of the election that left
much to be desired in terms of giving a comprehensive picture of the election as an
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opportunity for the citizens to assert their power to choose the leaders to whom they
would entrust the future of their community and their country.
…Where ‘ideologies’ matter…. The construction of the election as an episode in
the Estrada-Arroyo political rivalry attempted to perpetuate the notion that this rivalry is
a clash of principles and ideologies. However, the media did not anchor the ideological
issues on party platforms and programs of action, but on a set of dichotomies that Estrada
and Arroyo are supposed to represent.
One such dichotomy is the mass–elite differentiation, with Estrada being
identified with the former and Arroyo, the latter. Estrada won the 1998 presidency in a
landslide victory made possible by his strong mass following. Arroyo, who ran under a
different political party, won as vice-president, thanks to her support base composed
mainly of members of the middle class and the elite. People Power II, which unseated
Estrada and propelled Arroyo to the presidency, was dominated by the educated and the
elite members of the population. In contrast, People Power III, which was an attempt to
reaffirm Estrada’s presidency, was a mobilization of the masses. Arroyo’s detractors
played up this dichotomy, raised it to the level of the rhetoric of the class struggle
between the rich and the poor, and used the rhetoric to discredit her and her
administration.
However, the comparison between Estrada and Arroyo also generated personality-
based dichotomies, which Arroyo’s supporters harnessed in their favor. Although a
veteran in politics (before becoming president, he served as city mayor and senator for
several years and as vice-president under the Ramos administration), Estrada does not
have the track record to show that he has a good grasp of national and international
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issues. It does not help that he is a high school drop-out and has the reputation of having
a poor command of the English language. To make matters worse, he is a womanizer,
drinks heavily, throws lavish parties, and has close associations with unscrupulous
businessmen. Arroyo, in contrast, is well-educated and articulate, and can competently
discuss broad social issues. And it certainly works in her favor that she is the daughter of
a former Philippine president and is perceived to have strong Catholic values. From these
juxtapositions emerged dichotomies favorable to Arroyo: smart vs. dumb, competent vs.
inept, upright vs. corrupt. Arroyo, thus, is being equated with progress and development;
Estrada, with decadence and stagnation.
Unfortunately, there was little else that the Estrada and Arroyo camps – and the
media – could offer beyond the rhetoric of those dichotomies. There was no in-depth
discussion of party platforms and programs of action, as well as of the qualifications and
achievements of individual candidates. The political rivalry drama between Estrada and
Arroyo only partly accounts for the situation. The root of the problem goes deeper than
that, and it has to do with the nature of Philippine political parties.
Unlike political parties in other countries, Philippine political parties are marked
by “shifting … membership and leadership and the absence of ideological or
programmatic differences between parties” (Rocamora, 1998). It is not unusual for
candidates to move to other parties mid-way during the election campaign. It is also fairly
common to hear of parties and coalitions grouping and regrouping, as if in a game of
musical chairs. Because party alliances are so fluid, one could hardly expect that there
would be clear party lines and explicit ideological differences among Philippine political
parties. Conversely, one can also say that what prompts politicians to transfer from one
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party to the next (and to the next, or form their own, if so desired) – either for personal
convenience or out of a serious search for the party with the ‘right’ ideology – is that
these parties have no clear and stable ideologies and platforms.
Why Philippine political parties are the way they are is not an issue for this paper
to tackle.8 But, seen in the light of this situation, it is easy to figure out why the media’s
coverage of the elections does not focus on parties and their ideologies and platforms, but
on personalities – whom they (and many others) try to equate with a particular ideology.
Yet, the lessons of the political events preceding the election should have made them
realize that elections and votes should not be premised on personalities. The media did
aggressively preach against choices based on superficial, contrived images. Ironically,
they – like the candidates they were preaching against – hardly went beyond the rhetoric.
