Japan Airlines v. Asuncion

FACTS:Michael and Jeannete boarded a Japan Airlines plane bound for Los-Angeles.  As they have a stop-over in Narita, they decided to stay at the Hotel Nikko-Narita.  An airline staff endorsed their application for shore pass, which is required of foreigners if they intend to stay for not more than 72 hours.During the interview of Michael conducted by the Japanse immigration official, the later noticed that his height seemed to be shorter than that indicated in his passport. Their application for shore passes were denied, and they were escorted to the Narita Airport Rest House to be billeted overnight.  They were made to stay at the hotel until their departure the next day to Los Angeles.  They were also billed US400.00 each for their stay and security service and meals.Michael and Jeannete filed a case for damages against Japan Airlines, alleging that JAL did not fully apprise them of their travel requirements and they rudely and forcibly detained while at Narita.JAL on the other hand contended that the denial of the shore passes of Michale and Jeannete by the immigration agency of Japan was an act of state over which they have no control.  JAL also cannot impose upon the authorities not ti billet them at the Narita Aiport Rest House.After trial at the Regional Trial Court, the court found JAL liable for damages.  The Court of Appeals also sustained the ruling.

ISSUE:WoN the airline may be held liable for the denial of the shore passes of Michael and Jeanette?

HELD:“Under Article 1755 of the Civil Code, a common carrier such as JAL is bound to carry its passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances. When an airline issues a ticket to a passenger, confirmed for a particular flight on a certain date, a contract of carriage arises. The passenger has every right to expect that he be transported on that flight and on that date and it becomes the carrier’s obligation to carry him and his luggage safely to the agreed destination.10 If the passenger is not so transported or if in the process of transporting he dies or is injured, the carrier may be held liable for a breach of contract of carriage.11We find that JAL did not breach its contract of carriage with respondents. It may be true that JAL has the duty to inspect whether its passengers have the necessary travel documents, however, such duty does not extend to checking the veracity of every entry in these documents. JAL could not vouch for the authenticity of a passport and the correctness of the entries therein. The power to admit or not an alien into the country is a sovereign act which cannot be interfered with even by JAL. This is not within the ambit of the contract of carriage entered into by JAL and herein respondents. As such, JAL should not be faulted for the denial of respondents’ shore pass applications.”

Necesito v. Paras

FACTS:

Civil Code: ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry thepassengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using theutmost diligence of very cautious persons, ith a due regard for the all the circumstances.

Severina Garces and her son Precillano Necesito boarded a passenger truck of the Philippine Rabbit bus lines driven by Francisco Bandonell. The truck entered a wooden bridge, but the front wheels swerved to the right. The driver lost control, and after wrecking the bridge’s wooden rails, the truck fell on its right side into a creek where water was abreast deep. Garces died due to drowning while Necesito suffered injuries. Two actions for damages and attorney’s fees totalling over Php 85,000 were filed with the Tarlac CFI against the carrier. The carrier pleaded that the accident was due to “engine or mechanical trouble” independent or beyond the control of the defendants or of the driver Bandonell. The trial court found that the bus was proceeding slowly due to the bad condition of the road and that accident was due to the fracture of the truck’s right steering knuckle which could not be known by the carrier. Thus, it dismissed the complaints holding that the accident was exclusively due to fortuitous events.

ISSUE:WoN the carrier is liable for the manufacturing defect of the steering knucle, and whether the evidence discloses that in regard thereto the carrier exercised the diligence required by law

HELD: YES. while the carrier is not an insurer of the safety of the passengers,a passenger is entitled to recover damages from a carrier for an injuryresulting from a defect in an appliance purchased from a manufacturer,whenever it appears that the defect would have been discovered by thecarrier if it had exercised the degree of care which under the circumstanceswas incumbent upon it, with regard to inspection and application of thenecessary tests. In this connection, the manufacturer of the defectiveappliance is considered in law the agent of the carrier, and the good reputeof the manufacturer will not relieve the carrier from liability. The rationale of the carrier’s liability is the fact that the passenger has no privity with themanufacturer of the defective equipment hence, he has no remedy againsthim, while the carrier usually has. Carrier’s liability rests upon negligence, his failure to exercise the “utmost” degree of diligence that the law requires, and in case of a passenger’s death or injury the carrier bears the burden of satisfying the court that he has duly discharged the duty of prudence required.

Del Prado v. Manila Electric Co.

FACTS:Teodorico Florenciano, Meralco’s motorman, was driving the company’s street car along Hidalgo Street. Plaintiff Ignacio Del Prado ran across the street to catch the car. The motorman eased up but did not put the car into complete stop. Plaintiff was able to get hold of the rail and step his left foot when the car accelerated. As a result, plaintiff slipped off and fell to the ground. His foot was crushed by the wheel of the car. He filed a complaint for culpa contractual.

