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Tsunami Recovery in Batticaloa District, Eastern Sri
Lanka: Livelihood Revival and the Performance of Aid
Delivery Systems in the Fisheries Sector
A Thesis submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirement for the Degree of Master of
Science (Management of Natural Resources and Sustainable Agriculture).
By Camilla Marie Risvoll, May 2006
Norwegian University of Life Sciences
Department of International Environmental and Development Studies
II
The Department of International Environment and Development Studies, Noragric, is the
international gateway for the Norwegian University of Life Sciences (UMB). Eight
departments, associated research institutions and the Norwegian College of Veterinary
Medicine in Oslo. Established in 1986, Noragric’s contribution to international development
lies in the interface between research, education (Bachelor, Master and PhD programmes) and
assignments.
The Noragric Master theses are the final theses submitted by students in order to fulfil the
requirements under the Noragric Master programme “Management of Natural Resources and
Sustainable Agriculture” (MNRSA), “Development Studies” and other Master programmes.
The findings in this thesis do not necessarily reflect the views of Noragric. Extracts from this
publication may only be reproduced after prior consultation with the author and on condition
that the source is indicated. For rights of reproduction or translation contact Noragric.
Title picture: Fisherman in Kattankudy (photo: Camilla Marie Risvoll)
© Camilla Marie Risvoll, May 2006
Noragric
Department of International Environment and Development Studies
P.O. Box 5003
N-1432 Ås
Norway
Tel.: +47 64 96 52 00
Fax: +47 64 96 52 01
Internet: http://www.umb.no/noragric
III
Declaration
I hereby declare that this is my own original work, and applications of all other material are
acknowledged. This thesis has not been submitted to any other University than UMB for any
type of academic degree.
Signature: ____________________
Date: ________________________
Camilla Marie Risvoll, May 2006
IV
Dedication
I dedicate this work to the Tamil and Muslim fisher folk in Batticaloa District, Eastern
Sri Lanka
V
Acknowledgements
Firstly, I wish to give special thanks to Professor Ian Bryceson for his guidance, very helpful
comments and encouragement throughout this work. I am also very thankful to Professor N.
Shanmugaratnam for his advice and comments throughout the research period. Special thanks
go to Gunnar Album, Coastal Campaign, who has provided me with insightful information
and assistance during this work. I am very grateful to Dr. Steve Creech, for helpful comments
as well as providing me with very useful information while in the field.
I remain very grateful to the Development Fund for their financial support, which assisted me
throughout the period of field work.
I thank my interpreter Ravichandran Amarasingham for all the help, both in translating
interviews but also familiarising me with the local area. My local supervisor Dr. P Vinobaba
deserves special thanks, for connecting me to key informants as well as providing useful
comments while in the field. Thanks go to Arnulf Sandvik and Mr. K. Tharmaseelan for their
generosity while I was in Sri Lanka. Thanks go to Dr. Marit Haug, who provided me very
generously with literature throughout my time in the field. Finally, I thank my family and
friends for all their support during this work.
VI
VII
Abstract
Coastal communities in Batticaloa District, eastern Sri Lanka were severely impacted by the
December 26, 2004 tsunami as well as being victims of the protracted war that has been
ongoing for over two decades. This paper examines processes of post-tsunami livelihood
revival, at household and community levels in two fishing villages in Batticaloa District. The
performance of the aid delivery systems in relation to the fisheries sector were also examined.
Data was collected through semi-structured interviews of households engaged in fishing, and
of external actors involved in the post-tsunami recovery process in Batticaloa District. A
conceptual framework for social-ecological resilience including elements of the livelihood
approach, and particularly the concept of vulnerability was used as a tool when analysing the
collected data. The study reveals that the livelihoods of affected fisher folks in the studied
villages are far from recovered, one year after the tsunami. Several disadvantaged groups of
affected fishers have been marginalised in the recovery process, including part-time fishers,
fish workers, non-members of Fisheries Cooperative Societies and fishers only owning nets
before the tsunami. Fishers adapted to the changes after the tsunami by diversifying their
fishing practices. External actors’ responses in the recovery process have to a large extent
failed, often contributing towards exacerbating the already stressed social-ecological
situation. NGOs have distributed an oversupply of canoes in Batticaloa District which is
likely to erode resilience because, firstly, it will increase the pressure on already threatened
fish resources near shore, and secondly, the recovery of income generating activities for the
affected fishers will stagnate as fish catches are poor near shore due to damaged corals and
depleted resources. The Sri Lankan Government employed a centralised approach whereby
the principle of subsidiarity was neglected. Participation in planning and decision-making by
the affected people at local level was practically absent, despite various attempts at creating
ad hoc village committees. Such committees appeared to create further room for inequity in
the aid delivery. Some effective responses by a few exceptional organisations contributed
positively towards ameliorating the stressed situation and these were based upon learning and
experience, whereby the local people participated in their own livelihood recovery. This paper
concludes with highlighting the need for strengthening local people’s multiple livelihood
strategies, firstly as a risk-spreading mechanism for the fishers and secondly to prevent over-
exploitation on pressurised resources. This is because a return to primarily depending on the
fisheries sector appears in this case to be an ecologically unsustainable and economically
unviable livelihood option.
VIII
IX
Table of Contents
DECLARATION .................................................................................................................................................. III
DEDICATION ..................................................................................................................................................... IV
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS........................................................................................................................................V
ABSTRACT .......................................................................................................................................................VII
TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................................................................ IX
LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................................................... XI
LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................................................................................ XI
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ...................................................................................................................XII
1.0 INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................................... 1
1.1 STUDY OBJECTIVES ....................................................................................................................................... 3
1.2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK ........................................................................................................................... 3
1.3 PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF STUDY .................................................................................................................... 7
2.0 BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................................................. 9
2.1 THE DECEMBER 26, 2004 TSUNAMI .............................................................................................................. 9
2.2 THE CONFLICT – IN RETROSPECT ................................................................................................................... 9
2.3 THE PROTRACTED CONFLICT IN SRI LANKA................................................................................................. 11
2.4 FISHING ACTIVITIES IN SRI LANKA’S COASTAL AREAS ................................................................................ 14
2.5 IMPACTS ON THE SECTOR............................................................................................................................. 16
2.6 SOCIAL STRUCTURES ................................................................................................................................... 17
2.6.1 Fisher folk........................................................................................................................................... 17
2.6.2 Sri Lanka’s administrative system- in retrospect................................................................................ 18
2.6.3 The role of the state in the tsunami aftermath and the structure of coordination............................... 19
2.6.4 Aid delivery actors.............................................................................................................................. 22
2.7 LAND ISSUES ............................................................................................................................................... 23
3.0 METHODOLOGY........................................................................................................................................ 25
3.1 STUDY SITES................................................................................................................................................ 25
3.2 METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION................................................................................................................ 27
3.3 SAMPLING DESIGN AND PROCEDURE .......................................................................................................... 27
3.4 PRIMARY DATA ........................................................................................................................................... 28
3.5 SECONDARY DATA ...................................................................................................................................... 28
3.6 DATA ANALYSIS .......................................................................................................................................... 29
3.7 LIMITATIONS TO STUDY............................................................................................................................... 29
4. 0 RESULTS ..................................................................................................................................................... 31
4.1 FISH PRODUCTIVITY .................................................................................................................................... 31
4.1.1 Species composition and regeneration ............................................................................................... 31
X
4.2 THE FISHERIES SECTOR................................................................................................................................ 31
4. 2.1 Livelihood revival .............................................................................................................................. 32
4.2.2 Aid delivery......................................................................................................................................... 36
5.0 DISCUSSION ................................................................................................................................................ 43
5.1 VULNERABILITY CONTEXT .......................................................................................................................... 43
5.1.1 Dynamic Pressures ............................................................................................................................. 46
5.1.2 Unsafe Conditions .............................................................................................................................. 47
5.2 ACTORS RESPONSES IN THE RECOVERY PROCESS......................................................................................... 50
5.2.1 Ineffective response ............................................................................................................................ 50
5.2.2 Counter productive response.............................................................................................................. 60
5.2.3 Learning towards effective response .................................................................................................. 67
6.0 CONCLUDING REMARKS........................................................................................................................ 75
7.0 REFERENCES.............................................................................................................................................. 77
APPENDIX 1 INTERVIEWS .................................................................................................................................. 81
APPENDIX 2. SELECTED PICTURES OF VESSELS USED IN EASTERN SRI LANKAN FISHERIES. ............................... 92
XI
List of Figures
FIGURE 1 RESPONSES TO THE CRISIS FOLLOWING THE TSUNAMI. ADAPTED FROM BERKES ET AL. (2003)................ 5
FIGURE 2 VULNERABILITY PROGRESSION ADAPTED FROM WISNER ET AL. (2003). .................................................. 6
FIGURE 3 THE PROHIBITED ZONE. REGULATION.................................................................................................... 13
FIGURE 4MAP OF SRI LANKA SHOWING COASTAL AREAS AFFECTED BY WAR AND TSUNAMI.............................. 14
FIGURE 5 ILLUSTRATION OF ACTOR’S POSITIONING IN THE RECOVERY PROCESS (ADAPTED FROM AMARASINGHE
2005)............................................................................................................................................................ 20
FIGURE 6 MFAR’S DISASTER MANAGEMENT SCHEME (AMARASINGHE 2005). ...................................................... 21
FIGURE 7 PRESENT STRUCTURE OF RADA (SOURCE: CPA 2006). ......................................................................... 22
FIGURE 8 MAP AND SATELLITE IMAGE SHOWING THE STUDY SITES IN BATTICALOA DISTRICT. TEMPORARY
SHELTER CAMP AND PROPOSED LAND FOR TRADITIONAL PALAMEENMADU RESIDENTS (SOURCE:
MEARCH.ORG 2005 & GOOGLE EARTH ACCESSED 17 MAY 2006). .............................................................. 26
FIGURE 9 A TYPICAL FISHER’S HOUSE WITH APPARENTLY UNUSED CANOES. ......................................................... 37
FIGURE 10 BOAT REPAIRED BY CEYNOR, WITH ENGINE LEFT UNREPAIRED, AND ................................................ 63
FIGURE 11 INCOMPLETE REPAIR WORK BY CEYNOR AFTER THE TSUNAMI,.......................................................... 63
FIGURE 12 FRP BOATS SUPPLIED BY SAVE THE CHILDREN (GB) WAITING TO BE DELIVERED TO ........................... 64
FIGURE 13 REBUILDING HOMES IN KATTANKUDY IN A FLOOD-PRONE AREA.......................................................... 64
FIGURE 14 TEMPORARY SHELTERS IN A FLOOD PRONE AREA WITH STAGNANT WATER. ......................................... 65
FIGURE 15 THIRAIMADU TEMPORARY SHELTER CAMP WITH SEVERAL HOUSES MADE............................................ 66
List of Tables
TABLE 1 SUMMARY OF DESTROYED, REPLACED CRAFT AND PLEDGES, BY CRAFT TYPE, IN BATTICALOA DISTRICT
AS OF NOVEMBER 2005. (REPRODUCED FROM CREECH 2006)..................................................................... 17
TABLE 2 AVERAGE FISH CATCH, TIME SPENT FISHING, FISHING INCOME, FISH CATCH PER EFFORT AND AVERAGE
PRICE OF FISH PER KG. BEFORE AND AFTER THE TSUNAMI............................................................................. 32
TABLE 3 FISHING EQUIPMENT REPLACED AFTER THE TSUNAMI.............................................................................. 33
TABLE 4 MEMBERSHIP IN FCSS AFFECTING AID ASSISTANCE ................................................................................ 34
TABLE 5 TYPES OF FISHING NETS USED FOR SEA FISHING BEFORE THE TSUNAMI.................................................... 38
XII
Abbreviations and Acronyms
CBO Community Based Organisation
CFA Cease Fire Agreement
CPA Center for Policy Alternatives
DOFAR Department of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources
DS Divisional Secretary
EPRLF Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front
FAO Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations
FCS Fisheries Cooperative Societies
FRP boat Fiber Reinforced Plastic Boat
GA Government Agent
GN Grama Niladhari
GS Grama Sevaka
IDP Internally Displaced Persons
INGO International Non-Governmental Organisation
IPS Institute for Policy Studies
JHU Jathika Hela Uruma
JVP Janatha Vimukthi Perumuna
LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MOFAR Ministry of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources
NEP North Eastern Province
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
PDS Planning and Development Secretariat
P-TOMS Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure
SLMM Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission
TAFLOL Task Force for Logistics, Law and Order
TAFREN Task Force for Rebuilding the Nation
TAFRER Task Force for Rescue and Relief
TELO Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization
TRO Tamil Reconstruction Organisation
UN OCHA United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
1
1.0 Introduction
Despite efforts by a myriad of actors involved in the post-tsunami recovery process in
Batticaloa District in eastern Sri Lanka, the livelihoods of affected fisher folks are far from
recovered. Coastal communities in this region were severely affected by the December 26,
2004 tsunami. Many people that depended upon fisheries as their livelihood activity are
struggling to recover in the aftermath of the tsunami, partly due to lack of fishing equipment
to carry out income generating activities, although an oversupply of vessels have been
brought to the district. This situation is exacerbated by declining near shore resources which
is partly a result of coral reefs that were damaged by the tsunami, but also due to
inappropriate and unsustainable disaster-recovery measures. These problems are linked to
responses that emerged locally, nationally and internationally after the tsunami. A few
attempts of adaptive approaches to remedy ineffective and counterproductive responses have
contributed somewhat towards ameliorating the otherwise stressed situation. In order to
examine post-disaster recovery in Sri Lanka it is essential to take account of the impacts of
two events, the tsunami that struck the coast of Sri Lanka, and the protracted war which has
been ongoing for more than two decades.
Elements of the livelihood approach are combined with the concept of social-ecological
resilience. The livelihood approach focuses on livelihood strategies adapted by households
and individuals, and the context for such adaptation (Shanmugaratnam 2006). Vulnerability is
a key concept in the livelihood approach and is useful in the assessment of affected fisher-
folk’s capacities to cope with and recover from the stressed social-ecological situation. Social
and ecological vulnerability to disasters such as the tsunami are influenced by eroding
resilience both before and after the tsunami struck. Resilience refers to the capacity of related
social-ecological systems to cope and adapt through experience and learning as recurrent
changes occur through disturbances i.e. the tsunami, the protracted war and increasingly
depleted natural fish resources (Adger et al. 2005). In order to grasp the resilience of the
system in the tsunami aftermath, certain key indicators such as property rights, access to
resources and institutional change were explored (Adger 1997). Such focus was
complementary with the objectives of the study which are illustrated under heading 1.1
below.
2
Some root causes in conjunction with dynamic pressures and unsafe conditions contributed
towards the vulnerability context that was embedded in society before the tsunami struck, or
became causes for vulnerability among certain groups of people after the tsunami. Particularly
the civil conflict, but also the unequal ownership of land and uneven development among
different groups of people in society, were important root causes of vulnerability. Some
disadvantaged groups of people such as previous net owners, part-time fishers and non-
members of Fisheries Cooperative Societies (FCS) were left marginalised in the recovery
process and this contributed to the poor recovery rate within the studied households. There
were many reasons for such erosion of resilience to occur, and the responses generated by the
various actors contributed to patterns of vulnerability. The Government’s approach in the
tsunami aftermath was characterized by politicisation and centralisation. The enforcement of
the buffer zone was a Government regulated policy with severe impacts on the people
affected by it. Moreover, inertia among Government sectors created delays and further
marginalisation of affected people. Aid agencies such as national and international non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) provided valuable initial assistance to the affected
communities. However the large number of agencies, with varying levels of experience,
created an uncoordinated recovery process with many flaws. In order to build resilience after
crisis of a magnitude such as the tsunami, certain conditions for adaptive responses and co-
management are important, such as entail knowledge and learning, adhering to the principle
of subsidiarity, cross-scale transparency, coordination and facilitation of information flows
through social networks, enabling legislation that creates social space for sustainable and
viable fisheries management as well as establishing arenas for collaborative learning of
fisheries management (Olsson et al. 2004 in Othman 2005).
The United Nation’s Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), the German Development
Cooperation in Collaboration with the Sri Lankan Ministry of Nation Building and
Development, the Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA), Institute for Policy Studies (IPS),
International Collective in Support of Fishworkers (ICSF) are some of the institutions that
have carried out research in order to gain knowledge on the successes and failures of the post-
tsunami recovery responses nationally and in Batticaloa District. The research conducted so
far in regards to the topic investigates the national and district level, and include research of
institutions such as community-based organisations (CBO) as well as group interviews of
affected people at the village level. However, knowledge reflecting households and
3
individuals perceptions on ground realities appear to be lacking as limited research is
conducted at household level.
1.1 Study objectives
There were two objectives to this study:
• Examine processes of fisheries production and livelihood revival after the tsunami at
household and community level in two fishing villages: one of Tamil and the other of
Muslim origin.
• Examine the performance of aid delivery systems in the fisheries sector in the tsunami
aftermath.
This study investigates the shift in access to and allocation of resources, including land,
fishing equipment and social networks. The study also examines actors’ responses in the post-
tsunami recovery process and how they impact on the stressed social-ecological situation after
the tsunami hit the region in December 2004. Although the coastal communities in Batticaloa
District are affected both by war and the tsunami, and it is vital to consider both, the
objectives of this study focus on the recovery process from the impacts the tsunami had on
fishing communities.
1.2 Conceptual framework
A livelihood has been defined in many different ways but this study takes Ellis’ (2000)
definition of a livelihood as comprising “the assets (natural, physical, human, financial and
social capital), the activities, and the access to these (mediated by institutions and social
relations) that together determine the living gained by the individual or household”.
The livelihood approach identifies assets as key to the households’ choice and ability to
undertake activities (and thus the living so gained). The approach recognises the importance
of the assets and the activities to which they are put. The conceptual framework used here
combines elements of this approach with the concept of social-ecological resilience.
Resilience is central for achieving sustainability and loss of resilience decreases the ability to
deal with change (Berkes and Folke 1998).
