Translating China and reconstructing Chinese cultural identit(ies)

JIANSHE WU

TRANSLATING CHINA AND RECONSTRUCTING

CHINESE CULTURAL IDENTIT(IES)

“Collective memory” emerged as an object of scholarly inquiry only in the early twenti-

eth century. The scholarly boom began in the 1980s with two literary events: Yosef

Yerushalmi’s Zakhor: Jewish History and Jewish Memory and Pierre Nora’s introduction

“Between Memory and History“. Each of these texts identified memory as a primitive or

sacred form opposed to modern historical consciousness. In recent years, scholarly atten-

tion has been shifting to the cultural processes. It has become increasingly apparent that

the memories that are shared within generations and across different generations are the

product of public acts of remembrance. In this essay, the author attempts to distinguish

four layers of cultural identities in the 150-year-old history of China since 1840, by hav-

ing recourse to the transformation processes of the Western material and cosmological

beliefs, with two central questions in mind: (1) how are these layers transmitted or pre-

served? (2) To what extent have they been accepted in that time society?

China, as a land in the Far East, has long been the image of the ultimate other. Just as

Foucault claims, the word “China” should immediately evoke the image of a precise

region whose name alone constitutes for the West a vast reservoir of utopias.

In our dreamworld, is not China precisely this privileged site of space? In our traditional im-

agery, the Chinese culture is the most meticulous, the most rigidly ordered, the one most deaf

to temporal events, most attached to the pure delineation of space; we think of it as a civiliza-

tion of dikes and dams beneath the eternal face of the sky.1

Certainly, what Foucault states here is not to enhance this image of China, but to

show how difficult it is to be disconnected with one’s historical a priori.Contrary to this remote memory, the image of China as the other has been de-

formed ever since 1792, when George Macartney, a special envoy sent by the then

0324–4652/$20.00 Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest© 2007 Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest Springer, Dordrecht

Neohelicon XXXIV (2007) 2, 137–148DOI: 10.1007/s11059-007-2011-9

1 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences. Vintage, New

York, 1973. New York, 1973, XV.

Jianshe Wu, Department of Foreign Languages, Tsinghua University, Beijing, 100084 P. R. China.

E-mail: [email protected]

The author wishes to thank Professor Wang Ning for his extensive contributions to the conceptual-

ization of this article as well as for his advice and help in the analysis.

138 JIANSHE WU

British king, has brought home an ugly China in a stalemate. More than 40 years later,

the burst of the Opium War plunged China into an age of being “despised”. Even the

Second World War could not reshuffle China’s image. In 1958, Harold R. Isaacs, an

American scholar, carried out a survey on American images of China and India. He

reported that China had been looked down upon as an inferior race by most of the

Americans.2 Now nearly five decades have passed, China has witnessed the Korean

War, Vietnam War, Cultural Revolution, resumption of her seat in the UN, economic

reform and opening to the outside world, accession to the WTO and is bracing herself

up for the coming Olympic Games. The process heralds her anticipated incorporation

with the global system. Her image has again been mythologized from time to time, but

generally served as a spectacle alternating between hatred and amicability.

Here, China has emerged in different facets. The West, by its own reason or intelli-

gence, “chooses among the store of recollections, eliminates some of them, and ar-

ranges the others according to an order conforming to his ideas of the moment.”3

What really happens is that the past is distorted so as to introduce greater coherence

and a collective memory is forged in favor of the West so as to situate his own place in

the world.

Confronted with such a mythologized and mystified China, then, what is the na-

tional allegory held by present China, with her widening scope of transnational capi-

tal, digital media, and mass immigration having quickly pushed this traditional cul-

ture onto the road to post-industrial societies? How is this allegory transmitted and

preserved in China’s ever-remitting efforts in seeking for a gateway to reinvigorate

the country since 1840? In this essay, we attempt to reconstruct a Chinese cultural

identity by recourse to her collective memory in relation to the material and cosmo-

logical beliefs in building up a prosperous China. By so doing, we are expecting to

discover how China has been situating herself in the world, which could be

dramatically different from the imagination by the West.