ISSUES:(1) Whether the motorman was negligent(2) Whether Meralco is liable for breach of contract of carriage(3) Whether there was contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff

HELD:(1) We may observe at the outset that there is no obligation on the part of a street railway company to stop its cars to let on intending passengers at other points than those appointed for stoppage. Nevertheless, although the motorman of this car was not bound to stop to let the plaintiff on, it was his duty to do no act that would have the effect of increasing the plaintiff's peril while he was attempting to board the car. The premature acceleration of the car was, in our opinion, a breach of this duty.(2) The relation between a carrier of passengers for hire and its patrons is of a contractual nature; and a failure on the part of the carrier to use due care in carrying its passengers safely is a breach of duty (culpa contractual). Furthermore, the duty that the carrier of passengers owes to its patrons extends to persons boarding the cars as well as to those alighting therefrom.Where liability arises from a mere tort (culpa aquiliana), not involving a breach of positive obligation, an employer, or master, may exculpate himself by proving that he had exercised due diligence to prevent the damage; whereas this defense is not available if the liability of the master arises from a breach of contractual duty (culpa contractual). In the case before us the company pleaded as a special defense that it had used all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage suffered by the plaintiff; and to establish this contention the company introduced testimony showing that due care had been used in training and instructing the motorman in charge of this car in his art. But this proof is irrelevant in view of the fact that the liability involved was derived from a breach of obligation.(3) It is obvious that the plaintiff's negligence in attempting to board the moving car was not the proximate cause of the injury. The direct and proximate cause of the injury was the act of appellant's motorman in putting on the power prematurely. Again, the situation before us is one where the negligent act of the company's servant succeeded the negligent act of the plaintiff, and the negligence of the company must be considered the proximate cause of the injury. The rule here applicable seems to be analogous to, if not identical with that which is sometimes referred to as the doctrine of "the last clear chance." In accordance with this doctrine, the contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the action if it be shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the consequences of the negligence of the injured party. The negligence of the plaintiff was, however, contributory to the accident and must be considered as a mitigating circumstance.

Dangwa Transportation Co. v. Court of Appeals

FACTS:May 13, 1985: Theodore M. Lardizabal was driving a passenger bus belonging to

Dangwa Transportation Co. Inc. (Dangwa)  The bus was at full stop bet. Bunkhouses 53 and 54 when Pedro alightedPedro Cudiamat fell from the platform of the bus when it suddenly accelerated

forwardPedro was ran over by the rear right tires of the vehicleTheodore first brought his other passengers and cargo to their respective destinations

before bringing Pedro to Lepanto Hospital where he expiredPrivate respondents filed a complaint for damages against Dangwa for the death of

Pedro CudiamatDangwa: observed and continued to observe the extraordinary diligence required in

the operation of the co. and the supervision of the employees even as they are not absolute insurers of the public at large

RTC: in favour of Dangwa holding Pedrito as negligent and his negligence was the cause of his death but still ordered to pay in equity P 10,000 to the heirs of Pedrito

CA: reversed and ordered to pay Pedrito indemnity, moral damages, actual and compensatory damages and cost of the suit

ISSUE: WoN Dangwa should be held liable for the negligence of its driver Theodore

HELD: YES. CA affirmed.

A public utility once it stops, is in effect making a continuous offer to bus riders (EVEN when moving as long as it is still slow in motion)

Duty of the driver: do NOT make acts that would have the effect of increasing peril to a passenger while he is attempting to board the same

Premature acceleration of the bus in this case = breach of duty

Stepping and standing on the platform of the bus is already considered a passenger and is entitled all the rights and protection pertaining to such a contractual relation

Duty extends to boarding and alightingGR: By contract of carriage, the carrier assumes the express obligation to transport the passenger to his destination safely and observe extraordinary diligence with a due regard for all the circumstances, and any injury that might be suffered by the passenger is right away attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrierEX: carrier to prove that it has exercised extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Art. 1733 and 1755 of the Civil CodeFailure to immediately bring Pedrito to the hospital despite his serious condition = patent and incontrovertible proof of their negligence

Hospital was in Bunk 561st proceeded to Bunk 70 to allow a passenger (who later called the family of Pedrito on his own will) to alight and deliver a refrigeratorIn tort, actual damages is based on net earnings

Light Rail Transit Authority v. Navidad

FACTS: October 14, 1993, 7:30 p.m. : Drunk Nicanor Navidad (Nicanor) entered the EDSA

LRT station after purchasing a “token”.  While Nicanor was standing at the platform near the LRT tracks, the guard Junelito

Escartin approached him. Due to misunderstanding, they had a fist fight Nicanor fell on the tracks and killed

instantaneously upon being hit by a moving train operated by Rodolfo Roman

December 8, 1994: The widow of Nicanor, along with her children, filed a complaint for damages against Escartin, Roman, LRTA, Metro Transit Org. Inc. and Prudent (agency of security guards) for the death of her husband. 

