Tutorial Decentralisation in Morocco

Tutorial Decentralisation in MoroccoAuthor(s): John R. NellisSource: The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Sep., 1983), pp. 483-508Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/160820 .

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The Journal of Modern African Studies, 2I, 3 (1983), pp. 483-508 The Journal of Modern African Studies, 2I, 3 (1983), pp. 483-508 The Journal of Modern African Studies, 2I, 3 (1983), pp. 483-508 The Journal of Modern African Studies, 2I, 3 (1983), pp. 483-508 The Journal of Modern African Studies, 2I, 3 (1983), pp. 483-508

Tutorial Decentralisation in Morocco

by JOHN R. NELLIS*

IN less-developed countries generally, and Africa in particular, centralised forms of political and economic organisation were until recently the norm. But over the past I5 years, this form of government has come under attack, and excessive centralisation is now viewed as a primary contributor to prevailing high levels of inefficiency and ineffectiveness.1 Various forms of decentralisation - the shifting of responsibilities and resources from central to sub-national units and actors - have been

proposed as the necessary corrective mechanisms. Algeria, Kenya, the

Sudan, Tanzania, Tunisia, and Zambia have been among the African countries which have implemented programmes aimed at strengthening the personnel, finances, and freedom of manoeuvre of non-central

agencies and governments. This article examines the recent and continuing efforts of the

Kingdom of Morocco to decentralise and reform its politico- administrative system. The hyphenated term is necessary, since the aim is to strengthen both the finances and structures of the country's sub-national governments, and the public-service organisations and

personnel serving them. These efforts began in earnest in 1975, and have moved slowly, cautiously, but none the less perceptibly forward. To

date, the Government has made a substantial commitment to decentralisation. This is evidenced first, by changes in the financial situation of the local governments; second, by the large-scale restructuring of

regional, provincial, and especially communal institutions; and third, * Professor of Public Administration, The Maxwell School, Syracuse University. This article

is a revised and shortened version of'Tutorial Decentralization: the Case of Morocco', Occasional Paper No. 70, Local Revenue Administration Project, Metropolitan Studies Program, Syracuse, June I983. Part of the research was carried out under the auspices of the Project which is funded by the United States Agency for International Development. The views expressed are those of the author, and are not necessarily held by officials of U.S. AID

I The authors of the World Bank's Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa (Washington, D.C. 1981), argue that 'domestic policy inadequacies' are largely to blame for the poor economic performance of African states, and that central planning mechanisms and regulatory economic administrations are inefficient and unproductive. Suggested improvements include reducing the size and scope of government, eliminating or lightening gazetted regulations, and relying more on the market, the private sector, and consumer preferences (as expressed by a willingness to pay) for public services. See, especially, ch. 4, 'Policy and Administrative Framework', pp. 24-44.


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by the dramatic increase in sub-national staffing establishments, and the related but equally notable expansion of training programmes for local-level civil servants and elected officials.

The programme of decentralisation in Morocco is being implemented in what can be called a 'tutorial' fashion. That is, sub-national institutions are being given formal legal responsibilities which they are

manifestly unprepared to fulfill, since they lack the requisite financial and personnel resources. The Government then provides - piecemeal, incrementally, slowly - the means necessary to undertake portions of the legally transferred tasks. The central authorities closely supervise the local efforts to ensure that these are politically sound and

economically productive. The idea is that, given the lack of funds, the

shortage of trained staff, and the low levels of literacy of the inexperienced elected councillors, one must start small and build slowly any decentralisation effort.

It is true that many African governments have instituted similar

measures, or at least have announced roughly similar intentions. But the features which ultimately distinguish the Moroccan approach from others are the regime's blunt admission that this is a tutorial situation, and its willingness actually to increase powers and funds when the local

governments start to perform well. (A more common outcome in many countries is the formal legal transfer of authority or responsibility, not followed by further necessary action on the transfer of resources.) As

King Hassan II said in 1975, when announcing his Government's plans for local reorganisation, the communes are 'a school where one learns how to manage a budget, organise actions and execute plans, a school which trains citizens conscious of the true priorities and sensitive to the needs of the population'.1 The combination of this tutorial attitude with large sums of money makes this an unusual experiment in decentralisation.

This study proceeds by reviewing the background to the Moroccan

effort, summarising briefly the many and powerful factors contributing to centralisation, and trying to explain from where, none the less, the

pressures to decentralise arose. It then describes the sub-national institutional arrangements as they have evolved since independence in

I956, emphasising the major changes launched during 1975-6. This is followed by a discussion of the post-1975 workings and implications of the reformed system, stressing its financial, personnel, and participation aspects.

1 Cited in 'La Decentralisation au Maroc', in Cities unies (Paris), I04, automne I981, p. 18, no author given, but clearly a semi-official statement by the Moroccan Government.

























































484 484 484 484 484 JOHN R. NELLIS JOHN R. NELLIS JOHN R. NELLIS JOHN R. NELLIS JOHN R. NELLIS



TUTORIAL DECENTRALISATION IN MOROCCO TUTORIAL DECENTRALISATION IN MOROCCO TUTORIAL DECENTRALISATION IN MOROCCO TUTORIAL DECENTRALISATION IN MOROCCO TUTORIAL DECENTRALISATION IN MOROCCO

BACKGROUND

Most ofMoroccan and, indeed, Maghrebian history can be interpreted as a lengthy and conclusive demonstration of the costs of not having a sufficiently centralised, unified state-structure.1 Many historians, anthropologists, and political scientists agree that the lack of a centralised

polity is the main factor accounting for the region's 'colonization

yesterday and its underdevelopment today'.2 Both history and culture are factors which continue to influence the choice of centralising policies in post-independence Morocco because of the negative examples they provide to present leaders concerning the effects of excessive decentralisation.

Other, more positive factors are viewed as contributing to the centralist perspective. An Islamic philosophical tradition stressing the

organic unity of society, the centralising French colonial administrative and political inheritance, the pressures of underdevelopment which

supposedly necessitate and are used tojustify centralised rule - it is easy to find factors to account for the pervasive insistence in Morocco, until

quite recently, on firm centralisation as the proper mode of governance. The results of this emphasis are evident, and are recognised first and

foremost by the Moroccans themselves. The 1981 Five-Year Plan

officially castigates 'the excessive centralisation which characterises our administrative apparatus':

Most government departments have retained a centralised functional organisation. The defects of this system are: slowness of administrative management, great distances between decision centers and information sources, congestion of central services, and an irrational utilisation of human resources.3

Given the early post-independence history of the country, when regional dissidents openly disputed the authority of the central state, and when competing political groups - in some cases regionally based - showed no deep commitment to the basic framework of the state, firm centralisation was a rational and perhaps inevitable course of action. At least three times prior to I973, groups within the armed forces

attempted to eliminate the monarchy. General political uncertainty,

The line of reasoning presented in the first part of this section draws on John Nellis, 'Decentralization in North Africa: problems of policy implementation', in Dennis A. Rondinelli and G. Shabbir Cheema (eds.), Decentralization and Development: policy implementation in developing countries (Beverly Hills, 1983), ch. 5, pp. 127-82.

