Towards Lasting Peace and Stability

Lessons Learned in Iraq and Afghanistan

UN and GCTF Good Practices for

Rehabilitation and Reintegrtation of Violent Extremist Offenders

Presented by

Dr. D.M. Stone, MajGen USMC (Ret)

Detention: Viewed as a Problem

Historic failures in custody and care serve as recruiting tools for foreign fighters.

Detention had also served as a place for insurgents to conduct recruiting, training, and disciplining of future combatants.

Defining Strategic Success

VICTORY• Establish an alliance with

moderate Iraqis

• Empower them to effectively marginalize violent extremists

• Provide momentum to the process of reconciliation with Iraqi society

•Phase I: Apply COIN principles to TIF, separate extremists from population, and protect populations both inside and outside the TIF

•Phase II: Defeat the insurgency within the TIF, succeed in the battlefield of the mind, and identify ideas which are contagious

•Phase III: Engaging populations with detainees, families, and releasees and establish a “social epidemic” which advances the objective of empowering the moderate ummah to marginalize the violent extremists within Iraq

The Plan

TF-134 Goals

• Ensure standards of care and custody

• Determine if detainee is Imperative Security Risk

- if so, reduce the risk, replace the destructive ideology

- when no longer a threat, release

• Identify detainees who are Enduring Security Risks

• Collect information from detainees and provide intelligence

• Defeat any insurgency within the TIF

CRRBCapture MAG CELL &

Release Detention

Previous Detention Process (before July 2007)

GO ReviewUNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

Govt of Iraq Reintegration & Reconciliation

MNFRC & C2X/Corps Vetting

EducationCivics & Islamic Discussions

VOTECH & Work Programs

Family Advocacy

Pledge & Guarantor Post-ReleaseRelease

MAG CELL & CCCI Assessment & Transition In

MNFRC RehearingC2X/Corps Vetting

Capture

Current Engagement Process

Interrogation

AFTER

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

The Powder Keg Exploding,Jihadist University

2004-2007Poor Intelligence

Inability to Segregate Extremists

Inadequate Command and Control

In 2007 there were a total of SIX detainee murders and up to 25 severe mutilations.

In 2008 there have been zero detainee murders and zero mutilations.

No Services

BEFORE

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

Empowering moderates through:

