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IFSPA 2010 – Chengdu, China
Transaction Cost Economics of Port Performance:A Composite Frontier Analysis
Presentation by:John Liu
Director, C.Y. Tung International Centre for Maritime Studies
Department of Logistics and Maritime Studies
Hong Kong PolyU
October 15 - 18, 201010/21/2010JJ Liu1
Presentation by:John Liu
Director, C.Y. Tung International Centre for Maritime Studies
Department of Logistics and Maritime Studies
Hong Kong PolyU
October 15 - 18, 2010
Derive transaction cost characteristics of port logistics
Verify and test them against the theory of transactioncost economics (Williamson 2002, 2008):o Firm as a governance structure: Governance cost is inevitableo Governance cost: a nonlinear function of asset specificity (k)
within a certain mode of governance Transaction cost
Address research questions of:o The implication of omitting TCE from port efficiency analysis
(e.g., DEA and SFA, both excluding TCE)o Implications of TEC for port logistics: TEU-only rankings?
Impact of ownership structure, and legal origin? …
ABSTRACT
Derive transaction cost characteristics of port logistics
Verify and test them against the theory of transactioncost economics (Williamson 2002, 2008):o Firm as a governance structure: Governance cost is inevitableo Governance cost: a nonlinear function of asset specificity (k)
within a certain mode of governance Transaction cost
Address research questions of:o The implication of omitting TCE from port efficiency analysis
(e.g., DEA and SFA, both excluding TCE)o Implications of TEC for port logistics: TEU-only rankings?
Impact of ownership structure, and legal origin? …
Port performance: Port production, port governanceo Transaction cost economics (Williamson 2002, 2008): From
choice to contract; cost of governanceo Transaction characteristics of port governance: From nonlinear
cost to non-smooth frontier
A Composite Frontier Model of Port Logistics:Production (smooth) + Transaction (non-smooth)
Econometrical measures of port performance: Is TEU-only measure sufficiency? What’s missing?
Example: Container Port Efficiency Assessment
Outlines
Port performance: Port production, port governanceo Transaction cost economics (Williamson 2002, 2008): From
choice to contract; cost of governanceo Transaction characteristics of port governance: From nonlinear
cost to non-smooth frontier
A Composite Frontier Model of Port Logistics:Production (smooth) + Transaction (non-smooth)
Econometrical measures of port performance: Is TEU-only measure sufficiency? What’s missing?
Example: Container Port Efficiency Assessment
Port Performance
Port production performance: DEA, SFA TEU-only rankings? Implications of transaction cost: Cost of
governance
10/21/2010 LGT/Liu 4
Port Performance
Port production performance: DEA, SFA TEU-only rankings? Implications of transaction cost: Cost of
governance
Research Questions: To explain …
Why TEU-only rankings of ports? What’smissing?
Why coexist single-operator (e.g., Singapore)and multi-operator (e.g., Hong Kong) ports?
Why coexist stevedore and carrier terminaloperators?
10/21/2010 LGT/Liu 5
Research Questions: To explain …
Why TEU-only rankings of ports? What’smissing?
Why coexist single-operator (e.g., Singapore)and multi-operator (e.g., Hong Kong) ports?
Why coexist stevedore and carrier terminaloperators?
Current Port Logistics StudiesPort: The Firm as a Production Function
Port logistics: Broadly defined as transportlogistics of seaport, airport, and dry port, ….
Port as a production function: The classical theoryof the firm as a production function (or a DMU) Port level performance: DEA, SFA (not
operator performance; Yan, et al. 2009)
Transaction cost economics: Firm as a governancestructure Port as a governance structure ofterminal production
10/21/2010 LGT/Liu 6
Current Port Logistics StudiesPort: The Firm as a Production Function
Port logistics: Broadly defined as transportlogistics of seaport, airport, and dry port, ….
Port as a production function: The classical theoryof the firm as a production function (or a DMU) Port level performance: DEA, SFA (not
operator performance; Yan, et al. 2009)
Transaction cost economics: Firm as a governancestructure Port as a governance structure ofterminal production
Transaction Cost Economics
The Firm Theory:Production Function versusGovernance Structure
From Choice to Contract Cost of Contract Governance
10/21/2010 LGT/Liu 7
Transaction Cost Economics
The Firm Theory:Production Function versusGovernance Structure
From Choice to Contract Cost of Contract Governance
Firm as a Governance Structure (1):From Choice to Contract [Williamson, 2002]
Science of Choice: Theory of firm asproduction function
“Economics throughout the twentieth century has beendeveloped predominantly as a science of choice. ......Choice has been developed in two parallel constructions:the theory of consumer behavior, in which consumersmaximize utility, and the theory of the firm as productionfunction, in which firms maximize profit.”
