Turkey Watch_EU Member States Perceptions on Turkey’s Accession to the EU

8/6/2019 Turkey Watch_EU Member States Perceptions on Turkeys Accession to the EU

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i

TURKEY WATCH: EU MEMBER STATES

PERCEPTIONS ON TURKEYS

ACCESSION TO THE EU

Edited by:

Sait Akit,zgehan enyuva, idem stn


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Turkey Watch: EU Member States Perceptions on Turkeys Accession to the EU

ISBN: 978-605-89751-2-5

A publication of the Center for European Studies, Middle East Technical University

Any part of this publication may be fully reproduced in any form for educational or non-

profit uses with appropriate acknowledgement. No use of this publication may be made for

resale or other commercial purposes without prior written permission of the Center for

European Studies, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey.

Strengthening and Integrating Academic Networks(SInAN)

Publication funded by the Strengthening and Integrating Academic Networks(SInAN) project

(Grant Contract Nr. TR0604.01-03/092) which is implemented by the Center for European

Studies, Middle East Technical University under the Programme Promotion of Civil Society

Dialogue between the EU and Turkey: Universities Grant Scheme in coordination with the

Secretariat General for EU Affairs. The contracting authority for this project is the Central

Finance and Contracts Unit

The contents and publications of the SInAN project are the sole responsibility of the Center for

European Studies, Middle East Technical University and can in no way be taken to reflect the

views of the European Union.

The opinions expressed herein are only those of the authors and do not reflect any

institutional views.

Page and Cover design by

Ylmaz Alaahan

First Published: 2010

Printed in Turkey by

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Contents

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Turkey Watch: EU Member States Perceptions

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Introduction: In Search of an EU-wide Debate on Turkey

1

Turkey was accepted as an eligible candidate for EU membership at

the Helsinki Summit in December 1999, and began her negotiations

process for membership in October 2005. This was a period with very

positive developments in the relations between Turkey and the EuropeanUnion (EU), leading to a series of reform packages in Turkey with an

aim to fulfil the needs and requirements of Turkeys aspiration of

membership. The same period corresponded to an important era of

developments and attempts, first by the Ecevit government and then by

the Gl and Erdoan governments, to transform Turkeys internal and

external policies. At times, these attempts provided serious challenges on

very sensitive issues. Some of the important developments of the periodare the reconsideration of Turkeys foreign policy priorities and attempts

at solving long-standing disputes, such as the problematic relations with

Greece and the question of Cyprus.

Things have changed since the start of the negotiations process, and

the period between 2006 and 2009 has had its ups and downs; in fact,

*The opinions expressed herein are only those of the authors and do not reflect any

institutional views


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more downs than ups. This has various reasons. One of the most

expressed criticisms of this period has been the assessment that Turkey

has not accomplished much since 2006. In fact, the reform process wasargued to have slowed down, and at times to have come to a halt. On the

EU side, the lack of progress in Turkeys reform process is cited as an

important reason for lack of progress in the negotiations process.

Shortly after the start of the negotiations process, these claims were

coupled with calls, on the EU side, for alternatives to Turkeys full

membership. This corresponded with the change of leadership, first in

Germany and then in France. German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who

came to power in November 2005, strongly advocated a privileged

membership of Turkey rather than full membership. This position was

also asserted by French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who was elected to

the French presidency in May 2007, first during his election campaign

and later during his presidency. The election of the adamantly-opposed

Sarkozy to the presidency meant a turning point in Frances official

position on Turkeys membership to the EU1, and was followed up by

what was perceived in Turkey as an alternative for full membership: the

proposal of the Union for the Mediterranean.

Thus, in Turkey, the picture seems more mixed. First, it is believed

that there is an increasing ambiguity in the messages given to Turkey by

the institutions of the EU as well as by the leaders of some EU member

states, including Merkel and Sarkozy. The proposals for an alternative to

membership, plus political statements and comments on Turkeys

sensitive internal and external policy issues, have reinforced the feeling

of ambiguity; this has led to a commonly held belief that some of the

leaders of EU member states are creating new conditions and obstacles

which are not officially part of the accession negotiations process, with

1As also put forward by Nicolas Monceau in his chapter for this book.


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an aim to keep Turkey out. Indeed, in Turkey it was expected that the

accession process would not be easy after the EU membership of the

Republic of Cyprus2

, whose citizens largely perceive Turkey as themain party responsible for a lack of resolution to the Cyprus problem.

These concerns proved to be true, with the unofficial Greek Cypriot

blockage of certain chapters of the negotiations process, and the fears of

a train crash in December 2006. Indeed, Turkeys process of

negotiations proved to be more difficult, and the road to membership

thornier, than envisaged. The calls for a privileged partnership, the

proposal of the Union for the Mediterranean, the pressure on the

extension of the protocol of the Ankara agreement to include Cyprus,

and the calls for the opening of air and sea ports to Cyprus are all

strongly perceived in Turkey as trials intended to create new obstacles or

promote an alternative relationship with Turkey. Furthermore, the EUs

ongoing debate on Turkeys Europeanness and repeated questioning of

the nature of Turkeys candidacy only reinforce the myths and prejudices

regarding the EU, in Turkey.

We believe that there are serious, damaging myths and prejudices in

Turkey about the EU, on the one hand, and in the EU member states

about Turkey, on the other. One of the starting points of the project on

Strengthening and Integrating Academic Networks (SInAN) was to

question the myths and prejudices embedded in this ambiguous

relationship. This edited volume is an attempt to outline how Turkeyscandidacy is perceived by different actors in a number of EU member

states. While Turkish membership to the EU, its opportunities and

challenges for all parties are widely discussed, it is rather difficult to find

2As officially named, the Republic of Cyprus, although accepted by the EU to

represent the whole island in the EU, is not representative of the Turkish Cypriot

Community on the island. The Republic of Cyprus in this volume therefore refers tothe Greek Cypriot administered part of the island, and perceptions in Cyprus refers toGreek Cypriot perceptions.


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comprehensive analysis that brings together the positions and arguments

of different actors in different countries. In fact, at a very general level, it

is argued that Turkeys accession into the EU is one of the mostcontroversial topics deeply dividing both the EU governments and their

citizens. Indeed, there is very limited literature on the European

perceptions on Turkeys membership into the EU, and almost none that

tries to tackle all relevant stakeholders, such as the government, the

opposition, the public and the elites, by exploring their views and

examining the media coverage of those views within different countries.3

This volume is an output of the project on Strengthening and

Integrating Academic Networks (SInAN), funded by the EU under the

Promotion of Civil Society Dialogue between the EU and Turkey:

Universities Grant Scheme. Turkey Watch has its origins in the early

stages of the SInAN proposal aiming to follow the example of EU-27

Watch4, prepared under the EU-CONSENT project which was

coordinated by our partner, Jean Monnet Centre, University of Cologne.

With this publication, the Center for European Studies, Middle East

Technical University, as the main coordinator of SInAN, intends to

question the myths that characterise the terms of the current debate on

Turkeys EU integration process and to facilitate better knowledge and

understanding of Turkey within the EU and of the EU within Turkey.

Although the envisaged content of the volume has changed over time,

resulting in views from different EU member states on Turkish candidacyto the EU, the main objectives remained the same. Turkey Watch

addresses one general question, which is the following: How has

3One exception to this is the TEPAV-IAI Talking Turkey series; Natalie Tocci (ed.),

Talking Turkey in Europe: Towards a Differentiated Communication Strategy,

Quaderni IAI, December 2008. Also, for some detailed analysis on European public

opinion, see Antonia R. Jimnez and Ignacio T. Pay,European Public Opinion and

Turkeys Accession: Making Sense of Argument For or Against, EPIN, European PolicyInstitutes Network Working Paper no. 16, 2007.4

http://www.eu-consent.net/content.asp?contentid=522


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Turkeys candidacy been perceived in EU member states between the

years 2006 and 2009? We asked different experts from the member states

to take up the question, and to give qualitative insights by considering theperceptions of some of the main actors in their respective countries: the

governments, the opposition parties, the civil society organisations and

the media.