INTRODUCTION

It is compulsory for us first to distinguish what the material and cosmological beliefs

are designated to entail respectively. Based on his analysis on the American impe-

rium, Deepak Lal argues that “for prosperity, the most important features of a govern-

ment are civil and economic liberties, or what can be called economic freedom. Un-

like political freedom whose value is likely to be determined by the cosmological be-liefs of different cultures, the value of economic freedom depends on the material be-liefs of a civilization” (here, he makes a crucial distinction between political liberty,

2 See Harold R. Isaacs, Scratches on Our Minds: American Images of China and India, New York:

John Day, 1958, 63–238.3 Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, trans. Lewis A. Coser. Chicago and London: the

University of Chicago Press, 1992 [1952], 183.

as entailed by democracy, civil liberty, as embodied in the English Common Law

with its impartial enforcement of contracts, and economic liberty, as embodied obvi-

ously in the market, in terms of governance).4 What concerns us here is not the con-

vincingness of his argumentation. Instead, we are more interested in his insightful dis-

tinction between the cosmological beliefs and the material beliefs for this is where we

will start.

In most scholars’ eyes, what has been called forth to deconstruct the teleological

grand history of post-Opium-War China is nothing more than a teleology of perpetu-

ated growth and universal humanity modeled after the West. Since the pursuit of ma-

terial well-being and political liberty are both institutionalized to the point of being

mundane in the post-industrial West, in their opinion, present China, with its utilitar-

ian material beliefs and one-party polity, is and must be viewed as a shocking and

painful anomaly. However, in decoding the collective memory of Chinese material

and cosmological beliefs, we attempt to provide a different interpretation, about

China’s past and present. According to this reinterpretation, four distinct cultural

identities are distinguished from a 150-year-old perspective of the Chinese history

since 1840. They are: Fading Glory (1840–1919), Transitional Trauma (1919–1949),

Cultural Redefinition (1949–1978) and Chinese Consensus (1978 – present). As sug-

gested by Halbwachs, it is through a series of successive additions that new ideas and

new points of view have been incorporated.5 In analyzing those stages, we intend to

explore how those new ideas in the material and cosmological beliefs are added and

how the traditional ideas are transformed and preserved in China’s social framework.

FADING GLORY (1840–1919)

In ancient Chinese society, ever since the Han Dynasty, the material beliefs of “Lay-

ing Stress on the Agriculture and Restraining the Trade” have been established. In the

Han dynasty, Emperor Wen once comments that “Farming, is the Great Foundation of

the World”.6 Since that time, under Confucianism, commerce and industry have been

restricted and despised because of its desperate hunting for gain (li) whereas agricul-

ture serves as the only productive work.

It is actually well in accordance with its cosmological beliefs held by ancient Chi-

nese society, where the rules of propriety (li), righteousness (yi) and good faith (xin)

should constitute the core part of the ethic-oriented traditional beliefs. In Lun Yu(Confucian Analects), such a story could be found:

Fan Chi’ih requested to be taught husbandry. The Master said, “I am not so good for that as an

old husbandman”. He requested also to be taught gardening, and was answered, “I am not so

TRANSLATING CHINA AND RECONSTRUCTING CHINESE CULTURAL IDENTIT(IES) 139

4 See Deepak Lal, In Praise of Empires: Globalization and Order, New York: Palgrave

Macmillan, 2004, 178.5 Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, 183–187.6 See the Basic Annals of Emperor Wen, in Hanshu (The History of the Han Dynasty).

good for that as an old gardener”. Fan Ch’ih having gone out, the Master said, “A small man,

indeed, is Fan Hsu!” “If a superior love propriety, the people will not dare not to be reverent. If

he love righteousness, the people will not dare not to submit to his example. If he love good

faith, the people will not dare not to be sincere. Now, when these things obtain, the people

from all quarters will come to him, bearing their children on their backs; what need has he of a

knowledge of husbandry?”7

It should be noted in this anecdote that the cosmological beliefs, as embodied in

“propriety”, “righteousness” and “good faith”, are regarded as an overarching force

even in comparison with husbandry, “the great foundation of the world”. It is easily

perceived that ancient China tops the cosmological beliefs over the material beliefs.

