TPP paper 3 - Kyoto U

Working Paper No. 127

Graduate School of Economics, Kyoto University

What does the U.S. Agribusiness Industry Demand of Japan in the TPP Negotiations?

Problems revealed in the congressional hearings

and the USTR public comment procedures

Shuji Hisano

Graduate School of Economics, Kyoto University, Japan

E‐mail: [email protected]‐u.ac.jp

February 2013

Abstract

The main objective of this paper is to clarify how and in what way the U.S. agribusiness industry is asserting its

influence in the process of policy making and negotiations on the Trans‐Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP), by

taking into account the characteristics of the procedures in the U.S. trade negotiations and business networks

of influence and lobbying. Then, the paper will go on to delve into the detail of what the U.S. industry and trade

organisations and individual corporations have actually been demanding during the TPP negotiations,

particularly in relation to Japan’s commitment to the agreement. The subtle divergences of interests among

agribusiness subsectors will be taken into consideration when analysing the details of submitted comments and

relevant statements. Although it is non‐agricultural issues such as the deregulation of the financial and service

sectors, strengthening of intellectual property rights, enforcement of investor protection, and disciplining of

government procurement rules that are the focus of many of documents and statements issued by cross‐sector

business associations, the discussion in the paper is restricted to agriculture and food related industries.

Keywords: TPP negotiations, agribusiness, industry and trade organisations, business lobbying, discursive power


Shuji Hisano 2 / 23 Working Paper No.127

What does the U.S. Agribusiness Industry Demand of Japan in the TPP Negotiations?

‐‐ Problems revealed in the congressional hearings and the USTR public comment procedures ‐‐

Shuji Hisano (Kyoto University)

1.Introduction

On December 14, 2011, a hearing on the Trans‐Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement was held in the

SubcommitteeonTradeoftheU.S.HouseWaysandMeansCommittee.Followingopeningremarksbythe

tradesubcommitteechairmanKevinBradyandtestimonyfromDeputyU.S.TradeRepresentative(USTR)

Demetrios Marantis, there were representations on behalf of the private sector, including from

InternationalBusinessRelationsDirectorofCargill,Inc.,DevryS.Boughner,whoalsorepresentedtheU.S.

BusinessCoalitionforTPP,andfromVicePresidentofGlobalIntegratedSourcingandTradeforWal‐Mart

Stores,AngelaMarshallHofmann1.Aweekpreviously,theUSTR’srequestforpubliccommentonJapan’s

expressionof interest in theTPP agreementwasnoticed in theFederalRegister2. A total of 115public

comments, ofwhich113were submittedby January13, 2012 and an additional2 by February6, have

clearlyrevealedthescopeandextentofdemandsfromtheU.S. industry, includingagribusinessindustry

amongothers.

In the process of international policy‐making and policy‐transfer, non‐governmental actors have been

increasing their presence and role vis‐à‐vis national governments. International politics is not just a

processofinteractions(e.g.conflicts,negotiations,andalliances)amongnationalgovernments,butalsoa

process of diverse stakeholders’ commitments, such as business communities [Braithwaite & Drahos

2000;Levy&Newell2002],NGO/CSOs [Keck&Sikkink1998;Colás2002], andepistemic communities

[Haas1992].Althoughthelattertwogroupsofstakeholdersareengagedininfluencingpoliciesingeneral,

andtheTPPnegotiationsspecifically,industryorganisationsandcorporateactorswithmassivematerial,

institutional and ideological power at their disposal are overwhelming the other parties [Beder 2006;

Fuchs2007].Actorsinvolvedintheprocessofpolicy‐makingarenormallyequippedwithveryasymmetric

potentialsofpowerandinfluencethatarenotconstructedindiscursiveareasbutbasedondifferentand

often exclusive resources, competencies and (political) links they can dispose of [Dolata 2002; Andrée

2007]. In this respect, I do take a critical stance towards the poststructuralist view on narrative

constellations thattendstounderestimate theresource‐andstructure‐basedpowerrelations thatbring

theactorsintoposition.

The main objective of this paper is to clarify how and in what way the U.S. agribusiness industry is

assertingitsinfluenceintheprocessofpolicymakingandnegotiationsontheTPP,bytakingintoaccount

thecharacteristicsoftheprocedures intheU.S. tradenegotiations(Section2)andbusinessnetworksof

influenceandlobbying(Section3).Then,IwillgoontodelveintothedetailofwhattheU.S.industryand

trade organisations and individual corporations have actually been demanding during the TPP

negotiations, particularly in relation to Japan’s commitment to the agreement (Section 4). The subtle



divergencesof interestsamongagribusinesssubsectorswillbetaken intoconsiderationwhenanalysing

thedetailsofsubmittedcommentsandrelevantstatements.

Ihavetoacknowledgesomelimitationsinthispaper.InordertoexplorethefateoftheTPPnegotiations,

thenational andbusiness interests inAustralia andNewZealand, twootherkeyplayers in agricultural

tradeintheregion,cannotbeignored.However,duetotimeandcapacityconstraints,weneedtoexclude

these countries from our analysis, which will be limited to the United States. Furthermore, while it is

non‐agricultural issues such as the deregulation of the financial and service sectors, strengthening of

intellectual property rights, enforcement of investor protection, and disciplining of government

procurement rules that are the focus of many of documents and statements issued by cross‐sector

businessassociations [Kelseyed.2010], thediscussion inSection4 is restrictedtoagricultureandfood

relatedindustries.

2.U.S.LegislativeProceduresforTradeAgreements

The House Committee on Ways and Means is the chief tax‐writing committee in the House of

Representatives. It has a strongmandate (jurisdiction) over revenue‐related issues, such as tariffs and

trade agreements, social security policy and the medical insurance system. In addition to the

aforementioned hearing held in the Trade Subcommittee in December 2011, the committee convened

several hearings between January and April 2011. These included "Hearing on thePending FreeTrade

Agreements with Colombia, Panama, and South Korea and the Creation of U.S. Jobs" and "Hearing on

PresidentObama’sTrade PolicyAgenda". At the hearing on the pending FTAs held in January 2011, in

particular, testimony was given by President of the American Farm Bureau Federation and written

statements received from agricultural organisations and large agribusiness corporations (e.g. PepsiCo,

CampbellSoup,andConAgraFoods).

InadditiontotheHouseCommitteeonWaysandMeansanditscounterpartintheSenate,theCommittee

onFinance,othercommitteesalsoholdsimilarhearingsinrelationtotradeagreements.Forexample,the

House Committee on Agriculture held "Hearing to Review Market Promotion Programs and Their

EffectivenessonExpandingExportsofU.S.AgriculturalProducts" (Subcommittee onRural Development,

Research, Biotechnology, and Foreign Agriculture) in April 2011 and “Hearing to Review Pending Free

TradeAgreements" inMay2011. In the formerhearing,producerorganisations suchas theCoalition to

PromoteU.S.AgriculturalExports,theAmericanSoybeanAssociation,andtheU.S.MeatExportFederation,

repeatedlytestifiedastotheimportanceofUSDA’smarketpromotionprogrammes(i.e.exportsubsidies),

suchas“ForeignMarketDevelopmentProgram(FMD)","MarketAccessProgram(MAP)"and“Emerging

Markets Program (EMP)”; the producer organisations argued strongly in favour of continuation of the

market promotion programmes. In the latter hearing, other like‐minded organisations, such as the

National Association of Wheat Growers, the National Corn Growers Association, the National Pork

ProducersCouncil,andtheNationalCattlemen’sBeefAssociation,vigorouslyinsistedonthepromotionof

pending FTAs that aim to undermine agricultural protection policies in importing countries. Here we

observethenatureandthelogicofagriculturaltrade“liberalisation”policylaidbare.



ThelegislativeprocessintheU.S.usuallyproceedsviathefollowingsteps[HornbeckandCooper2011].

After being introduced, a bill is referred to the appropriate committee to go through the process of

Congressionalapproval.Abillisfirstconsideredinasubcommittee,whereitmaybeaccepted,amended,

orrejectedinamockmark‐upssession.Ifthemembersofthesubcommitteeagreetomoveabillforward,

it is reported to the full committee,where the process is repeated again. Throughout this stage of the

process, thecommitteesandsubcommitteescallhearings to investigate themeritsand flawsof thebill.

Theyinviteexperts,advocates,andopponentstoappearbeforethecommitteeandprovidetestimonyas

mentionedearlier.Ifthefullcommitteevotestoapprovethebill,itisreportedtotheflooroftheHouseor

the Senate, and the majority party leadership decides when to place the bill on the calendar for

consideration. If a bill is particularly pressing, itmaybe considered immediately.A billmustpass both

housesofCongressbeforeitgoestothePresidentforconsideration.AstheConstitutionrequiresthatthe

twobillshavetheexactsamewording,thebillsarebroughtintoalignmentattheConferenceCommittee

consistingofmembersfrombothchambers.Themembersofthecommitteeproduceaconferencereport,

intendedasthefinalversionofthebill,thenvoteagaintoapprovetheconferencereportandpresentitto

theSpeakeroftheHouseandthePresidentoftheSenatefortheirsignatures.Thebillisfinallysenttothe

President. If thePresidentagreessubstantiallywith thebill,hemaysign it into law,and thebill is then

printedintheStatutesatLarge.IfthePresidentbelievesthelawtobenegative,hemayvetoitandsendit

backtoCongress.Congressmayoverridethevetowithatwo‐thirdsvoteofeachchamber,atwhichpoint

thebillbecomeslaw3.

