TURKEY’S FIGHT AGAINST ISIS...orsam.org.tr Turkey’s Fight Against ISIS 3 Introduction Turkey, due to its geographical position neighbouring Syria and Iraq and the long land border

ORSAM

TURKEY’S FIGHT AGAINST ISIS

ReportNo: 5 / July 2019

ASST. PROF. GÖKTUĞ SÖNMEZ

Report No:5

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Ankara - TURKEY ORSAM © 2019

Content of this publication is copyrighted to ORSAM. Except reasonable and partial quotation and use under the Act No. 5846, Law on Intellectual and Artistic Works, via proper citation, the content may not be used or re-published without prior permission by ORSAM. The views ex-pressed in this publication reflect only the opinions of its authors and do not represent the institu-tional opinion of ORSAM.ISBN : 978-605-80703-6-3

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About the Author

Asst. Prof. Göktuğ Sönmez

received his bachelor’s degree in International Relations from Bilkent University, hismaster’s degree in International Relations at London School of Economic (LSE), and hisPhD from the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London. Hisresearch areas are International Relations Theory, Turkish Foreign Policy, andRadicalization and Violent Extremism. He conducted research on these areas at severalthink-tanks including the Center for Strategic Research of the Ministry of Foreign Affairsof the Republic of Turkey, Global Strategy Institute and the ORSAM. He currently worksas the Director of Security Studies at ORSAM.

July 2019

TURKEY’S FIGHTAGAINST ISIS

ORSAM REPORT

Report No:5

Turkey’s Fight Against ISIS2

Table Of Contents

Introduction ................................................................................................................................3

1- ISIS: A Brief Background ..................................................................................................3

2- ISIS’ Attacks in Global Context and the Group’s Attacks against Turkey ....................5

3- Turkey’s Fight at a glance ..................................................................................................6

a-D-ISIS Coalition, Border Controls and the Operation Euphrates Shield ........................6

b. Non-Military Efforts ..................................................................................................9

c- International Information Sharing and Preventing Returnees’ Movements ............11

Conclusion ..............................................................................................................................14

References ..............................................................................................................................15

Endnotes ................................................................................................................................16

Infographics

ISIS Attacks Against Turkey (Infographic-1)............................................................................6

The Euphrates Shield Operation (Infographic-2) ......................................................................7

Turkey's Fight in Numbers (Infographic-3) ..............................................................................9


Turkey’s Fight Against ISIS 3

Introduction

Turkey, due to its geographical positionneighbouring Syria and Iraq and the long landborder it shares with them, has been a countryaffected by radicalisation of different actorsand terrorist attacks carried out by them to agreat extent. As a consequence of its fightagainst various terrorist organizations for morethan four decades including ASALA, DHKP-C, PKK, and ISIS, Turkey has long been akey actor in terms of global security as well asa key partner in global counter-terrorism efforts.In the last decade, the Islamic State of Iraqand al-Sham (ISIS) has become one of themajor security concerns of the internationalcommunity with the group’s direct militaryadvances especially in Iraq and Syria as wellas due to the presence and activities of its af-filiates all over the globe. Accordingly, since2013, Turkey has been an active player interms of the global fight against ISIS as oneof the first countries designating the group asa terrorist organization long before its militaryadvances on the ground. Within this context,in this study, the group’s emergence and riseas well as its diminishing power and physicalpresence recently will be discussed. Followingthat, how Turkey responded to this threat withboth hard and soft measures will be mentioned.As two concepts becoming more and moreimportant lately, namely Foreign TerroristFighters and “returnees” and Turkey’s measuresand performance fighting them will be touchedupon. Consequently, the current situation bothwithin and out of Turkey and possible nextsteps in line with the group’s transformationwill be discussed.

1- ISIS: A Brief Background

Ahmed al-Khalayleh or Abu Musab al-Zar-qawi, with his widely known Nom de guerre,who was born in 1966, went to Afghanistan in

1989. Although he met bin Laden there, hehad an attitude that focused on enemies posi-tioned in close proximity while Laden gavemore importance to the distant enemy, theUS.1 This, in time, would turn into the group’smodus operandi which aims at increasing itspower by advancing towards particular closertargets where it perceives it can establish fielddominance rather than focusing on the “farawayenemy”. In 2002, al-Zarqawi went to the campsof Ansar al-Islam in Northern Iraq along withimportant figures from the Herat camp, wherehe laid the foundations of the structure whichwas to be called firstly Tawhid and Jihad andthen Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafi-dayn (in which Rafidayn refers to Euphratesand Tigris Rivers) and eventually the Iraqi al-Qaeda. In 2006, the Mujahideen Shura Council,formed as a result of the unification of theIraqi al-Qaeda with other small groups, cameto be known as the Islamic State of Iraq.2