2 Lucette Valensi, On the Eve of Colonialism: North Africa before the French conquest (New York, 1970), p. 8o.

3 Royaume de Maroc, Projet de plan de de'veloppment economique et social (Rabat, I98I), Vols. I, p. 69, and iI, p. 291.

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485 485 485 485 485



JOHN R. NELLIS JOHN R. NELLIS JOHN R. NELLIS JOHN R. NELLIS JOHN R. NELLIS

economic difficulties, and military disloyalty combined to provide ample justification for close central supervision and control.

In spite of the presence of these destabilising factors, the Moroccan

regime has decided to decentralise. A good part of the explanation for this is political, and may be expressed in a simple juxtaposition: Moroccan decentralisation is promoted because of the destabilising factors, not despite them. That is, during the ig6os and early 1970s, the threats to the regime were sufficiently evident and intense to lend decisive weight to centralising policies aimed at the maintenance of control. It was calculated, in the short run, that it would be best to rely on firm centralisation to weather the crises generated by the discussed factors.

But in the period of relative calm following the crises, the regime began to experiment with decentralisation as part of a longer-run effort aimed at weakening the effects of divisive factors. The national leaders

attempted to deal with the worst problems by centralising, and then

opted for a controlled movement in the reverse direction as a way of

preventing the re-emergence of trouble. Centralisation and decentra-

lisation are thus tactical components of a single strategy. They are used to deal, at different moments and in varying situations, with the

primordial problem of regime maintenance and survival. A second and very pressing political issue since the mid-g1970s is that

Morocco has been involved in a gruelling, expensive war in the

Western, or former Spanish, Sahara. The Government's position is that this territory is being rightfully reincorporated into the Moroccan state, whereas the Polisario movement, with outside support, has long contested this claim. The King's 1975 wish to decentralise coincided with the thrust at incorporation, and it is reasonable to think that the two efforts are linked. That is, the decentralisation campaign might well have been timed to appeal to Western Saharans, to demonstrate to the wary or uncommitted that some measure of local autonomy was

being offered, to show that local prerogatives would be maintained under the new system. Since this concession could not easily be offered to

only one region of the country, a more thorough form of decentralisation

emerged as a national programme. Part of the motivation for this new

strategy, then, stems from a response to an immediate political need. There are also economic and administrative explanations for the shift

to decentralisation. From I956 to the early I970s, the Government relied on quite cautious economic policies, and stressed conservative fiscal practices. During the general commodity boom of the early and mid- 1970s, in which the export price of Morocco's substantial phosphate

































































486 486 486 486 486




deposits dramatically increased, the national leaders decided that

previous policies had not only excessively constrained growth, but had also been responsible for perceptible increases in the inequity of income and service distribution, by region and class, clearly perceived as a

major cause of political discontent.

Thus, the Government embarked on a much more ambitious, growth-oriented economic campaign during the Third Five-Year Plan, I973-77, aimed at general expansion through increased investment in the exporting sectors. The annual average rate of G.D.P. growth in this

period was 7-3 per cent, as against 5-6 per cent during the previous five

years.1 But regional inequities persisted and may have increased, although few figures are available. Despite a relative decline in the income position of the poorest sections of the population vis-a-vis the wealthiest that may have taken place in the period I960-71, there is some evidence that this trend towards increased inequality may have been halted, if not actually reversed, from I971 to 1978.2

What is certain is that, in the view of the Government of Morocco, economic expansion and attempts to deal with regional disequilibrium went hand in hand with the increase in participation and democratisation

through decentralisation. The economic and political changes were linked together. It was the combination of policies which was seen as the solution to the problems of slow growth, inequality, and the

resulting threats to the regime. Next in this discussion of the reasons which have persuaded the

Moroccan authorities to undertake decentralisation, are two intertwined issues: (i) the perceived need to increase the scope, impact, and

efficiency of local governments and administrations, and (ii) the matter of sub-national participation and democratisation.

As indicated by the quotations from the most recent Plan, the Moroccan authorities are openly unhappy with the way in which their administrative system functions. They attribute the all-too-evident defects to excessive centralisation of both policy planning and fiscal control. From this managerial perspective, decentralisation is less of a

grand political or economic strategy and more of a limited technique to enhance the responsiveness and effectiveness of governmental activities.

The official view is that the programme will 'integrate' the sub-national levels, and especially the communes, 'in the process of

planning economic and social development'.3 Local authorities will

1 Christian Merat et al., Morocco: economic and social development report (Washington, D.C., 1981), P. i. 2 Ibid. pp. xxii-xxiv. 3 'La Decentralisation au Maroc', loc. cit. p. i9.

































































487 487 487 487 487




'progressively' - i.e. eventually - be made responsible for first the maintenance, and then the construction of local 'infrastructure' in the fields of sanitation, drinking water, buildings, rural roads, transport, and energy distribution.' It is clearly implied that in the longer run, decentralisation will (or should) reduce the frequent delays in the

implementation of projects in these fields. Decentralisation should

improve the productivity of both local officials and local people, reduce costs of construction and maintenance, and increase the general level of satisfaction with the regime.

How will it accomplish all these laudable ends? The transfer of some

implementation powers to the local level, especially revenue generation and distribution, will relieve, it is hoped, the congestion and over-loading of centre-local communication channels. Productivity will rise because local officials and people are presumed to know better what will, and will not, work in their locale. Giving them a larger role in the identification and execution of suitable projects supposedly increases the chances that more positive results will be achieved. At least, such are the plausible assertions of decentralisation theorists in and outside of Morocco.

Official and semi-official statements stress the importance of the participatory and democratising aspects of the programme. 'Local

democracy' will be made to 'flourish' through

decentralisation, which is affirmed in Western political and economic thought as a fundamental component of development... the process of decentralisation leads to a democratisation of local institutions and creates the conditions for the real participation of the citizens in public life.2

In sum, the Moroccan decision to begin to decentralise is based on a complex, but interrelated array of factors. First, it is thought that this

process will promote regional and income equality, as well as local

representative democracy (or at least the first stages thereof). These, in turn, will promote general political stability and, more specifically, enhance the regime's legitimacy. Second, it is thought that decentralisation will stimulate economic expansion, by transferring to the sub-national levels certain powers of the slow and ineffective - because over-centralised - administrative system. Third, it is thought that the

progressive transfer of resource generation and allocation powers away from the centre will result in a greater number and larger scope of services at the local level, an improvement in their delivery and

















































1 Projet de plan de developpement economique et social, p. 67. 2 'La Decentralisation au Maroc', loc. cit. pp. i8 and 24.





488 488 488 488 488




functioning, a growth in output, a reduction in cost, and an increase in public satisfaction with the Government.