…But personalities reign. If the 2001 election took place under ‘normal’ political
conditions, the media’s coverage of election personalities would not have been different
from the way they covered personalities of the past elections. They would have focused
on the campaign sorties, complete with details on what one candidate wore, what another
candidate sang, who this candidate danced with, what faux pas that candidate committed,
etc. But the 2001 election was held as the height of the struggle for political legitimacy
between Estrada and Arroyo, and the election coverage ended up being anchored on this
event. Still, as all election coverages go, this one needed personalities to make it real and
concrete before the audience’s eyes. Estrada and Arroyo partly filled in this need, but
they could not be the election’s main personalities simply because they were not directly
involved in it. They were not candidates in this election.
8 For an in-depth discussion of the nature of Philippine political parties, readers may refer to Bello (2001), David (2001), Doronila (2001), Gutierrez (1998), Laquian and Laquian (2002), and Rocamora (1998).
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Honasan and Lacson fit the role perfectly. They are concrete representations of
both the political struggle between Estrada and Arroyo (because they are accused of
having a hand in People Power III) and the election (because they are vying for a
senatorial seat). It was as if the two candidates presented the media with a happy
compromise – and more. Honasan and Lacson gave them a storyline that was as
sensational as it was important – that of two political icons hastily toppled down to the
status of fugitives.
The media’s – particularly the broadcast media’s – pre-election reportage on
selected details of the two candidates’ state as fugitives was at turns relentless, disturbing,
and later simply ludicrous. On an almost daily basis just before the election, Honasan
and/or Lacson were interviewed via telephone and typically given the run of a full 5 – 15
minutes to plead their innocence and to vent their ‘spiels’ on the injustice of the cases
filed against them. In the same segment, a representative from the Justice Department
would also be put on air via phone patch, to reiterate the validity of the orders for their
arrest. Given the almost religious regularity by which the two fugitive candidates were
giving interviews to the media, one tended to wonder whether the government, in its
failure to catch two highly visible fugitives, was simply inept, incompetent, or worse,
wishy-washy in its chosen courses of action.
Further, the media’s coverage of Honasan and Lacson showed little effort to
synthesize the usually long-winded verbal clashes between the fugitives and the
government representatives. Such silence strongly suggests that the media were more
interested in providing the audience with a regular dose of excitement akin to the thrill
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experienced by spectators watching two cockerels having it out in a cockfight, than in
ferreting out the ‘truth’ about the whole issue.
On the day of the election and beyond, the disjointed, almost frenzied seeking out
of Honasan and Lacson for interviews came to an all-too-abrupt halt, to be replaced
almost immediately by the reports on the election tallies and eventually, by other events
and issues of curiosity. If the candidates’ campaign sorties proved to be inferior to the
Honasan/Lacson story in terms of color and drama, the election tallies were a different
matter altogether. As the concretization of the people’s verdict (and therefore, of the
candidates’ effort), election tallies cannot be easily edged out by all other election stories
for the audience’s attention. More so for the Philippine 2001 election because until the
election day itself, there were a lot of speculations as to how the 13 senate seats would
ultimately be distributed between the two coalitions, the speculations having been
triggered by the fact that the division of the seats has great implications for the future of
the Arroyo administration. Hence, the shift in the personality focus of the election
coverage, a shift that was still very much consistent with the broader narrative of the
Estrada-Arroyo political rivalry. And whereas the Honasan/Lacson story offered the thrill
of a cockfight, the tallies came with all the suspense of a horserace.
Putting all the narratives together, one is inclined to conclude that if there is an
element that dominates in the media’s coverage of the election, it is sensationalism. Yet,
there is also much neutrality in the coverage, as the content analysis data would bear out.
It certainly is an awkward combination, but possible nonetheless.
All is fair in love and in war – and in elections, too. At first glance, it would seem
difficult to have a coverage that is simultaneously neutral and sensational. Conceptually,
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the two terms are, to some extent, the antithesis of each other. On the one hand, to be
neutral is to be detached and to be non-partisan. On the other hand, to be sensational is to
be engaged, to lean to one side of an argument, to be partisan. But in their coverage of the
2001 election, the Philippine media – especially the broadcast media – were able to show
that neutrality and sensationalism do mix, through the simple formula of featuring back-
to-back interviews with the contending personalities in an election issue, be it Honasan
and Lacson in the alleged coup attempt, COMELEC officials against their critics or
against each other, candidates against other candidates, or anyone else caught up in an
election issue who was willing to take part in the play that the media have staged in the
name of neutrality and truth.
