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Transnational Influences on IrishMuslim Networks: From Local to GlobalPerspectivesAdil Hussain KhanPublished online: 15 Dec 2011.

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Transnational Influences on Irish Muslim Networks:From Local to Global Perspectives

ADIL HUSSAIN KHAN

Abstract

The formation of Irish Muslim organizational structures has gradually been takingplace for nearly 60 years. External factors, including international politics, havedriven this process and shaped its outcomes from the very beginning. This studywill demonstrate how the displacement of Irish Muslim organizational structuresby purportedly representative transnational umbrella organizations has been influ-enced by the proponents of global Islamist movements, like the Muslim Brotherhood,and to a much lesser extent Jama‘at-i Islami. While this shift is consistent with thebroader objectives of global political Islam, this study will demonstrate how the Euro-pean setting enabled a relatively smooth transition to take place, from local to globalperspectives. By tracing key events in the historical evolution of the Irish Muslimcommunity, we will explore the role of external influences on the development ofMuslim networks within the country and abroad in an attempt to contextualizethe position of Irish Islam in a globalized framework. Ultimately, this study willoffer insights into the dubious relationships between Muslim representative bodiesat the European level and the local Muslims they claim to represent in a Europeancountry such as Ireland.

Introduction

A transition has been taking place within the power structures of Irish Muslim organiz-ations at various levels. As networks developed, influential individuals, who had beenguiding procedures at the local level, were steadily dislodged from positions of authorityby influential transnational organizations, whose aspirations incorporate the vision of amore globalized role for Irish Islam. In one such case, this transition has recast Dublinas the international headquarters for the European Council for Fatwa and Research(ECFR) headed by Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who remains one of the most recognizablefigures in contemporary Sunni Islam. Within a globalized context, however, the transfer-ence of authority that has taken place, from local Muslims to international umbrellaorganizations, has markedly changed the landscape of Irish Islam.

Beyond Ireland, contemporary Irish Islam is perhaps best known for its role in provid-ing an administrative platform for Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi and his ECFR. However,for those familiar with Irish Islam or its history, this association may seem a little mislead-ing. This discourse regarding the portrayal of Irish Islam, and even perhaps the associatedperceptions of Irish Muslim identity, is in many ways the focus of this study. As will bedemonstrated below, the significance of the transition of Irish Islam, from its organiz-ational beginnings as a student society to a center for European Muslim networks,extends well beyond the Irish setting. Perhaps this study will provide a basis for workswhich seek to characterize the parallels between Muslim organizational structures in

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other locations and those in Ireland. Nevertheless, one may choose to question, as weshall see below, the extent to which the formation of Muslim organizational structureswithin the Irish context is dependent upon the influence of external factors affectingMuslim communities at the local level. This line of inquiry illustrates how Irish Islambecame increasingly involved in transnational Muslim networks, which were originallyconceived as a means of implementing the ideologies of global political Islam.1 In duecourse, this has transformed Irish Islam into a nationalized religious division within a glo-balized construct, where national organizational structures comprise the building blocksof transnational umbrellas that loosely resemble an institutional hierarchy.2

The development ofMuslim communities in European countries, such as Ireland, withrelatively few historic connections to the Muslim world, is related to some extent to themotivating factors behind Muslim migration patterns. In this sense, it is important toexplore the relationship between the challenges faced by early Muslims in Ireland andthe formation of the specific organizational structures that were developed in response.However, it is also important to recognize that by the latter part of the twentiethcentury, these dynamics had changed as they are continuing to change, both in Irelandand abroad. For this reason, evaluating the differences in how competing voices ofIrish Islam express contemporary concerns highlights the breach between the politicaldiscourse of representative bodies and their constituencies at the local level. We shallsee below how Muslim organizational structures in Ireland are increasingly shaped byglobal concerns, which do not necessarily reflect the priorities of individual Muslims inIreland.3

Although there are many scholarly sources about Islam within the European context,4

the literature regarding early aspects of Irish Islam is limited.5 Consequently, most of thebackground information below is derived from the personal testimonies of early IrishMuslims, who have provided the groundwork for this study. In addition, efforts havebeen made to incorporate as much as possible the unpublished accounts of the DublinIslamic Society’s Logbook, which contains an informative record of the minutes tran-scribed at the meetings of the Society. In this respect, most accounts are anecdotal.However, this study endeavors to provide a starting point for discussions about IrishIslam, and perhaps lays a basis for further research aimed at delineating Ireland’s rolein the construction of European Islam.

Ireland’s First Muslim Organizational Structure

Muslims first began arriving in Ireland with some regularity in the early 1950s when theRoyal College of Surgeons in Ireland (RCSI) made arrangements to accept an annualquota of South Africa’s “Indian” students whose educational prospects had beenstinted by the country’s apartheid legislation. Although the first class in 1952 onlyincluded six “Indian” students from mixed religious backgrounds, the arrangementswere enough to enable a steady stream of Muslim migration to Ireland from SouthAfrica over the next several years.6 By 1959, 33 Muslim medical students decided toorganize a religious forum known as the Dublin Islamic Society (DIS), which therebybecame Ireland’s first Muslim representative body. Yousuf Jhavary, a leading figure inthe DIS’s formative period, held the post of secretary for a number of years.7 The aimsof the Society focused on practical issues, revolving around the community’s immediateneeds for holding organized Friday prayers, ‘Eıd prayers, and occasional religiouslectures. In fact, the first general meeting of the DIS took place at a local Protestantsponsored hostel for international students called Koinonia House, where most

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Muslim students resided. An executive committee of eight members, nearly one-quarterof the DIS’s membership roster, was established to implement the directives of theSociety.8 Aside from South Africans, the committee included one student from Tanza-nia, two Syrians, and two Egyptians, demonstrating the diversity of Muslims in Irelandat the time. In addition, the large proportion of DIS members who held executiveposts provides an indication of the grassroots nature of the Society’s administrative struc-ture.

For several years, the activities of the DIS remained based at the international students’hostel at Koinonia House, situated in close proximity to the main campus of the RCSI atSt Stephen’s Green in Dublin city center. However, the venue posed a problem for stu-dents who wanted to meet more regularly for daily prayers. Initially, about four or fiveSouth African students began congregating informally at Koinonia House for eveningprayers. The first prayers took place unofficially, due to the hostel’s explicit policyagainst religious favoritism. However, once the students received special permissionfrom hostel officials, they were able to gather formally on a weekly basis.9 Nevertheless,the earliest gatherings only attracted an average of five to eight worshipers per week. Inonly a short period of time, however, the attendance of the Friday gatherings hadgrown to average about 35 worshippers per week by 1961.10 Additional activities orga-nized by the DIS facilitated a process whereby early Muslim students studying inDublin could work towards establishing a permanent place for themselves in Irish society.