At the same time, more emphasis is laid on agriculture rather than trade. The preva-

lence of the cosmological beliefs over the material beliefs is also revealed in Mengzi(The Works of Mencius), another classic in Confucianism:

Therefore it is said, “It is not the exterior and interior walls being incomplete, and the supply

of weapons offensive and defensive not being large, which constitutes the calamity of a king-

dom. It is not the cultivable area not being extended, and stores and wealth not being accumu-

lated, which occasions the ruin of a State.” “When superiors do not observe the rules of pro-

priety, and inferiors do not learn, then seditious people spring up, and that State will perish in

no time.”8

Not surprisingly, the cosmological beliefs as embodied here in “the rules of propri-

ety” once again prevail over the material beliefs of cultivating area and accumulating

stores and wealth. Such hierarchical integration of the material and cosmological be-

liefs persist and it is not until the late Qing Dynasty, that the stalemate starts to be

challenged. And it also partly accounts for why Chinese society has been an agrarian

society for such a long time. In view of this, R. Redfield has convincingly labeled an-

cient China as “Composite Agrarian Society”, consisting of scholar-bureaucrat and

peasants.

Such framework guarantees a continuous prosperity in the ancient China but at the

same time leads to its downfall and disintegration. According to Giovanni Arrighi,

Takeshi Hamashita and Mark Selden, two factors contribute to Europe’s risings and

expansions in the 18th century: 1) a balanced competition between each country

within European polities; 2) the trade with countries outside Europe.9 On the con-

trary, the China imperium, under the framework of Suzerain-Vassal State Relation-

ships, maintains an unchallenged position within East Asian polities and its cosmo-

logical and material beliefs against gains prevent its possible adoption of trade and in-

dustry as the basic element of its self-contained economy. Without any other compet-

ing force from the outside, the China imperium has maintained her hierarchally or-

140 JIANSHE WU

7 Confucius, Confucian Analects, in The Chinese Classics (Volume I), trans. James Legge. Tai-

pei: SMC Publishing Inc. 1991, 264–265.8 Mencius, The Works of Mencius, in The Chinese Classics (Volume II), 291.9 Arrighi, Hamashita and Selden, The Resurgence of East Asia: 500, 150 and 50 Year Perspec-

tives, London and New York: Routledge, 2003.

dered beliefs for more than 1500 years and would stick to the same beliefs if this pro-

cess had not been interfered by the West.

Since the Opium War in 1840, the totality of traditional Chinese beliefs has been

severely oppugned by Chinese elites, with the danger of being colonized approaching

gradually. Some reformists like Xi Fucheng and Zheng Guanying have realized the

power inequilibrium between China and the West results from the fact of “China be-

ing an agrarian country” versus “foreign countries being a commercial one”.

In this oppugnation process, the material beliefs against trade and industry are to

some extent questioned and challenged. Wei Yuan proposes that “to learn from for-

eign countries and then tame them”;10 subsequently, Li Hongzhang adopts the West-

ern military beliefs and sets out to build a Western-style navy and ordinance machin-

ery. However, just as Halbwachs asserts, “a society can live only if its institutions rest

on potent collective beliefs. These beliefs cannot arise from a simple reflection. It is

all in vain to criticize dominant opinions, to show that they no longer respond to the

situation of the present, to denounce their abuses and to protest oppression or exploi-

tation”.11 Actually, these elites’ experiments in transforming the deep-rooted cosmo-

logical beliefs and the material beliefs have triggered some debates, but the traditional

beliefs, with its historical inertia, remain unchanged. All the time, the principle of

“adopting the Western system without any prejudice to Chinese tradition” is repeat-

edly emphasized. In 1904, Zhang Zhidong, one of the high-ranking officials in the

Qing Dynasty, insisted on promoting the traditional cosmological beliefs by claiming

“the tenet of setting up schools lies in its emphasis on loyalty and piety and seeks its

origins from the classics of Confucianism and history records”.12 More ironically,

Liang Qichao and Zhang Taiyan even reckon that Japanese Meiji Reform should be

attributed to the influence of traditional Chinese philosophy by Lu Xiangshan and

Wang Yangming. All these betray the fact that the traditional cosmological beliefs are

still firmly rooted in old China and only the material beliefs are slightly questioned

but unchallenged.