10/21/2010 LGT/Liu 8
Firm as a Governance Structure (1):From Choice to Contract [Williamson, 2002]
Science of Choice: Theory of firm asproduction function
“Economics throughout the twentieth century has beendeveloped predominantly as a science of choice. ......Choice has been developed in two parallel constructions:the theory of consumer behavior, in which consumersmaximize utility, and the theory of the firm as productionfunction, in which firms maximize profit.”
Firm as Governance Structure:From Choice to Contract [Williamson, 2002]
Science of Contract: Theory of firm asgovernance structure
……. By contrast with mechanism design and agenttheory of the firm, contract/governance approachassociates a firm with three critical attributes, namely,incentive intensity, administrative control and contractlaw regime.
10/21/2010 LGT/Liu 9
Firm as Governance Structure:From Choice to Contract [Williamson, 2002]
Science of Contract: Theory of firm asgovernance structure
……. By contrast with mechanism design and agenttheory of the firm, contract/governance approachassociates a firm with three critical attributes, namely,incentive intensity, administrative control and contractlaw regime.
Distinctions: Choice and Contract[Williamson, 2002]
Attributes: Transaction and Governance
Transaction = Ultimate unit of activity: “…must contain three principles of conflict,mutuality, and order. This unit is a transaction”
Attributes of Transaction: Asset specificity,disturbance (to transaction), and frequency
Attributes of Governance: Incentive intensity,administrative control and contract law regime
Transactions differ in attributes; Governancestructures differ in costs and competencies
10/21/2010 LGT/Liu 11
Attributes: Transaction and Governance
Transaction = Ultimate unit of activity: “…must contain three principles of conflict,mutuality, and order. This unit is a transaction”
Attributes of Transaction: Asset specificity,disturbance (to transaction), and frequency
Attributes of Governance: Incentive intensity,administrative control and contract law regime
Transactions differ in attributes; Governancestructures differ in costs and competencies
Transaction Cost Economics
Transaction cost: Asset specificity (which gives riseto bilateral dependency) and uncertainty (which posesadaptive needs) of transaction incur differenttransaction cost consequences (highly non-linear)under different modes and attributes (heterogeneous)of governance structure.
Adaptive regulation: “The requisite mix ofautonomous adaptations and coordinated adaptationsvary among transactions. Specifically, the need forcoordinated adaptations builds up as asset specificitydeepens.” (Williamson, 2002)
10/21/2010 LGT/Liu 12
Transaction Cost Economics
Transaction cost: Asset specificity (which gives riseto bilateral dependency) and uncertainty (which posesadaptive needs) of transaction incur differenttransaction cost consequences (highly non-linear)under different modes and attributes (heterogeneous)of governance structure.
Adaptive regulation: “The requisite mix ofautonomous adaptations and coordinated adaptationsvary among transactions. Specifically, the need forcoordinated adaptations builds up as asset specificitydeepens.” (Williamson, 2002)
Governance:Regular v.s. Contingent
Contingent risk: Disruption to Equilibrium
Classical control: speed, rate, differential dynamics
Impulse control: position, injection, stimulus
Contingent risk: Disruption to Equilibrium
Classical control: speed, rate, differential dynamics
Impulse control: position, injection, stimulus
Speed
impulse
Heuristic Model of Firm as Governance Structure:Heterogeneous and non-linear Costs
[Williamson, 2002]
Markets mode
Hybrid mode
Hierarchies
Hybrid mode
Review: Efficiency FrontierModels
Classical Frontier Model Applications to port performance:
DEA and SFA for port levelperformance; v.s. terminal level
10/21/2010 LGT/Liu 15
Review: Efficiency FrontierModels
Classical Frontier Model Applications to port performance:
DEA and SFA for port levelperformance; v.s. terminal level