By 1962, the students had decided to expand their activities beyond the universitysetting. Although the ‘Eıd al-adha prayers remained at Koinonia House that year, thelarger ‘Eıd al-fitr prayers, in which 120 Muslims participated, were offered at MolesworthHall near the RCSI campus.11 In 1963, the DIS was prompted to adopt a formal consti-tution in accordance with the bank’s regulations where its accounts were being held. Thedraft constitution provided the Society with a greater sense of legitimacy and a more for-malized structure. In the same year, the DIS joined the Federation of Student IslamicSocieties (FOSIS).12 Two DIS representatives, Yousuf Jhavary and Mohammed Khan,journeyed to Britain to attend the FOSIS inaugural meeting in Birmingham, whichfurther broadened the DIS’s role.13 It is interesting to note that the DIS was still regardedby its members as primarily a student society, which may only have been natural, consid-ering that most Muslims in Ireland at the time were students. Participating in FOSISthrough the 1960s enabled student representatives of the DIS to create contacts withother influential Muslims in Europe who were willing to support their efforts. In thisrespect, the consolidation of Muslim organizational structures was taking place acrossEurope for various reasons. As European Muslims were coming together at the locallevel, many community leaders were coordinating efforts across the continent as isolatedorganizations became increasingly aware of fellow Muslims in similar situations. In thissense, the Irish Muslim community, whose student members were mostly from SouthAfrica, did not comprise the only transient population of Muslim students in Europewho were forced to relocate due to political constraints.

The Ikhwan in Europe: Early Brotherhood Influences in Ireland

As the first Muslim medical students were coming together to form the DIS, unrelatedevents were unfolding abroad, which would come to have a considerable impact on thedirection of Irish Islam. In this respect, it is necessary to look at the formation of theDIS within the broader historical context of corresponding events in the Middle East.In Egypt, for example, the attempt in 1954 to assassinate revolutionary leader Gamal

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Abdel Nasser at the alleged behest of Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun)leaders had led to a major government crack down on political activists and oppositionmovements throughout the country. As a result, thousands of members of the MuslimBrotherhood were imprisoned indefinitely without formal charges, while the movementwas officially dissolved by the Nasser regime.14 Towards the end of the 1950s, anumber of Brotherhood supporters fled Egypt in search of political asylum abroad.Although most seem to have stayed within the confines of the Middle East, a few influ-ential members moved west to escape the Egyptian government’s sanctions on politicalopposition movements.15 As we will see below, this was an important step in the sub-sequent development of Islam in Europe and North America. This dynamic may alsohave been influenced, to some extent, by the early Brotherhood’s appeal to youngermiddle-class Egyptians with progressive ideas, especially while the movement’s govern-ance remained under the auspices of its founder, Hassan al-Banna (1906–1949).16 Bythe beginning of the 1960s, several promising activists in exile were unexpectedly pursu-ing paths of higher education in foreign countries, prior to stabilizing their personal situ-ations and eventually settling permanently in European or North American locations,including Ireland.One such member of the DIS in the early 1960s was Egyptian medical student Ahmed

Elkadi (d. 2009). Although Elkadi’s sojourn in Ireland is typically overshadowed by hismuch lengthier stay in the USA, Elkadi’s Irish contributions were nonetheless meaning-ful, according to his South African companions of the time.17 Upon completing hisstudies, Elkadi established himself as a heart surgeon and eventually settled in Americawhere he played a leading role in helping to solidify a number of Muslim organizationsoperating since the 1960s, including the Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA), theIslamic Medical Association of North America (IMANA), and the Muslim AmericanSociety (MAS), as well as the Muslim Youth of North America (MYNA), which effec-tively functions as the student branch of the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA).From Dublin, however, as an estranged medical student studying abroad, AhmedElkadi organized study circles to discuss passages of the Qur’an with fellow Muslimswho were less versed in the Arabic language than the Egyptian. Elkadi took advantageof these opportunities to introduce members to the ideas of prominent Ikhwani thinkerslike Said Ramadan (1926–1995), Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966), and Hassan al-Banna(1906–1949).18

Interestingly, Said Ramadan was himself in a similar situation to Elkadi at this stage ofhis career. Ramadan was a leading figure in the early Brotherhood who, like many of hiscompanions, had been expelled from his native Egypt following the government’s clampdown on the organization. Forced into exile, Ramadan spent a number of years shiftingfrom country to country prior to settling permanently with his family in Switzerland.Ramadan was highly regarded within Islamist circles due to his close relationship withHassan al-Banna. He had married Banna’s eldest daughter, Wafa, a few years prior toBanna’s assassination in 1949, in addition to having served as Banna’s personal sec-retary.19 From Europe, Said Ramadan invested considerable time in travelling toGermany where he completed a PhD from the University of Cologne. With stablefooting in Switzerland by 1958, Ramadan endeavored to assist European Muslimserect a number of mosques across the continent in accordance with his proselytisticworldview. Locally, Ramadan helped found the Islamic Centre of Geneva in 1961,which is still run by his son, Hani.20 Said Ramadan also played a major role in the estab-lishment of the Islamic Centre of Munich by chairing an early mosque constructioncommission intended to oversee the project.21 The construction commission has since

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evolved considerably and taken on an expanded role, resulting in a number of adminis-trative shuffles, jurisdictional reviews, and name changes over the years. At present, thesame administrative apparatus is known as the Islamische Gemeinschaft in Deutschland(IGD), which has long since become an influential representative of German Muslimsassociated with the Brotherhood’s ideologies.22

In these regards, Ramadan’s commitment to global Muslim unity through a process ofbureaucratization was consistent with his Islamist ideals, much like Ahmed Elkadi inDublin who encouraged Irish Muslims in his own way to establish themselves accord-ingly. On the European level, Ikhwani exiles, including Said Ramadan, played an impor-tant role in orchestrating Muslim initiatives on a transnational scale. Although Ramadandid not necessarily devise these projects of his own accord, he did help local Muslimsscattered throughout Europe collaborate with one another, whether by aiding in theestablishment of local infrastructure or by helping burgeoning Muslim communities inEurope access Middle Eastern resources in an unprecedented way. This was also trueof the developing Muslim community in Ireland. Hence, Muslim medical students,like Mohammed Khan from the DIS, were eager to develop and maintain contact withEuropean Muslim networks of support, irrespective of their ethnic or sectarian orien-tations. This was also apparent through the FOSIS initiative of 1963 whose timely for-mation was consistent with the broader interests of Western European Muslims. Forthese reasons, Mohammed Khan attempted to arrange a meeting with Said Ramadanat his Swiss residence in Geneva the same year. Although Khan journeyed fromDublin to Geneva, he was unable to meet Said Ramadan due to Ramadan’s unexpecteddeparture from the country, which in retrospect was rather typical of his illimitable travelengagements.23

Multiple factors contributed towards the development of Muslim organizational struc-tures in Europe through the 1960s. Although motivated Muslim activists disseminatingthe ideologies of political Islam had succeeded in capturing the attention of localMuslim students studying at European universities, they alone were not responsible forthe subsequent formation in later decades of transnational Islamist networks at the Euro-pean level.24 Many local Muslims themselves were looking for outside assistance or exter-nal support in establishing venues for basic religious undertakings in alien surroundingsacross Europe. In this sense, taking foundational measures towards the institutionaliza-tion of Islam was a necessary step in the crystallization of viable Muslim communitiesin cities like Dublin, where none had previously existed. For this reason, local IrishMuslims would equally welcome support for religious endeavors from their Church ofIreland hosts at Koinonia House, as well as from their more politically minded brethrenin exile, despite their lack of Islamist sympathies. As local needs grew in conjunction withlocal communities, the priorities of Irish Muslims changed and new issues began to takeprecedence in the DIS’s annual agendas. As a result, the mosque debate would soon finditself at the forefront of Irish Muslim concerns.