Once in charge of the Herat training camp forfighters from the Levant region in Afghanistan,Zarqawi could quickly gather fighters fromJordan, Lebanon and Syria, thereby strength-ening the human capital of the group.3

The letter that was written by Ayman al-Zawahiri in 2005 to Abu Musab al-Zarqawiwho proclaimed himself to be the commanderof al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) in 2004 may beconsidered a signal of the upcoming separation.The most crucial point of the letter was thethree criticisms Zawahiri brought to Zarqawi.These criticisms were mainly about Zarqawi’sbrutal methods, his harsh attitude towards theShiites, and that he did not give more space toIraqis in his groups, raising discontent amonglocals.4 In the following years, it would beseen that the group would maintain its attitudewith respect to the first two, even some “im-provements” regarding the third point wouldbe made.

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The structure formed by Zarqawi in Iraqhad five fundamental aims and these are thepoints that would determine the goals andmodus operandi of the organization in the fol-lowing years; to weaken the central governmentand security forces in Iraq, to gain the warriorsfrom the insurgency groups on the field, totake advantage of the position of the Sunniswho are side-lined the system, to provoke theShiite militias to carry out overreactive actionsand to make the US withdraw from Iraq.5 Inthis context, the conduct of a strategy calledthe “foco strategy”, which is attributed to CheGuavera and requires the conduct of small ac-tions to incite a conflict6 has been applied tothe Shiite and their holy places as seen in theexample of the al-Askari Mosque.

Zarqawi’s death in the US airstrike in 2006led to a new era. In this period, the organizationexperienced troubles within itself due to thedissatisfaction towards the leadership of AbuMusab al-Masri who replaced Zarqawi andsome of the non-Iraqi fighters moved to othercountries to form their own groups. One ofthem was Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, wholater formed the group known as the NusraFront.

Later rising to the leadership of the organ-ization, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was born in1971 in the city of Samarra and he has beenregistered in the records with the names of Alial-Bedri al-Samarrai, Dr. Ibrahim and AvvadIbrahim, and he is known to use al-Abu al-Dua as the nickname.7 Starting in 2012, it isobserved that the then Islamic State of Iraqundertook an ambitious restructuring and em-powerment program. The attacks on prisonsand the release of prisoners in this periodwithin the scope of the “Breaking the Walls”operation were considered as a move to provideserious human resources to the organization.The Iraqi Army started to be targeted morehardly and frequently after July 2013 within

the scope of the “Soldiers’ Harvest” campaign.This shifting and more aggressive attitudewas also believed to be linked to the USdecision to withdraw from Iraq and the ideathat the Iraqi Army had become an easiertarget. Following this process, the group mademajor military advances including in Anbar,Fallujah and Ramadi, and then Mosul. OnJune 29, 2014, the so-called “Islamic State”and Baghdadi’s “Caliphate” were declared.8

2013 was also a key turning point for thegroup. In order to take advantage of the con-ditions in Syria and use the country as a fieldof training and possible sphere of influence,Baghdadi moved to Syria and changed thename of the group to the Islamic State of Iraqand the Levant/Syria (ISIL/ISIS). This changewas criticized by Zawahiri, who warned Bagh-dadi to limit his activities to Iraq, which inreturn was eventually rejected by Baghdadi inmid-2013. After the attempts to push Baghdadiback to Iraq and to prevent him from trying tounite his group with the Nusra Front, al-Qaeda’s Syrian arm, failed, al-Qaeda cut offall its contacts with the group in February2014.

In the same month, Baghdadi put an end tothe “homage” he paid to al-Qaeda. One of themost crucial messages in this process is Bagh-dadi’s call for Zawahiri to break his allegianceto Taliban leader Mullah Omar and pay homageto himself as the leader. In this message, Bagh-dadi referred to Mullah Omar as “an ignorantand uneducated warlord who does not deservepolitical or religious respect”. Keeping itssilence until the beginning of 2015, the Talibanannounced in January 2015 that all of thegroups fighting in Afghanistan were fightingunder its emirate and the groups other thanthat would not be given the opportunity to beactive in Afghanistan.9 Following the procla-mation of the so-called “caliphate”, Baghdadialso conveyed the message that the focus ofthe organization would not be limited to Iraq



and Syria, signaling the global focus of thegroup. In this speech of Baghdadi, a call forglobal resistance was brought forward.Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, India, Kashmir,and China were mentioned in this context.

Over time, in many parts of the world fromCentral Asia to Africa, both the groups whichhave been active while “being loosely connectedto al-Qaeda” and those who have just emergedstarted paying homage or declaring their alle-giance to the group. Overall, ISIS, from thevery first efforts to form and empower itselfin Iraq, in the meantime, turned into a key se-curity threat with a global reach. In time, andespecially by advancing in Iraq and Syria thethreat posed by the group to Turkey becamemore and more visible. In the next section, abrief overview of the group’s attacks in thatcontext will be mentioned.