Players are lured by the “this-is-your-chance-to-air-your-side” argument. Of
course, there is also the implicit threat that s/he who refuses to speak up must be guilty as
charged. Thus, once the first scene has been put in place and the first actor has mouthed
his/her lines, the play begins to have a life of its own and it is relatively effortless to keep
it going. And since this is a play where reputations are at stake and emotions often run
high, there is more than enough dose of drama and spectacle to motivate the audience to
keep watching and listening.
The big question is: can the audience get past the drama and the spectacle? It is
difficult to give a categorical answer to this question. But certainly, the chances that such
will happen will be greater if the media, which provided the spectacle in the first place,
would take the trouble to process what the audience has seen and heard. Unfortunately, in
many instances, the media did not provide an adequate synthesis of the information that
were exchanged. They limited themselves to the role the moderator, and serendipitously
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hit upon the most neutral, yet the most sensational, of reportage that the audience could
ever ask for.
The Media and the Voters
The media play a critical role in helping people make sense of the events going on
around them, especially if these are events they have little direct experience with. The
national election is one such event. In one way or another, voters have to turn to the
media for information regarding the election and the candidates, and for guidance about
who they should vote for.
Paletz and Entman (1981:31) that the media’s impact on elections is “cumulative”
and that the context of an election is set “well in advance of the election year.” This
implies that when voters decide which candidates to vote for, they refer more to long-
term media messages about these candidates, and less to the immediate messages
disseminated before the elections. The results of the key informant interviews (please
refer to Annex B for the matrix summarizing the informants’ responses) conducted with
28 voters who participated in the 2001 Philippine national election corroborate Paletz and
Entman’s argument, and reveal other interesting insights on the role of the media in the
voters’ decision-making for the said election.
The Decision-Making Process
At the outset of their decision-making process during the 2001 senatorial
elections, Filipino voters typically had two criteria in screening candidates: politics and
personality. Politically, they identified candidates whom they perceived to espouse issues
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that they deemed important. At the same time, however, they favored candidates with
personable characteristics. Thus, they voted for candidates who were not only good in
economics but who also appeared to care for the poor. Similarly, they chose candidates
who not only focused on improving delivery of social services related to health,
education and the environment but who also seemed to be nationalistic and approachable.
The relationship between politics and personality was by no means equal.
Because their standards of good governance rested mainly on the delivery of minimum
basic needs, and because there was not much that the political parties could deliver in
terms of clear ideologies and platforms anyway, the voters seemed not to have refined
their selection of candidates along ideological left-right/liberal-conservative lines. Thus,
it was enough for them to know that candidates would embody an issue such as caring for
the environment, regardless of other-level nuances in environmental protection.
In lieu of strong ideological identification, the voters looked for personal
characteristics in candidates. Thus, they placed a premium on intelligence,
trustworthiness, word of honor and dedication to service, on the premise that candidates
who possess these traits would better serve them.
To make sense of the media information about the candidates, the voters
discussed election-related topics with their immediate family, friends and co-workers.
These discussions were necessitated in part by the need to organize dissonant, unequal
and uncertain information coming from the media, as well as to enable the voters to
situate themselves in the greater voting populace. Filipino voters shared opinions about
candidates as a form of surveillance, which, in turn, reflected the strong sense of kinship
in Philippine communities. Correspondingly, in the same inherently polite and non-
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confrontational setting, voting preferences were considered a very personal issue and
overt efforts to dissuade a person from his choices were perceived to be ingredients for
chaos or confusion. Thus, discussions about election remained phatic in nature and were
designed neither to be influenced by nor to influence other people into voting specific
candidates.
An exception to this “laissez-faire” choice are the voters who are members of
religious sects noted for their block voting; these people vote according to a set list
released by their church officials. That they accept this block voting reflects their trust
not only in their leaders in particular but also in their religious community in general.
