Università degli Studi di Verona

Corso di Laurea Specialistica in Linguistica

Tesi di Laurea

TWO TOPICS IN THE SYNTAX AND

SEMANTICS OF ANAPHORA

Relatore:

Prof. Denis Delfitto

Laureando:

Gaetano Fiorin

Anno Accademico 2005-2006

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Acknowledgments

I’ve spent hours trying to figure out the right words to thank Denis Delfitto and Giorgio

Graffi. Then, studying an article by Yosef Grodzinsky (Grodzinsky 2000b), I read a story

about Duke Ellington, who, late in his life, was interviewed during a TV show and I

thought it was perfect for my purposes. Grodzinsky reports it from Medini (1988). Here’s

the story: “[Ellington] was asked what he would like to say about the influences and

events that shaped his starry life. He said something like this: ‘Ya know what it’s like

runnin’ around life, like a maze, and ya comes to a corner and ya don’t know which was to

go, and some guy is standing there and ya asks him ‘which way?’ and he points and says,

‘That way,’ and ya run and run until you come to another fellow and ya asks him, and he

points and says ‘that way’ – what I want to do today…is to thank those guys who was

standin’ on these corners at the right time and pointed me off in the right way.’” Denis

Delfitto and Giorgio Graffi have been to me the guys around the corner and I thank them

for having pointed me in the right way.

During this period I have had the chance to meet a number of researchers, teachers, PhDs,

and fellow-students who made this experience extraordinary. I wish to thank them all:

Birgit Alber, Nicholas Asher, Camilla Bettoni, Roberto Bonato, Francesco Carbone, Frank

Drijkongingen, Paolo Frassi, Daniele Giaretta, Alessandra Giorgi, Jim Higginbotham,

Julie Hunter, Simona Marchesini, Chiara Melloni, Stella Merlin, Paola Paradisi, Laura

Pirani, Alan Prince, Stephan Rabanus, Eric Reuland, Jasper Roodenburg, Alessandra

Tomaselli, Alfredo Trovato, Maria Vender. I am grateful to Alessandra Giorgi and Eric

Reuland for their help and suggestions and to Francesco Carbone for having read and

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commented the thesis and for helpful discussions. A very special thanks goes to

Guglielmo Bottari whose friendship is a precious gift. A heartfelt thanks goes to my

family, Valentina, Ornella and Angelo, to which I owe everything, and to Giorgio and

Alberto.

This thesis is dedicated to the memory of Attilio Boano.

Verona

October, 2006

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Summary

1 A Theory of Anaphoric Relations Based on Economy Principles 10

1.0 Introduction 10

1.1 Canonical binding theory 17

1.1.1 Binding and binding conditions 17

1.1.2 Governing category 21

1.1.3 NPs as feature matrices 22

1.2 What’s wrong with CBT 23

1.2.1 Explanatory inadequacy 23

1.2.2 Binding conditions at the Conceptual-Intentional interface 25

1.2.3 Logophoric use of anaphors 27

1.2.4 Locally bound pronouns 32

1.2.5 Complementarity 32

1.3 A theory of anaphoric relations based on economy principles 33

1.3.1 Preliminary questions 33

1.3.2 Interpreting procedures and economy principles 35

1.3.3 Encoding linguistic dependencies 40

1.3.3.1 Syntactic encoding 40

1.3.3.1.1 Encoding a syntactic dependency 40

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1.3.3.1.2 chain, Chain and CHAIN 42

1.3.3.1.3 Interpreting CHAINs 45

1.3.3.1.4 Theoretical remarks 52

1.3.3.2 Variable binding 52

1.3.3.3 Co-reference 53

1.3.4 Economy principles 55

1.3.4.1 Condition A 57

1.3.4.2 Condition B 58

1.3.4.3 Condition C 59

1.3.4.4 Locally bound pronouns 60

1.3.4.5 Logophoric and long distance anaphors 61

1.3.4.6 Complementarity 63

1.4 Discussion 63

1.4.1 Theoretical considerations 63

1.4.2 Rule BV 64

1.4.3 Rule I 68

1.5 Conclusions 71

2 Attitudes De Se 75

2.0 Introduction 75

2.1 Attitudes de dicto, de re, de se 78

2.1.1 Attitudes de dicto and attitudes de re 78

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2.1.2 Attitudes de re and attitudes de se 79