Different experts provided us with insights on France, Germany,

Belgium, Italy, Spain, Greece, Sweden, Austria, Republic of Cyprus5,

Czech Republic, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria. This particular group of

EU member states reflects a number of concerns. First, it represents a

wide geographical distribution, including member states from southern,

northern, central and eastern Europe. Second, the group includes member

states from each successive enlargement process of the EU. Third, it

includes core, old, new, small and large member states. Fourth, it

includes EU neighbours of Turkey, and states which have good economic

relations with Turkey. Fifth, it includes states which officially have a

supportive position for Turkeys bid for membership, although some

show only conditional support, and states which have a negative position

on Turkeys membership. These scholarly attempts to tackle all relevant

stakeholders collectively support our assumption: Although perceived

and long accepted as an elite-driven process, the EU integration process

must take into consideration the perceptions of different actors for a

better understanding of the various dimensions of Turkeys bid formembership.

6

With the various country studies, we have tried to find answers to the

following questions, through a consideration of the period between 2006

and 2009:

5

See footnote 3.6See zgehan enyuva, Turkey European Union Relations: A Quest for Mass andElite Opinion SInAN Newsletter 2, 2009.


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How strong is the debate on Turkey? How informed is the debate on Turkey? What forms the basis of the perceptions of the different actors? Are there certain myths and prejudices that dominate the debate on

Turkey in these countries?

What are the reasons and motives in support for or opposition toTurkeys membership?

What are some of the perceived opportunities and challengespresented by Turkeys membership?

Is there convergence of arguments in favour of or against Turkeyon a cross-country basis?

Should perceptions on Turkeys membership be considered withina broader context such as that of future of Europe?

Indeed, comprehensive answers to these questions need further

exploration. This volume is an endeavour to contribute to such studies.

In his analysis of the French perceptions on Turkeys accession to the

EU, Nicolas Monceau points out that France is one of the EU members

where the public debate on Turkey is the most intense and controversial.

Monceau presents the main factors that explain the opposition in France,

at the elite and the public level, and looks at whether there are any

dividing lines across the parties and the leaders.

Katrin Bttger and Eva-Maria Maggi argue that there are diverging

positions on the question of Turkeys accession in Germany, and point to

different lines of argumentation which raise a comprehensive list of

questions. Yvonne Nasshoven, on the other hand, spotlights a limiteddebate on Turkeys candidacy in Belgium, due largely to its internal


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difficulties. However, the Belgian stance deserves exploration due to the

countrys large Turkish population, and the fact that Belgian Prime

Minister Hermann von Rompuy is to take the office of the President ofthe European Council for two and a half years, between 2009 and 2012.

Emiliano Alessandris contribution, with Sebastiano Sali, on

Italian perceptions is particularly interesting, as Italy is one of Turkeys

strongest supporters when it comes to integration into the EU. As such,

the perceptions of different actors and the inter-linkages between them

remain interesting issues to be explored. Similar to Italy, Spain is one of

the most supportive states of Turkeys entry into the EU. Eduard Soler i

Lecha and Irene Garca evaluate the Spanish position, and question

whether this official support is reflected at different levels. Athanasios C.

Kotsiaros, on the other hand, points to a supportive but reluctant position

in Greece, in his evaluation of the elements of support and opposition to

Turkeys accession. Swedish contributor Gunilla Herolf draws a picture

of conditional support for Turkeys membership, revealing that her

countrys interest largely lies in Turkeys reform process.

Alongside Germany and France, Austria and the Republic of Cyprus

can be counted among the most ardent opponents of Turkeys accession

to the EU. Cengiz Gnay discusses various elements and concerns with

respect to the Austrian opposition, and links these to concerns in Austria

which go beyond the simple debate on Turkey. Costas Melakopides

evaluation of the Greek Cypriot perceptions raises very controversial

points and issues for Turkey, and shows how prejudicial a community,

the Greek Cypriot community, can be in this particular issue

The debate on Turkeys candidacy is more limited in some of the new

members of the EU, as expressed by different experts. The Czech

contribution by Petr Kratochvl, David Krl and Dominika Drailov,

and the Polish contribution by Adam Szymaski both point to the limitednature of debate, while questioning the determinants of support and


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opposition for Turkeys membership. Iulia Serafimescu and Mihai Sebe,

on the other hand, take up the question for Romania by largely

concentrating on regional factors. Bulgaria is a most interesting case,given the large Turkish minority in the country and the political role it

has played since the early 1990s. In this final contribution, Marin

Lessenski looks at the factors that inform and influence the Bulgarian

perception, by concentrating on the images created by the Turkish

minority, the bilateral relations, and the historical and cultural context

that has shaped the relations between the two neighbouring countries.


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French Perceptions

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France is one of the European countries in which the issue of Turkeysaccession to the EU has sparked off the most intense public debate, often

controversial in tone, during recent years. This may initially seem surprising,

insofar as for centuries Turkey and France have shared close ties in many

historical, political and economic areas. This report first draws the evolution of

the French public opinion dealing with Turkeys accession to the EU in the pastyears. It presents the main factorspolitical, economic, cultural and social

explaining French majority opposition, both in the elites and the public. Thenthe report focuses on the political field in France, underlining the strong divide

between French political parties and leaders facing Turkeys accession to theEU. It shows how French political perceptions of Turkeys accession to the EUare linked to different conceptions of Europe and presents the evolution of

Frances official position on Turkeys membership to the EU since the electionof Nicolas Sarkozy as French President in 2007. The report concludes with the

role of the French media in launching a public debate in France on Turkeysaccession to the EU.

France is one of the European countries in which the issue of Turkeys

accession to the EU has sparked off the most intense public debate, often

controversial in tone, during recent years. This may initially seem

*The opinions expressed herein are only those of the author and do not reflect any



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surprising, insofar as for centuries Turkey and France have shared close

ties in many historical, political and economic areas.

Three main steps can be identified in the development of French

perceptions about Turkeys accession to the EU. First of all, the year

2002 marks a milestone in the media coverage of the Turkish issue in

France. In November 2002, Valry Giscard d'Estaing, then chairman of

the Convention on the future of Europe, launched the debate in France on

the subject of Turkeys Europeanness, asserting that as Turkey is not

located in Europe, its accession would mark the end of the EU. In the

same month, the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalknma

Partisi, or AKP)'s victory in Turkeys general elections led to the

formation of a new government described by the French media as

moderate Islamist. In 2004 and 2005, Turkeys application came under

debate as a political issue during the French campaign for the European

elections, followed in May 2005 by the referendum on the European

Constitution and the membership negotiations between Turkey and the

EU begun in October. Finally, in 2007, the election of Nicolas Sarkozy as

French President marks a turning point in Frances official stance

towards Turkeys accession to the EU.1

Most of the opinion polls tend to show the same findings: at the

European level, France, along with Germany, Austria and Greece,

demonstrates the strongest popular opposition to Turkeys accession to

the EU. According to the Eurobarometer2, a majority of French citizens

expressed reservations about the prospect of Turkey joining the EU. In

1Bruno Cautrs et Nicolas Monceau,La Tentation du refus ?Europens, Franais et

Turcs face ladhsion de la Turquie lUnion europenne, Paris, Presses de Sciences

Po, 2010.2 When another source is not mentioned, all the percentages quoted in the report are

from the Eurobarometers.


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French Perceptions

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autumn 2006, 69% of French citizens interviewed were opposed to

Turkey becoming a member of the EU in the future, while 22%

expressed the opposite view.3

Other international public opinion surveys,such as the Transatlantic Trends, confirm the same tendencies.

French opposition appears stable over time, even tending to increase

in recent years: varying from 64% to 69% between spring 2002 and

autumn 2006, and reaching 71% in spring 2008. During the same period,

the proportion of positive opinion also increases, but only slightly (from

19% to 22%). The decrease of No opinion since 2002 is also an

indicator of the impact of the public debate about the Turkish issue on the

shaping of public opinion.