EVOLUTION OF DECENTRALISATION

Obviously, decentralisation is a very broad concept, encompassing a number of positions and viewpoints. Following the French usage, the Moroccan authorities make a distinction between this process and deconcentration. Decentralisation is the transfer of a legally specified amount of authority to a directly elected representative council or

assembly of a sub-national unit. Deconcentration is the (not necessarily permanent) handing over of usually more limited responsibilities to sub-national officials or agencies, which remain subject to the control or supervision of the centre. At the margin, the distinction is blurred because the concept of tutelle - discussed below - means that even fully decentralised units remain subject to central authority. None the less, it is useful and reasonable to distinguish between powers handed over to elected bodies and transfers to administrative agencies, and this study will use the Moroccan terminology. Decentralisation will refer to reforms and actions of the elected communal councils and their administrative support services; deconcentration will be used when

discussing regional and provincial actions. We will continue to call the

general process decentralisation, and trust that the context will eliminate

any possible confusion. At independence in 1956, Morocco inherited from the French a

thoroughly traditional system of territorial administration. The country was divided into provinces - with the two great municipalities of Casablanca and Rabat having the roughly equivalent status of

prefectures - and communes. The number of provinces has risen from 18 in

1959, to 47 in 1983, in response to demands from less favoured areas that they be given their own administrations. The number of communes has also increased, because when the population reaches a certain point, an area of density splits off from its parent and becomes a commune in its own right. As of I983, there are 849 communes in Morocco: 764 are classed as rural, 45 are 'autonomous' or semi-urbanised, and 40 are urban. Three or four communes are grouped together by the Ministry of the Interior to form cercles, or districts, for administrative convenience only, albeit of no significance either electorally or to the other Ministries. Table I depicts the hierarchy of territorial administration.









































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TABLE I

The Moroccan Administrative Hierarchy, i9831

Number of

Official(s) Territorial Responsibility Units Officials

The King Nation Minister of the Interior Nation - -

Governors Provinces or Prefectures 47 47 Super-Caids Cercles 131 131

Pachas and Caids Communes The urban Pachas and rural Caids

often deal with more than one Commune 849 452

Khalifas Deputies to Pachas and Caids in the Communes n.a. n.a.

Shaykhs Fractions Traditional political and economic

units n.a. n.a.

Muqaddams Douars Sub-divisions of Communes n.a. n.a.

TABLE I


Number of








units n.a. n.a.


TABLE I


Number of








units n.a. n.a.


TABLE I


Number of








units n.a. n.a.


TABLE I


Number of








units n.a. n.a.


Pre-1975

Between 1956 and the large-scale communal reorganisation of I 975-6, four initiatives were announced which can be classified under the

general decentralisation heading. First, immediately after independence, the Government announced

that certain powers which had been centralised under the French would be deconcentrated to the provinces. The intent was not translated into

any substance until I963. Second, in I960, representative councils were established at the level of the communes. However, although elections were held and the local councillors took office, it is generally agreed that these first communal councils were of almost no economic or administrative importance.2 Third, in I963, the regime clarified its

programme of deconcentration to the provinces. Indeed, one might say that the I963 changes aimed at decentralisation,

since assemblies were created in all provinces. But this would be an overstatement, because both in terms of their composition and powers these assemblies cannot claim to be decentralised units. They are

composed partly of members either appointed or indirectly elected from

Pre-1975








Pre-1975








Pre-1975








Pre-1975








1 Sources: interviews in the Moroccan Ministry of the Interior, Rabat, I982; also Merat et al.

op. cit. pp. 267-72. 2 Douglas Ashford, Morocco-Tunisia: politics and planning (Syracuse, I965), pp. 33-59.









490 490 490 490 490



TUTORIAL DECENTRALISATION IN MOROCCO 49I

provincial 'professional organisations', such as chambers of commerce, farmers' groups, and unions; and partly of members elected indirectly by the communal councils. The budgets of these assemblies are financed

totally by central government subsidies. Though they possess, in theory, the power to raise taxes, none have done so; the reality is that they cannot tax, since the necessary enabling textes do not exist.1

The provincial assemblies are dominated by the important figure of the centrally-appointed Governor (who also plays a powerful role vis-a-vis the communal councils). They are consultative, not representative bodies, which deal mainly with administrative matters. All this means that the assemblies, and the provinces as a whole, are 'still more a unit of adminstrative deconcentration than a truly local government . 2

In I977, some further strengthening of their powers was undertaken, and this will be discussed below.

Fourth and finally, in 197 , groups of provinces were brought together to form economic regions. There are now seven of these, and they serve

mainly as physical planning and regional development units. They are not decentralised entities of government since their main task is to

prepare and review trans-provincial investment proposals for the national plan. Each economic region has a consultative assembly, made

up of representatives of professional organisations, and five members from each of the provincial assemblies in the region. The chairmanship shifts annually among the various chairmen of the provincial assemblies, assisted by a secretariat which is attached to the Governor of the

chair-holding province. The only central ministry represented at the

regional level is the State Secretariat for Planning, which has a regional delegate in each of the seven areas. The entire exercise is one of data collection and proposal preparation; in other words, the economic

regions are not a serious decentralisation mechanism,3 though they serve a useful role in the effort to correct regional imbalances.

Thus, though the Moroccans introduced a number of schemes prior to 1975-6 which attempted to decentralise, their efforts were very modest and limited.

Communal Reforms

In mid-1975, the King announced his intention to restructure the local government system, 'to enlarge to the maximum the attributions

1 In Morocco, as in most French-influenced systems, textes are indispensable legal documents which elaborate at length and transform policy statements into implementable law. They frequently appear a considerable time after the policy statement has been made.

2 Merat et al. op. cit. p. 270. 3 Ibid. pp. 268-9.














Communal Reforms

















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Communal Reforms



2 Merat et al. op. cit. p. 270. 3 Ibid. pp. 268-9. I 7 I 7 I 7 I 7 I 7 MOA MOA MOA MOA MOA




and responsibilities of elected representatives, and to accord to them in the future the means, giving them the power, to control local efforts'.' Some 14 months later, six legal textes were published, spelling out in detail the content of the communal reforms.2 According to these

documents, the elected communal councils were to be reorganised and become powerful bodies. 'The council regulates, by its deliberations, the affairs of the commune and... decides what measures to take in order to assure to the local authority its full economic, social, and cultural

development.'3 More specifically, the council: - prepares and approves the commune's budget; - 'defines the commune's economic and social development plan'; - 'examines' all projects and actions proposed for the commune by higher

authorities; - proposes projects to the national government, the implementation of

which exceeds local capacities and resources; - has the right to a high percentage of the resources generated by the

commune's forest reserves, if any; and -'decides on the commune's financial participation' in parastatal or

private sector investments in the commune.

Indeed, 'the council can express its wishes on any issue of local concern '. These and others powers described in detail in the first texte constitute a more comprehensive and meaningful approach to decentralisation than anything previously considered in Morocco.

Still, the textes contain a large number of important restraints. For

every power strengthened, or newly granted, there is a limitation or an ultimate central check. For example, the assertion that the council is free to discuss any matter is followed by this sentence: 'However, it is forbidden to put forward proposals of a political character, or proposals foreign to the objects of local interest.'5 The directing body for all Moroccan local authorities, the Ministry of the Interior, retains the

right to suspend the communal council if there is an 'emergency' - the conditions of which are not defined - to 'annul' the election of the

chairman, and to 'declare resigned' council members with excessive or

unjustified absences. If the Ministry disapproves of a resolution passed by the council, it can 'provoke' a reconsideration of the issue, and can declare null and void any resolution considered to be non-local in nature. The centrally-appointed Pachas and Caids remain responsible for

1 Andre Baldous, 'La R6forme communale au Maroc', in Annuaire de I'Afrique du Nord (Paris), XVI, 1977, p. 283-

2 All six textes are contained in Royaume du Maroc, Organisation communale et organisation des

finances des collectivites locales et de leur groupements (Rabat, 1976). 3 Ibid. Dahir No. I-76-583, p. 6. 4 Ibid. p. 7. 5 Ibid.

































































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'the maintenance of order and public security',1 and they have been

given control of 23 specific areas of action, including the right of

association, public meetings, matters of the press, elections, local

publicity, migration of workers, and issues relating to unions.2

Quite clearly, the textes have been carefully constructed to allow the Governors and the central officials of the Ministry of the Interior the

right to step back into control when, and if, the conditions warrant. Since these are not specified, it seems that such intervention remains

simply and fully at the discretion of the higher authorities themselves.