2.2 Chierchia’s property-account of attitudes de se 81

2.2.1 Linguistic relevance of attitudes de se 81

2.2.2 Lewis (1979): a ‘self-locational’ view of beliefs 82

2.2.3 Chierchia (1989): properties versus propositions 83

2.2.4 The grammar of de se 85

2.2.5 Infinitives and gerunds: PRO as a λ-abstractor and self-ascription revised 86

2.2.6 Anaphora and attitudes de se 89

2.3 Reinhart (1990) 91

2.3.1 Empirical objections to Chierchia (1989) 91

2.3.1.1 Attitudes de se and variable-binding 91

2.3.1.2 Attitudes de se and long-distance anaphors 97

2.3.2 Reinhart’s alternative proposal 98

2.3.2.1 Self-representational relation 98

2.3.2.2 Argument reduction and θ-reduction 103

2.4 Higginbotham (1992) 104

2.4.1 Attributive versus propositional account of control 104

2.4.2 Higginbotham’s theory of control 107

2.4.3 Attitudes de se 110

2.4.4 Features of PRO 112

2.4.5 Appendix: a theory of control based on economy principles? 113

2.5 Conclusions 116

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Works Cited 121

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1 A THEORY OF ANAPHORIC RELATIONS BASED ON

ECONOMY PRINCIPLES

1.0 Introduction

Anaphoric relations characterize all natural languages. An anaphoric relation is an

asymmetric relation between two linguistic expressions occurring in the same

environment, according to which the syntactic and semantic value of one expression, the

anaphoric element, crucially depends on the syntactic and semantic value of the other, the

antecedent. For instance, in sentence (1), the reflexive pronoun himself can contribute to

the meaning of the whole sentence only in the case its anaphoric relation with Frank is

correctly taken into account.

(1) Frank loves himself

Sentence (1), is true if and only if Frank loves himself, for ‘Frank’ as value of ‘himself.’

Thus, Frank and himself are anaphorically linked, Frank being the antecedent of himself.

Anaphoric relations represent a central topic in the theory of natural language.

Such relations show up in different ways and with different functions. In sentence (1), we

see an anaphoric relation between two nominal phrases (NPs), but this is not the only way

natural languages make use of this tool: just to cite a couple of examples, natural

languages make extensive use of temporal anaphora, anaphora between NPs and clauses

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or between NPs and full sentences. However, in this thesis I will concentrate on the

anaphoric relations between NPs.

The goal of a theory of language is to explain how the grammar encodes such

relations and represents them at the interface with the system of thoughts. In the

generative framework, initiated by the seminal work of Noam Chomsky, anaphoric

relations between NPs are traditionally accounted for by the module of grammar called

binding theory. The basic idea is that the core grammar is composed of different

subsystems, one of which is binding theory. Binding theory was first introduced by

Chomsky (1981), within what is known as Government and Binding (G&B) framework

and further developed in subsequent work, e.g. Chomsky (1986); I will refer to this

version of binding theory as Canonical Binding Theory (CBT).

The notion of binding, within CBT, is to be understood as a purely syntactic

notion, technically implemented as co-indexation under c-command. The idea underlying

this theory is that every NP must receive a numerical index, under well-specified

structural conditions, so that at the interface between the grammar and the system of

thoughts, i.e. at the level of Logical Form (LF), an anaphoric relation between two NPs

will be indicated by the fact that both NPs bear the same index. For instance, the LF of

sentence (1) would be something like (1′), where both NPs Frank and himself bear the

same numerical index 1.

(1′) [IP [NP Frank]1 [VP loves [NP himself]1]]

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NPs are divided in three types: Referential expressions, pronouns, and anaphors

(i.e. reflexive pronouns and reciprocal). CBT consists of three conditions on binding, each

applying to an NP type:

(2) CBT

(Condition A) An anaphor is bound in its minimal domain

(Condition B) A pronoun is free (i.e. not bound) in its minimal domain

(Condition C) A Referential expression is free

CBT is not uncontroversial and different objections have been raised against it. In

this chapter, I will follow the line paved by the work of Tanya Reinhart and Eric Reuland1,

and I will raise two specific objections to CBT.

The first objection is theoretical. I will claim that CBT does not meet the condition

of explanatory adequacy and, particularly, the condition of explanatory adequacy as stated

in the Minimalist Program (Chomsky 1995). In the minimalist framework it is assumed

that: (i) a theory of language meets explanatory adequacy if it can characterize the initial

state of the language faculty in a principled way, rather than just describe a certain state of

the language faculty; (ii) the grammar of human language is a computational system that

meets the Inclusiveness Condition; this condition states that no new element can be add in

the course of the computation. Given these (minimalist) assumptions I will claim that

CBT, although descriptively adequate, does not attain explanatory adequacy since: (i) it

describes a certain state of the language faculty but it does not characterize the initial state;

1 E.g.: Reinhart (1976; 1983; 2000; 2001), Reinhart and Reuland (1991; 1993; 1995), Reuland (1996; 1998; 2000; 2001a; 2001b).

