Tully_Two Meanings of Global Citizenship II_05

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Two Meanings of Global Citizenship: Modern and Diverse

James Tully, University of Victoria

The Meanings of Global Citizenship Conference

Liu Centre and Trudeau Foundation, UBC, September 9-10, 2005

I. Two contested ways of thinking about global citizenship

1. As Professors Byers and Zacher point out in their Introduction, there is a range ofmeanings of the phrase global citizenship and disagreement over their relativeimportance and appropriate use. This is to be expected. All complex political conceptswith a history are what Wittgenstein called family resemblance concepts. That is, they

have a range of different uses and there is not one essential feature common to eachmeaning, but, rather, overlapping similarities and dissimilarities among their varied uses(family resemblances). As a result, their use in particular cases is always open tocontestation and reasoned disagreement. These political concepts and their correspondinginstitutions and practices have been fought over historically and each generation inheritsthe variegated semantic field of uses handed down to them and continues the strugglesover their meanings, accepting some features while modifying others, in an endlessprocess of continuity and innovation. Global citizenship is no exception and is in factthe conjunction of two deeply contested concepts.

2. Among the various meanings of global citizenship today I would like to focus

exclusively on two contested types. Many of the most important struggles on the planetare overthese two meanings of global citizenship and the struggles themselves consist inthe exercise ofthese two practices of global citizenship.

3. These two forms of global citizenship have different names in different literature: lowintensity versus high intensity global citizenship, representative versus participatory, neo-liberal versus democratic, restrictive versus non-restrictive, civil versus civic, globalcitizenship from above versus citizenship from below, hegemonic versus counter-hegemonic, liberal democratic versus agonistic, global versus glocal, modern versusalternative modernities, hegemonic versus subaltern, and so on. The literature on lowintensity versus high intensity global citizenship is one of the closest formulations tothe analysis I present here of these two broad clusters of meanings and practices ofcitizenship.

4. I will call them modern and diverse. Both are modern in the sense of beingexercised over the last 200 years, yet the former is closely identified with the singularform of citizenship distinctive of the modern West and its global processes ofmodernization and citizenization of the non-West, whereas the latter is associated withthe idea of multiple or alternative modernities and modes of citizenship. Similarly, both

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have a place for diversity, but the latter is closely identified with global struggles for amultiplicity offorms of citizenship and a multiplicity of practices of governance in whichit is exercised, whereas the former restricts diversity to differences within the singularform and restricted location of modern global citizenship, on the claim that it is theuniversal type of global citizenship for all.

5. The reason why the concept of citizen and citizenship is indeterminate and hasseveral meanings, such as modern and diverse citizenship, is that it is defined in relationto two equally polysemic concepts: the rule of law and constitutionalism on the one sideand democratic participation and popular sovereignty on the other. Each meaning ofcitizenship interprets these two broad concepts of the rule of law and democratic participation in slightly different ways and weights them differently in relation tocitizenship. When citizenship is defined in relation to the rule of law, then it is seen as anopportunity concept: a status a person or group has in virtue of being recognized as thesubject of a normative order and the bearer of rights and duties. When it is defined inrelation to democracy, then it is seen as an exercise concept: a practice or activity that

citizens engage in within or over a normative order. Different meanings define andweight these two sides of citizenship differently and explain how they work togetherdifferently. Modern and diverse citizenship share this rich semantic field ofnomos (therule of law) and demos (democratic participation) but interpret it differently. Because thetwo meanings of citizenship share this rich semantic field of law and democracy, theyare not simple dichotomies or binary opposites, but overlapping, criss-crossing andsometimes conflicting in their applications.

6. Modern and diverse citizenship meanings share the idea that citizens are thesubjects or bearers of rights and duties guaranteed by the rule of law, that is, by somenormative order or what I will call relations of governance. But, they disagree over therelevant rights and duties andover the range of normative orders that count as the rule oflaw. Modern citizenship restricts the rule of law to one canonical type of legal orconstitutional order whereas diverse citizenship takes a wide and pluralistic range ofnormative orders to be instances of the rule of law.

They also both agree that what differentiates civic citizens from civil subjects is thatthey participate in having a say over the relations of governance to which they aresubjected and by which their conduct and interaction is coordinated and governed. This isthe democratic element in citizenship: we the people who are governed by a system ofrules or relationships of governance have a say over them. If the rules to which we aresubject in practices of governance are imposed on us by an internal tyrant, a foreignimperial power, or a structure of institutions and processes that subjectifies us behind ourbacks, then, by definition, we are passive subjects rather than active citizens. We arethus unfree in the democratic citizen sense and our powers of citizenship of self-rule,popular sovereignty, and self-determination are said to be usurped, dispossessed,restricted or colonized. Furthermore, if an imposed system is exempt from democratictransformation by those unfreely subjected to it, and permits only forms of citizenshipwithin its unalterable basic structure, then it is said to be closed rather than open (aconstitutional democracy but not a democratic constitution, for example).

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7. When the governed act as citizens and demand a say in the practices of governance towhich they are subject, they bring this practice under shared authority: that is, under theshared authority of citizens and governors in negotiation. They thereby democratize thepractice of governance. In virtue of participating in such activities, people who were

passive subjects subjectified by governing relationships become active citizens,transforming the way they are governed and their form of self-consciousness andconduct, and governing their governors in a reciprocal way. They become free in thecivic or citizenship sense. They become good citizens and, reciprocally, the rulers whoare constrained to listen and negotiate, become good governors.

8. Having a say and beinga citizen does not entail making the rules or governing directly,not does it require that the governed and governors are equal, although this is one end ofthe spectrum. In the Rousseauian tradition, for example, citizens are free only if they arethe actual authors of the laws from some point outside of the law (the state of nature orconstitutive assembly). Rather, it refers to the multiplicity of ways subjects can have a

say over relationships of power between governors and governed in which they findthemselves. In open systems they do this by challenging the ways they are governed,entering into negotiations with the powers that be in the various legal, political, cultural,social, civil institutions, movements and processes available for this, or in ad-hocnegotiations. They can participate individually or collectively, either directly or throughtrusted representatives, in local, national or global institutions, trying to reach agreementsover how to modify or transform the relationships and rules in question, implementingthe reforms, reviewing them, and starting over again.