In summary, it is the Confucian ethic-oriented cosmological and material beliefs

that have legitimated the ancient Chinese government rather than the national econ-

omy or the general’s standards of living. Thus, it is impossible to shake the potent col-

lective beliefs deep-rooted in the society merely by self-reflection or denouncement.

“Society will abandon its ancient beliefs only if it is assured of finding others”.13 A

society immerging in such ethic-oriented cosmological beliefs of “the rules of propri-

ety” will be less easily affected by the market-or-contract-based beliefs held by the

West. They are poles apart. Thus the marriage between cosmological beliefs and the

material beliefs remains, though somewhat disturbed by the third other.


10 Wei Yuan, Haiguo tuzhi (Diagram of Maritime Country), 1843.11 Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, 187.12 Zhang Zhidong, Kuimao xuezhi (KuiMo Academic System), 1904.13 Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, 187.

TRANSITIONAL TRAUMA (1919–1949)

It is not until the May 4th Movement in 1919 that China determined to embrace the

more and more appealing Western cosmological and material beliefs by asserting

“Down with Confucius.” The May 4th Movement is commonly regarded as a radical

break with the Confucian ethical and political system. The break goes along with a to-

tal embrace of Western culture. The ongoing overall Westernization movement as

proposed by Chen Xujing and Hu Shi permeated the old and calamitous nation.

During this period, China had undergone many critical events. Since 1927, the

ever-present military conflicts between warlords were gradually fading out; and from

1937 onward, anti-Japanese war broke out and lasted for 8 years; from 1946 to 1949,

there was a civil war between KMT regime and the army led by the Communist Party.

What underlies the transitional process is the fundamental beliefs to save the en-

dangered nation by resorting to the change of the mass’ cosmological beliefs, i.e., the

notion of “Cultural Salvation.” It is firmly believed that “cultural renovation consti-

tutes the basis of any other ensuing essential reforms (e.g., economic or political re-

forms)… it is determined to first promote a thorough reform on collective thoughts

and culture, and then push the reform on the social and political framework”.14 Obvi-

ously, “reform on collective thoughts and culture”, here, points to the necessity of

revolutionizing China’s cosmological beliefs. Whereas, the importance of tapping

market and promoting trade, as institutionalized by Western material beliefs, is

undermined or even despised, if we observe it in the historical hindsight.

As a result, “Science and Democracy” is proposed to replace the traditional

ethic-oriented cosmological beliefs and it undertakes to serve as Chinese ultimate be-

liefs, epistemology, ideology and value system. It is foreseeable that such proposal

will eventually evoke a ferocious struggle between the traditional beliefs, which pro-

mote the rules of propriety, righteousness, good faith as well as loyalty and piety, and

the rationalized Western beliefs. Such conflict is well represented in Lu Xun’s “Diary

of a Madman”, where the traditional society is condemned as “man eating man” and

there is a rupture between the current society and the tradition. Moreover, the confu-

sion such a rupture arouses could also be found in his short story “Medicine”, in

which Hua Laoshuan, a peasant still refraining from the influence of “Science and De-

mocracy”, has spent all his savings to buy a steamed bread soaked with a slaughtered

Science-and-Democracy believer’s blood in hopes of curing his son contracted with

tuberculosis. It could be observed that the awakening of those elites is in stark contrast

to the confusion disseminated among the masses. In this transitional process, tradi-

tional Chinese cosmological beliefs are scheduled to be replaced but it remains to

hold water in the then Chinese society. Just as is described by Lin Yutang in his “My