When it comes to trade agreements, however, there is amechanismcalled "TradePromotionAuthority

(TPA, also called Fast‐track negotiating authority)", by which the Congress grants the authority to the

President to negotiate and enter into a certain reciprocal free trade agreement. The Congress can then

vote on the agreement, butwithout amendment. TPA originated in the Trade Act of 1974, pursuant to

which itwas in effect between1975 and 1994. Itwas subsequently restoredby theTradeAct of 2002

(BipartisanTradePromotionAuthorityAct),TPAexpiredon July1,2007.What furthercomplicates the

current situation is the fact that free trade agreementswith Colombia, Panama and South Koreawere

negotiatedandsignedbeforetheexpirationofTPA,whiletheTPPnegotiationhasbeencarriedoutbythe

ObamaAdministration inaccordancewithTPAprocessbutwithout anyauthorityordirection todo so

fromCongress.AttheendofFebruary2012, itwasreportedthattheUSTRAmbassadorRonKirktolda

congressionalpanelthattheObamaAdministrationwouldasklawmakerstorenewTPAforon‐goingtrade

agreements4.At theSenateHearingonTradeAgendaonMarch7,20125, therewasadiscussionon the

possiblerenewalofTPA6.

UndertheTradeActof1974,thePresidentmust(i)affordinterestedpersonsanopportunitytopresent

their views regarding any matter relevant to any proposed agreement; (ii) designate an agency or

inter‐agency committee to hold a public hearing regarding any proposed agreement; and (iii) seek the

adviceoftheU.S. InternationalTradeCommission(ITC)regardingtheprobableeconomiceffectsonU.S.

industries and consumers of the removal of tariffs and non‐tariff barriers on imports7. In addition, the

expired Trade Act of 2002 outlined the following procedures. Before negotiations commence, the

Presidentmustconductcertainnotificationsandconsultationsthatinclude:(i)providingtheCongress,at



least90daysbeforeinitiatingnegotiations,withwrittennoticeofhis intent,andidentifyingthespecific

objectivesforthenegotiation,(ii)consulting,beforeandaftersubmissionofthenotice,withappropriate

CongressionalcommitteessuchastheHouseWaysandMeansCommittee,theSenateFinanceCommittee,

and the Congressional Oversight Group regarding any proposed agreement, and (iii) providing special

consultations on agriculture and import sensitive agricultural and textile products. The Presidentmust

also conduct specific notifications and consultations before and after agreements are entered into and

signed,including:(i)notifyingtheCongressinwritingofhisintentiontoenterintoanagreementatleast

90 days prior to doing so; (ii) consulting with appropriate Congressional committees (same as above

mentioned)regardingthenatureoftheagreementandanypotentialeffectsitmayhaveonexistinglaws;

(iii)notifying therevenue/financecommitteesat least180daysprior toentering into theagreementof

any potential changes to U.S. trade remedy laws that may be required; (iv) submitting private sector

advisorycommitteereports(discussedlater)totheCongress,thePresident,andtheUSTRnolaterthan30

daysafternotifyingtheCongressofhis intentiontoenter intoanagreement;(v)providingtheITCwith

trade agreement details at least 90 days prior to entering into an agreement; (vi) presenting to the

CongresstheITCreportontheimpactoftheagreementontheU.S.economyingeneralandinspecificU.S.

industriesnolaterthan90daysafterthePresidententersintotheagreement.

Thenasdescribedabove,thetradeagreementneedstobereviewed,priortotheimplementingbillbeing

introduced, by the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee and other

interestedcommittees.Althoughtheagreement(asalreadyagreedwithnegotiatingpartners)cannotbe

amended,theCongressisgivenanopportunitytoinvestigateadraftversionoftheimplementingbilland

express their views on it in mockmark‐ups. If approved in all of the aforementioned procedures and

signedbythePresident,thebillbecomesanimplementingtradelaw.

OnthebasisoftheseTradeActprocedures,theOfficeofUSTRnotifiedintheFederalRegisterofJanuary

26, 2009, of “Request for Comments and Notice of Public Hearing Concerning Proposed Trans‐Pacific

PartnershipFreeTradeAgreementwithSingapore,Chile,NewZealand,BruneiDarussalam,Australia,Peru

and Vietnam”8. Of the 57 submitted opinions, 25 were received from agricultural and food‐related

stakeholders.AfterhavingconsultedwithrelevantCongressionalcommittees,theUSTRnotifiedCongress

thatthePresidentintendstoenterintonegotiationsoftheTPPagreement“withtheobjectiveofshapinga

high‐standard, 21st century agreement with a membership and coverage that provides economically

significantmarketaccessopportunities forAmerica’sworkers, farmers, ranchers, serviceproviders,and

smallbusinesses”,andrequestingcommentsconcerningtheproposedagreementonDecember16,2009.

Inresponsetothenotice,130submissionswerereceived,including46fromagriculturalandfood‐related

stakeholders9. In addition, notificationsweremade requesting “CommentsConcerninganEnvironmental

Reviewof theProposedTPPAgreement" inMarch201010 and "CommentsonNegotiatingObjectivesWith

Respect toMalaysia'sParticipation inProposedTPPAgreement" in October 201011. Then, asmentioned

above, the notification to request public comments on the interest in the proposed TPP agreement

expressed by the Japanese,Mexican and Canadian governments respectivelywas issued in the Federal

RegisterofDecember7,201112.

Needless tosay, these threecountrieshadnotyetexpressed theirdecision to join theTPPnegotiations



formallyatthattime,andthereforetheprocedureswereregardedjustasareference.When,asanextstep,

Mexican andCanadian governments have officially announced their participation in negotiations of the

TPPagreementandtheU.S.governmenthasacceptedit,thenthePresidentistonotifytheCongress,and

negotiationswillbeformallylaunchednolaterthan90days13.Althoughitlookslikealongwaytogo,any

newlyparticipatingcountryisrequiredtoaccept“unconditionally”thegroundrulesalreadyagreedbythe

existingnineTPPcountriesandthereforewillnotlikelyextractanyconcessions,asclaimedinunisonby

the U.S. government and stakeholders. In addition to the U.S. automotive industry that has expressed

reservationsaboutJapan’sparticipationintheTPPnegotiations,thoseU.S.industryorganisationsthatare

facedwithmany problems concerning Japanese tariffs and non‐tariff barriers arewarning that Japan's

participation must not delay the negotiations and bring about any concession to “a high quality,

comprehensive, 21st century trade agreement". Therefore, it is possible that once the Japanese

government formally announces its intention to participate in the TPP agreement, the negotiation

proceduresasspecifiedintheTradeActcouldbeprocessedimmediately.

3.InfluenceofBusinessasaPoliticalActor

Itisnotthroughpublichearingsandcommentsalonethatrelatedindustryorganisationsareabletoexert

influence over the policy making processes that pertain to trade agreements and implementing bills.

Indeed, there isa lotof space (opportunitiesandroutes), inwhich industryassociationsand individual

companies can wield their influence as political actors in policymaking processes, especially those of

internationaltradepolicy.

1)MembershipofAdvisoryCommittees

Firstofall,industryassociationsandcorporateactorsregularlyparticipateasofficialmembersofvarious

expert advisory committees that are established by government agencies concerned with formulating

internationaltradepolicies.Forexample,thetrade‐relatedadvisorycommitteesystem,establishedbythe

U.S.CongressonthebasisofArticle135oftheTradeActof1974toensurethatU.S.tradepolicyandtrade

negotiatingobjectivesadequatelyreflectU.S.publicandprivatesectorinterests,ismanagedbytheUSTR's

OfficeofIntergovernmentalAffairs&Engagement(IAPE)incooperationwithotheragencies,includingthe

Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, and Labour, and the Environmental Protection Agency14. The

system consists of 28 advisory committees: (i) Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations

(ACTPN),(ii)fivepolicyadvisorycommitteessuchasAgriculturalPolicyAdvisoryCommittee(APAC)and

Industry Trade Advisory Committees (ITAC), and (ii) 22 technical advisory committees, including

AgriculturalTechnicalAdvisoryCommittee forTrade (ATAC, consistingof6 commoditygroups:animals

andanimalproducts;fruitsandvegetables;grains,feedandoilseeds;sweetenersandsweetenerproducts;

tobacco, cotton, peanuts, and planting seeds; and processed foods) and 16 sub‐committees of ITAC15.