9. Although both modern and diverse conceptions of global citizenship share thiscriterion of having a say over the rules to which the governed are subject, they define itand its cognate vocabulary in two contrasting and conflicting ways. For diverse globalcitizenship, the citizens right and responsibility of having a say over the relationshipsthrough which we are governed, and thus submitting it to shared democratic authority,applies in principle to any practice of governance in any area of life, just in virtue ofbeing governed, and in diverse ways. For modern global citizenship, it applies to arestricted subset of practices of governance and in a limited range of ways. From theperspective of diverse citizenship, therefore, modern global citizenship is one singularand historically contingent form of citizenship masquerading as universal; whereas, fromthe perspective of modern citizenship, diverse citizenship is uncivilized, anti-modern andillegitimate. The central differences are, therefore, which practices of governance areopen to citizenship and what modes of citizen practice are legitimate.

10. Diverse citizenship is prior to and complementary to modern citizenship in twosenses. Within European states, the rights of participation associated with moderncitizenship were fought and won by subjects who did not originally have these rights orthe right to organize and fight for them. They exercised their diverse citizenship incenturies of struggles as individuals, workers, women, immigrants, Indigenous peoples,gays, lesbians, oppressed minorities, environmentalists and so on to gain the democraticrights that are sometimes institutionalized in modern citizenship. Second, the kind of

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diverse citizen action of calling a relation of power into question and subjecting it to theshared authority of those subject to it, beyond the boundaries of the most recent formalinstitutionalization of modern citizenship, or conversely, the anti-democratic activity ofdownsizing the sphere of democratic citizenship, is a permanent feature of thedevelopment of modern citizenship. There is no fixed and universal meaning to modern

citizenship because the exercise of diverse citizenship by the governed constantlychallenges which relations of governance can be brought under shared authority and inwhat ways.

Since modern citizenship is paramount today, I will begin with it and its historicaldevelopment to a global form of citizenship.

II. The Globalization of Modern Citizenship

1. The defining feature of modern global citizenship is that it takes its singular andrestricted institutionalized form of citizenship as the uniquely civilized, modern and

universal form. It is globalized by means of Western formal and informal imperialism,and all other forms of citizenship are defined in contrast as uncivilized, less-developed,pre- or anti-modern, dysfunctional, insurgent, or lawless, and thus illegitimate and illegal.

2. Modern global citizenship can be roughly defined in terms of three features. First, anindividual is a citizen in virtue of a set of rights and duties, of formal equality andsubstantive inequality, relative to a formal legal system of civil laws that is effectivelyenforced by a coercive authority. The precondition of being a citizen in this civil senseis the imposition and effective enforcement of the rule of law from which the status ofcitizenship (rights and duties) derive. The imposition of law civilizes and thus createscitizens and civilization in this well-known Roman and Kantian sense. There are twopredominant traditions of interpretation of the requisite set of rights and duties of moderncitizenship at both the nation-state and global level: the liberal-democratic and neo-liberalwing and the social democracy and cosmopolitan democracy wing.

3. Second, regarding the democratic element of citizenship, citizens have a say in themaking oflaws by which they are governed in three ways: the practices and institutionsof elected representative government, the judicial system of courts, and civil society(freedom of assembly, voluntary associations, social movements, NGOS, free press),which mediates between the constitutional state and the private capitalist economy. SinceWorld War II more people have struggled for and won inclusion and a plurality of waysof participating in these canonical institutions (multiculturalism and multinationalism).The distinction between private and public constrains the exercise of citizenship in thesethree spheres to an island of democracy in a sea of non-democratic practices ofgovernance in the economic, military and other private spheres. Politics tends to bedefined by contests over the definition of the public and private by the two predominanttraditions of interpretation of these institutions: liberal democratic and social democratic.

4. Third, individual citizens, voluntary organizations, international civil society networks,and capitalist corporations (as persons) have the cosmopolitan right (ius commercium) to

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travel to and enter into any foreign country in the world, to enter into commercialrelations with the local people or their governments, and to have their ensuing privateproperty and private contracts coercively enforced under international private law and lexmercatoria, and by the local government, an imperial power, or an international league ofmodern or civilized nations of some kind. Every county has the correlative duty of

hospitality to be open to free trade in this sense, even where there have been centuries ofabuse of the right by imperial powers, and to protect the property and contracts offoreigners against local democratic control and expropriation. If the local governmentfails to uphold its duty of open door free trade, then the wronged imperial power (in the19th century), or the UN, a single state or a coalition of states (in the 20 th century), canintervene militarily to uphold the global cosmopolitan right of free travel and freecommerce and structurally adjust the local constitution along modern citizenship lines, just as states protect the market freedoms of its modern citizens and modern foreigncitizens in their own states.

5. The European imperial powers and the US globalized this form of modern citizenship.

During the 19

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century, European imperialism entered a second phase and colonized 85%of the globe. International law was reconfigured around the standard of civilization. TheEuropean imperial states (and the US after 1895) that had the three features of moderncitizenship (above) defined themselves as civilized. They defined the non-Europeancolonies and protectorates in contrast as uncivilized. The civilized imperial states weresaid to have the duty to civilize the peoples under their imperial control. This consistedin the duty of first forcefully opening non-European societies to the civilizing effectsof free trade dominated by Europe: that is, to gain control of the resources, labour andmarkets of the non-European world and to integrate them into competing imperialeconomies under their respective ownership. Second, it consisted in imposing a formalsystem of colonial laws on the colonies, dominions and protectorates, paramount overlocal, customary law, as a kind of proto-modern citizenship. This imposed structure oflaw tended to dispossess the imperialized peoples of their own systems of law, forms ofcitizenship, and usurped their democratic control over their own resources and labour,rendering them subject to an alien system of economic and legal relationships, while atthe same time protecting foreign corporations. Third, a plethora of voluntary andreligious organizations exercised their cosmopolitan rights of global civil society to enterthe colonies and help in the universal project of civilizing the natives, that is, of preparingthem for eventual modern citizenship.

6. While this is a clear case of domination and imposed despotism from the perspective ofdiverse citizenship, it is seen as the burden of civilizing and modernizing backward orless-developed peoples, through various stages of economic and legal development andmandate systems, from the universal perspective of modern citizenship. The three processes (above) worked imperfectly, faced multiple resistances, and producedunintended effects, contrary to the unilateral theories of civilizational development.