Despite the grand language of the textes and the implication that the communes will shortly become centres of local planning and democracy, their present reality is that they are only carefully-controlled providers of mundane services: sewers, street cleaning, garbage collection, bus

stations, markets, and slaughter houses. Given all these limitations on the fiscal and policy independence of

the communes, is it reasonable to continue to apply the term decentralisation to what is happening in Morocco? The answer is a somewhat hesitant yes. First, though the textes contain many restrictions on communal independence of action, they are mainly review and con-

tingency features, designed to come into play when, and if, the communes

get into trouble (though, yet again, one must admit that it is the centre which can arbitrarily say what is and is not 'trouble'). Second, while the powers of the communal councils are consultative, vague, and limited in comparison to the centre, they none the less add up to a radical departure from past practice. What to outsiders may appear quite circumscribed is for many Moroccans an extraordinary degree of local latitude. The wording of the textes, reserving ultimate review functions to the tutelle or central supervisory authority, is very much the norm in the French-influenced Moroccan administrative/legal system. What is thus remarkable are the first steps towards the transfer of

powers, not the checking mechanisms.

Third, and most important, are the actions which followed the

publication of the textes. While formal rules and jurisdictional texts are far more important in the Moroccan system than in the Anglo-American model, they remain ultimately a matter for interpretation and implementation. It is the way in which activities have progressed since 1975-6 that give cause for optimism; and it is to these that we now turn.

1 Ibid. p. i . 2 Ibid.

































































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INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES

The year of 1976 was an opportune time to launch the new

programme. Politically, there prevailed an unusually strong sense of nationalist enthusiasm, mainly due to the campaign to incorporate the Western Sahara. The escalating conflict in the south - the costs and casualties of which had not yet become serious - unified all political movements in the country. In all likelihood, the climate of commitment and internal resolve helped persuade the Government that the time was

particularly appropriate to push forward the decentralisation effort.

Thus, the Saharan conflict seems to have served both as a partial generator of decentralisation, and as a partial justifier for hastening the

implementation of the programme once the textes were published. The economic situation was also quite promising. In the mid-1970s,

national income was growing faster than population. G.D.P. growth rates were well ahead of previous peformance. Commodity prices were

very high, and Morocco saw the possibility, once the Saharan territories were pacified, of controlling the bulk of the world's phosphate production. Large capital inflows were providing the Government with extra

resources, and hence the aura of economic optimism which facilitated the decision to undertake new and different policies.

In November 1976, elections were held and 13,358 communal councillors were chosen. According to Andre Baldous, they included those with the following socio-professional backgrounds: farmers, or

people working in agriculture (60o 0%), businessmen, artisans, indus- trialists (I44%), officials and civil servants (I4'2%), and workers

(50o 0%). This author claims that of'a small sample' he investigated, 42 per cent were illiterate, while another 40 per cent possessed only primary education.1 Since the overall Moroccan adult literacy rate was still only 28 per cent in the mid-I970s,2 these figures seem reasonable and probably reflect general levels of achievement among the councillors as a whole. In support of this conclusion, Moroccan officials of the

Ministry of the Interior, interviewed in I982, estimated that at least 50 per cent of the council chairmen were illiterate. Overall, these data offer an insight into both the audacity of the programme, and one of the main reasons for the tutorial approach.

The first year and a half of the activity of the councils confirmed the existence of three key problems which, indeed, had been apparent from the outset. The first and most obvious was the lack of education and

1 Baldous, loc. cit. p. 300. 2 World Bank, World Development Report, I982 (New York, I982), p. I IO.





























































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TUTORIAL DECENTRALISATION IN MOROCCO 495

experience of the elected councillors, especially in the rural communes; the second was the absence of competent local support staff to aid their deliberations and undertakings; and the third was the inadequacy of the financial resources of the councils. All three were of critical

importance, and the fact that they have been tackled encourages a sense of optimism concerning Moroccan decentralisation.

Personnel and training

The earliest concrete move to reduce the shortage of skills came in

September I977, when a new local civil-service cadre was established in order to provide each communal council with a secretary-general. This official is far more than a recorder and scribe, for it is his ability to formulate project proposals in a manner acceptable to national dispensers that will allow the communes to tap the resources in centrally-controlled investment funds. As of the end of 1982, each of the 85 urban and autonomous communes had a secretary-general. The first group destined for rural service, about 80 in number, finished a special six-months

training course in mid-I982, and it is hoped that all communes will have a secretary-general by the end of I985.

As of 1980, the local authorities employed 37,000 staff, an increase of 20 per cent since the mid-1970s. Of this number, 25,000 are staff of one kind or another from the Ministry of the Interior, while the

remaining I2,000 are specifically communal personnel, almost all in the lowest ranks - guards, gardeners, repairmen, cleaners, and junior secretaries.1 The greatest needs are in the middle administrative and technical ranks, the demand for whom also exceeds supply on the national level. For decentralisation to work effectively, the communes must have local staff who can prepare and implement projects. Regulations have been changed to increase the attractiveness of service in the rural areas, but few officials settled in the towns have shown much interest in moving there. The only reasonable solution, short of

coercion, is to train and post relatively new and young officers to the communes.

Up until 1981, training was assigned to a relatively low-level sub-division or service of the Ministry of the Interior which, during the

period 1968-80, 'graduated' a grand total of 2,309 lower and middle-

1 All these figures are from Merat et al. op. cit. p. 276. Estimates by officials of the Ministry of the Interior during a March I982 interview, placed the number of communal staff at a specific IO,I23. The Projet de plan de de'veloppement iconomique et social, p. 279, states that local authority personnel numbered 41,000 in 1978, up 6,500 from the previous year.























































level staff.1 In 1981, in recognition of the personnel demands being generated by decentralisation, the office of training was turned into a directorate known as the Direction de la formation des cadres.

By mid-1982, the D.F.C. had under its control a complement of 13 training centres, with an enrolment of 2,334 students, a number larger than the total output during the previous I 2 years. One of the courses run by the D.F.C. is that for the communal secretary-generals; other

programmes are designed to produce technical assistants, draftsmen, works foremen, administrative assistants and secretaries, and some other

specialists, such as rural market 'price-controllers' and horticulturists. The Ministry's vast enlargement of their training operation points to the seriousness with which the policy of decentralisation is being implemented.

The D.F.C. is responsible for the training of the elected councillors as well. Since there are so many of them, and since the voters are

supposed to have the chance to make changes every six years (the second election was actually held in June I983), and since we may expect a certain amount of turnover, then this task of training may be regarded as permanent. The officers in the Ministry of the Interior, who prefer to use the term 'information seminars' rather than 'training sessions' to describe their work with the councillors, devised a format in 1982 in which essential information on duties, rights, and procedures could be passed on to the elected members. The idea is to start with groups of council chairmen, and work on down to their executive committees, and finally to the members without special office. The intention is to take the seminars to the communes rather than bring the councillors to the training centres.