A . O u tp u t C o n ta in e r T h ro u g h p u t in T E U s (m il l io n )B . In p u ts1 . C a r g o H a n d l in g E q u ip m e n ts :
C H Q : C a rg o h a n d lin g c a p a c i ty a t q u a y in to n n a g e (0 0 0 ’ s ) a
C H Y : C a rg o h a n d lin g c a p a c i ty a t y a rd in to n n a g e ( 0 0 0 ’ s ) b
2 . T e r m in a l I n fr a s tr u c tu r e s :B e r th : N u m b e r o f b e r thQ le n g th : L e n g th o f q u a y l in e in m e te r ( 0 0 0 ’ s )T a r e a : T e rm in a l a r e a in s q u a re d m e te r s ( 0 0 0 ’s )
3 . S to r a g e F a c i l i t ie s :S to r a g e : S to r a g e c a p a c i ty in n u m b e r o f T E U s ( 0 0 0 ’ s )R e e fe r : N u m b e r o f e le c t r ic r e e fe r p o in ts
C . In d iv id u a l C h a r a c te r is t ic s1 . T e r m in a l a n d p o r t le v e l :
D e p th : D e p th o f w a te r in m e te rC a ll : N u m b e r o f l in e r s c a l l in g th e te rm in a lO p e r a to r : N u m b e r o f o p e ra to r s in p o r tT e r m in a l : N u m b e r o f te rm in a ls in p o r t
2 . P o r t g r o u p d u m m ie s ( in f r a c t io n o f to ta l s a m p le ) :H P H : H u tc h is o n P o r t H o ld in g sP S A : P o r t o f S in g a p o re A u th o r i ty C o rp o ra t io nP N O : P & OS S A : S S A M a r in eM S K : M a e r s kO th e r : n o t b e lo n g to a n y o f a b o v e g ro u p s
3 . C o u n tr y le v e l:G D P : G D P in c u r r e n t U S $ (b i l l io n ) c
E X P : G o o d s e x p o r ts in c u r r e n t U S $ (b i l l io n ) c
I M P : G o o d s im p o r ts in c u r re n t U S $ (b i l l io n ) c
4 . C o n t in e n ta l D is tr ib u t io n ( in f r a c t io n o f to ta l s a m p le ) :A S : A s iaE U : E u ro p eN A : N o r th A m e r ic aL A : L a t in A m e r ic aO C : O c e a n iaA F : A f r ic aM E : M id d le E a s t
N u m b e r o f C o u n tr ie sN u m b e r o f P o r tsN u m b e r o f T e rm in a l O p e ra to r sN u m b e r o f O b s e rv a t io n s
0 .7 9 3 4 (1 .4 7 5 4 )
0 .3 3 4 6 (0 .3 4 6 1 )5 .0 6 6 7 (6 .8 3 6 2 )
4 .6 5 1 6 (4 .8 1 7 4 )1 .2 5 8 2 (1 .0 9 6 0 )5 7 1 .2 9 (8 4 1 .5 1 )
2 2 .8 3 5 (8 7 .6 9 2 )4 2 0 .2 1 (4 4 4 .8 7 )
1 2 .5 0 6 (1 .9 5 4 1 )1 5 .0 6 0 (1 3 .2 4 5 )3 .5 8 2 9 (2 .6 0 4 6 )6 .9 0 4 5 (6 .3 4 0 9 )
0 .0 40 .0 30 .0 60 .0 50 .0 20 .8 0
2 3 8 2 .8 (3 4 1 3 .7 )2 6 5 .3 2 (2 4 4 .8 9 )3 1 1 .2 6 (3 7 3 .3 9 )
0 .3 10 .2 60 .2 00 .0 60 .0 80 .0 40 .0 5
3 97 8
1 4 15 9 7
a T h e a g g re g a te d c a p a c i ty o f : ( 1 ) q u a y c r a n e s ; ( 2 ) s h ip s h o re c o n ta in e r c r a n e s .b T h e a g g re g a te d c a p a c i ty o f : ( 1 ) g a n try c r a n e s ; ( 2 ) y a rd c r a n e s ; (3 ) y a rd g a n tr ie s ; (4 ) r e a c h s ta c k e r s ; (5 ) y a rd t r a c k to r s ; ( 6 ) y a rd c h a s is t r a i le r s ;(7 ) f o rk l if ts ; ( 8 ) s t r a d d le c a r r ie r s ; (9 ) c o n ta in e r l i f te r s ; (1 0 ) m o b ile c r a n e s .c T h e c o u n try d a ta c a n b e fo u n d a t th e W o r ld B a n k w e b s i te : h t tp : / /d e v d a ta .w o r ld b a n k .o rg /d a ta o n lin e /o ld -d e fa u l t .h tm
A . O u tp u t C o n ta in e r T h ro u g h p u t in T E U s (m il l io n )B . In p u ts1 . C a r g o H a n d l in g E q u ip m e n ts :
C H Q : C a rg o h a n d lin g c a p a c i ty a t q u a y in to n n a g e (0 0 0 ’ s ) a
C H Y : C a rg o h a n d lin g c a p a c i ty a t y a rd in to n n a g e ( 0 0 0 ’ s ) b
2 . T e r m in a l I n fr a s tr u c tu r e s :B e r th : N u m b e r o f b e r thQ le n g th : L e n g th o f q u a y l in e in m e te r ( 0 0 0 ’ s )T a r e a : T e rm in a l a r e a in s q u a re d m e te r s ( 0 0 0 ’s )
3 . S to r a g e F a c i l i t ie s :S to r a g e : S to r a g e c a p a c i ty in n u m b e r o f T E U s ( 0 0 0 ’ s )R e e fe r : N u m b e r o f e le c t r ic r e e fe r p o in ts
C . In d iv id u a l C h a r a c te r is t ic s1 . T e r m in a l a n d p o r t le v e l :