In summary, modern citizenship was globalized in two main ways before and during the19thc: the replication imperialism of imposing formal colonies around the world; and theimposition and coercive protection of the cosmopolitan right of open commerce under

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international law for corporations and voluntary civil society organizations (cosmopolitanimperialism).

7. In the twentieth century, the formal colonies were dismantled. Local political powerwas transferred to, or taken back by, westernized capitalist or socialist elites during

decolonization. While the decolonized (but not de-imperialized) peoples dreamed ofdiverse forms of citizenship, self-reliance, local democracy, alternative modernities or adialogical among diverse civilizations, the westernized elites, trapped in economic,military, technological and debt dependencies of the persisting imperial relationships,were constrained to continue what colonialism began: the destruction, overriding orsubordination of local communities, economies and legalities, and the rapid developmentof nationalizing subaltern regimes of uniform modern citizenship and civilizationdominated by the economies of the former imperial powers, or face the overwhelmingforce of military and financial power.

8. During the same period of decolonization and the Cold War, Western imperialism was

transformed from formal colonial rule to informal, infrastructural governance overnominally free subaltern states. Informal interactive imperialism is a unique form ofimperialism that is exercised over a world already rendered dependent, unequal andsubject to the hegemony of the former colonial powers by centuries of replication andcosmopolitan imperialism. It consists in the exercise of various unequal relations of power (economic, cultural, educational, debt, financial, loans, bribes, aid) over thenominally free subaltern peoples to constrain them to continue to develop along the linesof dependent modern global citizenship, all backed up by the threat of militaryintervention to protect the commercial and other rights of modern citizenship. Post-colonial subaltern peoples, with all their internal divisions, have a limited yetindeterminate range of possible actions within this unequal field, from assimilation at oneend through the multiplicity of ways of trying to modify the rules of the field fromwithin, to outright confrontation at the other. The result is a much more complex anddynamic system of unequal interaction than during the period of formal colonial rule.

9. After World War II a set of global institutions were established, mainly by the UnitedStates, to govern this global imperial system of modern citizenship, primarily through theWorld Bank, International Monetary Fund, and World Trade Organization, and,whenever possible, through the United Nations and voluntary coalitions of the formerimperial powers (the G8). In the same period, the leadership of the system passed fromthe competing European imperial powers to the United States, which had a century ofexperience with informal imperialism in Latin America, under the Monroe Doctrine andits corollaries. Woodrow Wilson gave expression to this new phase of westernimperialism and the new form of corporation capitalism. It consists in recognizing theright of self-determination of all peoples, and thus is anti-colonial, and the right of theUnited States to intervene in former colonies to ensure they determine themselves inaccordance with openness to free trade under US world hegemony. While proclaimingself-determination President Wilson invaded China, Haiti, Mexico and the DominicanRepublic to open them to free trade and protect American corporations from localdemocracy, and saw no contradiction in so doing.

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10. During the period of decolonization the imperial powers internationalized theirformer imperial duty to civilize the non-European world and the former coloniescriticized the language of a standard of civilization used by the League of Nations. Therights and institutions of modern global citizenship and the duty to make the world over

in its civilizational image were recast in the post-colonial terms of international rights,development, modernization, and democratization.

11. Similarly, international law is now said to promote a norm of democracy, meaningto recognize only liberal democratic countries that have elections, civil society, protectprivate property, and are open to capitalist development. Like the 19th century distinctionbetween civilized and uncivilized states, the states that fail to meet these criteria are notliberal or democratic, but less-developed and thus in need of economic developmentand democratization imposed by the Western powers. The interpretation of the norm ofdemocracy is contested at the global level by the two hegemonic Western traditions ofmodernization: the neo-liberal and cosmopolitan democracy wings.

12. Since World War II the means available to govern the conduct of whole countries andregions informally have increased exponentially. The WB and WTO, local elites, aidagencies, civil society organizations, non-governmental organizations, the globalmarketing of education, and multinational corporations work together in the leastdeveloped countries to break down their pre-modern ways and local self-reliance,integrate them further into the global economy, and build institutions of low intensitydemocracy. Under modernizing imperialism, the colluding civil society organizations play the role of the old religious societies and residential schools in the period ofcivilizational imperialism.

13. The transition to what Manuel Castells called network forms of economic, political,media and military organization in the 1980s increased the range and depth of globalinformal control of local self-governing nodes and global civil society immensely. Theunilateral proliferation of global juridical regimes such as GATT, the expansion ofTRIPPS and lex Mercatoria, and the neo-liberal revolution have privatized whole areasof life that were formerly open to modern or diverse forms of democratic citizenship,placing millions of people under the governance of multinational networked corporationsin which they have no say. And the supranational (or imperial) legal regimes override anderode modern citizenship at the national level.

14. The turn to global securitization after 9/11/2001 has provided the pretext to restrictmodern global citizenship even further than the neo-liberal revolution had achieved in theprevious decade. The neo-liberal revolution reduced modern citizenship to the firstfeature, a narrow reading of the second, and a strengthening of the third; that is, thecoercive enforcement of open door imperialism and market freedoms, often to therepression of the democratic feature, on the grounds that democratic freedoms willsomehow naturally follow market freedoms. This is justified by the revival of IsaiahBerlins infamous Cold War argument that liberal institutions do not require democraticfreedoms. Securitization deepens this trend, outlaws diverse citizenship altogether, and

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intensifies the executive enforcement and incarceration mechanisms of moderncitizenship.

15. Underlying the globalization and enforcement of modern citizenship in its nationaland cosmopolitan forms by means of informal imperialism are two military features. The

first is the dependency of subaltern states on the US run global arms market to sustain amilitary force capable of protecting the property rights of local and foreign elites againsttheir own democratic citizens. The second is the capacity of the US military to interveneimmediately anywhere on the planet if any people challenge the imposed regime ofmodern citizenship. Governance by intervention (threatened or actual) is based on thefull spectrum dominance of the United States over the globe by means of 725 militarybases around the world (and over 900 within the US) and the constant patrolling of theglobe by operatives, marines, navy, air force, satellites and the weaponization of space.The US military has divided the globe into four zones governed by four USCommanders in Chief (CINC) who make up the Joint Chiefs of Staff, like the formergovernors general of colonial empires, and equally paramount over the customary laws of

individual states in their respective regions. These imperial military relationships enforcethe modernization model and structure the field of any possible democratic action ofsubaltern peoples. As the neo-liberal imperialists put it, the hidden hand of the marketwill never work without the hidden fist McDonalds cannot flourish withoutMcDonnell Douglas, the designer of the US Air Force F-15.