4
Smith (1992:25) in Wisner et al. (2003) defines resilience as ‘the measure of the rate of
recovery from a stressful experience, reflecting the social capacity to absorb and recover from
the occurrence of a hazardous event’. Social systems create the conditions in which hazards
have a differential impact on various societies and different groups within society. Broadly,
three aspects define a system’s resilience: (1) the amount of shock it can absorb and remain in
the given state; (2) its ability to reorganise self; and (3) learning and adaptation capacity
(Milestad and Darnhofer, 2003). The shock may take any form, notable here is taking the
form of an external disturbance such as the December 2004 tsunami, which through the
resulting shock and stress increased peoples’ proneness to livelihood insecurity. It is
important to recognize that the Batticaloa District has also faced over twenty years with
armed conflict, which has disrupted peoples’ livelihood in which both social and ecological
resilience has been and still is affected.
Coastal people in the fishing villages of Palameenmadu and Kattankudy have traditionally
depended on fisheries for their livelihood. The fisheries are their natural capital and through
use of physical assets such as nets, canoes, and boats household members undertake fishing as
an income generating activity. Village members with enough financial capital to buy fishing
gears participated in fishing and/or employed others to fish. As such the fisheries were a main
source of livelihood to majority households.
The December 26, 2004 tsunami killed people, destroyed settlement infrastructure, canoes,
boats and nets. It also impacted directly on the ecological systems by killing fish and
damaging corals. Thereby it disrupted the communities’ livelihood that was based primarily
on the coastal fisheries. Apart from the direct disruption of the social system through the
many deaths and destruction of houses, dismantling the fisheries itself had far reaching
consequences since the sector is the main livelihood of these coastal people. Both the social
and ecological systems were challenged to cope with and adapt to the new conditions. Coping
and adaptation are two related concepts that relate to vulnerability but while coping capacity
is more directly related to an extreme event such as the December 2004 tsunami, adaptive
capacity refers to a longer time frame and as such entails learning either before and/or after an
extreme event. Enhancement of both is thus necessary to reduce vulnerability and to increase
social-ecological resilience of households such as in the Batticaloa District after the tsunami.
Three generic responses to the crisis, which followed in the tsunami aftermath, are possible
and are illustrated in Figure 1 below.
5
Figure 1 Responses to the crisis following the tsunami. Adapted from Berkes et al. (2003).
In order to assess the resilience of the ecological and social systems in the aftermath of the
tsunami it is important to recognise the factors that determine the event to become such an
unprecedented human disaster. The concept of vulnerability aptly helps to identify the level of
6
resilience held by the people and elements of the “Pressure and Release” model (PAR)
adopted by Wisner et al. (2005) is used as a tool to illustrate this. The adapted model
identifies three stages that contribute to the vulnerability context that may be embedded in the
society before the tsunami occurred. These stages consist of ‘root causes’, ‘dynamic
pressures’ and ‘unsafe conditions’ (Figure 2), which act as determinants in the progression of
vulnerability.
Figure 2 Vulnerability progression adapted from Wisner et al. (2003).
Livelihood recovery in the tsunami aftermath is perceived in different ways. One stream of
thought is to attempt to reconstruct the pre-tsunami scenario: in relation to the fisheries sector,
this implies replacements of fishing equipment and vessels to pre-tsunami levels alongside
reserecting old structures and trends.
Another approach would be to look beyond returning to the previous status and to promote
new developments. In doing so it is essential to link development with peace-building due to
the protracted war that has been ongoing for the past decades. Recognizing the impacts the
war has had upon societies is essential because of the significant unevenness that has been
created amongst people in society, whereby certain groups of people and regions within the
country have been victims of discrimination. This inequality is an important determinant and
reflects where different groups of people are positioned, thus must be considered in the
7
assessments of people’s needs. In relation to such an approach, seeking to enhance people’s
wellbeing in terms of livelihood and human security, non-discrimination, freedom, justice and
improved opportunities are central (Shanmugaratnam 2005). In terms of development it is
important to increase opportunities for diversification and adaptive livelihood strategies
amongst people, whereby one must address root causes of vulnerability in society. Resilience
is central in this regard as it determines peoples potential to cope with shocks and utilizing
opportunities available to them. Building resilience is to partly reduce dependency upon
natural resources for livelihood revival as well as to promote diversified livelihoods (Pomeroy
et al. 2005). While considering avenues for generating opportunities, it is also important to be
aware of possible challenges that may arise. To overcome such challenges and to avoid
erosion of resilience, it is necessary to consider aspects such as the level of political will, the
vision apparent in regards to long term sustainability of the country’s revival and the
institutional and organisational context (Shanmugaratnam 2005).
1.3 Purpose and Scope of Study
The purpose of this study is to assess the effectiveness of the post-tsunami recovery of fisher
folk’s livelihoods, alongside responses generated by involved aid agencies and the Sri Lankan
Government in the tsunami aftermath in Batticaloa District.
A myriad of actors were involved in the post-tsunami recovery, however this study is limited
to deal with a selection of INGOs, NGOs, CBOs and Government bodies alongside fishing
households in two fishing communities. The fishing households affected by the tsunami in
Batticaloa District have also been war victims to varying degrees. Due to the complexities of
the civil conflict in Sri Lanka this dimension is only briefly considered in this study, whereby
the principal focus is placed on issues directly affecting the fishers’ livelihoods after the
tsunami. However, in order to grasp the situation to a fuller extent a deeper and more
integrative study of the complexities related to the civil conflict is required, particularly
because there are strong linkages between war-displaced and tsunami-displaced victims. Both
have significant impacts on the vulnerability context within the social-ecological systems.
This paper starts with a presentation of the background of issues that are underlying causes
contributing to the present situation in Batticaloa District. This includes the history of the civil
conflict and the protracted war, the fisheries sector and social structures in the society. The
8
methodology identify methods used for interviews for fisher households and various actors
engaged in the recovery process, some limitations to the study, followed by the theoretical
framework used.
9
2.0 Background
2.1 The December 26, 2004 Tsunami
The tsunami waves that hit the coast of Sri Lanka on December 26, 2004 were results of an
earthquake off the west Coast of northern Sumatra that measured 8.9 on the Richter scale. The
tsunami waves also led to widespread catastrophe in India, Maldives, Indonesia, and Thailand
particularly but also caused damaged in Malaysia, Bangladesh, Somalia and Seychelles
(recoverlanka 2005). The tsunami killed over 30,000 people in Sri Lanka and affected many
more through displacement and destroyed assets. The international community and INGOs
were practically overloaded with funds and deadlines for relief and recovery, and they
appeared to be insensitive to the protracted conflict in Sri Lanka, which was reflected in their
approaches to tsunami relief (Philipson & Thangarajah 2005).
2.2 The conflict – in retrospect
The features of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka can be explained to some extent by the conflict
structures existent in Sri Lanka before independence. Such conflict structures reflect Sri
Lanka’s historical formation of the ethnic society, and were between castes within the same
ethnicity groups or between the highland and the lowland Sinhalese. Prior to independence,
the identity of both Sinhalese and Tamils was weak, however numerous Sinhala dominated
policies that arose after independence, triggered an emerging conflict between Tamils and
Sinhalese people. Conflict between Tamils and Sinhalese has appeared since the mid-1950s
and is grounded in rivalry for recognition and power alongside disputes over post-colonial
directions as well as distribution of resources. Following independence, the Tamils responded
to attacks on their positions using democratic approaches (Sorensen 2001).
In the early stages of the Tamil struggle, the objective went from expansion of Tamils’
regional autonomy, to gradually transforming into conversion of the singular state structure to
become a federal state (Fujita et al. 2003). However, during the economic depression in the
1970s, frustration grew among Tamil people and the vision of a separate state became strong
for many Tamils (Sorensen 2001). Their rational for such agenda was that an autonomous
entity was the only possibility for their political and economic rights to be protected, thus they
increasingly accentuated their rights to self-determination (Nithiyanandam 2000). The first
10
step was the formation of the Tamil United Front, which later was transformed to the Tamil
United Liberation Front (TULF), which attained the status of the main opposition in the Sri
Lankan Parliament. While such development took place at a parliamentary level, frustration
towards both the Government and the Tamil political elite grew strong among the Tamil
youth, who moved towards the same vision of a Tamil state, through militant means.
Armed conflict between the Sri Lankan Army (SLA) and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE) started in 1983 with the killings of 13 Sinhalese soldiers in an ambush, which
triggered further violence between the Sinhalese majority (74% of population) and the Tamil
minority (18%). The results were further polarisation between the two ethnic communities
and displacement of hundreds of thousands Tamils. The war has primarily been between the
Sri Lankan army forces and militant Tamils, however prior to the war and the first part of it
reflected internal power struggles among several active militant groups. These were such as
LTTE, the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO) and the Eelam People’s
Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), whereby LTTE after annihilating the other groups,
ended up as the dominant organisation challenging the Sri Lankan state by representing the
battle for Tamil Eelam. The war in Sri Lanka escalated markedly in 1990 and lead to more
than 1 million people being displaced in the North-East. Brief peace-talks were initiated in
1994 with agreements of a cease-fire in order to start peace negotiations, however this fell
through and LTTE withdrew. Between 1995 and 1999 the Sri Lankan Government carried out
several attempts to weaken LTTE in the north by carrying out military operations throughout
an adopted strategy called ‘War for Peace’. This resulted in many more displacements of
Tamil people (Sorensen 2001). Attempts were made to end the war, and in 2002 a cease-fire
agreement was enforced which, although very frail, is still intact in 2006. A result of the war
is a dual power structure in the North Eastern Province (NEP) which is a convergence
between the Sri Lankan state and a de facto LTTE state.
The Muslim fraction in Sri Lanka never identified themselves with the vision of a Tamil
Eelam, and tried to retain a neutral position in the conflict. However, such position became
increasingly difficult after the 1990 attacks by the LTTE, firstly in a massacre in a mosque in
Batticaloa, and later expelling the Muslim population from Jaffna. Such actions reflect
LTTE’s objections to including the Muslims as part of their vision of Tamil Eelam, and have
contributed towards the adverse relationship between Muslims and Tamils. Moreover, young
11
Muslims were in the early 1990s recruited by military intelligence to inform on LTTE
activity, which exacerbated the tension between Tamils and Muslims (Fujita et al. 2003).
The Eastern province has been the most unstable region throughout the war, and has been a
contested site of intra-Tamil rivalry. The defection of Colonel Karuna, an Eastern Tamil who
represents the East’s resentment of LTTE’s bias towards the North, has made the East
undergo military, political, social and economic difficulties. The picture of who is supporting
who within the Tamil communities in the East is very unclear, which has created extensive
suffering among the civilian population (Philipson & Thangarajah 2005).
International engagement in the North-East
India is the single most important actor in the North-East of Sri Lanka and has a
comprehensive commitment through trade, cultural and diplomatic relations, and intelligence
activity (Philipson & Thangarajah 2005). Norway, with other Nordic countries, is monitoring
the Cease Fire Agreement (CFA), through the Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission (SLMM).
Norway’s role in SLMM has been accused of having a conflict of interest between mediation
and monitoring, and also ignoring the need to include other interest groups into consultations
i.e. Muslims.
2.3 The protracted conflict in Sri Lanka
The protracted war in Sri Lanka has affected different parts of the country unevenly in regards
to spatial and socio-economic measures and in regards to development (Shanmugaratnam
2005). This was a continuation from the post-independence policies by the Sri Lankan
Government which discriminated Tamils. Such pro-Sinhalese policies were reflected in
language policies, irrigation projects, university entrance, settlement projects and
development investments. The NEPs contribution to the country’s GDP in relation to
production activities dropped from 15% to 4% from the start of the war until 1997. In socio-
economic terms, the North-East experienced more than 65,000 deaths due to the conflict and
several more became refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP). Forced emigration
resulted in considerable losses of human capital and has altered the demographic structure in
the North and East. In many instances, displacement has for instance separated fishermen
from their fishing grounds, and damages to social institutions has damaged fishers’ fishing
12
unions, credit societies and made many social networks dysfunctional (Fujita et al. 2003). It is
estimated that about 60% of the coastal communities in the North-East are poor, referring to
the ‘dollar-a-day’ income criterion. The fact that more than 80% of Sri Lanka’s industries are
in the Western Province (WP) contributes to such scale of poverty, which is illustrated in
Figure 4 below. As the war has become protracted it has generated a war economy which has
been favourable for particular groups, however more significantly it has lead to further
conflicts affecting larger segments of the Sri Lankan people, whereby the North-Eastern
coastal communities are among the worst affected (Shanmugaratnam 2005). The Tsunami
struck particularly hard in these regions making the situation for these people utterly severe.
While the war has created a fragmented polity and ethnically divided society, the tsunami
created some hope of unity in its wake. Such opportunity for reconciliation was however short
lived and divisive political forces soon appeared to conquest. In the tsunami aftermath there
were emerging conflicts over the coastal zone resources and widespread suspicion whether
the Government will promote privatisation and commercialisation of the coastal areas
(Shanmugaratnam 2005). The buffer zone policy fuelled such suspicions. The enforced buffer
zones differed between the different parts of the country, whereby the buffer zone in the East
for instance was 100 metres wider than it was in the south. This is evidence on measures
introduced by the Government that contributes to the unevenness that is apparent in society,
which in terms weakened the capacities of many tsunami survivors to cope with effects of the
tsunami.
The civil conflict in Sri Lanka has vast implications on the people’s livelihood on almost all
aspects of their lives. Obvious impacts are on human security and its contribution to the
fragmented landscape of uncertainty and vulnerability that it creates amongst the people, but
it also has direct impacts on the daily livelihood activities of fisher folk in form of imposed
restrictions on fishing, which at present is denying them from carrying out livelihood
activities. Beside large numbers of people from the NEP being displaced during the war,
particularly the North has been affected by long-term bans and restrictions on fishing.
However recently this also became the case for communities along the East coast. On March
28, 2006 the Sri Lankan Government introduced a ban on fishing with vessels over three
tonnes and exceeding 28ft, through the Emergency Regulation No. 1 of 2006, which consists
of the establishment of a Prohibited Zone covering around 70% of Sri Lanka’s entire coastline
(Figure 3).
13
Figure 3 The Prohibited Zone. Regulation
No. 1 of 2006. (source: Sinhalaya.com 29.03.2006).
Figure 4 identifies the coastal areas affected by the war and the tsunami, and shows that
almost two-thirds of the areas affected by the tsunami are also war-affected areas, which is in
the NEP. Coastal communities in the high intensity conflict areas within the NEP, such as
Batticaloa, Trincomalee, Mullaitivu and the Jaffna peninsula, were among the worst affected
by the tsunami.
14
Figure 4Map of Sri Lanka Showing Coastal Areas Affected by War and Tsunami
(Reproduced from Shanmugaratnam 2005, Country map from RecoverLanka 2005).
2.4 Fishing activities in Sri Lanka’s coastal areas
Sri Lanka’s coastal districts inhabit 31% of the population. There are 1,337 fishing villages
with about 123,970 fishing households and 703 landing sites (Shanmugaratnam 2005). The
coastline of Sri Lanka is about 1,585 km and supports ecosystems such as coral reefs,
mangroves, sea grass beds and marshy lands. Well-developed coral reefs exist along much of
the Sri Lankan coast line and along the east coast they exist for instance between Batticaloa
and Kalmunai. The coral reefs in Sri Lanka are important sources of natural resources,
whereby export of sea cucumbers, ornamental fish and spiny lobsters have contributed
significantly to the foreign exchange earnings (Dharmaretnam & Ahamed 2005). Fringing
coral reefs along the coast near Batticaloa were severely affected by coral bleaching in 1998
and large-scale coral mortality had occurred prior to the tsunami (Rajasuriya 2005). Recent
research identified extensive damages of Pasikudah reef (live coral < 25%) and moderate
15
damages of Thennadi bay area reef with 50% live coral (Fairoz pers. comm.). Furthermore the
shallow fringing reef at Palchenai consists of live coral within a range of 5% on the shallower
inshore edge to 30% on the deeper outer edge. Moderate quantities of smothering by debris
and/or sediments have occurred, predominantly on the shallower, fringing reefs where
extensive beds of dead coral rubble were present (Meynell & Rust 2005).
Fish is the main source of protein for the people from eastern Sri Lanka, and fishing is the
main livelihood activity for 12 per cent of the people from the NEP (NESOHR 2006). Sri
Lanka’s fisheries resources are divided into three categories: (1) marine resources, (2) inland
resources and (3) brackish-water resources (Amarasinghe 2005). In Batticaloa District the
tsunami affected communities rely both on marine resources and brackish-water resources as
the district is right on the coast and the Batticaloa lagoon is covering large parts of the district
with only a short stretch of land separating it from the sea. Lagoon fishing is also important
throughout Sri Lanka including Batticaloa District where it provides a major source of
livelihood activity for many people.
Sri Lankan marine resources are divided into two sub-sectors: coastal fishery and offshore
and deep-sea fishery (Gupta & Sharma 2004). The marines sector accounts for 85 per cent of
the fisheries sector’s employment and about 98 000 people are directly engaged in fishing.
Many more are engaged in activities related to fishing, e.g. marketing. Prior to the last three
decades fishing was carried out using non-motorized crafts such as canoes and catamarans
(Rajasuriya et al. 1995). The actual fish catch in the sea was already by year 2000
approaching the estimated potential exploitable limit of around 90 000 tonnes. Deep-sea
fishing commenced in the late 1980s in Sri Lanka and fishing expanding to outside Sri
Lanka’s EEZ commenced in the early 1990s. Multi-day boats is the main fishing craft used
for deep-sea fishing, employing techniques such as large-meshed gill netting, long lining and
trolling. About 75 per cent of the Multi-day boat owners are of non-fishing background, thus
a remarkable entry of non-fishers into the Sri Lankan fisheries sector occurred with the
commencement of deep-sea fishing, which dramatically altered traditional patterns of labour
recruitment and employer-employee relations (Gupta & Sharma 2004). Fish workers
employed on Multi-day boats are vulnerable due to the dangers associated with deep-sea
fishing as well as absence of employment contracts between boat owners and fish workers,
thus lacking legal provisions on acceptable working conditions.