D e p th : D e p th o f w a te r in m e te rC a ll : N u m b e r o f l in e r s c a l l in g th e te rm in a lO p e r a to r : N u m b e r o f o p e ra to r s in p o r tT e r m in a l : N u m b e r o f te rm in a ls in p o r t
2 . P o r t g r o u p d u m m ie s ( in f r a c t io n o f to ta l s a m p le ) :H P H : H u tc h is o n P o r t H o ld in g sP S A : P o r t o f S in g a p o re A u th o r i ty C o rp o ra t io nP N O : P & OS S A : S S A M a r in eM S K : M a e r s kO th e r : n o t b e lo n g to a n y o f a b o v e g ro u p s
3 . C o u n tr y le v e l:G D P : G D P in c u r r e n t U S $ (b i l l io n ) c
E X P : G o o d s e x p o r ts in c u r r e n t U S $ (b i l l io n ) c
I M P : G o o d s im p o r ts in c u r re n t U S $ (b i l l io n ) c
4 . C o n t in e n ta l D is tr ib u t io n ( in f r a c t io n o f to ta l s a m p le ) :A S : A s iaE U : E u ro p eN A : N o r th A m e r ic aL A : L a t in A m e r ic aO C : O c e a n iaA F : A f r ic aM E : M id d le E a s t
N u m b e r o f C o u n tr ie sN u m b e r o f P o r tsN u m b e r o f T e rm in a l O p e ra to r sN u m b e r o f O b s e rv a t io n s
0 .7 9 3 4 (1 .4 7 5 4 )
0 .3 3 4 6 (0 .3 4 6 1 )5 .0 6 6 7 (6 .8 3 6 2 )
4 .6 5 1 6 (4 .8 1 7 4 )1 .2 5 8 2 (1 .0 9 6 0 )5 7 1 .2 9 (8 4 1 .5 1 )
2 2 .8 3 5 (8 7 .6 9 2 )4 2 0 .2 1 (4 4 4 .8 7 )
1 2 .5 0 6 (1 .9 5 4 1 )1 5 .0 6 0 (1 3 .2 4 5 )3 .5 8 2 9 (2 .6 0 4 6 )6 .9 0 4 5 (6 .3 4 0 9 )
0 .0 40 .0 30 .0 60 .0 50 .0 20 .8 0
2 3 8 2 .8 (3 4 1 3 .7 )2 6 5 .3 2 (2 4 4 .8 9 )3 1 1 .2 6 (3 7 3 .3 9 )
0 .3 10 .2 60 .2 00 .0 60 .0 80 .0 40 .0 5
3 97 8
1 4 15 9 7
a T h e a g g re g a te d c a p a c i ty o f : ( 1 ) q u a y c r a n e s ; ( 2 ) s h ip s h o re c o n ta in e r c r a n e s .b T h e a g g re g a te d c a p a c i ty o f : ( 1 ) g a n try c r a n e s ; ( 2 ) y a rd c r a n e s ; (3 ) y a rd g a n tr ie s ; (4 ) r e a c h s ta c k e r s ; (5 ) y a rd t r a c k to r s ; ( 6 ) y a rd c h a s is t r a i le r s ;(7 ) f o rk l if ts ; ( 8 ) s t r a d d le c a r r ie r s ; (9 ) c o n ta in e r l i f te r s ; (1 0 ) m o b ile c r a n e s .c T h e c o u n try d a ta c a n b e fo u n d a t th e W o r ld B a n k w e b s i te : h t tp : / /d e v d a ta .w o r ld b a n k .o rg /d a ta o n lin e /o ld -d e fa u l t .h tm
The frontier model in economic efficiency theory, aspioneered by Arrow, Cheney, Minhas and Solow (1961) andMcFadden (1963)), is constructed via an input cost-minimization problem subject to functional technologyconstraint in term of production function, y = g(x); that is:Find an input vector that solves the following problem:
Production Frontier: Defined
The frontier model in economic efficiency theory, aspioneered by Arrow, Cheney, Minhas and Solow (1961) andMcFadden (1963)), is constructed via an input cost-minimization problem subject to functional technologyconstraint in term of production function, y = g(x); that is:Find an input vector that solves the following problem:
{ }
≥≥⋅=⋅=
=⋅= ∑=∈
0givenanyfor,)(:)(
)(s.t.
min);((PF) 1
)(
yyxgAxyL
xgAy
xwxwwyCm
jjj
t
yLx
Efficiency Measure: Stochastic Production Frontier(Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt 1977; Meeusen and Broeck 1977)
StochasticInefficiency
frontier
Actual output
Transaction Cost in Port Logistics
Port-Operator Logistics System Measures of Port Transaction Asset
Factorso Asset Specificity (operational
attributes)o Contingent Adaptive-ness
(infrastructural attributes)10/21/2010 LGT/Liu 19
Transaction Cost in Port Logistics
Port-Operator Logistics System Measures of Port Transaction Asset
Factorso Asset Specificity (operational
attributes)o Contingent Adaptive-ness
(infrastructural attributes)
Port-Operator Logistics System
y)specificitassete.g.,output;on(transactifunctionntransactio:)(
productionportcollectiveofoutput:)(
origin)legale.g.,regime,(legalattibutescticallegal/poli
control)admine.g.,density,(adaptiveattributesturalinfrastruc
operators)of#e.g.,capacity,onal(transactiattributesloperationa
)(irregularsticscharacteriinputon transacti:
handling)cargoe.g.,capacity,andcapital(regular;input technical:
3
2
1
zA
xg
z
z
z
z
x
−−−
Port
f(x,z)
Operator(s)
…..