Whilethemorethan600registeredmembersofthese28advisorycommitteesincludeacademics,labour

unions,consumergroups,environmentalgroupsandlocalgovernments,themembershipisdominatedby

representatives of industry associations and private companies. In particular, it is notable that the

membershipofAPACincludesrepresentativesfromlargeagribusinesscompaniessuchasPepsiCo,Tyson



Foods,ADM,andCargill,aswellasmajorproducersandmanufacturersassociationssuchastheAmerican

MeatInstitute(AMI),theAmericanSoybeanAssociation(ASA),theInternationalDairyFoodsAssociation

(IDFA), theNationalOilseedProcessorsAssociation(NOPA),andtheGroceryManufacturersAssociation

(GMA).Prominent in themembershipofATAarerepresentativesofCoca‐Cola,KraftFoods,andGeneral

Mills. Themembership list for the ATAC for Trade in Processed Food in particular, reads like a list of

leadingagribusinessinterests. Inaddition,theroleofthePresidentExportCouncil(PEC),establishedin

1973toserveasaprivateadvisoryboardfortradepolicyofsuccessivePresidents,isnotnegligible16.As

part of the President Obama’s “National Export Strategy” launched in January 2010, the President has

appointedtwentyprivate‐sectormemberstothePECwhichherelaunchedafterahiatus.ThePECincludes

CEOs of Xerox and Boeing as the chairperson and vice‐chairperson respectively, and CEOs of Dow

Chemical, Campbell Soup, and ADM. Significantly, the PEC also includes CEOs from the services and

investment sectorwhichhasbecomea focusof theTPPnegotiations.What isproblematic is that these

advisorycommitteemembershavefullaccesstoanarrayofdrafttextsandaninsideroleintheprocess,as

well as privileged access to government leaders, negotiators and policy makers. Indeed, as heavily

criticisedinthecaseofTPPnegotiations,these“advisers”arelegallybarredfromdisclosinganydetailed

informationabouttheissuesbeingdiscussedinthecommittees[Eagleton2006].Formallythepurposeof

the PEC is to directly advise the President on “government policies andprograms that affectU.S. trade

performance;promotesexportexpansion;andprovidesaforumfordiscussingandresolvingtrade‐related

problemsamongthebusiness, industrial,agricultural, labour,andgovernmentsectors”(accordingtothe

PEC’smissionstatement).However,throughmembershipofthePEC,corporateactorsareinapositionto

exert political influence on policy making processes by providing “expertise and knowledge” which

ensuresthattheirvestedinterestsarereflectedinreviewreportstoCongressontheagendaandcontents

oftradeagreements.

2)BusinessLobbyingGroups

Second, a range of powerful business lobby groups have been organised towield political influence on

behalf of business interests by approaching and donating to government officials and members of

Congress[Beder2006].IntheU.S.,theNationalAssociationofManufacturers(NAM)andtheChamberof

Commerce(USCC),amongothers,arelongstandingorganisationswithaverybroadbasisincludingsmall

andmediumsizedcorporations.But,when it comesto the influenceon international tradepolicies, the

roleofcross‐sectoralbusinesslobbygroupsledbylarge,transnationalcorporationsishighlysignificant.

ThelatterincludestheNationalForeignTradeCouncil(NFTC),theU.S.CouncilforInternationalBusiness

(USCIB),theEmergencyCommitteeforAmericanTrade(ECAT)17,andBusinessRoundtable(BRT).These

groupswork to achieve political goals through a combination of public relations and political lobbying

with a strong leverage effect derived from the fact that they claim to represent broad sectors of the

businesscommunity.

At the level of bilateral or regional cooperation,we also need to pay attention to the role of American

Chamber of Commerce and U.S. Business Council located abroad such as the American Chamber of

CommerceinJapan(ACCJ),theU.S.KoreaBusinessCouncil,andtheU.S.ChinaBusinessCouncil.TheFood

andAgricultureWorkingGroupof theU.S.ASEANBusinessCouncil is chairedbyCargill andMonsanto,



while the boardmembers of the National Center for APEC (NCAPEC), which is focused exclusively on

facilitating U.S. private sector input to the APEC process, includes Cargill, John Deere, Kraft Foods,

Starbucks, andWal‐Mart.Theseorganisationshavebeen taskedwith lobbyinggovernmentofficialsand

policymakers in partner countries. In a similar vein, the APEC Business Advisory Council (ABAC)was

established in 1995 to enable the private sector body of each member country to present

recommendations to APEC Leaders in an annual dialogue and advise APEC officials on business sector

prioritiesandconcerns”.

These business lobby groups have played an important role in swiftly responding to the requests for

public comments on the TPP and FTA negotiations, and also occasionally publicly releasing their

statementsandopenlettersonrelatedissues.Forexample,inits2009Agenda,theECATallocated7pages

(11pages in theECAT2011Agenda) to theTPP, andhas continuously listed the issue at the topof its

priorityagendas.TheECAThaspointedoutthat:“TPPisamuch‐neededresponsetotheproliferationof

preferential trade agreements in the Asia Pacific that do not include the United States” (ECAT 2011

Agenda).Assuch,theTPPisperceivedasanindispensableU.S.responsetoapossibilityofbeingsidelined

andexcludedfromtherapidlygrowingandvitalAsia‐PacificmarketsandtofearsthattheseregionalFTAs

“generally fall far short of the strong and comprehensive typeof FTA that theUnitedStates negotiates,

includingwith respect to such issues as services liberalization, investmentprotectionsand competition

policy”.WhatisnoteworthyisthatsinceatanearlystagetheTPPhasbeenviewedas“abuildingblocthat

could eventually bring other major trading nations, such as Canada, Japan, Mexico and Korea, into a

commonsetofrulesandmarket‐openingmeasuresthatwillprovideconcreteandimportantbenefitsfor

theUnitedStates”(ECAT2009Agenda).

NotwithstandingthefilteringandmanipulationofinformationbythemainstreammassmediainJapan18,

theECAThasunequivocallystatedthatthemainpointofTPPnegotiationsisnotlimitedtomarketaccess

forconsumerandindustrialgoodsandagriculturalmarketaccess,butratherextendstoawiderangeof

disputed, sovereignty‐threatening issues, such as substantial openings in all key service sectors, strong

rules on access, accountability and transparency in government procurement, and the promotion and

protection of intellectual property rights as well as foreign direct investment (e.g. provisions for

Investor‐StateDisputeSettlement(ISDS)mechanism).ThescopeandextentoftheinfluenceofECATand

otherleadingbusinesslobbyinggroupsispartlyevidencedbythefactthattheirviewsandpointsraised

andeven their texts andpassagesusedat an early stagehavebeen repeated in subsequent statements

issuedbyvariousotherbusinessassociations.

3)Ad‐hocLobbyingCoalitions

Third, specifically aimed to promote TPP negotiations and ensure that trade and investment rules

prioritise business interests over national and public concerns, the U.S. Business Coalition for TPP

(hereafterdescribedastheTPPCoalition)hasbeenformed,andreleasedthefirstavailablestatementand

open letter addressed to theUSTRambassadorRonKirk in June14, 2010, on itswebsite19. Alongwith

General Electric and Pfizer, Cargill andWal‐Mart are designated as co‐chairs of the TPP Coalition, the

membersofwhich includeKraftFoods,Mars,Monsanto,P&G,theAmericanFarmBureauFederationand



theCornRefinersAssociationsamongotheragriculturalandfood‐relatedorganisations.TheTPPCoalition

is far fromthe firstbusinesscoalition in theU.S.andelsewhere formedtoaddressad‐hocpolicy issues.

AccordingtoSharonBeder[2006],whohasexaminedtheroleoftransnationalcorporateagencyinsocial

policy,“avastnetworkofbusinesscoalitionsandgroups,supportedbyanarrayofwell‐fundedthinktanks

andpublicrelationsfirms,proliferatedduringthe1980sand1990s”,theperiodinwhichwewitnessedthe

advent of neoliberal globalisation that has been undermining the role of national governments and

democratic decision‐making processes in favour of transnational business interests as described in the

conceptof“corporatefoodregime”[McMichael2005].

While coordinating corporate/sectoral interests and enhancing the partnerships among their member

corporations,thesebusinesscoalitionshavebeenactingasaclass‐‐‐“transnationalcapitalistclass”inthe

wordsofLeslieSklair[2001],basedonthecommoninterestsofglobalcapitalratherthanacollectionof

competingcompanies‐‐‐,tointerveneintradeandinvestmentpolicy.

Forexample,behindtheshiftofGATT/WTOnegotiationsfromtariffbarrierstonon‐tariffbarriers,notably

toservicesandinvestmentrulesandintellectualpropertyrights,wecannothelpbutlookattheroleofthe

followingbusinesslobbyingcoalitions.

i. The U.S.‐based Multilateral Trade Negotiation (MTN) Coalition was formed in 1990 as part of the

lobbyingattempt toencouragethesuspendednegotiations, thensucceededby theAlliance forGATT

Now in 1994, the U.S. Alliance for Trade Expansion (USTrade) in 1999, and American Business

CoalitionforDoha(ABCDoha)in2005inordertopromotethemultilateralnegotiationsandsuccessful

ratifications in theCongress [Beder2010].However, theirorganisational structureandmanagement

areusually lessvisible,andfurthermoreit isdifficultto follow‐uptheiractivities indetailduetothe

factthatthesead‐hoccoalitionsusuallyceasetoexistafterachievingtheirpoliticalgoals.

ii. In the service sector, various coalitions have been established, such as the U.S. Coalition of Service

Industries (USCSI, 1982) and the European Services Forum (ESF, 1999), as an aggressive lobbying

efforttoplaceservicesfirmlyontheglobaltradeagenda.TheconclusionoftheGeneralAgreementon

Trade in Services (GATS) in the final GATT agreement in 1994was amajor victory for the services

industrylobbyingcampaignbytheUSCSI[Wesselius2002].Sincemostdevelopingcountrieshavenot

made strong liberalisation commitments under the 1994 GATS agreement, the industry lobby

campaignshavebeenre‐launchedinmanycountries,notablytheESF,toprepareforandinfluencethe

so‐called GATS 2000 negotiations with the objective of increasing the number and quality of

liberalisationcommitments[Eagleton2006].