LRTA and Roman filed a counter-claim against Nicanor and a cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent

Prudent: denied liability – averred that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and surpervision of its security guards

LRTA and Roman: presented evidence Prudent and Escartin: demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to prove that

Escartin was negligent in his assigned task RTC: In favour of widow and against Prudent and Escartin, complaint against LRT

and Roman were dismissed for lack of merit CA: reversed by exonerating Prudent and held LRTA and Roman liable

ISSUE: WoN LRTA and Roman should be liable according to the contract of carriage

HELD:NO.  Affirmed with Modification: (a) nominal damages is DELETED (CANNOT co-exist w/ compensatory damages) (b) Roman is absolved.

Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the nature of its business and for reasons of public policy, is burdened with the duty off exercising utmost diligence in ensuring the safety of passengersCivil Code:

Art. 1755.  A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstancesArt. 1756.  In case of death or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755Art. 1759.  Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or wilful acts of the former’s employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers

This liability of the common carriers does NOT cease upon proof that they                   Exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and

                    supervision of their employees

Art. 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier’s employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.

Carriers presumed to be at fault or been negligent and by simple proof of injury, the passenger is relieaved of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or of its employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen event or to force majeureWhere it hires its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task, the common carrier is NOT relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriageGR: Prudent can be liable only for tort under Art. 2176 and related provisions in conjunction with Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. (Tort may arise even under a contract, where tort [quasi-delict liability] is that which breaches the contract)

EX: if employer’s liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee, employer  can be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of its employees. 

EX to the EX: Upon showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee 

Factual finding of the CA: NO link bet. Prudent and the death of Nicanor for the reason that the negligence of Escartin was NOT provenNO showing that Roman himself is guilty of any culpable act or omission, he must also be absolved from liability

Contractual tie bet. LRT and Nicanor is NOT itself a juridical relation bet. Nicanor and RomanRoman can be liable only for his own fault or negligence

La Mallorca v. De Jesus

FACTS:On October 1959, Lolita de Jesus was riding a bus owned by La Mallorca and Pampanga Bus Company which had a head on collision against a freight truck. Apparently, the bus had a tire blow out which resulted to the accident. Lolita died and so her father, Valentin de Jesus, filed a civil case for damages against La Mallorca. The lower court rendered judgment in favor of De Jesus and ordered La Mallorca to pay for actual, compensatory, and moral damages including counsel fees. This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. La Mallorca assailed the decision as it argued that a tire blow out is a fortuitous event and should not be taken as negligence.

ISSUE:WoN a tire blow out is a fortuitous event.

HELD: No. As found by the lower court, the tire blow out in this case was due to the fact that the inner circle of the wheel of the bus was pressed so closely to the rim which caused it to eventually explode. This mechanical defect in the installation of the wheel could have been easily discovered had the bus been subjected to a thorough check up before it was allowed to hit the road. La Mallorca is therefore negligent and the tire explosion is not a fortuitous event for it could have been avoided had the bus been properly maintained.The Supreme Court also emphasized in this case that moral damages are recoverable by reason of the death of a passenger caused by the breach of contract of a common carrier, as provided in Article 1764, in relation to Article 2206, of the Civil Code.

Aboitiz Shipping Co. v. Court of Appeals

FACTS:Anacleto Viana boarded the vessel M/V Antonia, owned by Aboitiz Shipping Corporation, at the port at San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, bound for Manila. After said vessel had landed, the Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation took over the exclusive control of the cargoes loaded on said vessel pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement between Pioneer and petitioner Aboitiz.

The crane owned by Pioneer was placed alongside the vessel and one (1) hour after the passengers of said vessel had disembarked, it started operation by unloading the cargoes from said vessel. While the crane was being operated, Anacleto Viana who had already disembarked from said vessel obviously remembering that some of his cargoes were still loaded in the vessel, went back to the vessel, and it was while he was pointing to the crew of the said vessel to the place where his cargoes were loaded that the crane hit him, pinning him between the side of the vessel and the crane. He was thereafter brought to the hospital where he later expired three (3) days thereafter.

Private respondents Vianas filed a complaint for damages against petitioner for breach of contract of carriage. Aboitiz denied responsibility contending that at the time of the accident, the vessel was completely under the control of respondent Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation as the exclusive stevedoring contractor of Aboitiz, which handled the unloading of cargoes from the vessel of Aboitiz.

ISSUE: WoN Aboitiz is negligent and is thus liable for the death.

HELD:

Yes.

x x x [T]he victim Anacleto Viana guilty of contributory negligence, but it was the negligence of Aboitiz in prematurely turning over the vessel to the arrastre operator for the unloading of cargoes which was the direct, immediate and proximate cause of the victim's death.