Terminal 1
Terminal l
xg(x) A(z)
z
y
y)specificitassete.g.,output;on(transactifunctionntransactio:)(
productionportcollectiveofoutput:)(
origin)legale.g.,regime,(legalattibutescticallegal/poli
control)admine.g.,density,(adaptiveattributesturalinfrastruc
operators)of#e.g.,capacity,onal(transactiattributesloperationa
)(irregularsticscharacteriinputon transacti:
handling)cargoe.g.,capacity,andcapital(regular;input technical:
3
2
1
zA
xg
z
z
z
z
x
−−−
Port Logistics: Production + Transaction
capacityTEUe.g.,
input Regular:)( Function,n ProductioTerminal--
=x
xxg
governanceandcontroladmine.g.,
inputIrregular:)( Function,nTransactio Port--
=z
zzA
)()(),(
:)(nTransactio)(n Productio:logistics Port--
xgzAzxf
zAxg
⋅=+
),(
costnTransactiocostn Productio:costlogistics Port--
zxxw t +⋅+
Non-smooth Cost of Port Governance
5 operators
3 mixed operators
1 stevedore
Composite Port Frontier (CPF)
Composite non-smooth frontier: bothx (regular input) and z (transactioninput) as decision variables
Composite: production + transaction Non-smooth: non-smooth cost and
production output
10/21/2010 LGT/Liu 23
Composite Port Frontier (CPF)
Composite non-smooth frontier: bothx (regular input) and z (transactioninput) as decision variables
Composite: production + transaction Non-smooth: non-smooth cost and
production output
Composite Frontier (CF) Model forPort Logistics
{ }
=≥≥=
=+⋅=
∈
functiondemandgiven:)(
0givenanyfor,)()(:),()(
)()(),(s.t.
),(min);,(
:(CF)-
)(),(
pdy
yyxgzAzxyL
xgzAzxf
zxxwwzyC t
yLzx
{ }
=≥≥=
=+⋅=
∈
functiondemandgiven:)(
0givenanyfor,)()(:),()(
)()(),(s.t.
),(min);,(
:(CF)-
)(),(
pdy
yyxgzAzxyL
xgzAzxf
zxxwwzyC t
yLzx
Non-smooth Transaction Function
,,,1),,[for,)(
such that,0numbersingnondecreasofseriesa with
,offunctionstepwiseais)(where
1 iij
iji
iji
i
ij
iii
NjcczAzA
c
zzA
=∈=
≥
+
kizAzA
zAz
ii
k
i,,1),()(
:)(smooth-nonand,inputIrregular-
1=∏=
=
,,,1),,[for,)(
such that,0numbersingnondecreasofseriesa with
,offunctionstepwiseais)(where
1 iij
iji
iji
i
ij
iii
NjcczAzA
c
zzA
=∈=
≥
+
Application to Port Efficiency:
Econometrical Calibration ofComposite Port Frontier
10/21/2010 LGT/Liu 26
Application to Port Efficiency:
Econometrical Calibration ofComposite Port Frontier
Econometrical Calibration of Composite Frontier
: ModelCF− +∆−+∆− ⋅⋅=⋅= eXgZAexfy )()()(
:0) Model(201CF EmpiricalLHMY−
ttttt BXy +∆−+= ˆˆ ttttt BXy +∆−+= ˆˆ
ttt Z +Θ+= ˆ
XXZAyy lnˆ),(ln,lnˆwhere ===
inputsattributentransactio:lnˆ ZZ t =
),0(~ 2 Nt
Numerical Validation: Non-smooth Cost of Governance
Container Ports Datasets:SFA of Heterogeneous Frontier
(From TR-B by J.Yan, X.Sun, and J. Liu; 2009)
-- Single output (TEU’s): from 1997 to 2009
-- Homogeneous vs Heterogeneous (in TR-B, YSL 2009,and continuing) in production: time-variant x
-- Non-smooth Frontiers under transaction input (Ourcurrent work, and ongoing): time-invariant z
Container Ports Datasets:SFA of Heterogeneous Frontier
(From TR-B by J.Yan, X.Sun, and J. Liu; 2009)
-- Single output (TEU’s): from 1997 to 2009
-- Homogeneous vs Heterogeneous (in TR-B, YSL 2009,and continuing) in production: time-variant x
-- Non-smooth Frontiers under transaction input (Ourcurrent work, and ongoing): time-invariant z
Features should be incorporated in an empirical model1. Controlling for Individual heterogeneity:
Clustering effects (by port, country, region, andport groups);
2. Controlling for the technical change;
3. Time varying efficiency and time persistence inefficiency change;
1. Controlling for Individual heterogeneity:Clustering effects (by port, country, region, andport groups);
2. Controlling for the technical change;
3. Time varying efficiency and time persistence inefficiency change;
Overview of Current Data on Global Container Ports
The basic unit is operator.
