To#what#extend#can#Realism#and#Constructivism#explain# ...englishinsideout.com/WordPress/wp-content/uploads/2015/...Foreign Policy Analysis in Comparative Perspective 107-206 3 Introduction#

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To#what# extend# can# Realism# and# Constructivism# explain# the# foreign#

policy#of#the#United#States#of#America#in#the#United#Nations#Security#

Council?#

Name: George Mullens

Supervisor: Kai Oppermann

Course: Law with Politics

Date: 7th May 2015

Foreign Policy Analysis in Comparative Perspective

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Abstract#

The author will be analysing the impact of US foreign policy on the Security Council in the

cases of the Rwandan Genocide, Libyan and Syrian civil wars. The author argues that both a

constructivist and realist perspective can be useful in explaining the reasons why intervention

was or was not the chosen policy for the United States. This work focuses particularly on how

cooperation can arise in an anarchic world from a realist perspective whilst also focusing on

how norms emerge from a constructivist view in terms of justifications for humanitarian

interventions. While norms such as responsibility to protect are important in the logic of

intervening, the author argues that material interests outweigh the use of norms in situations in

which the benefits of intervening do not outweigh the costs. When there is a convergence of

these two factors in that norms align with the interests at stake then humanitarian intervention

can occur.

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Foreign Policy Analysis in Comparative Perspective! !!

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Contents Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 3 Realism ...................................................................................................................................... 4 Constructivism ........................................................................................................................... 6 Rwandan Genocide .................................................................................................................. 11 Libyan Civil War ..................................................................................................................... 17 Syrian Civil War ...................................................................................................................... 21 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 25 Bibliography ............................................................................................................................ 27 !


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Introduction#

For the purposes of this dissertation we will analyse a realist and constructivist perspective in

order to explain the foreign policy of the United States in the United Nations Security Council.

We are using realism because, the United States as the hegemon of the international system, is

the most powerful and its actions are central to everything that the Security Council does –

indeed without the support of the Untied States, the United Nations is severely hindered by

what it can and cannot do as demonstrated by our three case studies. Constructivism on the will

be useful in analysing the impact of norms with regard to humanitarian interventions.

The cases of Rwanda, Libya and Syria were chosen because of their importance in the debate

concerning humanitarian interventions. Rwanda brought to light the importance of

humanitarian interventions and brought the norm of responsibility to protect to the international

limelight. Libya was considered to be the first occasion in the international community invoked

responsibility to protect. Syria is an occasion where humanitarian intervention was arguably

necessary, yet didn’t occur. By looking at a realist and constructivist perspective we will be

able to understand why cooperation occurred and why it failed to materialise. By analysing

these cases we will be able to see that US foreign policy in the Security Council has changed

over time from Clinton to Obama. This dissertation will argue that a constructivist perspective

is more helpful in explaining the situations in which cooperation did occur whilst also

explaining a change in identity in US foreign policy in accepting emerging norms, yet a realist

perspective is better for the analysis of why states choose not to cooperate as material interests

are of more importance.

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Realism#

Realism has been one of the most prevalent schools of thinking within foreign policy analysis.

In order to comprehend US foreign policy, it is necessary to have an understanding of realism,

and in particular, neoclassical realism. For most realists, power is the starting point by which

states determine their foreign policy. The more powerful a state, the more it will seek to affect

international relations via its foreign policy. Realism starts off with five key assumptions with

how the world works.

The first assumption is states interact in an anarchic environment1, without the protection from

a superior authority. The second assumption is that “states are self-regarding”2 and that the

international system works in a self-help system in which states “look out for their own security

and well-being, they cannot rely on others to ensure their vital interests, nor are they likely to

equate their own security and well-being with that of others”3. Wohlforth states that egoism

based on self-interest drives the behaviour of political actors; it is “rooted in human nature”4.

The third assumption is that the central goal for states is survival, as John Mearshimer puts it:

“the most basic motive driving states is survival”5; a view also maintained by Elman as “threat

to survival is the main problem generated by the system”6. The fourth assumption is that the

primary actors in the international system are states7. Realists, in particular structural realists

such as Mearshimer, black-box the state to say “they are assumed to be alike, save for the fact

that some states are more or less powerful than others.”8 Wohlforth reaffirms that states are

the most important group in the international system, whilst recognising that other actors exist9.

This is one of the manifestations of groupism in which humans are formed of and are part of

groups – humans need cohesion provided by groups. Cohesion leads to conflict between groups

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!1 Rose, G. (1988) “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy”, World Politics, Vol.51(1), p.149 2 Elman, C. (1996) “Horses for Courses: Why Not Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy?”, Security Studies, Vol.6(1), p.19 3 ibid 4 Wohlforth, W. (2012) “Realism and foreign policy” in Smith, S. Hadfield, A. & Dunne, T. “Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases”, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.36 5 Mearsheimer, J. (1994) “The False Promise of International Institutions”, International Security, Vol.19(3), p.7 6 Supra, n.2 7 Waltz, K. (1979) “Theory of International Politics”, Boston: McGraw-Hill, p.94-95 8 Mearsheimer, J. (2013) “Structural Realism” in Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith “International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity”, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.77 9 ibid


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as some grow in power and material resources and others fall10. The final assumption is that

states will select policies and strategies which “the expected gain is likely to exceed the

expected loss”11. Neorealism assumes that states will attempt to make rational choices based

on the assessment of their strategic situation and external environment12.

Hegemonic stability theory is a sub-theory of realism whose main theorist is Robert Gilpin; as

the US is the main hegemon in the international system we will briefly discuss it here. The

basic premise of this theory is that powerful states will seek to have dominance over all aspects

of the international system, fostering a hierarchy within the anarchic international system13.

This theory seeks to explain how cooperation “can emerge among major powers and how

international orders, comprising rules, norms and institutions, emerge and are sustained”14.

Cooperation in an anarchic system is relevant for discussing the United Nations Security

Council: under which conditions will cooperation arise? And under what conditions will

cooperation fail to materialise? Waltz maintains that the structure of the international politics

limits cooperation in two manners. Firstly, in a self-help system “each of the units spends a

portion of its effort, not in forwarding its own good, but in providing the means of protecting

itself against others”15. This essentially means that when there is the possibility of cooperating

with another state for a mutual gain, states will feel insecure and “must ask how the gain will

be divided” 16 and will ask who will gain more from cooperating. If the potential gain is

disproportionate, then it may result in a disproportionate gain, allowing a policy which could

destroy or damange the other cooperating state, thus rendering cooperation unlikely. The

prospect of large gains will not necessarily allow cooperation between two parties, so long as

there are fears about how the other state will use its increased capabilities. As Waltz states,

“the condition of insecurity – at the least, the uncertainty of each about the other’s future

intentions and actions works against their cooperation”17. Cooperation can be limited under a

neorealist perspective by saying that in self-help systems, actors will worry about their survival,

and this worry about survival will affect their behaviour. All actors want to maximise profit,

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!10 OpCit, n.4 11 OpCit, n.2, p.20 12 ibid 13 Gilpin, R. (1988) “The Theory of Hegemonic War”, The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 18(4) 591 14 OpCit, n.4, p.41 15 OpCit, n.7, p.105 16 ibid, p.105 17 ibid, p.105

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however their profits cannot be maximised if they cannot survive as “to maximise profits

tomorrow as well as today, firms first have to survive.”18 This implies that states need a

compromise between security and maximising their profits: nations are more concerned with

their relative strength rather than an absolute advantage in comparison with other states.