Networks and Networking: Transitioning From Local to Global Perspectives

A transition of the DIS was beginning to take place from a student to a non-studentsociety. In this respect, the relationships that DIS members had begun to foster interna-tionally, including those through FOSIS, appear to have played a significant role. It isclear that several leading activists in exile had taken a keen interest in the direction ofFOSIS, especially Brotherhood figureheads like Said Ramadan, and others fromJama‘at-i Islami.25 The developing contact between the DIS and other European mis-

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sions proved invaluable, as a stable Irish Muslim community in permanent residencegradually emerged from the student society. By the mid-1960s, some of the earliermedical students had completed their studies and had begun practicing as physiciansin the Dublin area. Although most students returned to their countries of origin uponreceiving their qualifications, some had married Irish wives and were beginning to startfamilies in Ireland. Such marriages were particularly problematic for South AfricanMuslims, since mixed marriages were illegal under the apartheid legislation, makingthe prospect of return difficult. As the Muslim population in Ireland continued togrow, the DIS was forced to address the needs of its increasing non-student members,which further broadened the scope of the Society and highlighted the need for more per-manent facilities beyond the student halls of residence. The gradual increase of Muslimprofessionals in the Irish medical industry, however, did not have a meaningful impact onthe DIS’s revenues straight away. In fact, the records of the annual general meetings ofthe DIS indicate that substantial percentages of the Society’s meager collections weredonated to various charitable causes around the world. In this respect, fundraising wassimply not a priority for DIS members, since the overhead costs of running a student reli-gious society, in comparison to running a mosque, remained quite low. Annual expendi-tures, aside from charitable donations, often included hall rentals for the biannual ‘Eıdcelebrations, administrative expenses, and the cost of occasional socials.26

The treasurer’s reports of the DIS indicate that the Society’s balance throughout themid-1960s was on the order of £70. This was after relatively large portions of theSociety’s balances were at times donated to charitable causes. Over the years, the DIShad sent small contributions abroad to fellow Muslims in need, such as organizationscommitted to helping Palestinians and Algerians. They had also supported the effortsof local non-Muslim charities, such as Oxfam and the Society for the Blind in Dublin,following discussions clarifying the extent of their Christian orientations. The secretary’sreport of 1965 indicates that the DIS made a relatively large donation of £36 towards theconstruction of the Islamic Centre of Munich, which was then under the direction of SaidRamadan. Nonetheless, discussions regarding a permanent Islamic center in Dublin didnot arise until 1966 when a proposition to build or rent permanent mosque facilities inDublin was ultimately rejected by members who did not see a pressing need to pursuethe project at the time.27

In 1967, when the Dublin mosque issue arose again, somemembers felt that the moneywould be better spent as a donation to the ongoing mosque project in Munich. Therewere also genuine concerns amongst students that the number of Muslims in Dublinwas too small to support a permanent Islamic center. In response to these fears, it wassuggested that the DIS establish a type of trust where other organizations, such as theWoking mosque in Britain, the Islamic Centre of Geneva, or the Bank of Ireland couldact as trustees on behalf of the proposed Dublin Islamic Centre, in the event that theMuslim community of Ireland ceased to exist.28 In a tentative gesture, DIS membersdecided to proceed with the project with caution, while various avenues were exploredmore thoroughly. In a preliminary attempt to raise funds, interested students wroteletters to their families in South Africa requesting donations for an Islamic center, eventhough the DIS had yet to formally adopt a resolution to pursue the project. Thestudent contingent could not reach a consensus regarding the mosque project sincemost DIS members still intended to return to their countries of origin following the com-pletion of their studies. For this reason, the mosque project was abandoned once againfollowing internal disputes.29

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Fundraising Strategies and Vested Interests

By the summer break of 1970, the students had collectively decided to solicit donationsfrom family members while returning home for the holidays to South Africa.30 Althoughthey managed to raise limited funds, it was not enough to establish a permanent Islamiccenter in Dublin.31 In 1971, the students registered the DIS as a “friendly society” underIreland’s Friendly Societies Act of 1896, which enabled it to purchase land as an organ-ization in the name of its trustees.32 It also enabled them to acquire non-profit statusunder Irish law, open bank accounts with special privileges, and qualify for newly insti-tuted government support services for the organization.

In 1972, Tajmmul Hussain Hayat visited seven embassies in London on behalf of theDIS to raise awareness regarding the mosque project without luck.33 The same year,Yusuf Vaizie invited the first Libyan cultural attaché from its embassy in London tovisit Dublin in regards to student recruitment for the Royal College of Surgeons.Between 1972 and 1973, Vaizie accompanied four RCSI professors to London foradditional meetings with diplomatic dignitaries from the Egyptian, Kuwaiti, and SaudiArabian embassies regarding these objectives.34 By the 1970s, international studentrecruitment had become a lucrative venture for College officials who had hoped tostrengthen ties with Middle Eastern countries through the RCSI’s extensive Muslimalumni. In addition, the RCSI had already been benefitting from an increasing Arabstudent population in recent years.35 In due course, cultivating these relationshipsthrough diplomatic channels afforded Irish Muslims the opportunity to discuss the pro-posed mosque project, which was marketed as a means to address the absence of ade-quate religious facilities for Muslim students in Ireland. In this way, countriesinterested in fostering a long-term relationship with Ireland found the notion of anIslamic center that would cater to the needs of Muslim expatriates in Dublin ratherappealing.36

In 1973, the DIS made a breakthrough in its fundraising campaign. In addition toreceiving more substantial pledges from private investors in South Africa, the studentssucceeded in involving Middle Eastern embassies in the Islamic center project, whichprovided a striking change in the history of Irish Islam. In March 1973, the DIS receiveda donation totaling over £1,500 from the ruling family of Abu Dhabi. In March 1974, itreceived nearly £18,000 from King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, who had donated the moneypersonally rather than through the Saudi Ministry of Awqaf in accordance with typicalprotocols.37 Most interesting, however, was the manner in which the sizable Saudidonation was secured, which once again relates to the broader context of politicalIslam in Europe.38

Political Islam in Europe through a Globalized Framework

The DIS had continued sending representatives to various conferences and gatherings ofinterest to lobby external support for the Dublin mosque project. In July 1973, DISmembers had attended an international Muslim youth conference in Tripoli hosted byMuammar Qaddafi, whose own ascent to power had only taken place some yearsprior.39 Just a few months earlier, in May 1973, the delegation also attended the Inter-national Conference for Islamic Cultural Centres and Bodies in Europe held inLondon. Upon returning to Ireland from the international conferences, DIS membersconfidently proclaimed that the Dublin mosque project had been “well represented”.40

Each conference featured several leading Islamists, including Ghulam Azam (b. 1922),

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who despite retaining strong ties to Britain served as the amır of the Bengali wing ofJama‘at-i Islami from 1969 to 2000. There was also Khurshid Ahmad (b. 1932), thecurrent na’ib amır of Jama‘at-i Islami Pakistan, who attended both conferences while con-currently managing to set up the Islamic Foundation in Leicester the same year. Also inattendance at the London conference was Ghaleb Himmat (b. 1938), the latest Ikhwanifigurehead of the Islamic Centre of Munich who subsequently chaired the IGD through2000.41 Owing largely to Himmat’s resourcefulness, the Munich mosque project wasscheduled to open the same year (in 1973), now that Libyan funding would ensure itstimely completion.42