Time period is between 1997 and 2009.
We focus on the top 100 container ports in the world(ranked in 2005)
Data was collected from different sources:Containerization International Yearbooks, World Bank,and a subscribed data base – ContainerizationInternational Intelligence
The basic unit is operator.
Time period is between 1997 and 2009.
We focus on the top 100 container ports in the world(ranked in 2005)
Data was collected from different sources:Containerization International Yearbooks, World Bank,and a subscribed data base – ContainerizationInternational Intelligence
A . O u tp u t C o n ta in e r T h ro u g h p u t in T E U s (m il l io n )B . In p u ts1 . C a r g o H a n d l in g E q u ip m e n ts :
C H Q : C a rg o h a n d lin g c a p a c i ty a t q u a y in to n n a g e (0 0 0 ’ s ) a
C H Y : C a rg o h a n d lin g c a p a c i ty a t y a rd in to n n a g e ( 0 0 0 ’ s ) b
2 . T e r m in a l I n fr a s tr u c tu r e s :B e r th : N u m b e r o f b e r thQ le n g th : L e n g th o f q u a y l in e in m e te r ( 0 0 0 ’ s )T a r e a : T e rm in a l a r e a in s q u a re d m e te r s ( 0 0 0 ’s )
3 . S to r a g e F a c i l i t ie s :S to r a g e : S to r a g e c a p a c i ty in n u m b e r o f T E U s ( 0 0 0 ’ s )R e e fe r : N u m b e r o f e le c t r ic r e e fe r p o in ts
C . In d iv id u a l C h a r a c te r is t ic s1 . T e r m in a l a n d p o r t le v e l :
D e p th : D e p th o f w a te r in m e te rC a ll : N u m b e r o f l in e r s c a l l in g th e te rm in a lO p e r a to r : N u m b e r o f o p e ra to r s in p o r tT e r m in a l : N u m b e r o f te rm in a ls in p o r t
2 . P o r t g r o u p d u m m ie s ( in f r a c t io n o f to ta l s a m p le ) :H P H : H u tc h is o n P o r t H o ld in g sP S A : P o r t o f S in g a p o re A u th o r i ty C o rp o ra t io nP N O : P & OS S A : S S A M a r in eM S K : M a e r s kO th e r : n o t b e lo n g to a n y o f a b o v e g ro u p s
3 . C o u n tr y le v e l:G D P : G D P in c u r r e n t U S $ (b i l l io n ) c
E X P : G o o d s e x p o r ts in c u r r e n t U S $ (b i l l io n ) c
I M P : G o o d s im p o r ts in c u r re n t U S $ (b i l l io n ) c
4 . C o n t in e n ta l D is tr ib u t io n ( in f r a c t io n o f to ta l s a m p le ) :A S : A s iaE U : E u ro p eN A : N o r th A m e r ic aL A : L a t in A m e r ic aO C : O c e a n iaA F : A f r ic aM E : M id d le E a s t
N u m b e r o f C o u n tr ie sN u m b e r o f P o r tsN u m b e r o f T e rm in a l O p e ra to r sN u m b e r o f O b s e rv a t io n s
0 .7 9 3 4 (1 .4 7 5 4 )
0 .3 3 4 6 (0 .3 4 6 1 )5 .0 6 6 7 (6 .8 3 6 2 )
4 .6 5 1 6 (4 .8 1 7 4 )1 .2 5 8 2 (1 .0 9 6 0 )5 7 1 .2 9 (8 4 1 .5 1 )
2 2 .8 3 5 (8 7 .6 9 2 )4 2 0 .2 1 (4 4 4 .8 7 )
1 2 .5 0 6 (1 .9 5 4 1 )1 5 .0 6 0 (1 3 .2 4 5 )3 .5 8 2 9 (2 .6 0 4 6 )6 .9 0 4 5 (6 .3 4 0 9 )
0 .0 40 .0 30 .0 60 .0 50 .0 20 .8 0
2 3 8 2 .8 (3 4 1 3 .7 )2 6 5 .3 2 (2 4 4 .8 9 )3 1 1 .2 6 (3 7 3 .3 9 )
0 .3 10 .2 60 .2 00 .0 60 .0 80 .0 40 .0 5
3 97 8
1 4 15 9 7
a T h e a g g re g a te d c a p a c i ty o f : ( 1 ) q u a y c r a n e s ; ( 2 ) s h ip s h o re c o n ta in e r c r a n e s .b T h e a g g re g a te d c a p a c i ty o f : ( 1 ) g a n try c r a n e s ; ( 2 ) y a rd c r a n e s ; (3 ) y a rd g a n tr ie s ; (4 ) r e a c h s ta c k e r s ; (5 ) y a rd t r a c k to r s ; ( 6 ) y a rd c h a s is t r a i le r s ;(7 ) f o rk l if ts ; ( 8 ) s t r a d d le c a r r ie r s ; (9 ) c o n ta in e r l i f te r s ; (1 0 ) m o b ile c r a n e s .c T h e c o u n try d a ta c a n b e fo u n d a t th e W o r ld B a n k w e b s i te : h t tp : / /d e v d a ta .w o r ld b a n k .o rg /d a ta o n lin e /o ld -d e fa u l t .h tm