The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the passenger has been landed at the port of destination and has left the vessel owner's dock or premises. 11 Once created, the relationship will not ordinarily terminate until the passenger has, after reaching his destination, safely alighted from the carrier's conveyance or had a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's premises. All persons who remain on the premises a reasonable time after leaving the conveyance are to be deemed passengers, and what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances, and includes a reasonable time to see after his baggage and prepare for his departure. 12 The carrier-passenger relationship is not terminated merely by the fact that the person transported has been carried to his destination if, for example, such person remains in the carrier's premises to claim his baggage.

It is apparent from the foregoing that what prompted the Court to rule as it did in said case is the fact of the passenger's reasonable presence within the carrier's premises.

That reasonableness of time should be made to depend on the attending circumstances of the case, such as the kind of common carrier, the nature of its business, the customs of the place, and so forth, and therefore precludes a consideration of the time element per se without taking into account such other factors. It is thus of no moment whether in the cited case of La Mallorca there was no appreciable interregnum for the passenger therein to leave the carrier's premises whereas in the case at bar, an interval of one (1) hour had elapsed before the victim met the accident. The primary factor to be considered is the existence of a reasonable cause as will justify the presence of the victim on or near the petitioner's vessel. We believe there exists such a justifiable cause.

It is of common knowledge that, by the very nature of petitioner's business as a shipper, the passengers of vessels are allotted a longer period of time to disembark from the ship than other common carriers such as a passenger bus. With respect to the bulk of cargoes and the number of passengers it can load, such vessels are capable of accommodating a bigger volume of both as compared to the capacity of a regular commuter bus. Consequently, a ship passenger will need at least an hour as is the usual practice, to disembark from the vessel and claim his baggage whereas a bus passenger can easily get off the bus and retrieve his luggage in a very short period of time. Verily, petitioner cannot categorically claim, through the bare expedient of comparing the period of time entailed in getting the passenger's cargoes, that the ruling in La Mallorca is inapplicable to the case at bar. On the contrary, if we are to apply the doctrine enunciated therein to the instant petition, we cannot in reason doubt that the victim Anacleto Viana was still a passenger at the time of the incident. When the accident occurred, the victim was in the act of unloading his cargoes, which he had every right to do, from petitioner's vessel. As earlier stated, a carrier is duty bound not only to bring its passengers safely to their destination but also to afford them a reasonable time to claim their baggage.

Calalas v. Court of Appeals

FACTS:Private respondent Eliza Sunga, then freshman at Siliman University , took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was filled to capacity, Sunga was given by the conductor an extension seat, a wooden stool at the back of the door at the rear end of the vehicle. When the jeepney stopped to a let passenger off and Sunga was about to give way to the outgoing passenger, an Izuzu truck driven by Verena and owned by Salva bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney. Sunga sustained multiple injuries and remained on a cast for three months. Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, for breach of  contract of carriage. Calalas, on the other hand,filed a third party complaint against Francisco Salva, the owner of the truck. The lower  court rendered judgment against Salva and absolved Calalas of  liability. It took cognizance of other case (Civil Case No. 3490), filed by Calalas against Salva and Verena ,for quasi-delict, in which branch 37 of the same court held Salva and his driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for the damage to his jeepney The CA reversed the lower courts ruling on the ground the ground that Sunga’s cause of action was based on a contract of carriage, not quasi-deplict, and that the common carrier failed to exercise the diligence required under the Civil Code. The appellate court dismissed the third-party complaint against Salva and adjudged Calalas liable for  damages to Sunga. ISSUE: HELD:In quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the basis of the action, whereas in breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination. In case od death or injuries to passengers, Article 1756 of the CC provides that common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or have acted negligently unless they proved that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755. This provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of proof.

It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in action for quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation created by law.

Gillaco v. Manila Railroad Co.

FACTS:Lieut. Gillaco, husband of plaintiff, was a passenger in the early morning train of MRR from Calamba, Laguna to Manila, at about 7:30 a.m. When the train reached the Paco, Railroad Station, a train guard (Devesa) of MRR assigned in the Manila-San Fernando, La Union Line, was in the station waiting for the same train to take him to Tutuban Station, to report for duty which was to start from 9:00 a.m. to 7:00 a.m. of the same day. Devesa, having a long standing personal grudge with Gillaco, hot and killed the latter with a carbine furnished by respondent, upon seeing him inside the train coach. Gillaco died. Devesa was convicted with homicide by final judgement of the CA. Court of First Instance awarded damages to the plaintiff.

Defense by MRR - no liability attaches to it as employer of the killer; that it is not responsible subsidiary ex delicto, under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code, because the crime was not committed while the slayer was in the actual performance of his ordinary duties and service; nor is it responsible ex contractu, since the complaint did not aver sufficient facts to establish such liability, and no negligence on appellant's party was shown.

Court below - Railroad company responsible on the ground that a contract of transportation implies protection of the passengers against acts of personal violence by the agents or employees of the carrier

ISSUE:WoN MRR is liable for the damages for the death of Gillaco caused by Devesa.