Thus, efforts have been launched to upgrade the capacities of local councillors and to alleviate the shortages of skilled personnel. Though the solutions proposed are in their first stages of implementation, the actions taken to date seem positive and promising. But to make the decentralisation venture a full reality, more than competent councillors and well-staffed offices are required. The ultimate issue is money. What are the resources available to the local councils? In what ways do

present financial arrangements differ from those of the past? What

precisely can and will the new officers and upgraded councillors do with their powers?





































1 These figures, and all other information on which this section on personnel and training is

based, were obtained during interviews in the D.F.C. in Rabat during March I982.









496 496 496 496 496 JOHN R. NELLIS JOHN R. NELLIS JOHN R. NELLIS JOHN R. NELLIS JOHN R. NELLIS



TABLE 2

Moroccan Local Government Accounts, i967-751 millions of dirhams

I967 1968 1969 1970 197I I972 1973 1974 1975

I. Ordinary Revenue 294 314 327 338 750 804 893 1,095 i,i56 Provinces and prefectures 28 29 30 31 146 140 174 202 153 Municipalities 233 248 257 262 462 504 531 658 747

Autonomous centres 13 15 i6 I7 66 72 84 ii6 124

Rural communes 20 23 24 28 76 88 104 119 132

of which: Central tax transfers 206 224 235 230 294 298 286 339 225

Provinces and prefectures 28 29 30 29 73 68 84 85 41

Municipalities I60 I75 I84 184 200 200 I82 214 156

Autonomous centres 7 7 7 7 13 15 II 27 13

Rural communes 11 13 14 8 7 I4 9 13 15

2. Ordinary Expenditure 266 275 28I 312 449 461 337 4I3 373


Municipalities 207 212 214 239 299 327 26i 318 254

Autonomous centres I I12 13 14 27 27 18 22 20

Rural communes 20 22 24 28 38 39 31 37 65

3. Ordinary Surplus (i-2) 28 39 46 26 301 343 566 682 783 Provinces and prefectures 0 I 0 0 6i 72 147 i66 119

Municipalities 26 36 43 23 163 177 270 340 493

Autonomous centres 2 3 3 3 39 45 66 94 104

Rural communes o i 0 o 38 49 73 82 67

4. Investment Expenditure 107 124 149 II8 92 79 137 I69 2II


Municipalities 43 47 48 56 33 42 77 93 138 Autonomous centres 8 8 8 8 10 8 7 I2 18

Rural communes I5 15 15 15 8 8 14 13 15

5. Overall Surplus or Deficit (-) -79 -89 -I03 -92 209 269 419 513 572

Provinces and prefectures -41 -53 -89 -39 19 51 io8 115 79

Municipalities -532 -521 -513 - 33 130 135 193 247 355

Autonomous centres -6 -5 -5 -5 29 37 59 82 86

Rural communes -15 -14 -I5 -15 30 31 17 24 50

Source: Merat et al. op. cit. Table 5-8 of Appendices. This World Bank publication attributed the above figures to the Ministere desfinances in Rabat.

TABLE 2


I967 1968 1969 1970 197I I972 1973 1974 1975



Rural communes 20 23 24 28 76 88 104 119 132





Rural communes 11 13 14 8 7 I4 9 13 15





Rural communes 20 22 24 28 38 39 31 37 65


Municipalities 26 36 43 23 163 177 270 340 493






Rural communes I5 15 15 15 8 8 14 13 15



Municipalities -532 -521 -513 - 33 130 135 193 247 355


Rural communes -15 -14 -I5 -15 30 31 17 24 50


TABLE 2


I967 1968 1969 1970 197I I972 1973 1974 1975



Rural communes 20 23 24 28 76 88 104 119 132





Rural communes 11 13 14 8 7 I4 9 13 15





Rural communes 20 22 24 28 38 39 31 37 65


Municipalities 26 36 43 23 163 177 270 340 493






Rural communes I5 15 15 15 8 8 14 13 15



Municipalities -532 -521 -513 - 33 130 135 193 247 355


Rural communes -15 -14 -I5 -15 30 31 17 24 50


TABLE 2


I967 1968 1969 1970 197I I972 1973 1974 1975



Rural communes 20 23 24 28 76 88 104 119 132





Rural communes 11 13 14 8 7 I4 9 13 15





Rural communes 20 22 24 28 38 39 31 37 65


Municipalities 26 36 43 23 163 177 270 340 493






Rural communes I5 15 15 15 8 8 14 13 15



Municipalities -532 -521 -513 - 33 130 135 193 247 355


Rural communes -15 -14 -I5 -15 30 31 17 24 50


TABLE 2


I967 1968 1969 1970 197I I972 1973 1974 1975



Rural communes 20 23 24 28 76 88 104 119 132





Rural communes 11 13 14 8 7 I4 9 13 15





Rural communes 20 22 24 28 38 39 31 37 65


Municipalities 26 36 43 23 163 177 270 340 493






Rural communes I5 15 15 15 8 8 14 13 15



Municipalities -532 -521 -513 - 33 130 135 193 247 355


Rural communes -15 -14 -I5 -15 30 31 17 24 50


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LOCAL PUBLIC FINANCE

Most sources assert that the sub-national governments in general, and the rural communes in particular, have been and continue to be financed almost entirely by central government tax transfers, loans, and grants. The only detailed figures available are for the period I967-75, and they only partially support this contention.

Table 2 shows a steady and substantial increase in the ordinary revenues of sub-national governments through the entire period. Nor are these negligible sums; calculating roughly that 100 million dirhams

equalled 25 million U.S. $, it is clear that in most years the total

expenditure (a combination of items 2 and 4) has come close to $ioo million, and that this has been growing. Second, apparently in contradiction to conventional assessments, central government tax transfers - which provided 70 per cent of ordinary revenues in the

period I967-70 - declined to an average of 32 per cent during the next

5 years. A recent World Bank study stated that, as of 1980, direct central

government subsidies supported 65 per cent of the expenditure of the local authorities.1 Calculations from the data in Table 2 yield different

figures: for the whole of the period under review, an annual average of 49 per cent of ordinary revenue was derived from central government tax transfers, while these accounted for 54 per cent of total expenditure. The World Bank was probably including central subsidies to investment, and not just operating budgets. What is certain is that the Government, on average, has financed by transfers about half of the operating expenditures of the local authorities, except, interestingly enough, in the rural communes, which could depend on transfers for only one-quarter of their expenditures.

According to the World Bank study, up until 1968, all local authorities were mainly financed by revenues from an earmarked national source, the Taxe sur les produits et services. After this date,

supposedly, these funds were replaced by more direct subsidisation. A second source insisted that, as of 1978, municipalities at least were still

receiving funds from tied national taxes; from 'the urban tax, the

municipal supply tax, patent fees',2 and from an unspecified variety of

national-imposed and collected user-charges. Whatever the origins, Moroccan municipalities appear to have found substantial ways of

generating resources, as can be inferred from the surpluses they registered during the years I971-5.

