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august 18, 2012 vol xlviI no 33 EPW Economic & Political Weekly22

Nikhil Raymond Puri (nikhilpuri@gmail.com) is a DPhil candidate at the University of Oxford, UK.

Towards a Typology of Madrasas in West Bengal

Nikhil Raymond Puri

West Bengal is seen as a success story in the reform and modernisation of madrasas. What is the real picture in terms of the attitudes of and practices in the reforming and reluctant madrasas? What drives some madrasas to engage with reform of the syllabus and why are some others opposed?

West Bengal is widely portrayed as a madrasa success story. Insofar as numerical indicators

go, the state has managed to attract a signifi cant number of madrasas to its modernisation scheme. As of 2011, its reformed-to-unreformed ratio was about 1:1.6 (601 reformed madrasas versus about 950 unreformed madrasas). The state can also boast of the extent to which its madrasas have been modern-ised. The 601 madrasas that benefi t from the state support lay a heavy emphasis on secular subjects, following more or less the same curriculum as secular gov-ernment schools. They also represent (through their student body) immense diversity of gender and religious affi lia-tion. About 65% of students in these ma-drasas are girls, and 13% are non-Muslims.1 Much of the state’s success has been attributed to the fi nancial incen-tives it makes available. In addition to state-sponsored teachers of secular sub-jects, madrasas partaking in West Bengal’s reform programmes are also given salaries for their religious teachers.

But before highlighting the successes of West Bengal’s madrasa project, it is necessary to take a closer look at the

state’s madrasa landscape. This article provides an elementary typology of ma-drasas in West Bengal, in turn, improv-ing the legibility of the state’s moderni-sation efforts.

Recognition-Seeking Madrasas

West Bengal’s madrasas fall into three major categories. The fi rst category consists of madrasas that are either un-opposed to, or actively in pursuit of, rec-ognition. Some madrasas model their curricula on that of the state’s recognised madrasas even before attaining recogni-tion. By engaging in such acts of self-imposed modernisation, these madrasas try to convince the state of their deter-mination, thereby hoping to expedite the recognition process.

The Majerhat Pirdanga Bakhtiari Faizi Jalali Senior Madrasa in North 24 Parga-nas is a case in point. Established in 1980, this madrasa has voluntarily mimicked the state-imposed madrasa curriculum since its founding.2 A look at the subse-quent evolution of the madrasa’s curri-culum thus gives an indication of the extent to which the state has reformed the curricula of the (senior) madrasas under its jurisdiction.3 Initially, the ma-drasa’s curriculum, like that of the state, gave more weight to religious subjects. In 1989, the curriculum was modifi ed, re-ducing the religious content, and intro-ducing secular subjects such as science and geography. The 1,000-mark syllabus contained 350 marks of language study (150 marks Arabic, 100 marks Bengali,

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and 100 marks English); 200 marks for the study of science (100 marks mathe-matics, 50 marks physical sciences and 50 marks life sciences); 50 marks for Islamic history; 50 marks for geography; and 350 marks devoted to the study of Islamic texts (100 marks Tafsir (Quranic commentary), 100 marks Hadith (pro-phetic traditions), 50 marks Fiqh (Islam-ic jurisprudence), 50 marks Usool (rul-ings on, and interpretation of, Islamic jurisprudence and prophetic traditions), and 50 marks Faraid (inheritance law).

In 1995, the syllabus was further diluted – in the case of this madrasa, vol-untarily. Hundred marks of the Islamic texts were eliminated, and history was increased to 100 marks with the inclu-sion of 50 marks for modern history. In 2005, the Arabic component of the cur-riculum was reduced from 150 to 100 marks, leaving the overall religious com-ponent of the curriculum at just 350 out of 1,000 marks, excluding 100 marks for Arabic. While this gradual (but drastic) dilution of the once religion-heavy cur-riculum presents a major disincentive for many madrasas to opt for recogni-tion, the Majerhat Pirdanga Bakhtiari Faizi Jalali Senior Madrasa voluntarily subjected itself to these changes in the hope of attaining recognition. This type of madrasa, which one may suitably call “recognition-seeking”, is not uncommon in West Bengal.

The process of acquiring recognition involves a number of steps subsequent to the formal request. Once an application is submitted, the state inspects the madrasa to make sure it meets a number of prerequisites. These include require-ments of syllabus, student strength, and infrastructure. But even when these minimum standards are met, the state is often slow in granting recognition. Accor ding to A K M Farhad, the recogni-tion process can at times be characte-rised by red tape and nepotism.4 Know-ing a politician or senior bureaucrat signifi cantly brightens one’s prospects. Conversely, not having such connections could mean rejection in perpetuity. Thus, infrastructural inadequacies combined with ineffi ciency (on the part of the state) have often kept willing madrasas from obtaining recognition. But unappealing

policies on the part of the state have also served to reduce the demand for recog-nition amongst recognition-seekers.