French opposition to Turkeys full accession to the EU can be viewed

within the more general opposition to EU enlargement expressed in

recent years. In spring 2007, 60% of French respondents are opposed to

the EU enlargement while 32% expressed the opposite view.4

In national

opinion polls carried out by IFOP in December 2002, June 2003, and inJune and September 2004, between 56% and 61% of French respondents

expressed negative opinions concerning Turkeys accession to the EU.5

What are the main factors explaining French majority opposition to

Turkey's accession to the EU? The political, economic, cultural and

migratory dimensions of Turkish-European relations play an important

role in French perceptions of Turkish membership to the EU. In autumn

2006, economic and political conditionality is supported by a large

3Eurobaromtre 66. Lopinion publique dans lUnion europenne. Automne 2006.Rapport national France, Brussels, january 2007.4Eurobaromtre 67. Lopinion publique dans lUnion europenne. Printemps 2007.

Rapport national France, Brussels, july 2007.5

The main resultats of these surveys are available on the Website of IFOP

(www.ifop.com), in particular the following :Les Europens et la Turquie, surveycarried out by IFOP in December 2004 in five European countries (France, Germany,England, Italy and Spain).
http://www.ifop.com/http://www.ifop.com/


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majority of French respondents, particularly in the issue of human rights.

Fears of encouraging immigration from Turkey are also widely shared by

the French. Last but not least, cultural non-compatibility, an argumentoften raised in the debates about Turkeys Europeanness, features

among the main concerns of the French.

In June 2008, Turkey's accession to the EU appeared not to represent a

priority in the opinions of French citizens or leaders. Indeed, Turkeys

potential accession to the EU was ranked in thirteenth position among the

three topics of most concern to the French (with 6% of respondents),

while no leader interviewed expressed concern about this issue.

Similarly, as a matter of foreign policy, Turkish membership was ranked

respectively at sixth and fourth place among the concerns of the

population (14% of respondents) and of the elite (13%). Finally,

Turkeys potential accession to the EU was not regarded by the French as

one of the two priority topics to be handled by President Sarkozy during

the French Presidency of the EU in 20086.

Both the French population and the elite adopt similar positions,

which translate as a majority opposition to Turkey joining the EU. In

June 2008, 62% and 63% of respondents from the general public and

among the "Top Leaders" do not support Turkeys accession to the EU,

of which 36% not at all among the general public. In contrast, 35% and

37% were in favour, of which 6% very favourable, among the citizens

and leaders interviewed. An analysis based on social categories reveals

significant variations. Older generations are more reluctant to accept

Turkey's membership than the new ones. Indeed, opposition to Turkey's

accession appears higher, the older the population. Similarly, political

orientations seem to play a significant role in the French perception of

6

Survey on the image of Turkey in France, commissioned by the Turkish Embassy inParis and carried out in June 2008 by OpinionWay, to a representative sample of the

population and a panel of French leaders.


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French Perceptions

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Turkey's application. The supporters of Sgolne Royal in the 1st round

of the 2007 presidential election are more likely to favour Turkeys

accession (54%) than those who voted for Franois Bayrou (36%) orNicolas Sarkozy (21%). However, these results merit explanation, insofar

as nearly half of all French citizens surveyed (42%), who in June 2008

declared themselves opposed to Turkeys accession (that is, 62% of the

sample), would nevertheless be in favour of Turkeys membership to the

EU in the future if it meets all the criteria (legal, economic and political)

as defined by the European Council. The same goes for 25% of leaders

surveyed who expressed their opposition in 2008. We observe here again

that time plays an important role in the perception of Turkey's

application. Among the reasons for opposition to Turkeys accession to

the EU: Turkey is not considered to be a European country either

geographically or culturally for 48% of citizens and 74% of the leaders

interviewed. Political and legal arguments prevail for the general public -

Turkey will never be a truly secular country (19%) or a true democracy

(14%) while the elite place emphasis on Turkeys over-preponderance

in the EU owing to its population (13%).

French popular perception of Turkey also throws light on the

respective places of these arguments in the national imagination. For the

majority of respondents, Turkey is a country with a rich history (84% of

citizens and 100% of leaders). It is also perceived as a young country,

culturally vibrant, turned towards the future and economically dynamic.Nearly half of the people and one third of the elite polled believe

ultimately that Turkey can make an important contribution to Europe.

But Turkey is considered by only a minority of respondents to be

democratic (38% of residents and 32% of leaders), secular (37% and

55%) and respectful of human rights (27% and 10% of positive

opinions). In conclusion, other findings show that the French public has

limited knowledge of Turkey as a country, its history, culture, political


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system and economic and social realities. A Turkish Season launched

in France between July 2009 and March 2010 should encourage citizens

to gain more insight into this country.

In 2009, French perceptions of Turkeys EU candidacy seem to be

evolving more positively. After President Obamas statement in favour of

Turkey's accession to the EU at the EU-United States Summit in Prague

in April 2009, 50% of French citizens interviewed said that they were

against and 35% in favour. Supporters of the Centre-Right Democratic

Movement expressed a majority of negative opinions to Turkish

accession (71%), followed by right-wing (67%) and left-wing supporters

(41%). Among the French respondents in favour of Turkeys accession,

49% are left-wing supporters, 21% are MoDem sympathizers and 19%

from the right. These results reflect an increase in the French support of

Turkeys accession to the EU in comparison to previous opinion polls. In

June 2005, a survey on the same topic obtained results of 66% against,

28% in favour and 6% no opinion.

Finally, the French viewpoint on Turkeys accession to the EU can

also be explained by additional factors not regularly gauged by opinion

surveys. The role of secularism in French society is certainly a factor to

take into consideration and in particular the impact of public debates

raised in the past about the wearing of Islamic headscarves in public. In

2004, a law adopted according to the recommendations of the Stasi

Commission banned religious symbols in French state schools. Suchdebates are likely to have an influence on French public opinion towards

Turkeys application, which is seen as a Muslim country where issues of

secularism and religion in the public domain are regularly discussed.

Frances perception of the Islamic religion, due to its colonial past

(especially in North Africa), plus the importance given to the devoir de

mmoire (duty of remembrance), which led France to officially


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French Perceptions

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recognize the Armenian genocide in 2001, are also significant factors

which may explain French views on Turkeys accession to the EU.

In the political field, French perceptions of Turkeys accession to the

EU have created a split within French political parties and leaders since

the early 2000s. Turkeys application for full membership to the EU has

gone beyond national political divisions, resulting in opposition from

both right and left. The table below shows the - positive or negative -

stances of the main French political parties, and of their leaders, towards

Turkey's accession to the EU.


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Nationalist, right-wing and centrist parties are mostly against Turkey's

accession to the EU, while the far-left and left-wing parties seem to be

more divided. The Greens and the French Communist Party support

Turkeys accession to the EU within the framework of the conditions set

up by the Copenhagen criteria. The geographical, cultural and religious

arguments are more favoured by the right-wing parties while the politicalconditionality (respect for human rights and minorities)-and the

Armenian issue for the Socialist Party-are underlined by the left-wing

parties. Valry Giscard d'Estaing was one of the first French political

leaders to reject Turkey's accession to the EU on geographical grounds.

In November 2002, in an interview published byLe Monde that provoked

a vigorous public debate in France about Turkey, he stated : Turkey is a

country with close ties to Europe, an important country with a real elite,but it is not a European country. (...) Its capital is not within Europe, 95%

of its population is outside of Europe: this is not a European country.

The cultural and religious arguments, which focus on the threat of a

conflict of civilizations between Islamic and Western cultures and

values, were also often cited by many right-wing and centrist political

leaders, such as Franois Bayrou, chairman of the Democratic

Movement, or Jean-Pierre Raffarin, former Prime Minister in 2002-2005.