iii. Also included in the final GATT agreement was Trade‐Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)

despite the opposition of developing countries. It has been revealed that behind the scenes of the

negotiation process, CEOs of Pfizer and IBM collaborated to persuade the U.S. government and

Congressfirstthroughtheadvisorycommittee(ACTPN),subsequentlythroughformingtheIntellectual

PropertyCommittee20 (IPC,1986) incooperationwith JapaneseandEuropean industryassociations

sothattheycouldorganiseinternational lobbyinginWashingtonD.C.aswellas inGenevato include

theissueinGATTnegotiations[Drahos2002].

iv. Intheagriculturalandfoodsector,withtheinitiativeofYum!Brands,agroupofmultinationalfastfood



chains including KFC, PizzaHat and Taco Bell, the U.S. Food Trade Alliancewas formed in 2005, in

cooperationwithotherfoodservicemultinationalssuchasMcDonald's,BurgerKing,andStarbucks.It

further evolved into the coalition of Global Alliance for Liberalized Trade in Food and Agriculture,

includingmore than40agri‐food industry lobbygroupsandproducers’groups from15countries in

ordertostimulatethefalteringagriculturalfreetradenegotiations[Eagleton2006:30].

v. It iswellknownthat theUSCIBorganised international lobbyingactivitiestowardstherealisationof

theMultilateralAgreementonInvestment(MAI),involvingtheEuropeanRoundTableofIndustrialists

(ERT),theJapanBusinessFederation(Keidanren),theInternationalChamberofCommerce(ICC)and

the OECD’s Business and Industry Advisory Committee (BIAC) [Beder 2006]. Faced with massive

anti‐MAIcampaignsorganisedbymanyNGOsacrosstheworld,theproposalwasfinallyabandonedat

theendof1998[Eagan2003].However,thebasicframeworkofbilateralinvestmentagreementsand

theknow‐howofnegotiatinginvestmentagreements(i.e.tokeepthedraft insecrettotheend)were

learnedintheprocess,andarenowbeingappliedintherecentbilateralinvestmentagreementsaswell

asTPPnegotiations21.

4)OtherPoliticalTools:InstrumentalandDiscursivePowers

Lastly but not least, political donations and “revolving door” practices are still important tools for

individualcompaniesandindustryassociationstodirectlyandinstrumentallyexercisetheirinfluenceon

policymakersandgovernmentofficials.Also,corporationsareabletoinfluencetheprocessofproducing

andcommunicatingpolicyideasandframingproblemsandsolutionstolegitimisecertainpolicygoalsby

funding university academics, research institutions, think tanks and policy discussion groups [Beder

2006]. This dimension of the political power of business is what Dris Fuchs [2007] has identified as

“discursivepower”22.Althoughitisbeyondthescopeofthisstudy,weneedtopayattentionparticularlyto

theroleofneoliberalthinktankssuchastheAmericanEnterpriseInstitute(AEI),theHeritageFoundation

and theCato Institute in settingpolicy agendas,while providing advice to andnetworking strategically

withofficialswhoareinfluentialinareasofpolicy23.

4.RequestoftheUnitedStatesforagriculture‐relatedindustry

Outofthe115publiccommentsconcerningtheannouncementmadebytheJapanesegovernmentof its

interestinjoiningtheTPPnegotiations,47commentsrelatetoagricultureandfoodissues,while28outof

the124commentsonCanadaand32outofthe94commentsonMexicoaresubmittedbyagricultureand

food‐relatedorganisations.Althoughthereisonlyaslightdifferenceintheareaofconcernsbetweenthe

countries,itisclearthatissuesintheagricultureandfoodsector,alongwiththetextileandapparelsector,

are particularly sensitive in the negotiations. Note, however, that a variety of interests are usually

representedby sectorally and geographicallydifferent organisations in the agriculture and food‐related

sector,resultinginthenumberofitstradeorganisationsoutnumberingothersectors.AlthoughintheU.S.

theAmericanFarmBureauFederationconsistingofrelatively large‐scalemarket‐orientedfarmsandthe

NationalFarmersUnion (NFU) composedof relatively small andmedium‐sized family farmsare largely

representingthevoicesofAmericanfarmersasacross‐sectoralorganisation24,theirunionisationratesare



notnecessarilyhighcomparedwiththoseofEuropeandJapan[Fukuda2008].Moreattentionneedstobe

paid to the fact that not only major agribusiness corporations including grain trade and processing

companiessuchasADMandCargill andagricultural inputcompanies suchasDeereandMonsanto,but

also major food processing and food service companies such as ConAgra Foods, Kraft Foods, and

McDonald’s on the demand side of agricultural products, are affiliated with some commodity‐based

producers’ organisations as regular members or supporting members. At the same time, commodity

producersandtheir tradeorganisationssometimeshavethemembershipofsome industryassociations

organised bymajor agri‐food corporations. In this regard,we can assume that varying interests of the

agricultureandfoodsectorhavebeenadjustedandreconciledbymajoragri‐foodcorporations,whilealso

contributing to cross‐sectoral industry associations, to increase their overall clout to influence policy

processes(Table1).

1)SomeConflictswithintheAgrifoodSector

Asawhole,agricultureandfoodrelatedindustriesalongwithothershaveurgedtheU.S.governmentand

its TPP partners “to move forward decisively and ambitiously” so that a final TPP agreement can be

reachedassoonaspossible.AlsotheystressthattheinclusionofJapanwould“enhancethesignificanceof

theTPPandmaketheagreementmuchmoreencompassing”,andthereforetheylargelywelcomeJapanto

thenegotiations.However,theyatthesametimeexpresstheirsenseofcautionaboutapossibledelayand

compromiseinthenegotiationsunderminingthecomprehensivenessoftheagreement.Inthemeantime,

it has turned out that therewere several conflictswithin the sectorwhen 63 agri‐food companies and

organisationswerepreparinganopen letterofDecember5,2011, issuedto theUSTRAmbassadorRon

Kirk and theUSDA Secretary Thomas Vilsack respectively in the aim of promoting the participation of

JapanintheTPPnegotiations.

One of the conflicts exposed during the process can be seen in the case of the American Soybean

Association(ASA,hereafterASA‐soyinordertodifferentiatefromASA‐sugar).Indeed,theASA‐soydidnot

signtheletterpartlybecauseitwassensitiveto“possibleadverseeffects”onU.S.soyexportsthatcould

stem from Japan joining the TPP25. It is ironic that soymeal exported to and used in Japan to feed its

livestock would be compromised if the Japanese livestock industry which is still viable due to trade

barriers is displaced by the increase of beef exports from the U.S. under the TPP trade deal. In the

statementsubmittedtotheUSTRpubliccomments,however,theASA‐soyhaschangeditsstanceandnow

supportsJapan’sinclusionintheTPPonthegroundthattheremovalofJapan’sbarrierstoU.S.livestock

exports“wouldoffersubstantialnewopportunitiestoexpandU.S.exportstoJapanofdairy,pork,beefand

poultry products”, whereby demand for soybeans as amajor component of feed rationswould expand

accordingly26. Also, theASA‐soy has calculated that Japan’s reform efforts under the TPP framework to

makeitsfarmersmoreefficientandcompetitivewillmeancontinuingtohaveaccesstolow‐costfeeds,and

thereforeJapanwillcontinuetoimportsoybeansfromtheU.S.forprocessing.However,itseemsastateof

delicatebalancebetweentheactualconflictsintheirnuancedexpressionsasinthecaseoftheAmerican

FeedIndustryAssociationsayingthat:“TheU.S.wouldultimatelybeexportingmorefeedtoJapaninthe

formofvalue‐addedproducts suchasmeatsanddairyproducts, and thosesaleswouldbenefit theU.S.

feed,livestockandpoultryindustries,andtheircustomers”27.



Another example of the nuanced conflictswithin the agri‐food sector is revealed between theNational

MilkProducersFederation(NMPF)andtheAmericanSugarAlliance(ASA‐sugar)ontheonehand,andthe

U.S. Dairy Export Council (USDEC), the Sweetener Users Association (SUA), the National Confectioners

Association(NCA)andtheGroceryManufacturersAssociation(GMA)ontheother.Thatmeanstherehave

beenconflictsbetweenthosewhoproduceagriculturalrawmaterialsininternationallyalesscompetitive

wayand therefore feel threatenedby free tradedealwithAustralia andNewZealand inparticular, and

thosewhouseandprocess rawmaterialsand thereforewant to source them internationallyata lower

cost. According to an article released by the weekly journal of Inside U.S. Trade, the agri‐food groups

adopted “a softer tone than they had in earlier drafts of the letter”28. For instance, they set no explicit

preconditions for Japan’s entry into the negotiations in the final version of the letter, though they had

previouslyplannedtodemandJapannottoexcludeanysectorsfromtheTPPtradedeal.Thiswasbecause

thetougherlanguagewasresistedbysomelettersignatoriessuchastheNMPF,whohasbeenurgingUSTR

toexcludeU.S.‐NewZealanddairytradefromtheTPPbyinsistingthattheycannotcompeteagainst“the

uniquelyanti‐competitivesituationinNewZealandwherebyonecompanytherecontrolsover90%ofthe

country’smilk production andmore than 40%of global dairy trade in key product areas”29. Instead of

usingtheterm“noexclusions”,thefinalletteronlystatedthatoneimportantissuetobetackledbeforea

decision on Japan can be made is whether Japan “recognizes and accepts that TPP must be a

comprehensive agreement”. This terminology is ambiguous enough to be interpreted severalways. It is

saidthatsimplybecauseanagreementis“comprehensive”doesnotnecessarilymeanthatallproductswill

be subject to complete liberalisation as argued in the Korea‐U.S. free trade agreement (in which rice

market access has been excluded, but still described as a “comprehensive” agreement) and therefore

acceptablefortheNMPFandthelike30.TheUSDECsharestheconcernoftheNMPFanddemandstheUSTR

to exclude theU.S.‐NewZealanddairy tradedeal unless there could be created a level playing field for

dairyproducts.DespitesimilarconcernsexpressedbytheASA‐sugar,however,theSUA,theNCA,andthe