16. Once these institutions and technologies of informal imperialism were firmly in placeby the end of the Cold War, the imperial networks could be run somewhat analogously alarge networked multinational corporation, more efficiently than they were run by the oldcumbersome and expensive formal, competing colonial imperial systems of thenineteenth century (actually more like the old Charter Companies imperialism of Britishindirect rule). The disanalogy, of course, that the subaltern states, while all unequal,dependent and formerly colonized (as we have seen), are internally complex andconflicted, differently situated relative to each other, and are able to exercise a range of powers available to them within and against the hegemonic relations of globalgovernance.

17. This whole project of globalizing modern citizenship and governing it by means ofinformal imperialism led by the US is laid out not only in the globalization literature ofFukuyama, Friedman, Ferguson, and Zakari, but also with great clarity in The NationalSecurity Doctrine of the United States of America (2002). Here the imposition of aregime of restricted modern citizenship by means of military intervention and continuousmilitary intervention until replication elites are sufficiently socialized is said to open acountry to market freedoms and global civil society; to bring freedom and democracyto oppressed peoples. This is said to be precisely the universal form of free citizenship allpeoples of the world want and which the United States, in virtue of its economic andmilitary superpower, is uniquely situated to deliver and exercise dominance. The spreadof the types of freedom and low intensity democracy of modern global citizenship is theprevailing justification of western imperialism today, as we see for example in Iraq andAfghanistan.

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18. Consequently, in addition to the globalization of modern citizenship by the imperialdevelopment of replication modern states and by means of the global protection of thecosmopolitan and commercial rights of modern citizens by international law and militaryintervention, there is also another kind of citizenship that develops around the global

governors who enforce these two processes of citizenization. This is the less formalrelationship between the governors of the global system and the various elites, subalterns,collaborators, influence peddlers, arms dealers, opinion moulders and courtiers. It wouldbe easy to quote the democratic critics of modernization imperialism, but this corruptionof democratic citizenship has caught the attention of the mainstream scholars andofficials as well. Here is how Susan Strange, an international political scientist, describesthe scene:

What is emerging is, therefore, a non-territorial empire with its imperial capital inWashington DC. If the imperial capitals used to attract courtesans of foreign provinces, Washington instead attracts lobbies and agents of international

companies, representatives of minority groups dispersed throughout the empire andpressure groups organized at a global scale As in Rome, citizenship is notlimited to a superior race and the empire contains a mix of citizens with the samelegal and political rights, semi-citizens, and non-citizens, such as the slavepopulation in Rome The semi-citizens of the empire are many and are spreadout. They include many people employed by big transnational firms that operatein the transnational structure of production that assists, as they all well know, theglobal market. This includes the people employed in transnational banking and,very often, the members of the national armed forces, especially those that aretrained, armed by, and dependent on the United States armed forces. It also includesmany scholars in medicine, the natural sciences and the social sciences, as in business management and economy, who view the American professionalassociations and universities as those peers before whose eyes they want to shineand excel. It also includes the people in the press and the mass media, for whom theAmerican technology and the examples offered by the United States have shownthe way, changing the established institutions and organizations.

19. How do the promoters and protectors of modern citizenship treat their citizens today?Here is how Samuel Huntingdon, a conservative realist, describes the form of rulepracticed by the United States government (not unknown to Canadian citizens concernedabout softwood lumber):

To press other countries to adopt American values and practices on issues such ashuman rights and democracy; to prevent that third countries acquire militarycapacities susceptible of interfering with American military superiority; to have theAmerican legislation applied to other countries; to qualify third countries withregard to their adhesion to American standards on human rights, drugs, terrorism,nuclear and missile proliferation and, now, religious freedom; to apply sanctionsagainst the countries that do not conform to the American standards on these issues;to promote the corporate American interests under the slogans of free trade and

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open markets and to shape the politics of the IMF and the World Bank to servethose same interests to force other countries to adopt social and economic policies that benefit the American economic interests, to promote the sale ofAmerican weapons and prevent that other countries do the same to categorizecertain countries as pariah states or criminal states and exclude them from the

global institutions because they refuse to prostrate themselves before the Americanwishes.

20. How well do the global leaders of the World Bank and WTO consult the democraticwishes of those they seek to democratize? As Iris Marion Young, a political theorist,comments on Globalization and its Discontents by Joseph Stiglitz, former head of theWorld Bank:

Joseph Stiglitz argues that the global economic system is now run by a dictatorshipof international finance. The global finance elites from the US and a few other G8countries, from the IMF, World Bank and WTO, aligned with private financial and

investment interests, effectively set the major terms of international and capitalmovement. Stiglitz acknowledges that these government, international organization,and business officials believe that they have the general interest of the worldspeople in view. The problems is that their background training, social positions, andthose to whom they are most directly accountable induce them to define this generalinterest in particular ways that are biased against the interests of most of the worldspoor.

21. And, how well does this system promote democratic citizenship and shared authorityin the subaltern states? W.I. Robinson, a Third World area specialist, writes that thepromotion of low intensity democracy is aimed not only at mitigating the social andpolitical tensions produced by elite-based and undemocratic status-quos, but also atsuppressing popular and mass aspirations for more thoroughgoing democratization ofsocial life in the 21st century international order.

III.Diverse global citizenship

1. The continuing imperial globalization of modern citizenship in its lowest intensityform is clearly the paramount pattern of global politics today. Nevertheless, it does notproceed unopposed as a necessary, inevitable and universal process of development, as itsproponents loudly claim. It is opposed by a multiplicity of global citizenship struggles to(1) reverse, reform and democratize from within the dwindling democratic freedoms ofmodern global citizenship (the social democratic agenda and proportional representationfor example); and (2) expand and diversify the practices of democratic citizenship, inorder to bring the anti-democratic relationships of governance of informal imperialismunder the shared authority of the people and peoples who are subjected to them withouttheir consent. As a result of these struggles, the processes of globalization are muchmore complex, interactive and indeterminate than the grand theories presume.