Apart from these usual considerations in choosing candidates, the events
preceding the 2001 national election – i.e., Estrada’s impeachment trial, People Power II
and People Power III – also figured significantly in some voters’ decision on whom to
vote. Among these voters, the decisive moment for making their choices came either a)
during Estrada’s impeachment trial, held four months before the elections or b) after
People Power II and People Power III, which found them having to decide whether to
support the administration (Arroyo) or the opposition (Estrada). These voters were fully
aware that the majority in the eventual Senate would help define the legitimacy of the
Arroyo government.
Undoubtedly, what boosted the significance of these events and made them
pivotal factors in the voters’ choices is that they were accorded live and full media
coverage. The coverage gave Filipinos the unique and unprecedented opportunity to look
intently at the workings of national politicians and enabled them to develop
characterizations of the prominent ones. When these politicians decided to run for one of
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the posts in the 2001 election, the voters rated them according to their performance in the
impeachment trial and/or the people power mobilizations.
While these events catapulted otherwise obscure local politicians to national
prominence and diminished the palatability of other prominent politicians, other
personalities were in the consciousness of the voters long before the trial or the
demonstrations. By being in the media or by being related to other media people, these
personalities were the object of the voters' consideration even before they officially ran
for the senate. In fact, the top winner in the elections was Noli de Castro, who, for more
than 20 years was the main anchor of the country's top primetime TV and radio news
programs. Two other winners, while perhaps good politicians in their own right, entered
the national consciousness by virtue of their marriage to two of the country’s long-time
top female movie celebrities.
Assessment of Media’s Influence
The voters, in general, did not think that the mass media, as one strong force,
influenced whom they eventually elected to the senate. Very few of the informants
admitted that whatever judgment they formed about a particular candidate’s politics and
personality were largely shaped by the information they got from the mass media.
Those who claimed that the media were not able to influence their choice of
candidates could be further divided into two groups, which, for lack of a better term,
could be labeled the ‘clueless’ and the ‘smug’. The clueless are those who explained that
the media were not able to influence them simply because it is not media’s role to
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influence people. One could very well say that these people are completely convinced
that the information the media give out is invariably neutral and objective.
The smug ones are those who claimed that they were able to ward off the media’s
obvious attempts to influence them. These voters claimed that the media’s analysis of
events or any obvious endorsements of certain individuals/parties did not sway them into
voting for particular candidates. They likewise said that campaign posters, endorsements,
advertisements and surveys had no use for them beyond serving as information sources.
However, these campaign tools, as the voters themselves noted, reinforced their previous
images of various candidates.
Whether clueless or smug, the voters claimed that the media’s contribution to
their decision-making was limited to the information they provided about issues and
events, and the exposure they gave to personalities. The information was then discussed
with people in their social networks, and based on the discussion and their personal
processing of the various information they have acquired, the voters formed images about
the candidates. Thus, information from media led to the association of particular images
with particular politicians; without the initial information from the media, there would
have been no image to form and to eventually reinforce.
The media-cultivated images, which were premised on the dual criteria of politics
and personality discussed earlier, had actually dominated the voters’ reckoning of the
candidates. The power of these images comes from the fact that the voters had no means
of verifying them except, again, through the media. Even the discussions between the
voters and their social networks are premised on these mediated images; in effect, these
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networks reinforce the power of second hand, mediated images by giving them a
semblance of having originated from the community.
Unbeknownst to the voters, the mass media did influence their choices – in a
manner so subtle as to escape their (the voters’) notice. It is quite disappointing that many
of the voters were not able to grasp the gradual, insidious way that the media had shaped
their perceptions about the election and its candidates. It is even more unfortunate that
some of them had smugly declared they were beyond media’s influence.
Synthesis and Conclusion
The analysis of the Philippine mass media’s role in the 2001 election reveals
interesting dimensions of the relationship between media and politics in the country.
Such relationship has a long and colorful history, and it is quite a challenge to decide
where to begin and how to articulate the ‘discourse’ about this relationship.