The London conference of 1973 was sponsored by the Saudi embassy under the direc-tion of diplomat Salem Azzam (1924–2008), who had already been in contact with DISsecretary T. H. Hayat the previous year, as mentioned above. Azzam was from an influ-ential Egyptian family, despite his Saudi posting, who was swiftly emerging as a leadingfigure in European political Islam. Azzam was highly respected within the community forhis longstanding commitment to Arab nationalism. Most notably, Salem Azzam was thenephew of Abd al-Rahman Azzam (or Azzam Pasha, 1893–1976), a prominent Egyptianpolitician whose celebrated career culminated in the years between 1945 and 1952, whenhe served as the first secretary-general of the Arab League.43 However, within the histori-cal context prior to World War II, the Azzam family was known to have strong politicalties to the early Muslim Brotherhood, namely through Abd al-Rahman Azzam and hisfellow activist companion Hassan al-Banna.44

Nevertheless, Salem Azzam had used the London conference to establish a platform forhis Islamic Council of Europe (ICE), an early Muslim umbrella organization at the Euro-pean level, which was inaugurated that year. Although the ICE appears to have since beensuperseded by other umbrella organizations, it was reasonably active in London since itsinception in 1973 and throughout the early 1980s.45 Salem Azzam and the ICE were fullycommitted to consolidating a transnational network of Muslim organizational structuresin Europe and beyond. Azzam’s stature within the ranks of the Saudi embassy wascemented by the marriage of his cousin, Muna bint Abd al-Rahman Azzam, to KingFaisal’s son, Muhammad al-Faisal. Given the various channels at Salem Azzam’s dispo-sal, procuring funds for peripheral projects, such as Dublin’s Islamic center, was simplynot a problem. In these regards, funding Ireland’s first mosque equally served a numberof religious, socio-political, and diplomatic interests at the same time, both personallyand professionally. By establishing a European Muslim umbrella organization andfunding member mosques to join, proponents of political Islam considerably expandedtheir scope of influence throughout Europe.With regal support behind the DIS, the mosque project concluded with ease. On 19

May 1974 the DIS purchased a property for £18,000 at 7 Harrington Street in Dublincity center for use as Ireland’s first mosque.46 Following someminor setbacks concerningrenovations and planning permission,47 the official opening of the Centre took place on17 December 1977, though it had been in use by local Muslims since 1976.48 The inau-gural ceremony included a number of distinguished politicians, such as Irish PresidentCearbhall Ó Dálaigh, as well as “chief guest” Salem Azzam, who travelled to Dublinfrom London to attend the event.49 Interestingly prior to the opening of the mosque,the DIS appointed a new group of trustees in conjunction with the election proceduresof Irish Friendly Societies. Of the five trustees selected, four were South African inorigin, and one was Egyptian national Salem Azzam.50 As a trustee of the mosque withexcellent contacts in Europe and the Middle East, Salem Azzam had considerablecontrol over the direction of the Irish Muslim community.

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It may be worth pausing momentarily to recognize the sophistication of Salem Azzam’sposturing and the complexity of the ICE’s platform. The ICE was much more than aEuropean offshoot grounded in Brotherhood ideology. The ICE was an independententity that was not bounded by the Egyptian Brotherhood’s hierarchical structure or itspolitical policies, which hardly made sense in a European context. In addition, the execu-tive committee of the ICE managed to incorporate Muslim Brothers in European exile,like Said Ramadan, as well as leading figures from Jama‘at-i Islami, like KhurshidAhmad.51 This emphasis on commonalities resonated well within Europe’s diverse immi-grant communities where many Muslims may have felt more inclined, though not com-mitted, to political Islam than in their native surroundings. In addition, the ICEaddressed the exclusivist objections of hardliners by stressing the similarities betweenIslamist movements in developing a comprehensive Muslim political ideology, whichwas supposedly more appropriate for European Muslims than conventional Ikhwani orJama‘at-i Islami politics. This had a lasting impression on smaller organizations likethe DIS, which had been cultivating relationships with different ideological figureheadsin Europe for some time, through FOSIS and other means.

The DIS’s association with the ICE had tangible benefits beyond the financial contri-butions that had already been received. In 1977, the ICE committed to sending a reli-gious speaker to Dublin on a monthly basis, which was a welcome additionconsidering Dublin lacked a fulltime imam.52 Also, the DIS occasionally invited itsown guest speakers from abroad, fulfilling the religious expectations of local memberswhile strengthening transnational Muslim networks. One of the more notable speakersto visit Ireland during this period was Ahmed Deedat (1918–2005). Deedat had spentmost of his life in South Africa and hence was a familiar figure among Dublin’s SouthAfrican Muslims. His Islamic Propagation Centre International (IPCI) was well receivedby Irish Muslims who appreciated Deedat’s specialization in Christian–Muslim relations.Interestingly, RCSI graduate Dr. Mohammed Khan still serves on the IPCI’s executiveboard as a senior trustee based outside Durban. Similarly, Khurshid Ahmad, who bynow was a familiar figure to DIS members, visited Dublin as well. The inclusion of theDIS in broader initiatives imparted a sense of belonging to local members who had other-wise been isolated from other Muslim communities in Europe and abroad. This also gavethe impression to local Irish Muslims that their concerns were systematically beingaddressed on a unified world stage through a cohesive political framework.53

1980s to the Present

By the 1980s, the DIS was growing more rapidly than before, bearing in mind that even asmall addition ofMuslims each year had a relatively large impact on a congregation of thissize. In this respect, Ireland was still mainly a temporary destination for Muslim studentsand now also for Muslim workers who were arriving for technical training in the Irishaviation industry. By 1981, an agreement had been reached with the Kuwaiti Ministryof Awqaf regarding the sponsorship of a fulltime imam. Although interim imams and stu-dents continued to occupy the post provisionally, the temporary imam to benefit mostfrom the resolution was Yahya al-Hussein, a native of Sudan who was recruited by aSudanese friend studying economics in Ireland at the time. Yahya al-Hussein hasremained the imam of the Dublin mosque since 1983, despite what has periodicallybeen intense opposition to his political perspectives. In these regards, it is interestingto note that ongoing tensions between Middle Eastern Muslims and the imam of theDublin mosque appear to have been correlated with Hasan al-Turabi’s disputes with

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the Brotherhood. Nevertheless, the two Irish factions seem to have resolved their issues,at least for the time being, even though Turabi has since formed his own splinter groupindependent of the Sudanese Brotherhood.54

Although members had taken major steps to secure a fulltime imam, it was clear thatthe DIS was in much greater need for a more spacious Islamic center. A larger venuewas identified at 163 South Circular Road on the site of the former Donroe PresbyterianChurch, which was purchased in 1983 and subsequently transformed into the DublinMosque. The larger facilities proved more adequate to house Dublin’s increasingMuslim population from Arabic speaking countries. It also provided the desired capabili-ties of establishing a rudimentary Islamic school for children.55 In preparation for futureexpansions, the DIS solicited friendly advice from various Muslim bodies in Europe,including its long time ally in Britain, the Islamic Foundation of Leicester. The IslamicFoundation’s protracted influence on this relationship may be visible through theDIS’s subsequent name change to the Islamic Foundation of Ireland (IFI) prior to thedelayed opening of Ireland’s first Muslim National School in 1990.56

From the late 1980s to the early 1990s, there were an increasing number of Libyan,Algerian, and Malaysian migrants arriving in Ireland.57 It appears as though theLibyan connection might have been strengthened by Qaddafi’s prospering relationswith Ireland since the 1970s, which seem to have developed despite his continuedsupport for the IRA.58 There was also a significant increase in the arrival of Muslim stu-dents from the Gulf region, which appears to have been encouraged by amicable relationsbetween the United Arab Emirates and Ireland following a few highprofile sharedbusiness ventures, many of which continue to this day.59 In addition, it is well knownin horseracing circles that the Maktoum family of Dubai has invested hundreds ofmillions in the horseracing industry worldwide.60 Maktoum family members have con-sistently been amongst the top buyers of bloodstock at major British and Irish auctionsfor a number of years. Although theMaktoum family has recently constructed superlativefacilities in Britain and Dubai, it retains several family-owned stables in Ireland, mainlysituated around County Kildare.61 Perhaps this, in part, explains the Maktoumfamily’s willingness to fully sponsor Dublin’s most recent mosque in Clonskeagh,Dublin 14, after being approached by an Emirati medical student from the RCSI in1992. In this respect, the student’s influential family background appears to have beena contributing factor in the decision. Nevertheless, it is clear from conversations withlocal Irish Muslims involved in the process that personal sympathies shaped the sub-sequent outcomes in a way which might seem favorable to proponents of global politicalIslam.