Country, My People”, most of the Chinese revel in a bighearted and resilient way of

living. As a result, the needs to modify the society’s structure lack the necessary impe-

142 JIANSHE WU

14 Lin Yusheng, The Crisis of Chinese Consciousness: Radical Antitraditionalism in the May

Fourth Era. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1979, 45–46.

tus to free itself from the past. The material beliefs, less debated and less challenged,

are still free from any transformation. At the same time, the social problems arising

from the Western society and the cruelty as shown in the two world wars inspire those

elites in China to perceive the trap set by the overall Westernization.

In summary, although those elites in the May 4th Movement impose a different ap-

praisal on the traditional material and cosmological beliefs, they take the same ap-

proach in an attempt to search for a way out to save the nation. A consensus of cultural

salvation and ideological salvation has been reached among the then intellectuals.

Such approach to save the nation by means of thoughts and culture transformation

permeates society. But anyway, the function and effects produced by the transforma-

tion of its cosmological beliefs is mythologically overstated. They just believe that

the change in the cosmological beliefs is quintessential as far as the rise and fall of the

nation is concerned, compared with the transformation of the material beliefs. There-

fore, science here is not merely regarded as a discipline of knowledge, but as the pana-

cea to solve all the problems existing in nature, society, life, politics and ethics. It is

not so much a tool to know the nature and create the wealth we need, as the only legiti-

mate means to reconstruct society and value system. At that time, it is universally ac-

knowledged among the intellectuals that to save the nation, the urgent affair is to

waken up people and recast the spirit of the nation through a revolutionary cultural

transformation, rather than to develop science and reinvigorate the economy. How-

ever, their beliefs are wrongly placed largely because cultural salvation they have

upheld fails to touch upon the material beliefs of the mass.

CULTURAL REDEFINITION (1949–1978)

Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, China has been a socialist soci-

ety. With the breaking out of Korean War and the ensuing Cold War between the so-

cialist camp and capitalist camp, it is difficult for China to rely on the trade with the

outside world. Instead, a self-contained economic framework is more pragmatic and

conducive. Moreover, to safeguard the new-born system becomes more urgent. So,

similar to the previous stage, the transformation in the cosmological beliefs is again

emphasized here. As a result, the socialist cosmological beliefs are established and

have been maintained under the guideline of “class struggle as the center”. Conse-

quently, it leads to another rupture between the present beliefs and the past.

Then, how could such a rupture be possible? Two questions should be raised so as

to search for a plausible answer. Where can it find the necessary impetus to free itself

from the past? And in what direction can it reconstruct itself? As far as literature is

concerned, this period is characterized by the establishment of socialist cultural hege-

mony and the legitimation of socialist culture. In “Zai yan’an wenyi zuotanhui shang

de jianghua” (Talks at the Yan’an Forum on Literature and Art), Mao Zedong acutely

questions for whom literature and art serve. He asserts that they are not isolated, but

tightly bound up with politics, economy and culture. Since now the masses have un-

precedentedly taken the regime under control, and in the new epoch, the workers and


the peasants rise to be the master of the history, it is self-evident that they should act as

the protagonists in the new literature and art.15 Following this wake, Zhou Yang, the

then Chinese official in charge of literature and art, claims that “if we regard the May

4th Movement as the first revolution in literary history, then the publication of ‘Talks

at the Yan’an Forum on Literature and Art’ and its aftermath could be ranked as the

second literary revolution, even more significant and more profound than the for-

mer.”16 Under such strong impetus, “People’s Literature” and “Literature of Workers,

Peasants and Soldiers” gradually take the place of “Literature of Human” and become

prevalent; accordingly, the literature in the Communist Liberated Area as well as the

Literature of Workers, Peasants and Soldiers endorses the direction of creating a

grand revolutionary narrative and new national narrative in which workers and peas-

ants play a dominant role.