HELD:While a passenger is entitled to protection from personal violence by the Civil Code or its agents or employees since the contract of transportation obligates the carrier to transport a passenger safely to his destination, the responsibility of the Civil Code extends only to those acts that the Civil Code could  foresee or avoid through the exercise of the degree of care and diligence required of it.The Old Civil Code did not impose upon Civil Code the absolute liability for assaults of their employees upon the passengers.

[OCC: It is sufficient to reiterate that the source of the defendant's legal liability is the contract of carriage; that by entering into that contract he bound himself to carry the plaintiff safely and securely to their destination; and that having failed to do so he is liable in damages unless he shows that the failure to fulfill his obligation was due to causes mentioned in article 1105 of  the Civil Code, which reads as follows:"No one shall be liable for events which could not be foreseen or which, even if foreseen, were inevitable, with the exception of  the cases in which the law expressly provides otherwise and those in which the obligation itself imposes such liability."]

The act of the guard was entirely unforeseeable by MRR which had no means to ascertain or  anticipate that the two would meet nor could it foresee every personal rancour that might exist between its employees and its passengers. The shooting was a caso fortuito within the definition of article 105 of  the OCC and was both being unforeseeable and inevitable under the circumstances. Hence, resulting breach of appellant's contract of safe carriage with the late Tomas Gillaco was excused thereby.

[The lower Court and the appellees both relied on the American authorities that particularly hold carriers to be insurers of the safety of theirpassengers against willful assault and intentional ill treatment on the part of their servants, it being immaterial that the act should be one of private retribution on the part of the servant, impelled by personal malice toward the passenger (10 Am. Jur. 108; Ed. Note to Gassenheimer vs. Wester R. Co. 40 LRA (NS), p. 999, et seq.) But as can be inferred from the previous jurisprudence of this Court , the Civil Code of 1889 did not impose such absolute liability (Lasam vs. Smith, supra). The liability of a carrier as an insurer was not recognized in this jurisdiction]

When the crime took place, the guard had no duties to discharge. Devesa was therefore under  no obligation to safeguard the passenger of the Calamba-Manila train, where the deceased was riding; and the killing of Gillaco was not done in line of duty. His position would be that of a passenger also waiting transportation and not of an employee assigned to discharge duties that the Railroad had  assumed by its contract with the deceased. As a result, Devesa's assault cannot be deemed in law a breach of Gillaco's contract of transportation by a servant or employee of the carrier. [The only good reason for making the carrier responsible for the misconduct of the servant perpetrated in his own interest, and not in that of  his employer, or otherwise within the scope of his employment, is that the servant is clothed with the delegated authority, and charge with the duty by the carrier, to execute his undertaking with the passenger. And it cannot be said, we think, that there is any such delegation to the employees at a station with reference to passenger embarking at another or traveling on the train. Of course, we are speaking only of the principle which holds a carrier responsible for wrong done to passenger by servants acting in their own interest, and not in that of the employer. That principle is not the ordinary rule, respondent superior, by which the employer is held responsible only for act or omissions of  the employee in the scope of his employment; but the only reason in our opinion for a broader liability arises from the fact that the servant, in mistreating the passenger wholly for some private purpose of his own, in the very act, violates the contractual obligation of the employer for the performance of which he has put the employee in his place.The reason does not exist where the employee who committed the assault was never in a position in which it became his duty to his employer to represent him in discharging any duty of the latter toward the passenger. The proposition that the carrier clothes every employee engaged in the transportation business with the comprehensive duty of protecting every passenger with whom he may in any way come in contact, and hereby makes himself liable for every assault commited by such servant, without regard to the inquiry whether or not the passenger has come within the sphere of duty of that servant as indicated by the employment, is regarded as not only not sustained by the authorities, but as being unsound and oppressive both to the employer and the employee. (Houston& T. C. R. Co. vs. Bush, 32 LRA (NS), p. 1205.)]

Judgment appealed from is reversed and the complaint ordered dismissed

Maranan v. Perez

Facts: Rogelio Corachea, on October 18, 1960, was a passenger in a taxicab owned and operated by Pascual Perez when he was stabbed and killed by the driver, Simeon Valenzuela. Valenzuela was prosecuted for homicide in the Court of First Instance of Batangas and was found guilty. While appeal was pending in the Court of Appeals, Antonia Maranan, Rogelio's mother, filed an action to recover damages. The court decided in plaintiff’s favor. Hence the instant petition.

Issue: Whether or not defendant- operators could be held liable for damages

Held: Yes. Defendant-appellant relies solely on the ruling enunciated in Gillaco v. Manila Railroad Co., 97 Phil. 884, that the carrier is under no absolute liability for assaults of its employees upon the passengers. The attendant facts and controlling law of that case and the one at bar are very different however. In the Gillaco case, the passenger was killed outside the scope and the course of duty of the guilty employee. Now here, the killing was perpetrated by the driver of the very cab transporting the passenger, in whose hands the carrier had entrusted the duty of executing the contract of carriage. In other words, unlike the Gillaco case, the killing of the passenger here took place in the course of duty of the guilty employee and when the employee was acting within the scope of his duties.