Current Irish Muslim Networks

Within the broader context of European Islam, 1989 marked the beginning of the Fed-eration of Islamic Organisations in Europe (FIOE), a reasonably successful umbrellaorganization established along the lines of the ICE by supporters of the European Broth-erhood.62 At present, the FIOE claims to be the largest and perhaps most comprehensiverepresentative of European Islam, consisting of “hundreds of member organizationsspread across 28 European States”.63 The FIOE presents itself as the crowning achieve-ment of numerous failed attempts to mobilize European Muslims, which consequentlyhave enabled it to “unif[y] the political discourse” with respect to European Islam.64

Since its inception, the FIOE has been much more efficient than previous EuropeanMuslim umbrella organizations at compartmentalizing aspects of authority into an insti-

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tutional framework. For example, the FIOE has since established the Forum of EuropeanMuslim Youth and Student Organisations, the European Media Association, and theECFR.65 Since its formation at a London assembly in March 1997, the ECFR hasbeen headed by Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who remains an important spiritual figure-head for the contemporary Brotherhood’s religious ideology, despite his disdain forbeing constrained by party politics.66

In October 1998, the ECFR relocated its headquarters to Clonskeagh, where the newlyopened facilities of the Islamic Cultural Centre of Ireland (ICCI) were in an optimal pos-ition to house the Council’s executive.67 Since then, the costs incurred from subsequentmeetings of the ECFR, similar to the costs arising from the ICCI’s original construction,its annual upkeep, and its extensive administrative staff, have been provided by theMaktoum foundation. In addition, the ICCI’s Egyptian imam, Hussein Halawa, whoseown arrival in Dublin coincided with the mosque’s construction and the Council’s relo-cation to Ireland, serves as the general secretary for the ECFR while he concurrentlychairs the Irish Council of Imams, Ireland’s national Muslim umbrella.68 Other ECFRmembers include Ahmed al-Rawi, an Iraqi immigrant who headed the FIOE through2006,69 as well as Ahmad Jaballah, the FIOE’s current head.70 Similarly, Jaballah alsoplays an active role in France’s national umbrella organization, the Union des Organis-ations Islamiques de France (UOIF), which is often associated with the Brotherhood’sworldview.71

In 1995, the FIOE set up the Europe Trust (formerly the European Trust), an organ-ization intended “to promote the establishment of businesses and investments to generateincome to fund charitable projects”.72 The Europe Trust has attempted to develop aportfolio of profitable assets, which will one day enable it to effectively serve as a priva-tized European awqaf. With this in mind, half of the Trust’s returns are reinvested forfuture earnings while half are distributed amongst an array of initiatives geared towardsimproving social infrastructure and better community services. The Europe Trust hasprovided the FIOE with considerable financial leverage with regards to meeting itslong-term objectives. At present, Ahmed al-Rawi serves as the executive director of theEurope Trust, while its board of trustees is chaired by Nooh al-Kaddo, a senioradvisor of the FIOE. In addition, Nooh al-Kaddo has remained the executive directorof ICCI in Clonskeagh since early 1997, only shortly after its official opening in Novem-ber 1996. In this circular fashion, key positions are occupied by professional administra-tors at local, national, and international levels, providing remarkably consistentrepresentation of narrowly defined objectives.

Importantly, the ICCI is not the only Islamic center in Ireland charged with coordinat-ing events and religious activities consistent with the FIOE’s broader interests. In fact,despite the ICCI’s abundant financial resources, the FIOE’s official representative organ-ization in Ireland is the Muslim Association of Ireland (MAI), whose administrativeoffices are based at a different mosque complex in Tallaght, Dublin 24. In this way,there appears to be an expansive network of independent mosque organizations whovoluntarily subscribe to the FIOE’s broader European mission, which is invariablylinked to its religious ideology. As such, the ICCI willingly cooperates with the MAIon FIOE initiatives, even though it is not officially the FIOE’s representative inIreland. However, the MAI, in conjunction with four other mosques in Ireland, relieson annual subsidies from the ICCI in order to sustain its annual budget.73 In this way,six mosques spread throughout Ireland employ imams who appear rather consistent onpertinent issues, despite their local autonomy, which has arguably been compromisedby financial dependence. In these regards, most Irish mosques are small operations

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with a limited number of fulltime employees, whose regular provisions often amount totheir only source of livelihood. Accordingly, the breakdown of these precarious situationsand the internal dynamics of each Irish mosque are largely beyond the scope of this study.For our purposes, it is sufficient to demonstrate how the development of national andtransnational networks need not be the outcome of organizational initiatives at the grass-roots level.

Conclusion

In recent years, significant changes have taken place, which appear to indicate a growingdesire to counter the uncontested influence of the ICCI’s national network of what manyIrish Muslims regard as corporate imams. Additional grassroots movements haveappeared in an attempt to preserve the idiosyncrasies of a distinctly Irish expression ofIslam, which may have been made easier by a growing number of second generationIrish Muslims who are just now coming of age. Still, the Muslim population of Irelandonly numbers in the tens of thousands, and the booming immigration of the 1990sseems to have subsided as fewer migrants from Muslim majority countries are choosing,at least for the time being, to settle in Ireland. Nevertheless, the Irish Muslim communityremains a remarkably diverse conglomeration of relatively newly settled immigrants fromvarious parts of the world.We see that within the broader context of contemporary Islam, globalization and trans-

national networks have played a significant role in the way in which local organizationalstructures, especially in Ireland, have developed. In these regards, it seems consistentwith expectations that the proponents of political Islam have sustained a prolonged inter-est in establishing national and transnational bodies through Muslim organizationalendeavors on a grand scale. Likewise, it is also understandable why struggling localMuslims in foreign settings have welcomed external support from major Islamist move-ments, like the Muslim Brotherhood and Jama‘at-i Islami, in establishing a much neededreligious infrastructure at the local level. Nevertheless, for outsiders who are unfamiliarwith the internal dynamics of Muslim communities in the West, an untenable link hasbeen drawn between major Muslim mouthpieces, like the FIOE or perhaps even theIrish Council of Imams, and grassroots opinion, whereas in fact there is none.As we have seen earlier, many of what might be regarded as some of the most influential

transnational networks may ultimately revolve around the same elite group of figureheadsworking in various capacities under the aegis of different titles at the local, national, andinternational levels. This adequately portrays to onlookers an image of cooperative net-works of collaboration amongst seemingly autonomous Muslim community structures,which pervasively extend beyond continental boundaries and comprehensively representMuslim concerns worldwide. However, as we have seen in the case of Ireland, many ofthese institutional frameworks share strong administrative, ideological, and financialties. Moreover, we have seen how in some instances a range of institutional frameworksthat purportedly hold sway at the local, national, and international levels inevitablyreduce to the same network employees, if not the same imam.A direct consequence of these influences on Irish Muslim networks has been the

skewed perception of Irish Islam, where local Muslim particularities are portrayed asnationalized religious phenomena within a global ideal. That local Irish Muslims havegradually been dislodged from leadership positions within broader institutional frame-works that span Irish and indeed European Islam is a testimony to the delicate balancewhich must be achieved between pragmatism and spiritual ideology, as practical