Cooperation is limited in a second way by the state worrying “about a division of possible gains

that may favour others more than itself”19. This is the first way in which the structure of the

international system limits cooperation rather than the actions of the state itself. A state will

worry if it is dependant on cooperation and exchanges of goods and services. Waltz argues that

the more specialized a state is, the more it will rely on imports and exports from others20, the

world would benefit if all states specialised. Specialisation doesn’t occur because states would

place themselves in a position where there is close interdependence and state survival might be

at stake. Closely interdependent states will worry about their security because states seek to

control “what they depend on or to lessen the extent of their dependency”21. With an absence

of security in anarchy, the incentive of each actor is to ensure security for itself as no other

state, organization or structure can be counted on to do so. Rather than increasing the well

being of their populace, the reward for spending on security is the maintenance of the autonomy

of the state.

For the purposes of analysis when discussing realism for each of the case studies we will be

looking at whether cooperation is possible and under which conditions cooperation would

occur, whether the United States is the hegemon of the system and what are the incentives or

disincentives to cooperating in the scenario.

Constructivism#

Constructivism is another theory, whose main exponent is Alexander Wendt. Unlike realism,

constructivism seeks to explain the world as a conception of human thinking or social

construction. For Wendt, “anarchy is what states make of it”22, meaning that a state is not bound

by an anarchic international system, instead norms, social facts and identity are vital for

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!18 ibid, p.105 19 ibid, p.106 20 ibid, p.106 21 ibid, p.106 22 Wendt, A. (1992) “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics”, International Organization, Vol.46(2), p.395


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constructivists; the international system is not determined by self-help and power politics,

instead these are institutions, not essential features of anarchy23. In comparison to realists who

contend “that anarchy and the distribution of relative power drive most of what goes on in

world politics”24, constructivists maintain that “realism misses what is often a more determinant

factor, namely, the intersubjectively shared ideas that shape behaviour by constituting the

identities and interests of actors”25. Constructivists share four core propositions.

Firstly, constructivists believe in the social construction of reality and the importance of social

facts. This first proposition is concerned with the distinction between “brute” and “social”

facts26. Constructivists believe that some aspects of our environment are given naturally and

do not depend on beliefs. An example provided by Houghton is playing golf in a storm. If I get

hit by lightning whilst playing golf, I will be electrocuted irrespective of whether I believe in

the existence of electricity – this is a brute fact27. On the other hand, a “social fact” is a fact,

which depends on what we believe and whether we believe in them at all. An example of a

social construction given by Houghton is money, the fact that we believe money has value

gives it a purpose as a means of exchange for goods and services. The key point of these

analogies is that constructivists believe that much of the political and social world consists of

social facts. If applied to international relations, notions of anarchy and sovereignty are not

timeless truths, but “instead constitute social inventions that human beings have fashioned

themselves” 28 . This approach to the political world is caught in Wendt’s famous phrase

“anarchy is what states make of it”29.

Secondly, in contrast with realism, constructivism focuses on ideational and material structures

with the importance of norms and rules30. Constructivists maintain that structure cannot be

understood solely through a reference to material forces such as military power and natural

resources. Structures encourage certain behaviour and penalise those who do not respond to

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!23 ibid, p.395 24 Copeland, D. (2006) “The constructivist challenge to structural realism” in Guzzini, S. and Leander, A. “Constructivism and International Relations: Alexander Wendt and his critics”, New York: Routledge, p.1 25 ibid, p.1 26 Houghton, D. (2007) “Reinvigorating the Study of Foreign Policy Decision Making: Toward a Constructivist Approach”, Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol.3(1), p.28 27 ibid 28 ibid, p.28 29 OpCit n.22, p.395 30 Flockhart, T. (2012) “Constructivism and foreign policy” in Smith, S. Hadfield, A and Dunne, T. “Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases”, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.84

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this encouragement. Structure consists of material and ideational factors: “shared knowledge

about material factors, rules, symbols and language, which all shape how we interpret the world

and the actions of others”31 are vitally important for constructivists. Our shared meanings of

material forces constitute the structure which then organizes our actions, simply put, “for

constructivists it is simply impossible to get a grasp on reality by only looking at the material

world”, thus directly challenging neorealism. A good example of this is the meaning behind a

French and North Korean nuclear weapon. We might view the North Korean nuclear weapon

as mattering more because of the meaning with which it is interpreted – it is interpreted in the

social context of hostility and enmity. The French nuclear warhead might be equally as

dangerous in a material sense, but it is not of concern to us because it is interpreted in terms of

the social context of friendship. Houghton gives another good example of this point; Las Vegas

for instance can be simply viewed as a collection of buildings with “bright lights in the middle

of the desert”32. However, the excitement of Las Vegas has to do with the meaning that humans

attach to it that make it seductive and alluring – it is this meaning of ‘state of mind’ which is

captured by constructivism.

Structures are codified by rules and norms that agents who are a part of these structures have

to abide by. Finnemore and Sikkink define norms as “a standard of appropriate behaviour with

a given identity”33. Norms such as responsibility to protect, human rights and those present in

the United Nations Charter form an understanding of what is appropriate and inappropriate

behaviour for actors, forming a major influence on the interests and identity of an actor. One

of the most important norms which we will discuss is the norm of humanitarian intervention.

It is defined by Holzgrefe as “the threat or use of force across state boarders by a state (or group

of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of fundamental human

rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission of the state within

whose territory force is applied”34. Constructivists agree that norms have a structural function

that constrains certain behaviour whilst constituting other behaviours 35 . Nonetheless, the

difficulty of norms in the international system is noted by Wendt who states “while norms and

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!31 ibid, p.84 32 OpCit, n.26, p.29 33 Finnemore, M. and Sikkink, K. (1998) “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change”, International Organization, Vol.52(4), p.891 34 Holzgrefe, J. (2003) “The Humanitarian Intervention Debate” in Holzgrefe, J. and Keohane, R. “Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas” Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.18 35 OpCit, n.30, p.84


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law govern most domestic politics, self-interest and coercion seem to rule international politics.

International law and institutions exist, but the ability of this superstructure to counter the

material base of power and interest seems limited”36. To further analyse how norms emerge,

we will be looking at the norm life cycle when analysing Rwanda.