A . O u tp u t C o n ta in e r T h ro u g h p u t in T E U s (m il l io n )B . In p u ts1 . C a r g o H a n d l in g E q u ip m e n ts :
C H Q : C a rg o h a n d lin g c a p a c i ty a t q u a y in to n n a g e (0 0 0 ’ s ) a
C H Y : C a rg o h a n d lin g c a p a c i ty a t y a rd in to n n a g e ( 0 0 0 ’ s ) b
2 . T e r m in a l I n fr a s tr u c tu r e s :B e r th : N u m b e r o f b e r thQ le n g th : L e n g th o f q u a y l in e in m e te r ( 0 0 0 ’ s )T a r e a : T e rm in a l a r e a in s q u a re d m e te r s ( 0 0 0 ’s )
3 . S to r a g e F a c i l i t ie s :S to r a g e : S to r a g e c a p a c i ty in n u m b e r o f T E U s ( 0 0 0 ’ s )R e e fe r : N u m b e r o f e le c t r ic r e e fe r p o in ts
C . In d iv id u a l C h a r a c te r is t ic s1 . T e r m in a l a n d p o r t le v e l :
D e p th : D e p th o f w a te r in m e te rC a ll : N u m b e r o f l in e r s c a l l in g th e te rm in a lO p e r a to r : N u m b e r o f o p e ra to r s in p o r tT e r m in a l : N u m b e r o f te rm in a ls in p o r t
2 . P o r t g r o u p d u m m ie s ( in f r a c t io n o f to ta l s a m p le ) :H P H : H u tc h is o n P o r t H o ld in g sP S A : P o r t o f S in g a p o re A u th o r i ty C o rp o ra t io nP N O : P & OS S A : S S A M a r in eM S K : M a e r s kO th e r : n o t b e lo n g to a n y o f a b o v e g ro u p s
3 . C o u n tr y le v e l:G D P : G D P in c u r r e n t U S $ (b i l l io n ) c
E X P : G o o d s e x p o r ts in c u r r e n t U S $ (b i l l io n ) c
I M P : G o o d s im p o r ts in c u r re n t U S $ (b i l l io n ) c
4 . C o n t in e n ta l D is tr ib u t io n ( in f r a c t io n o f to ta l s a m p le ) :A S : A s iaE U : E u ro p eN A : N o r th A m e r ic aL A : L a t in A m e r ic aO C : O c e a n iaA F : A f r ic aM E : M id d le E a s t
N u m b e r o f C o u n tr ie sN u m b e r o f P o r tsN u m b e r o f T e rm in a l O p e ra to r sN u m b e r o f O b s e rv a t io n s
0 .7 9 3 4 (1 .4 7 5 4 )
0 .3 3 4 6 (0 .3 4 6 1 )5 .0 6 6 7 (6 .8 3 6 2 )
4 .6 5 1 6 (4 .8 1 7 4 )1 .2 5 8 2 (1 .0 9 6 0 )5 7 1 .2 9 (8 4 1 .5 1 )
2 2 .8 3 5 (8 7 .6 9 2 )4 2 0 .2 1 (4 4 4 .8 7 )
1 2 .5 0 6 (1 .9 5 4 1 )1 5 .0 6 0 (1 3 .2 4 5 )3 .5 8 2 9 (2 .6 0 4 6 )6 .9 0 4 5 (6 .3 4 0 9 )
0 .0 40 .0 30 .0 60 .0 50 .0 20 .8 0
2 3 8 2 .8 (3 4 1 3 .7 )2 6 5 .3 2 (2 4 4 .8 9 )3 1 1 .2 6 (3 7 3 .3 9 )
0 .3 10 .2 60 .2 00 .0 60 .0 80 .0 40 .0 5
3 97 8
1 4 15 9 7
a T h e a g g re g a te d c a p a c i ty o f : ( 1 ) q u a y c r a n e s ; ( 2 ) s h ip s h o re c o n ta in e r c r a n e s .b T h e a g g re g a te d c a p a c i ty o f : ( 1 ) g a n try c r a n e s ; ( 2 ) y a rd c r a n e s ; (3 ) y a rd g a n tr ie s ; (4 ) r e a c h s ta c k e r s ; (5 ) y a rd t r a c k to r s ; ( 6 ) y a rd c h a s is t r a i le r s ;(7 ) f o rk l if ts ; ( 8 ) s t r a d d le c a r r ie r s ; (9 ) c o n ta in e r l i f te r s ; (1 0 ) m o b ile c r a n e s .c T h e c o u n try d a ta c a n b e fo u n d a t th e W o r ld B a n k w e b s i te : h t tp : / /d e v d a ta .w o r ld b a n k .o rg /d a ta o n lin e /o ld -d e fa u l t .h tm
Base model Model ignoringtechnical change
Model ignoring unobs.heter.