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constraints often compel struggling Muslim communities to arrive at a temporary equili-brium. In this sense, positions of authority have been consigned to proponents of politicalIslam in exchange for tacit guarantees of support at the local level. This also shows thetremendous pressure on local Muslims in Western countries, such as Ireland, to silentlycomply with politically oriented umbrellas while they trade funding for authority, andreligious infrastructure for identity rights, amongst other things, which usually accom-pany a sense of international recognition. Transnational influences, including the Broth-erhood networks and the sources of Middle Eastern funding that require elitist accesshave left a visible mark on the face of Irish and indeed European Islam in regards to per-ceptions of Muslim authority.

In this sense, it is certainly reasonable to suggest that the same Irish Muslim commu-nity members may have abandoned the transnationalism seen in the FIOE or the ECFR,in favor of local organizational frameworks, had they done so under the patronage ofalternative international funders. Likewise, it is certainly conceivable for Irish organiz-ational structures to suddenly dissociate with Brotherhood networks in favor of suppor-ters with different orientations (such as Sufis, Wahhabis, or Tablighis, etc.) in the eventthat additional resources become available. Clearly, the likelihood of these changescannot be correlated to corresponding changes in Irish Muslim identity, since the reli-gious sentiments permeating grassroots Islam in Ireland, and perhaps even in Europe,are largely disconnected from major Muslim representatives. However, this is not tosay that these influences have somehow thwarted the progression of ordinary IrishIslam, which continues to evolve at its own pace at the grassroots level. The transferenceof authority that has taken place in Ireland, from public forums to international umbrellaorganizations, is an indication of the vulnerability of small immigrant communities thatlack access to an independent means of support. In this sense, a globalized religious infra-structure might well appear to be an attractive proposition for a reasonable price. Never-theless, reclaiming this authority may pose an even greater challenge to future generationsof Irish Muslims who may or may not choose to comply with the current exchangeforever. Although, irrespective of future transformations, it is clear that transnationalinfluences have affected the dynamic interplay of local politics and religion, whichunderlie the crystallization of Muslim organizational structures as well as the subsequentconsolidation of Muslim networks in Ireland and beyond.

Acknowledgments

The research and preliminary findings of this study were presented in papers at theWorld Congress for Middle Eastern Studies (WOCMES) in Barcelona and at theworld congress for the International Association for the History of Religions (IAHR)in Toronto in 2010. I would like to thank the participants of these conferences fortheir valuable feedback. I would also like to thank Oliver Scharbrodt and TuulaSakaranaho for their comments on earlier drafts. This research was funded by theIrish Research Council for the Humanities and Social Sciences (IRCHSS) and theDepartment of An Taoiseach through a postdoctoral fellowship at UniversityCollege Cork from 2009 to 2011.

NOTES

1. For detailed analyses and a comprehensive definition of political Islam, see Peter Mandaville, GlobalPolitical Islam, NewYork: Routledge, 2007; see also Olivier Roy,Globalized Islam: The Search for a New

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Ummah, New York: Columbia University Press, 2004; see also Olivier Roy, The Failure of PoliticalIslam, London: I.B Tauris, 2007; see also Routledge Handbook of Political Islam, ed. Shahram Akbar-zadeh, Routledge: London, 2011.

2. For a broader discussion on the nationalization of Muslim organizations in Europe, see JonathanLaurence, “Managing Transnational Islam: Muslims and the State in Western Europe”, in Immigra-tion and the Transformation of Europe, eds. Craig A. Parsons and Timothy M. Smeeding, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp. 251–273; see alsoMarcelMaussen, “TheGovernance of Islamin Western Europe”, IMISCOE Working Paper, No. 16, 2006, pp. 55–59.

3. For example, local priorities of emerging Muslim communities might include gathering together forcongregational prayers, establishing study circles, or jointly acquiring halal meat. See JørgenS. Nielsen, Towards a European Islam, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999, p. 26.

4. See ibid.; see also Muslims in the Enlarged Europe, eds. Brigitte Marechal, Stefano Allievi, Felice Das-setto and Jørgen S. Nielsen, Lieden: Brill, 2003; see also Jørgen S. Nielsen, Muslims in WesternEurope, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004; Tariq Ramadan, To Be a EuropeanMuslim, Leicester: Islamic Foundation, 1999; see also European Islam: Challenges for Public Policyand Society, eds. Samir Amghar, Amel Boubekeur and Michael Emerson, Brussels: Centre for Euro-pean Policy Studies, 2007; see also Jocelyne Cesari, When Islam and Democracy Meet: Muslims inEurope and in the United States, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004; see also Producing IslamicKnowledge: Transmission and dissemination in Western Europe, eds. Martin van Bruinessen andStefano Allievi, London: Routledge, 2011; see also Islam in Europe: Diversity, Identity, and Influence,eds. Aziz al-Azmeh and Effie Fokas, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008; see also Islam,Europe’s Second Religion: The New Social, Cultural and Political Landscape, ed. Shireen Hunter, West-port: Praeger, 2002.

5. See Oliver Scharbrodt, “Islam in Ireland: Organising a Migrant Religion”, in Ireland’s New ReligiousMovements, eds. Olivia Cosgrove, Laurence Cox, Carmen Kuhling and Peter Mulholland, Newcas-tle-upon-Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2011, pp. 318–336.

6. This information is based largely on personal communication with Dr. Yusuf Vaizie and Dr. IsmailCoovadia who arrived in Dublin to study at the Royal College of Surgeons of Ireland in 1956 and1957, respectively. See Adil Hussain Khan, “Muslim Students in 1950s Dublin”, History Ireland,Vol. 18, No. 3, Jul–Aug, 2010, pp. 44–45; see also Goolam Vahed, “An ‘Imagined Community’ inDiaspora: Gujaratis in South Africa”, South Asian History and Culture, Vol. 1, No. 4, October 2010,p. 621; see also Goolam Vahed and Thembisa Waetjen, Gender, Modernity & Indian Delights: TheWoman’s Cultural Group of Durban, 1954–2010, Cape Town: Human Sciences Research Council,2010, p. 75.

7. See Dublin Islamic Society, Logbook: General Meetings Minute Book, unpublished, minutes of theAnnual General Meeting (henceforth AGM) on 23 January 1959.