The third core feature of constructivism is the role of identity in shaping political action and

the importance of logic of action. Identity is defined by Flockhart as “the agent’s understanding

of self, its place in the social world, and its relationship with others.”37 Identities are vital for

constructivists because they suggest a set of interests for a choice of actions, which an agent

can make. By recognising identity as an important factor, constructivists thus place a role on

historical, cultural, political and social context of the actor in question. Identity is crucial

simply because “material forces by themselves have no intrinsic meaning, constructivists

stress; their meanings are socially created by human beings and their ideas”38. “Collective

norms and understanding constitute the social identities of actors and also define the basic

‘rules of the game’ in which actors find themselves in their interactions.”39 The importance of

this logic is not to be underestimated, through identity a state is able to understand others

according to the attributes that their identity gives them, whilst concurrently recreating their

own identity through social practices40. This contrasts with realism, which maintains that the

only important identity is that of a self-interested state with an objective for survival and

ensuring the reproduction of a stable world 41 . Identity is important in relation to norms

especially, because actors in the system will abide by certain norms depending on their identity.

The fourth core belief of constructivism is that structures and agents are mutual constituted42.

This follows from the field of sociology, the idea of structuration maintained by Anthony

Giddens that holds that structure influences agents43. Agents are able to influence structure

through practice. This essentially means that “through practice, social facts are externalised

and habitualized”44 and thus becomes independent from the agents who first constructed these

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!36 Wendt, A. (1999) “Social Theory of International Politics”, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.2 37 ibid, p.2 38 OpCit, n.26, p.29 39 Risse, T. (2000) “’Let’s Argue!’: Communicative Action in World Politics”, International Organization, Vol.54(1), p.5 40 Hopf, T. (1998) “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory”, International Security, Vol.23(1), p.175 41 OpCit, n.30, p.85 42 OpCit, n.26, p.28 43 Giddens, A. (1984) “The Constitution of Society”, Berkeley: University of California Press, p.2 44 OpCit, n.30, p.86

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social facts. “Agents do not exist in isolation from the structures that they create”45, it is through

practice that important institutions and norms such as sovereignty, self-help and cooperation

become internalized. The logic of structuration goes further with this idea. The logic of

structuration assumes a mutually constitutive relationship between structure and agency; Hopf

has argued that although structuration implies that change is possible through practice, agents

reproduce their own constraints and limits meaning that although change is possible, it is

difficult to accomplish46. Checkel maintains that constructivists find it difficult to explain how

“powerful social structures (norms) come from […] why and how they change over time”47.

Now that we have outlined constructivism and realism, we have to ask under which situations

in realism and constructivism we would expect the United States to intervene in humanitarian

situations – such as those present in Rwanda, Syria and Libya. Structural realists would expect

cooperation to be unlikely because of competition between major powers. The anarchic

international system dissuades cooperation between major powers because “it requires states

to worry about their relative gains of cooperation and the possibility that adversaries will cheat

on agreements”48. Cooperation is possible under realism as long as the state in question views

the norm or organisation as relevant. Cooperation is possible if the relative gains from action

outweigh any losses, along with norms such as humanitarian intervention, this can be a

powerful reasoning in favour of intervention.

Constructivists challenge the view presented by realism. Wendt states that there is no

relationship between the extent of shared ideas in a system and the extent of cooperation.

Secondly, Wendt believes that the role of an agent is central because the “culture of an

international system is based on a structure of roles”49 . Constructivists see two problems

occurring with cooperation; the first is getting agents to work together with a mutually

beneficial end such as reducing violence. The second problem happens in creating “stable

patterns of behaviour, whether cooperative or conflictual”50 – regularities are normal in nature

when they are determined by solely materialistic forces. Whereas when conflicts are caused by

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!45 OpCit, n.26, p.28 46 OpCit, n.40, p.180 47 Checkel, J. (1998) “The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory”, World Politics, Vol.50(2), p.339 48 Glaser, C. (1994) “Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help” International Security, Vol.19(3), p.50 49 OpCit, n.36 p.251 50 ibid, p.251


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social regularities then shared ideas will be vital in determining cooperation as “limited forms

of inter-state cooperation based on shared ideas – respecting property, keeping promises, and

limiting violence – are possible” 51 . Constructivists believe that cooperation can occur in

situations in which shared ideas or norms have been compromised.

Rwandan#Genocide# On the 6th of April 1994 the President Habyarimana of Rwanda and multiple top government

officials were murdered when their plane was shot down on approach to the airport in Kigali,

the capital of Rwanda. This event acted as the catalyst for one of the worse instances of human

rights violations of the 20th century52. In the space of a hundred days from the 6th of April to

19th of July 1994 it was estimated that around eight hundred thousand people were murdered,

the genocide had a rate of killing that “exceeded the rate of killing attained during the

Holocaust” 53 . The issue with Rwanda was that the international community could have

intervened at a relatively low cost before the worse of the killing occurred, yet it didn’t. There

were two-thousand five hundred UN peacekeepers present, however soon after the killing

began the UN ordered peacekeepers to not protect civilians, eventually leading to the UN

withdrawing all but two-hundred and seventy troops54. Rwanda in many respects became the

poster-child of UN failures as UN officials failed to grasp the scale and brutality of the killings.

Despite this failure from the UN, blame of the genocide can be also aimed towards members

of the Security Council, in particular the United States. Subsequent to the failures of Rwanda,

the former Secretary-General Kofi Annan called for a responsibility to protect for situations in

which mass atrocity crimes are being committed55 – this emerging norm will be analysed

further in the sections on Syria and Libya.

It has been maintained that the United States did all in its power to stifle the possibility of

sending in more peacekeepers to Rwanda. The US “used its considerable power in the Security

Council to help muzzle the call for intervention and later obstructed those who wanted to

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!51 ibid. p.251 52 OpCit, n.34, p.15 53 Barnett, M. (2002) “Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda” New York: Cornell University Press, p.1 54 ibid, p.2 55 Annan, K. (2012) “Prevention, Promotion and protection: our shared responsibility”, Available from the Kofi Annan Foundation at: http://kofiannanfoundation.org/newsroom/speeches/2012/04/prevention-promotion-and-protection-our-shared-responsibility [Accessed on 29/04/15]

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intervene”56. By looking at a realist and constructivist perspective we have to analyse the

reasons why cooperation failed to materialise by looking firstly at the material reasons why

intervention failed to occur.

By 1994, the United States remained the most powerful nation in the world, especially with the

collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War three years prior to the Rwandan

Genocide. President Clinton was acting in a wholly new environment, the bi-polar, stable world

of the Cold War had ended and he was acting in a world that would become multipolar57 and

US domination in international politics was not by any means certain58. However, by looking

at material facts we can clearly see that at the time, the United States was and still is the

hegemon of the system. “America's economy is 40 percent larger than that of its nearest rival,

and its defense spending equals that of the next six countries combined”59, considering that the

four of those six countries are allies of the United States makes American dominance even

more prevalent. The United States has attained an unrivalled geopolitical position, it not only

outweighs most of the developed world in terms of military and economic power, but it has the

liberty to do what it desires on the international stage60. This unrivalled position also means

that the United States has little to gain from it’s foreign policy61, situations such as that in

Rwanda did not present a threat to the US’s overall power position and can be thus set aside

by looking at a realist perspective.