Coalition for Sugar Reform who represents “consumer, trade, and commerce groups, manufacturing

associations,andfoodandbeveragecompaniesthatusesugar,aswellasthetradeassociationsforthese

industries”,aredemandingtheeliminationoftheUSDA’ssugarpricesupportprogrammeandlobbyingfor

the introduction of “the Free Market Sugar Act”, insisting that: “The current U.S. sugar policy puts

sugar‐using companies at a severe disadvantage. We are forced to pay artificially inflated prices that

seriouslyhamperourabilitytobeprofitableandtoinvestbackintoourbusiness”31.TheSUAadditionally

justifies its demand to eliminate U.S. barriers on sugar by referring that the sugar exclusion from

Australian additional market access in the U.S.‐Australia FTA “despite warnings this would lead other

countriestoseekexclusionsinfutureFTAs”hasactuallyleadto,forexample,thericeexclusionfromthe

U.S.‐KoreaFTAthat is “denyingU.S. riceproducersaccess to theKoreanmarket”,and theSUAdescribes

this as “a valuable lesson” tobe learnedbyU.S. tradenegotiators32. The commentbyWal‐Mart ismore

straightforward,sayingthat:“webelieveitisimperativethattheU.S.governmentholditselftothesame

standarditdemandsofitstradingpartnersbyofferingmeaningfulmarketaccessinpotentiallysensitive

areastotheU.S.suchastextile,dairyandsugar”33.

Inspiteofthesenuanceddifferencesandconflicts, theannouncementof interestbyJapanin joiningthe



TPPnegotiationshasbeenlargelywelcomedbyeventheorganisationsofthesesensitiveproducts,mainly

becauseitwould“offerimportantnewmarketaccessopportunitiesforU.S.dairyexports,aswellasawide

rangeofotheragriculturalproductsandtheU.S.economyasawhole”34.

Ontheotherhand,thereisanotherconcernexpressedbytheU.S.beefindustry.AccordingtotheInsideU.S.

Tradearticle,theU.S.beefindustryfavoursa“low‐keyapproachintermsofitsdemandsbecauseitdoes

notwanttoarousepublicoppositioninJapantolettinginmoreU.S.beefimports,orcreatetheimpression

that the U.S. is pressuring Japan on this issue”35,while at the same time theNational Cattlemen’s Beef

Association (NCBA), the American Meat Institute (AMI) and the U.S. Meat Export Federation (USMEF)

continuetoputmassivepressureonJapantoincreaseitsaccessforU.S.beefexportsespeciallyinrelation

to its age restrictions imposed in thewake of BSE outbreak. In this regard, it is interesting to see that

Wal‐Martmentionedinitscommentsthat:“Webelieve,however,thattheAdministrationshouldnotbeso

cautiousanddeliberativeaboutnewmembersastounderminethedesireandwillofaccedingcountriesto

jointheTPP.ATPPthat istoodifficultto join(eitherbydemandingpre‐negotiationof issuesor limited

participation in thenegotiationsprocess)will notdeliveron the fullpromiseof thepact”36. Cargill also

gave a comment on the issue with respect to food export embargo: “TPP economies should exhibit

necessary leadership and express through a binding commitment that food is not a weapon. The

agreementshouldprovideforfreeflowofexportsacrosstheregion”.Here,Cargilldidnotexplicitlyframe

the foodembargo issues in the languageof foodsecurity,but this is arguably related toa foodsecurity

concernfacedbyfoodimportingcountrieslikeJapan.Needlesstosay,thisframingofandsolutiontofood

securityconcernisbasedontheneoliberalcorporatefoodregime[McMichael2005], i.e.a foodsecurity

fulfilledbytradeliberalisation(i.e.eliminatingbothtariffandnon‐tariffmeasurestofacilitatefreetrade)

and by structural adjustment of the domestic agricultural sector (i.e. concentration to small number of

large‐scaleproducerswhoare“efficient”and“productive”innarrowlydefinedeconomicterms),asechoed

in the written testimony by Cargill’s international business relations director Mr. Boughner, who

mentioned that: “we see a strong TPP agreement as important to the increase of global food security

becauseitreducesbarrierstomovingfoodfromplacesofsurplustoplacesofdeficit”37.

Inthesamelineofarguments,CargillalongwiththeNorthAmericanGrainExportAssociation(NAEGA)

and theNational Grain and FeedAssociation (NGFA) claim the inclusion of an “innovative technologies

working group” in the TPP as a forum to address trade issues related to technology and agriculture,

including “low‐levelpresence (LLP)ofbiotechproductsand labelling issues”.Bysodoing,aswell asby

establishing a “science‐based regulatory framework” based on theWTO SPS and TBT agreements, it is

expectedtoincreaseandfacilitatetradeinagriculturalproductsproducedwithagriculturalbiotechnology

(i.e. genetically modification), which are regarded by them to be a top priority with respect to “the

challengesfacingglobalagricultureandenergysuppliesinthefuture”38.

2)IndividualInterestsandDemandsofKeySub‐sectors

Letustakeupsomeofthebusinessinterestthatseemstobecharacteristicofanindividualsub‐sector.

First, there are a lot of claims against Japan’s remaining high tariffs and demands for their immediate

removal, inanticipationofexpandingU.S.exportstoJapan,oneofthebiggestmarkets intheregion.For



example,JapanisoneofthelargestexportmarketsforU.S.dairyproducts(forthbehindMexico,Canada

andChinain2011),butaccordingtothedairysectororganisationstheiraccesstotheJapanesemarketis

stilltightlyrestrictedinmostproductareasduetoits“significanttariffbarriers”includingapproximately

25to35%oftheadvaloremtariffs,“acomplicatedquotasystem”andmark‐uppricesystemmanagedby

theAgriculture&Livestock Industries Corporation (ALIC), aswell as non‐tariff restrictions suchas the

foodadditiveapprovalsystemandhealthcertificaterequirement39.Similarly,theUSARiceFederation,the

global advocate for all segments of the U.S. rice industry, complains that, despite the fact that Japan

consistentlyranksasthesecondlargestexportmarketforU.S.rice,itspotentialtoexportmorericefrom

the U.S. has been restricted by the limited amount of TRQ (tariff‐rate quota) import commitment

(approximately7‐8%ofdomesticconsumption)requiredundertheWTOagreementand“aprohibitively

high”out‐of‐quotaduty(setat¥341perkilogramme,oraboutsixtimestheFOBpriceofU.S.riceshipped

toJapan).TheUSARiceFederationwarnsthatanyexceptionoftarifflinesfromtheTPPnegotiationwill

weakenthebenefitsofaprospectiveagreementtotheUnitedStates40.

Second,evenintheporksector,inwhichJapanisthelargestvaluemarketandthesecondlargestvolume

marketintheworldforU.S.porkexports,theNationalPorkProducersCouncil(NPPC)claimsthata“Gate

Price” system imposed by Japanese government has severely restricted imports of many lower and

medium‐pricedporkcuts41. JapanalsoheavilyreliesontheU.S.forsoybeansandsoymeal importswith

zero‐dutyTRQ,making Japan theU.S. soybean industry’s third largest country (afterChinaandMexico)

while ranked 7th for U.S. soy meal export destination. However, the National Oilseed Processors

Association (NOPA) claims that due to 6.5%and7.6%of the ad valorem rates imposedon refined and

crudesoybeanoilsrespectively Japanremainsrankedonly20th forU.S.soybeanoil42.TheCornRefiners

Association(CRA)alsotargetsremaininghightariffsforstarch‐basedsweeteners(glucose,dextroseand

highfructosecornsyrup)andstrictlylimitedTRQforunmodifiedstarch,althoughlowerorzerotariffsare

alreadyimplementedformostrefinedcornproducts43.

Third, there are many claims concerning the SPS requirements that have been one of contentious

non‐tariffbarrierissuesforsometime.Withregardtorice,testingformaximumresiduelevels(MRL)of

approximately800chemicalsandtestingforthepresenceofthegeneticallymodifiedtraitofLibertyLink

601 rice are required on U.S. rice as a condition of entry44. The USA Rice criticises thesemeasures as

unscientificandnon‐tariffbarrierstoberemoved.Inaddition,BSErelatedrestrictions(i.e.theagelimits)

on U.S. beef imports, MRL sanctions on U.S. potato imports, and “rigorous” pest treatment process

requiredfortheimportofapplesandcherriesareraisedasconcernsbyrespectiveproducerorganisations

aswellasfoodprocessingandservicecompanies.