For the period after I975, available data are both better and worse.

































































498 498 498 498 498

1 Merat et al. op. cit. p. 284. 1 Merat et al. op. cit. p. 284. 1 Merat et al. op. cit. p. 284. 1 Merat et al. op. cit. p. 284. 1 Merat et al. op. cit. p. 284. 2 Baldous, loc. cit. p. 308. 2 Baldous, loc. cit. p. 308. 2 Baldous, loc. cit. p. 308. 2 Baldous, loc. cit. p. 308. 2 Baldous, loc. cit. p. 308.




Better in the sense that there is now some information on the various

centrally controlled grant and loan funds, which presently play the dominant role in the financing of local authorities; worse, in that there is no detailed breakdown, even of the type offered in the tantalising but

inadequate Table 2. The little that is known of post-1975 financial sources and sums for Moroccan local athorities is presented in outline form in Table 3.

The first reflection is that the projections for the future levels of

funding are probably over-estimates of what will actually be available. This seems most obvious with regard to the expected self-generated revenues in the rural communes. But it is likely, given the well-documented

tendency for goernments the world over to be optimistic about their revenues and the prevailing economic conditions, that the estimates

concerning appropriations to the Fonds d'e6quipement communal (Communal Supply Fund) and the Fonds de developpement des collectivites locales et de leur groupements (Local Authorities Development Fund) will also not be met. The percentage of the shortfall may be less than that encountered in the previous case; none the less, the projections seem unlikely to be reached.

Second, though the funds dispersed in the future will probably be less than projected, the fact remains that some extraordinary changes in

financing patterns took place during the period I977-80: (i) the Local Authorities Development Fund and (ii) the subvention de'quipement or investment subsidies, both up by 600 per cent; (iii) the Communal

Supply Fund, up by 500 per cent; and (iv) the subvention defonctionnement or recurrent subsidies, up by 100 per cent. These are very major and

rapid increases, and their significance is heightened by the realisation that they occurred during a period of restraint, since the expansionist economic programme of the Moroccan Government as a whole drew to a close at the end of I977. Along with the increases in personnel and the rapid expansion of the training programmes, these dramatically larger sums of money are good evidence of the regime's serious commitment to local government reform in general, and to decentralisation in particular.

Third, it is the operation of the two Funds aimed expressly at the local level which best reveals the tutorial perspective. As noted in Table 3, at least up to I978, the more established Communal Supply Fund made loans mainly to the wealthiest, most urbanised communes, due partly to their generally superior creditworthiness, and also because of their skilled staff who were able to submit attractive proposals. The chief areas of investment have been: sewers, drainage, water supply, electri-

















































499 499 499 499 499



TABLE 3

Sources and Amounts of Finance for Moroccan Local Authorities: Post-1975 Information'

TABLE 3


TABLE 3


TABLE 3


TABLE 3


I. Self-generatedfinance in communes (as noted, provinces do not raise taxes but communes do; these are market taxes and cesses, fees for utilities, local property and vacant urban-land taxes, and revenues from forest reserves).

Administered by: Local authorities, communal councils. Purpose: To generate operating revenue. Sums actually raised: Million dirhams: 1978, 26-2; 1979, 29-9. Estimates: Million dirhams: I98I, 300; 1982, 330; 1983, 420; 1984, 475; 1985, 671. Comments: There is a vast discrepancy between the sums 'actually raised' and those supposedly generated

by the rural communes in Table 2, at least for the years I970-5. With regard to the estimates, they seem, at first glance, over-optimistic. There is no tax-base to support, and no adequate system to collect, such 10 to 20-fold increases, let alone the local absorption capacity, at the moment, to utilise such sums. A reform of the tax system is presently being considered.

2. Subvention defonctionnement (Budget subsidies for regular and recurrent expenditures) Administered by: Ministry of the Interior. Purpose: 'To assure the equilibrium of local authorities' budgets.' Sums actually spent: Doubled in four years, 1977 to i980, from 15 to 30 million dirhams. Estimates: Million dirhams: I981, 34-5. Comments: There are no estimates for post-I981. Self-financing, and the grants and loans outlined in the

following sections, will, supposedly, fill the need. But, more realistically, subventions will probably be continued for the foreseeable future.

3. Subvention d'equipement (Supply subsidies) Administered by: Ministry of the Interior.

Purpose: To finance investment and development actions in the local authorities. Sums actually spent: Million dirhams: 'for many years' up to 1978, ioo00 annually; I979, 400 (279 according to

World Bank); 1980, 6oo.

Estimates Not available.

4. Fonds d'equipement communal (F.E.C.). or Communal Supply Fund Administered by: Caisse de depot et de gestion (Bank of Deposit and Management), created in 1959. Supervised

by the Ministries of the Interior and Finance, and by the Bank of Morocco.













































0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

0

I14

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Purpose:

Sums actually loaned:

Estimates: Comment:

Purpose:


Estimates: Comment:

Purpose:


Estimates: Comment:

Purpose:


Estimates: Comment:

Purpose:


Estimates: Comment:

To provide loans to communes and regies (local public utilities) for infrastructure projects. Operates as a development bank.

Considerable variation in figures available on recent expenditure. Million dirhams: 1977, between 35 to 70; I978, between 36-6 to I00; 1979, between 97-3 to i62'4; I980, between

173.8 to 200.

Million dirhams: 1981, 250; 1982, 350; 1983, 450; 1984, 6oo; I985, 8oo.

Two comparatively well developed and urbanised regions, the Central and the North-West, contained communes which obtained 6o per cent of all F.E.C. loans to local authorities in

I976, and more than 80 per cent in 1977-8. A major thrust of the current decentralisation

programme is to enable other (especially rural) communes to tap the resources of the F.E.C.



173.8 to 200.







173.8 to 200.







173.8 to 200.







173.8 to 200.





5. Fonds de d6veloppement des collectivites locales et de leur groupements (F.D.C.L.) or Local Authorities Development Fund

Administered by: Ministry of the Interior.

Purpose: To provide grants to finance the investment budgets of communes and rlgies. Founded in

1976, and administered by Governors. Sums actually granted: Million dirhams: 1978, I00oo; 1979, 250; I980, 6oo.

Estimates: Million dirhams: 1981, 6oo; i982, 6oo; 1983, 6oo; I984, 650; 1985, 650. Comments: Before I976, regional and local development projects were budgeted to the Ministry responsible

for their completion. After 1976, the F.D.C.L. received these appropriations through the Ministry of the Interior. The provincial authorities now distribute these funds: a major decentralisation initiative.

6. Fonds special de diveloppement regional (F.S.D.R.) or Special Regional Development Fund

Administered by: State Secretariat for Planning and Regional Development. Founded in 1973.

Purpose: Originally to provide grants to infrastructure projects in the poorest provinces. Lately, a means of financing projects proposed by regional consultative assemblies.

Sums actually dispersed: Million dirhams: 1977, 452; 1978, 428; 1980, 258. Estimates: A total of 500 million dirhams from 1981 to 1985. Comments: I,760 million dirhams were appropriated to the F.S.D.R. during the period of the Three-Year-

Plan, 1977-80. Actual expenditure was I,138 million dirhams, 65 per cent of what was planned, thereby indicating a lack of absorptive capacity at the sub-national level. The activities of the F.S.D.R. are being phased out and taken over by the F.D.C.L.













































o 03

0 fn

r

24

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0

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1 Sources: Merat et al. op. cit. pp. 267-90; 'Les Collectivites locales et le plan' and 'Les Moyens financiers de la decentralisation', in Cities unies, 104, automne >

I981, pp. 25-8; Projet de plan de developpement iconomique et social, Vol. i, pp. 66-9; and Baldous, loc. cit. pp. 308-10. 0

Note: $.o00 = 3-97 dirhams in 1981, and 5'5I in 1982.
