Until 1997, the recognition process was quite straightforward. Recognition, once successfully obtained, led to imme-diate monetary rewards – initially in the form of modest fi nancial support for the madrasa as a whole, and later, by way of salaries for its teachers. In 1997, however, the West Bengal state legislative assembly passed a bill whereby the teachers of a recognised madrasa became the respon-sibility of the state. A service commis-sion was established to appoint teachers to madrasas through a centralised system. One reason why the Majerhat Pirdanga Bakhtiari Faizi Jalali Senior Madrasa is a senior one only in name is that the madrasa’s teachers fear being replaced by government-appointed substitutes. As Soharab Hossain, president of the West Bengal Board of Madrasah Education, explains, “an attempt is underway to make an additional 200 madrasas in West Bengal recognised. These madrasas are willing to accept the recognised curri-culum but are not willing to let the Madrasah Service Commission choose their teachers”.5 Thus, the West Bengal School Service Commission Act of 1997 presents a critical juncture in the state’s madrasa reform efforts. Prior to its enact-ment, recognition-seeking madrasas were kept from obtaining recognition only by their own infrastructural shortcomings or the ineptitude of state offi cials. After 1997, however, madrasas formerly keen on accepting recognition were forced to recalibrate their position. Owing to the drastic shift in the nature (in qualitative terms) of support offered by the state, only one (senior) madrasa in West Bengal accepted recognition in the post-1997 period.

The unwillingness of (earlier recogni-tion-ready) madrasas to accept recognition after 1997 stems from the increasingly aggressive and intrusive nature of the state’s efforts. Iman Ali, headmaster of the Aminpur Khwaja Moinuddin Chishti Senior Madrasa, has strong views on this matter: “Many private madrasas are co-ed and follow the state-imposed syllabus”, says Ali, “but they still fail to get approval for recognition”. The reason

for this refusal, Ali believes, is the govern-ment’s “allergy to senior madrasas”. Given the relatively signifi cant (depending on one’s vantage point) theological compo-nent of the senior madrasas, “the govern-ment is much more willing to accept high madrasas”, where religion is present only in the highly reduced form of “Introduction to Islam”.6

‘Opposed Madrasas’

The second category of madrasas in West Bengal consists of those elements that are fundamentally opposed to rec-ognition, and can reasonably be called “opposed madrasas”. These khariji ma-drasas derive their very identity from the quality of existing and functioning outside the realm of government recog-nition. Mostly Deobandi, they are defi ned by a common ideology which precludes the possibility of accepting money from the state. But even within this category of madrasas, there exist different shades of opinion. Some opposed madrasas are willing to accept certain benefi ts deriv-ing from recognition (such as the state’s acknowledgement of the legitimacy of a madrasa’s degree) without accepting recognition per se. Others are unwilling to display any thappa (stamp) that bears the state’s authority.

The Jamia Milia Madinatul Uloom in Bardhaman belongs to the fi rst type. Qazi Mohammad Yasin believes that “khariji madrasas are to be defi ned, not by their curricula (more or less theology), but by their determination to remain outside the boundaries of the govern-ment”.7 While this position ostensibly places Yasin amongst those wanting nothing to do with the state, he is more fl exible. Though Yasin holds that “khariji madrasas are not allowed (as a matter of principle) to accept money from the state”, he has actively sought state support of a different kind. Given its khariji status, students at Yasin’s madrasa do not receive degrees that are recognised by mainstream universities. Government madrasas, on the other hand, offer degrees that are considered equivalent to those of government-run secular schools, ena-bling their students to partake in higher education. In the hypothetical scenario where the state grants Yasin’s syllabus

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equivalence (to that of a mainstream school) without any semblance of “sup-port”, Yasin is likely to accept unhesitat-ingly. Yasin’s opposition thus rests on a double standard. He entertains the pros-pect of extracting specifi c state-derived benefi ts, while simultaneously priding himself on his determination to function independently of the state.

Another group of opposed madrasas, however, derives pride from remaining completely untainted by the state’s gaze. For them, any state support, be it fi nancial or otherwise, is completely unacceptable. Quari Fazlur Rahman of the Darul Quran Madrasa Azmatia represents this type of opposed madrasa. The thought of seek-ing recognition has neither occurred to Rahman in the past, nor is it likely to cross his mind in the future. With great pride he announces his position: “We do not leave the (khariji) boundary within which we have been operating. It has been this way for a hundred years”.8 Faqrul Islam Qasmi of the Jamia Qasim Ul Uloom is also resolutely opposed to recognition by the state. Qasmi conveys his position quite simply: “The path towards recognition is unknown to me. All I know is this (the khariji way)”.9 What do the attitudes exhibited by the opposed madrasa portend for the state’s efforts at modernisation? The group, exemplifi ed by Quari Fazlur Rahman and Faqrul Is-lam Qasmi, shows no signs of willingness to change. This madrasa is unlikely to move in any domain, instead represent-ing the “uncompro mising opposition”,

the end of the recognition continuum. The fi rst type of opposed madrasa shows more selecti vity. Though fi rm in its opposition to recognition, this madrasa does acknow ledge certain do-mains in which its opposition to state support may be relaxed. Selectively-op-posed madrasas thus exhibit rigid oppo-sition in some areas, and fl exibility in others. Both types of oppo sed madrasa, however, fi rmly oppose the acceptance of recognition.