Fourth,remaininghightariffsonprocessedfooditemshavealsodrawnmuchattention.TheNCArequests

theeliminationof thehightariffsof10‐25%onU.S. confectionerywithin fiveyears,while theGMAhas

raised the SPS and TBT related issues including regulations on the use of ingredients, additives and

processingaidssomuchastoberegardedbytheGMAas“unnecessaryrestrictiveandoverlyinfluenced

byactivistviews”,emphasisingthat:"Shouldanyofthenewpartnersopenlyexpressoppositiontoanyof

thespecific‘plus’textputforwardbytheU.S.whichisstronglysupportedbyGMAcompaniesandothers,

GMAwouldbereluctanttosupportthatcountry’scandidacygoingforward”45.TheAmericanFrozenFood



Institute(AFFI)expressesdissatisfactionbycitingthefactthatJapan,withatotalfoodanddrinkmarketof

$635 billion, imports “only” $11.1 billion of U.S. food and agricultural products. By referring to the

increased food exports to Canada under theNAFTA, the AFFI shows the expectation that: "Eliminating

Japanesenon‐tariffbarrierstotradeforU.S.foodimportsalonewouldrepresentnewopportunityforthe

frozenfoodindustry”46.

Fifth, comments fromYum!Restaurants International (Yam!Brands’ international arm),whichoperates

morethan1,500KFCandPizzaHutrestaurantsinJapan,areverysuggestiveandinclusive47.Concernsfor

thecompanyincludebothtariffandnon‐tariffbarriersthatrestricttheimportofanumberofingredients

usedintheirrestaurants.Byreferringspecificallytofrozenfries,freshandprocessedcheese,frozenraw

chickencut,andpreparedcorn inparticular, thecompanyestimatesthateliminatingthesetariffswould

allowthecompanytoimport“tensofmillionsofdollarsofadditionalproductsfromU.S.producersforits

restaurants in Japan”. When it comes to non‐tariff barriers, the company requests the USTR to put

additional pressure on Japan to deregulate or eliminate BSE related restrictions of U.S. beef, avian flu

related restrictions on U.S. poultry, pesticide residue sanctions policy on U.S. potatoes, and lengthy,

cumbersome and unnecessary procedures required for new active ingredients. On the other hand,

Wal‐MartStores Inc.,whichoperates thenetworkofmore than9,700stores in28countriesworldwide

and has launched business in Japan through its subsidiary Seiyu (since 2002), submitted its comments

withafocuson“inefficientandcollusivedistributionnetworks”basedonitsownexperienceinstruggles

toenterthemarketbeforeacquiringSeiyu,alongwithremaininghightariffsonstaplegoodssuchasrice,

dairy andother foodproducts suchas fish, citrus, redmeat, etc. andexcessive inspections required for

apples. The company has also been involved in lobbying activities in the service sector through the

CoalitionforServiceIndustries(CSI)andthelike,thoughcoveringitisbeyondthescopeofthispaper.

Sixth,despiteassumptionsthatCropLifeAmerica(CLA),representingtheU.S.plantscience(agrochemical)

industry,wouldmentiontheissueofGMOmandatorylabelling,commentsactuallyrefertotheproblemof

intellectualpropertyrights.Thisisprobablybecauseitsorganisationalconfigurationisdifferenttothatof

CropLife International(CLI),which iscontrolledbytransnationalagro‐biotechnologycompaniessuchas

Monsanto,SyngentaandDuPont.TheCLAcommentspositivelyonJapan’swillingnesstotakepartinthe

TPP negotiations by reasoning that Japan’s commitments (as well as those of Canada and Mexico) to

implement and enforce IPR “must be leveraged with those of the existing TPP countries". Also, the

association’s commentsdrawattention to the freer foreign investment flowsand strongerprotectionof

investors,“transparent,effective,enforceableandmutuallycoherent”regulatorysystems,andconditions

forfaircompetitioninrelationtotheso‐calledstate‐ownedenterprises(SOEs).

Lastly,IhavetorefertothecommentssubmittedbytheOrganicTradeAssociation(OTA)48.Itisestimated

that the organic foodmarket grew8%while thematuremarket of other foods only experienced 0.6%

growthin2010;especiallyU.S.organicexportsareanimportantdriverfortheU.S.organicsectorwithits

exports of all organic products at $1.7 billion in 2009, contributing to well‐paying jobs and incomes

generated throughout rural economies; and relatively highermargins on exports are also beneficial to

small‐ and medium‐sized organic companies. However, we should be reminded that many organic

companieshavegonethroughacquisitionsbymajorfoodprocessorssuchasHeinz,Kellogg,KraftFoods,



PepsiCoandCampbell Soup,whoactuallyhavea stake in theOTAbehind itsmember listofmore than

1,130small‐andmedium‐sizeorganiccompanies49.Theinterestofthesemajorfoodcompaniesisnotin

therealisationofenvironmentally‐soundandlocally‐orientedsustainableagriculture,butratheraimedat

profiting from the rapidly growing organic market and export opportunities. The OTA complains that

inconsistenciesandduplicationofproceduresbetweentheU.S.NationalOrganicProgram(NOP)andthe

JapanAgriculturalStandards(JAS)certificationfororganicproducts“discourageanyattemptstocultivate

Japanese markets by small‐ and medium‐size U.S. organic companies”. It also regards Japan’s

implementationofazero‐toleranceresiduepolicyforpesticideandexclusionofNOP‐approvedmaterials

as trade restrictive barriers. The association’s concerns and demands mentioned beforehand are not

significantlydifferentfromother“conventional”industryassociations50.

5.Conclusion

It should be noted that the above‐mentioned issues requested byU.S. agri‐food groups and companies

concerning Japan’s possible inclusion in the TPP negotiations largely but not exclusively overlap with

thoselistedinaseriesofannualreportsthattheUSTRsubmitstotheCongress,suchas“NationalTrade

Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers”, “Report on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS

Report)"and“ReportonTechnicalBarrierstoTrade(TBTReport)”thathavechaptersdedicatedtoeach

contesting country, including Japan. In thisway, these industry concerns have been raised publicly but

anonymously.Byanalysingindetailthosepublichearingsandcommentsmade,statementsreleased,and

openlettersissuedbyrelevantagri‐foodtradeorganisationsandcompanies,however,allthedotsarenow

connectedandidentified.Despitesomeconflictinginterestsamongsub‐sectorsofsensitiveproductsthat

areusuallyatacompetitivedisadvantagewithAustraliaandNewZealand,andalsodespitesomenuanced

differences between sub‐sectors whose products have penetrated into the Japanese market and those

whose exports to Japan have been restricted, it is obvious that Japan’s participation in the TPP is

considered indispensable and positively awaited in order to achievemeaningful gains from themarket

undertheTPPAgreement.Itisworthyofattentionthat,becauseofthesignificanceoftheJapanesemarket

tobeincludedintheTPP,therehavebeensomenuancedandmoderateapproachesbyadvisingcautionin

making excessive demands for Japanwhich could undermine Japan’swillingness to join the TPP, or by

bringing intoarguments the ideaof “food security”witha concernof importing countries like Japan in

mind. At the same time, however, there are found to be clear and strong messages that Japan's

participationshouldnot leadtoanydelayandcompromiseintheTPPnegotiations,puttingpressureon

U.S.negotiatorsnottogiveanyroomforrenegotiationandcompromisetopossiblenewmembers.

Due to limited space and time, this paper has been focused exclusively on agriculture and food related

issuesandthereforeshortofelucidatingtheinterestsofindustryinservices,intellectualpropertyrights,

publicprocurement,andinvestmentrelatedissues51.Whileit isevidentthatagreementsontheseissues

wouldbenefitmultinationalcompanies[Wallach2012b],whatimpactsithasontheU.S.domesticindustry,

especiallyemployment,isnotnecessarilyclear.AccordingtotheU.S.ChamberofCommerce,itisestimated

that nearly 18millionU.S. jobs depend on tradewith its FTApartners, 5.4million ofwhich have been



createdbytheincreaseintradeunleashedbythefreetradeagreements52.TheUSDAestimatesthatevery

$1 billion worth of agricultural exports supports 9,000 jobs and generates an additional $1.4 billion

throughout theU.S. supplychainsofagriculturalproducts53.Whether theyare trueornot, theTPPand

other FTAs are viewed by the Obama Administration as a key policy to achieve the objectives of its

"NationalExportStrategy":namelytodoubletheexportandcreate2millionjobsforthecomingfiveyears

(2010‐15). This iswhy thephrase of "job creation" is always included in the title andoutline ofpublic

hearingsandotherofficialdocuments.However,negativeimpactsofFTAsonpeople'slivelihoodsandlocal

economieshavealreadybeenexperiencedbymanyintheNAFTA.Infact,scepticismandcriticismagainst

the TPP and FTAs have spread among trade unions, civil society organisations and family farmers'

organisations in the U.S. and other TPP member countries, providing the potential to raise public

awarenessandanti‐TPPmovementsbeyondthenationalborders54.

IthasbecomeclearthattheTPPagreementencroachesonpoliciesandinstitutionsrelatedtonationaland

peoples’ sovereignty.However, the content andprocessesof theTPPnegotiations arebeingkept secret

fromthepublic(andeventolegitimatelawmakers)andwillnotbedisclosedtothepublicforuptofour

years after the conclusion of the agreement. This undemocratic process of negotiations has attracted

intense criticism [Wallach2012a]55.Notwithstanding the secrecywithwhich thenegotiationsarebeing

conducted,representatives(lobbyists)frommajorcompaniesandindustryorganisationsaregivenaccess

to the “confidential”officialdocumentsandshare the informationregularlywithnegotiators (highrank

officials) ofmember governments as laid out in the Section3. These lobbyists arenot justprivy to the

processandoutcomesofnegotiations,butarealsowieldingdirectandindirectinfluenceoverthepolicy

settingagenda,andgenerating“knowledge”tobereflectedinpolicydocuments[Beder2006].