In this period of cultural redefinition, the Soviet-style thought transformations,

politics-laden cultural activities such as Criticisms on the Study of A Dream of RedMansions, the Anti-Rightist Movement and others, permeates the whole country.

Moreover, the ensuing Cultural Revolution throws the whole country into a civil

strife. There is no individualism, no subjectivity, no self-assurance and no aseity. Fi-

nally, highly unified under the ideological governance, all social activities and living

experiences are manifested as political. Naturally, the popular cosmological beliefs

prevalent then are represented by revolutionary idealism and heroism. “Science and

Democracy” has been literally discarded. All the members in the society are dreaming

of joining in the Communist party and proud of being Poor Peasants (Pinnong) in

class origin.17 And the material beliefs of the pursuit of gains will be severely inhib-

ited and even punished. It goes without saying that it indicates an ideological commit-

ment, which certainly paved the way for the success in its struggle against the KMT

regime, and now served to maintain the socialist regime without being threatened by

the foreign forces. So strangely, the cosmological beliefs stand in themselves and are

totally disintegrated with the material beliefs of seeking after gains.

In summary, accompanied by the smoke of gunpowder, the cosmological beliefs

cannot be reconstructed without the imprints of the war. In the process of cultural re-

definition, the practicality, rationality, political enthusiasm and nationalism are

blended to a miracle. Moreover, at that time, an instinctive spurn of the Western cos-

mological beliefs is justified. Such collective psyche fostered by successive wars is

difficult to be remodeled fundamentally.

It could be anticipated that through a series of political criticisms and cultural

transformations, new-type proletarian cosmological beliefs are set up. It is required

144 JIANSHE WU

15 Mao Zedong, “Talks at the Yan’an Forum on Literature and Art“, in Maozedong xuanji (Se-

lected Works of Mao Zedong) Volume III, Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1991, 873.16 Zhou Yang, The Course of Literature and Art of Mao Zedong Should Be Strictly Carried

through. A lecture given at the Central Literature Institute. 1951.17 This is one of the social strata established then according to the financial condition of each fam-

ily for the purpose of class struggle. The poorer one is, the more favorable position he will hold

in the class struggle.

that such beliefs should be integrated into the revolution. It will certainly result in its

incompatibility with the material beliefs of developing economy and widening the

trade relations. Admittedly, such incompatibility has attracted the attention from de-

cision makers as shown by the 8th National CPC Congress in 1956. However, the uto-

pia of militarized institution brings on the eruption of the Cultural Revolution, which

legitimatizes the cosmological beliefs as represented by revolutionary idealism and

heroism and renders the material beliefs invisible or latent.

CHINESE CONSENSUS (1978-PRESENT)

In 1978, there appeared a debate on the criterion of truth and eventually it enabled

Deng Xiaoping to become China’s factual top leader. For the first time in the 20th cen-

tury, the cosmological beliefs have given way to the material beliefs with “economic

construction at the centre”. Now, China’s economy is developing by leaps and bounds

with its GDP ranking fourth in the world, labeled as the “world factory”, with its full

preparations to host the Olympic Games in Beijing in 2008. China has gradually in-

volved itself in the process of globalization in an overall way.

A scrutiny of this process could realize its starts with the readjustment of its cos-

mological beliefs. By discussing “scar literature” and “subjectivity” in literature field,

“humanism” and “the criterion of assessing truth” in philosophical field, and “tradi-

tional culture” and “modernity” in history field, people are no longer confining them-

selves to these classics or revolutionary movies in seeking for the meaning of life. In-

stead, they start to explore what is underlying the popular culture like TV, films or

Internet. They tend to like the aphorism by Deng Xiaoping: “It does not matter

whether the cat is white or black, so long as it catches mice.” Such realistic attitudes

come to terms with the tremendous reorientation of the material beliefs.