16
Following the onset of globalisation, commenced a significant growth of Sri Lanka’s
contemporary mechanised fishing fleet, with a six fold increase in the volume (from 3240
tonnes to 19,5666 tonnes) of fishery export during a five-year period between 1985-2000
(Gupta & Sharma 2004). The capitalistic nature of the mechanised fishing technology, formed
requirement for credit for fishers, in order for them to access new technology. Fishers
engaged in traditional fishing activities had the least access to credit amenities because formal
lending schemes favour asset-rich individuals.
2.5 Impacts on the sector
Between 90,000 to 100,000 active fishers lost their livelihoods in Sri Lanka due to the
tsunami (Amarasinghe 2005). About 103,000 fisher people were displaced and 16,500 fisher
houses where destroyed whereas 13,300 houses were damaged. Damages to the fishing
industry in Sri Lanka were immense with 76 percent of the fishing fleet affected, i.e. 53
percent destroyed and 23 percent was damaged. 10 of the 12 existing fishery harbours, 37
fishing anchorages and 200 fish landing centres were either destroyed or damaged.
Rehabilitation costs are estimated to be about USD 123.2 million. This involves repairs and
replacements of fishing crafts and equipment, restoration of harbours and anchorages, cold
storages and ice plants. A drop of 41% in fish production in 2005 is estimated due to the
effects of the tsunami (FAO 2005). Table 1 below shows the impacts on the fishing fleet in
Batticaloa District and nationally. The statistics from Batticaloa illustrates a focus on
replacing vessels that are used for near shore fishing and over-supply of canoes was present,
which occurred within the first half of 2005. Most FRP boats were yet to be replaced,
however replacements of these boats took place in December in Batticaloa District. As
illustrated in the total of pledged and replaced vessels, it is assumed that more vessels will
enter Batticaloa District after the tsunami than what was destroyed in the tsunami.
17
Table 1 Summary of destroyed, replaced craft and pledges, by craft type, in Batticaloa District as of
November 2005. (Reproduced from Creech 2006).
Batticaloa District Nationally Multi
Day One Day
FRP Trad. Beach Seine
Multi Day
One Day
FRP Trad. Beach Seine
Destroyed: 0 4 494 2,107 119 187 272 3,986 9,051 699 % of National Total
0% 1% 12% 23% 17%
Replaced: 0 0 97 2,141 57 0 20 324 6,486 147 % of National: Total
0% 0% 30% 33% 39%
Pledged: 0 5 495 356 57 175 373 1,938 2,678 297 % of National Total
0% 1% 26% 13% 19%
Final Total:
0 5 592 2,497 114 175 393 2,262 9,164 444
% of Destroyed
- 125% 120% 119% 96% 94% 144% 57% 101% 64%
2.6 Social structures
2.6.1 Fisher folk
People that engage in fishing in Sri Lanka do not consist of a homogenous group of people.
Fishing communities are stratified, both horizontally and vertically. Horizontal stratification
can be illustrated by type of fishing craft used, (such as ‘unmechanised traditional – lagoon’,
‘unmechanised traditional – marine’, traditional mechanised – marine’, mechanised outboard
motor (OBM’ referred to as FRP boat in this study, ‘mechanised one day boats with inboard
motors (IBM)’ and mechanised multi-day boats with IBM’.) Vertical stratification refers to
the categories the people attached to the fishery sector belong to. These include part- and full-
time fishermen and fisherwomen, part- and full-time fish workers, individual boat owners and
commercial boat owners (Creech 2005). The vertical stratification determines a person’s
status and is a contributing factor to differential vulnerability amongst the people belonging to
the various categories.
The political economy of fishing communities creates vulnerability amongst certain groups of
fishers. The fisheries sector is dominated by small groups of big boat owners and middlemen,
locally called mudalalies. Fish workers are the majority group within fisheries and usually
work for mudalalies for a small wage. The relationship between fish workers and mudalalies
18
is often one of dependency because fish workers depend on mudalalies for credit particularly
in times of low incomes, furthermore the mudalali mostly decides upon the sale of the harvest
(Shanmugaratnam 2005). Often the mudalali or middleman is the owner of the fishing vessel
and equipment and this exacerbates the fish workers’ asymmetric relationship with the
mudalali, resulting in livelihood insecurity.
Fisheries Cooperative Societies (FCS) is the community based institution ingrained in fishing
communities, with the purpose of representing the people engaged in the fisheries sector.
Each FCS has a nine-member Board of Directors which consists of six members. The studied
FCSs in Batticaloa District had committees which consisted of a President, Vice-President,
Treasurer, Chair person and in addition some other members. Traditionally the FCSs main
source of finance is the Government, and funds are channelled through the Ministry of
Fisheries (FAO 1984). Most FCSs, except those in the north of the country, are generally
weak CBOs. Office bearers of a typical FCS are usually older men, who are boat owners and
usually do not fish themselves but employ fish workers to use their boats and equipment.
There are several factors that may contribute to such organisation structure. The dominance of
men is a reflection of a fisheries sector where there are very few women engaged in fishing.
Some are engaged in lagoon fishing and post harvest processing of fish. Older individuals
have more status in the community, thus also easier become an office bearer (Creech 2005).
2.6.2 Sri Lanka’s administrative system- in retrospect
Sri Lanka has failed to develop the necessary links between economic policies and political
strategies in order to perform and accomplish development amongst it people (Nithiyanandam
2000). At Independence in 1948, Sri Lanka’s administrative system (established during the
British colonial period) was highly centralized. An important feature of this system was the
provincial/district administration which is known as the “Kacheri System” (District System).
A Government Agent (GA) was appointed as Government’s general representative in the
district and had at the time assigned for all governmental tasks within his area. This system
changed in 1992 with the ‘Transfer of Powers Act No. 58, which transferred responsibilities
to Assistant Government Agents at divisional level with the designation of “Divisional
Secretaries”. Accordingly the Divisional Secretariat became the administrative centre for
governmental policy implementations.
19
2.6.3 The role of the state in the tsunami aftermath and the structure of
coordination
The tsunami allowed for cross party mobilisation in its initial stages of the emergency relief
phase. The Government and LTTE further worked towards a shared mechanism for tsunami
relief and reconstruction in the NEP called P-TOMS, however this mechanism was rejected
by the Supreme Court. This rejection may have contributed to that key actors reverted back to
pursuing traditional competitive politics, thereby withdrawing the opportunity for cooperation
between the conflicting actors in Sri Lanka. There was opposition to the P-TOMS from
Nationalist political parties such as Janatha Vimukthi Perumuna (JVP) and Jathika Hela
Uruma (JHU) in the South, who campaigned against the enforcement of P-TOMS, thereby
challenging its legality in the Supreme Court (LankaWeb 2005).
Most of the information sharing and coordination occurred at district level by the District
Secretaries and the Divisional Secretaries as key actors. Four coordination bodies were
operating in the Batticaloa District, which were The Task Force for Rebuilding the Nation
(TAFREN), United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA),
the Consortium of Human Affairs (CHA) and Innayam. UN OCHA was in charge with the
coordination of INGOs. TAFREN was one of three task forces and was set up under a
Presidential directive after the tsunami, with a mandate to facilitate, enable, coordinate and
monitor the post-tsunami reconstruction efforts (RADA 2006). The other task forces were
TAFRER (Task Force for Rescue and Relief) and TAFLOL (Task Force for Logistics, Law
and Order). TAFREN was the operating task force in the recovery phase in the Batticaloa
District, and was supposed to coordinate the NGOs activities. The role of CHA was to
encourage and facilitate coordination between all parties involved. Innayam is a local
coordination body dealing with local NGOs. Formal district coordination meetings, sector
specific and cross sector meetings have taken place at the divisional and/or district level
(Amarasinghe 2005). Both the district and the divisional level used lead agencies to chair
meeting alongside providing technical support. In LTTE controlled areas, several entities are
involved in relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction such as the Tamil Rehabilitation
Organisation (TRO), the Planning and Development Secretariat (PDS) and INGOs and
NGOs. TRO played a significant role in both the relief and reconstruction phase in Batticaloa
District although this area is Government controlled. Figure 5 below shows the position the
various actors have in the rebuilding process after the tsunami.
20
Figure 5 Illustration of Actor’s positioning in the recovery process (Adapted from Amarasinghe 2005).
Coordinating committees disseminating district-level information on damages, relief and
reconstruction needs, existed at the district-level consisting of the district secretary, divisional
secretaries, representatives from the Department of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources
(DOFAR) and NGOs (Amarasinghe 2005). Village-level activities were planned at divisional-
level, whereby the divisional secretaries cooperated with the NGOs and CBOs. The smallest
administrative unit at the village-level was the Grama Niladhari (GN), however the smallest
unit in the fisheries administrative division consisted of the Fisheries Inspectors (FI) division.
The Ministry of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (MOFAR) established in January 2005 a
management scheme with the purpose of dealing with the needs of the fisheries sector after
the tsunami. The structure of this scheme is illustrated in Figure 6 below:
21
Figure 6 MFAR’s disaster management scheme (Amarasinghe 2005).
The Special Disaster Steering Committee consisted of officers who were assessing the
people’s needs after the tsunami in the various districts. The District Disaster Steering
Committee held meetings at the District Secretaries and discussed any current affairs and
made decisions regarding rebuilding of the fisheries sector. The Disaster Management Centres
were established at the FI division-level and consisted of the Fisheries Inspector,
Coordination officers, Fisheries Guards, representatives from fishing community
organisations and the GN.
Divisional Secretaries played a key role in the recovery process in the tsunami aftermath
because they were the contact and information point between the Government and aid
agencies (Haug pers. comm.) as well as entry point to the Government administration.
With the change of Government in November the old structure as described above was
replaced with three new structures; Ministry of Nation Building, Ministry of Resettlement and
Reconstruction and Development Agency (RADA). RADA was to replace TAFREN,
TAFOR, the Housing Reconstruction Unit (THRU), The Traditional Accommodation Project
(TAP) and the Rehabilitation of Persons, Properties and Industries Authority (REPPIA). Past
structures dealing with relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts have provided limited
coherency within their strategies as responsibilities in regards to conflict-related issues was
scattered among the various structures. RADA and the Ministry of Nation Building are
dealing with both tsunami- and conflict-related issues, thus there might be a better insurance
of equal treatment of tsunami and conflict affected communities (CPA 2006).
RADAs role is rather unclear due to secrecy in surrounding the creation of this authority,
however it is meant to function as the single Government focal point responsible for all
22
activities regarding reconstruction and development after any disaster, it be natural- or
conflict- related (CPA 2006). The present structure of RADA is illustrated in Figure 7 below,
which shows that a link between RADA and LTTE is absent.
Figure 7 Present structure of RADA (source: CPA 2006).
2.6.4 Aid delivery actors
Due to the unprecedented scale of the tsunami a myriad of actors entered Sri Lanka in order to
assist in recovery of the affected people. There were already some INGOs present in
Batticaloa District prior to the tsunami and while some of them continued working with war
affected victims, most converted to efforts targeting tsunami victims in the tsunami aftermath.
Some INGOs cooperated with local NGOs or CBOs, whereas others carried out their work
without such collaborations. The level of knowledge of the local context and experience with
reconstruction work varied greatly among the aid agencies working in Batticaloa,
consequently affecting the quality of the recovery.
The immediate relief phase proceeded with vast distributions of aid, both from within Sri
Lanka and abroad, and consisted mostly of food, clothes, various household-items and debris
clearing. This aid was given and carried out by individuals and various organisations and
institutions from non-affected areas of Sri Lanka as well as from abroad. Non-food items have
been distributed with religious institutions such as temples, churches and mosques playing the
leading roles. Amarasinghe (2005) notes that no complaints have been made in the immediate
relief phase which indicates a successful distribution of relief aid.
23
2.7 Land issues
The ethnic conflict has impacted significantly upon land and housing in Sri Lanka,
particularly in the multi-ethnic East. Over 800,000 people, whereby 78 per cent Tamils, 13
per cent Muslims and 8 per cent Sinhalese have been displaced in the North and East due to
the war. Key obstacles both due to the war and the tsunami are loss or destruction of property
documents such as deeds or land permits. Property rights to land are volatile and politicised in
Sri Lanka and justification for land claims used by the various parties is often mirrored on
communal disputes at meso- and micro-level (Korf 2003).
The Tsunami Housing Reconstruction Unit (THRU) was established to deal with housing
needs after the tsunami. The people who lost their houses or lived within the buffer zone will
receive houses built on small plots donated by the state. Housing loans are given to people
that lived outside the buffer zone, whereby they can repair their damaged houses.
Reconstruction of houses for people who lived within the buffer zone prior to the tsunami is
funded by NGOs, INGOs and the private sector. Damaged or destroyed houses outside the
buffer zone are funded by World Bank, Asian Development Bank and others.
Construction of houses within the buffer zone is illegal and land will be identifies and
allocated nearby the affected village, but outside the buffer zone.
24
25
3.0 Methodology
3.1 Study sites
The research was conducted in Batticaloa District in eastern Sri Lanka (Figure 3), which is a
government controlled area that has been heavily affected by the tsunami and is also suffering
from the effects of twenty years of continuing civil war. As the two largest populations in the
east are of Tamil and Muslim origin, one village predominantly populated by of each of these
ethnic groups was chosen as study sites.
The Batticaloa District has a population of approximately 545,480 people, and the highest
population density is at Kattankudy DS Division. The major portion of the population is
engaged in agriculture (paddy cultivation) whereas fishing is the second largest economic
sector. A total of 255,000 persons from Batticaloa District were affected in the tsunami,
whereby 3,177 lost their lives. The estimated monetary losses in the district are approximately
Rs. 10,472.5, whereby Rs.722.7 stems from the fisheries sector. 5,376 houses were partially
damaged whereas 12,232 were fully damaged (Recoverlanka 2005).
The studied fishing villages are in Kattankudy DS Division (Kattankudy north) and in
Malmunai North DS Division (Palameenmadu). Both villages were adversely affected by the
tsunami and people’s assets base for livelihood generation was severely damaged. The two
communities were located in the cleared area (Government controlled) within a range of 20
km to Batticaloa town. Kattankuddy, which is the Muslim village, was considerably larger in
terms of population size compared to the Tamil village Palameenmadu. Palameenmadu is
located in close proximity to both the sea and the Batticaloa lagoon, however the interviewed
fishers from the village were mainly sea fishers and only carried out lagoon fishing in the off
season. The interviewed fishers from Kattankudy were all sea fishers. The majority of the
interviewed households in both villages consisted of people that had lived there since birth,
however a large number of the respondents had at least been displaced once before, as a
consequence of the war. Almost all had been displaced more than once after the tsunami and
all the respondents from the Tamil village were still displaced, living in a temporary shelter
camp. They had been allocated new land near an area named Kokkuvil (Figure 8), which was
further away from the sea than were they used to live before the tsunami. Figure 8 below
shows the location of Palameenmadu and Kattankudy. It also identifies the location of
26
Thiraimadu temporary shelter camps, whereby all the interviewed households from
Palameenmadu resided.
Figure 8 Map and satellite image showing the study sites in Batticaloa District. Temporary shelter camp
and proposed land for traditional Palameenmadu residents (Source: Mearch.org 2005 & Google Earth
accessed 17 May 2006).
The respondents from the Muslim village consisted of people mostly from outside the buffer
zone. Thus many of these people had either moved back to their previous homes, or were
living in a temporary shelter camp but waiting to return as soon as the rebuilding was
completed. Displaced people from different communities inhabited the temporary shelter
camp in Kattankudy, as a result of the war. The temporary shelter camp wherein the
Palameenmadu residents lived was built after the tsunami and was occupied by people who
lost their homes in the tsunami.
The Tamil village consisted of 380 families whereas the number of people in the studied
section of the Muslim village is unknown but likely much higher. Only a small fraction of the
northern section of this village was studied, however the whole village consisted of
approximately 80 000 people.
27
3.2 Methods of Data Collection
This study examined processes of fisheries production and livelihood revival among fishing
communities, as well as aid delivery systems performance in the fisheries sector. Primary and
secondary data have been collected and the methodology consisted of mainly qualitative
research methods. The qualitative strategy included interviews on attitudes and perceptions of
local people and various other actors involved in the reconstruction process.
3.3 Sampling Design and Procedure
The type of sampling was of a non-probability character. Convenience sampling of snowball
character was employed as the people interviewed were the ones most readily available, for
example in temporary shelter camps or at fish landing sites (Bryman 2004). By utilising such
a strategy, additional contacts were established that were of relevance to the research, in this
way a broader and larger sample for interviews was created. The same procedure was used
when interviewing various other actors involved in the recovery process.
A representative sample of people with regard to gender, age and ethnicity was an intended
goal. As fishers’ are usually men, it was seen as important to also gain women’s perceptions.
Some wives of fishers were therefore interviewed, however none of these women were
actively engaged in fishing but stayed at home caring for their children.
The interview questions were based on Adgers’ (2003) key indicators (property rights, access
to resources, institutional change, demographic change and economic structure), with
particular emphasis on property rights, access to resources and institutional change. Interview
questions for households involved their fishing practices before and after the tsunami, type of
fishing they engaged in, equipment replacement after the tsunami, perceptions on recovery
process and the buffer zone policy.
Some of the data gathered on the fishers was interpreted statistically using Excel and the
statistical program Minitab.
28
3.4 Primary data
50 households were interviewed, 25 in each of the two villages. Several interviews were
conducted with representatives from NGOs, INGOs, Government officials, Coordination
bodies, Grama Sevaka (village leader appointed by the Government) and middlemen.
Qualitative research approaches with semi-structured to unstructured interviews was
incorporated. Two types of open-ended questionnaires were used, one for fishers and another
for organizations, Government officials and other relevant actors. By using open-ended
questions the respondent is less restricted and may provide new and unexpected responses
(Bryman 2004). Observation was an integral element of the data collection as the holistic
picture was best explored with such strategy. Observations were important also while
conducting interviews, as body language helps to reveal peoples feelings about an issue
(Denzin & Lincoln 2003), especially in such a tense political situation.