Although these kind of argumentsmight be dismissed as "non‐academic", political economy bears the

responsibilityofanalysinginteractionsbetweeneconomicactors/processesandpoliticalactors/processes

theoreticallyandempirically,andthereforenowisthetimeforustoplaythissignificantroletodoso.





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1 Thefulltextoftheseremarksandtestimoniesareavailableonthefollowingwebsite:http://waysandmeans.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=2715732 Office of theUnited StatesTradeRepresentative, “Request forCommentson Japan’s Expressionof Interest in theProposedTrans‐Pacific PartnershipTradeAgreement”,FederalRegister, Vol.76,No.235,December7, 2011,Notices,pp.76476‐76479[FRDocNo:2011‐31322].

3 It is said that any clause of free trade agreements that is not beneficial to theU.S. (business) interests could beregardedasinvalidonthegroundthatitwouldcontradicttheU.S.Constitution,which“superiority”isstipulatedintheimplementationlawsofeach freetradeagreement.This isremarkableasweknowthattheU.S.governmentalwaysnegotiates for a trade agreement that is highly binding and providing other governments with less room tomanoeuvre.4 ThefulltextofRonKirk’stestimonyisavailableonthefollowingwebsite:http://waysandmeans.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=2814895 Thefulltextofcommitteemembers’statementsandRonKirk’stestimonyandthevideoofthewholehearingsanddiscussionsareavailableonthefollowingwebsite:http://www.finance.senate.gov/hearings/hearing/?id=100a5535‐5056‐a032‐5221‐cd749e768acf 6 WehavetoberemindedthateventheFTAswithColombia,PanamaandSouthKorea,whichweresignedbytheBushadministrationwithavalidTradePromotionAuthorityandthereforesupposedtobevotedwithoutmodificationbythe Congress, facedwith a difficulty in the process of political accommodation. TheWhiteHouse eventually couldenactthoseFTAsbyurgingtheSenatemajorityDemocrattopromotetheratificationoftheFTAimplementationlawson the condition of the renewal of a trade adjustment assistant (TAA) programme,which is aimed to provide jobtrainingandemploymentsearchservices,aswellasincomeandinsuranceassistancetoworkerswhohavelostjobsduetotheeffectsofinternationaltrade,whileatthesametimeurgingtheHousemajorityRepublicantoratifytheTAAlawontheconditionofthepromotionoftheFTAimplementationlaws.However,duetoabipartisancompromiseontheTAA, there seems less room topersuade less internationally competitive industry sectors and labourunions tosupporttheTPPthatwillsurelyandnegativelyimpactonthem.7 AccordingtotheUSITCNewsRelease12‐087,August7,2012,theinvestigations“U.S.‐Trans‐PacificPartnershipFree



Trade Agreement Including Canada and Mexico: Advice on the Probable Economic Effect of Providing Duty‐FreeTreatmentforImports”wererequestedbytheU.S.TradeRepresentative(USTR)inaletterreceivedJuly19,2012.TheUSITC was expected to submit its confidential report to the USTR by November 19, 2012. The USITC was alsoscheduledtoholdapublichearinginconnectionwiththeinvestigationsonSeptember12,2012. 8 FederalRegister,Vol.74,No.15,January26,2009,Notices,pp.4480‐4482[FRDocNo:E9‐1515].9 Thefulltextofthesepubliccommentsareavailableonthefollowingwebsitewithasearchfor“USTR‐2009‐0002”10 FederalRegister,Vol.75,No.57,March25,2010,Notices,pp.14479‐14481[FRDocNo:2010‐6653].11 FederalRegister,Vol.75,No.202,October20,2010,Notices,pp.64778‐64779[FRDocNo:2010‐26332].12 FederalRegister,Vol.76,No.235,December7,2011,Notices,pp.76478‐76481,forJapan[FRDocNo:2011‐31322],Mexico[FRDocNo:2011‐31317],andCanada[FRDocNo:2011‐31318].13 According to thisprocedure,PresidentObama formallyannounced to inviteMexico (June18,2012)andCanada(June19,2012)tojointheTPPnegotiations.TheAdministrationshortlynotifiedtheCongressofitsintenttoincludeMexico and Canada in the TPP negotiations. The notification has triggered a 90‐day consultation period with theCongressonU.S.negotiatingobjectiveswithrespecttothosetwocountries. 14 http://www.ustr.gov/about‐us/intergovernmental‐affairs/advisory‐committees 15 ITAC’s subcommittees include: 01‐ Aerospace Equipment; 02‐ Automotive Equipment and Capital Goods; 03‐Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals,Health ScienceProducts andServices; 04‐ConsumerGoods;05‐DistributionServices;06‐EnergyandEnergyServices;07‐ForestProducts;08‐ InformationandCommunicationsTechnologies,Services,andElectronicCommerce;09‐Non‐FerrousMetalsandBuildingMaterials;10‐ServicesandFinanceIndustries;11‐Small andMinorityBusiness; 12‐ Steel; 13‐ Textiles and Clothing; 14‐ CustomsMatters andTrade Facilitation; 15‐IntellectualPropertyRights;16‐StandardsandTechnicalTradeBarriers.16 http://www.trade.gov/pec/.AlthoughthePECincludesmembersfrombothCongressandGovernmentofficials,itisrepresentativesoftheprivatesector(corporateCEOs)whoareplayingacrucialrole.17 TheECATisanassociationofthechiefexecutivesofleadingU.S.businessenterpriseswithglobaloperations. 18 TherhetoricemployedbyJapanesemassmediaandthemainstreambusinessfederation“Keidanren”isaimedtomanipulatewhatisactuallyarguedintheTPPnegotiationsandtoturnitintoamatteroffreetradeofgoods.Then,various false dichotomies have been presented, such as: (i) “98.5% vs. 1.5%” discourse: based on the fact thatAgricultureGDPasshareoftotalGDPis1.5%,buttherealityisthattheagriculturalsectoringeneralhasamultipliedeffectoverbroadareasof localeconomiesandbearsecologicalandculturalmultifunctionalvalues.(ii)“Opentovs.isolationfromglobaleconomies”:basedonthefactthatsomeofagriculturalproductssuchasriceareprotectedwithrelativelyhightariffsandnon‐tariffregulations,buttherealityisthatJapanheavilyandexceptionallydependsonfoodimport(foodimportdependencyismorethan60%onacaloriebasis):i.e.alreadytoomuchopentotheglobalmarket,andifcomparedtootherfood‐importingdevelopedcountriessuchasSouthKorea,NorwayandSwitzerland,Japan’saveragetariffrateforagriculturalproductsis low,andrathercomparablewithfood‐exportingcountries.(iii)“IfnotjointheTPP,JapanwouldgetleftbehindotherAsiancountries”discourse:basedonthefactthatASEANcountriesandSouthKoreaareveryactiveinfreetradeagreements,buttherealityisthattherelationshipamongASEANcountrieshas been destabilised due to individual TPP deals with the U.S. and therefore major ASEAN economies such asThailandandIndonesiaarescepticaloftheTPPandkeepadistancefromit.ItisalsoarguedthatJapan’sFTApolicyisleft behind South Korea’s rather aggressive FTA policy. However, it is meaningless to compare the level of tradedependency ratio to GDP between Korea and Japan since the latter has relatively huge domestic market, whileextremely high trade dependency makes Korean economy unstable when the global economy goes into decline.Furthermore,itismanipulativelydescribedthattheagriculturalsectoristhebiggesthurdlefor“benefiting”freetrade,globaleconomy.Inadditiontotheseattacksontheagriculturalsector,thecooperative,health‐care,andpostalservicesectors comeunder the lashof themainstreammassmedia andKeidanren. Sucha situationhas triggeredmassiveanti‐TPP campaignswith an extra effort to criticise the role ofmainstreammassmedia, analyse the historical andstructuralbackgroundsofTPPandrevealitshiddenagendaandprobableimpactsonthepeople’s livingconditions.For example,Noubunkyou [Rural CultureAssociation Japan] ed. (2011)TPP‐toNihon‐noRonten [TPPandPointsofContentionforJapan],Tokyo:RuralCulturalAssociationJapan;Hagiwara,S.(2011)Nihon‐noKouzou‘Kaikaku’‐toTPP[Structural‘Reform’ofJapanandTPP],Tokyo:ShinnihonShuppansha;Nougyou‐to‐Keizai[AgricultureandEconomy],Extra Edition on TPP, May 2011; Nougyou‐to‐Keizai [Agriculture and Economy], Special Issue on TPP, May 2012;Tashiro,Y.ed.(2012)TPP‐Mondai‐noShin‐Kyokumen[ANewPhaseofTPPIssues:ReasonstoStopTPP],OtsukiShoten.AllofthesearepublishedinJapanese. 19 U.S.BusinessCoalitionforTPP,“TPPCoalitionExpressesStrongSupportforTPPNegotiations:UrgesU.S.andTPP