Moreover, the Gillaco case was decided under the provisions of the Civil Code of 1889 which, unlike the present Civil Code, did not impose upon common carriers absolute liability for the safety of passengers against wilful assaults or negligent acts committed by their employees. The death of the passenger in the Gillaco case was truly a fortuitous event which exempted the carrier from liability.

The Civil Code provisions on the subject of Common Carriers are new and were taken from Anglo-American Law. There, the basis of the carrier's liability for assaults on passengers committed by its drivers rests either on (1) the doctrine of respondeat superior or (2) the principle that it is the carrier's implied duty to transport the passenger safely.

Under the first, which is the minority view, the carrier is liable only when the act of the employee is within the scope of his authority and duty. It is not sufficient that the act be within the course of employment only. Under the second view, upheld by the majority and also by the later cases, it is enough that the assault happens within the course of the employee's duty. It is no defense for the carrier that the act was done in excess of authority or in disobedience of the carrier's orders. The carrier's liability here is absolute in the sense that it practically secures the passengers from assaults committed by its own employees. As can be gleaned from Art. 1759, the Civil Code of the Philippines evidently follows the rule based on the second view. At least three very cogent reasons underlie this rule. (1) the special undertaking of the carrier requires that it furnish its passenger that full measure of protection afforded by the exercise of the high degree of care prescribed by the law, inter alia from violence and insults at the hands of strangers and other passengers, but above all, from the acts of the carrier's own servants charged with the passenger's safety; (2) said liability of the carrier for the servant's violation of duty to passengers, is the result of the formers confiding in the servant's hands the performance of his contract to safely transport the

passenger, delegating therewith the duty of protecting the passenger with the utmost care prescribed by law; and (3) as between the carrier and the passenger, the former must bear the risk of wrongful acts or negligence of the carrier's employees against passengers, since it, and not the passengers, has power to select and remove them.

Accordingly, it is the carrier's strict obligation to select its drivers and similar employees with due regard not only to their technical competence and physical ability, but also, no less important, to their total personality, including their patterns of behavior, moral fibers, and social attitude.

Applying this stringent norm to the facts in this case, therefore, the lower court rightly adjudged the defendant carrier liable pursuant to Art. 1759 of the Civil Code. The dismissal of the claim against the defendant driver was also correct. Plaintiff's action was predicated on breach of contract of carriage7 and the cab driver was not a party thereto. His civil liability is covered in the criminal case wherein he was convicted by final judgment.

Isaac v. A.L. Ammen Trans.

Facts: Plaintiff boarded defendant’s bus as paying passenger from Albay. The bus collided with a pick-up truck which was coming from opposite direction trying to swerve from a pile of gravel. As a result, his left arm was completely severed. Plaintiff chose to hold defendant liable on its contractual obligation. Plaintiff brought an action for damages which the lower court dismissed holding the driver of the pick-up car negligent and not that of the bus.

Issue: Whether or not the common carrier is liable.

Held: The bus was running at a moderate speed. The driver of the bus upon the speeding pick-up truck swerved the bus to the very extreme right of the road. Said driver would not move the bus further without endangering the safety of his passengers. Notwithstanding all these efforts, the rear left side was hit. This finding of the lower court was sustained.

Also, of the carrier’s employee is confronted with a sudden emergency, he is not held to the same degree of care he would otherwise, he required in the absence of such emergency.

By placing his left arm on the window, he is guilty of contributory negligence cannot relieve the carrier but can only reduce its liability (ART. 1762), this is a circumstance which further militates against plaintiff’s position. It is a prevailing rule that it is negligence per se for passengers on a railroad to protrude any part of his body and that no recovery can be had for an injury.”

Philippine National Railways v. Court of Appeals

Facts: Winifredo Tupang, husband of plaintiff, boarded a train of appellant at Libmanan, Camarines Sur, as a paying passenger bound for Manila. Due to some mechanical defect, the train stopped at Sipocot, Camarines Sur, for repairs. Unfortunately, upon passing Iyam Bridge at Lucena, Quezon, Winifredo Tupang fell off the train resulting in his death.The train did not stop despite the alarm raised by the other passengers that somebody fell from the train. Upon complaint filed by Rosario the lower court after trial, held PNR liable for damages for breach of contract of carriage. The decision was sustained by the appellate court hence the present petition, wherein PNR raised for the first time, as a defense, the doctrine of state immunity from suit. It alleged that it is a mere agency of the Philippine government without distinct or separate personality of its own, and that its funds are governmental in character and, therefore, not subject to garnishment or execution.

Issue: Whether or not PNR can raise the defense of doctrine of state immunity from suit.