8. Ibid.9. Personal communication with Dr. Yusuf Vaizie.10. See DIS, Logbook, op. cit., Secretary’s Report, 2 November 1961.11. Ibid., Secretary’s Report, 19 October 1962.12. Ibid., Special General Meeting (henceforth, SGM), 15 November 1963.13. Personal communication with Dr. Mohammed Khan who came to Dublin from Durban in 1960 to

study medicine at the RCSI.14. See Richard P. Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993,

pp. 151–162.15. See Brigitte Maréchal, The Muslim Brothers in Europe: Roots and Discourse, Leiden: Brill, 2008,

pp. 27–31.16. See Richard P. Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers, op. cit., pp. 328–331.17. Personal communication with Dr. Mohammed Khan and Dr. Yusuf Vaizie. Ahmed Elkadi resided in

Dublin from 1962 to 1964.18. Ibid.19. See Brigitte Maréchal, The Muslim Brothers in Europe, op. cit., pp. 60, 135–136.20. See the official website of the Islamic Centre of Geneva (Centre Islamique de Genève), accessed May

23, 2011, http://www.cige.org/.21. Although the land for the mosque had been purchased by 1964, fiscal setbacks delayed its completion,

and the Islamic Centre of Munich did not officially open until 1973. See the website of the IslamicCentre of Munich (Islamische Zentrum München), accessed May 23, 2011, http://www.islamisches-zentrum-muenchen.de.

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22. Lorenzo Vidino, The New Muslim Brotherhood in the West, New York: Columbia University Press,2010, p. 30; see also Ian Johnson, A Mosque in Munich, New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt,2010, pp. 174, 197.

23. Personal communication with Dr. Mohammed Khan. Instead, Mohammed Khan toured the newlyopened Islamic Centre of Geneva where he vividly recalls meeting Tariq Ramadan (b. 1962) as ababy. Fortunately for him, Khan was still able to meet Said Ramadan in Jeddah at a later datewhile performing Hajj in 1970.

24. See Silvio Ferrari, “The Secularity of the State and the Shaping of Muslim Representative Organiz-ations in Western Europe”, in European Muslims and the Secular State, eds. Jocelyne Cesari andSeán McLoughlin, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006, pp. 11–24; see also Dilwar Hussain, “The Holy Grailof Muslims in Western Europe: Representation and their Relationship with the State”, inModernizingIslam: Religion in the Public Sphere in Europe and the Middle East, eds. John L. Esposito and FrancoisBurgat, London: C. Hurst & Company, 2003, pp. 215–250; see alsoMarcelMaussen, The Governanceof Islam in Western Europe, op. cit., pp. 63–65.

25. Jørgen S. Nielsen, Towards a European Islam, op. cit., p. 17; see also, Ziauddin Sardar, DesperatelySeeking Paradise: Journeys of a Sceptical Muslim, London: Granta Books, 2004, p. 28.

26. See the Treasurer’s Reports through the 1960s in DIS, Logbook, op. cit.27. Ibid., AGM, April 1966.28. Ibid., AGM, 25 January 1967.29. Ibid., SGM, 16 January 1967, and AGM, 25 January 1967, and also the final debate when formal col-

lections for the mosque were finally adopted in SGM, 10 January 1969.30. See ibid., Centre Project Report in AGM, 24 April 1970, especially under Abdullah Lamki’s sugges-

tions (e) and ( f).31. Ibid.; see also point (6) in the Treasurer’s Report in AGM, 23 April 1971, which states that the Centre

balance was £2,669.32. See the registration record of Friendly Societies, Register No. 1719, 28 October 1971.33. See DIS, Logbook, op. cit., AGM, 14 April 1972. He visited the embassies of Saudi Arabia, Libya,

Kuwait, Iran, Abu Dhabi, Algeria, and Malaysia.34. Personal communication with Dr. Yusuf Vaizie.35. Perhaps it is worth mentioning that the RCSI currently has commonwealth campuses in the Middle

East and Southeast Asia. These include the Penang Medical College which was founded in 1996 inMalaysia (www.pmc.edu.my), the RCSI Dubai which was founded in 2005 in the United ArabEmirates (www.rcsidubai.com), and the RCSI Bahrain founded in 2004, which includes theMedical University of Bahrain where new teaching facilities incorporate the recently built KingHamad University Hospital (www.rcsi-mub.com). In addition, the RCSI’s Institute of Leadershiphas since 2003 entered into an agreement, enabling RCSI faculty members to teach courses inhealth services management to students in Amman, Jordan, which are thereby accredited byYarmouk University based in Irbid (www.rcsileadership.org). This move in particular has pavedthe way for future discussions regarding a potential campus of RCSI Jordan. In these regards, itis evident that the RCSI’s current strategies for expansion are in part due to its longstanding diplo-matic relationship with the Middle East and Malaysia, as well as the College’s inclusive admissionpolicies, which historically have been seen as accommodating towards international students withconnections to the region.

36. For a broader perspective on Ireland’s relationship with Middle Eastern countries, see Rory Miller,“The Politics of Trade and Diplomacy: Ireland’s Evolving Relationship with the Muslim MiddleEast”, Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol. 15, 2004, pp. 123–145.

37. Since the donations were made in local currencies, the exact totals were £1,518 from Abu Dhabi and£17,914.28 from Saudi Arabia. See DIS, Logbook, op. cit., Extra-Ordinary General Meeting, 22March 1974.

38. It may also be worth noting that this was the same period when Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia decidedto fund the pending mosque project for the Islamic Cultural Centre at Regent’s Park in London,which had previously remained incomplete for decades prior. In this respect, perhaps similar circum-stances motivated the generosity expressed towards the Muslims of Britain and Ireland.

39. Anthony McDermott, “Qaddafi and Libya”, The World Today, Vol. 29, No. 9, Sep, 1973, p. 399 innote 8.

40. DIS, Logbook, op. cit., Extra-Ordinary General Meeting, 22 March 1974.41. Ian Johnson, A Mosque in Munich, op. cit., 2010, pp. 194–195.42. Ibid., p. 185.

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43. Historian Ralph Coury has highlighted at length the pivotal role played by Azzam Pasha, and others, inthe formulation of Arab nationalism. See Ralph M. Coury, “Who ‘Invented’ Egyptian Arab Nation-alism? Part 1”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 14, No. 3, Aug 1982, pp. 249–281; seealso his “Who ‘Invented’ Egyptian Arab Nationalism? Part 2”, International Journal of Middle EastStudies, Vol. 14, No. 4, Nov 1982, pp. 459–479.

44. See Richard P.Mitchell,The Society of theMuslim Brothers, op. cit., p. 56; see also Israel Gershoni, “TheMuslim Brothers and the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936–39”, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 22, No. 3,July 1986, p. 387; see also the biography by Ralph Coury, The Making of an Egyptian Arab Nationalist:The Early Years of Azzam Pasha, 1893–1936, Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 1998. Correspondingly, thefamily connections thus make SalemAzzam an uncle of Ayman al-Zawahiri (b. 1951), since Zawahiri’sgrandmother married Abd al-Rahman’s Azzam’s brother, Abd al-Wahab Azzam, a former president ofCairo University. It may also be worth recalling that Ayman al-Zawahiri was himself actively involvedwith the Egyptian Brotherhood from an early age, prior to his split with the movement, leading to theformation of his own Islamic Jihad, see Salahuddin Hassan, “An Interview with Ayman al-Zawahiri’sUncle”, Al-Dastur, 15 Sept 2006, accessed 23 May 2011, http://www.ikhwanweb.com.

45. Today, the ICE is perhaps best known for its lingering publications, like the Universal Islamic Declara-tion of Human Rights with its forward by Salem Azzam. See Salem Azzam,Universal Islamic Declarationof Human Rights, Paris: Islamic Council of Europe, 1981; also available as his “Universal IslamicDeclaration of Human Rights”, The International Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 2, No. 3, 1998,pp. 102–112. This work was widely distributed as a belated response to the United Nations UniversalDeclaration of Human Rights from 1948, which was regarded, especially by Islamists, as dogmaticallypartial towards Western cultural and religious values. For example, see Sayyid Abu’l-‘Ala Maududi,Human Rights in Islam, Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1977. The ICE also drafted a model constitutionin 1983 for would-be Islamic states, perhaps in hope that the recent revolution in Iran would spread toother parts of theMuslimworld. See SalemAzzam,AModel of an Islamic Constitution, London: IslamicCouncil of Europe, 1983.