NegotiatingPartnerstoCompleteaComprehensiveandHigh‐StandardAgreementby2011”,NewsRelease, June14,2010.20 The IPCwas an adhoc coalition of 13majorUS corporations:Bristol‐Myers,DuPont, FMCCorporation,GeneralElectric,GeneralMotors,Hewlett‐Packard, IBM, Johnson&Johnson,Merck,Monsanto,Pfizer,Rockwell InternationalandWarnerCommunications.21 JaneKelseydescribestheTPPasbeing“theMultilateralAgreementonInvestmentonsteroids”inaninterviewwithSamVarghese,“TPPA'threatensnationalsovereignty'”.iTWire,October21,2011. http://www.itwire.com/opinion‐and‐analysis/open‐sauce/50568‐tppa‐threatens‐national‐sovereignty/50568‐tppa‐threatens‐national‐sovereignty?limitstart=022 Fuchsdescribesdiscursivepoweras“thecapacitytoinfluencepoliciesandthepoliticalprocessassuchthroughtheshapingofnormsandideas”[Fuchs2007:139],wherebypoliticalauthorityandlegitimacyareincreasinglyacquiredbybusinessactor.23 Think‐tank is generally defined as a groupof peoplewith experience orknowledgeof a particular subject,whoworktoproduceideasandgiveadvice.However,severalpoliticalscientistsdefineit inadifferentway, forexample:“Think tanks attempt to influence or inform policy through intellectual argument and analysis rather than directlobbying” [Stone2000]; “Rather thanorganisationscommitted toobjectiveanalysisofpolicyproblems, think tankshavebecomeorganisationsthatturnexpertsintoadvocatesandpolicyinformationintoammunition”[Rich2004].24 ThereisalsotheNationalFamilyFarmersCoalition(NFFC)representingfamilyfarmandruralgroupswithacloserelationwithagrowing international foodsovereigntymovement.TheNFFCaswellas theNFUareopposedtotheon‐goingFTAsandTPPthatdonotlearnanylessonsfromNAFTA.25 InsideU.S.Trade, “U.S.Food,AGGroupsExpressEagerness for Japan to JoinTPPTalks”. InsideU.S.Trade,Vol.29,No.48,December9,2011.26 Comments by the ASA‐soy, January 13, 2012 [Docked# USTR‐2011‐0018‐0014]; Inside U.S. Trade, “AmericanSoybeanAssociationPushestoAllowJapanintoTPPTalks”.InsideU.S.Trade,Vol.30,No.2,January13,2012.27 CommentsbytheAFIA,January13,2012[Docked#USTR‐2011‐0018‐0076]28 InsideU.S.Trade,op.cit.,December9,2011.29 CommentsbytheNMPF,January25,2010[Docked#USTR‐2009‐0041‐0026].30 InsideU.S.Trade,op.cit.,December9,2011.31 The Coalition for Sugar Reform, “The Coalition for Sugar Reform Applauds U.S. Reps. Pitts and Davis forIntroduction of Bipartisan Legislation: The Free Market Sugar Act”, April 6, 2011. The ASA‐sugar expresses itsconcerns that: “Granting of duty‐free treatment to sugar imports fromTPP countries (notablyAustralia, aswell assomepotentialparticipantsinSoutheastAsiaandOceania…insertedbytheauthor)wouldclearlyberuinoustotheU.S.sugarindustryandwouldmakeoperationofthedomesticsugarprogram,mandatedbyCongressintheFarmBill,impossible…. The United States is already the world second largest net importer of sugar and has committee toimportingnolessthan15%ofitsneeds.Inmanyyears,thatpercentageishigher.Asamatterofnationalfoodsecurity,theremainingU.S.sugarindustryshouldnotbeputatrisk”.32 CommentsbytheSUA,January13,2012[Docked#USTR‐2011‐0018‐0024].33 CommentsbyWal‐MartStores,Inc.,January13,2012[Docked#USTR‐2011‐0018‐0113].34 CommentsbytheNMPF,January13,2012[Docked#USTR‐2011‐0018‐0037].35 InsideU.S.Trade, “AGGroups,AutoCompaniesatOddsover JapanEnteringTPP inNearTerm”. InsideU.S.Trade,Vol.29,No.45,November18,2011.36 CommentsbyWal‐MartStores,Inc.,op.cit.37 WrittenTestimonyofDevryS.Boughner,DirectorofInternationalBusinessRelations,Cargill, Inc.,beforetheU.S.HouseofRepresentatives,CommitteeonWaysandMeans,TradeSubcommittee,December14,2011.Inthisregard,itisinterestingtoseethecommentsbytheASA‐sugarontheTPPandprobableeconomiceffectofprovidingduty‐freetreatmentforimportsbeforetheITC,March2,2010[InvestigationNos.TA‐131‐034/TA2104‐026],sayingthat:“TheUnitedStatesisalreadytheworldsecondlargestnetimporterofsugarandhascommittedtoimportingnolessthan15%of itsneeds. Inmanyyears, thatpercentage ishigher.Asamatterofnational foodsecurity, theremainingU.S.sugarindustryshouldnotbeputatrisk”.ThiskindoffoodsecuritydiscourseisexactlyassameaswhattheJapaneseMinistryofAgriculturehaslongbeeninsistingininternationalnegotiations. 38 CommentsbyCargill,Inc.,January13,2012[Docked#USTR‐2011‐0018‐0111].



39 CommentsbytheNMPF,op.cit.40 CommentsbytheUSARice,January13,2012[Docked#USTR‐2011‐0018‐0075].41 CommentsbytheNPPC,January13,2012[Docked#USTR‐2011‐0018‐0073].42 CommentsbytheNOPA,January13,2012[Docked#USTR‐2011‐0018‐0039].43 CommentsbytheCRA,January13,2012[Docked#USTR‐2011‐0018‐0089].44 CommentsbytheUSARice,op.cit.45 CommentsbytheGMA,January13,2012[Docked#USTR‐2011‐0018‐0044].46 CommentsbytheAFFI,January13,2012[Docked#USTR‐2011‐0018‐0100].47 Comments by Yum! Restaurants International, January 13, 2011 [Docked# USTR‐2011‐0018‐0063]; Please notethat the network of Yum! Brands restaurants in Japan is owned and operated by Mitsubishi Corporation, whichestablishedKFCJapanjointlywithUSKFC(partofYum!Brands, Inc.since2002) in1970,boughtoutYum!Brands’stake of the joint subsidiary inDecember 2007. Despite this background, Yum! Restaurants International calls theJapanesenetworkofKFCandPizzaHutrestaurantsas“its”restaurants.Giventhesignificanceof“brand”valuesinthefood services industry and also the fact that KFC Japan is never beyond a licensee of Yum! Brands, this isunderstandable.48 CommentsbytheOTA,January13,2011[Docked#USTR‐2011‐0018‐0098].49 Phil Howard; Stephanie Strom, “Has ‘Organic’ Been Oversized?” The New York Times, July 7, 2012. Heinz onceownedHainCeresttialGroup,whoitselfhasacquiredmanyorganiccompanies,divestedin2005. 50 The studies by Buck, Getz, and Guthman [1997] and Guthman [2004], among others, provided a framework toconsidertheorganicsectorfromthepointofviewofagribusinessandoff‐farmcapitalonorganicproduction,inrulesetting, intersectoral dynamics and agronomic practices. They coined and used the term “conventionalisation” todescribetheprocessesbywhichanorganicfarmingsectorreproducesthemostsalientfeaturesoftheconventionalmodesoffarmingoristoadegreesubsumedintoconventionalagro–foodcommoditychains[Jordan2010]. 51 Thereforeitisquiteprobablethatevenifcommoninterestsamongagribusinessindustrycouldbeconfirmed,theyarestillpartoftheentire“capitalistclass”whoeventuallyaggregatesdifferentinterestsandincorporatesthemintothenationalandinter‐nationalagreements.Atthesametime,however,asKelsey[2011]hasassumedandwarnedthatthe driver of the proposed TPP agreement has little to do with commercial gain than to do with revival of U.S.geopoliticalandstrategicinfluenceintheAsianregiontocounterChina’sascendancybyisolatingandsubordinatingChinainpartthroughsettingupaU.S.‐defined,region‐widelegalregime.52 U.S.ChamberofCommerce,OpeningMarkets,Creating Jobs:EstimatedU.S.EmploymentEffectsofTradewithFTAPartners.May14,2010.53 For example, see the Statement by Thomas Vilsack, Secretary of Agriculture, Before the Subcommittee onAgriculture,RuralDevelopment,FoodandDrugAdministration,andRelatedAgenciesCommitteeonAppropriations,U.S.SenateMarch2,2010.54 The Citizens Trade Campaign (CTC), a U.S. national coalition of environmental, labour, consumer, family farm,religious, and other civil society groups founded in 1992 to improve the North American Free Trade Agreement(NAFTA), is actively engaged in anti‐TPP campaigns. Public Citizen, a national, non‐profit consumer advocacyorganization founded in 1971, is also active on the issue through its division of Global Trade Watch. TheseorganisationsarecloselycollaboratingwiththeircounterpartsinAustralia(AFTINET),NewZealand(TPPWatch),andotherTPPparticipatingcountries.http://www.citizenstrade.org/ctc/trade‐policies/tpp‐potential‐trade‐policy‐problems/

http://tppwatch.org/55 ItisnotonlycivilsocietyorganisationsandadvocacygroupsthathavecriticisedthesecrecyoftheTPPnegotiations.EvenmembersofCongressareraisingtheirconcernswhileleakedTPPtextoninvestmentandintellectualpropertyclearlyshowthedangersofnegotiations.

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