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2. From the perspective of diverse global citizenship, the unilateral imposition of modernglobal citizenship (or any institutionalized form of citizenship), without the say,negotiation and shared authority of the individuals and peoples who are subject to it, isthe violation of their democratic freedom - the usurpation and subalternization of theirpolitical, economic, legal and cultural citizenship. Yet, as we have seen, this is precisely

the basic injustice of globalization. Modern citizenship is too restrictive in Westernsocieties and both imposed and too restrictedin its colonizing forms. While it is designedto get at certain forms of oppression of the state over the liberal and market freedoms ofthe moderns it is too partial to get at the dominant forms of oppression and exploitationtoday. Indeed, as we have seen, it hides these other forms of oppression under the mantraof uniform modernization, globalization and democratization.

3. The relations of power and knowledge that govern our conduct and interaction asindividuals, groups, classes, peoples and supranational communities in oppressive andexploitive ways are complex: multiplex, overlapping, criss-crossing and constantlychanging. They are not all conveniently located in the state or the economy, and they are

not controlled by a single class standing above the field of power, as the classic liberaland Marxists models held. To understand these diverse practices of governance, criticizethem, and bring them under the shared democratic authority of those subject to them inculturally sensitive ways that do not engender new forms of oppression is an endlessseries of contextual tasks of citizenship tailored to the specific forms of unfree practicesof governance by the people who are governed by them. This is the field of diversecitizenship.

4. The major problem of global citizenship today is the continuation and intensification ofWestern imperial rule in a new informal mode outlined in section II: the proliferation ofinformal imperial networks of economic, legal, cultural, media, security, and militaryrelations of power and subjectification that not only bypass the diverse citizenship of themillions of people who are subject to them, but also manipulate, downsize or disregardthe representative and legal instititutions of modern global citizenship that werehistorically designed to bring them under shared representative authority. This is adouble crisis of modern and diverse citizenship.

5. As we have seen, the worst dimension of these processes of de-citizenization is thesituation of the former colonized peoples within the informal relations of imperialdomination and exploitation that govern the field of their possible political and economicactions. The weak, replication institutions of western modern global citizenship imposedon them during 500 years of imperialism and the dependent elites who profit from themremove their political and economic affairs from the popular sovereignty of the people.These structures in turn are subordinated to a system of international laws and economicrelations over which they have no say but which determine their economic developmentto the benefit of the imperial powers and to the detriment and indebtedness of the localpeople, usually in the form of resource extraction, single-crop agriculture for export, andsweat shops. These global relationships in turn are governed by states, global institutionsand multinational corporations over which they have no say.

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6. If they resist and try to bring these relationships under some kind of shared authority by practices of citizenship, courageous elected leaders are removed or assassinated, popular movements are repressed by their own elites, or military intervention andoccupation defeats the movements, restructures the constitution, rebuilds the police force,works with civil society organizations to create a modernizing, export-oriented civil

society, and builds a new global military base nearby. If citizens turn to self-determination, the classic tool of collective citizenship, they find that this has alreadybeen integrated into the repertoire of informal imperial rule since the time of formaldecolonization. All this is justified in terms of bringing modern freedoms anddemocratization to a rogue or dysfunctional state. As Partha Chatterjee comments,Europe and the Americas, the only true subjects of history, have thought out on ourbehalf not only the script of colonial enlightenment and exploitation, but also that of ouranti-colonial resistance and post-colonial misery.

7. Oxfam concludes that western modernization imperialism is a form of continuous lowintensity warfare against democratic self-reliance. The majority of the worlds population

in the (informally) imperialized states is now more impoverished than under earlierformal colonial rule, after three successive waves of modernization and democratizationpolicies since Decolonization. 840 million people are malnourished. 6,000,000 childrenunder the age of 5 die each year as a consequence of malnutrition. 1.2 billion people liveon less than $1 a day and half the worlds population lives on less than $2 a day. 91 outof every 1,000 children in the developing world die before 5 years old. 12 million dieannually from lack of water. 1.1 billion people have no access to clean water. 2.4 billionpeople live without proper sanitation. 40 million live with AIDS. 113 million childrenhave no basic education. 1 in 5 does not survive past 40 years of age. There are onebillion non-literate adults, two-thirds are women and 98% live in the developing world.In the least developed countries, 45% of the children do not attend school. In countrieswith literacy rate of less than 55% the per capita income is about $600.

8. In contrast, the wealth of the richest 1% of the world is equal to that of the poorest57%. The assets of the 200 richest people are worth more than the total income of 41% ofthe worlds people. Three families alone have a combined wealth of $135 billion. Thisequals the annual income of 600 million people living in the worlds poorest countries.The richest 20% of the worlds population receive 150 times the wealth of the poorest20%. In 1960, the share of the global income of the bottom 20% was 2.3%. By 1991, thishad fallen to 1.4%. The richest fifth of the worlds people consume 45% of the worldsmeat and fish; the poorest fifth consume 5%. The richest fifth consume 58% of totalenergy, the poorest fifth less than 4%. The richest fifth have 75% of all telephones, thepoorest fifth 1.5%. The richest fifth own 87% of the worlds vehicles, the poorest fifthless than 1%.

9. Despite the horrendous inequalities of life-situations, the massive powers of inclusionand assimilation, and the brutal techniques of repression when these fail, subjectscontinue to try to act as citizens in a diversity of ways. Let me mention four importantways.

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The first is that the imperial globalization of restricted modern citizenship by colonial andpost-colonial means has not been as deep and effective as its defenders and critics havepresupposed. Beneath the veneer of globalization lies another world of legal, political,cultural, citizen and even economic pluralism that has survived, to varying degrees,within the interstices of the processes of modernization we have discussed. The entire

imperial world picture of modern state-centred and global citizenship and its technologiesof implementation are not universal and comprehensive in either theory or practice. Thereare alternative modernities, alternative civilizations, and alternativecosmopolitanisms, that are both the imaginaries and the lived experience of millions ofpeople in the colonized world (as well as in the alternative cultures in the imperial states).The reason for this remarkable survival of alternative modernities, unknown to thedominate debate, is that western imperialism has always depended upon the collaborationof imperialized peoples and, as a result, those who have not been westernized have beenable to keep their forms of legal and political associations and diverse modes ofcitizenship alive to some extent, under both colonial and informal imperialism.