Fence-Sitting Madrasas

The third category of madrasas in West Bengal is that of the “fence-sitters”. As the name suggests, “fence-sitters” con-sist of indecisive elements that remain on the fence because they could use the money (state support), but are unwilling to invite certain consequences associat-ed with recognition (such as the dilution of their syllabi). This group of madrasas exhibits a willingness to become sarkari subject to certain conditions, and may jump to the recognised side of the fence as and when the state alters the terms of its engagement. These schools teach pri-marily deeni (religious) subjects and do not give much weight to secular subjects like mathematics, English and science. It is important to recognise that most schools in this category would rather ap-proach a Muslim-run non-governmental organisation (NGO) or other source of funding before approaching the state (if the necessity should arise). While these “fence-sitters” are legitimately khariji in

that they oppose the state’s support, they differ from opposed madrasas in one very important respect. Opposed madrasas derive part of their identity from their autonomy vis-à-vis the state. Fence-sitters, on the other hand, are only opposed to certain specifi c terms of the recognition package. As these terms change, so may the intensity of their opposition. Their willingness to accept state support depends on both the quantitative (magni-tude of economic incentives) and qualita-tive (degree of interference by the state) nature of this support.

A K Abdul Khaleque of the Al-Jamia-tul Faruqiyah Azharul Uloom in Bardha-man is a fence-sitter. He has a clear sense of the advantages accompanying recognition, and would readily trade his current salary of Rs 3,000 per month for a government salary of Rs 18,000 per month. Before doing so, however, he wants an assurance that his accept-ance of state support will not lead to the dilution of his syllabus. “We want the benefi ts of recognition”, says Khaleque, “but not by selling our beliefs”.10 Mohammad Shahidul Qadri of the Madrasa Hussainiya Ghausiya is also discerning of what lies across the fence. Like Khaleque, he is willing to cross the fence if it means he can enjoy fi nancial support without having to endure interference. “If the madrasa modernisation programme in West Bengal functioned more as it does in other states,” says Qadri, “I would be inclined to accept recognition”.11

REVIEW OF URBAN AFFAIRSJuly 28, 2012

Making Ends Meet: Youth Enterprise at the Rural-Urban Intersections – Stephen Young, Craig Jeffrey

Subaltern Urbanisation in India – Eric Denis, Partha Mukhopadhyay, Marie-Hélène Zérah

Rejuvenating India’s Small Towns – Kalpana Sharma

The ‘North-East’ Map of Delhi – Duncan McDuie-Ra

Protesting Publics in Indian Cities: The 2006 Sealing Drive and Delhi’s Traders – Diya Mehra

Enumerating the Semi-Visible: The Politics of Regularising Delhi’s Unauthorised Colonies – Anna Zimmer

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Locating the Dividing Line

In order to establish the dividing line between khariji and sarkari madrasas, it is necessary to locate the fence on which the fence-sitters are perched. This can be done by determining the common denominator defi ning all madrasas that refuse recognition. As is evident from the preceding discussion, the opposition of khariji madrasas to recognition is driven by a number of factors, each of which seems suffi cient (but not neces-sary). Some heads of madrasas are un-willing to affi liate with a curriculum that runs counter to their imaan (beliefs), others are additionally hesitant to re-ceive money from the state, and yet oth-ers are unwilling to bear the stamp of the state on their sleeve. But at any given time, only one such concern is shared by all khariji madrasas (since those madra-sas that do not share this concern are ex-pected to cross the fence and accept rec-ognition). This common concern defi nes the fence. Though this fence may be characterised by periods of relative stasis, it is equally capable of movement in response to changes in the terms of the state’s support. For most of West Bengal’s history in madrasa modernisation, the fence has moved gently as the conse-quences of accepting recognition evolved (in consonance with the gradual dilution of the senior madrasas’ religious curric-ulum). The critical juncture presented in 1997, on the other hand, induced a more noticeable shift in the fence. The increased intrusiveness of the state in 1997 led to a displacement of the common concern (amongst khariji madrasas) from “dilution of the syllabus” to “a loss of say in teacher selec-tion”. This displace-ment was in turn ac-companied by a left-ward shift of the fence (with respect to its position in the fi gure).