It could be argued that Clinton wanted to build a world in which the United States was not the

sole superpower, in which the stability of bi-polarity was not certain and therefore the survival

of the state was in question. Notions of human rights in Africa did not threaten the survival of

the state and therefore were not of strategic, geographical or economic importance to the United

States as there was “little interest in Africa”62. It is clear from a realist perspective that norms

in this case do not matter, especially in comparison to the Obama administration. The brutality

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!56 OpCit, n.53 p.2 57 Mann, J. (2014) “On Realism, Old and New”, Available from The American Prospect: https://prospect.org/article/realism-old-and-new-0 [Accessed on 25/04/15] 58 Walt, S. (2000) “Two Cheers for Clinton’s Foreign Policy”, Available from Foreign Affairs at: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/55848/stephen-m-walt/two-cheers-for-clintons-foreign-policy [Accessed on 29/04/15] 59 ibid 60 ibid 61 ibid 62 Lynch, C. (2015) “Exclusive: Rwanda Revisited”, Available from Foreign Policy at: http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/04/05/rwanda-revisited-genocide-united-states-state-department/ [Accessed on 29/04/15]


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of the genocide was more than clear to US diplomats and UN officials who received reports

warning of the possibility of genocide63. Nothing was done to intervene to respect international

norms which had been clearly violated on a massive scale. The self-interest of the United States

was of more importance. Seven weeks into the genocide, President Clinton restated the foreign

policy of the United States by saying that the United States would only intervene on

humanitarian grounds if it was in the interest of the United States as involvement “in any of

the world's ethnic conflicts in the end must depend on the cumulative weight of the American

interests at stake”64. The statement from President Clinton confirms the realist perspective in

many ways to ultimately see whether cooperation was possible in Rwanda, the crisis had to

have been of direct interest to the foreign policy of the United States, which it wasn’t. The costs

of intervening in Rwanda outweighed any potential benefits.

From a constructivist perspective the reasoning for not intervening in Rwanda depends on two

principal characteristics, firstly we will consider the identity and interests of the political actors,

followed by the norm life cycle proposed by Finnemore and Sikkink. We can thus see that the

norms, interests and identities at the time of Rwanda were not in support of a humanitarian

intervention.

The first issue that Rwanda brings is the issue of identity. Actors or agents in a system have an

identity, according to constructivists this identity is crucial; because it gives importance to areas

such as history, culture and language. It is through these devices that we as humans interpret

the world around us. Non-intervention in Rwanda can be primarily understood as a reaction to

past historical events. President Clinton referenced the failure of Somalia65 for why the United

States did not want to intervene, with the deaths of 18 US military personnel66. Due to the failed

mission in Somalia there was no appetite for intervention in Rwanda. Asides from the historical

context, Weiss points towards the evolution of norms, domestic politics and media coverage as

reasons for why the west is willing to sometimes intervene67. If we consider the definition of

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!63 ibid 64 Clinton, W. (1994) “Remarks at the United States Naval Academy Commencement Ceremony in Annapolis, Maryland”, Available from The American Presidency Project at: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=50236 [Accessed on 29/04/15] 65 Clinton, W. (1993) “American President: Bill Clinton, Foreign Affairs”, Available from the Miller Center at: http://millercenter.org/president/clinton/essays/biography/5 [Accessed on 30/04/25] 66 US Department of State (2013) “Milestones: 1993-2000: Somalia 1992-1993”, Available from US Department of State at: https://history.state.gov/milestones/1993-2000/somalia [Accessed 29/04/15] 67 Weiss, T. (1999) “Military-Civilian Interactions” Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, p.1

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identity given by Flockhart, we have to note the understanding that President Clinton has for

himself, his place in the social world and his relationship with others. Unlike realism, which

sees the actors in charge as not relevant, for constructivists the identity of the actor is

paramount. Under a constructivist perspective we have to ask which factors of identity will

make the prospect of a humanitarian intervention less likely to be a chosen policy68.

As soon as President Clinton entered office, it was made clear that foreign policy was not a

priority; the famous phrase “it’s the economy, stupid”69 gave an indication of this, a view that

is supported by Charles-Philippe David70. For many, including realist scholars such as Walt,

this one phrase is evidence of Clinton not intending on being a President concerned by foreign

policy71. Where as realists pertain that structure is maintained by the exogenous nature of actors

in an anarchic, self-help system72; constructivists maintain that the interests of an actor are

formed endogenously73. Interests are formed internally; identity, which is defined by Waltz as

“relatively stable, role-specific understandings and expectations about self”74. Norms can act,

not only regulate state behaviour, but they can “constitute the very interests and identity that

determine state behaviour”75. If these norms are not of interest to the identity in question, then

it will not be abided by, as demonstrated by Clinton.

Changes in interests under holistic constructivism can highlight this change in interests as

“socialization processes internal to a state can change the state’s identity and interests

independently of [international] interaction”76. It is evident that “domestic identity as well as

shared norms of international society has causal effects on states' interest and behaviour”77.

Constructivism would argue that the norm has not been internalized yet. To analyse this claim

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!68 OpCit, n.34, p.18 69 OpCit, n.58 70 David, C. (2004) “’Foreign Policy is not what I came here to do’ Dissecting Clinton’s Foreign-Policy Making: A first cut”, Available from the Montreal Institute of International Studies: http://www.ieim.uqam.ca/IMG/pdf/foreign_policy_firstcut.pdf [Accessed on 29/04/15] 71 Supra, n.69 72 Dixon, S. (2013) “Humanitarian Intervention: A Novel Constructivist Analysis of Norms and Behaviour”, Available from the Journal of Politics & International Studies, Vol.9 at: http://www.polis.leeds.ac.uk/assets/files/students/student-journal/sum-13/130930-sum13-dixon.pdf [Accessed on 29/04/15] 73 ibid 74 OpCit, n.22, p.397 75 Supra, n.72 76 OpCit, n.26, p.199 77 Mohammed, M. (2011) “A Holistic Constructivist Approach to Iran’s Foreign Policy”, International Journal of Business and Social Science, Vol.2(4), p.282


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we will be referring to the important work of Finnemore and Sikkink on the norm life cycle.

Figure 1: Norm Life Cycle78

With regards to humanitarian intervention, the norm life cycle process demonstrates why

humanitarian intervention was not fully supported for Rwanda. In the first stage of norm

emergence, norm entrepreneurs attempt to convince state leaders to accept and embrace the

new norms79. Once norm leaders have accepted the norm then it is up to them to “attempt to

socialize other states to become norm followers”80. The second stage is distinguished by further

imitation while norm leaders aim to “socialize other states to become norm followers”81. The

reason this norm cascade occurs may vary as a “combination of pressure for conformity, desire

to enhance international legitimation, and the desire of state leaders to enhance their self-

esteem facilitate norm cascades”. Once the cascade has passed the norm is internalized and it

is taken-for-granted. An example is votes for women or slavery 82 – few people question

whether women should be able to vote or whether slavery is abhorrent83. What is evident for

humanitarian intervention is that it is a norm that has not been subject to the norm cascade

process. There is still a lot of controversy surrounding humanitarian intervention as evidenced

by Holzgrefe84. If the norm in question is not internalized, then nothing is preventing the United

States from not following the norm. A state’s domestic norms can sway its external and

international identity to make certain policy choices unattractive. By opening the ‘black box’

of the state we can see via a constructivist perspective how policy choices arise.