Intelligence

AFTER

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

Segregating Violent Extremists

Reconciliation Services

Proper Command and Control

* T

IFR

C S

ER

VIC

ES

BE

GIN

AR

RIV

AL

OF

16

TH M

P B

DE

DE

PA

RT

UR

E O

F 1

6TH M

P B

DE

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

JAN07

FEB07

MAR07

APR07

MAY07

JUN07

JULY07

AUG07

SEP07

OCT07

NOV07

DEC07

JAN08

FEB08

MAR08

APR08

Disturbance/Riot Escape Murder Tunnels

TF Bucca Force Reduction Impacts

* TIFRC Services did not start until Sep 07

Surge

AFTERBEFORE

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

TIF Weekly Re-internments 2004-2008

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

401

7-2

3 O

ct 0

4

12

-18

De

c 0

4

6-1

2 F

eb

05

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r 0

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29

Ma

y -

4 J

un

05

24

-30

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l 0

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18

-24

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p 0

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-19

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an

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ar

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6 M

ay 0

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25

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n -

1 J

ul 0

6

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-26

Au

g 0

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-21

Oct 0

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-16

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c 0

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eb

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r 0

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ay 0

8

2004

26 Week Moving Avg.

2005 2006 2007 2008

Pledge Start MNFRC StartReintegration Services Start

AFTERBEFORE

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE

PV2 Byron Fouty

CACHE LOCATIONS

SAFE HOUSES

PENDING ATTACKS

MEETING PLACES

INTEL SUPPORT TO MISCAP

SOURCE OPNS

OVER 1000 INTERROGATIONS

TRIBAL ENGAGEMENT

INSURGENT AND TERRORIST TTPsCELLORGANIZATION

IDENTIFY INSURGENT LEADERS

IED EFFORTS WITH JIEDDO, CEXC, AND NGIC

WEAPON SMUGGLING ROUTES

UTILIZE LEGAL SYSTEM

INTEL SUPPORT TO SONS OF IRAQIDENTIFY SONS OF IRAQ INFILTRATORS

IDENTIFY RECONCILIATION CANDIDATES

AQI PERCEPTION OF SOI

ASSESS SONS OF IRAQ EFFECTIVENESS

IP CDR

ABUNUR

5XIIRsNINEWA

DEVELOP TARGETS

JIDC

4XEFP IIRs

RECOVERED

TIF Release & Re-Internment2004 2004-2005 2004-2006 2004-2007 2004-2008

Cumulative Releases 10350 20412 34368 43319 49632Cumulative Re-Internments 37 571 1606 2847 3145Cumulative Re-Internment Rate 0.36% 2.80% 4.67% 6.57% 6.34%

7 Sept-31 Dec 07 7 Sep 07-17 May 08Cumulative MNFRC Releases 3743 8546Cumulative MNFRC Re-Internments 6 28Post MNFRC Re-Internment Rate 0.16% 0.33%

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

3500

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Cumulative Re-Internment

AFTER

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

Detainees

Special Populations

- Youth

- Women

- Mentally challenged

- Foreign Fighters

- Enduring Threats

COIN Operations

Engagement Programs

- Civics

- Education

- Votech

- Jobs

- Religious Discussion

MNFRC

MEDIAGoI Partnerships

Western

Pan-Arab

Iraqi

INGOsICRC

Amnesty International

UN

Executive

Ministries

Legislature

MOJ MOE

MOHR

President

Vice Presidents

Prime Minister

Social/Cultural Outreach

Families

Tribes/Clans

Sheiks/Leaders

USG

& MNF-I

MNC-IUSM-I

CALL

OSD

“Bernie’s” Timeline (ISN 168058— al Shayie)

Dec 2004 – Failed VBIED attack on Jordanian Embassy31 July 05 – Turned over to Saudi ArabiaMar 2008 – Bernie meets the DCG-DO in Saudi Arabia

Sunday, 18 September 2005

Strategic Releases: Capitalize on external Arab IO capabilities using Foreign Fighter detainees willing to publicly speak against Jihad

Strategic Releases

There is inadequate prison bed space in which to house current and projected inmate populations.

CJIATF-435 MajGen Stone UNCLASSIFIED / FOUO 17

Battlefield of the Mind

Moderates

GOI and CoalitionExtremists

United Nations Best Practices

• Defining Goals and Objectives• Prison Context• The Role of Different Actors• Reintegration Components• Looking to Other Relevant Fields

Defining Goals and Objectives

• #1 In developing a rehabilitation program, it is important to first clearly define the program’s goals and objectives and identify indicators of success and failure.

• #2. Good prison standards and practices can offer an appropriate starting point for building an effective, safe and smoothly operating rehabilitation program.

CJIATF-435 MajGen Stone UNCLASSIFIED / FOUO 21

In Coalition and GIRoA detention/corrections, there is a lack of a validated inmate classification system to identify prisoners by category, risk and radicalization.

• #3. An importanat first step is developing an effective intake, assessment and classification system for new inmates.

• #4. Where possible, States should consider establishing separate facilities for those inmates going through the rehabilitation programs.

• #5. Ensure that all relevant staff are appropriately and professionally trained and educated to deal with the complexities of reintegration or rehabilitation efforts.

UNCLASSIFIED / FOUO 23

“Radicalization”

Afghan Prisons U.S. DetentionAfghan Criminals

Radical Islamists

CJIATF-435 MajGen Stone

The Role of Different Actors

• #6. Some measure of control should be maintained over the inmates’ communication, both within and outside the prison.

• #7. Rehabilitation Programs should incorporate a broad range of cross-disciplinary experts, with close coordination among the relevant departments and personnel involved.

• #8. Psychologists can play a key role in the rehabilitation process and should be fully integrated into these programs.