2- ISIS’ Attacks in Global Context

and the Group’s Attacks against

Turkey

As a result of the above-mentioned globalreach, overall, in 29 countries, around 140 at-tacks were carried out either directly by thegroup or by the people/groups affiliated or in-spired by it, claiming the lives of around 2100people. To mention some of the most spectacularattacks of the group, on 18 April 2015, asuicide bomber on a motorbike blew himselfup in front of a bank in Jalalabad killing morethan 30 people, on 31 October, 2015 a bombdestroyed a Russian passenger airplane flyingover the Sınai Peninsula, Egypt, killing morethan 220 people; on 12 November 2015, 6 at-tacks in Paris claimed the lives of at least 130people and wounded more than 350, on 22March 2016, three explosions in Brussels (twoin the airport and one in an undergroundstation) killed more than 30 people, on 12June 2016, an attacker opened fire on thecrowd at a nightclub in Florida, killing 49

people, on 28 June 2016, a combined attackcarried out by guns and suicide vests at theairport in Istanbul killed more than 40 people,on 14 July 2016, in Nice, France, a manrammed a truck into the crowd in France’sNational Day, killing more than 80 people, on31 December 2016, an ISIS-linked terroristattacked a crowded nightclub in Istanbul,killing 39 people, on 23 March 2017, a terroristrammed a car into the crowd over the West-minster Bridge in London and then stabbed apolice officer. Thus, putting aside the group’smilitary advances and operations in Iraq andSyria and presence in Libya, it owes a significantportion of its “fame” to its affiliates and peopleinspired by its discourse carrying out attacksall over the world.

Since mid-2014, ISIS has been regardingTurkey as a high priority in its list of possibleareas in which the group needs to exert its in-fluence and gain fighters from and from whichto defend itself from possible military move.Within this context, some of the most sensationaland tragic terror attacks carried out by ISISare as follows:

Storming the Turkish Consulate Buildingin Mosul (June 11, 2014): 49 people were kid-napped and held captive for 101 days includingTurkey’s Consulate General

Suruç attack (July 20, 2015): Claimed 34lives, left 104 people injured

Ankara Train Station attack (October 10,2015): Claimed 103 lives, left more than 400people injured

İstanbul Sultanahmet Police Station attack(January 12, 2016): Claimed 13 lives, left 14people injured

İstanbul İstiklal attack (March 19, 2016):Claimed 4 lives, left 39 people injured

İstanbul- Atatürk Airport attack (July 28,2016): Claimed 45 lives, left more than 230people injured

Gaziantep wedding attack (August 20,2016): Claimed 51 lives, left more than 94people injured

İstanbul- Reina attack (December 31, 2016):Claimed 39 lives, left more than 65 people in-jured

Moreover, between January and May 2016,in almost 20 mortar/rocket attacks, Kilis washit by around 60 rockets/mortars, claimingthe lives of 19 residents and 70 people wereinjured. In addition, ISIS, in the mosques itcontrols, in Friday sermons, repeatedly men-tioned Kilis, Gaziantep, and Karkamış as highpriority targets, further highlighting the terroristgroup’s intention to target Turkey and itsborder areas. Besides, Turkish military personnelpositioned in the Bashiqa camp in Iraq werealso targeted by the group.

3- Turkey’s Fight at a glance

a-D-ISIS Coalition, Border Controls

and the Operation Euphrates Shield

As one of the key institutional frameworksunder the UN’s roof, the Global Counter Ter-rorism Forum (GCTF) has been initiated byTurkey along with the US, two first co-chairsof this body. GCTF was co-chaired by Turkeybetween 2011 and 2016 until the Netherlandsand Morocco replaced Turkey and the US asco-chairs. Turkey also co-chaired the Horn ofAfrica Working Group within the GCTF withthe European Union. It was also a key actor interms of leading GCTF initiatives to Addressthe Life Cycle of Radicalization to Violence”and the “Antalya Memorandum on Good Prac-tices on the Protection of Soft Targets in aCounterterrorism Context”. Turkey is also anactive member of D-ISIS Coalition or the

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ISIS Attacks against TurkeyStorming the Turkish Consulate Building in Mosul (June 11, 2014): 49 people were kidnapped