The selection of NGOs interviewed in this study was partly based upon their role and
importance in the recovery of the fisheries sector, and partly their willingness to be
interviewed. Some group interviews were conducted both of fishers and committee members
of FCSs, whereby the interviewees participated in creating a Venn-diagram where they ranked
the village’s relationship with various actors involved in the relief and reconstruction after the
tsunami (Mikkelsen 2005). Furthermore the interviewees participated in making a resource
map of the village where they identified settlement patterns and who and where boat-owners,
canoe-owners, net-owners and fish workers lived. It was useful with such identification as
these patterns could be measured against the information from household interviewees, thus
fill in potential gaps. The District Secretaries in both Kattankudy and Batticaloa were looked
upon as key informants, however as noted in the limitation section under heading 3.8 below,
neither could be interviewed.
3.5 Secondary data
Literature that provided information relevant to the objectives was sought. Books, journals,
“grey” literature which included documents from Ministries, Governmental organizations,
NGOs, INGOs and coordination bodies; Consortium for Humanitarian Agencies (CPA), UN
OCHA, Tamilnet, FAO and internet-based articles relevant for the study.
29
3.6 Data analysis
In the analysis of the qualitative data, the data was categorised and when possible quantified,
which Bryman (2004) notes is one of the basic steps in the analysis of qualitative data. Data
from group discussions were utilised for cross-checking and supplementing household data.
A contingency table was created in determining the proportion of the shift in employment
structure from being self-employment before the tsunami to becoming waged labourer after
the tsunami. The probability of members of FCSs receiving assistance and non-members
receiving assistance was calculated by creating a contingency table. Furthermore, by help of
the statistical program Minitab, some paired t-tests were carried out in relation to income,
employment, time spent fishing and fish catch. The p-value used was: P<0.05.
3.7 Limitations to study
The relatively short time spent in the field affected the study in terms of limiting the number
of interviews carried out. An interpreter was utilised, which had the potential of distorting
responses. Familiarizing the interpreter with the research topic prior to the interviews as well
as agreeing upon interview procedures prior to conducting the interviews were important
procedures that prevented any misunderstandings (Bryman 2004).
The civil conflict in Sri Lanka put some limitations to the study. Both selected villages were
unsafe to travel in at times throughout the field work. Particularly Kattankudy caused
difficulty due to several armed attacks on civilians whilst in the field. This was the reality
particularly after the Presidential election on the 17th of November 2005. The District
Secretaries (DS) in both Kattankudy and Batticaloa were essential in the post-tsunami
recovery process, hence interviewing them was considered central for this study. However
this was not a possible task. The DS from Kattankudy became a victim for the conflict that is
occurring in Sri Lanka and was assassinated while this field work was conducted. The DS
from Batticaloa could not be reached even after several attempts.
The data collected on fish productivity was limited. Although questions targeted fish catch,
composition and size, little information was provided on these issues as the fishers were more
interested in conveying the obstacles in the aid delivery process.
30
31
4. 0 Results
4.1 Fish productivity
4.1.1 Species composition and regeneration
Fishers in both sites revealed that fish catch consisted of the same species after the tsunami as
was normal before. When they caught different species than before, they believed this was a
result of using different nets after the tsunami. Most fishers said there was no difference in
fish size, however a few had noticed a decline in fish size in the lagoon.
4.2 The fisheries sector
The household interviews revealed that fishers catch significantly less fish per day after the
tsunami (Table 2). Several reasons for this were given, which most had foundation in people’s
coping with increased vulnerability after the tsunami. Firstly; the fishers lacked the
appropriate equipment. Secondly; the fishers still feared the sea, and hence carried out fishing
for a shorter time than before the tsunami and thirdly; some remained in the temporary shelter
camp pending in case of aid agencies entering to distribute assistance. The damage to coral
reefs close to shore is an indicator for such significant decline in fish resources caught by
fishers after the tsunami.
The interviews revealed a significant decline in fishing hours spent after the tsunami
compared to before (Table 2). Besides the fear of the sea, interviewees expressed an
escalating fear of being attacked by soldiers, when travelling to the seashore. The
consequence of the latter was that most fishers did not fish at night anymore as they used to
before the tsunami. Some interviewees mentioned uncertainty of the new vessel’s and
engine’s quality as reasons to stay in the sea for a shorter period than before. Interviews
revealed that most fishers’ travelled a lot further out at sea now compared to before the
tsunami: the reasons they gave for this was the death of the coral reef, with the consequence
of less fish being found close to shore.
Interviews revealed that income after the tsunami had decreased significantly and the prices
for fish have risen slightly after the tsunami (Table 2).
32
Interviews of government officials revealed plans of more focus on a shift towards deep-sea
fishing and improved technology in the fisheries sector. Interviews revealed that the FCS
from Kattankudy is hiring divers from Trincomalee to train local fishers to use scuba
equipment to catch fish in the tsunami aftermath. The motivation behind such activity was
possibilities of increased income generation amongst fishers who learned the technique.
Table 2 Average fish catch, time spent fishing, fishing income, fish catch per effort and average price of
fish per kg. before and after the tsunami.
Pre-tsunami Post-tsunami P-value<0.05 Fish catch (kg/day) 71 34 0.018 Time spent fishing (hrs/day) 11 6 0.000 Fishing income (Rs./day) 402 204 0.000
Fish catch per unit effort (kg/hr) 6.5 5.6
Average price of fish per kg. (Rs) 5.7 6.0
4. 2.1 Livelihood revival
Income sources and alternatives
Fishing was, particularly before but also after the tsunami, the main source of income for
most of the interviewed households in both Palameenmadu and Kattankudy. After the tsunami
83% from Palameenmadu and 67% from Kattankudy perceived fishing as their main income
source. Before the tsunami fishing was the most important source of income for all
respondents. Relief in form of tsunami stamps, food stamps and instalments of Rs. 5000 were
still important for most households, although most of these were about to end.
NGOs had provided employment for few of the interviewed households (less than 1%) after
the tsunami which consisted of cash for work programs. Other alternative income activities
were created by the villagers themselves, based on a growing demand for labourers to work in
the construction industry after the tsunami. Carpentry and masonry were the activities carried
out as alternatives to fishing, and a moderate number of individuals from the households were
involved in such activities (20%). Only 18% of the village residents interviewed had more
than one source of income within the family. Most women were housewives both before and
after the tsunami, however most of those who generated income before the tsunami had not
been able to conduct these activities in the aftermath in the absence of a place to do so.
33
Interviewees responded that income is generally highest between March and April as this is
peak season for sea fishing. The low season, which is between October and December, is a
time with low incomes and many fishers then fish in the sheltered lagoon despite low catches
there.
Access to resources
The interviewed households were in a transitional phase between being dependent upon
emergency relief and reconstructing their livelihoods because most relief aid, such as tsunami
stamps and other foods and clothes had come to an end. They did not have land or a house to
live in, but were still living in temporary shelters distant from the sea. Thus it was difficult for
them to carry out livelihood activities due to increased distance and travel impediments, such
as limited means of transport and check points along the road by the Sri Lankan Army and
possible attacks.
Fishers revealed that the livelihood recovery in the fisheries sector was far from complete and
none of the interviewed households had received full replacement of their lost fishing
equipment (Table 3). Most fishers had received some assistance, however most interviewees
noted that it was not sufficient for them to be fully recovered in terms of income generation.
Interviews revealed that households had experienced a significant reduction in income after
the tsunami (Table 2). Livelihood recovery varied greatly amongst people in the villages,
however not significantly between the two sites. People who owned canoes and boats before
the tsunami were closer to recovery (29 %) than fishers who only owned nets before the
tsunami (1 %). Another major impediment for recovery in Kattankudy was that no agency had
yet rebuilt any of the 56 cottages that were destroyed in the tsunami. The cottages were
central in order to store fishing equipment. Interviewed fishers emphasised that NGOs should
visit the most affected people and ask them what their real needs are, as such procedures were
essentially absent.
Table 3 Fishing equipment replaced after the tsunami
Fisher who before the tsunami was:
Number of individuals that owned such equipment before the tsunami
% of individuals that lost their equipment in the tsunami
% of individuals receiving some replacement after the tsunami
Canoe owner 25 96 29 Boat owner 17 100 29 Net owner 9 100 1
34
Members of Fishing Cooperative Societies (FCS) had a much greater probability of receiving
assistance than fishers that were not members of a FCS (Table 4). There were some villagers
that not were members of the FCS for various reasons, and the membership fee was seen as
the main reason. Others were not members because they held a membership in a different
FCS in the village they used to live in at earlier stages of their lives. Part-time fishers were not
perceived as ‘real’ fishers by the committee members of the FCSs, and were not included on
beneficiary lists. Observations of NGOs’ aid-delivery pattern revealed that full-time fishers
were in focus and part-time fishers that were not members of FCSs did not receive fishing
nets.
Table 4 Membership in FCSs affecting aid assistance
Assistance Membership status
Received Not received
Proportion receiving
assistance (%)
Members of FCS
Non-members of FCS
21
1
17
9
50
10
Interviews revealed that 48% of pre-tsunami self-employed fishers have changed their
employment status to carrying out waged employment after the tsunami. The income amongst
these people decreased significantly after the tsunami (53%). This indicates that such shift in
employment structure had significant effects on the income generation amongst those that
after the tsunami changed to waged employment. Some of the households affected by this
shift compensated their decreased incomes by diversifying into work not related to fishing,
such as carpentry, masonry or labour work for NGOs (30% of interviewed households). Such
response was particularly fruitful in the tsunami aftermath due to the large labour demand as a
result of relief and reconstruction activities implemented by NGOs. The fishers recognised
lack of fishing equipment as the reason for the shift in employment structure. Batticaloa
District received a surplus of fishing vessels as illustrated in Table 1 of this paper, however
the interviewed fishers revealed they have not received replacements of lost vessels. This
illustrates a discrepancy between gear distributed and affected people receiving replacement
of lost equipment.
35
Relocation
The interviews revealed a significant difference in house and land ownership amongst the
households in the two villages. 82 % of the households from Kattankudy had deed (freehold)
on their land/house before the tsunami whereas 18 % had permit before the tsunami. None of
these mentioned any losses of documents. None of the Kattankudy households said that they
only had customary land titles before the tsunami. None of the interviewed households from
Palameenmadu had deeds to their house/land but 35 % had permits. 65 % of the interviewees
revealed that they had customary ownership of their house/land, thus had no documents to
prove this in the tsunami aftermath.
92% of the interviewed households from Palameenmadu and 44% from Kattankudy had been
relocated between two and four times after the tsunami. 52% of the households from
Palameenmadu and 40% from Kattankudy had experienced displacement in 1990 due to the
civil war. For some this incident was relocation to either Palameenmadu or Kattankudy,
which is where they have lived until now. The interviewees said it was worse being displaced
after the tsunami because they did not have a home to return to. 20% of the households from
Palameenmadu revealed that they did not want to move as close to the sea as they lived before
due to fear of a new tsunami however they still wanted to live closer than what was suggested
by the Government. Land was suggested for the Palameenmadu residents, however strong
resistance was felt by these people because they did not want to live in the identified plot due
to reasons such as distance to sea and lack of closeness to the neighbouring village.
Restitution
All interviewees that lived beyond 200m of the mean high tide mark, and had more than 40%
damaged houses due to the tsunami, were supposed to receive compensation of Rs 250 000
from the government to rebuild on their own land. All the interviewed households from
Palameenmadu lived within the 200 meter buffer zone before the tsunami and they had all
been relocated to refugee camps or friends/relatives within the initial weeks and months after
the tsunami. After six months they were relocated again to a temporary shelter camp, where
they all still were living. 28% of the households had been told by the government or a NGO
that they would receive a permanent house but nobody knew the location. The remaining
residents interviewed had not received any information on where their future homes would be.
Only 2% of households from Kattankudy lived within the buffer zone before the tsunami.
36
While our research took place, the government decided to decrease the width of the buffer
zone from 200m to 80m in Kattankudy, hence only 1 household then was within that zone.
64% of the households that lived beyond 200 metres before the tsunami had received at least
one instalment of Rs 50 000 from the Sri Lankan Government. In addition UN Habitat gave
grants to people with fully damaged houses and 12% from Kattankudy had received this.
Thiraimadu temporary shelter camp, which was the biggest in Batticaloa District and where
the victims from Palameenmadu relocated to, was in an area covered in trees prior to the
tsunami. One NGO recognized in the aftermath that they cut down far too many trees and
now there is hardly any shade around any of the shelters. The same respondent said that due
to limited planning, the camp is located in a very flood prone area. Household interviews
revealed fear amongst the residents about having to move again during the wet season from
November-December.
4.2.2 Aid delivery
Interviewees ranked the organisations both present in the relief phase and still remaining there
as the ones with the strongest relationship to the village people. The actors present at the relief
phase were mainly local NGOs, CBOs, mudalalies and the Sri Lankan Army. They ranked the
organisations involved in reconstruction lower in terms of strength of relationship and these
mainly consisted of INGOs. The organisations involved in livelihood reconstruction were
ranked highest in terms of significance of help due to the amount of money they provided
when replacing physical assets. A majority of the interviewed households perceived INGOs
as the most important actors in the recovery process. Such perception was mostly due to the
financial resources of the INGOs but also because they perceived the Sri Lankan Government
as ineffective with much talk and promises, however executing little action.
The interviewed households were satisfied with the relief phase, however felt the assistance in
order to improve income generation remained poor. They claimed that NGOs were not
reaching the most affected people and the Government provided little help for improving their
livelihoods. Interviews of households further revealed that they had registered to many NGOs
and filled in many forms on what they needed, however the NGOs had never got back to
them.
37
85% of respondents from Palameenmadu and 93% from Kattankudy said the assistance is not
reaching the most affected people. 64% of the interviewed households in Palameenmadu and
28% in Kattankudy recognised that too many fishing vessels are distributed overall. They
commented that the main problem was that people not affected in the tsunami are receiving
this assistance through influence. Interviews revealed that fishers have the perception that
influential individuals in society such as Government officials and committee members of
FCSs and Village Reconstruction Committees (VRC) accept bribes to include people on
beneficiary lists.
Interviewed NGOs and government officials responded that the aid delivered to the coastal
communities was in the form of equipment, which the residents had used before to carry out
fishing. Canoes, FRP boats and nets are the main assets distributed. Interviews of several aid
agencies revealed a concern that people are expecting more aid than what they have lost in the
tsunami and that people are dishonest about what they have acquired of assistance. Interviews
of fishers revealed that the oversupply of fishing crafts as a result of the aid delivery has
resulted in an influx of new entrants to the fisheries sector. Figure 9 below illustrates the
oversupply of crafts, whereby this house had three canoes not ready for use as they are not
rigged.
Figure 9 A typical fisher’s house with apparently unused canoes.
Many INGOs distributed fishing assets on a purely grant basis, which was how all canoes
were delivered. Save the children (GB), Sewa Lanka and Oxfam (Australia) were distributing
assets through a loan and credit scheme. They revealed this was due to the unfortunate
38
consequences they had seen as a result of giving assets as grants, such as tradable gear being
resold. The INGO responsible for most of the canoe district, however interviews of other
INGOs revealed that many NGOs give grants rather than loans because they are there only for
a short period of time. Oxfam GB had switched from Loan schemes which were their
common procedure, to give grants in the tsunami aftermath. The rationale for giving grants
was Interviewed fishers on the other hand, revealed that the reasons why people sold the gear
they had received was because it was either wrong type, not enough to be useful or of poor
quality. The fishing crafts were too thin which made them unsuitable in rough sea, as they
sometimes fractured. Interviews revealed that repairs of fishing crafts were good with the
exception of some repairs done by the Sri Lankan state owned company CEYNOR, whereby
boats remained unfinished. The majority of fishers were not satisfied with the types of nets
distributed, as they said the net-type and size they received after the tsunami, did not coincide
with what they previously used for fishing (Table 5). The Committee members of the FCSs in
both villages declared that a whole mixture of nets had been distributed. Sea-fishers have
received lagoon nets and vice versa. Interviews revealed further that Save the Children (GB)
would provide 3 types of nets (1, 3.5 and 4.5 Inches) but these would comprise of only 5
pieces instead of the 20 pieces required for it to be functional. The fishers said that many of
them re-sold incomplete nets because they could not afford to buy the remaining pieces
required to carry out fishing.
Table 5 Types of fishing nets used for sea fishing before the tsunami
Net type Mesh size (inch) Type of craft Type of fish (local
name)
Fishing location
Maya net 5 ½ inch FRP boat talapati, kopera, bahlea, klavale, katta, suran
Deep sea
Kiri net 1 inch Canoe kiri, shila, sale Far out in sea, but surface area
Thrakka net 18 inch FRP boat thrakka Deep sea
Mural net ¾ inch Canoe murali, sugatea, small para
Canoe
Fishers blamed local net shop owners for the poor and unsatisfactory delivery of nets. The
fishers targeted different species according to available boats and nets as a result of the
deficiency of equipments after the tsunami.
39
Oxfam (Australia) provided loans, 50% as grant and 50% which had to be repaid to the local
organisation in order to buy nets and other fishing gears. The interviews of INGOs revealed
that few were cooperating with local NGOs. Only Oxfam (Australia) deliberately did all their
implementations in cooperation with a local CBO (TCDO), and this is probably because
Oxfam (Australia) had worked in the district for many years.
Interviews of various INGOs and Government officials revealed tension between the two, and
this was reinforced by personal observations in meetings. INGOs said the Government was
the sole reason for the slow house reconstruction. The Government officials accused INGOs
for following their own guidelines without cooperating with the Government. Interviewing
TAFREN revealed that the Government wanted INGOs to build more multi-day boats as well
as replacing lost FRP boats. The INGOs focused on canoe and FRP boat deliveries.
Coordination/Information flow
The interviewees were asked whether they perceived the cooperation and communication
between the villagers and the humanitarian agencies as satisfactory in the tsunami aftermath,
however the response was predominantly negative.