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in other words, CBT does not tell us which basic properties of the human language faculty

underlie the binding conditions stated in (2); (ii) the mechanism of syntactic binding is not

consistent with our basic assumptions about the system of grammar; in fact, the

introduction of indices, which are syntactic objects visible at LF, in the course of the

computation does not respect the IC.

The second objection I will raise against CBT is empirical. Among other problems,

I will concentrate on what is known as the ‘logophoric’ use of anaphors. According to this

use, an anaphor can be used, in some circumstances, as un unbound element. Many

languages, including for example English and Italian, show relevant instances of such use.

In my presentation I will concentrate on examples from English and Icelandic. Recall that

Condition A of CBT entails that anaphors must always be bound; henceforth, the

logophoric use of anaphors violates this condition.

Several proposals have been made to account for these problems. Nevertheless, in

this thesis I will follow the path of a deep revision of the theory of anaphoric relations, a

revision based on the work that Reinhart and Reuland have done in the last twenty years.

In this thesis I will try to present their work as an organic and coherent theory of

anaphoric relations, alternative to CBT.

It will be first demonstrated that an anaphoric relation can be encoded at three

different levels: (i) it can be encoded in (narrow) syntax, and in this case it must be

understood as a relation resulting from the blind and automatic application of basic

computational operations to a pure morpho-syntactic lexicon, i.e. characterized in terms of

primitive features; (ii) it can be encoded at the semantic level, and in this case the relevant

operation is that of (logical) variable-binding by means of which a variable is bound by an

operator; (iii) it can be encoded at the discourse level and in this case the mechanism at

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hand is that of co-reference, by means of which two linguistic expressions, syntactically

and semantically unrelated, are valuated, according to pragmatic principles, as referring to

the same entity in the discourse domain.

The syntactic relation that will be presented in this framework, which is different

from the notion of syntactic binding of CBT, prevents us from falling into the theoretical

problems that CBT had to deal with. In fact, this relation does not imply the use of indices,

hence IC is respected. Moreover, since such a relation results from the blind and automatic

application of computational operations to primitive lexical features, it attains explanatory

adequacy. In this case there is no postulation of a new primitive notion, such as syntactic

binding, rather the relation derives straightforwardly from the basic properties of the

computational system.

It is also worth noticing that both the syntactic and the semantic encoding are

subjected to specific structural conditions, such as c-command. However, it will be shown

that such conditions are also derived from more primitive properties of the computational

system, rather than postulated. More precisely, they derive from conditions on movement,

which is a primitive syntactic operation. It seems also correct to assume that co-reference

is subjected to pragmatic constrains, however I shall not consider this issue here since it

would require the introduction of a fully formalized theory of discourse, a task that I

cannot grant in this thesis.

It is then assumed that different costs are associated with the three levels. The

basic idea is that encoding an anaphoric relation between two linguistic expressions at the

level of syntax is cheaper than encoding a linguistic dependency between the same

expressions at the semantic level, and, similarly, encoding an anaphoric relation between

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two linguistic expressions at the semantic level is cheaper than encoding a linguistic

dependency between the same expressions at the discourse level.

Note that, at this point, the system of language can rely on three different strategies

to achieve the same result. For instance, consider a structure like (3), where we want two

linguistic expressions α and β within σ to receive the same value:

(3) [σ …α…β…]

If the relevant structural conditions are met, the dependency between α and β can be

encoded within syntax and the encoding is associated with a certain cost. However, if the

structural conditions at the semantic level are also met, a linguistic dependency between α

and β can be encoded at this level as well, but the encoding would be more expensive.

Finally, α and β can receive the same value at the discourse level but this would be the

most expensive option.

The theory of anaphoric relations I will propose following Reuland (2001a) will be

based on an economy principle, that can be very informally stated as follows: ‘a certain

strategy is blocked whenever a cheaper strategy is available.’ For instance, if a linguistic

dependency can be encoded at the semantic level, then the encoding at the discourse level

will be blocked, and, if a linguistic dependency can be encoded at the syntactic level, then

the encoding at the semantic level will be blocked.

This theory of anaphora has been developed specifically to overcome the empirical

and theoretical problems of CBT, and it will be shown how the result is achieved.

However, the theory encounters other problems. One of such problems is that the theory

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relies on mechanisms of global economy, as opposed to computational economy. Very

roughly, a principle of computational economy applies to a set of derivations obtained

using the same initial array of lexical items and determines the cheapest derivation. A

principle of global economy, on the other hand determines the cheapest derivation among

a set of derivations obtained by different arrays of lexical items. It will be shown that the

principles of the theory proposed in this thesis are principles of global economy.

In the first paragraph (1.1) I shall present CBT and I will give a brief sketch of

some developments of such theory.