and held captive for 101 days including Turkey’s Consulate General

7

Şanlıurfa-Suruç attack

Claimed 34 lives, left 104 people injured

July 20, 2015

İstanbul Sultanahmet Police Station attack


January 12, 2016

İstanbul- Atatürk Airport attack

Claimed 45 lives, left more than 230 people injured

July 28, 2016

İstanbul- Reina attack


Mortar and Rocket attacks against Kilis and Bashiqa

December 31, 2016

Ankara Train Station attack


October 10, 2015

İstanbul İstiklal attack


March 19, 2016

Gaziantep wedding attack


August 20, 2016

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Infographic-1



Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS and co-leaderof the Coalition’s working group on FTFs. Interms of the implementation of UNSC 2178,Turkey has long been at the forefront of thefight. For instance, individuals suspected tohave links to terrorist groups trying to haveaccess to Turkey or travelling to other desti-nations through the country are transferred toDeportation Centers and expelled to their homecountries. In addition, 22 Risk Analysis Unitsin 16 cities located in airports and bus terminalsare quite central instruments in terms of pre-venting travels of such people. As the financialdimension of terrorism getting more and moreattention, it should also be noted that Turkeyis also a member of the Financial Action TaskForce (FATF), the global anti-money launder-ing/countering terrorist financing body. Interms of the coutnry’s contribution to globalefforts, along with the US, Turkey led the ini-

tiative to produce the FATF report on ISIS fi-nancing in 2015. Turkey’s Financial IntelligenceUnit (MASAK) activly contributes to FATF’sefforts in line with UNSC 1267 and 1373, pri-marily focusing on terrorist financing and themeasures to prevent and prosecute them. Be-sides these multilateral efforts, Turkey alsoconcluded bilateral agreements with more than70 countries within the context of the fightagainst terrorism. Only in 2017, total of 739Daesh members were remanded in custodywhile 4,765 suspects were arrested for linksto the terror group in 2017.

Turkey has allowed its airspace to be usedby Coalition aircraft for both combat andnon-combat roles, including intelligencegathering, personnel recovery, and hasopened its facilities to the Coalition partners,allowing over 60 aircraft with over 1200 per-sonnel to be deployed to support operations,

Infographic-2

for the operations targeting ISIS in Syria andIraq, and 90 percent of the operations of un-manned air vehicles are focused in Syrianborder area to detect illegal crossing andsmuggling activities.

With the Operation Euphrates Shield, startedin August 24, 2016, Turkey directly engagedwith ISIS’ presence on the Syrian side of itsborders. With the operation, it cleared itsborder from ISIS presence, controlled morethan 230 residential areas and 1900 squarekilometres, killing 3000 terrorists. In late Feb-ruary 2017, an important stronghold of ISISin Syria, namely al-Bab was also controlled.The Operation, which began in August, 2016,had two main goals – clearing the Turkishborder of Islamic State (IS) and preventingthe merger of cantons controlled by the YPGin the same area. The latter had a further goal,which was to push the People’s ProtectionUnits (YPG) forces to the west of EuphratesRiver and in so doing clear Manbij of thePKK’s Syrian branch YPG, which is still onTurkey’s priorities list. Turkey’s National Se-curity Council announced the end of OperationEuphrates Shield on March 27, 2016.

Following the Operation, a key tool forISIS’ Online Propaganda, Dabiq e-journalceased to be published by the group, furtherdamage to the group’s propaganda machine.The group’s demise has been coupled with adecrease in its online presence and propagandaactivities. ISIS has suffered from seriousdamage to its propaganda machine lately. Inthe summer of 2015, the group propagandamachine could produce “more than 200 videos,radio programmes, magazines and photo reportseach week”, whereas as of now, the numberdiminished so significantly that it is around20 outputs weekly.10 Whereas the groups couldproduce around 900 online content items inAugust 2015 at the peak of its online propagandaactivity, as of late 2017, the number fell asmuch as around 100.11 While the group waspublishing several e-journals at the peak of itspower, including Konstantiniyye (Turkish),Istok (Russian), Dabiq (English), Dar-al Islam(French) and Rumiyah (English), none of themare published anymore including the last “sur-vivor” Dabiq which was ceased to be publishedafter Turkey’s Euphrates Shield Operation.

ISIS, once able to satisfy around 90-95percent of its economic needs by its own rev-

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enues, had presented a unique case at the peakof its power as an almost completely self-sus-tainable terrorist organization. The group’s oilrevenues only were around $40 million amonth in 2015. Even though territorial lossesresulted in a significant loss here, too, it is es-timated that the group can still make $4 milliona month even after the loss of control over oilfields in Iraq and Syria, a figure far from ig-norable for a terrorist group even though it isat best modest for an insurgency aiming at es-tablishing and sustaining a state-like structurewhile at the same time fighting at differentfronts.12 Relatedly, in 2014, 79 million litersof smuggled oil was intercepted by Turkishlaw enforcement and customs authorities, in2015 this amount decreased to 1,22 millionliters due to effective measures taken toprevent oil smuggling. On the other hand, theamount of intercepted smuggled oil at theSyrian border, which was 12,6 million litersin 2014, decreased to 887 thousand liters in2015. Additionally, 300 kilometers of illegalpipelines were also destroyed