The most astonishing example of the survival of diverse citizenship is the survival andrenaissance of 250 million Indigenous peoples who have survived 500 years of genocide,dispossession, marginalization, assimilation, colonial rule, and the imposition of westernforms of government and economic organization. Consequently, the lived experience ofthe present age is very different and more multiplex than the flat world and smoothworld that is seen through the neo-liberal and neo-Marxist world-pictures ofglobalizaton.

10. Second, even where people have been constrained to work within the imposedinstitutions of modern citizenship, they have been able think and act differently withinand sometimes against the institutionalized form. The reason for this is that in any systemof rule and subjection, there is always a certain room to maneuver in following the rulesof the game; from the silent non-cooperation in total institutions of modernization like thearmy and the residential school, to the hidden scripts and arts of resistance, to some of therecent struggles of multiculturalism and multinationalism, to the more challengingexercises of diverse citizenship to radically transform these imposed institutions from theinside. The latter are exemplified by the non-violent forms of resistance, political andeconomic democracy, and self-reliant fair trade versus free trade practiced by Gandhi andVandana Shiva.

11. Third, after decolonization and the turn to informal imperialism, millions of theworlds poor have been forced to migrate from the colonized world to the imperialcenters to find work, and these diasporas are closely controlled and monitored by thepowers-that-be. Despite the immense hardships and forms of discrimination and non-recognition, they have refused to be servile subjects and have exercised their citizenshipin new and untoward ways, modifying and culturalizing the straightjacket of moderncitizenship in the capital cities and reversing the relations of communication, culture andcommunity between imperial centre and colonies. This boomerang effect or journeyback has created deeply diverse cultural communities in the capital cities and newdiasporic supranational communities of immigrants with their home countries. These

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counter-imperial and counter-national forms of diverse citizenship are bound together bynew kinds of citizen solidarity across similarities and differences that Paul Gilroy callsconviviality.

12. Fourth, because many of the hegemonic forms of power that undermine citizenship

today take the form of informal networks, a new type of diverse citizenship hasdeveloped in opposition. These counter-hegemonic networks of the globalization ofcitizenship from below link together local nodes, organized in diverse citizenship ways,into global networks that have the capacity to act together to bring undemocratic relationsof governance under the shared authority of the governed in various spheres. They thinkand act both globally and locally in what is called glocaldiverse citizenship. Sometimesthey act to confront undemocratic networks of power directly and force them to negotiate.Other times they act to bring undemocratic concentrations of power into therepresentative institutions and courts of national and global modern citizenship, helpingto reform and strengthen these traditional institutions. The actors involved are oftenorganized into NGO or CSO (civil society organization) forms of citizenship that directly

counter the CONGOs (coopted NGOs) that work on the hegemonic side of a particularstruggle. Here, the very relations of power that are employed to constrain them to adaptto a restrictive form of neo-liberal global citizenship turn out to be able to be used tochallenge and modify these relations.

13. These networks of diverse citizens - who see themselves engaging in counter-hegemonic globalization or globalization from below - take a multiplicity of forms andbring together a multiplicity of individual and collective actors from any node in theinformal networks that govern our conduct and interaction, from the poorest peasants tointernational lawyers, retired business people and democratically-minded technicalexperts. There is not a privileged actor, a privileged set of institutions, or a privileged setof procedures in bringing oppressive networks of power under shared authority, as therewere in earlier forms of citizen resistance to formal colonization. These older forms ofcollective citizenship such as revolutions of decolonization, nation-state building andthe support of international voluntary organizations - have been found to be asinappropriate to the current situation as the single model of modern citizenship. Theseforms of citizenship are specific to the forms of power they address. Again, the reasonthis kind of diverse citizenship is possible and appropriate in our times is that there isalways a limited room to maneuver within the informal relations of power; to modifythem from within and even transform them. The diversity of forms can be seen in thisshort list of examples: Fair trade (in the interstices of free trade), the Landless WorkersMovement, Food Sovereignty, Porto Allegro participatory democracy, the movements todemocratize the UN, the Land Mines Convention, the International Forum onGlobalization, the environmental movement, and countless others. Even in the highlystructured world of international law, networks of officially unrecognized and uninvitedcitizen networks (non-state actors) can make a difference by working to change theinternational normative orders from within.

14. The World Social Forum has emerged as the forum for these four types of counter-hegemonic diverse citizenship today. It stands in opposition to the World Economic

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Forum, the forum of hegemonic, neo-liberal citizenship. Representatives from thousandsof alternative modernities, local struggles and glocal networks come to discuss theirdifferent forms of citizenship and learn from each other. This commitment to diversecitizenship is the first thesis of the WSF:

Even as there is biodiversity and it must be defended, there is also demodiversity,and it must be defended as well. There is not, therefore, one form of democracyalone, i.e. liberal representative democracy. There are several other forms, such asdirect, participatory, deliberative, intercultural democracy. But outside the Westernworld and culture there are still other forms of democracy which must be valorized.Take, for example, the autonomous government of the Indigenous communitiesaswell as the traditional authorities in Africa or the panchayats in India. The point isnot to accept uncritically any of these forms of democracy, but rather to makepossible their inclusion in the debates about the deepening and radicalization ofdemocracy.

15. The WSF works in two ways.First, instead of trying to force these diverse forms ofcitizenship into a single allegedly universal mould, the role of the forum is to enabletranslation among the diverse actors and their diverse ways of enacting citizenship,without hierarchy or reduction, so they are always aware of the partiality of their ownperspective and do not try to impose it on others or falsely universalize it, as in themodern citizenship model. The point is to create, in every movement or NGO, in everypractice or strategy, in every discourse or knowledge, a contact zone that may render it porous and hence permeable to other NGOs, practices, strategies, discourses, andknowledges. Second, instead of constructing theories of citizenship in ivory towers, theWSF aims to link academic research more closely to citizen practice on the ground innetworks of reciprocal elucidation between citizen groups and academics. Of course, agreat deal of academic research is moving in this direction and the Trudeau Foundationsupports fellows and scholars engaged in it. The Forum aims to go further and to create apopular university of social movements (PUSM). The objective is to make knowledge ofalternative globalization (diverse citizenship) as global as globalization itself.