Mean Efficiency Median Estimate[5%-ile, 95%-ile]
Median Estimate[5%-ile, 95%-ile]
Median Estimate[5%-ile, 95%-ile]
1997 – 1998
1999 – 2001
2002 – 2004
0.8072[0.7009, 0.8293]
0.8393[0.7406, 0.9153]
0.8423[0.7415, 0.8986]
0.7015[0.6221, 0.7832]
0.7816[0.7202, 0.8675]
0.8602[0.7867, 0.9267]
0.4138[0.3376, 0.4880]
0.4267[0.3652, 0.4825]
0.4344[0.3676, 0.4925]
Mean Efficiency Levels
Base model Model ignoringtechnical change
Model ignoring unobs.heter.
Mean Efficiency Median Estimate[5%-ile, 95%-ile]
Median Estimate[5%-ile, 95%-ile]
Median Estimate[5%-ile, 95%-ile]
1997 – 1998
1999 – 2001
2002 – 2004
0.8072[0.7009, 0.8293]
0.8393[0.7406, 0.9153]
0.8423[0.7415, 0.8986]
0.7015[0.6221, 0.7832]
0.7816[0.7202, 0.8675]
0.8602[0.7867, 0.9267]
0.4138[0.3376, 0.4880]
0.4267[0.3652, 0.4825]
0.4344[0.3676, 0.4925]
Figure 2: The estimated distribution of individual efficiency level. The plotted density functions
are estimated by kernel densities using Epanechnikov kernel and Silverman's (1985) rule-of-thumb
bandwidth selector.
Figure 2: The estimated distribution of individual efficiency level. The plotted density functions
are estimated by kernel densities using Epanechnikov kernel and Silverman's (1985) rule-of-thumb
bandwidth selector.
Base model Model with translogfrontier a
Model with multivariatehalf normal distributed
inefficiency b
Mean Efficiency Median Estimate[5%-ile, 95%-ile]
Median Estimate[5%-ile, 95%-ile]
Median Estimate[5%-ile, 95%-ile]
1997 – 1998
1999 – 2001
2002 – 2004
0.8072[0.7009, 0.8293]
0.8393[0.7406, 0.9153]
0.8423[0.7415, 0.8986]
0.7748[0.6751, 0.8628]
0.7923[0.7056, 0.8824]
0.8164[0.7233, 0.8953]
0.7134[0.6416, 0.7748]
0.7335[0.6680, 0.7823]
0.7032[0.6362, 0.7541]
a This model is the variation from the base model by replacing the Cobb-Douglas productionfrontier with the translog production frontier.
b This model is the variation from the base model by changing the inefficiency specification
as
Sensitivity AnalysisBase model Model with translog
frontier aModel with multivariatehalf normal distributed
inefficiency b
Mean Efficiency Median Estimate[5%-ile, 95%-ile]
Median Estimate[5%-ile, 95%-ile]
Median Estimate[5%-ile, 95%-ile]
1997 – 1998
1999 – 2001
2002 – 2004
0.8072[0.7009, 0.8293]
0.8393[0.7406, 0.9153]
0.8423[0.7415, 0.8986]
0.7748[0.6751, 0.8628]
0.7923[0.7056, 0.8824]
0.8164[0.7233, 0.8953]
0.7134[0.6416, 0.7748]
0.7335[0.6680, 0.7823]
0.7032[0.6362, 0.7541]
a This model is the variation from the base model by replacing the Cobb-Douglas productionfrontier with the translog production frontier.
b This model is the variation from the base model by changing the inefficiency specification
as ( ) ( ).,0~,,,020499019798 321321 Nddd iiiiiiit′⋅+⋅+⋅=
Explanatory Conclusion
TEU-only rankings without TCE tend to over estimateport performance: 1) Cost of governance ignored; 2)Cost of adaptation (e.g., optimal z) ignored
Coexist of single-operator (e.g., Singapore) and multi-operator (e.g., Hong Kong) ports: can be explained byTCE, especially by legal origin theory.
Coexist stevedore and carrier terminal operators: canbe explained by infrastructural transaction costs,especially the mode of governance
10/21/2010 LGT/Liu 36
Explanatory Conclusion
TEU-only rankings without TCE tend to over estimateport performance: 1) Cost of governance ignored; 2)Cost of adaptation (e.g., optimal z) ignored
Coexist of single-operator (e.g., Singapore) and multi-operator (e.g., Hong Kong) ports: can be explained byTCE, especially by legal origin theory.
Coexist stevedore and carrier terminal operators: canbe explained by infrastructural transaction costs,especially the mode of governance
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