With a lack of will from Washington and the lack of norm internalization, it is evident to see

that both a constructivist and realist perspective can give exaplanations to different reasons

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!78 OpCit, n.33, p.896 79 ibid, p.895 80 ibid, p.895 81 ibid, p.895 82 ibid, p.895 83 ibid, p.895 84 OpCit, n.34 p.18

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why intervention was not supported. This is even evident in the Security Council resolutions

on Rwanda, because of a lack of will to intervene peacekeeping numbers were reduced in

Resolution 91285, which was subsequently rated as one of the worse UN Security Council

resolutions ever passed 86 . The resolution reduced size of UNAMIR from 2,548 to 270

peacekeepers. After the passing of the resolution it became apparent that a larger force was

necessary to stop the genocide. Despite protests from Boutros-Ghali to reconsider the decision,

saying that the UN mandate was too small to deal with mass atrocities on the scale present in

Rwanda, the United States “blocked any decision by the council to expand the mission”87. Even

when cooperation is possible, Finnemore points towards difficulties in cooperation and

coordination which can make humanitarian interventions difficult to sustain88. It was only a

month later on the 17th of May that the Security Council urged to increase the strength of

UNAMIR up to 5,500 troops89 in Resolution 91890.

The failures of Rwanda were evident to actors after the genocide. In his address to the Rwandan

people, President Clinton said, “the international community, together with nations in Africa,

must bear its share of responsibility for this tragedy, as well. We did not act quickly enough

after the killing began. […] We did not immediately call these crimes by their rightful name:

genocide”91. The identity of the leaders of the time was vital in determining the outcome of the

genocide, although actors were aware of the killing, they were not aware of the sheer scale,

brutality and efficiency of the genocide then it is questionable whether it would have had the

same outcome. Realism and constructivism can explain the US foreign policy: for realists, the

self-interest and lack of economic interests in Rwanda meant that it was not of strategic interest

to the United States. Constructivists can explain that the norm of humanitarian intervention has

not been internalised, leading to the US not wanting to intervene, whilst the identity of the

actors in question brings evidence against the intervention into Rwanda. The aftermath of

Rwanda brought into light one of the most important emerging norms in international relations,

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!85 UN Security Council (1994) UN Doc S/RES/912 86 Lynch, C. (2010) “The 10 worst U.N. Security Council Resolutions ever”, Available from Foreign Policy at: http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/05/21/the-10-worst-u-n-security-council-resolutions-ever-2/ [Accessed on 29/04/15] 87 ibid 88 Finnemore, M. (2002) “Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention” in Katzen, P. “The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics” New York: Columbia University Press, Available from: http://www.metu.edu.tr/~utuba/Finnemore.pdf [Accessed on 30/04/15] 89 United Nations (2015) “UNAMIR”, Available from: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamirS.htm [Accessed 30/04/15] 90 UN Security Council (1994) UN Doc S/RES/918 91 Clinton, W. (1998) “Remarks to the People of Rwanda”, Available from the Miller Center: http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/speech-4602, [Accessed on 29/04/15]


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responsibility to protect. We will continue our analysis with the Libyan Civil War to see

whether the approach of the United States has changed since Rwanda.

Libyan#Civil#War# The emerging norm of responsibility to protect played an important role in the world’s response

to the civil war in Libya92. In order to fully analyse the response of the United States to this

crisis we will analyse the impact of the norm of responsibility to protect (often abbreviated to

R2P) whilst also looking at the strategic, economic and geo-political importance of Libya. For

this section we will find that the constructivist approach is more relevant in discussing this

“emerging norm”93.

Firstly, the emerging norm of responsibility to protect surfaced after the experiences in Rwanda

and Kosovo in the 1990s94. This norm is of particular importance with regard to a change in

American identity in order to intervene into Libya to stop the possibility of genocide occurring.

It was first outlined in the 2001 report by ICISS95. In 2005 the then Secretary-General Kofi

Annan approved of the doctrine in his 2005 report96. The norm received support from world

leaders at the 2005 World Summit, which subsequently passed a resolution in the UN General

Assembly stating in paragraphs 138 and 139 that “each individual state has the responsibility

to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against

humanity”97. The norm holds that state sovereignty is not sacrosanct, for instances in which the

mass atrocity crimes such as genocide, ethnic cleansing and mass murder 98 have been

commited. As such, there are three core aspects to R2P that will be briefly outlined below.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!92 Bellamy, A. (2011) “Libya and the Responsibility to Protect: The Exception and the Norm”, Ethics and International Affairs, Vol.25(3), p.263 93 Annan, K. Axworthy, L. & Alexander, C. (2015) “The Responsibility to Protect 10 Years On: Reflections On Its Past, Present and Future”, Available from the Center of International Policy Studies at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ohzVUuUsn3g [Accessed on 29/04/15] 94 Welsh, J. (2009) “Implementing the ‘Responsibility to Protect’”, Available from the Oxford Institute for Ethics, Law and Armed Conflict at: http://www.elac.ox.ac.uk/downloads/r2p_policybrief_180209.pdf [Accessed on 30/04/15] 95 ICISS (2001) “The Responsibility to Protect”, Available from the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect at: http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf [Accessed on 30/04/15] 96 Annan, K. (2005) “In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All”, New York: United Nations 97 UN General Assembly (2005) A/RES/60/1 98 Weiss, T. (2012) “Current Issue 9 – R2P”, Available from the Academic Council on the United Nations System at: http://acuns.org/r2p/ [Accessed on 30/04/15]

George Mullens

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The doctrine of R2P is divided into three sections, a responsibility to prevent, react and

rebuild99. The state is not at threat for minor breaches of human rights; these sections are

relevant to the worse mass atrocity crimes. From a constructivist perspective we could say that

the introduction of responsibility to protect challenged the norm of sovereignty, which has

already been internalized by following the norm life cycle of Finnemore and Sikkink. R2P

challenges the traditional notion of state sovereignty; sovereignty carries ethics with regard to

states upholding beliefs of humanitarian duties100. UN Security Council Resolution 1973 was

passed, with the United States voting in favour. It did not refer to responsibility to protect101,

only reiterating “the responsibility of the Libyan authorities to protect the Libyan

population”102, along with the imposition of a no-fly zone. The importance of this resolution is

not to be understated: this was the first ever UN resolution which advocated for military

intervention in a “sovereign state against the express will of that state’s government”103. Welsh

argued that the Council not holding that the international community had the responsibility to

intervene suggests that some members questioned whether military action was appropriate104.