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French Perceptions

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Beyond the divide between left and right sides, the issue of Turkey's

accession to the EU has also created divisions within French leading

political parties and the government. Within the Gaullist movement,former President Jacques Chirac has supported Turkeys "European

vocation" for years. He played an important role in supporting Turkeys

application on the European scene, in particular in the decision of the

Helsinki European Council in December 1999 to grant the status of

candidate country to Turkey. However, in October 2004, President

Chirac stated that he wished to submit any further EU enlargement to a

compulsory referendum, so hoping to dissociate the Turkish issue and the

debate on the European Constitution. In this way, the French would be

consulted by referendum on Turkey's accession to the EU. The issue of a

compulsory referendum about Turkeys accession to the EU was raised

again in summer 2008 on the occasion of the debate about the revision of

the French Constitution. While the abolition of a compulsory referendum

for the ratification of any new accession to the EU was considered, MPs

voted for a provision rendering a referendum compulsory for EU

accession of countries whose population represents more than 5% of the

total EU population, which is true in Turkeys case. In the end, the

French Senate decided to cancel the provision.

In the years 2002-2007, President Chiracs support for Turkeys

application to the EU appears to have been at odds with the presidential

party stand (UMP) and the parliamentary majority. During the campaignfor European Parliament elections, Turkeys application was used as a

major campaign argument by some political parties. In April 2004, the

UMP and its then chairman Alain Jupp distanced itself from Jacques

Chirac and stated its opposition to Turkey's accession to the EU. The

presidential party formulated a "privileged partnership" with Turkey as

an alternative to full membership. This kind of partnership has been

promoted in Europe, especially in French and German public debates in


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recent years. It aims to maintain the cohesion of the EU while ensuring

the stability of its borders.

The election of Nicolas Sarkozy as French President on 6 May 2007,

inaugurated a turning point in France's official position on Turkeys

membership to the EU. Throughout the presidential campaign,

particularly during the debate between the two candidates Sgolne

Royal and Nicolas Sarkozy, the latter reasserted his opposition to

Turkeys accession in the event of his election. Quoting geographical

arguments - "Turkey is Asia Minor" - he proposed an alternative in the

form of a Union for the Mediterranean, which was officially launched in

Paris in July 2008 with the participation of Turkish Prime Minister Recep

T. Erdogan. In reaction to the support given by U.S. President Barack

Obama to Turkeys accession to the EU at the EU-United States Summit

in Prague in April 2009, President Sarkozy reiterated his opposition to

this prospect.

Beyond the left-right division, positions on Turkey differ along withthe visions of the future of the EU. Indeed, Turkey's candidacy goes

beyond the partisan opposition to bring together, on both sides, those

who defend the idea of a European power. The latter, Laurent Fabius and

Franois Bayrou among them, oppose the entry of Turkey into the EU on

the pretext that it would severely threaten the political construction of

Europe. On the other hand, Turkey's application is championed by both

the right and the left for geopolitical reasons. In this way, Pierre

Lellouche, one of the few representatives of the UMP to support Turkey's

accession to the EU who was appointed as Secretary of State for

European Affairs in June 2009, and Dominique Strauss-Kahn for the PS

concur in their analysis of the geopolitical significance of Turkey in

Europe. Turkey's candidacy also raises objections within the current

French government. President Sarkozys opinions are not shared by a

number of ministers, such as the minister of Foreign Affairs, the socialist


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French Perceptions

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Bernard Kouchner, and the Secretary of State for European Affairs from

2007 to December 2008, Jean-Pierre Jouyet, who have both reiterated

their support for Turkey's accession to the EU.

If nowadays right-wing and centrist parties are mostly opposed to

Turkeys membership of the EU, the Socialist Party seems to be more

divided on the issue. In recent years, the PS has provided a measured

support to Turkeys accession in the long run, and its status of candidate

country was recognised by the European Council in 1999 when Lionel

Jospin was Prime Minister. However, the Turkish issue raises significant

opposition within the party. Some of its members, such as Laurent

Fabius, Hubert Vdrine or Robert Badinter, are openly opposed to

Turkeys accession for a variety of reasons. Others are more supportive

of the prospect, such as Dominique Strauss-Kahn, currently director of

the IMF, or Pierre Moscovici, former minister of European affairs and PS

national secretary for international relations, who is in favour of a

"reasoned yes" to Turkey's accession if it meets the Copenhagen criteria.

Out of all the French Socialist leaders, Michel Rocard, former Prime

Minister, has shown the most support for the Turkish candidacy in recent

years. He participated in an Independent Commission on Turkey, which

in September 2004 issued a report supporting the opening of accession

negotiations with the EU if Turkey fulfilled the Copenhagen political

criteria. Similarly, Rocard has engaged in public debate on numerous

occasions for Turkeys accession to the EU, defending his views in thebookYes to Turkey, published in September 2008. Sgolne Royal has

long declared that the issue of Turkeys membership should be left to the

French people to decide. During the 2007 presidential campaign, she then

claimed that she was in favour of Turkeys accession on principle but

that the EU needed to put the procedure on hold. Finally, several leading

politicians from both left and right who previously supported Turkeys

membership, have also changed their minds about Turkeys accession to


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20

the UE, including Alain Jupp, former Prime Minister, Michel Barnier,

former Minister of Foreign Affairs and more recently Bernard Kouchner.

In Spring 2009, the Turkish issue came back strongly into the French

political arena on the occasion of the campaign for the European

elections. President Sarkozy played a major role in making Turkeys

accession to the EU a major issue in the European elections. He stated his

opposition to Turkeys accession to the EU, both in a speech at a UMP

meeting in Nmes in May and during a joint declaration with the

chancellor of Germany, Angela Merkel, in Berlin on 10 May 2009.

Sarkozys stance provoked a number of reactions within the EU, in

particular from European countries whose governments support Turkeys

membership to the EU, such as Poland, Portugal or Sweden.

As regards the French media, in particular radio and television, one

may say that they do not have a specific stand concerning Turkeys

accession to the EU. In recent years, the national press has mostly

broadcasted the positions held by the opinion leaders, such as theacademics or the politicians, especially in specific sections such as

Opinions (in Le Monde or Le Figaro) or Rebonds (Libration). For

instance,Le Monde played an important role in launching a public debate

in France when it headlined on the front page the interview with Giscard

dEstaing in November 2002, which was then followed with many

reactions in the same sections.

In conclusion, French perceptions of Turkeys accession to the EU

have shown a stable and majority opposition, both in the public and the

elites, for the last years. However, some recent opinion polls may give a

more optimistic view of French perceptions, when more citizens answer

that they agree with Turkeys membership to the EU in the future if it

fulfills the required criteria. In parallel, French perceptions have revealedthe great divide among EU countries in the face of Turkeys accession to


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French Perceptions

21

the EU. Sarkozys stance during the campaign for the European elections

in 2009 has not been followed by many national governments within the

EU. In this prospect, the evolution of French perceptions in the comingyears will also be linked to the place and influence of France within

Europe.


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22

When analyzing the German perception of Turkish candidacy for EU-

membership, diverging positions can be observed in the media, in the

government and opposition parties as well as in civil society. These

diverging arguments mostly follow the lines of three subjects with

opposing positions that are advanced to different degrees by the actors.

The first subject is the question of identity. Here, the two extremes arethe following: On the one side stands the argument that the relationship

between a Christian EU and a Muslim Turkey is that of a Clash of

Civilizations, while on the other side, humanitarian thinking is the

reference point and being advocated at the same time. The second subject

by which the perception of Turkish EU-membership is pervaded

concerns institutional (in)stability. Here, arguments concern either the

EUs outdated internal structure or the Turkish political system. Whilesome argue that Turkey is not ready for accession, other actors stress the

fact that Turkey will not enter the EU before it is ready and fulfils the

necessary criteria anyway. A third line of argumentation deals with


institutional views. The article results form the IEP-Programme Dialogue Europe ofthe Otto Wolff-Foundation.


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German Perceptions

23

strategic geopolitics and security. Here, one side argues that a Turkish

EU-membership would bring the conflicts of Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan

closer too close to the EU, while the other side sees Turkey as abuffer or even a bridge between Europe and the Arab world.