16. The most dangerous immediate threat to global citizenship today, both modern anddiverse, is securitization and militarization of more and more areas of life. This trendseverely restricts modern citizenship and represses diverse citizenship, thereby closingthe door on glocal movements for self-reliant, democratic economic development againstworld poverty, and engendering the more extreme anti-democratic and almost mirror-image terrorist networks in response, whereas what is needed is more openness to self-reliant democratic citizenship. But even in these extreme conditions, the average suicidebombers apparently do not believe in an anti-democratic theology or wish to colonize theWest. They simply want the imperial powers to leave their homeland and their resources,and these are the only instruments of citizen action left to them. Yet these desperateactions provide the pretext for more rounds of securitization and further assaults ondemocratic citizenship.

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17. If this brief analysis has some plausibility, then the guarantee of global citizenship isneither securitization nor the imposition of one form of citizenship, but, as we know fromour own history, the patient and obstinate diverse practices of citizens themselves.

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Endnotes

The numbers refer to the sections in the text.

I. Two contested ways of thinking about global citizenship

1. See James Tully, Political Philosophy as a Critical Activity, Stephen White andDonald Moon, eds., What is Political Theory (2004), 80-102.

3. The concept of low intensity citizenship and democracy was originally developed byGills, B., Rocamora, J., Wilson, R., eds. Low Intensity Democracy: Political Power in theNew World Order (1993) and Robinson, W.I., Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, USIntervention, and Hegemony (1996) in their studies of the democratization ofGuatemala, Argentina, the Philippines, Chile, Nicaragua and Haiti. It is now widely usedto contrast with high intensity, or broader and more participatory forms of citizenship.

4. I have discussed these two types of citizenship in more detail in Democracy andGlobalization, in Ronald Beiner and Wayne Norman, eds., Canadian PoliticalPhilosophy, (2001), 36-62, and The Unfreedom of the Moderns in relation to their idealsof Constitutionalism and Democracy, Modern Law Review, 65, 2 (2003), 205-228.

II. The Globalization of Modern Citizenship

4. See Edward Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society (2002) and Martti Koskenniemi,The Gentle Civiler of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960 (2001)for the historical development of this modern national and global system.

5. Gerrit W. Gong, The Standard of Civilization in International Society (1984) andabove, note 4. For a comparative analysis of how the European empires and the UnitedStates dispossessed the non-European world of its land by means of different legalsystems, see John C. Weaver, The Great Land Rush and the Making of the ModernWorld 1650-1900 (2003). For a review of recent work on the third dimension of thecivilizing project, see Ann Laura Stoler, Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Raceand the Intimate in Colonial Rule (2002). Gong, Keene, and Koskenniemmi all argue thatthere have always been two systems of international law: one for the civilized sovereignstates where the norm of non-intervention applies; and another for the relations betweenthe civilized and uncivilized states, where intervention to protect the third feature ofmodern citizenship has always applied. After World War II and the founding of theUnited Nations and the global Bretton Woods institutions, the terms developed anddeveloping, democratic and democratizing were substituted for civilized anduncivilized, but the dual system continued. Indeed, the language of civilized anduncivilized returned to the dominant discourse in the 1990s. For a recent reformulationof this doctrine, see The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty,The Responsibility to Protect (2001).

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6. Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer, 98-179. For the role of the mandate systems, seeWilliam Bain, Between Anarchy and Society: Trusteeship and the Obligations of Power(2003).

7. Prasenjit Duara, ed. Decolonization: Perspectives from then and now (2004). For the

military dependency, see Alexander Wendt and Michael Barnett, Dependent Stateformation and Third World Militarization, Review of International Studies, 19 (1993),321-347. For the debt dependency, see Noreena Hertz, The Debt Threat: How Debt isDestroying the Developing World (2004).

8. The concept of informal imperialism was introduced by Ronald Robinson, ImperialTheory and the Question of Imperialism after Empire, The Journal of Imperial andCommonwealth History, 12, 2 (January 1984) 42-54, and Wolfgang Mommsen, The Endof Empire and the Continuity of Imperialism, in Mommsen and Osterhammel, eds.,Imperialism and after: Continuities and Discontinuities (1986), 333-358. It is now widelyused by scholars of contemporary imperialism. For a recent overview of US informal

imperialism, see Stephen Howe, American Empire: the history and future of an idea,OpenDemocracy 12 June 2003, 1-12, www.openDemocracy.net. I have discussed itsdistinctive logic in Law, Democracy, and Imperialism, Annual Law and SocietyLecture, Faculty of Law, University of Edinburgh, March 10-11, 2005 (forthcoming). Seealso Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey, Retrieving the Imperial: Empire and InternationalRelations, Millennium, 31, 1 (2002), 109-127.

9. For the rise of US informal imperialism to global rule through the 20 th century, see NeilSmith, American Empire: Roosevelts Geographer and the Prelude to Globalization(2003) and Andrew Bacevich, American Empire: the Realities and Consequences of U.S.Diplomacy (2002). Bacevich shows the continuity of US open door informalimperialism from President Wilson to today. For a critical review of the Bretton Woodsglobal institutions as instruments of imperial rule today, see Joseph Stiglitz, Globalizationand Its Discontents (2002) and below note 20.

10. Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society, and Smith, American Empire, and note 5above.

11. This thesis of an international norm of democracy was originally advanced by AnneMarie Slaughter and Thomas Franck in the early 1990s. See the analysis and criticism ofit from the perspective of diverse citizenship by Susan Marks, The Riddle of allConstitutions (2000).

12. See the case studies of Ghana and Uganda by Alison Ayers, DemystifyingDemocratization: The Global Constitution of Liberal Politics in Africa, in Third WorldQuarterly (forthcoming, Winter 2005), Duncan Green, The Rise and Crisis of MarketEconomies in Latin America (2003), and Gills, et al, Low Intensity Democracy.