TABLE 4 Grants Made by the Local Authorities Development Fund, g978-8o1

thousand dirhams

Region 1978 I 979 1980 Total %

South 8,649 35,000 6o,ooo Io03,649 9.5 Tensift 6,457 30,000 70,000 106,457 9.7 Centre 29,152 55,000 120,000 204,152 i8.6

North-West 23,580 50,000 100o,ooo 173,580 I 5.8 Centre-North 9,668 20,000 6o,ooo 89,668 8.2 East 12,250 20,000 40,000 72,250 6.6 Centre-South 4,992 10,000 40,000 54,992 5.0

All Regions 94,748 220,000 490,000 804,748 73.3 Other Grantsa 5,252 178,300 110,000 293,552 26.7

Total 100,000 398,000 6oo,ooo I,098,300 I00.0

a For operations of communal interest or credits transferred by the Ministries.

fication, land reserves, and roads. In order to give the rural communes a better chance of obtaining loans from the Communal Supply Fund, after I976 a mobile project preparation unit was formed, to help rural units select, design, and appraise submissions. This is an interim

measure, designed to fill the gap until communal councillors and civil servants can do the job.

The Local Authorities Development Fund is much more discretionary, but still requires the submission of project proposals. The implication of Table 4 is that regional equity and other non-economic concerns play a more open role in the Fund's project-approval process, but the Moroccan officials consulted stressed that economic considerations are not ignored. As with the Communal Supply Fund, the grants have gone mainly to infrastructure, to finance projects in sewage and sanitation, drinking water, buildings, rural roads, electrification, local staff train-

ing, transportation, and general supplies. Table 4 shows that the two most favoured regions, Centre and

North-West, have been awarded over one-third of all grants, which is not surprising since they contain the two largest cities in the country. The less-populated East and Centre-South were allocated comparatively small percentages, while the lightly inhabited South - containing the reincorporated Saharan territories - received a disproportionately


thousand dirhams





Total 100,000 398,000 6oo,ooo I,098,300 I00.0








thousand dirhams





Total 100,000 398,000 6oo,ooo I,098,300 I00.0








thousand dirhams





Total 100,000 398,000 6oo,ooo I,098,300 I00.0








thousand dirhams





Total 100,000 398,000 6oo,ooo I,098,300 I00.0







1 Source: Projet de plan de developpement economique et social, Vol. i, p. 67. 1 Source: Projet de plan de developpement economique et social, Vol. i, p. 67. 1 Source: Projet de plan de developpement economique et social, Vol. i, p. 67. 1 Source: Projet de plan de developpement economique et social, Vol. i, p. 67. 1 Source: Projet de plan de developpement economique et social, Vol. i, p. 67.

502 502 502 502 502




large amount. While there is no claim that perfect regional equity has been attained, it is obvious that the distribution is far less skewed than with the loans of the Communal Supply Fund.

In essence, then, the Moroccan decentralisation programme aims at

endowing the communes with (i) an elected council to identify the desires and capacities of the local population; (2) the technical/administrative capacity to translate these priorities into acceptable project format; (3) the staff to implement some, and later most, of these projects; and (4) the legal and, eventually, the economic power through the reformed tax

system, to generate locally the funds necessary to finance their own

development. In the interim, financing will be made by means of the

Funds, which encourage and stimulate local endeavours, but which

necessarily retain, for the moment, technical vetting and resource- allocation responsibility in the centre. The logic of this approach is hard to fault. As the World Bank study noted, in the short- and medium-run, financial independence for Moroccan local authorities is simply not realistic.1

It would be interesting to know more about many parts of the local finance system, especially the precise manner in which project proposals are devised, submitted, approved, and implemented. No detailed

analyses of this type are available, though the draft Five-Year-Plan, I981-5, did say that these processes have 'proved their worth' during the previous two years, and deserved reinforcement and expansion in the new plan period.2

A review paper of the Ministry of the Interior presented a very different assessment in March I980 by stating that between 1978 and

I 980 the decentralisation/deconcentration initiative' met with enormous

practical difficulties, even resistance of a diverse nature, which have rendered the progress of the double reform slow and uncertain'.3 The

major problem was that, despite the official promises of sufficient financial support, the programme encountered' real material difficulties' which hindered its implementation. According to the Ministry of the

Interior, in the years 1978-80, the local authorities suffered a reduction in 'investment resources' of over 40 per cent compared to the period I973-7.4 If the Funds have increased by anywhere near as much as official claims, it is very hard to see just how a reduction of this

magnitude could have taken place. But a questioning of the figures does

1 See the discussion in Merat et al. op. cit. pp. I 11-I4. 2 Project de plan de developpement &conomique et social, p. I78. 3 Royaume de Maroc, Minstere de 1'interieur, Direction des collectivites locales, Note d orientation.

Commission nationale des equipements des collectivites locales (Rabat, I980), p. i. 4 Ibid. p. 7.





































































503 503 503 503 503




not necessarily blunt the overall thrust of the Ministry's report, which was that decentralisation could be viewed as 'highly positive at the level of principle... but negative with regard to practical achievements'.1

To recapitulate: the Moroccan decentralisation programme has, since I975, (i) reformed democratic/participatory institutions at the local level; (ii) deconcentrated administrative powers to the provinces; (iii) expanded the local civil-service establishments, and taken steps to make more attractive a career at the sub-national levels; (iv) started to improve the competences of the communal councillors (v) increased the sums of money available for the use of sub-national governments; and (vi) structured the disbursements of the increased monies in such a way as to enhance, incrementally, the powers and capacities of the sub-national units. Although there are no case-studies about how the

operation is working to date, there is general agreement that the effort is desirable, even necessary, and merits strengthening, particularly with

regard to the all-important financial aspects. This is what is known of the structure and operations of the local

public-finance system. The picture is disturbingly incomplete. But available information is sufficient to conclude that much of an innovative and progressive nature has taken place since 1975. Perhaps, more

important, the actions undertaken constitute in themselves pressures for additional reforms. That is, there are now many more officials and

agencies supporting decentralisation, and this constituency is calling for the clarification of the regulations concerning the supposedly decentralised fiscal system. It remains to be seen whether this pressure is sufficient to lead to concrete results.

DECONCENTRATION

The process of deconcentration has also been strengthened, most

notably after 1977. In that year, the already substantial powers of the Governors were increased, raising them to the level of co-managers of most of what was spent at the provincial and communal levels. Further, many of the supply credits of the line Ministries, formerly controlled

completely by Rabat, were made more a provincial responsibility although, as always, ultimate tutelle powers were reserved for the centre.

Responsibilities transferred included all expenditures on primary schools, youth and sports action, post offices, administrative buildings, and tertiary roads.2








DECONCENTRATION












DECONCENTRATION












DECONCENTRATION












DECONCENTRATION





2 Projet de plan de dlveloppement iconomique et social, p. 69. 2 Projet de plan de dlveloppement iconomique et social, p. 69. 2 Projet de plan de dlveloppement iconomique et social, p. 69. 2 Projet de plan de dlveloppement iconomique et social, p. 69. 2 Projet de plan de dlveloppement iconomique et social, p. 69. 1 Ibid. 1 Ibid. 1 Ibid. 1 Ibid. 1 Ibid.