It has to be noted however, that not all actors promoting or opposing

Turkish EU membership make use of all the arguments systematized

above.

Some parts of the German media have been constantly engaged withthe Turkish EU accession process during the last years. The nature of this

engagement has changed recently, whereas the main attitude towards

Turkeys accession stays divided. Other print media, TV and radio

stations remain notably quiet. Instead, the integration of Turkish

immigrants in Germany is a steady topic.

Along the lines of their political (party) orientation, German

newspapers are divided into a group of accession supporters on the one

side and critics on the other. The mostly conservative newspapers

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) and Die Welt have analyzed the

accession process quite sceptically and would rather prefer an alternative

affiliation of Turkey, such as the privileged partnership proposed by the

Christian Democratic Party (CDU) in 2004. Their arguments emphasize

the differences between Turkey and the EU drawing upon culturalheritages, identities and history.

1In contrast to this, the more liberal/left-

leaning newspapers like the Sddeutsche Zeitung (SZ) and the

1Wimmel, A. (2006) Beyond the Bosphorus? Comparing German, French and British

Discourses on Turkeys Application to Join the European Union, ReihePolitikwissenschaft/Political Science Series, No. 111,

http://www.ihs.ac.at/publications/pol/pw_111.pdf, see also Welt am Sonntag (2008)EU-Beitritt der Trkei: Entspannt euch!, 25 May 2008, p. 31; Peter Graf Kielmansegg(2009) Europa braucht Grenzen, in: FAZ, 27 May 2009, p. 7.


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24

Frankfurter Rundschau have generally assessed Turkeys ambitions to

join the EU positively, dependent on the speed of the reform-process

initiated by the Turkish government to fulfil the accession criteria. Othernewspapers, like the left-leaning Tageszeitung or the tabloid Bild do not

present the issue as a central topic.Rather, domestic questions like the

integration of Turkish immigrants in Germany are emphasized.

Interestingly, the argumentative nature of the main newspapers has

moved away from a concentration on the domestic political situation in

Turkey towards a closer look at the future and identity of the EU project

itself. Especially during the last year, Turkish EU membership

aspirations and EU internal processes like the establishing of the new

Lisbon Treaty were combined in commentaries.2

Using the accession

negotiations with Turkey as an example, commentators argue pro and

con over an effective EU enlargement policy that has to be linked to the

debate on European identity. Even though the main protagonists, the

FAZ and the SZ, keep their basic opinions to the EU membership of

Turkey, their argumentations are linked to internal affairs of the EU

rather than treating both issues separately. The FAZ, for example,

commented on Turkeys disagreement with Anders Fogh Rasmussen as

NATO general secretary, as an example of a conflict of civilizations

which could be enhanced with Turkey as a member of the EU system,

where blackmailing often works and identity plays an important role in

daily political life.3

Also, the SZ claims that the problematic signingprocedure of the Lisbon Treaty shows the need to combine the future of

enlargement policy with the debate on European identity. The will of the

accession candidates to contribute to the European Integration process

2Peter Graf Kielmansegg (2009) Europa braucht Grenzen, in: FAZ, 27 May 2009, p.

7.; SZ (2009) Insel gegen Kontinent 30 July 2009, p. 4; Welt am Sonntag (2008) EU-Beitritt der Trkei: Entspannt euch!, 25 May 2008, p. 31.3FAZ (2009) Schne Partner, 5 April 2009, p. 14.


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German Perceptions

25

should be an accession criterion for future enlargements and for Turkeys

accession.4

Taking into consideration all types of media, the debate mainly

remained an issue within the print media. In general, reports of other

media, like TV stations, concentrate on negative connotations of Islam.5

The picture drawn emphasizes cultural differences and the reports

concentrated on rather negative examples of social integration.6

German media perceive Turkeys ambitions to join the EU

differentiated. While the conservative press advocates a scepticalapproach, the liberal orientated newspapers are rather supportive.

Accompanied by the mostly negative reporting on Islam within the

broader media, it can be said that in general the German media shows

little optimism concerning a successful EU accession of Turkey.

Since there has been a general election in Germany on 27 September

2009 and it is foreseeable that a new government will be formed shortly,

the following section will firstly deal with the positions of the

government of 2005-2009 and the opinions of the two parties therein.

Secondly, the individual positions of the three smaller parties in

parliament (Bundestag)in opposition between 2005 and 2009will be

outlined. In a third step, the opinions voiced during the coalition

negotiations in the Fall of 2009 will be mentioned.

The government of chancellor Angela Merkel comprises the two

largest parties in Germany, namely the conservative Christian

Democratic Party (CDU) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD).

4SZ (2009) Insel gegen Kontinent 30 July 2009, p. 4.

5Kai Hafez/Carola Richter (2007) Das Islambild von ARD und ZDF, in: ApuZ 26-

27/2007, pp. 40-46.6Grsel Gr (2005) Das Trkeibild der deutschen Presse, in: Brger im Staat 3/2005,pp. 122-129.


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26

These two governing parties hold diverging positions in the grand

coalition concerning Turkish candidacy for EU-membership. While the

CDU wants a privileged partnership, the SPD advocates EU-membership. The CDU argues along the lines of EU-internal and identity

reasons, whereas the SPD is of the opinion that membership can stabilize

Turkish democracy and thus refute the argument that we are heading for

a Clash of Civilizations.

The Coalition contract7

of 2005 foresees that if the EU is not able to

absorb another member or if Turkey is not able to fulfil all criteria related

to membership, then Turkey has to be bound to Europe as closely as

possible and in a way that allows for its privileged relations to develop.

The contract thus comprises both of the institutional arguments, namely

the question of the EUs internal structures as well as that of the Turkish

political system. It does not give an opinion, however on what should

happen if both prerequisites are met, but only maps out further steps for a

situation in which one or the otheror bothconditions are not fulfilled.

Concerning the election campaign for the European Parliament,

further enlargements of the EU were not an important subject. There was,

however, a mentioning of the subject in the manifestoes.

In their manifesto8

for the elections of the European Parliament, the

conservatives (CDU) based their advocating a privileged partnership on a

more general support of a consolidation phase and a slowing down of all

enlargement processes, since they give priority to the stabilizing of the

European identity and the EUs institutions. Already in 2000, in its

updated programme,9

the CDU stressed the fact that the question of

7CDU/CSU/SPD (2005) Gemeinsam fr Deutschland. Mit Mut und Menschlichkeit,

11 November 2005, Berlin.8

CDU (2009) Starkes EuropaSichere Zukunft, 16 March 2009, Berlin.9 CDU-Bundesvorstand (2000) Programmatische Offensive fr Deutschland.Norderstedter Erklrung, 7/8 January 2000, Norderstedt.


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German Perceptions

27

where the borders of Europe lie should be answered before it reaches the

borders of Iraq and Iran. It is thus using an argument of fear of the

conflicts of the Arab world rather than seeing future membership as abridge or a buffer between Europe and countries like Iraq or Iran. In its

electoral programme for post-2009,10

the CDU stresses the fact that

Turkey does not fulfil the prerequisites for EU-membership, such as

equal rights, the protection of minorities or freedom of religion. For that

reason they support a privileged partnership instead of EU-membership

for Turkey.

In addition, the CDUs Bavarian partner CSU supports referenda to

decide on new EU-members.11

The same opinion has been voiced by

Chancellor Merkel. At a meeting of young conservatives in May 2009,

she stressed the fact that there is no sense in repeated enlargements if

these make it impossible to handle the EU.12

She thus pointed once more

to the inadequate EU-internal structure for further enlargements. Her

statements are backed by another large member of the EU, namely

France, which also opposes a Turkish EU-membership. The German-

Turkish Forum, a small organisation within the CDU with 400 members

that aims at bringing People of Turkish descent and the CDU closer

together, advocates Turkish EU-membership.13

It especially opposes

arguments aiming for differing and incompatible values. They see only a

minority of CDU members following this argument, while a majority

refers to the countrys size and the EUs limited absorption capacity. TheGerman-Turkish Forum argues in particular that if these two cultures

were incompatible that an integration of people of Turkish descent into

10CDU/CSU (2009) Wir haben die Kraft. Gemeinsam fr unser Land.