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13. For the network revolution and its effect on democratic citizenship, see James Tully,Communication Networks, Hegemony, and Communicative Action, ConwebConstitutional Papers (June 2005),www.qub.ac.uk/pais/Research/PaperSeries/ConWEBPapers/ . For the proliferation of lexMercatoria and supranational legal regimes that restrict global democracy and override

national democracy, see Claire Cutler, Private Power and Global Authority:Transnational Merchant Law and the Global Political Economy (2003).

14. For the defence of US imperialism in terms of the spread of neo-liberalism detachedfrom democratic freedom, see Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom: IlliberalDemocracy at Home and Abroad (2003) and William Odom and Robert Dujarric,Americas Inadvertent Empire (2004). For a critical account of the liberal informalimperialists, see Rahul Rao, The Empire Writes Back (to Michael Ignatieff),Millennium, 33, 1 (2004), 145-166, and Jeanne Morefield, Covenants without Swords:Idealist Liberalism and the Spirit of Empire (2005). For a similar criticism of theimperialism of the cosmopolitan or social democratic wing of globalization, see Patrick

Bond, Top Down or Bottom Up?, and Benjamin Barber, Global Governance fromBelow, both in David Held, ed. Debating Globalization (2005), 82-93, 93-106, andDavid Helds reply, Ibid., 141-167.

15. For the global military empire, see Chalmers Johnson, Sorrows of Empire:Militarism, Secrecy and the End of the Republic (2004). It is outlined in the US militarysJoint Vision 2020 at www.dtic.mil/jointvision/. The famous quotation that the hiddenhand needs the hidden fist comes from Thomas Friedman, a leading spokesperson for thenew imperialism: The Lexus and the Olive Tree (1999).

16. Bacevich, American Empire.

17. President of the United States, The National Security Strategy of the United States ofAmerica (September 2002), www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf. See Johnson, Sorrows ofEmpire, for the analysis of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars in this light.

18. Susan Strange, Towards a theory of transnational empire, in E.O. Czempiel and J.Roseneau, eds., Global Change and Theoretical Challenge (1989).

19. Samuel Huntingdon, The Lonely Superpower, Foreign Affairs, 78, 2. Huntingdonsthesis that the United States disregards the rules that it imposes on others when it is intheir military and economic interest to do so is supported by Philippe Sands, LawlessWorld: America and the Making and Breaking of Global Rules (2005).

20. Iris Marion Young, Modest Reflections on Hegemony and Global Democracy,World Congress of Philosophy, Istanbul (2003). Michael Chossudousky, TheGlobalization of Poverty and the New World Order (2003) agrees that the World Bankand World Trade Organization govern the developing world, and argues that the UnitedStates enforces their rules by means of its military dominance.

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21. Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy, 6. See also Walden Bello, Dilemmas of Domination:the Unmaking of the American Empire (2005) for similar conclusions.

III.Diverse global citizenship

4. For a more detailed presentation of this claim, see Tully, Unfreedom of the Moderns,above I.4.

6. Partha Chaterjee, The Nation and its Fragments: Colonial and Post-Colonial Histories(1993), 5. For a recent overview of this kind of history in Latin America, see GregGrandin, The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America and the Cold War (2004). For asurvey of the informal imperial control of self-determination revolutions during and afterDecolonization, see Duara, Decolonization, and James D. Le Sueur, ed. TheDecolonization Reader (2002). For a recent restatement of Chaterjees tragic conclusion,see David Scott, Conscripts of Modernity: the Tragedy of Colonial Enlightenment(2005).

7. Jeremy Seabrook, The No-Nonsense Guide to World Poverty (2003), 53. All thestatistics come from this volume and they are cited from United Nations publications.

8. Ibid.

9. For a recent world history of legal and political pluralism, see Lauren Benton, Law andColonial Cultures 1400-1900 (2001). For the alternative modernities movement, seeDipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe (2000) and Dilip P. Gaonkar, ed. AlternativeModernities (2001). For Indigenous Peoples, see Jeremy Mander and Victoria Tauli-Corpuz, Paradigm Wars: Indigenous Peoples Resistance to Economic Globalization, aspecial report of the International Forum on Globalization and the Committee onIndigenous Peoples (2004). For a rejoinder to the flat world view of the grand theoristsof globalization, see John Gray, The World is Round, The New York Review of Books,LII, 13 (August 11, 2005).

10. See Jai Sen and Anand Escobar, eds., Challenging Empires (2004) and VandanaShiva, The Living Democracy Movement: Alternatives to the Bankruptcy ofGlobalization (2002). For the global contest between free trade and self-reliant fairtrade, see Graham Dunkley, Free Trade: Myth, Realities and Alternatives (2004).

11. Paul Gilroy, After Empire: Melancholia or Convivial Culture? (2005).

12. For an overview of the field, see Louise Amoore, The Global Resistance Reader(2005).

13. One of the best introductions to this enormous field of diverse glocal citizenship is thesyllabus of Professor Robert Hershey, Faculty of Law, University of Arizona, for Law697B, Globalization and the Transformation of Culture: A curriculum for social inquiryand responsibility. For the social constructivist research on challenging and modifying

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international norms, see the work of Stephen Toope and Jutta Brune, and see the casestudy by Asher Alkoby, Non-State Actors and the Legitimacy of InternationalEnvironmental Law, Non-State Actors and International Law, 3 (2003), 23-98.

14. Boaventura de Sousa Santos, The World Social Forum: A Users Guide (2004),

www.ces.uc.pt/bss/documentos/fsm_eng.pdf, accessed July 14, 2005, at 107 for the firstthesis.

15. Sousa Santos, World Social Forum, 122-139 (on translation), and 140-148 (onPopular University of Social Movements).

16. This is also appears to be Kofi Annans view of the immediate threat and the properdemocratic response. See Report of the Secretary General of the United Nations, InLarger Freedom: towards development, security, and human rights for all (21 March2005). I also take the title, larger freedom, to be a diplomatic allusion to the contrastbetween low intensity and high intensity democracy. See Johanna Mendelson Forman,

In Larger Freedom: Kofi Annans challenge, OpenDemocracy (23 March 2005). For theempirical research on the motivation of suicide bombers, see Robert Pape, Dying to Win:the Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (2005).

17. See I.10 above.
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