Held: No. The PNR was created under Rep. Act 4156, as amended. Section 4 of the said Act provides:The Philippine national Railways shall have the following powers:a. To do all such other things and to transact all such business directly or indirectly necessary, incidental or conducive to the attainment of the purpose of the corporation; and

b. Generally, to exercise all powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law.Under the foregoing section, the PNR has all the powers, the characteristics and attributes of a corporation under the Corporation Law. There can be no question then that the PNR may sue and be sued and may be subjected to court processes just like any other corporation.Now, is PNR negligent? Yes. The appellate court found, the petitioner does not deny, that the train boarded by the deceased Winifredo Tupang was so over-crowded that he and many other passengers had no choice but to sit on the open platforms between the coaches of the train. It is likewise undisputed that the train did not even slow down when it approached the Iyam Bridge which was under repair at the time, Neither did the train stop, despite the alarm raised by other passengers that a person had fallen off the train at lyam Bridge. The petitioner has the obligation to transport its passengers to their destinations and to observe extraordinary diligence in doing so. Death or any injury suffered by any of its passengers gives rise to the presumption that it was negligent in the performance of its obligation under the contract of carriage. Thus, as correctly ruled by the respondent court, the petitioner failed to overthrow such presumption of negligence with clear and convincing evidence.

But while petitioner failed to exercise extraordinary diligence as required by law, it appears that the deceased was chargeable with contributory negligence. Since he opted to sit on the open platform between the coaches of the train, he should have held tightly and tenaciously on the upright metal bar found at the side of said platform to avoid falling off from the speeding train. Such contributory negligence, while not exempting the PNR from liability, nevertheless justified the deletion of the amount adjudicated as moral damages and exemplary damages. Exemplary damages may be allowed only in cases where the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.

Pilapil v. Court of Appeals

FACTS:Petitioner Pilapil, on board respondent’s bus was hit above his eye by a stone hurled by an unidentified bystander. Respondent’s personnel lost no time in bringing him to a hospital, but eventually petitioner partially lost his left eye’s vision and sustained a permanent scar.

Thus, Petitioner lodged an action for recovery of damages before the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur which the latter granted. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed said decision.

ISSUE:WoN common carriers assume risks to passengers such as the stoning in this case?

HELD:In consideration of the right granted to it by the public to engage in the business of transporting passengers and goods, a common carrier does not give its consent to become an insurer of any and all risks to passengers and goods. It merely undertakes to perform certain duties to the public as the law imposes, and holds itself liable for any breach thereof.

x x x

While the law requires the highest degree of diligence from common carriers in the safe transport of their passengers and creates a presumption of negligence against them, it does not, however, make the carrier an insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers.

x x x

Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier's employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.

Clearly under the above provision, a tort committed by a stranger which causes injury to a passenger does not accord the latter a cause of action against the carrier. The negligence for which a common carrier is held responsible is the negligent omission by the carrier's employees to prevent the tort from being committed when the same could have been foreseen and prevented by them. Further, under the same provision, it is to be noted that when the violation of the contract is due to the willful acts of strangers, as in the instant case, the degree of care essential to be exercised by the common carrier for the protection of its passenger is only that of a good father of a family.

Bachelor Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals

Facts: The bus owned by Petitioners came from Davao City on its way to Cagayan de Oro City passing Butuan City. While at Tabon-Tabon, Butuan City, the bus picked up a passenger, that about fifteen minutes later, a passenger at the rear portion suddenly stabbed a PC soldier which caused commotion and panic among the passengers. When the bus stopped, passengers Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut were found lying down the road, the former already dead as a result of head injuries and the latter also suffering from severe injuries which caused her death later. The passenger assailant alighted from the bus and ran toward the bushes but was killed by the police. Thereafter, the heirs of Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut, private respondents herein filed a complaint for "sum of money" against Bachelor Express, Inc., its alleged owner and the driver Rivera. The lower court dismissed the complaint. CA reversed the decision, hence the instant petition.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is negligent.

Held: Yes. The liability, if any, of the petitioners is anchored on culpa contractual or breach of contract of carriage. Art. 1732, 1733, 1755 and 1756 are applicable. There is no question that Bachelor is a common carrier. Hence, Bachelor is bound to carry its passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances. In the case at bar, Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut were passengers of a bus belonging to Bachelor and, while passengers of the bus, suffered injuries which caused their death. Consequently, pursuant to Article 1756 of the Civil Code, Bachelor is presumed to have acted negligently unless it can prove that it had observed extraordinary diligence in accordance with Articles 1733 and 1755 of the New Civil Code.