Regierungsprogramm 2009-2013, 28. June 2009, Berlin.11

CSU (2009) Wahlaufruf der Christlich-Sozialen Union zur Bundestagswahl 2009.

Was unser Land jetzt braucht: Eine starke CSU in Berlin, 17/18 June 2009, Nuremberg.12 Cf. Turkey shocked by Franco-German Rhetoric, in: EurActiv.com, 11 May 2009.13

Cf. Deutsch-Trkisches Forum der CDU, http://www.dtf-online.de.


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28

German society would make any efforts for integrating these into

German society useless. Its goals are being counter-acted by discussions

such as the one following a controversial speech by the Turkish PrimeMinister Recep Tayyip Erdoan in Cologne in February 2008 to the

Turkish community in Germany, dealing with their assimilation. In the

wake of this speech, the CSU called for suspending accession

negotiations with Turkey.14

What would a so-called privileged

partnership actually look like? A policy paper of the CSU affiliated

Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung that was authored by the now Minister of

Economics, Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg maps out possible alternatives

to a full-fledged membership.15

The policy paper is based on the

assumption that Turkish membership would overwhelm the EU and that

alternatives have to be found. It especially stresses the point that not all

four freedoms can be opened to Turkey. While it sees no problems in a

deep economic cooperation, restrictions to free movement of persons and

free movement of services, as well as a monetary union and large-scale

financial support in the form of direct payments to the agricultural sector

or in Structural and Cohesion Policy are foreseen.

The Social Democrats, on the other hand, support Turkish EU-

membership if Turkey fulfils all the necessary criteria. They stress the

fact that a Turkey which is committed to European values can build a

bridge to other Muslim countries, an asset which lies in the interest of

Germany and Europe. In March 2009, the German foreign minister,Frank-Walter Steinmeier, stressed the fact that it is enlargement that is

14FAZ (2008) Sder fordert einfrieren der Beitrittsverhandlungen, 15 February 2008;

see also Barbara Lippert (2008) Wait-and-See. Attitudes of German StakeholdersTowards EU-Turkey, in: Nathalie Tocci (ed.) Talking Turkey in Europe: Towards a

Differentiated Communication Strategy, Rome, pp. 135-160, here p. 145.15 Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg (2004) Die Beziehungen zwischen der Trkei und derEUeine Privilegierte Partnerschaft , Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung: Aktuelle Analysen 33.


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German Perceptions

29

being negotiated with Turkey and nothing else.16

Concerning referenda,

he underlined that those do not exist in Germany on a national level. He

thinks it is thus not politically correct to hold a referendum on thissubject or any other. He said that it is a question of credibility to fulfil

existing obligations concerning Turkish and Balkan membership

perspectives. He does not deny the fact, however, that internal reforms

are necessary to proceed.

Between the two largest parties, a different approach on causes and

effects in these fields can be observed. While the CDU stresses the

causes and assumes that the lack of internal and external reforms is the

cause for alternative measures other than enlargement, the SPD stresses

the effect, namely membership as being able to result in stability and

peace in the region.

Of the opposition by the three smaller parties, the Green Party

supports serious accession negotiations with Turkey to support the

countries democratic and economic transformation. It assumes thatTurkish EU-Membership is in the EUs own interest, since it can be a

stabilizing anchor in the region.17

The liberal Federal Democrats (FDP) see the Lisbon treaty, or an

equivalent, as a prerequisite for further enlargement. Cautiously, they

stress the point that Turkish accession is not on the agenda in the next

five years anyway.18

They see the key for accession in the

implementation of reforms and the absorption capacity of the EU. Party

leader Guido Westerwelle said in an interview in May 2009 that Turkey

has a right to expect Europe not to deny EU-membership categorically.

16Frank-Walter Steinmeier, interview with Hrriyet, 21 March 2009.

17Bndnis 90/Die Grnen (2009) Volles Programm mit WUMS! Fr ein besseres

Europa, 23-25 January 2009, Dortmund, p. 150.18

FDP (2009) Ein Europa der Freiheit in der Welt des 21. Jahrhunderts. Programm derFreien Demokratischen Partei fr die Wahl zum VII. Europischen Parlament 2009, 17January 2009, Berlin, p. 4.


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30

As has been agreed, a possible accession has to be considered

unprejudiced. He considers calling off the process as demanded by the

CSU would be the end of a prudent foreign policy19

. However, he doesnot think an accession is possible on a short timescale. His main focus is

on reforms in Turkey: The country has to show that it is on the right path

in terms of rule of law, society, democracy and economy.

In its party documents, The Left (Die Linke) does not deal with

enlargement in general or Turkey in particular.20

Yet, in February 2008,

their deputy party leader Katina Schubert stressed the fact that Turkey

belongs in the EU if it fulfils the Copenhagen criteria.21

For the coalition consultations between the CDU, CSU and FDP

following the elections on 27 September 2009, the question of Turkish

EU accession is a conflictive, albeit not a central, subject. While the spirit

within the FDP leans towards agreeing with Turkish EU-membership, the

CDU continues to advocate a privileged partnership.22

It will be

interesting to see whether the FDP will change its opinion, convergingtowards the CDUs and CSUs point of view.The subject led to a conflict

between CSUs Horst Seehofer, who wants to include a No concerning

Turkish EU-membership in the coalition contract, and FDP party leader

Guido Westerwelle who opposes this idea on the basis that the subject

will notbecome relevant during the new governments four-year term in

19Guido Westerwelle, interview with Der Spiegel, 4 May 2009.

20Die Linke (2009) Solidaritt, Demokratie, Frieden Gemeinsam fr den Wechsel inEuropa! Europawahlprogramm 2009 der Partei DIE LINKE, 28 February 2009, Essen;idem (2009) Konsequent sozial. Fr Demokratie und Frieden.Bundestagswahlprogramm 2009, 20/21 June 2009, Berlin.21

Katina Schubert (2008) Europisierung ist Perspektive gegen Nationalismus, press

release, 13 February 2008.22Oliver Grimm (2009) Rckkehr der liberalen Pro-Europer, in: Die Presse, 28September 2009.


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German Perceptions

31

office.23

Since the foreign ministry combined with the position of deputy

chancellor traditionally goes to the coalition partner and this is expected

to be filled by party leader Guido Westerwelle, this conflict of opinionsmight continue to be relevant in the future.

Speaking about the perception of Turkeys accession aspirations by

German civil society, two groups, the Christian churches and the Turkish

communities in Germany, are of special interest. Both groups are notably

sensitive to the topic, their positions controversial and their perspectivesdifferent.

Two thirds of the German population is affiliated to a Christian

church, even though their membership rates have been constantly

declining during the last years. The Catholic and the Protestant churches

are skeptical about EUs enlargement towards Turkey wherein they

concentrate on the domestic situation in Turkey. Their main concerns are

the freedom of religion, the non-discrimination against minorities and the

respect of human rights within the country. During the last years, the

Protestant Church declared the accession negotiations between the EU

and Turkey an open process with the accession as one possible

outcome.24

Referring to the unacceptable situation of the Christian

minority in Turkey, this position changed recently.25

Alternatives to EU

membership, restricted to an intensified economic cooperation, are nowfavored and a full-membership is not supported anymore. Also, the

23 Spiegel Online: Seehofer und Westerwelle verkrachen sich wegen Trkei, 13October 2009.24

Speech of Bishop Wolfgang Huber Religionsfreiheit und Toleranz - Wie aktuell istder Augsburger Religionsfriede?, 22 September 2005,http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/050923_huber_religionsfriede.html.25

Wolfgang Huber, interview with Hamburger Abendblatt Online, 31 May2009,http://www.abendblatt.de/politik/article1034762/Bischof-Huber-DieTuer kei-

gehoert-nicht-in-die-EU.html


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32

Catholic Church pledges against full membership. Emphasizing the

cultural differences between Europe and Turkey, the Catholic Church in

Germany prefers the privileged partnership proposed by the CDU.26

Within the Turkish community, the broader perception of Turkeys

membership aspirations is difficult to access. In Germany there are

several organizations which claim to represent the interest of the 2.6

million German Turks, who are also divided along political party lines.