Turkey has also strengthened its physicalborder control measures and security along its911 kilometers border with Syria. Within this

context, Turkey has been putting a significantamount of effort into its “Syrian border physicalsecurity system” which includes constructionof 192 kilometers of wall. Moreover, thenumber of the personnel of the existing 12Border Battalions which was 12.000 in 2104,has been increased to 20.000. New units of airdefense and reconnaissance have been addedto the battalions. Within the context of theBorder Physical Security System Project, thenumber of border patrol stations were increasedalong with 375,6 kilometers length of trenches,197 kilometers of barbed wire, 19,8 kilometersof movable concrete Wall and 26,3 kilometersof accordion barrier system. 473 kilometersof Syrian border illumination poles installedat every 50 meters, and the existing 1,217kilometers length of border patrol path hasbeen improved.

b. Non-Military Efforts

In terms of non-military measures put for-ward by Turkey, there are several points whichdeserve a great deal of attention both in termsof best practices and efforts to reach out topeople via direct contact as well as counter-narratives.

Infographic-3

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The Ministry of Family and Social Affairs,the Ministry of Youth and Sports as well asthe police and military within the context ofbriefing and information activities aimed atweakening the ideological and social base ofradical groups. Social and cultural projects,which has have long been believed to be a keycomponent of any smart power strategy aimingat inflicting a major blow to radical groups’especially young human capital succeeded togather more than 65 thousand people.

The Presidency of Religious Affairs acts asa key institution to producing and publicizinga religious counter-narrative. In order to produceand publicise religious counter-narrative, 550preachers are charged by the Presidency ofReligious Affairs in prisons where radicalisationcan produce and re-produce itself. Moreover,the Presidency of Religious Affairs publishedtwo reports, entitled “The Fundamental Phi-losophy and Religious References of ISIS”and “Exploitation of Religion and TerroristOrganization ISIS” in 2015 and 2017 respec-tively. Another piece, “DEAŞ: Dehşete Dayalıbir Din İstismarı/DEASH: Exploitation of Re-

ligion Based on Terror” is also produced anddisseminated as booklets in 2018. The two re-ports published by the Presidency of ReligiousAffairs on making sense of the religious refer-ences and narrative used by ISIS are also animportant endeavour. The reports not onlycover ISIS’s religious references and its his-torical background, but also show how theterrorist group distorts religious concepts andabuse them in order to gain legitimacy andhow to respond to this distortion. Nevertheless,as mentioned in earlier sections, a state insti-tution disseminating counter-messaging andacounter-narrative could easily suffer from le-gitimacy issues in the eyes of radical groups.The institution itself as well as the scholars,academics etc. who took part in the productionof such reports would be labelled as the “state’smere tools” to fight “us” and “only servingthe state’s interests” which is the “enemy”itself. Moreover, even the inconsistency in thetitles of the reports regarding ISIS/ISIS seemsfurther weakening its intellectual reach.

Personnel in the prisons are also trainedspecifically to get better equipped in terms of



the ways that people can be radicalized andhow to prevent them. “High Security” prisonsare organized for the leadership of variousterrorist organizations with cells containing 1to 3 inmates. Hotlines 183 and 144 have alsobeen in use. The Information Analysis Serviceis active since 2017 to monitor communicationamong inmates as well as their communicationwith the outside. Within the context of the“Dynamic Security” approach, not only pre-vention of future crimes is aimed for, but alsopsychological support, moral training, and per-sonal development support are also providedto inmates for rehabilitation. In that respectseveral EU-funded projects are being carriedout to improve counselling and support pro-grammes such as DEPAR and R2PRIS. Turkey’smassive immigrant population has also beensubject to education programmes and personnelin the refugee camps were also educated inareas including personal communication, law,economics, media and health. The youth campsorganised by the Ministry of Youth and Sportssucceeded in attracting around 60 thousandyouth. In 352 projects directed at the youthrun by the Ministry only in 2015, around $9million was spent and 328 thousand youthwere able to benefit from them. Even thoughthese youth camps and projects were not or-ganised/run for the goal of preventing radical-isation, the youth camps are one of the keymeasures in the literature on preventing andcountering violent extremism (P/CVE). There-fore, either incorporating brief curriculums re-garding the fight against radicalisation or de-signing individual camps or projects to thatend could be quite useful measures which areabsent in the case of Turkey for the timebeing.