Bachelor denies liability for the death of Beter and Rautraut in that their death was caused by a third person who was beyond its control and supervision. In effect, the petitioner, in order to overcome the presumption of fault or negligence under the law, states that the vehicular incident resulting in the death of passengers Beter and Rautraut was caused by force majeure or caso fortuito over which the common carrier did not have any control. The running amuck of the passenger was the proximate cause of the incident as it triggered off a commotion and panic among the passengers such that the passengers started running to the sole exit shoving each other resulting in the falling off the bus by passengers Beter and Rautraut causing them fatal injuries. The sudden act of the passenger who stabbed another passenger in the bus is within the context of force majeure. However, in order that a common carrier may be absolved from liability in case of force majeure, it is not enough that the accident was caused by force majeure. The common carrier must still prove that it was not negligent in causing the injuries resulting from such accident. In this case, Bachelor was negligent.

Considering the factual findings of the Court of Appeals-the bus driver did not immediately stop the bus at the height of the commotion; the bus was speeding from a full stop; the victims fell from the bus door when it was opened or gave way while the bus was still running; the conductor panicked and blew his whistle after people had already fallen off the bus; and the bus was not properly equipped with doors in accordance with law-it is clear that the petitioners have failed to overcome the

presumption of fault and negligence found in the law governing common carriers. The petitioners' argument that the petitioners "are not insurers of their passengers" deserves no merit in view of the failure of the petitioners to prove that the deaths of the two passengers were exclusively due to force majeure and not to the failure of the petitioners to observe extraordinary diligence in transporting safely the passengers to their destinations as warranted by law.

Fortune Express Inc. v. Court of AppealsFacts: A bus of petitioner figured in an accident with a jeepney in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norter, resulting in the death of several passengers of the jeepney, including two Maranaos. A constabulary agent investigated and found out that the owner of the jeepney was a Maranao and that certain Maranaos were planning to take revenge on the petitioner by burning some of its buses. The operations manager of petitioner was advised to take precautionary measures. Four days after the accident, three armed Maranaos who pretended to be passengers seized a bus petitioner bound for Iligan City and set it on fire. Atty. Talib Caorong, whose heirs are private respondents herein was a passenger of the bus and was shot and killed during the incident. The private respondents brought this suit for breach of contract of carriage. Complaint was dismissed in the lower court but its decision was reversed in CA, hence the instant petition, with petitioners contention that the acts of the Maranaos is caso fortuito.

Issue: Was there breach of contract of carriage?

Held: Yes. Art. 1763 of the Civil Code provides that a common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of wilfull acts of other passengers, if the employees of the common carrier could have prevented the act through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family. In the present case, it is clear that because of the negligence of petitioner's employees, the seizure of the bus by Mananggolo and his men was made possible.

Despite warning by the Philippine Constabulary at Cagayan de Oro that the Maranaos were planning to take revenge on the petitioner by burning some of its buses and the assurance of petitioner's operation manager, Diosdado Bravo, that the necessary precautions would be taken, petitioner did nothing to protect the safety of its passengers. Had petitioner and its employees been vigilant they would not have failed to see that the malefactors had a large quantity of gasoline with them. Under the circumstances, simple precautionary measures to protect the safety of passengers, such as frisking passengers and inspecting their baggages, preferably with non-intrusive gadgets such as metal detectors, before allowing them on board could have been employed without violating the passenger's constitutional rights.

Petitioner invokes the ruling in Pilapil v. Court of Appeals, and De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, in support of its contention that the seizure of its bus by the assailants constitutes force majeure. In Pilapil v. Court of Appeals, it was held that a common carrier is not liable for failing to install window grills on its buses to protect the passengers from injuries cause by rocks hurled at the bus by lawless elements. On the other hand, in De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, it was ruled that a common carriers is not responsible for goods lost as a result of a robbery which is attended by grave or irresistable threat, violence, or force.

It is clear that the cases of Pilapil and De Guzman do not apply to the prensent case. Art. 1755 of the Civil Code provides that "a common carrier is bound to carry the passengers as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances." Thus, we held in Pilapil and De Guzman that the respondents therein were not negligent in failing to take special precautions against threats to the safety of passengers which could not be foreseen, such as tortious or criminal acts of third persons. In the present case, this factor of unforeseeability (the second requisite for an event to be

considered force majeure) is lacking. As already stated, despite the report of PC agent Generalao that the Maranaos were planning to burn some of petitioner's buses and the assurance of petitioner's operation manager (Diosdado Bravo) that the necessary precautions would be taken, nothing was really done by petitioner to protect the safety of passengers.

The petitioner contends that Atty. Caorong was guilty of contributory negligence in returning to the bus to retrieve something. But Atty. Caorong did not act recklessly. It should be pointed out that the intended targets of the violence were petitioners and its employees, not its passengers. The assailant's motive was to retaliate for the loss of life of two Maranaos as a result of the collision between petitioner's bus and the jeepney in which the two Maranaos were riding. Mananggolo, the leader of the group which had hijacked the bus, ordered the passengers to get off the bus as they intended to burn it and its driver. The armed men actually allowed Atty. Caorong to retrieve something from the bus. What apparently angered them was his attempt to help the driver of the bus by pleading for his life. He was playing the role of the good Samaritan. Certainly, this act cannot be considered an act of negligence, let alone recklessness.