Interviews of both Government officials, UN OCHA and NGOs revealed that coordination
was particularly poor during the first 6-8 months, but slowly improved as more emphasis was
placed upon the importance of coordination by the Sri Lankan Government, the coordination
bodies operating in the Batticaloa District as well as some NGOs. Actors involved in the
livelihood sector revealed that coordination was still poor, particularly due to the large
amount of damaged assets within fisheries and the myriad of actors engaged in asset
replacements. There were coordination and livelihood meetings every week, however lack of
attendance by major actors were repeatedly observed. Interviews revealed that local
Government had the mandate to chair these meetings, however this did not occur and instead
an INGO fulfilled this task. INGOs claimed that the reason why Government officials do not
carry out their tasks properly is because they expect INGOs to do the job as they have more
resources.
Interviews and observations in coordination meetings revealed that due to rigidity within
coordination created frustration among NGOs. In the first 8 months after the tsunami they had
40
to fill out many forms in order to inform the Government on what their plans were, as well as
having the purpose of sharing information among the various actors. This system was
inefficient and time consuming, however eventually GA requested UN OCHA to collect all
the information in regards to the various actors plans and responsibilities, which consequently
improved coordination.
Together with the Department of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (DFAR), Fishing
Cooperative Societies (FCS) played a significant role in the selections of beneficiaries, and
channelling of fishing assets delivered by NGOs. The interviews of NGOs and government
institutions revealed that targeting and selecting beneficiaries was the greatest challenge in the
rebuilding process. To overcome this hurdle, they created village committees that were given
the task of verifying beneficiary lists and, if necessary, change them and select new
beneficiaries. Interviews of NGOs revealed that TAFREN was not very useful for them in
coordinating and providing information, at least not in the early stages of the reconstruction
efforts. TAFREN on the other hand claimed that INGOs carried out their work without
consulting the Government, thus often went against policy regulations i.e. distributing too
many canoes and boats, consequently resulting in further depletion of strained resources. The
consultation of the people had been through the committee members of the FCSs, VRCs or
the committee the NGO itself had created on an ad-hoc basis. The selection of new village
committees occurred in a manner where fishers informally at a meeting suggested others to
become members. Own observations were that older men that also were committee members
of the FCS, including both the President and the Treasurer, were selected as members in the
new committee introduced by the NGO. Two NGOs had plans to start training newly founded
village committees such as the Village Reconstruction Committees (VRC), rather than
training already existing local-level institutions.
In the early stages of equipment distributions, CORDAID took responsibility of replacing all
the lost canoes in the district. The Department of Fisheries lacked the necessary information
and capacity to produce beneficiary lists for the agencies ready to distribute fishing
equipment, thus they handed the responsibility of it over to the FCSs. About eight months
after Save the Children (GB) committed to replace all the FRP boats, nets and engines in the
district. They signed an agreement with the Department of Fisheries and based their work on
the data provided by them. They created a village committee which was to finalize the
beneficiaries list provided by the government.
41
Households from Palameenmadu that, prior to the tsunami lived within 100 and 200 meter of
the mean high tide mark, emphasised frustration regarding the lack of formal instructions
from the Government in order for the DS to approve that the width of the buffer zone would
decrease in their region. The DS had told them that such policy change would most likely
happen, however at a meeting he revealed that he had to wait for approval from the national
level. Interviews of NGOs also revealed frustration amongst some of them due to the lack of
information flowing downward in the system in regards to policy changes on the buffer zone
issue.
LTTE’s direct role in the tsunami recovery process was difficult to detect, however through
agencies like TRO they were visible. LTTE was also present particularly in Palameenmadu as
this village had fairly strong attachments to TRO, thus indirectly to LTTE. The residents of
Palameenmadu were not eager to speak of LTTE but highlighted their importance in the relief
phase. These respondents recognised the difficulty they had with confrontations of the Sri
Lankan Army (SLA), which often carried out round-ups where they checked identity cards
and sometimes did house searches.
One INGO revealed that the affected people in Southern Sri Lanka appeared to be more
traumatised by the tsunami than the people in the East.
42
43
5.0 Discussion
5.1 Vulnerability context
Wisner et al. (2003) notes that a natural hazard may act as a trigger for a wider disaster that
follows. The scale of the disaster caused by the tsunami was magnified due to the
vulnerability context of the social and ecological systems that characterised the coastal areas
of eastern Sri Lanka.
Access to assets and activities (e.g. fish resources as well as the right and ability to fish) is
influenced by unsafe conditions such as the local economy, social relations, and public action
and institutions. The dynamic pressures impact upon both the unsafe conditions and resource
access, thus determine the vulnerability and risks to which fishers are exposed. These factors
are interrelated with root causes and act as determinants in the progression of vulnerability.
Restricted access to resources illustrates how variation in access, whether it be to physical or
social assets, and the context of it, e.g. the enforcement of government policies on land
access, has significance for potential loss and rate of recovery (Wisner et al. 2003). Resources
include a variety of material and non-material assets: fishing communities; fishing equipment,
labour power, specialist knowledge and skills and land are important resources for the fishing
communities to carry out livelihood activities. Non-material resources are found to be
fundamental particularly in the recovery process as they partly determine access to material
assets. Access to such resources partly characterises a household’s socio-economic location,
which determines how well it can adapt to external stresses (Shanmugaratnam 2006).
Protracted war between the Sri Lankan Government and LTTE has weakened the local
governments in eastern Sri Lanka. The Batticaloa District embraces double-disaster effect
with the recently sudden-onset tsunami, in addition to the slow-onset civil conflict, whereby
the latter has unfolded over a period of over twenty years. Political fragmentation alongside
intra-elite rivalry has resulted in politicisation of ethnicity, strategic coalitions as well as
political corruption and patronage. In the tsunami aftermath the occurrence of P-TOMS is a
prime example of the failure of employing the opportunity of reconciliation to good purpose
which, as discussed in the background section under heading 2.3, arose from the tsunami, and
illustrates the difficulty for conflict resolution between the Sri Lankan Government and LTTE
(Shanmugaratnam 2005).
44
Vertical accountability relations between the Government and citizens are lacking, thus
eroding the resilience of minority ethnic groups (Stokke 2005). The war has put great
restrictions on people’s livelihoods, which was obvious in the aftermath, by all the regulations
and roundups of Tamils by the Sri Lankan Army (SLA). Furthermore, the escalating attacks
along the roads have disabled fishers to fish at night when catches are higher. Such situation
has resulted in a tense relationship between the authorities and the residents, and the myriad
of SLA soldiers in Batticaloa District in the tsunami aftermath would only exacerbate this
overwrought situation. Such tension could weaken the trust between the people and the state,
which is essential for potential improvement measures in society to be effective (Wisner et al.
2003). The results indicate that the community members perceived the INGOs as more
important than the Government in the recovery process, something that suggests a feeling of
distrust amongst the people to the Government. This was particularly apparent in
Palameenmadu, which might be a consequence of the war and the restrictions it has placed
upon Tamils. The tsunami could have provided an opportunity for peace talks, but instead the
combating parts have become even more polarised.
It seems reasonable to suggest that the war affected communities are more vulnerable to the
disastrous affects of the tsunami than the ones not affected by war as they already have an
impaired social system in place. On the contrary, the experiences that the war affected people
possess in regards to shocks and stresses due to the protracted war, might increase their
resilience to cope with new shocks. Interviews of NGOs revealed that tsunami victims in
southern parts of Sri Lanka appeared to be more severely traumatised by the tsunami event.
Although being poor and subject to varying levels of vulnerability, the people in the south has
not been exposed to such a continual state of stress as people in the North and East have
experienced due to war. Based on such discussion one can argue that in general, despite being
more vulnerable for instance in terms of less access to resources, war affected victims may
possess certain resilience, particularly in psychological terms, to cope with a disaster such as
the tsunami.
Property rights
‘Resource rights’ refers to a right to carry out particular action with regards to resources, for
instance right to access and manage the resource, right to extract the resource, and to transfer
45
ownership (Brown et al. 2006). Many people that lived along the coast only had customary
rights to their land and acquiring legal land title had become increasingly difficult. This had
detrimental impacts on the affected people as claiming back their land or receiving
compensation became difficult for this reason.
Clarity over resource ownership is essential in order to achieve effective reconstruction of
regions affected by disasters. Title to land is one major obstacle in the return and
rehabilitation of relocated people in Batticaloa District. In order to claim compensation for
damaged or destroyed house, the beneficiaries need legal title to the land on which the house
was standing. NGOs do not grant reconstruction assistance unless the beneficiary can prove
that they possess a land title. These conditions made the Palameenmadu respondents
particularly vulnerable because very few had land titles. It is estimated that 90 per cent of the
people who lost their houses in the tsunami also lost their legal and property documentation,
and hence were left without tangible proof of their informal land ownership (Brown et al.
2006). Identifying rightful beneficiaries hence becomes difficult, thus complicating the
reconstruction process further.
Land issues create difficulties for both tsunami and conflict IDPs. Under the Land
Development Ordinance (LDO) people who abandoned their land will lose the permit,
regardless if the abandonment was of free will or because the conflict forced them to do so.
The people that were relocated during the 1990 communal riots lost the permits on the land
they occupied then because their land was ‘abandoned’. The houses they built on state land
were destroyed in the tsunami and the authorities’ cancellation of the permits on their original
home land illustrates insensitivity towards the vulnerability of the displaced people (Robinson
pers. comm.). The people displaced to Palameenmadu due to the conflict have after the
tsunami for the second time lost their land title due to the buffer zone policy. The 1981 Coast
Conservation Act, which prohibits construction within 200 metres of the mean high tide mark,
was latent before the tsunami, however the tsunami was the trigger needed for the
Government to enforce it, resulting in much uncertainty and delays of reconstructions as well
as depriving thousands of tsunami-displaced people in returning to and rebuilding their
original homes. The difficult conditions of displacement due to the buffer zone, exacerbates
the human insecurity among the people (Shanmugaratnam 2005).
46
This unclear picture regarding land-tenure has created delays in the reconstruction process.
Such delays increase the cost of the reconstruction as well as increases the tsunami’s
“disaster” potential because the victims’ means of livelihoods are placed on hold while
waiting for a place to resettle, with the result of deprived incomes. Additionally, secure tenure
rights could accelerate livelihood recovery as it provides collateral, which increases
borrowing capabilities (Brown et al. 2006).
5.1.1 Dynamic Pressures
Interviews and reviewed literature indicated that fish resources were and are over-exploited
along the east-coast of Sri Lanka and despite of limited detailed evidence, research and catch
patterns identify a likeliness of depletion of the area’s fish resources (WorldFish Center 2005,
Sharma 1999). FAO (2006) identifies that production in coastal fisheries has levelled off
during recent years, whilst the numbers of fishers depending on the resource has increased
concurrently. The high population pressure, particularly in Kattankudy accelerates this trend.
The tsunami affected the fish stock near-shore by the damage it made on coral reefs. Fish
feeding on the fringing reefs close to shore have moved further off shore according to the
interviewed fishers. As identified under heading 4.2, fishers catch significantly less fish near
shore, which is an indication of the damaged corals’ impacts on fish stocks, thereby, fishers
livelihoods. Fishers’ dependency on natural resources, the increasing population pressure and
over exploited resources all contribute to eroding resilience. Population pressure creates
additional strain on resources as they are increasingly exploited, which in turn deteriorates the
opportunities for the fishers dependent on fish resources for income and food security. Such
trend will exacerbate the downward spiral of resource depletion.
Fishing is subject to variability for several reasons. Firstly, it is a seasonal activity as the sea
is too rough for fishing in the time of the monsoon. A result of this is very little income during
two to three months (October-December). Although fishers generally fish in the lagoon
through such times, the income is much lower than what is generated through sea fishing.
According to some interviewed fishers, income from sea fishing could in a good season be
adequate to support the family through the low season. Secondly, income from fishing varies
day by day depending on the catch.
47
Fishing in the studied communities generally generates little income for the fishers, which
partly is a consequence of the inverse relationship between stagnation of fish productivity and
an increased number of fishers and partly due to employment structures which is discussed
under Heading 5.2.2 below. FAO (2006) notes that this has resulted in smaller share of
income per fisher in recent years, which further exacerbates the fishers’ poverty.
5.1.2 Unsafe Conditions
Social dimensions and institutional processes
Vast losses of fishing equipment due to the tsunami have hampered fishers’ livelihood
activities tremendously. Alongside house reconstruction, replacing fishing equipment has
been the foremost priority among most aid agencies in order to rebuild people’s livelihoods.
However, the degree of success in this process has been variable and, according to FAO
(2006) an oversupply of 3,000 FRP boats and 800 traditional crafts is likely. FAO further
notes that only 46% of people who received boats are genuine beneficiaries. Several gaps
exist that have contributed to such discrepancy in aid distribution, and which simultaneously
have eroded resilience within the fishing communities.
Discrepancy was evident both at district and local level. The inconsistency between the
North-East compared to the South of the country is apparent with regard to the status of house
constructions, whereby e.g. Hambantota in the South has more houses assigned for
construction than was damaged in the tsunami. Moreover, out of the 3,107 houses that were
damaged in Hambantota district, 1366 of them are already handed over to beneficiaries. The
situation in Batticaloa District provides a sharp contrast to this picture, with only 72 houses
handed over to beneficiaries out of the 5201 houses that were damaged (CPA 2006). The
studied fishing communities are subject to marginalisation because they are at the fringes of
social power, whereby they have little force in political courses (Robbins 2004).
Some of the discrepancies that were present at local scale were more difficult to detect. There
were some particularly disadvantaged categories of people that were subject to the creation of
particular patterns of social vulnerability at local scales. These include the households that did
not hold a membership of a FCS before the tsunami, the previous net owners and part-time
fishers who have been neglected in the recovery process. In addition there were a number of
48
households in Kattankudy that were displaced to this town during the war, whom had no
‘rights’ for membership in the FCSs in Kattankudy. These groups of people were
marginalised as they are pushed into economically marginal social positions by community
neglect, and thus economic deprivation and reduced access to physical assets (Robbins 2004).
Furthermore, they experience double vulnerability as they have been relocated first due to
civil strife and then again due to the tsunami. At a regional scale the households within the
buffer zone have been subject to official neglect, which decreased their social resilience. That
most of these people did not have legal land title exacerbated their vulnerability further.
The vertical stratification determines a person’s status and is a contributing factor that may
create differential vulnerability amongst the people belonging to the various categories as
discussed under heading 2.6.1. The changes that occurred in employment status amongst
fishers, as a result of the unsound distribution of fishing equipment, have significant
implications not only for income generation but also in regards to their livelihood
opportunities. The fishers that shifted from being self-employed to becoming fish workers are
more vulnerable to future stresses as their income has decreased significantly. Fish workers
are usually employed by boat owners or mudalalies (business people), who pay them low
wages. The fish worker’s income is also lower, thus they are in a less resilient position in
terms of livelihood activities than the people owning the fishing assets. The assets in
themselves generate income, without the owners having to carry out the fishing, thus they can
carry out other income generating activities while employing labourers to fish for them.
Opportunities for the fish workers are usually low and do not allow for much socio-economic
upward mobility as their income is shared amongst the other fish workers that fish in the same
boat, and they obtain only a small portion (under 1/5th) each of the total income. The rest goes
to the mudalali who also provides the fuel for the boat. These small earnings do not allow the
fish workers to invest much in own equipment and because they did not own fishing assets
before the tsunami the are not entitled to receive assistance in the tsunami aftermath according
to the ‘replacement only’ rule laid down by the Ministry of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources
(MFAR). Instead many employees are forced to take up loans from mudalalies to cover
expenses during periods of low income. Due to high interest rates the risk of becoming
dependent on the mudalali is high.
49
Part-time fishers
Fishing communities are stratified, both horizontally and vertically as discussed under
heading 2.6.1 (Creech 2005), and fishers are either part- or full- time fishers. The post-
tsunami trend of not supporting part-time fishers by ignoring them in the recovery process is a
paradox to the aim of sustainable fisheries. Commonly, many fishers are mobile between
sectors in times of poor income from fishing. Part-time fishers reflect an adaptability to
diversify, which increases resilience in stressful times. It would therefore be more fruitful to
encourage such fishing practices by including part-time fishers in asset replacements, rather
than excluding them because they are not full-time fishers. Discriminating against part-time
fishers in the aid distributions promote people to become full-time fishers which further
increase the pressure on the resources. The strategy observed by certain NGOs, alongside the
Governments vision of improving the fisheries sector may not be the most suitable
development strategy in a war- and poverty-stricken area such as the Batticaloa District. In the
long term it could reveal more fruitful to support complementary household activities, as this
raises the opportunity income of fishing, with potential benefits of both conservation and
economic character (Allison & Ellis 2001).
Membership in a Fishing Cooperative Society (FCS)
Membership in a FCS is crucial in order to enable an individual or household available
networks of support. The non-members of FCSs were largely excluded from the aid delivery
process as most fishing assets were channelled through the FCSs, thus membership was
essential for successful livelihood recovery.
There were several reasons for people remaining non-members of a FCS before the tsunami,
as discussed under heading 4.2.1. Interviews with fishermen revealed that non-members
before the tsunami had difficulties acquiring membership after the tsunami. People that in the
war were displaced to Palameenmadu already had a membership in a different FCS. They did
not acquire membership once settled in the village as the FCS was generally inactive. The
situation changed after the tsunami, and a membership in the FCS became essential for
becoming eligible to replacement of gear. However, it was then difficult for them to become
members in their new village, and these people, although not physically displaced anymore
due to the war, are still socially and economically displaced (Sorensen 2001). Many NGOs
did not recognise this institutional rigidity, which had negative implications for fishers
without FCS membership.
50
5.2 Actors responses in the recovery process
Crisis creates space for reorganization, however it is necessary to find a dynamic balance
between past experiences on the one hand and innovation on the other. Innovative approaches
need to be framed by accumulated experiences of the system in order to cope with change and
obtain adaptive capacity. According to Berkes et al. (2003) there are several factors that build
or threaten resilience. This study identifies certain factors that have affected the resilience of
the social and ecological systems and this is reflected in the adaptive capacities the various
actors are endowed with, which ultimately determines the effectiveness of their responses.