504 504 504 504 504




The official position is that deconcentration is well-launched, but in need of still further enlargement and elaboration. This will require a more precise definition of the division of responsibilities between central units and the regional or provincial agents of the key Ministries. There is a great need to simplify the lines of communication in order ' to avoid the delays and the slow transmission of information between the central and field services'.l At the provincial level, co-ordination of the various services needs to be improved; this will be brought about

primarily by 'the lightening of control procedures'. Other proposals include a clarification of the supervision powers of the central offices, and a 'qualitative and quantitative reinforcement of the personnel resources of the field services '.2 This, in turn, requires further adjustments in salaries in order to make sub-national postings more attractive, as well as a revision of living allowances, new recruitment procedures, and modifications of regulations concerning the prospects of advancement from rural positions. All of these proposals aim at increasing the

efficiency and responsiveness of the administrative system. As with communal decentralisation, the impression gained from

reading the available materials is that there is considerable enthusiasm over what has been achieved so far, tempered by the realisation (i) that a great deal remains to be done before the effort can be regarded as a successful departure from past practice, and (ii) that the notion of deconcentration has met with resistance:

certain obstacles linked to the implementation of new decentralised institutions continue to hinder the application of options taken by the Government... These difficulties concern the reticence of a certain number of central services to cede prerogatives (implementation, launching of actions, recruitment and management of personnel) to their field units judged still too inexperienced and insufficiently endowed in human and physical means. The functions of these services must be redefined in order to permit them to play fully the role which is assigned to them in the processes of decentralisation and deconcentration.3

CONCLUSIONS

Morocco is, at the time of writing, in the eighth year of its experiment with decentralisation. The term 'experiment' is fair, for there remains much that is tentative, testing, and speculative about the programme. The communal councils remain severely constrained in terms of revenue generation and resource allocation. Though their supporting services have been enlarged, they started from a base of near zero, and

large percentage increases still translate into absolutely small numbers.






CONCLUSIONS








CONCLUSIONS








CONCLUSIONS








CONCLUSIONS



505 505 505 505 505

1 Ibid. p. 292. 1 Ibid. p. 292. 1 Ibid. p. 292. 1 Ibid. p. 292. 1 Ibid. p. 292. 2 Ibid. p. 294. 2 Ibid. p. 294. 2 Ibid. p. 294. 2 Ibid. p. 294. 2 Ibid. p. 294. 3 Ibid. p. 73. 3 Ibid. p. 73. 3 Ibid. p. 73. 3 Ibid. p. 73. 3 Ibid. p. 73.




The powers of provincial administrators have been modestly scaled

upwards, but there have been no truly dramatic changes in either

operational style or the central locus of important decision-making. It is clear that after I975 increased activities have been undertaken both

by and on behalf of the sub-national units. Does all this add up to

enough progress to term the effort a success? It is possible to give a negative answer: not enough has been done

or spent, only the easy and non-threatening aspects have been

implemented, and there is no guarantee that the promises for continuing and expanding the effort will be fulfilled. Given the reasonableness of this argument, let us avoid the temptation to retreat to a commonly used academic dodge: i.e. that it is too early to tell, and that more data collection and analysis are necessary before a definitive judgement can be reached. Since the decentralisation programme is still underway, this would be an accurate - and very safe - line of reasoning.

Yet, as far as Morocco is concerned, a bit of both optimism and

audacity is justified. Why? Primarily, because what is happening with decentralisation is unusual in terms of the scope of the operation, the amount of resources that have been devoted to it, the continuing and clear support of the top leadership for the programme, and the growing constituency that now supports its further refinement and application. These factors distinguish Moroccan decentralisation from the generally less-serious ventures of many other African states. Comparatively speaking, the Moroccans have demonstrated both commitment to the

concept and shrewdness in application. Admittedly, this does not mean that accomplishments to date have been transformatory in nature. Nor does it ensure that the promises for further reform, especially concerning the local public-finance system, will necessarily be fulfilled. What it does mean is that the Moroccan Government has been willing to take some

risks, to commit some resources, to change some regulations; in short, to move beyond mere rhetoric.

Second, one must admit the basic reasonableness of the tutorial perspective. Full-scale, immediate transfer of resource-generation power to the sub-national level in Morocco would quickly result in the increase of inequity, as the few communes endowed with a good tax base

prospered, and the many not so endowed stagnated or declined. Personnel shortages, project preparation expertise, realistic appraisal among elected councillors of what government action can accomplish, enhancement of the local production and thus local tax base - all these are medium- if not long-term matters.

Thus, the logic of the situation is as follows. The eventual success

























































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of decentralisation necessitates the local generation of locally used resources, at least to a significantly greater extent than at present. For this to happen, there must exist an infrastructure of personnel and

expertise, and this cannot be locally developed without outside assist- ance. Only the Government - through its training programmes and financial arrangements - can create this infrastructure. Therefore, for the foreseeable future, central involvement in sub-national affairs will be extensive and significant.

This line of reasoning applies to many countries other than Morocco, but the Government has gone one step further. It has asked: what can be done during the period of creating the necessary infrastructure to make this a more rapid, cumulative, and self-reinforcing process? The answer is the three-part decentralisation reform - institutions, personnel and training, and finance - and the accompanying efforts in deconcentration.

The Moroccan approach is pragmatic and realistic. It satisfies sub-national aspirations without creating unmanageable resistance

among centralisers. Each stage of the process has been prefaced and introduced by the Head of State himself in a broad, ambitious policy statement, which has then required several cautious years of detailed work in order to move the intention to the level of practical meaning. This approach fits the political and adminstrative context of the country, as citizens are well accustomed to long delays between the announcement of a policy and its actual implementation. In Morocco, nobody really expects sweeping change to be effected rapidly, and the Government can rely on, and use, the normal period of delay before demands are made that promises be realised. The external observer may be tempted to point to these delays, and to the obvious differences between the impressive intentions and the modest accomplishments, and conclude that the emphasis on decentralisation is a sham. The counter-argument offered here is that, given Morocco's heritage and history, present efforts are meaningful - so much so, that the chances for continued reform appear to be good.

If the Moroccan regime, operating in such a highly uncertain socio-economic environment, can undertake a meaningful programme ofdecentralisation, then other countries possessing comparable resources of personnel and finance could reasonably be expected to do the same, with roughly equivalent results. Admittedly, this is a carefully limited conclusion. It is clearly very difficult to reduce a long and complex policy process to a few principles which could easily be replicated in a variety of political settings. None the less, the Moroccans have made

























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a good start by beginning with institutional reform, and moving on to

increasing the number, status, and training of required personnel, including elected councillors. Only then has the Government provided the new financial arrangements which even more require the involvement of local staff, local representatives, and ultimately, local people themselves. Thus, it is not only the specific nature of the Moroccan actions that should be analysed by other governments considering decentralisation, but the sequencing of these operations as well.

508 JOHN R. NELLIS



508 JOHN R. NELLIS



508 JOHN R. NELLIS



508 JOHN R. NELLIS





Documents

Tutorial Decentralisation in Morocco