Referring to the past, the fading glory, traumatic transition and the cultural redefi-

nition, the traditional framework of the cosmological and material beliefs and the

continuous emphasis on the transformation of the cosmological beliefs contribute lit-

tle to the prosperity of China and China remains to be despised by the West. China co-

mes to recognize the traditional ethic-oriented cosmological beliefs and the socialism

politic-oriented cosmological beliefs are more and more turning against the modern-

ization process in China. And she starts to realize the necessity of being secular and

market-oriented. China has made it clear that for those collective experiences, which

have been held in common by other contemporary groups, we could have a try on

them. Admittedly, it is the adoption of the western-style material beliefs since 1978

that leads us to an ever-growing-prosperous China. And as a result, we could observe

the rationalization of technology, market and desire in daily life.

In Beijing, 70% buildings or mansions are named after foreign culture; and in pre-

paring for the Olympic Games, its gymnasiums and other main sports facilities are to-

tally designed by foreigners (instead, the main sports facilities for hosting the 1964

Olympic Games in Tokyo are all designed by Japanese architectures in hopes of rep-

resenting the new image of post-war Japan); as for its mascot “Friendlies”, their forms


seem to borrow from Japanese “Iron Fisted Atom” or American Superman. Uncon-

sciously or subconsciously, China is under the powerful influence of western beliefs

while the Chinese tradition is going invisible. At the same time, people are becoming

more practical and less concerned with ideology. As a result, a more indifferent atti-

tude is taken by the mass towards the society they are in; the gap between the poor and

the rich is increasingly widening; the entangling corruption and environmental issues

haunts us. Upon these thorny problems, China is redefining its laissez-aller attitudes

towards the dominant western-style material beliefs.

On the other hand, China still resists taking over the dominant western cosmologi-

cal beliefs as entailed in democracy. It is claimed by many scholars both at home and

abroad that growth without democracy in China therefore becomes the unfortunate

solution to the legitimization crisis of Chinese socialism which has long been forced

to compete with multinational capitalism in the latter’s playground. In their opinion,

this is something of anomy.

But theoretically speaking, the adoption of the western material beliefs doesn’t

necessarily mean the adoption of western cosmological beliefs. Hong Kong is a good

exception. The marriage between market and democracy is more a prejudication than

a justification. The Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom Index shows that since

1980, economic freedom has been rising around the world and has accelerated since

the 1990s.18 Many of the countries or regions where economic freedom is secure are

not those which have political freedom. As the integration of the traditional Chinese

cosmological beliefs, as represented by the rules of propriety, righteousness and good

faith, into its agrarian material beliefs has guaranteed a prosperous and powerful

China for as long as thousands of years, the marriage between democracy and market

could be another historical coincidence. And in reality, such marriage has been chal-

lenged by two World Wars, Cold War, American’s unilateralism, technophobia and

the global interference in the internal affairs of other polities.

In view of these deficiencies and foreseeable threats, China is cautious in modeling

after its western counterparts. The notion of “constructing a harmonious society” is

proposed and advocated in China, intending to construct “a society of democracy,

rule of law, equity, justice, sincerity, amity, vitality, stability and orderliness, har-

mony between man and nature;”19 at the same time, “Eight Honors and Disgraces”

has been listed, among which loving the mother country, serving the people, science,

hard work, unity and cooperation, honesty and keeping one’s word, respecting laws

and regulations, suffering for the struggle are highly eulogized.20 And in memory of

the 70th anniversary of Long March, Long March spirit is rediscovered so as to com-

plete the new Long March, i.e., to bring about a great rejuvenation of the Chinese na-

tion.21 All these notions are closely bound up with the ethic-oriented traditional cos-

146 JIANSHE WU

18 See Gwartney and Lawson, Economic Freedom of the World: 2003 Annual Report. Fraser

Institue, Vancouver, 2003.19 Hu Jingtao, http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2005-02/19/content_2595497.htm.20 Hu Jingtao, http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1024/4165047.html.21 Hu Jingtao, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2006-10/22/content_5235987.htm.

mological beliefs, while such western beliefs as democracy, nomocracy, science are

also incorporated.