The magnitude of the 2004 tsunami made relief and reconstruction very extensive and the
dimension of the recovery is further complicated by the complex picture shaped by the
conflict that has subsisted for many decades in Sri Lanka. The immediate relief phase was
generally successful as noted by Amarasinghe (2005), however the transition into the next
phase of reconstruction and recovery of livelihoods has not taken place with the same level of
success. This is partly due to failure to carry out a locally sensitive approach which requires
actors to interact at the village level in order to obtain knowledge about people’s actual
situation. The recovery process is largely conducted with foreign funds administered through
a foreign reality conception, rather than being built on local recollection of the place and how
it was in its immediate past (Skotte 2005).
5.2.1 Ineffective response
Several factors threatened resilience within the social and ecological systems, which in turn
contributed to the ineffective management responses that transpired in Sri Lanka in the
tsunami aftermath. McGovern (1980: 272) in Berkes et al. (2003) noted that suppression of
innovation and centralised decision-making in the face of change weaken adaptive responses.
Politicisation and centralisation of tsunami recovery
Certain institutional approaches in upper political levels negatively affected local level
institutions and were reflected in the politicisation and centralisation of the tsunami recovery.
Centralised agencies are physically separated from the resources, because they are not
51
familiar with the local realities, and thereby not capable of accumulating practical ecological
knowledge, consequently being susceptible to making large mistakes in regards to resource
management and decision making (Gunderson et al. 1995, in Berkes et al. 2003).
Instead of using the tsunami as an opportunity to promote peace talks, the Sri Lankan
Government used it to strengthen the central authorities’ power in the provinces, by declaring
a state of emergency whereby all powers relating to post-tsunami relief and recovery became
concentrated in two centralised authorities directly accountable to the President of the time.
Such move was effective in their interests because it opposed the devolution of power which
has been an interior element of negotiations between Sinhalese and Tamil representatives of
Governments in post-colonial Sri Lanka and deprived the North East Provincial Council
(NEPC) from its administrative powers (Korf 2005). The failure of P-TOMS halted the
opportunity of resolving social uncertainties between the different parts in society, thus
blocking the way for learning towards an effective response.
TAFREN was formed without being rooted in the affected communities. It would thus be
difficult for TAFREN to function with the proposed role it was given and one can thus
question the rational of forming such an authority. The Government’s edifice of a centralised
structure, such as TAFREN, clearly demonstrates a disregard for local government structures,
and they have furthermore failed to consult the victims. The consequences are thus apparent
in the Government’s failure to provide appropriate assistance to affected communities
reflected in decision-making that lack ground-reality knowledge. The limited knowledge and
experience of TAFREN employees is also a reason for their failure to succeed in their
coordinating role. Support to this argument is illustrated by Amarasinghe (2005), who
emphasises TAFRENs lack of competence in crisis-handling as the main reason for their
failure at the district-level.
In the Governments implementation of the buffer zone, they used the centralised government
authorities to attain land for settlement. This again illustrates the deprivation of power sharing
that has taken place in the tsunami aftermath and poses questions in regards to who controls
the state land (Korf 2005). Further politicisation took place in the reconstruction process
reflected in the dominance of corporate interests, for instance demonstrated by the Sri Lanka
Tourist Board, which refers to the tsunami as a “unique opportunity” to turn the Sri Lankan
coast line in to a “world class tourism destination”. Such counterproductive responses clearly
52
contradict the principle of subsidiarity, consequently undermining the structures embedded at
the local level (Shanmugaratnam 2005).
Inertia at the macro level has slowed down the rebuilding process and created greater risk of
human rights violations, particularly on the displaced people that had their homes within the
buffer zone prior to the tsunami, and in the aftermath had lost their access to land. Although
the power for decision-making in Sri Lanka is meant to be delegated at the district level, it is
as discussed above in reality referred back to the national level. Interviews revealed that the
residents of Palameenmadu were informally told about the potential revision of the buffer-
zone set back standards several months before it actually became formalised. This created
frustration and agony amongst them as they remained in suspense as to whether they could
return home or not. The revised set back standards for the buffer zone were not formalised
until the 27th of December 2005, although the matter had been discussed and proposed at
district level a lot earlier. District staff needed to wait for directions and approval from
national level and this has caused considerable delays in the rebuilding process. This
ambiguity caused uncertainty for planning of future strategies, as they were unsure of what
their options would be regarding their access to the sea. According to CPA (2006) there is still
evidence that the buffer zone revision has not yet reached all local actors, with the
consequence of houses being constructed to people outside the original buffer zone, who in
reality are entitled to return to their original home. A buffer zone up to 65 meter will be
enforced in Batticaloa District, hence many of the interviewed households from
Palameenmadu are still affected by this as their houses were within 65 meters of the mean
high tide mark.
Not all people wanted to move back to their prior homes due to fear of a new tsunami, and
neither were they satisfied about the new land allocated to them. The villagers’ judgments are
highly understandable after what they have experienced. The lack of possibilities for these
people to participate in the decision-making regarding their future homes touches upon
fundamental human rights, whereby they have become victims of a highly centralised
decision making process wherein they have no influence.
Resilience and resource rights provide strong linkages, particularly in the establishment of
mechanisms to regulate land tenure, in order to elucidate land ownership and access (Brown
et al. 2006). Social resilience at the community level is affected by the buffer zone policy
53
through changing property rights and inequality in access to resources (Adger 1997). The
enforcement of the buffer zone thus appears to be an unsustainable intervention in terms of
equity and its impact on community and individual stability and resilience. The coastal fishers
lived close to the seashore because this allowed them access to the resources imperative for
carrying out income generating livelihood activities. This creates a crucial link between the
ecosystem and social resilience as the demand for resources partially determines settlement
location. By enforcing the buffer zone the social resilience diminishes as the fishers become
removed from such access.
The imposed buffer zone may obstruct the economic recovery of affected areas as it separates
the fishers from the resources they depend on (Brown et al. 2006). Fishers’ desire to live near
their source of employment reflects a pressure leading to vulnerability due the risk-prone
nature of the location. The Sri Lankan Government ostensibly enforced the buffer zone to
move coastal people away to reduce future risk-exposures, which could possibly be beneficial
in promoting regeneration of natural buffers such as natural breakwaters and mangrove
forests. It could also be argued that coastal settlement has degraded these hazard buffers in
some places to an extent that they have become ineffective.
The people that lived closest to the sea and lagoon were more vulnerable in terms of
absorbing a hazard as extreme as the tsunami, and also the more frequent floods and cyclones.
In general, many of the households dependent on fishing, previously occupied the areas
within the buffer zone. Despite the risky location, the fishers’ rationale for staying near the
sea is explicable for several reasons. Firstly; transportation options are poor as they are
lacking the means to commute if they live away from the sea. Secondly; it is essential for
fishers to monitor sea conditions in order to make appropriate management decisions
regarding when and where to fish, and thirdly; they have no means of storing their equipment
safely as all storage-cottages were destroyed by the tsunami-wave and none of them had been
rebuilt.
Ultimately the Governments attempts at deflecting risk may have the reverse effect of
generating new disaster vulnerability. Not only are the victims losing livelihood access, but
relocation increases population density in new areas and without appropriate planning and
impact assessments of the new location, this operation may accelerate environmental
degradation (Brown et al. 2006).
54
Replacement of fishing crafts and equipment
The majority of attention and resources has been directed to reconstructing and returning
fishing capacity to the pre-tsunami state, whereby physical assets have been in focus. The Sri
Lankan Government decided that distribution of FRP boats and canoes was only to consist of
replacing those destroyed or damaged in the tsunami. This decision is perhaps justifiable at
first glance as it is a measure to prevent too many boats and canoes entering the sea and
lagoon, thereby upgrading fishing capacity, thus exacerbating the over-capacity problem that
was already apparent prior to the tsunami.
On the other hand it creates a dilemma as it excludes vulnerable and poor people from
receiving assistance. The pre-tsunami boat owners were usually wealthy and were often
multiple boat-owners. These lost more in the tsunami in absolute terms, however in relation to
total property, the less resourceful households were worse off. Fish workers were usually
dependent on the boat owners, as they delivered their wages and provided loans or advanced
payments in needy times (Creech pers. comm.). These restrictive measures have twofold
negative effects on many tsunami affected fishing households as the findings show that many
have not yet received fishing-gear replacement at all, let alone complete sets of what they had
before the tsunami. The restrictions on fishing craft distributions may be good to prevent new
entrants into fishing, however it makes the post-tsunami livelihood adaptation very difficult
for the poorer fishers whom are marginalised in the recovery process. The new entrants into
the fisheries sector after the tsunami on the other hand, may eventually drive income down as
well as contribute to the potential over-exploitation of the resources. Keeping in mind the
oversupply of vessels allocated for Batticaloa District, whilst referring to findings under
heading 4.2.1, whereby fishers claim to have received replacement of lost gear, it is apparent
that many vessels were delivered to people not affected by the tsunami, alternatively that the
fishers already have resold the craft acquired.
Weak communication, coordination and information flow
Open communication and information flow play a key role in building networks and mutual
trust between actors. Transparency between actors at different levels enables cross-scale
transfers of knowledge and learning, which will contribute towards strategies that can
55
strengthen resilience while navigating through times of crisis (Berkes et al. 2003). Actors
involved in the post-tsunami recovery process failed to opt for such strategies thus created a
chaotic picture of aid delivery and further division between the Government and aid agencies
on the one side, and the affected people on the other, whereby the latter remained
disempowered.
Poor coordination was reflected in the recovery process in various ways, for instance by
distributions of inappropriate equipment, equipment reaching people not affected by the
tsunami and several instances of duplication.
Moreover, several agencies operated in multiple sectors and in both the emergency relief- and
the reconstruction- phase, as well as planning to carry on throughout the phase of
development. Skotte (2005) emphasised the risk related to organisations, which have
experience with relief work, all of a sudden start rebuilding whole villages. Such execution of
tasks completely unfamiliar to them contains a high risk of failure. Skotte (2005) further notes
that the situation in Sri Lanka might be comparative to the problems faced in Bosnia where
the implications of an unplanned rebuilding based on inexperience lead to thousands of new
houses remaining empty.
Duplication was a problem in the recovery process, which mostly appeared to be a result of
poor coordination among the various NGOs and other involved actors. This problem was
given high priority on livelihood/coordination meetings and the result was a much stricter
monitoring and follow-up of beneficiary-lists, and of who had already received assistance.
Although such approach was needed, it was disadvantageous for the households that were on
lists of beneficiaries that already had received assistance. Many of them, as noted above, had
received inappropriate gear, however they now became ineligible for further assistance as
they already had received something earlier. This reflects unawareness amongst the NGOs
where they did not evaluate the quality of their work, with the result of many victims
remaining vulnerable and becoming pushed into further poverty as they due to bureaucracy
were squeezed out of the compensation process.
Actors lacking experience with conflict and reconstruction
The failure of reaching the most affected people with the help required is much due to poor
information flow and limited communication that occurred between the aid agencies and the
56
victims. The consequence was that agencies providing aid were lacking reliable information
regarding the beneficiaries needs, thus mistakes regarding deliveries were repeatedly made.
One major reason for the uncoordinated picture that reflected the recovery process was the
lack of experience amongst most actors in handling a disaster of such magnitude. The
interviewees’ low ranking of the organisations involved in the recovery process in terms of
closeness to the community, illustrates the absence of aid agencies at village level. It
illustrates the failure of INGOs to cooperate with the communities which would contribute to
the INGOs unawareness and lack of knowledge of the beneficiaries needs. The tsunami
victims were left unable to participate as well as excluded from decision-making due to the
Governments top-down approach, but also in relation to NGOs, as communication among
them was limited. Household interviews emphasised a common perception of an urgent need
for NGOs to approach the affected people directly to be able to learn about their real needs, in
order to contribute meaningfully in the recovery process. This failure among the aid agencies
explains the many inappropriate gear replacements which consequently led to reselling of
gear and many complaints from victims reflecting poor livelihood recovery.
Shanmugaratnam (1996:166) in Adger et al. (2001) notes that sustainable natural resource
management is difficult to achieve where distribution of private wealth is highly uneven, thus
the coping and recovery of the disadvantaged groups of people are under more strain than the
people that are better off in terms of wealth distribution. Many involved actors in the recovery
process failed to consider such unevenness, not only in regards to war victims but also the
various disadvantaged groups amongst fishers as discussed earlier. Many aid agencies
entered the scene for the first time and interviews revealed limited knowledge and experience
with the Sri Lankan conflict context, contributing towards discrimination against war victims
in favour of tsunami victims. Fujita et al. (2003) emphasizes the importance for donors and
aid agencies to have understanding of the politics, power relations and conflicts within the
region where they work, in order to generate equity in the development process. Such
understanding appeared to generally be lacking amongst many actors working in Batticaloa
District, thus conflict sensitivity was often neglected. For instance the massive funding
allocated to tsunami victims provides a stark contrast to funds allocated for conflict-displaced
victims, whereby meagre funds have been made available. Such disparity is partly an
illustration of the power that rests within the media, and such situation might contribute to
exacerbate Tamil ethnic grievances and the division within communities, as the conflict-
displaced mostly consists of Tamil communities (CPA 2006).
57
The planning, decision-making and coordination in the tsunami aftermath occurred at national
or district level and failed to sufficiently include the affected communities. The result of such
exclusion and lack of participation at the village level is aid efforts often unsuitable for the
receiver. The interviewed victims had no influence on the location of temporary shelter
camps, permanent housing or the manner in which aid is distributed to them. A somewhat
negative strategy adapted seems to be acquiring aid as a response of the ongoing distributions
given as purely grants. Although this may be considered a downside to the aid response, it is
an understandable approach as fishers may receive aid that far exceeds the daily income from
fishing. Such behaviour however is an indicator of an emerging aid-dependency arising
amongst people. Such a situation heightens the vulnerability imposed by the tsunami and it
undermines the effectiveness of the aid recovery process (Kälin 2005). It seems rather
obvious that the way the donors’ massive funds have been distributed has been harmful for
the affected people, not only in terms of unfair distributions but also what it has done with the
people. Not only are aid given as grants but it has often been dumped at various locations
without any concern whether it includes what the recipients really need. By such approaches
it is legitimate to argue that the tsunami victims are treated as ‘pure’ victims, reduced to
recipients of the Western world’s benevolence (Korf 2005). As this study indicates, the
recovery process has been politicised and centralised by the Sri Lankan Government on the
one hand, whereas on the other it was transformed to an arena where aid agencies were
competing to spend their money quickly and produce reportable results. The affected people
have been reduced to pawns in the battlefield between conflict parties, politicians striving for
votes and aid agencies striving to show benevolence.
Power imbalance: powerful central Government and weak local level institutions
Although regulations and guidelines of tsunami relief and reconstruction efforts was issued by
the Central Government with minimum local involvement, the Department of Fisheries
dispersed duties and responsibility down to FCSs and other actors in regards to finding
beneficiaries for asset replacements. The reason for such trend was that the local authorities in
Batticaloa severely lacked resources and capacity to carry out the duties designated for them,
and most data on for instance registered fishing equipment disappeared in the tsunami as they
were not properly stored. Such lack of capacity within local authorities is a result of the
dependency that has been established by the Central Government, whereby the Local
58
Government has in the past been dictated by Central Authorities on planning and decision
making (CPA 2006). Local Authorities in Batticaloa felt that due to their lack of capacity,
INGOs have taken advantage of this by following their own agenda, regardless of
Government guidelines. This has created distrust between the Government and INGOs, which
has further challenged the coordination process.
Close cooperation between INGOs and local NGOs or CBOs was generally not observed in
the Batticaloa District, with a few exceptions such as Oxfam (Australia) which has worked in
the region through local CBOs for many years. Working through local institutions would
bring both the coordination and aid delivery down to the village level, rather than operating at
the district level, whereby Shaw & Goda (2004) argues that coordination among NGOs in a
post-disaster scenario is much more successful when rooted in the community and its people.
Coordination meetings in Batticaloa were conducted in English, which made it difficult for
some local NGOs to participate, and consequently they failed to attend. Attendance in
coordination meetings is a prerequisite for the coordination to succeed, and this failure
contributed to the communication gap between INGOs and local actors.
If the expertise of the local institutions had been utilised more efficiently, some of the gaps in
the recovery process, eroding certain individuals or groups’ resilience (i.e. part-time fishers,
non-members of FCSs, net-owners), might have been avoided. According to FAO (2006) the
greatest success in distributing boats to genuine beneficiaries occurred in areas such as Jaffna
and Mulaitivu where they have strong FCSs. Strong FCSs have managed to assist aid
providers in identifying genuine beneficiaries, however such strong FCSs barely exist in other
parts of Sri Lanka, with some exceptions in the East, i.e. in Trincomalee and Kalmunai
(Album pers. comm.).
Strengthening physical assets, by replacing fishing equipment, without at the same time
strengthening social assets, for instance FCSs, resembles a great mistake by the agencies
involved in the recovery process. Although FCSs were important actors in the recovery
process, the link between the aid-agencies and the FCSs were weak. The FCSs were given
major tasks and responsibilities with little communication and training prior to conducting
such tasks required by them. As noted by Creech (pers. comm.) many FCSs were almost
inactive before the tsunami, thus they were hardly ready for the responsibilities they were
being allocated in the tsunami aftermath.
59
The role of the FCSs has been dramatically altered in the tsunami aftermath partly as a result
of the Department of Fisheries’ lack of capacity as mentioned above, but also as the fisheries
sector was severely affected and the FCSs are the institution representing the fishers. The
committee members of the FCSs were among the people that were perceived as bringing
inequity to the aid distribution and thus the recovery process. It is useful to look at the
structures of the FCSs, as earlier discussed under heading 2.6.1, in order to clarify their
weaknesses. About 90 per cent of the members of FCSs are fish workers. This scenario is
poorly reflected in the FCS committees, which mostly consist of older boat owners that do not
necessarily fish themselves. Young fishers do not have the experience and trust within the
community that is required to be a FCS committee member (Creech pers. comm.). It becomes
apparent that it is necessary to put more emphasise on how to best manage power, be it at the
national or local level. If power is devolved to local level such as in the instance discussed
above, it is concurrently important to strengthen the institutions acquiring such power.