R2P was definitely on the minds of world leaders as Obama embarked to change the identity

of the United States by saying: “some nations may be able to turn a blind eye to atrocities in

other countries”105. “When our interests and values are at stake, we have a responsibility to

act”106. It could be argued that responsibility to protect did not play a large role; in the ten

publicly recorded meetings of the Security Council, only six members of the council explicitly

or implied references to R2P with the US referencing it once107.

In Obama’s address to the American people, it is clear to see that this is significant with regard

to the change in American identity108 – especially in the aftermath of the wars in Iraq and

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!99 Weiss, T. (2011) “RtoP Alive and Well after Libya”, Ethics & International Affairs, Vol.25(3), p.287 100 Jarvis, S. (2013) “Obama’s Adoption of Responsibility to Protect: A constructivist analysis”, Available from the Journal of Politics & International Studies Vol.9 at: http://www.polis.leeds.ac.uk/assets/files/students/student-journal/sum-13/130930-sum13-jarvis.pdf [Accessed on 30/04/15] 101 Morris, J. (2013) “Libya and Syria: R2P and the spectre of the swinging pendulum”, International Affairs, Vol.85(5), p.1267 102 UN Security Council (2011) S/RES/1973 103 OpCit, n.101, p.1271 104 Welsh, J. (2011) “Civilian Protection in Libya: Putting Coercion and Controversy Back into RtoP”, Ethics & International Affairs, Vol.25(3), p.255 105 Obama, B. (2011) “Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Libya”, Available from the White House at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/28/remarks-president-address-nation-libya [Accessed on 28/04/15] 106 ibid 107 OpCit, n.101, p.1272 108 ibid


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Afghanistan as noted by Samuel Jarvis. Statements from world leaders “clearly framed the

intervention in terms of human rights and standards of international law”109. A thesis accepted

by commentators such as Weiss110. To comprehend policy change, examining the new social

construction of the United States will be of use to thus understand Obama’s motives behind

supporting R2P and subsequently intervening into Libya. From a constructivist outlook we

have to note that the identity of the US provides significant shifts in US foreign policy. It is

clear that Obama brought certain ideals about America’s world position, thus bringing in key

individuals such as the US Ambassador to the United Nations Samantha Power who was a

special adviser to the President and author of the book A Problem from Hell: America and the

Age of Genocide111.

By comparing the Obama administration to the Bush Administration, we can further analyse

the change in identity as “under the Bush administration, there was arguably little regard for

the international fallout from the use of unilateral force, as well as the severe discrediting of

American moral values”112. The acceptance of R2P has acted as a significant identity change

by discrediting the views and actions of the Bush administration. Therefore the acceptance of

R2P acted as a catalyst for intervention into Libya, despite it being a case specific occurrence,

as “America cannot use our military wherever repression occurs. And given the costs and risks

of intervention, we must always measure our interests against the need for action”113. The

United States was not completely in charge of the operation in Libya with the NATO

intervention being in charge of a Canadian; France undertook the lead role in initial airstrikes114.

However, it should not be surprising that regime change was the result of the NATO

intervention the imposition of the no-fly zone is meant to dissuade dictators like Gaddafi, if

change doesn’t occur then regime change is the logical outcome of deploying forces under

R2P115. Despite the United States not taking a leading role in the mission in Libya, the move

towards R2P is undeniable and explains why the United States intervened into Libya; however

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!109 Fermor, S. (2012) “NATO’s decision to intervene in Libya (2011): Realist principles or humanitarian norms?”, Available from the Journal of Politics & International Studies, Vol.8, at: http://www.polis.leeds.ac.uk/assets/files/students/student-journal/ug-winter-12/130217-win12-chris-fermor-9.pdf [Accessed on 30/04/15] 110 OpCit, n.99 111 Power, S. (2002) “A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide”, New York: Basic Books!112 OpCit, n.100, p.215 113 OpCit, n.105 114 Chesterman, S. (2011) “’Leading from Behind’: The Responsibility to Protect, the Obama Doctrine, and Humanitarian Intervention after Libya”, Ethics & International Affairs, Vol.25(3), p.283 115 Weiss, T. (2014) “Military Humanitarianism: Syria Hasn’t Killed It”, The Washington Quarterly, Vol.37(1), p.11

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considerations of regime change while considering the volatility in Libya presently has further

complicated the UN response in Syria as noted by Thakur116. We will now turn to a realist

explanation for intervention.

To further explain the reasons for intervention we will undertake the analysis provided by Hans

Morgenthau in his seminal work Power among Nations. Morgenthau explains the importance

of prudence when taking decisions based on morality as “there can be no political morality

without prudence; that is, without consideration of the political consequences of seemingly

moral action”117. When analyzing reasons for intervention Dunne and Schmidt point towards

“the relative distribution of power [as] the key independent variable in understanding the […]

outcomes such as war and peace, alliance politics, and the balance of power”118, as these

considerations arose whilst NATO considered intervention.

While considering a realist approach it is important to understand the material factors at play.

Libya as a member of OPEC is the holder of the largest oil reserves in Africa119 with over 42

billion oil barrels in largely unexplored reserves120. Material resources played a large economic

factor into the decision to intervene, irrespective of the threats of Gaddafi to “fight until the

last drop of blood”121. Libya’s key geopolitical position was vital, it borders two other countries,

which underwent change during the Arab spring: Egypt and Tunisia. Libya’s economic and

geographic position also meant that it was a large provider of oil and natural gas to Italy and

Germany, both eventually becoming highly dependant on Libyan oil exports122. Yergin notes

the highly prized value of Libyan oil, which is considered to be of high quality due to its low

sulphur content123 along with very extensive and exploitable reserves of natural gas, made

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!116 Thakur, R. (2014) “Syria and Responsibility to Protect” in Murray, R. & McKay, A. “Into the Eleventh Hour: R2P, Syria and Humanitarianism in Crisis”, Available from E-International Relations at: http://www.e-ir.info/wp-content/uploads/R2P-Syria-and-Humanitarianism-in-Crisis-E-IR.pdf [Accessed on 01/05/15] 117 Morgenthau, H. (1967) “Politics among Nations”, New York: Knopf, p.6 118 Dunne, T. & Schmidt, B. (2011) “Realism” in Baylis, J. Smith, S. & Owens, P. “The Globalization of World Politics”, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.169 119 US Energy Information Administration (2014) “Country Analysis Brief: Libya”, Available from US Energy Information Administration at: http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/Libya/libya.pdf [Accesses on 30/04/15] 120 Joy, A. (2011) “The Crisis in Libya”, Available from the Observer Research Foundation at: http://orfonline.org/cms/export/orfonline/modules/issuebrief/attachments/Libya-18-april_1303729979339.pdf [Accessed on 30/04/15] 121 Saleh, H. and England, A. (2011) “Defiant Gaddafi vows fight to death”, Available from Financial Times at: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5b307dd4-3e9d-11e0-9e8f-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3Yue8UI4N [Accessed on 01/05/15] 122 OpCit, n.109 123 Yergin, D. (1991) “The Prize”, New York: Simon & Schuster, p.529


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Libya a vital concern to Western powers. All of this points towards the US realising the

potential gain from intervening by installing a more reliable regime “with all the benefits that

might bring in terms of reliable access to high quality, easily exploitable hydrocarbons”124. The

possibility to change Libya from a dictatorship to a moderate democracy must have featured

prominently for Obama considering his respect for democracy and human rights125. With the

rise of China’s economic power and Russia’s aversion to international security, a regime

change in Libya to a friendlier democratic state would be an attractive solution to an economic

crisis-stricken West of recent years.