A possible starting point is to examine the brand of ‘neutrality’ that the media
have demonstrated in covering election issues, an approach that they have now adopted
when reporting about other political issues in the country. At the very least, one could
look at this practice as a manifestation of the media’s preoccupation with sensationalism,
which is in turn brought about by their desire to attract audiences and rake in revenues.
Yet, one could also not help thinking that this current practice is part of a long process of
‘soul searching’ and ‘healing’ that the media have been undergoing in the course of
discharging their sometimes-conflicting roles as watchdogs of society and partners in
nation-building and national development. It is as if the media are still reeling from the
trauma of having been used (wittingly or unwittingly) by Ferdinand Marcos to perpetuate
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his 14-year dictatorship. After having found the will and the voice to depose a dictator,
the media have vowed never to let such a thing happen again, or at least never to again be
a partner in such a complicity. This is a sentiment that the media share with the rest of the
country. And like the media, the whole Filipino nation is still trying to get back on its
feet, 17 years after the bloodless people power revolution toppled the Marcos regime.
Post-1986, the country started out with much hope for its future and much
expectation from the newly-installed president, Corazon Aquino. Many of the
expectations did not materialize, but the 1992 presidential election gave the people reason
to go on hoping. Fidel Ramos, former chief-of-staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and a key figure in People Power I, won the presidency. His military
background drew suspicions from such sectors as the left-wing groups, but the general
population was willing to give him a chance. But like Aquino, Ramos failed to give the
masses what they had hoped for the most: a tangible improvement in their day-to-day
existence. And so people turned to Joseph Estrada who, unlike Aquino and Ramos, was
perceived to be a populist politician. Events would soon reveal that there was little that
was populist about Estrada beyond the film hero image that endeared him to the masses.
This ‘populist’ president had to go, and once more, the country stakes its future on an
elitist president. With the failures of the past presidents clearly etched in their minds, it is
not surprising that the people now carry out an uneasy, guarded relationship with
President Arroyo.
The transformations in media’s political reporting over the last 17 years mirror the
various sentiments that the population has held for its presidents. The media were
generally ‘kind’ to Aquino, quite wary but still supportive of Ramos, initially indulgent
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but later on ruthless in their coverage of Estrada, and guarded in their dealings with
Arroyo. Further, the media – and the people – learned one more lesson from their
relationships with these presidents: it is that when people join forces, when people are
vigilant, it is possible to unseat even the most firmly entrenched dictatorship. Drawing
from this lesson, the media have opened up avenues for people’s more active
involvement in politics and government. Thus were born live TV debates with public
participation and phone-in radio commentaries on pressing socio-political issues
confronting the country. Thus were born ingenious uses of the short messaging service
(SMS), inspired by the power of ‘texting’9 in mobilizing citizens for People Power II.
Radio and TV stations now use this technology for opinion polling and for getting
information from ordinary citizens about the misdeeds of public servants. Thus was born,
too, the ‘heads-on’ reportage on controversial issues, regarded as an effective way to let
the ‘truth’ out. In short, whereas the people were previously deprived of the chance to air
their sentiments, now they are given so many opportunities to let their voices be heard.
But whose voices are being heard? Theoretically, these new developments are for
everyone – regardless of socio-economic status – to avail of. In reality, such is most
probably not the case, for two main reasons. First, these developments make use of
technologies (mobile phones, landline phones, TV/radio sets) that are not accessible to
everyone.
Second, they assume that all members of the population have equal motivation to
participate in the discussions; the reality is that some people are more motivated than the
others to give their opinions and feedback about socio-political issues and events. A
9 The Filipinos’ colloquial term for sending messages through SMS. Throughout the impeachment trial, SMS was widely used as a means of exchanging information and opinions about the latest developments in the trial. It is acknowledged that during the three days of People Power II, millions of text messages were sent and received, as a means of coordinating protest actions and of keeping up the morale of the protesters.
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cursory review of the radio and TV public affairs programs indicates, though, that
audience-participants come from the upper to the lower-middle class segments of the
population. In some programs, there is a good mix of participants from the various socio-
economic classes; in others, the participants are concentrated in one socio -economic
class.