In reality, the Chinese model seems more appealing to most of the countries. “We

all know what the American ‘strings’ are: democracy, freedom, human rights, the rule

of law. When the West offers money or simply its embrace, it wants these things in re-

turn. China has no such preoccupations or scruples. If the Washington consensus is

ideologically interventionist, the emerging Beijing consensus looks ideologically ag-

nostic. It prizes peace, development and trade”.22 According to “Foreign Policy in Fo-

cus”, “China’s foreign policy of persuading friends and influencing enemies is a tri-

umph of realism. … China has used quiet diplomacy, respect for sovereignty, and lots

of hard currency to acquire access and resources. It hasn’t thrown its weight around”.

And “[China] adopted a multilateral approach that contrasted sharply not only with its

earlier foreign policy instincts but also with growing U.S. unilateralism. China has

become the strong silent type that plays off the brash U.S. cowboy. It’s an image that

goes over well with global audiences. In international polls, perceptions of China’s

influence in the world are significantly more positive than attitudes toward the United

States.”23 The adoption of western-style material beliefs in majority and its rejection

of western cosmological beliefs in majority constitute the emerging Chinese consen-

sus and its existence has been gradually justified.

In summary, that China as well as other countries around the world, grounds its le-

gitimacy solely and defensively on economic growth and social rationalization is not

to offset and neutralize the ideological offense waged by the West. Instead, they are

not assured of the western cosmological beliefs’ being the perfectly safe way out in

this turmoil world. Compared to the neoliberal transitions in Eastern Europe or, more

tragically, Russia, the Chinese development model seems to work better. This is why

today “there’s no surer vote-getter in Latin America than assailing economic advice

so closely identified with the U.S. that it is known as the ‘Washington consensus’…

the pervasive unpopularity of the U.S. economic model already is prompting coun-

tries such as Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela to build stronger trade and diplomatic

ties to China as an alternative.”24 To be globalized doesn’t necessarily mean to be

westernized. Actually, the Chinese development model may be more feasible com-

pared with the free-market economy and democracy advocated by the western coun-

tries. As for China, new principles and traditions already exist within its current social

framework as the old China imbued with older traditions and principles. China is or-

ganizing its social lives on a new basis and has adopted new perspectives on people

and their activities in a more realistic way. While they had grown in number and

accepted by contemporary countries, it would have formulated Chinese consensus.


22 Roger Cohen, “Welcome to the New Bipolar World – China versus America”, in Khaleej Times

Online, 23 November 2006.23 John Feffer, “China: What’s the Big Mystery?”, in Foreign Policy in Focus. December 4, 2006.24 David J. Lynch, “Anger over Free-Market Reforms Fuels Leftward Swing in Latin America”, in

USA Today, February 9, 2006.

CONCLUSIONS

In the process of Chinese modernization, Chinese have been striving to break away

from the traditional material and cosmological beliefs and sympathetically reflect on

the triad relationship between country, individual and the mass time and again. Since

1840, the western material and cosmological beliefs embark to challenge the tradi-

tional ethic-oriented cosmological beliefs as well as the agrarian material beliefs. But

its audience is not easily assured of its legitimization in the Chinese context. From

cultural salvation, through cultural redefinition, to Chinese consensus, the western

material beliefs are partly accepted while its cosmological beliefs are rejected to a

larger extent.

It seems to most western scholars that such performance is not “correct” or “coher-

ent”. But as a layered process of collective psyche corresponding to the vicissitude of

the times, we are not in the position to adjudicate its anomaly. If we insist on grafting

the western beliefs onto the present China, it would not outlive its framework, just as

we have observed in Eastern Europe as well as in Russia.

Chinese consensus, as a new cultural identity, could not do without the western

material and cosmological beliefs. At the same time, the western material and cosmo-

logical beliefs shall not dismiss it as threatening or insignificant, since without stimu-

lation from the outside, the framework of western beliefs would cease to develop and

stay in a stalemate as we have observed in ancient China. In this global village, we

need each other.

148 JIANSHE WU

Documents

Translating China and reconstructing Chinese cultural identit(ies)