46. See DIS, Logbook, op. cit., Secretary’s Report in AGM, 11 April 1975. The purchase also included themews in the rear of the building at 7A Synge Place, which were subsequently rented out by the DIS fora number of years.

47. See “Islamic Society turned down by Corporation”, Irish Independent, 2 May 1975.48. See DIS, Logbook, op. cit., AGM, 18 December 1977.49. See ibid., under the heading “Official Opening of Islamic Centre” in the Secretary’s Report. Although

ÓDálaigh had left office in 1976, he had established ties with DIS members through the Irish Councilfor Overseas Students (ICOS), which had arranged a meeting at his official residence in May 1975.See also AGM, 14 November 1975.

50. See ibid., AGM, 7 November 1976.51. David Rich, “The Very Model of a British Muslim Brotherhood”, in The Muslim Brotherhood:

The Organization and Policies of a Global Islamist Movement, ed. Barry Rubin, New York: PalgraveMacmillan, 2010, p. 118.

52. See DIS, Logbook, op. cit., AGM, 18 December 1977 in the Ladies Islamic Committee’s report.53. These sentiments have been expressed by multiple members, especially Dr. Mohammed Khan. In

addition there are several statements in the Logbook which allude to similar sentiments. Forexample, see ibid., SGM 7 January 1972, in the Secretary’s Report (1971–1972) about FOSIS; seealso ibid., under Matters Arising.

54. For more on Turabi, see J. Millard Burr and Robert O. Collins, Revolutionary Sudan: Hasan al-Turabiand the Islamist State, 1989–2000, Leiden: Brill, 2003; see also Mohamed Elhachmi Hamdi, TheMaking of an Islamic Political Leader: Conversations with Hasan al-Turabi, Boulder: Westview, 1998;see also Abdel Wahab El-Affendi, Turabi’s Revolution: Islam and Power in the Sudan, London: GreySeal, 1991.

55. For more on Islamic education in Ireland, see Tuula Sakaranaho, Religious Freedom, Multiculturalism,Islam: Cross-reading Finland and Ireland, Leiden: Brill, 2006, pp. 383–408.

56. Clearly, the name change also broadened the scope of the organization from Dublin to Ireland.57. It may be worth mentioning that significant numbers of South Asian immigrants have arrived in

Ireland since the mid to late 1990s. It appears as though these newcomers now constitute the majorityof Muslims in Ireland. However, their recent arrival has enabled this narrative to run its course unop-posed until relatively recently. For this reason, it seems as though the opposition to the Brotherhoodnetworks posed by the developing South AsianMuslim communities in Ireland and their own internalrivalries would best be discussed in another forum with a South Asian focus.

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58. Rory Miller, “The Politics of Trade and Diplomacy”, op. cit., pp. 136–137; Qaddafi’s readiness tosupply the IRA with arms and financial support was denounced by key figures in the internationalcommunity, even though it continued for years and may even have increased following the Britainbacked US bombing of Tripoli in 1986. For media coverage, see “The IRA’s Store of Weaponry”,BBC News, August 14, 2001, accessed 23 May 2011, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/northern_ireland/1482426.stm; see also Steve Doughty, “IRA victims killed with Libyan semtex to get £2bnin compensation from Colonel Gaddafi”, Daily Mail, June 13 2010, accessed May 23 2011, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/worldnews/article-1286302/Colonel-Gaddafi-pay-2bn-compensation-IRA-victims-killed-semtex.html.

59. In one such case, Aer Rianta, one of the world’s “leading international airport retail managementcompan[ies]”, currently operating as a subsidiary of the Dublin Airport Authority, underwent aseries of consultations in 1983, resulting in the creation of Dubai Duty Free (see www.dublinairportauthority.com; see also www.ari.ie). Consequently, the royal family of Dubai heavilyrecruited Aer Rianta executives when first establishing Dubai Duty Free. At present, the company’sexecutive board is still composed of Irish nationals from the original 1983 team. According toDubai Duty Free chairman, H. H. Sheikh Ahmed bin Saeed al-Maktoum, the company yieldedrecord sales in 2010 grossing $1.27 billion, nearly 14 per cent more than in 2009 (see www.dubaidutyfree.com).

60. For a narrative of the family’s involvement in horseracing, see www.godolphin.com; see also www.sheikhmohammed.com, which includes a brief biography of Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid al-Maktoum and an account of his life as a “Leader, Equestrian, [and] Poet”.

61. At present, the Maktoum family has since expanded its operations significantly and owns at least eightpremier stables with outstanding facilities throughout the Republic of Ireland. These include Kildan-gan Stud, Ragusa Stud, Old Connell Stud, Ballymany Stud, and Derrinstown Stud in CountyKildare; Blackhall Stud in County Wexford; Ballysheehan Stud in County Tipperary; and WoodparkStud in County Meath. For more information, see the website of Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid AlMaktoum’s global breeding operations at www.darley.co.uk; see also Katherine Butler, “People of theCrescent in Dublin”, Dublin Historical Record, Vol. 50, No. 2, Autumn, 1997, p. 101.

62. See Sara Silvestri, “Moderate Islamist Groups in Europe: The Muslim Brothers”, in Political Islam:Context versus Ideology, eds. Khaled Hroub, London: Saqi, 2010, pp. 268–270; see also the discussionin Brigitte Maréchal, The Muslim Brothers in Europe, op. cit., p. 174.

63. See the ‘About Us’ link on the official website www.euro-muslim.com.64. Ibid.65. Ibid.66. See Jakob Skovgaard and Bettina Gräf, eds., Global Mufti: The Phenomenon of Yusuf al-Qaradawi,

London: C. Hurst & Co., 2009; see also Brigitte Maréchal, The Muslim Brothers in Europe, op. cit.,pp. 147–150.

67. ECFR, Fatwas of the European Council for Fatwa and Research, Cairo: al-Falah Foundation, 2003, p. 6.68. For an analysis of these moves, namely the details of the ECFR’s relocation to, andHalawa’s arrival in,

Dublin, see Adil Hussain Khan, “Creating the Image of European Islam: The European Council forFatwa and Research and Ireland”, in Muslim Political Participation in Europe, ed. Jørgen S. Nielsen,Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, forthcoming.

69. Brigitte Maréchal, The Muslim Brothers in Europe, op. cit., p. 251; see also Lorenzo Vidino, The NewMuslim Brotherhood in the West, op. cit., pp. 51–52.

70. Brigitte Maréchal, The Muslim Brothers in Europe, op. cit., p. 155.71. For an enlightening account of the UOIF, amongst other organizations, and its political role in

France, see Alexandre Caeiro, “Religious Authorities or Political Actors? The Muslim Leaders ofthe French Representative Bodies of Islam”, in European Muslims and the Secular State, op. cit.,pp. 71–84; see also ibid., pp. 69, 158; see also Lorenzo Vidino, The New Muslim Brotherhood in theWest, op. cit., p. 48.

72. See the ‘About’ tab on the official website, www.europetrust.eu.com.73. Personal communication with Dr. Nooh al-Kaddo at his ICCI office: February 2011.

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