Another important question that should be raised is if the people concerned give
equal or selective attention to those who have decided to participate in the discussions
about socio-political issues. Given the elite nature of Philippine political parties and the
commercial orientation of Philippine media, it is possible that non-elite, non-
‘newsworthy’ voices would be marginalized. Still another question that should be
addressed is how much leeway to give to these various voices. It is good for diverse
voices to be heard; however, as the present state of confusion among Filipinos indicate, it
is also sometimes counterproductive to be hearing so many voices speaking at the same
time.
Herein lies the challenge for the media, which have shown that they carry the
cataclysmic potential to effect sudden as well as insidious change in a community — be it
for the better or otherwise. This capacity has been witnessed at several critical stages of
the country’s political and social history, not the least of which were the three People
Power revolutions that collectively took place within less than a decade. At differing
levels, the media have been an acknowledged pivotal point in all three revolutions. From
the lessons of these revolutions, the media have seen it fit to play the advocate for various
voices – from above or below, left, right or center. But if the country is to heal, the media
should help the people find their way in the chaos of these voices, and help the nation
find that one voice that would move the narrative of nationhood away from conflict and
strife, towards unity and real democracy.
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Table 1. Topics and issues covered across all media types
MEDIA T YPE
Print Television Radio TOTAL T OPICS & ISSUES
f % f % f % f % ELECTION PROCESS 322 37.7 38 38.0 120 50.4 480 40.2
Election problems/ irregularities 111 19 66 196 40.8 Call for participation/clean and peaceful elections
86 0 2 88 18.3
Election preparations 70 11 29 110 22.9 Others 55 8 23 86 17.9 Candidates’ Profile 195 22.8 34 34.0 50 21.0 279 23.4 Involvement in criminal/ administrative cases or questionable activities
54 23 34 111 39.8
Candidates’ platform/program of action 23 4 4 31 11.1 Campaign sorties 40 0 1 41 14.7 Candidates’ qualifications 20 4 4 28 10.0 Others 58 3 7 68 24.4 Candidates and the Vote 128 15.0 24 24.0 46 19.3 198 16.6 Analysis of election outcomes 35 0 0 35 17.7 Predictions about election outcomes 28 4 1 33 16.7 Election tallies/results 28 19 29 76 38.4 Straw polls/exit polls about candidates 16 1 6 23 11.6 Others 21 0 10 31 15.7 Election Stakeholders 145 17.0 2 2.0 10 4.2 157 13.2 COMELEC’s performance 35 1 0 36 22.9 Role of teachers 35 0 6 41 26.1 Government/administration 1 1 0 2 1.3 Support of religious groups for specific candidates 8 0 4 12 7.6 Others 66 0 0 66 42.0 Elections and Social Issues 52 6.1 0 0.0 0 0.0 52 4.4 Impact of elections on business/economy 14 0 0 14 26.9 Impact of elections on specific groups 13 0 0 13 25.0 Post-election program for the govt. 14 0 0 14 26.9 Others 11 0 0 11 21.2 Other Topics 13 1.5 2 2.0 12 5.0 27 2.3
TOTAL 855 100.0 100 100.0 238 100.0 1193 100.0
ANNEX A Content Analysis Tables
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Table 2. Main actors across all media types (top seven actors specified)
MEDIA T YPE
Print Television Radio TOTAL T OPICS & ISSUES
f % f % f % f % No. of Media Materials w/ Main Actors 820* 126** 225*** No. of Main Actors 51 54 37
Commission on Elections 68 8.3 20 15.9 37 16.4 125 10.7 People Power Coalition (PPC) 36 4.4 8 6.3 11 4.9 55 4.7 Puwersa ng Masa (PnM) 32 3.9 6 4.8 11 4.9 49 4.2 Gregorio Honasan 30 3.6 17 13.5 21 9.3 68 5.8 Panfilo Lacson 24 2.9 15 11.9 12 5.3 51 4.4 Party List Groups 28 3.4 7 5.6 7 3.1 42 3.6 National Movement for Free Elections 26 3.2 12 9.5 15 6.7 53 4.5 Others 576 70.2 41 32.5 111 49.3 728 62.2 * 14 print articles had more than 1 main actor, while 49 articles did not have a main actor