If these economic concerns are taken along with relations between the United States and Libya

then it can be seen that a realist explanation can give a satisfactory explanation for the US’s

foreign policy in the Security Council. The United States and Great Britain had suffered losses

at the hands of the Libyan regime, the prime example being the Lockerbie bombing of Pan Am

Flight 103126, resulting in the deaths of 270 people, meant that the Libyan regime was most

likely detestable to most Western countries. From a realist perspective we could say that the

benefits of pursuing regime change in Libya outweighed the potential costs. Both humanitarian

norms of R2P and the material resources present in Libya meant that humanitarian intervention

was an attractive option for the United States. The United States was thus able to not stop the

violence of the Gaddafi regime towards civilians by using R2P but was also able to benefit

from the material resources that regime change would bring.

Syrian#Civil#War#

The ongoing civil war in Syria has relevance in this debate between humanitarian norms and

power politics as the basis for intervention. While intervention in Libya occurred early in the

conflict, in Syria intervention has not occurred despite a worse humanitarian situation in which

chemical weapons have been used. The Syrian civil war has killed an estimated 125,000

people127; with an estimated 7.6 million Syrians being internally displaced with a total 12.2

million people requiring assistance inside of Syria, according to official estimates of the

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!124 Supra, n.122 125 ibid 126 Plachta, M. (2001) “The Lockerbie Case: The Role of the Security Council in Enforcing the principle Aut Dedere Aut Judicare”, European Journal of International Law, Vol.12(1), p.125 127 Jenkings, B. (2014) “The Dynamics of Syria’s Civil War”, Available from the RAND Corporation at: PE115/RAND_PE115.pdf" http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE115/RAND_PE115.pdf

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European Commission128. There are “compelling moral reasons for U.S. involvement”129 due

to the continued usage of chemical weapons by the Assad regime130, even after inspections

from the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons131. Firstly we will analyse the

realist interpretation in the decisions behind the Syrian civil war.

Mearshiemer in arguing against intervention has pointed that the real interest of the United

States in Syria is not to intervene. “If anything, intervention is likely to make a bad situation

worse”132. Mearshiemer’s considers that the Syrian civil war does not threaten the survival of

the American state, especially bearing in mind that the United States is the “regional hegemon

in the Western Hemisphere”133 in possession of the ultimate deterrent, “thousands of nuclear

weapons”134. Not every state in the Middle East is of strategic or economic interest to the United

States. This is especially the case with Syria, which is considered to be a weak country with

relatively poor oil and natural resources135, especially if compared with Libya. With the advent

of the civil war, Syria is in an even weaker position than before when it posed no threat to the

United States.

Other arguments that Syria is of strategic importance to the US revolve around terrorism,

restoring American credibility and Syria’s relationship with Iran. If the US were to intervene

in Syria it would not only prove to be a significant loss for Hezbollah and other terrorist groups

such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State136, but it would essentially remove Iran’s one ally in the

region137. These arguments are flawed according to Mearsheimer as intervention in Syria could

result in more harm towards the United States, without any significant gain. Indeed, military

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! [Accessed on 01/05/15] 128 European Commission (2015) “Syria Crisis”, Available from the European Commission Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection at: http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/syria_en.pdf [Accessed on 01/05/15] 129 Mearsheimer, J. (2014) “America Unhinged”, The National Interest, Vol.129 (January/February), p.9 130 Daragahi, B. (2014) “Assad still using chemical weapons, say Syrian rebels”, Available from the Financial Times at: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9e18f7e8-5460-11e4-84c6-00144feab7de.html [Accessed on 01/05/15] 131 OPWC (2015) “Progress in the Elimination of the Syrian Chemical Weapons Programme” EC-79/DG.1, Available from the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons at: https://www.opcw.org/index.php?eID=dam_frontend_push&docID=185 [Accessed on 01/05/15] 132 OpCit, n.129, p.10 133 ibid, p.11 134 ibid 135 ibid 136 Jenkings, B. (2014) “The Dynamics of Syria’s Civil War”, Available from the RAND Corporation at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE115/RAND_PE115.pdf [Accessed on 01/05/15] 137 OpCit, n.129. p.15


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intervention in countries like Syria is more likely to trigger problems with terrorism as argued

by Mearsheimer. Jenkins points towards the fact that half of the Syrian population will be living

as refugees, this situation is far more likely to result in terrorism in the long term138.

From a realist perspective, intervention into Syria would not help the balance of power towards

the United States as intervention in Syria would likely mean that the Assad regime would

receive more support from Hezbollah, Iran and Russia139 – they key allies of Assad – thus

exacerbating the problem; rendering it more probable the conflict will spill across boarders.

Another argument posed in favour of intervention is that American credibility would be

restored as Obama’s “red line”140 which suggested intervention would be employed if chemical

weapons were present. The costs of intervention would outweigh any economic benefits or

otherwise to be derived from a relatively weak country and the damage posed by intervening

means that it is not in the interest of the United States to intervene in Syria. We will now

continue with a constructivist analysis of US foreign policy with regard to Syria.

While considering a constructivist approach, it is worth noting that academics such as Weiss141,

Evans142, Thakur143 , Carment and Landry144 do not believe that R2P has been abandoned,

merely that it is still in the process of emerging. Evans points towards the Security Council

taking decisive action145 following the 2013 Ghouta chemical weapon attacks by authorising

the destruction of chemical weapons and foreshadowing the use of coercive action of Chapter

VII if Syria failed to cooperate in Resolution 2118146. Although this resolution in in response

to chemical weapons attacks, in reality the decision occurred because of a unanimous sense

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!138 OpCit, n.136 139 OpCit, n.129, p.17 140 Obama, B. (2012) “Remarks by the President to the White House Press Corps”, Available from the White House at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/08/20/remarks-president-white-house-press-corps [Accessed on 01/05/15]!141!Weiss, T. (2014) “After Syria, Whither R2P” in Murray, R. & McKay, A. “Into the Eleventh Hour: R2P, Syria and Humanitarianism in Crisis”, Available from E-International Relations at: http://www.e-ir.info/wp-content/uploads/R2P-Syria-and-Humanitarianism-in-Crisis-E-IR.pdf [Accessed on 01/05/15] 142!Evans, G. (2014) “The Consequences of Non-Intervention in Syria: Does the Responsibility to Protect have a Future” in Murray, R. & McKay, A. “Into the Eleventh Hour: R2P, Syria and Humanitarianism in Crisis”, Available from E-International Relations at: http://www.e-ir.info/wp-content/uploads/R2P-Syria-and-Humanitarianism-in-Crisis-E-IR.pdf [Accessed on 01/05/15] 143 OpCit, n.116 144 Carment, D. & Landry, J. (2014) “R2P in Syria: Regional Dimensions” in Murray, R. & McKay, A. “Into the Eleventh Hour: R2P, Syria and Humanitarianism in Crisis”, Available from E-International Relations at: http://www.e-ir.info/wp-content/uploads/R2P-Syria-and-Humanitarianism-in-Crisis-E-IR.pdf [Accessed on 01/05/15] 145 Supra, n.142 146 UN Security Council (2013) UN Doc S/RES/2118

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that the actions of the Syrian regime were inhumane 147 . The issue which humanitarian

intervention brought into Syria is that interventions need to be proportional; any intervention

into a full-scale war like Syria would require any ‘minimal force’ to be close to the maximum.