Comments on Turkish EU-membership from these organizations are rare.

Nevertheless, Cem zdemir, the German-Turk politician and chairman

of the Green Party, sees a generally positive attitude of the German-Turk

population towards Turkeys ambitions to join the EU.27 The Turkish

Community in Germany (Trkische Gemeinde Deutschlands-TGD) for

example, which represents more than 200 communities in Germany,

pledges for membership and emphasizes the practical facilitation for the

Turks living in Germany and Europe; for example their right to vote

locally.28

Furthermore, Turkeys membership could converge the Muslim

and Christian communities within Europe and thus become a geo-

political and cultural bridge between Europe and the Middle East.

Summing up, within the German Christian churches, a critical attitude

towards Turkish membership is dominant. While concentrating on the

domestic situation in Turkey, they estimate the cultural differences

between Turkey and Europe as too significant for a successful

cooperation within the EU. The Turkish community in Germany

emphasizes Turkeys capacity to bridge cultural differences between the

26Central Committee of German Catholics, press release, 17 April 2005,

http://www.zdk.de/pressemeldungen/meldung.php?id=229.27

Cem zdemir (2005)Demokratie und Islam sind vereinbar, in: Cafe Babel, 25February 2005, http://www.cafebabel.com/fre/article/1103/demokratie-und-islam-sind-

vereinbar.html.28 Turkish community in Germany, activity report 2006-2008,

http://www.tgd.de/index.php?name=News&file=article&sid=842&theme=Printer.


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German Perceptions

33

Christian and Muslim community within and outside Europe. Looking at

these two groups, German civil society seems to be divided over the

question of EU membership of Turkey.

It can thus be concluded that German public opinion towards Turkish

candidacy for EU-membership is comprised of diverging positions and

arguments. The virulence of proponents and/or opponents of Turkish EU-

membership will depend on the further development of the accession

process but also of the internal institutional development of the EU.


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34

Belgium has in the debate on the accession of Turkey to the EU always taken

a positive stance. Still, debate has remained limited as internal problems,

mostly due to the difficult situation between Flemish and Wallonians in the

country, have forced the state to put its emphasis on domestic politics. This

passivity has especially been reflected by the near absence of debate in the

media, which has only for short timeframes gained importance.However,

throughout 2010 the Kingdom of Belgium is going to become one of the key

players of European politics, as the country will hold the Presidency of the EU. Also its Prime Minister, Hermann von Rompuy is at the moment one of the

frontrunners for the office of the first President of the European Council. Under

these circumstances, European and foreign policies are going to figure more

prominently in the political landscape, including Turkeys accession to the EU.

Belgium has been a founding member of the European Communities

and actively been involved in shaping European politics since the

beginning. Especially for the countrys position as a small member

country of the EU, European integration has always meant an

enhancement of its role in the world. Therefore the country has taken a

strong prointegrative view, calling for a deepening of the EU.




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Belgian Perceptions

35

However, throughout the last years Belgium internal federalism has

suffered from separatist and regionalist movements, mostly in the

prosperous Dutch-speaking Flanders, but also in French-speakingWallonia. Those forces, with regard to Turkish EU enlargement opposed

to the general line of Belgium politics, have taken a position against the

possibility of a Turkish membership in the EU. Although the two main

separatist parties Vlaams Belang in Flanders, and Front National in

Wallonia are not involved in government and still provide only for a

small part of the Belgium Assembly, the underlying problems between

the two major regions have paralyzed the country during the last two

years to a large extent.

Debate about Turkish membership is largely absent in the Belgium

press. Mostly, discussions are caused by incidents happening within the

country that have an effect on the perception of Turkey by Belgians.

Here, especially, two discussions deserve to be mentioned: The electionof a grey wolf at the municipal elections in Brussels in October 2006,

and the debate following a statement of the Turkish ambassador to

Belgium, Fuat Tanlay, in 2009.

The debate on the election of Murat Denizli, a grey wolf who has been

elected in the Brussels district of Schaarbeek, in this sense is exemplary

as it shows that the discussion on Turkish membership in Belgium is

largely stimulated by events happening on the ground with regard to the

Belgian Turkish community. Here, especially, the fear of a possible

communitarization of Turkish problems in Belgium has been discussed,

linked with a debate on the overall problem of Turkish ultranationalist

parties.

A second incident has been caused lately by the statement of the

Turkish ambassador to Belgium, Fuat Tanlay. In the context of a courtcase concerning the Revolutionary Peoples Liberation Front (Devrimci


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36

Sol) in summer 2009, the ambassador was quoted inHrriyetsaying that

terrorism one day was going to haunt Belgium and that then would be

understood what the word terrorism means.1

This, by many, has beenunderstood as a threat and has been heavily criticized.

In general, debates on Turkish EU membership have rather been

reproduced than stimulated by the Belgian media. This is especially true

for the regular perception of progress reports published by the European

Commission, and the debate on a privileged partnership , launched by

Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel in 2009. Belgian media thus can be

characterized as reactive, not proactive on the topic of Turkish accession.

This certainly is also due to the fact that Belgium, as seat of many key

European institutions and capital of the EU, is closely watching to

keep its own national identity distinct from the momentum of the

European institutions, and to separate those areas of life distinctively.

Still, surprisingly public discussion on enlargement is less positive on

Turkish enlargement than the governments view. This is also confirmed

by the figures of Eurobarometer, where only a close majority of 53% is

in favour of a further enlargement.2

Belgian foreign policy in the past years cannot be discussed without

referring to Belgiums own political situation. The overall fragmentation

of the party system,3

discontinuity in the government and increased

1RTBF, Lambassadeur turc souhaite du terrorisme en Belgique, 20 July 2009.

2Eurobarometer 71, Lopnion publique dans lUnion Europenne, Spring 2009, p. 50.

3 Political parties in Belgium are organised along the lines of the Flemish and Wallonian

community, so that no overarching Belgian party exists. The main parties involve the

Christian democratic parties (Christian Democratic and Flemish party and Centre

Dmocrate Humaniste), the socialist parties (Socialistische Partij Anders and PartiSocialiste), the liberal parties (Flemish Liberal Democrats and Mouvement

Rformateur) and the green parties (Groen! and Ecolo). Very important players are theFlemish and Wallonian nationalist parties Vlaams Belang and Front National, VlaamsBelang gaining around 11% in the general elections 2007.


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Belgian Perceptions

37

tensions between the Flemish and Wallonian population have led to only

limited discussion on foreign policy matters in the government and

beyond. Looking into the situation more closely, since 2006, theKingdom of Belgium has seen four governments: Verhofstadt II,

composed of a coalition between four parties from 11 July 2003 to 21

December 2007, Verhofstadt III, in place as an interim government from

21 December 2007 to 20 March 2008, the government Leterme from 20

March 2008 until 30 December 2008, and, starting from 30 December

2008 the government with Herman van Rompuy as Prime Minister. The

government formation which followed the general elections on 10 June

2007 thereby has been the longest period of establishing a new

government in Belgian history. In addition, in the past governments five

parties have been sharing power in order to form a majority, so that

consensus has been found only at the lowest common denominator. As a

consequence, domestic politics have dominated the governments

agenda.

Nevertheless, the Belgium government has during the past years

shown a favorable attitude towards the accession of Turkey to the EU.

Especially Guy Verhofstadt, Belgium Prime Minister from 1999 to 2008

has taken a positive stance on the prospect of Turkish EU membership, a

position he is now also continuing to pronounce in the European

Parliament as leader of the group of the Liberals (ALDE), though voicing

his opinion more moderately.