Certain NGOs tried to overcome the problem of weak and untrustworthy FCSs by creating
new village committees on an ad hoc basis. This procedure lacks experience as it is not
previously tested within this society, thus is questionable. The selection process of committee
members for the new committees was strongly dominated by patronage relationships.
Influential individuals such as committee members from other village committees were
selected into the new committee; hence the whole purpose of creating a committee that
reflected the community was not accomplished. Communities’ heterogeneity is emphasised
earlier and the studied communities contained differences in status, wealth and incomes
amongst its residents, which contributed to differential livelihood options and adaptability in
the tsunami aftermath. Institutions in communities are often based on compromises between
various actors, as values and interests vary due to the heterogeneous nature of the community.
Allison & Ellis (2001) thus argue for supporting existing local-level institutions, as long term
strengthening of the old institution has the potential of being more sustainable, with an
objective to eliminate politicisation and develop it into a democratic institution that provides
services for all its members.
The NGOs in Batticaloa seemed to be driven by two agendas. On one side they help the most
needed, which also is the reason why they are there. On the other side, there appear to be a
hidden agenda of showing “results” to their respective donors or country of origin supporting
their work. Sometimes these two objectives do not go together. Firstly, the presence of such
60
large number of aid agencies has created competition amongst them in acquiring villages and
beneficiaries within villages. Most NGOs mark their presence with large signs in order for
other agencies to see that this is their working area. Secondly, the strong force of INGOs
present, holding large funds, creates power among them, simultaneously as it withdraws
power from the Sri Lankan state. Hanlon (1991) points out the importance of donors working
through the local government rather than bypassing them, in order for the local government to
become strengthened. The aid work may in the short term run slower, however such approach
suggests a more self-sufficient institution in the long run, which is crucial as the aid agencies
will eventually leave Sri Lanka. Many aid agencies oppose to ‘slowing down’ the aid work
due to the many people in need of help. Forming new village committees by some INGOs, as
discussed earlier, is a prime example of a counterproductive response constructing parallel
structures which is a short term solution but completely ignores the existing structures in
society, i.e. FCSs, which desperately needs strengthening. Although the aid so far given by
the aid agencies is valuable for many people, it is nevertheless important to plan for a
development-oriented approach, which is integrated in the regional economy and will provide
the victims with viable and sustainable livelihood opportunities for the future (Korf 2005).
The devastating effects the tsunami had on people have produced a vast amount of funding
targeting the rebuilding process. Assets have been distributed on a purely grant basis which
creates conditions for extensive corruption, at the same time as it distorts the markets and
leads to ascending prices (Skotte 2005). Labour was extracted from the local NGOs and
CBOs to INGOs because of the appealing wages that the INGOs could offer. The
reconstruction of infrastructure and housing after the tsunami provided some alternative short-
term employment for people, for instance with “cash for work” programs. However, a
downside to this booming reconstruction phase was that prices in many sectors, and
particularly the construction sector had risen, which created problems for the local economy.
Attempts were made to deal with these problems by various NGOs, for example by
introducing micro credit schemes, which is discussed below under Heading 5.3.3.
5.2.2 Counter productive response
Counterproductive responses often lead to social and ecological brittleness partly because
they reflect an agenda of striving to preserve the status quo. Consequences of such responses
61
are often conditions that have the potential to contribute towards larger-scale crisis later on
(Berkes et al. 2003).
Inequity in resource access: Quality of the recovery process
Incomplete distributions
The direct consequence of the uncoordinated aid delivery was that many affected people
remained with gear that they were unfamiliar with, or gear that was incomplete and
unsatisfactory for them to carry out fishing. The incorrect nets that were distributed created
tension in the village as fishers blamed net shop keepers for this failure, however the
underlying error lies within the NGO or donor distributing these nets, which have distanced
themselves from the delivery by not following it right through to the end receiver. The NGOs’
capacity puts limits to what they can keep control over, however one must question the
quality of the work as the boat and canoe quality is vital for the security of the fishers. It
would be more useful with less quantity in terms of number of boats and nets, and instead
ensure that the gear is of good quality and reach the affected people without being
misallocated along the way. This inadequacy in aid delivery has prompted people to resell the
gear acquired. Although such re-sale might appear “immoral”, it might be the best solution for
the receiver of the gear as it can provide more livelihood flexibility, particularly when the
gear is inadequate for them to fish effectively. Many fishers received canoes without nets, or
wrong types of nets, and substituting assets then almost became the only viable option for
them.
With regard to house reconstructions, the discrepancy at district level between the North-East
and the South, as discussed earlier, is a reflection of the lack of political will towards the
North-East. The difference in buffer zone width between North-East and the South is another
response which further exacerbates the already existing unevenness between different
categories of people within different districts. Such responses by the Government have caused
delays in the reconstruction and have placed increased stress on the affected people.
Boats and canoes: lack of quality control
62
A common perception among interviewed fishers was the poor quality of the fishing vessels
distributed to them by the NGOs. Particularly canoes had very poor quality as the hull was
much thinner than required. The newly distributed boats have consisted of reduced amount of
the raw material required for the satisfactory quality (Album pers. comm.). CEYNOR claimed
to repair boats, however in reality many of these boats were incomplete (Figure 10 & 11),
which prevented fishers from using such boats. According to Sønvisen et al. (2006),
CEYNOR are now being investigated by FAO for irregularities in boat repairs, however
people affected by these failures have suffered unnecessarily due to hasty and insufficient
repair work. The imperative of speedy deliveries and the pressure placed upon NGOs to spend
money in a set time-frame has contributed to creating this situation. The lack of appropriate
measures prepared by the Government in regards to boat building has allowed such a chaotic
situation in the boat replacements to occur. If inspectors had been present at the boat yards,
assessing the procedures of construction and controlling the quality of what was built
simultaneously as they directed what type of boat was suitable to what region, the existing
problems might have been minimised. However, such control measures were not in place,
partly due to limited capacity within the Government, but this may also be attributed by
inertia from the Governments part.
None of the boats that were distributed in Batticaloa District were locally built. If local boat
builders had been supported rather than importing boats from the outside, the benefits could
be two-fold; firstly it would provide local employment and secondly the boats would be more
appropriate for the local conditions. A problem was that the boats distributed on the east
coast, were built for conditions on the west coast.
63
Figure 10 Boat repaired by CEYNOR, with engine left unrepaired, and
Figure 11 Incomplete repair work by CEYNOR after the tsunami,
The low number of replacements of FRP boats among the interviewed households is partly
due to delays from the INGO’s part. Many FRP boats had arrived Batticaloa, but were stored
for several months in an unusable condition because the engines had not been delivered
(Figure 12).
64
Figure 12 FRP boats supplied by Save the Children (GB) waiting to be delivered to
beneficiaries due to lack of engines or nets.
Inappropriate locations of temporary shelters
Many temporary shelter camps and even permanent houses were built in flood prone areas as
illustrated in Figures 13 and 14 below. This affected many people in the monsoon time
between October to December, and although some drainage system were eventually installed,
many families became victims of floods which resulted in relocation yet again (Tamil-net
2006).
Figure 13 Rebuilding homes in Kattankudy in a flood-prone area.
65
Figure 14 Temporary shelters in a flood prone area with stagnant water.
Thiraimadu temporary shelter camp, which is the Palameenmadu villagers temporary home at
present, used to be an area completely covered in trees before the NGOs commenced
construction, however in the urgency for making shelters for people, it was not only situated
in a highly flood prone area, but almost all the trees were cut down (Figure 15). This
eliminates storm barriers as well as shade for the residents of the camp, and it is obvious that
limited consultation with local people occurred, whereby such a flood prone area could have
been avoided. Another example that illustrates little local awareness is the building material
of many of the temporary shelters. As illustrated in Figure 11 below, they were built with tin
roofs and walls, which is very hot in the Sri Lankan climate. The situation is that these
shelters will be the homes for many people for a long time, exposing them to poor living
conditions.
66
Figure 15 Thiraimadu temporary shelter camp with several houses made
Failure to generate effective responses in the wake of a crisis
In order to secure the household’s livelihoods, substitution capabilities among assets and
activities play a vital role (Ellis 2000). Low potentials for substitution create more
vulnerability among people when a shock such as the tsunami strikes. The village residents’
livelihood portfolio was narrow with limited diversification both before and after the tsunami.
The wives that generated income for the family usually contributed with little cash due to the
types of work carried out. In order to strengthen the households livelihood strategies and
create more opportunities for females in income generation, houses and land is crucial. It is a
fundamental need for the households to have a house and preferably to get back their land in
order to rebuild some kind of livelihood activities. Most of the females interviewed revealed
that they had not returned to their traditional income generating activities such as mat
weaving or shop keeping, in absence of a suitable place to carry it out.
In lack of livelihood alternatives, some fishers are carrying out fishing methods that may have
negative impacts on the resources. Batticaloa District has for the last decade increased their
exploitation of ornamental species and sea-cucumbers by using scuba equipment in collecting
these species (Rajasuriya et al. 1995). As illustrated in the result section under heading 4.2,
interviews of FCSs in Kattankudy revealed a focus on training fishers to use scuba equipment
as a strategy to increase their income. The assistance provided to the affected people did not
67
look beyond prior existing activities, thus opportunities for diversification among people were
poorly explored. Apart from fishing equipment, distributions went along patterns of providing
small income generating activities for instance for women, such as e.g. sewing machines or
chickens. These are, in theory, reasonable implementations as they provide an activity that the
majority of women are familiar with, however in reality they are often not viable, because
firstly, they generate little income and secondly, the problem of competition arises when too
many people start carrying out the same activities, thus the problem of reselling distributed
assets again became a common practice.
5.2.3 Learning towards effective response
Certain responses apparent in the tsunami aftermath included elements that had the potential
for contributing positively towards strengthening resilience of the stressed social-ecological
situation. Factors that were important for effective responses were memory and knowledge
that allowed for innovative approaches to emerge. Some aid agencies had absorbed valuable
knowledge and experience during the first part of the tsunami recovery phase, which later
contributed to innovations that had the potential of strengthening resilience within the
systems. Fishers’ local knowledge illustrates the resilience that is endowed within their
adaptive capacity to carry out sustainable management practices.
Innovation arising from memory and knowledge
Measures of introducing micro credit schemes, improving asset ownership structures as well
as employing local labour are steps towards a more effective response of positive adaptation
and institutional learning, which may contribute towards ameliorating the stressed situation in
a more positive manner. Many credit societies became dysfunctional during the war due to
displacements and war-time restrictions, as noted under heading 2.2, which makes it even
more important for the aid agencies to focus on making such schemes available for the
fishers.
Save the Children (GB) provided the communities with FRP-boats on a micro-credit scheme
basis. This activity had at least two advantages; firstly, fishers that could use a boat had few
other means to acquire one due to high purchasing costs, and secondly, by having a micro-
credit scheme, the debt was not to go back to Save the Children but to the FCS, thus the
68
community as a whole would benefit. As noted by Wisner et al. (2003) that in order to build
resilience it is crucial to bring the ‘banking’ down to the level of the poorest groups which
normally are denied loan facilities. Save the Children (GB) transferred these loans to the
FCSs, for them to handle the loan-scheme locally.
Oxfam (Australia) wanted to make improvements to the traditional asset ownership structures,
by creating shared ownership of the fishing crafts they distributed. The intention was to even
out income inequality amongst fish workers.
The Government however disregarded this response of learning and empowerment of fish
workers by denying this, as crafts were only to be distributed to prior owners. Meanwhile,
many non-affected boat owners received boats, which the Government was unable to prevent.
One can question if old structures necessarily need to be kept or if shared ownerships in this
case would bring development? It is important to recognize the role the boat owners played
with regards to their employees. Fish workers relied on boat owners in times of need and they
were often their only loan mechanism. However, this dependency-relationship placed fish
workers in a vulnerable position where income usually was poor.
Economic resilience was in the tsunami aftermath built by some agencies, particularly in the
interventions within boat repair. The Coastal Campaign (a joint effort between the
Development Fund and Friends of the Earth, Norway) formed repair-stations along the
tsunami affected coast, including one in Palameenmadu. It consisted of local people who had
been trained to repair damaged boats and canoes. This did not only bring income to local
people, but it also brought knowledge and skills about boat repair into the community. A
rotation of labourers occurred, thus income and increased knowledge and skills were provided
to several individuals within the community. The selection of labourers was gender-neutral,
with both female and male workers. Such skills will be useful in the future as fishing crafts
do need repair from time to time. This also makes the community more resilient in case of
future natural hazards.
69
Technological change with the potential of either exacerbating crisis or strengthening
resilience: Political structures enforced by the Government.
The major change that arose from the tsunami triggered an opportunity to reorganize, which
according to Berkes et al. (2003) is to form, reconsider and reshape management practices,
regulations, and organizational structure.
The Sri Lankan Government encouraged deep-sea fishing prior to the tsunami, and this policy
is increasingly encouraged in the tsunami aftermath, as a mechanism to overcome the problem
of over-fishing in coastal waters. Prior to the tsunami the Government offered a number of
subsidies as incentives for increasing deep-sea fishing, which resulted in off-shore fishing
within the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Creech (pers. comm.) noted that the off-shore
resources in eastern Sri Lanka are still under-utilized, however without careful coastal
management, the southern scenario will eventually be a reality also in the east.
Hall (pers. comm.) pointed at some problems involved with shifting to deep-sea fishing, as
these resources also may reach over-exploitation. The fishers would then tend to return to the
shallow waters in bigger boats, which firstly; will compete with the small-scale fishers that
fish close to shore, and secondly; the catch-capacity will be further upgraded, thus eventually
having the potential of weakening the resilience of both the ecological and social system.
Dealing with the problem of over-harvesting in coastal waters by encouraging deep-sea
fishing, thereby encouraging NGOs to deliver bigger fishing-boats, might only provide a
short-term solution, as it may impede the alertness in responding to environmental feedback,
consequently having the potential of further alienate people from their ecosystem (Berkes et
al. 2003). The Sri Lankan Government also opts for increased efficiency by improving
technology, which is important for reasons such as security and quality, however if not
carefully planned and monitored it may not promote fishing as a sustainable livelihood option
for small-scale fishers in the long term. Increased efficiency in the fisheries industry will only
allow fishers to remain in the business as long as over-fishing does not occur. Once the catch
rate exceeds the sustainable levels, fishing becomes a sustainable livelihood option for a
smaller number of families compared to before the “efficiency” measures were put in place
(Allison & Ellis 2001).
On the contrary, although the above arguments are sound referring to fisheries in many
developing countries, it somewhat creates a dilemma in regards to the picture of Sri Lankan
70
fisheries. Looking at the size of boats in Sri Lankan fisheries, a carefully regulated shift to
deep-sea fishing may offer sustainability, particularly when recognising the number of fishers
it may help out of poverty. There is much more potential for higher income off-shore due to
the value of fish, such as tuna. The biggest boats that they use in Sri Lankan fisheries are
usually about 45ft long, hence considerably smaller than foreign boats, and thus consequently
only allowing for moderate catches. However, in order to preserve sustainability if promoting
deep sea fishing, it is crucial to simultaneously place emphasis on the importance of
incorporating measures on increasing the knowledge base of fishers and boat owners
regarding management and fishing practices in regards to deep-sea fishing. It is important to
acknowledge that some level of uncertainty always will exist in complex systems such as sea
fishing. It is thus crucial to carry out adaptive management which entails monitoring and
integrating cross-scale information into the management. Continuous feedback from the
social-ecological system, for instance from resource users experience or science, is required in
order to shape the direction of management (Berkes et al. 2003). A tendency of targeting
sharks is apparent, consequently contributing towards depleting this resource. The reason for
such fishing practices is due to the less demanding nature of catching sharks compared to for
instance catching tuna (Album pers. comm.). It is therefore important to provide knowledge
and training for fishers that shift to deep-sea fishing, in order for it to become a viable and
sustainable livelihood activity.
It is neither possible nor desirable to encourage all near shore fishers to shift to deep-sea
fishing. It therefore seems evident that in order to build ecological and social resilience, it is
fruitful to encourage flexibility in the fisheries i.e. by strengthening multiple livelihood
strategies for the coastal communities, rather than only focusing on spatially shifting the
fishing pressure. In order to identify and promote alternative income generating activities, it is
important to incorporate capacities that can evolve with the changes occurring in the coastal
areas which often are ongoing processes (IMM 1999). Although arguing for preservation of
traditional fishing methods, some technology improvements such as more efficient storage
capacity and enhanced safety and seaworthiness are vital (Allison & Ellis 2001). Increased
emphasis on safety is particularly important for the fisheries sector in Batticaloa District as
replaced fishing crafts after the tsunami often has been poor.
Educating and training fishers on deep-sea fishing, concurrently with encouraging such
fishing practices, draws on social-ecological memory and is a key to stimulate learning
71
towards an effective response. If such practices are done in a sustainable manner,
incorporating a community based approach; it can provide better income for poor fishers
without depleting the resources, thus contributing towards ameliorating the stressed social-
ecological situation. The Coastal Campaign/AJ Fishing was in the process of building
improved day-boats with enhanced storage capacity, whereby local people should assist in the
boat building. These boats were intended to be 30ft long and include improved storage and
safety mechanisms. Training on sustainable deep-sea fishing was simultaneously intended to
happen by knowledge sharing from experienced fishers from Trincomalee. However, the Sri
Lankan Government has recently (March 2006) introduced a ban on fishing, which
counteracts effective responses such as the one of the Coastal Campaign. This Government
restriction prohibits vessels more than 28ft in length and was introduced in the wake of the
LTTE-attack on the Sri Lankan Navy’s sea craft on March 25, 2006. The escalating build-up
of tension between LTTE and the Government at the end of year 2005 and progressing into
year 2006, has resulted in discrepancy within different Ministries within the Government. The
Department of Fisheries’ mechanisms on promoting deep-sea fishing is overridden by this ban
of beyond 28ft vessels fishing within the prohibited zone as referred to under heading 2.3 of
this study. The rational for the ban is to prevent the LTTE from smuggling weapons in the
guise of fishers and the Sri Lankan Police and armed forces are given powers to open fire at
violators (Colombo Page 2006). This illustrates how the fishers in the North-East of Sri Lanka
are involuntarily caught up in the conflict due to their strategic position on the coast, which
entails the potential of having disastrous impacts on their livelihood security.