Disagreements within the Security Council do not focus on disagreements with the norm itself;

rather there are disagreements on the application of the norm in the hardest cases in which

prevention has failed, as noted by Evans148.

Weiss takes the view that although intervention did not occur in Syria, the reason humanitarian

intervention did not occur is because of the structure of the Security Council149. After all,

according to a constructivist view, structure affects agency and vice-versa. The United States,

United Kingdom and France may have had the will to intervene, but with the veto power of

Russia and China this possibility was not going to be feasible as “the five permanent members

can block resolutions before they are tested”150. The structure of the UN also renders the

question of feasibility prevalent. Rwanda demonstrated that even with the UN asking for an

increase in troops, it took six months to get the necessary support from member states151. The

moral dimensions of R2P were present as Bashar Al-Assad’s actions resulted in the deaths of

far more civilians than Gaddafi’s actions152, however the structure of the UN has impeded

action through the Council. R2P did not prevent action, instead geopolitical considerations, the

costs of intervention and a tougher military situation hindered intervention153.

The politics on the ground in Syria meant that intervention was not supported with insurgent

atrocities replacing those of the Assad regime – Syria was distinctly more complicated than

Libya154. Obama was pressured by domestic actors not to intervene in Syria with public and

political actors calling upon the President not to send in airstrikes155. With a lack of political

capital, lack of support domestically and internationally from other Security Council members

and a complicated political situation, it is evident why intervention was not the chosen route.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!147 Supra, n.142 148 ibid 149 OpCit, n.115, p.12 150 ibid, p.12 151 OpCit, n.89 152 OpCit, n.115, p.13 153 OpCit, n.141 154 ibid 155 Goldman, R (2013) “Obama Unleashes Public Relations Offensive”, Available from: http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/obama-unleashes-public-relations-offensive-make-case-syria/story?id=20201311 [Accessed on 01/05/15]


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Indeed, without the support of the United Kingdom, with the vote for intervention failing in

the House of Commons156, the United States was not able to rely on its key ally, making

humanitarian intervention not possible without support from the Security Council, meaning

that Syria had the support of moral reasons without the backing of political power. Weiss notes

that in comparison to Libya, where there was a backing of moral thought with political power,

in Syria, only the moral aspects of R2P were present with an absence of political power behind

intervention157. The weariness of the consequences of humanitarian intervention with complex

regional dynamics158 meant that intervention in Syria was not a popular or likely solution, as

Russia would have vetoed any Security Council resolution authorizing intervention159, where

as if compared to Libya, Gadaffi had no allies which would have stopped intervention.

Glanville perfectly sums up the reasons for why intervention did not occur as “norms matter,

but so do the material and strategic interests of great powers, and a norm is not rendered

meaningless by the fact that it is sometimes trumped by interests”160.

Humanitarian intervention in Syria on the basis of responsibility to protect would have been

justified in many ways. What is evident in Syria is that the strategic and material interests of

great powers were of more importance rather than the possible emergence of the norm. These

interests, or lack thereof, meant that the United States had no strategic or economic benefit to

intervention unlike in Libya where the gains from intervention outweighed the costs. Syria

demonstrates the opposite qualities to Libya – the economic benefits did not outweigh the costs

of intervention and would likely exacerbate a complicated political and military situation in

Syria.

Conclusion#!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!156 Chatham House (2014) “The End of Intervention? Implications of the Syria Vote for UK Foreign Policy”, Available from Chatham House Royal Institute of International Affairs at: http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20140506ImplicationsofSyriaVote.pdf [Accessed on 09/05/15] 157 OpCit, n.153 158 OpCit, n.144 159 Glanville, L. (2012) “Syria Teaches Us Little About Questions of Military Intervention” in Murray, R. & McKay, A. “Into the Eleventh Hour: R2P, Syria and Humanitarianism in Crisis”, Available from E-International Relations at: http://www.e-ir.info/wp-content/uploads/R2P-Syria-and-Humanitarianism-in-Crisis-E-IR.pdf [Accessed on 01/05/15] 160 ibid

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26

The conflicts in Rwanda, Libya and Syria demonstrate that norms do play an important role in

justifying intervention; in the one circumstance in which it occurred, worries about material,

economic and strategic concerns outweighed the will to intervene. The United States has been

vital in all three of these cases. The US failed to respect emerging norms in the case of Rwanda.

Due to the international backlash faced as a resolute of Rwanda and the wars in Iraq and

Afghanistan, the US has come to approve of certain norms under the Obama administration.

The norm of responsibility to protect emerges through the norm life cycle as Obama seeks to

change the identity of the US through acceptance of human rights and democracy.

However, because a norm has emerged, it does not mean that material interests will be set

aside, rather they will be taken in consideration with the norm depending on the identity of the

actor in question. If the accepted norm does not outweigh material interests then these realist

factors will be of more relevance, resulting in non-intervention in Syria and Rwanda. Syria and

Rwanda demonstrate that while norms are accepted and the Security Council condemns

violence, material interests will be prevalent to the decisions of the United States and major

powers. It was the very lack of interest, economic or otherwise, in Rwanda and Syria that meant

that intervention was not going to occur, despite a strong moral argument for humanitarian

intervention. Rwanda shows that without interests at stake, the benefits of intervention fail to

outweigh all costs – resulting in non-intervention from the US and other Council members.

Where as Syria shows that despite support for norms, complicated situations on the ground and

a lack of economic sources can hinder the most towards humanitarian intervention under R2P.

If the norm in question is supported and the material interests at stake are important then

intervention is more likely to occur. This is because it is supported by a strong moral argument

to stop mass atrocities along with the material benefits which intervention would provide – as

demonstrated by Libya. The US failure to intervene in Syria does not mean that R2P is no

longer respected, it instead means that the norm still has to be internalized into all countries.

Once internalization has occurred and material interests outweigh the costs of intervention then

intervention is more likely to occur. Ultimately this means that the combination of a realist and

constructivist analysis can be complementary when looking at the reasons for and against

intervention in Rwanda, Libya and Syria.


107-206 27

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