The roots of this positive position are twofold: Internal policies,

especially Turkish population living in Belgium and domestically

informed objectives, especially security, on the one hand; and the

external policies of Belgium and its agenda as member state of the EU,

on the other hand. Being a small country, Belgium plays a specific role


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38

here; , as one diplomat put it: Inevitably, as a small country being

against Turkish membership will not change much.4

Furthermore, the reasons brought forward for Belgiums positiondiverge depending on the context in which the discussion takes place, but

in general three areas can be identified:

(1) Geopolitical reasons and the role of Europe in the world: Here the

possible function of Turkey as a bridge between Europe and the Near

East, even Central Asia, is emphasized. Turkey is expected to be a factor

of stability in a troubled region, also given its membership in NATOsince 1951 which was not put into question by the Cold War, and a

potential reorientation towards Russia.5

Turkey therefore proved to be a

reliable partner in the context of cooperation in international

organizations, so that an atmosphere of trust emerged which can be built

upon.

(2) Security from a European perspective: The integration of Turkey

in the institutions and policies of the EU is seen by the Belgian

government as the best way to achieve security both with regard to

militarist and fundamentalist forces in Turkey on the one hand, and

energy security for the EU on the other hand. Thus, a mixture of internal

security and economic matters is informing this realist position, founded

on instrumentalist and rational choice beliefs.

(3) Providing a tool for reform in Turkey: The Belgian governmentalso puts forward the need for reform in Turkey, for which it sees

4Pourqoi les Belges soutiennent la candidature de la Turquie, inLe Soir, 08 December

2004.5

Chambre des Reprsentants de Belgique, Proposition de Rsolution relative ladhsion de la Turquie lUnion europenne, texte adopt par la Commission desrelations extrieures, DOC 502121/004, 10 December 2002.


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enlargement as the main incentive.6

Thereby, especially the values of

human rights, democracy and minority rights are put forward. Still, the

discourse on minorities features less prominently than in other countries,given the Belgianproblmatique of Flemish-Wallonian relations.

The offspring of the favorable position of the government

consequently results from a mixture of self-interested security reasons,

but also from the strong belief that cooperation and the existence of joint

values is essential for the well-being of the respective Belgian and

Turkish societies. As many people of Turkish origin already live in the

member countries of the EU, membership is seen as a natural next step.

This position has been more or less intensively pronounced during the

last governments; however, the Belgian government at the same time has

always been clear that there are clear conditions for membership which

have to be met: First, the Copenhagen criteria, which have also guided

the EUs enlargement to the East, need to be strictly applied. This for

Belgium means especially the political criteria of the respect of the rule

of law, of human rights and of healthy civil-military relations. Comprised

is also the full transposition of the acquis communautaire, whereas the

need for reform on the economic system is only discussed at the margins

by the Belgian government. Secondly, Turkey needs to solve its

difficulties with Cyprus and Greece. This, as Guy Verhofstadt stated

already in 2005, is crucial to the negotiations.7

Belgium will, from 01 July 2010 onwards, take on the Council

Presidency of the EU. Preparation is still in its early stages, but some

exchanges of opinion have already taken place. In this context, the

6Coalition agreement concluded between negotiators of the Christen Demokraatisch

und Vlaams CD&V, Movement Reformateur (MR), Parti Socialiste PS, Vlaamse

Liberalen and Democraten Open Vld und centre democratie humaniste, 23 December

2007.7Riccardi, Fernando, Les divergences sur ladhsion de la Turquie se radicalisent, dansbulletin Quotidien Europe n 8861, 07 January 2005, p.3.


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preparatory documents point in the same direction: In line with the

progress made in the accession criteria, the negotiations with Turkey and

FYROM shall proceed. Still, with regard to Cyprus and the situation onhuman rights it is remarked in the document that the steps forward have

been rather little.8

Summing up, although Belgium has not been at the forefront of

lobbying for a Turkish membership among the member countries of the

EU, it has continuously supported the Turkish membership, but also

demanded clear standards. Belgium has, in addition, acknowledged the

need for a partnership approach with regard to Turkey, as stated by the

then Belgian Foreign Minister Karel de Gucht on 20 January 2009:

[] Turkey has not been well - or even equally - treated by theEU. [] The time has come for the partnership between Turkeyand Europe to mature. It needs to become a permanent and

unbreakable bond. []Turkey is Europes ally. As an integral partof the European family, sharing the same values, it is Europesbridge to the emerging powers in Asia and - let no one forget - the

Middle East. Even more than that, Turkey is a bridge to the

Muslim world and it is the prime example that modernisation,

secularisation and democracy are not anathema to Islam. Turkey is,

in short, an essential ally in the most important struggles that the

world will face for years to come. So let Europe rise above its fears

and be as great and as generous as this great game demands.9

Belgian opposition parties for the most part share the governments

approach of a clear enlargement perspective for Turkey, given that the

criteria for membership are met by the country. One example can here be

8Snat et Chambre des reprsentants de Belgique, Prparation de la prsidence belge de

l'Union europenne en 2010 (1), Rapport fait au nom du comit davis federal chargdes questions europennes par Mme Delvaux et M. De Croo, Document lgislatif n 4-986/1, 9 December 2008.9

de Gucht, Karel, An unbreakable bond, in: Europes world, 20 January 2009, availableat http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home_old/Comm unityPosts/tabid/809/PostID/152/Default.aspx (5 November 2009).
http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home_old/Comm%20unityPosts/http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home_old/Comm%20unityPosts/


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given by the electoral programme of the Green Flemish party Groen!,

which in its manifesto for the 2007 general elections wrote that as soon

as criteria for human and minority rights are fulfilled by Turkey,accession negotiations may be advanced. The EU in this context would

offer to be an active supporter of Turkish reform.10

However, opinion in Belgian politics on Turkish accession is not

homogeneous: Especially the Flemish and Wallonian nationalist parties

have taken a strong position against the inclusion of Turkey in the EU.

Looking into a policy proposal by the deputies Francis van den Eynde

and Alexandra Colen, the main reasons for this position are the belief that

Turkey has no cultural roots in Europe, the situation with regard to

Armenia, the Kurds and Cyprus, the geographical position of Turkey

with 97% of its territory on the Asian continent, and general animosity

between Turkey and the European continent during 700 years. Vlaams

Belang also refers to civil-military relations and takes up the position that

the EU would be acting as an agent of the geopolitical interests of the

United States of America by having Turkey accede to the EU.11

It would underestimate the potential Vlaams Belang has in the

Flemish parts of the countries to put aside this position as marginalized.

In contrast, 11% of the people have in the previous election voted for the

Flemish nationalists, who have over the past years continuously had good

election results. Although Belgian politics have so far had a consensus to

not associate the nationalist party in the federal government, Vlaams

Belang continues to be voted for by a significant number of people.

10Groen!, De toekomst begint nu, Programma Groen! voor de federale verkiezingen van

10 June 2007, p. 113.11

Belgian House of Representatives, Proposition de Rsolution relative la candidaturede la Turquie ladhsion lUnion Europenne, dpose par M. Francis Van denEynde et Mme Alexandra Colen, DOC 520286/001, 07 November 2007.


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With regard to civil society it is, in the context of Belgium, even more

important to clearly distinguish between the discussion of civil societytaken place in Belgium as seat of the European institutions, and the

Belgian discussion on Turkish adhesion.

Looking at the actors closely associated to EU action in Belgium, the

European Movement Belgium or the Young European Federalists

Belgium are active members of the discussion. Also single-issue

NGOs like the Kurdish and Armenian associations active in Belgium

give input into the debate.

Still, overall the civil society landscape in Belgium is rather silent on

the issue of the enlargement process of the EU; an observation which is

true also for trade unions.

The reason for this abstention is rather easy to explain: The debate on

issues related to the EU in Belgium is already covere

Documents

Turkey Watch_EU Member States Perceptions on Turkey’s Accession to the EU