** 30 TV segments had more than 1 main actor, while 4 segments did not have a main actor
*** 8 radio segments had more than 1 main actor, 21 segments did not have a main actor
Table 3. Main actors and slant for main actors across all media types
Media Type
Print Television Radio
Total Topics & Issues
+ ? - + ? - + ? - f % People Power Coalition (PPC) 17 16 3 1 4 3 0 10 1 55 4.7 Puwersa ng Masa (PnM) 9 11 12 0 3 3 1 10 0 49 4.2 Gregorio Honasan 5 14 11 5 6 6 1 20 0 68 5.8 Panfilo Lacson 8 9 7 6 5 4 2 9 1 51 4.4 Party List Groups 9 13 6 0 5 2 0 6 1 42 3.6 Commission on Elections 11 21 36 4 8 8 0 33 4 125 10.7 National Movement for Free Elections 11 9 6 3 5 4 1 14 0 53 4.5 Others 202 237 137 10 19 12 12 81 18 728 62.2
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Expressed Ideal of Politicians Independence in Decision-Making
POLITICIANS SHOULD… ?? not only ensure employment
for everyone; they should also be educated and fearless
?? espouse programs for education and the economy as well as be brave and nationalistic
?? I have friends in the
media but I am still not influenced by media
?? I still rely on my personal decision
?? TV, and radio news do not influence voters: it’s all a sham
?? I only watch but am not influenced
P E R S O N A L
Surveying the Respondents’ Social Networks
To inform… And not to influence…
?? We usually ask each other regarding who will vote just to be informed.
?? We discuss matters on election during meals, or anytime we could talk, to share opinions
?? I ask my children on whom they will vote for, but each of us has his own choices
?? I talk to my family and friends and they have their own pet politicians in the same way that I have mine
?? I only voice out my opinion but I do not debate with people because I am afraid of confrontation ?? I do not like to influence because I do not like to dictate ?? I do not like to be bothered with trying to engage others in a debate
Yet at times, to follow…
?? …we prefer to discuss it with the officials of the Iglesia ni Cristo
I N T E R P E R S O N A L _
G R O U P
Issues important to voters:
The Impeachment Trial The Two EDSAs
?? The economy ?? Education ?? Health ?? Environment
?? I made my choices based on the impeachment trial, which I followed religiously
?? The
impeachment trial, as covered on TV, was pivotal for my choices.
?? The events at EDSA II and III motivated me on whom to vote for the Senate
?? I was supposed to
vote for one candidate but changed my mind because of what happened in EDSA III
S O C I E T A L
Annex B Qualitative Trends from Key-Informant Interviews
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Traits important to voters: Professional Personal
?? Well-educated ?? Well-accomplished
?? Approachable ?? Helpful ?? Humane ?? Intelligent ?? Fearless ?? Nationalistic ?? Honest ?? Scrupulous ?? Has word of honor ?? Respectable ?? Loyal to service ?? Simple in his ways ?? Kind-hearted ?? Trustworthy
Media as Influential
Media exposure of personalities
Media exposure by osmosis
Media as (objective) sources of information
?? Noli de Castro's program showed him helping others… and serving as the voice of the people
?? I became an admirer of Noli de Castro because of his show.
?? Through media, we were informed about how Angara helped the elderly
?? I voted for Ralph Recto because his wife, Vilma Santos, is my idol
?? I voted for Francis Pangilinan because his wife, Sharon Cuneta, embodies good family values
?? The media help enlighten voters
?? The media help insofar as informing the voters about personalities
?? The media cover events where politicians help people
?? TV influences by reporting events
M A S S
M E D I A
Identification of Politicians and Issues
Identification of Politicians with Key Personality Traits
?? Loi Ejercito for medical missions
?? Juan Flavier for health ?? Noli de Castro as a voice
for the masses ?? Villar for housing
?? Juan Flavier is a simple man with a simple lifestyle
?? …Like Joker Arroyo, who is fearless
P E R S O N A L I T I E S
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References and Data Sources
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