Conclusions

To summarise, the madrasa landscape in West Bengal looks very much like the one depicted in the fi gure. Recognition-seeking madrasas constitute one end of the spectrum. Voluntarily diluting their curricula to mirror that of the state,

these madrasas present ideal candidates for recognition. Many, though not all, of West Bengal’s 601 recognised madrasas correspond to this type. The remaining recognised madrasas would qualify as fence-sitters today, but applied for state support at a time when recognition had a very different meaning. Such situations where recognition-seekers by yesterday’s standards become “would be” fence-sitters by today’s standards suggest that often times a madrasa’s concerns are shaped by events following the recognition deci-sion. In the 1970s, for instance, the gov-ernment supported madrasas without modifying the contents of their syllabi. Naturally, “dilution of the syllabus” was a concern unknown to many madrasas that accepted recognition at the time.12

Amongst those madrasas that are op-posed to recognition, the uncompromis-ingly-opposed madrasas represent the other extreme of the madrasa landscape. They thrive on their khariji status and resist every opportunity to partake in state-initiated modernisation. The other species in the opposed category is the selectively-opposed madrasa. It shows no willingness to accept recognition per se, but is still open to the possibility of obtaining specifi c benefi ts accom-panying recognition. The differences be-tween the fence-sitter and the selectively-opposed madrasa, though subtle, are important. The fence-sitter is open to the prospect of accepting recognition, but momentarily exhibits discontent with its details. The selectively-opposed madrasa, on the other hand, is blind to the option of recognition. It may seek

benefi ts that form part of the state’s rec-ognition package, but it does so uphold-ing its “independent” status and avoid-ing the “un desirable” prefi x – “sarkari”. The fence-sitter’s position is: “I would ac-cept recognition if so and so conditions were satisfi ed”. The selectively-opposed madrasa sees less need for exchange: “I defi nitely will not accept recognition, but the state ought to provide such

and such regardless – as a right rather than a reward”.13

While opposing madrasas are charac-terised by immobility, there is more movement between the other two types of madrasas – fence-sitters and recognition-seekers. This movement depends on the position of the fence. A leftward shift of the fence (signifying an increasingly intrusive recognition package) will likely cause more recognition-seekers to join the club of fence-sitters. Similarly, a rightward shift of the fence (repre-senting more amenable terms of sup-port) will prompt many fence-sitters to accept recognition.

The state needs to appreciate this con-text and position the fence accordingly. Any respectable standard of “success” demands that the modernisation scheme is able to absorb willing entrants while simultaneously attracting at least some madrasas that are not already modern.

Notes

1 Soharab Hossain (president, West Bengal Board of Madrasah Education, Kolkata), interviewed by author on 20 July 2009.

2 Hossain Mohammad Ebrahim Laskar and Mohammad Khabir Hossain (teachers, Majerhat Pirdanga Bakhtiari Faizi Jalali Senior Madrasa, North 24 Parganas), interviewed by author, on 1 October 2009.

3 West Bengal’s reformed madrasas can be classi-fi ed under three categories according to grade level and religious character: junior high, high and senior madrasas. Amongst these, senior madrasas are most committed (in terms of cur-riculum content) to religious instruction.

4 A K M Farhad (teacher, Ghutiarisharif SSGMNS Senior Madrasa, South 24 Parganas), inter-viewed by author, 27 August 2009.

5 Interviewed by author, 20 July 2009. 6 Iman Ali (headmaster, Aminpur Khwaja

Moinuddin Chishti Senior Madrasa, North 24 Parganas), interviewed by author, 1 October 2009.

7 Interviewed by author, 18 August 2009. 8 Interviewed by author, 3 October 2009. 9 Interviewed by author, 30 September 2009. 10 A K Abdul Khaleque (headmaster, Al-Jamiatul

Faruqiyah Azharul Uloom, Bardhaman), inter-viewed by author, 18 August 2009.

11 Interviewed by author, 17 August. 12 The same cannot be said of the Service Com-

mission legislation passed in 1997 (which gives the state control over teacher appointment in the madrasa) since it only applies to madrasas accepting recognition after its enactment.

13 Individuals running madrasas of the selectively-opposed type hold the view that the state should provide them certain benefi ts uncondi-tionally. For instance, Qazi Mohammad Yasin suggests that acceptance of his madrasa’s de-gree (by universities) should not be contingent on his acceptance of recognition. Rather, he considers this “benefi t” a baseline provision for which all educational institutions (whether governmental or private, religious or secular) should qualify.

Figure: Classification of Madrasas in West Bengal

1: Recognition-seekers 3: Fence-sitters 2b: Uncompromisingly opposed

The fence

Recognised Madrasas Khariji Madrasas 2a: Selectively opposed