The fishing restrictions do not only affect the owners of multi-day boats but also the many
fish workers that will be without employment as they are prohibited to use the boats in the
sea. Most of the interviewed fishers rely on the income from sea fishing in the peak season,
which also assist them throughout the low season from October to December. Now such
income opportunities are hampered for several reasons. Firstly; they lack necessary
equipment, and secondly; due to limited resources near shore, fishers need to travel further off
shore to catch fish as discussed earlier, which in terms require bigger and better boats, both
for safety and storage reasons. The fishing ban also implies that all replaced and repaired
multi-day boats cannot be used within the Prohibited Zone and only small boats near shore
can be used, which brings contradictory signals to what has been imposed earlier in the
attempts of precautionary measures for sustainable fisheries, i.e. increased pressure on near
shore resources where smaller boats are used, contributing towards further depletion of the
72
resources. This illustrates how the recovery process after the tsunami needs to be seen in light
of the conflict in Sri Lanka, and the situation at present unfortunately does not allow for
planning and implementation that does not have the potential of being disarranged by the
conflict.
Memory and knowledge in management practices
Successful adaptation indicates improved capacities to resist shocks, thus has the ability to
strengthen resilience within the social system. Access to assets, asset substitutability or
changing the asset mix, as well as diversification, contribute towards the level of success
obtained from adaptive strategies (Ellis 2000).
Diversification of livelihoods is a feature of fishing communities in developing countries
according to Allison & Ellis (2001) and often plays a significant role in the level of success
obtained among the fishing households income generation. The pursuit of diverse livelihood
strategies by fishers may avert the need for the policy measures placed upon the fishers, as
their low-technology, opportunistic fishing methods adjust to the resources available. Many
fishers fish in the lagoon when bad weather prevents fishing in the open sea. In pre-tsunami
times, fishers used different net types and fishing grounds according to what was most
productive for the season. This was a fruitful strategy before the tsunami, however after the
tsunami the gear used depends on what has been made available from various aid agencies.
Many fishers demonstrated relatively quick adaptation to the deficiency of appropriate fishing
nets by targeting other species.
Geographical mobility is usually a necessary feature of small-scale fisheries for fishers to
adapt to mobile or fluctuating fish stocks (Allison & Ellis 2001). Such geographical mobility
revealed to be crucial in order for the fishers to sustain their catches in the tsunami aftermath
and is a key determinant for coping with disturbances. The long term trend of over-fishing in
near-shore waters would eventually force the fishers to go further out to sea or opt for other
livelihood activities. However the tsunami with its destructions of corals, accelerated this
mobilisation, as a strategy to sustain catches. This places constraints on fishing because
higher risk is involved in travelling further offshore, especially approaching the monsoon
season when the weather is unpredictable. Fishers stated that the time spent fishing had
decreased significantly, thus a double loss in resilience is created as a result of the augmented
73
vulnerability amongst fishers after the tsunami. However, the mobility and adaptability by the
fishers may in the long term be beneficial for preservation of fish stocks in the long term
because fishers move away from locally depleted resources. Interviews revealed considerably
lower fish catches after the tsunami which is not only a reflection of the declining fish stocks
near shore due to deaths of corals, but also a consequence of decreased number of fishing
hours spent. New entrants into the fisheries sector and improved technology may however
impede the sustainability of the livelihood strategies adopted by the traditional small-scale
fishers.
74
75
6.0 Concluding remarks
The responses in the aftermath of the tsunami reflect the level of knowledge and experience
inherent in societies at all scales. The magnitude of the tsunami and its tragic impacts allowed
little time for planning in the emergency relief phase. However, the many failures in the
subsequent recovery phase illustrate the need to rethink how better planning mechanisms
could have prevented such failures. Inadequate cooperation with the affected people created
an information gap between local levels and district and national levels. It is necessary to
change the process from its centralised top-down focus, to an approach which includes the
affected people to participate in planning and deciding on their own livelihood recovery
processes. The principle of subsidiarity is thus essential, acknowledging that decisions are
often best made where they directly impact. It is therefore important to strengthen the capacity
of local authorities at the same time as allowing local people to make decisions affecting their
own lives. The Sri Lankan Government’s centralised approach is an illustration of total
neglect of the subsidiarity principle.
The current worsening tension in the civil conflict in Sri Lanka (May 2006) implies the
necessity of increased conflict sensitivity among involved actors in the recovery process. The
responses of the Government and aid agencies have neglected the root causes of vulnerability
that are embedded in society. This has negative impacts on both the ecological and social
systems. Firstly, oversupply of fishing vessels will increase the strain on already pressurised
resources. And secondly, the fishers’ income generation has been significantly lower due to
discrepancies in the aid distributions after the tsunami.
To a considerable extent, the generous outpourings by the international community have thus
proved to create the opposite effects to what was intended. This appears to be a result of the
responses by both aid agencies and the Sri Lankan Government in the tsunami aftermath,
whereby a return to primarily depending upon the fisheries sector is focused upon, and
strengthening multiple livelihood strategies has been neglected. The latter can provide more
ecologically sustainable and economically viable livelihood options as it may spread risk
through less dependency on limited natural resources.
The experiences and observations from the aftermath of the tsunami illustrate an emphasis on
rebuilding physical damages such as fishing vessels and equipment. Such a response reflects a
76
two-fold problem which provides lessons for future disaster recovery: firstly, while focusing
on physical assets, it is necessary to simultaneously strengthen local institutions such as FCSs,
in order to achieve equity in the recovery process. Secondly, attempts to return to the pre-
disaster scenario of narrow livelihood options should be reconsidered, and rather adapt to new
situations in order to promote development in the affected communities.
77
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Appendix 1 Interviews
Questionnaire - Households Household number Name of respondent (optional) Date District Village 1.0 Household data 1.1 Sex Female 1
Male 2 1.2 Age (years) ………… 1.3 Marital status Single 1
Married 2 1.4 Ethnicity Tamil 1
Muslim 2 Singhalese 3
1.5 Religion Hindu 1 Muslim 2 Buddhist 3 Chatolic 4 Christian 5
1.6 Education background None 1 Primary 2 Secondary 3 Tertiary 4 Adult literacy 5 Other (specify) 6 How many years……….
1.7 Main household occupation Smallholder fisher 1 Commercial fisher 2 Smallholder farmer 3 Wage labourer 4 Artisan 5 Housewife 6 Trader 7 Others 8
1.8 Number of children At school
……….. ______
Status of the fisherman Owner of boat 1 Canoe 2 Daily worker 3 Sole buyer 4 Seller 5 Intermediator 6
1.9 Status in village
Political/Community leader 1 Opinion leader 2 Cultural leader 3 Religious leader 4 Social worker 5 Ordinary citizen 6
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Other (specify) 7 …………………………………..
1.10 Member of fishing coorporation Yes 1 - in this village……………… - different village…………. No 2 - why?.......................................
2.0 Objective 1: to examine processes of livelihood reconstruction and social-ecological
resilience at household and community level in two fishing villages, one of Tamil and the
other of Muslim origin, with reference to the tsunami.
Research Question 1: How has the demographic status of the household been affected by the
tsunami with reference to resource access and property rights?
2.1 Available assets and access
Assets Before tsunami After tsunami
Within bufferzone
Natural: land: ownership
customary
access to sea/lagoon
Physical:
- boats:
canoe: sea or lagoon
small fiberglass boat
large day boat
multiday boat
outboard/inboard motor
specify size & type
- other fishing equipment:
nets
beach seine
cold room facilities
- property:
house
equipment storage place
- other
Human: fishing skills/knowledge
Social: social network
relatives
Financial: access to credit
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Access to remittances
• Boat been totally damaged, partially or not: ____________________________________
• Have you got: - new boat or canoe: _____________________
- repaired old boat or canoe _______________________
2.2 How long have you and your family lived in this village? ______________________
2.3 Are you living at the same place now as prior to the tsunami?
1. if yes, do you have the same access to resources as before? _______________________________________________________________ 2. If no, have you been compensated? _______________________________________________________________
2.4. If there are or have been constraints on your access to fishing resources, what is the reason for this? ________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________ 2.5 Do you work independently or are you employed by others before/after the tsunami?
________________________________________________________________________ 2.6 Do you have people working for you? _____________________________________
Research Question 2: What are the livelihood sources of the households before and after the
tsunami?
2.7 Do you fish in the sea or the lagoon or both?_____________________________
2.8 what kind of gear did you use in terms of net size, type of net, modes:
Before tsunami________________________________________________________
After the tsunami_______________________________________________________
2.9 Are there any new roles for women in the household economy after compared to before the tsunami? ___________________________________________________ 2.10 Has the access to extension services changed after the tsunami? ________________________________________________________________________ 2.11 Have there been changes in the status of traditional leaders after the tsunami? ________________________________________________________________________ 2.12 What help if any do you receive from the fishing cooperative? _________________ ________________________________________________________________________
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2.13 How is your access to a landing site now compared to before the tsunami? ________ ________________________________________________________________________ 2.14 How is access to market now compared to before the tsunami? _________________ ________________________________________________________________________ 2.15How many businesses in the village before and after the tsunami________________ ________________________________________________________________________ Research Question 4: What institutions and individuals are active in promoting and
implementing the buffer zone system?
2.15 How do you think the buffer zone system will impact on you in regards to: 1) property rights:___________________________________________________ 2) landing rights:____________________________________________________ 3) access to fishing resources:__________________________________________
Research Question 5: What is the contribution of the fishing industry to the household
welfare?
2.16 Does your family have other income except from fishing? _____________________ ________________________________________________________________________ 2.17Was fishing the main source of income in the household prior to the tsunami? If others, please mention them. ________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________ 2.18 Do activities and income sources vary throughout the year? ________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________
2.19 Seasonal calendar – before and after the tsunami
Income generating activity Ja
nua
ry
Febr
uar
y
Mar
ch A
pril
May
June
July
Aug
ust
Sept
em
ber
Oct
ober
Nov
em
ber
Dec
em
ber
Lagoon before
Lagoon after
Sea before
Sea after
Labour work before
Labour work after
Paddy fields before
Paddy fields after
Related to tsunami
Others before
Others after
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2.22 Income diagram: Can you quantify monthly income for each income generating
activity? Income generating activity Amount generated per month
Before tsunami After tsunami
Fishing
Sea Lagoon
Labour work
Cash for work
Agricultural work
Ohers (specify)
2.23 Expenditure diagram: Expenditure Amount spent per month
Before tsunami After tsunami
Food
Clothing
School fees
Fuel
Maintenance
Others
2.24 Has the income disparity (difference) among the households increased / decreased after the tsunami? 3.0 Objective 2: to assess the role of various actors, with an emphasis on international
NGO’s, in post-tsunami livelihood reconstruction
Research Question 3: What are local peoples’ perceptions on external actors’ effects on the
reconstruction after the tsunami?
3.1 Do you or your community have contact with any:
1. International NGOs 2. National NGOs 3. Local NGOs/CBOs 4. Church 5. Temple 6. Mosque
a) if yes; 1. do you communicate with them? ______________________ 2. do they acknowledge your real needs? _________________
b) If no, are you receiving sufficient help in regards to livelihood revival? _____________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________ 3.3 Have you received equipment from any NGO? If yes: - what kind of equipment___________________________________________________ - from what NGO(s): ______________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________
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3.5 Do you feel that the people that are doing humanitarian work actually reach those who need it the most? _____________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________ 3.6 Who do you think is in charge and most powerful in the reconstruction process? ________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________ 3.7 What is your relationship with middlemen (mudalali) now compared to before the tsunami? ________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________ 3.8 Are you a member of an interest group? ___________________________________ 3.9 Do you feel that your community have sufficiently been able to participate and influence in the decision making processes regarding access to resources and property rights after the tsunami? ____________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________ 3.10 Where there any NGOs working here in your village before the tsunami? _________ ________________________________________________________________________
4.0 Objective 4: to assess the fishing productivity after the tsunami
4.1 Compare fishing before and after the tsunami: Change before/after Before After
Fish catch per day (total weight of fish caught?)
Species composition
Dominant species in same month before/after
Change in fish size (length)
Time spent per week
Distance out at sea
4.2 Have there been any change in number of people carrying out fishing after the tsunami compared to before? ________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________
4.4 Can you see any changes in regards to fishing practices now after the tsunami? ________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________ 4.5 Are the boat building that have occurred after the tsunami adequate? ____________ ________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 4.6 Who has donated the boats for you? _______________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________
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4.7 Did you receive the boats through: 1. the NGO came directly to me: _____________________________________________ 2. through the fishing cooperative ____________________________________________ 3. through the government __________________________________________________ 4. through the church/temple ________________________________________________ 5. through the grama sevaka ________________________________________________ 4.8 Do you feel that the most affected people are receiving boats and other fishing equipment? ______________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________ 4.9 Who are the people that are mainly receiving:
1. boats _____________________________________________________________ 2. canoes ____________________________________________________________
4.10 Has the boats built been of the right size, shape and quality? ________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________ 4.11 What type has mainly been distributed in this village? 1. canoe 2. small fiber glass day boat 3. multiday boat 4. engine 4.12 Do you feel there has been any differences of distribution of fishing boats and equipment between hindus, christians or muslims? ______________________________ _______________________________________________________________________ _______________________________________________________________________ 4.13 Have the civil conflict impacted much on your life? __________________________ ________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________ 5.0 General. 5.1 Overall, are you satisfied with the tsunami reconstruction process? Yes / no 5.2 What are your recommendations for improving the reconstruction? ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________
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Interview questions of International NGOs, NGOs, Government officials and other
relevant actors
Objective 2: to assess the role of various actors, with an emphasis on international
NGO’s, in post-tsunami livelihood reconstruction
Research Question 1: How do NGOs perceive the effects of the tsunami and what is their
understanding of the phenomena?
3.1 What are the economic, social and environmental effects of the tsunami? 3.2 What villages are you operating in? 3.2 What is your role and priorities in the in the reconstruction work Research Question 2: What approach do they use in the reconstruction work?
3.3 How did the various NGOs classify the victims? 3.5 What are the interactions between the NGOs and the government? 3.6 Do the NGOs involve the government in its activities and decision making?
To find out if there are any differences in the recovery between Muslims and Tamils:
3.7 How does your NGO select the village and households that you will help? 3.8 Do you work in both Tamil and Muslim villages? 3.9 What kind of help do you provide the people with? Research Question 4: What NGOs where operating in these communities before and after the
tsunami?
4.1 How is the reconstruction process going so far from your point of view? 4.2 Is you organization achieving what they have set out to achieve? 4.3 Are there any constraints in the reconstruction work, if so can you give an outline on this? 4.4 Who do you feel are in charge in the reconstruction process? 4.5 Do you feel any actors involved in the rebuilding process is misusing their role? 4.6 Do you find the local people cooperative? 4.7 Are the local people involved in much of the revival work or is it mainly carried out by external actors? 4.8 What does your organization emphasize as particular important in the rebuilding work? 4.9 Do you feel that you are reaching the people that really need your help? 4.10 Do you share your resources amongst all groups of people being hit by the tsunami, being Tamils, Muslims, Singalese? 4.11 Are there any differences regarding willingness to communicate and cooperate amongst the various groups of people? 4.12 Is the conflict between Tamils and Singalese creating problems for your work? 4.13 What do you think of the proposed buffer zone rule? 4.14 How do you think it will affect fishers being relocated? 4.15 Are there opportunities to diversify for these people if they no longer have access to the resources in the sea? 4.16 What are provided for them in terms of options to promote livelihood security? 4.17 Are the boat building that have occurred after the tsunami adequate? 4.18 How is the money allocated in terms of the rebuilding process in this region? 4.19 What channels does your organization go through in order to achieve your goals? Here
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thinking of operating directly to individuals or going through community based forums.
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Interview guide – Coordination bodies
• Your role in the post tsunami work • A key problem as it seems now a year after the tsunami: it is a protracted humanitarian
crisis. Much work is done but; o boats are of bad quality, o no nets or wrong nets, o over fishing, o ownership structure of boats might be changing, o many gaps to fill as affected people have not got sufficient help o big problem with hosing for affected people
• Relief/reconstruction work - coordination and distribution of goods to the affected people
• Governments role (and TAFREN) in the process • INGOs vs local NGOs • What is your view on creating ad-hoc organizations ? • NGO coordination, who do they go through when working here, is it departments,
fishing cooperatives, local NGOs or directly to beneficiaries? What is legally correct and what happens
• Beneficiary lists • Ownership issue. Land/house. What will happen to the people within/without buffer
zone? People without deed. • Land availability. Is there much state land available? • Flooding issue, will they be replaced again?
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Questionnaire for Fisheries Cooperative Societies (FCS) and Grama Sevaka
• How many families/households live in this village before/after the tsunami? • How many fishing households? • How many people are members of the FCS? • Why are some of the fishermen not members? • How many boat/canoe owners before/after the tsunami? • Do the boat owners fish themselves or do they only use labourers? • Do you think the ownership structure of boats have changed after the tsunami? • What NGOs have helped in this village? • Access to landing sites for people before/after • Are there criteria for becoming members of the FCS? • Do people need licenses to fish or can anyone carry out fishing in sea/lagoon? • Are there people that carry out illegal fishing in this area? • Lists on registered people needing fishing equipment and who has received equipment • How many of the fishermen died in the tsunami? • Have many fishermen started fishing again (when and how many) • How has the new role for the cooperative (having more power and money)
impacted/changed the cooperative? • What are the main tasks of the FCS before/after the tsunami? • Have your FCS received money or equipment such as boats, nets etc from any NGOs? • How is the distribution of boats and other equipment channeled? Does it go through
you, local NGOs and/or the government? • Do you provide credit or loan scheme for people in the village? • Are you still affected by the civil conflict in this village?
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Appendix 2. Selected pictures of vessels used in eastern Sri Lankan fisheries.
Canoes distributed after the tsunami
Day boats
Fishers back from fishing