Within the context of Turkey’s efforts tocomply with the international regulations andeffectively cooperate with its internationalpartners, one of the most important documentsrelated to FTF was conveyed by the Prime

Ministry to the Parliament on February 2,2016, entitled “The Bill of Approval of theRatification of the Additional Protocol to theCouncil of Europe Convention on the Preventionof Terrorism”. Here, in line with the UNSC2178, travels with the aim of joining terroristgroups, organising and financing such travelsand helping facilitation of such efforts wereproposed to be subject to relevant legal regu-lations and to make amendments to includetraining for terrorist purposes, too the existingregulations in order to avoid any loopholes. Itshould also be noted that Turkey, which wasthe co-chair of the Global Counter TerrorismForum with the US, played a quite active rolein the production of the resolution 2178. Bydoing so, Turkey would not only have thechance to revise and if necessary, amend andimprove its own capability, regulations, andpractices, but also would contribute to the in-ternational and regional security with its ex-perience and fight in the field.

c- International Information Sharing

and Preventing Returnees’ Movements

In terms of Turkey’s international effortsand cooperation, even though the Brusselsand Paris attacks and the information Turkeyprovided to the concerned European countriesbeforehand was surprisingly ignored, thesetwo cases showed Turkey’s active efforts interms of international efforts to fight radicali-sation, violent extremism and foreign terroristfighters. Turkey had officially warned theFrench government twice about one of the at-tackers, Omer Ismail Moustefai, who in 2013,entered Turkey. These warnings were made inDecember 2014 and June 2015, quite earlierthan the attack. In response, let alone any pre-caution taken, no contact was made in returnby the French government up until the “infor-mation request” they demanded after the attackstook place. Similarly, before the Brusselsairport attack, Turkey informed not only Bel-

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gium, but also the Dutch government aboutone of the attackers, Ibrahim El Bakraoui,who was in Turkey’s suspected FTF list already,travelled to Turkey twice in July and August,2015. He, being after detained in Gaziantep,was deported by Turkey (one of his two de-portations) to the Netherlands from where hethen moved to Belgium. Following his depor-tation, Turkey warned both governments’ aboutBakraoui’s suspected attempt to access Syria.Turkey also warned the Belgian governmentabout Najim Laachroui following his trip toTurkey as well as İbrahim El Bakraoui’sbrother, Khalid. According to the Belgian gov-ernment, both individuals were said to be“clean” and “had no terror links”. The Belgiangovernment issued an INTERPOL red noticeonly 3 weeks before the attack due to suspected“terrorist” links of Laarouchi and Khalid elBakraoui.

Along with the question of remaining humancapital of ISIS in general, which can well beutilised by Al-Qaeda and future ISIS-likegroups, unless the deep socio-economic andpolitical drivers are addressed on the ground,how countries would deal with their owncitizens who fought in Syria and Iraq forterrorist groups and more particularly for ISISand now trying to make their way back homestands out as a challenging aspect of thegroup’s human capital. With the loss of its“state”, ISIS has been producing a significantamount of returning foreign terrorist fighters(FTFs) considering the fact, that at its peak,the number of FTFs fighting for the groupreached around 40,000.13

Disappointment with the gap between whatis promised and what is the actual situationunder ISIS’ control, cessation of the once at-tractive financial flow, destruction of the “pres-tigious” image of being a “solider” of a “rightand winning cause” and the “caliphate”, falsi-fication of the group’s discourse about the fall

of its much propagated images of “unbeatablecaliphate” and “capability to win forever”, ac-ceptance of the fact that the group will hardlysurvive this process are some of the reasonsbehind the tendency to return. However, it isalso possible that in response to this “fall”,many FTFs also return to their countries tocarry the war with them to the “heart of theenemy” which played important roles in thedestruction of the embodiment of his/her“cause”.

United Nations Security Council Resolutionnumbered 2178 (2014), which is widely knownfor its emphasis on the conceptualization ofForeign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs), focuses onthe flight information and screening of suspi-cious individuals based on this information.According to Resolution 2178, the UN callsfor the airline operators in the Member Statesto provide API information to the relevant in-stitutions and thus to detect their departurefrom the country, their effort to enter thecountry or pass through it. This call wasrepeated in 2016 with the UNSC Resolution2309. It is no coincidence that 2016 was theyear when ISIS suffered losses on the groundand that the FTFs became increasingly importanton the agenda.

The UN stressed the need for MemberStates to step up their efforts; thus, giving animportant message to those countries whichdo not have the required level of awareness orthe necessary technical capabilities. Resolution2396 of December 2017 is the most recent de-cision within this context. In this resolution,the UN calls on Member States to strengthentheir border security, their efforts for informationsharing, and other means related to the returnof FTFs. In this context, the Member Statesare urged to collect API, PNRs and biometricdata of the people suspected of terroristactivities, developing monitoring lists and



matching the data with these lists, strengtheninginformation sharing and increasing their ca-pacities in order to match this data in coordi-nation with the organizations such as INTER-POL, IATA, IOCA, and CTED under the roofof the UN.

In connection with this message, 56 UNMember States are currently using the APIsystem. It is clear that the increase in thisgiven number is quite vital for the global fightagainst terrorism. For monitoring the suspects’travel and the incorporation of this data to in-ternational information-sharing schemes in thecountries except these 56 stands out as a majorobstacle in this context. This number is partic-ularly noteworthy in these days when returningFTFs, which legal processes to be followedabout them, how to identify and disengagethem from terrorists groups have been climbingup in the international security agenda.