The Next

Attack

Just One Cell Phone Call Away . . .Serena Hotel

Attack

CPD HeadquartersBombing

Pol-i-Charki Wing 3Take Down

Bombs

KidnappingsAssassinations

CPD Action

Insurgent Retaliation

• #9. As the personnel in most frequent contact with the inmates, it is important that prison officers understand and are carefully attuned to the rehabilitation process, even if they are not directly responsible for its delivery.

• #10. When appropriate, States should integrate religious scholars into the rehabilitation process.

• #11. Law enforcement officers who are interviewing inmates during the rehabilitation process should receive specialized training and should coordinate these activities closely with the rehabilitation professionals.

• #12. Victims and victim’s advocates can be powerful voices and States should consider including them in rehabilitation programs, where appropriate.

• #13. Former violent extremists can be influential with those going through the rehabilitation process and should be included where possible and appropriate.

• #14. Charismatic members of the community can also help inspire change and should be included in rehabilitation programs where possible and appropriate.

Reintegration Components

• #15. Rehabilitation efforts should include behavioral and cognitive skills programs.

• #16. Rehabilitation programs should include basic education courses where possible and appropriate.

• #17. Rehabilitation programs should include vocational skills training and employment assistance where possible and appropriate.

• #18. States should consider finding ways to recognize the achievement of inmates who have completed the rehabilitation program.

• #19. States should consider whether inmates should be eligible for sentence reduction or other more lenient treatment based on the completion of rehabilitation courses.

• #20. States should consider whether additional financial support can be provided to inmates and their families who have completed the rehabilitation courses.

• #21. States should consider developing aftercare programs to enable the treatment to continue after the inmate has left the prison setting.

• #22. Consideration for protective measures should be given when there is evidence that a reformed terrorist may face threats to his or her life, or the lives of family members, upon release from custody.

• #23. Formal or informal, parole-like monitoring post release can be an effective method to prevent recidivism.

• # 24. Families should be integrated where possible and appropriate into rehabilitation programs.

• #25. Fostering a welcoming community environment for the inmate post-release is critical to long-term success.

Other Relevant Fields.

#26. As States design rehabilitation programs, they should look, as appropriate, to other relevant fields beyond terrorism for lessons learned.

33

Success Dependencies

Isolate insurgent

forces from

external support

Political Will

War Strategy

Police Training

Agriculture

Reconstruction/PRT

Rule of Law

Corrections

CJIATF-435 MajGen Stone UNCLASSIFIED / FOUO

Kuwait City

Hamadan

Ahvaz

Dezful

Tigris R.

Euphrates R.

IRANIRAN

H3

22

6

Baghdad

1

KUWAITKUWAIT

JORDANJORDAN

H4

Tallil

2

5

12

1

10

1

Mosul Irbil

An Najaf

Kirkuk

Al Kut

Al Amarah

Ar Ramadi

Ar’ar

As Samawah

Umm Qasr

An Nasiriyah

Al Basrah

Baqubah

Ar Rutbah

Dayr az Zawr

Rafha

Karbala

Sulaymaniyah

Al Qaim

Bashur

Al Hillah

Samarra

Fallujah

Al Kufa

Dahuk

Az Zubayr

Safwan

Tall Afar

Ad Diwaniyah

KarbalaKarbala

Al Muthanna’Al Muthanna’

Al BasrahAl Basrah

Dhi QarDhi Qar MaysanMaysan

WasitWasitBabilBabil

Al QadisiyahAl Qadisiyah

Al AnbarAl Anbar

DiyalaDiyala

Salah ad DinSalah ad Din

NinawaNinawa

At TamimAt TamimAs SulaymaniyahAs Sulaymaniyah

ArbilArbil

DahukDahuk

An NajafAn Najaf

9

SYRIASYRIA

SAUDIARABIASAUDIARABIA

LSA ANACONDALSA ANACONDA

FLB SYCAMOREFLB SYCAMORE

FLB JOSHUAFLB JOSHUA

FLB CEDARFLB CEDAR

4

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

PL ALPHAPL BRAVO

OBJ CHARLIE

BATTLEFIELD

of the MIND