Turkey, due to its geographic proximity toterrorist groups with various motives and thefact that these groups have also been active inthe country along with the country’s crucialgeographical position in the context of travels,has a highly significant role in terms of datacollection and sharing. Being one of the above-mentioned 56 UN Member States where theAPI system is in use, Turkey’s critical impor-tance was witnessed during the internationalinformation-sharing processes prior to the at-tacks in Brussels and Paris. In addition tothose attacks, it is also valid to argue thatTurkey is located in an even more critical se-curity axis in the context of the question of“returnees”. Within this framework, Turkey,the founding co-chair of the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (GCTF) and one of the ar-chitects of the above-mentioned Resolution2178 participated in the 9th Ministerial Meetingentitled “Detection and Intervention of Terrorists’

Travels through Strengthened Terrorist Trackingand Information-Sharing” in September, 2018,focused on “terrorists’ travel initiatives”.

The main issues discussed in this meetingwere the “watch lists” in which the “matching”with the above-mentioned data pool will becarried out, the accessibility of these lists tothe authorities at the borders, and the estab-lishment of an internationally integrated databaseand doing all these by taking into considerationthe legal rules and fundamental rights regardingprivacy and protection of personal data. Turkey,to note in this regard, based on the Law onForeigners and International Protection, cur-rently holds a no-entry list of 73.309 namesfrom 151 countries, 7271 foreigners were de-ported since 2011 in the context of measuresagainst foreign fighters, and has active riskanalysis units in 16 provinces at 22 points,more than six thousand suspects have beenregistered as Inadmissible Passenger (INAD),and about six thousand people have alreadybeen deported.

Combined, all these shows the internationalcommunity that Turkey, aside from its significantgeographical proximity, is well aware of thedanger and puts a serious effort in terms oftaking necessary steps in order to tackle it ef-fectively. Turkey has also put in place a broadarray of mechanisms to disrupt or stop theflow of foreign fighters. Turkey is continuouslyenhancing security measures to stop and in-tercept foreign terrorist fighters at airports andother border crossing points through RiskAnalysis Units established specifically for thispurpose. Turkey has begun to counter thethreat of foreign terrorist fighters since 2011and called for source countries to take necessarylegal and administrative measures to preventdeparture and travel of FTFs from their coun-tries.

Report No:5


Conclusion

As a member of the Global Coalition toDefeat ISIS or D-ISIS in short, Turkey, despitehaving suffered from occasional indifferenceand/or lack of response of other members ofthe coalition both during the Euphrates ShieldOperation and regarding its concerns aboutthe PKK’S off-shoot YPG in Northern Syria,from the very beginning of the fight, both di-rectly and indirectly and also in many casesindividually took effective measures againstthe group. Along with the country’s cross-border operations and support to the globalcoalition, the fight has been more and moreintense inside the country with more than4500 people were taken into custody and morethan 700 people arrested for allegations aboutlinks to ISIS only in 2017. Turkey’s efforts interms of information-sharing and preventionof terrorists’ travels have been exemplified inmany cases including the tragic attacks inBrussels and Paris. Besides, as the Ministry ofInterior announced recently, the country foiledaround 700 terror plots in 2017 whereas thenumber is almost 350 in 2018. All in all, from

international cooperation to cross-border op-erations, Turkey stands out as a key actor interms of global counter-terrorism efforts andP/CVE-related strategies. Nevertheless, am-biguities in terms of defining terrorism anddesignating terrorist groups result in setbacksin terms of international cooperation and jeop-ardize relations between NATO allies as inthe case of YPG. While fighting a terroristgroup does not make another terrorist group alegitimate actor on the ground, divergenciesbetween NATO allies still exist on the subject.Whether the recent discussions about the US’withdrawal from Syria would result in a morestrategically wise mid to long-term strategyand how this would affect Turkey’s concernsneed to be observed quite closely in the comingmonths. In any case, Turkey’s positon of stand-ing against all manifestations of terrorismposing a national security threat and the ensuedsteps to be taken in order to materialise thisapproach would most possibly continue in theforeseeable future either against YPG’s presencein Northern Syria or a resurgence of ISISand/or like-minded groups.



References

“Turkey ‘Deported 3719 Foreign Fighters since 2011’”, Hurriyet Daily News, 9/8/2016.

“Türkiye bombacılara göz açtırmadı”, Star, 24/3/2016.

“Türkiye, Brüksel saldırganını iki kez sınır dışı etmiş”, Hürriyet, 24/3/2016.

Brendan I. Koerner, “Why ISIS is Winning the Social Media War”, Wired, April 2016.

Charlie Winter, “Inside the collapse of Islamic State’s propaganda machine”, Wired, 20December2017.

Charlie Winter, “Is Islamic State losing control of its virtual caliphate, BBC, November 9,2017.

Charlie Winter, “Documenting the Virtual ‘Caliphate’”, Quilliam Foundation, October 2015.

Christopher Woody & Mike Nudelman, “Here’s How Many Foreign ISIS Fighters HaveRe-turned Home From the Battlefield”, Business Insider, OCtober 26, 2017.

Colin Clarke and Charlie Winter, “The Islamıc State May be Faılıng, But Its Strategic Com-munications Legacy is Here to Stay”, War on the Rocks, August 17, 2017.

Craig Whiteside, “New Masters of Revolutionary Warfare: The Islamic State Movement(2002-2016)”, Perspectives on Terrorism 10:4 (August 2016), p. 6-20.

Dawood Azami, “The Islamic State in South and Central Asia”, Survival 58:4 (2016), p. 131-158.

Gareth Stansfield, “Explaining the Aims, Rise, and Impact of the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham”, The Middle East Journal 70:1 (Winter, 2016), p. 146-151.

Haroro J. Ingram, “The strategic logic of Islamic State information operations”, AustralianJournal of International Affairs 69:6 (2015), p. 729-752.

Patrick Johnston, “Oil, Extortion Still Paying Off for ISIS”, The Cipher Brief, October 27,2017.

Profile: Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Council on Foreign Relations, 8 June 2006.

Shmuel Bar and Yair Minzili, “The Zawahiri Letter and the Strategy of al-Qaeda”, HudsonInstitute, 26 February, 2006.

Stephan Rosiny, “The Rise and Demise of the IS Caliphate”, Middle East Policy 22:2 (Sum-mer 2015), p. 94-107, p. 96.

Truls Hallberg Tonnessen, “Heirs of Zarqawi or Saddam? The Relationship between al-Qaidain Iraq and the Islamic State”, Perspective on Terrorism 9:4 (Ağustos 2015), p. 48-60.

UN Al-Qaida Sanctions List, List of individuals, entities and other groups, 2014.

Report No:5


Endnotes

1 Profile: Abu Musab alZarqawi, Council on Foreign Relations, 8 June 2006.

2 Stephan Rosiny, “The Rise and Demise of the IS Caliphate”, Middle East Policy 22:2 (Sum

mer 2015), p. 94107, p. 96.

3 Truls Hallberg Tonnessen, “Heirs of Zarqawi or Saddam? The Relationship between al

Qaida in Iraq and the Islamic State”, Perspective on Terrorism 9:4 (Ağustos 2015), p. 48

60, p. 49.

4 Shmuel Bar and Yair Minzili, “The Zawahiri Letter and the Strategy of alQaeda”, Hudson

Institute, 26 February, 2006.

5 Craig Whiteside, “New Masters of Revolutionary Warfare: The Islamic State Movement

(20022016)”, Perspectives on Terrorism 10:4 (August 2016), p. 620, p. 9.

6 Haroro J. Ingram, “The strategic logic of Islamic State information operations”, Australian

Journal of International Affairs 69:6 (2015), p. 729752, p. 744.

7 UN AlQaida Sanctions List, List of individuals, entities and other groups, 2014.

8 Gareth Stansfield, “Explaining the Aims, Rise, and Impact of the Islamic State in Iraq and

alSham”, The Middle East Journal 70:1 (Winter, 2016), p. 146151, p. 147.

9 Dawood Azami, “The Islamic State in South and Central Asia”, Survival 58:4 (2016), p.

131158, p. 139.

10 Charlie Winter, “Is Islamic State losing control of its virtual caliphate, BBC, November 9,

2017. Also see Charlie Winter, “Documenting the Virtual ‘Caliphate’”, Quilliam Foundation,

October 2015.

11 Charlie Winter, “Inside the collapse of Islamic State’s propaganda machine”, Wired, 20De-

cember 2017.

12 Patrick Johnston, “Oil, Extortion Still Paying Off for ISIS”, The Cipher Brief, October 27,

2017.

13 Christopher Woody & Mike Nudelman, “Here’s How Many Foreign ISIS Fighters HaveRe

turned Home From the Battlefield”, Business Insider, OCtober 26, 2017.

ORSAM Publishes Middle East Analysis and Middle Eastern Studies as periodical journals. Middle East Analysis, which ispublished bimonthly in Turkish, covers the expert opinions on contemporary developments in the MiddleEast. Middle Eastern Studies is a semi-annual journal on international relations. As a scholarly and refereedjournal, published in both Turkish and English, Middle Eastern Studies is composed of the contributions ofacademics who are experts in their field. Middle Eastern Studies, where respectable, national and internationallevel academics publishes their papers, is indexed by Applied Social Sciences and Abstracts (ASSIA), EBSCOHost, Index Islamicus, International Bibliography of Social Sciences (IBBS), Worldwide Political ScienceAbstracts (WPSA).

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