In the second paragraph (1.2) I shall present a discussion of the objections raised

against CBT concentrating first on the theoretical problems (1.2.1 and 1.2.2) and then on

the empirical problems (1.2.3, 1.2.4 and 1.2.5). Particular attention will be given to the

logophoric use of anaphors and to some relevant literature on the subject.

In the third paragraph (1.3) I shall expose the theory of anaphoric relations based

on economy principles. In particular, in 1.3.1 I will introduce a working hypothesis on

which the development of the theory will be based and in 1.3.2 I will give a first account

of the structure of the theory. Then I will give a detailed account of the three interpretative

strategies at the three relevant levels: at the syntactic level (1.3.3.1), at the semantic level

(1.3.3.2), and at the discourse level (1.3.3.3). Finally I will introduce the economy

principles regulating the choice between the different interpretative strategies and I will

try to show the empirical power of the theory through a number of examples (1.3.4). I will

also show that the logophoric use of anaphors will be accounted straightforwardly by the

theory.

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In a last paragraph (1.4) I shall present some personal considerations on the theory

and I shall try to consider some theoretical and empirical problems that the theory leaves

open.

1.1 Canonical binding theory

1.1.1 Binding and binding conditions

Binding theory is the module of Universal Grammar (UG) that regulates the interpretation

of Nominal Phrases (NPs). BT was introduced by Chomsky (1981) and then developed in

subsequent works published during the eighties (Chomsky 1982, 1986). I will refer to this

version of binding theory, according to the traditional usage, as Canonical Binding Theory

(CBT). Within the Government and Binding (G&B) framework, binding theory is

introduced as a subsystem of core grammar, along with other subsystems as bounding

theory, government theory, θ-theory, Case theory and control theory.

The central idea is that at the level of Logical Form (LF)-representation, all NPs,

including empty categories such as traces or PROs, must be indexed by a single index. BT

can then be seen as the collection of the principles that are responsible for the correct

indexing.

The notion of binding is, in CBT, a syntactic notion, technically implemented by

means of two more basic syntactic notions, namely, c-command and co-indexing. Two

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NPs are co-indexed if they bear the same index2. C-command and binding are defined as

follows:

(1) C-command3

A node α c-commands a node β iff

(i) α does not dominate β;

(ii) β does not dominate α;

(iii) the first branching node dominating α also dominates β

(2) Binding

α binds β iff

(i) α c-commands β;

(ii) α and β are coindexed

A basic assumption for CBT is that NPs can be subdivided into three categories: (i)

anaphors, (ii) pronouns and (iii) R-expressions. Anaphors are reflexive pronouns (such as

himself, herself,…), reciprocals (such as each other,…) and NP-traces. Pronouns are all

personal and possessive pronouns such as he, him, his, her, etc.. Both anaphors and

pronouns do not independently select a referent from the universe of discourse. R-

expressions (i.e. Referential-expressions), on the other hand, are all nominal expressions

that do select a referent. CBT has one principle for each category. Formally:

2 In order for α and β to be co-indexed, the following condition must be satisfied: (i) α and β are non-distinct in features for person, number and gender. 3 The notion of c-command is due Reinhart (1976; 1983).

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(3) Canonical Binding Theory

(Condition A) An anaphor is bound in its minimal domain

(Condition B) A pronoun is free (i.e. not bound) in its minimal domain

(Condition C) An R-expression is free

The notion of minimal domain is not uncontroversial. It will be better discussed in

the next paragraph. Actually, we might let us take the minimal domain of an NP as the

clause containing it. Now let me clarify the meaning of the conditions in (3) with some

examples.

Condition A: consider the following examples:

(4) Franki loves himselfi

(5) *Franki thinks [that Miriamj loves himselfi]

In sentence (4) the anaphor himself is bound by the R-expression Frank within the

anaphor’s minimal domain; Condition A is met and the sentence is grammatical. On the

contrary, in (5) the anaphor is bound by the R-expression Frank, which is outside the

anaphor’s minimal domain (indicated by square brackets); the sentence is then ruled out

by Condition A which requires the anaphor to be bound within its minimal domain.

Condition B:

(6) *Franki loves himi

(7) Franki thinks [that Miriamj loves himi]

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Condition B states that a pronominal expression is free in its minimal domain. Then, (6) is

ruled out since the pronoun him is bound within its minimal domain by the R-expression

Frank, violating Condition B. Sentence (7), on the other hand, is well formed; the pronoun

is bound, but the binder is outside the pronoun’s minimal domain. Note that Condition B

states only the possibility for a pronoun to be bound, but it does not state that a pronoun

must be bound. Whilst, according to Condition A, an anaphor must be bound, otherwise it

cannot be interpreted, a pronoun needs not to be bound. How can a pronoun be interpreted

if unbound? It can be interpreted by means of pragmatic principles. In fact, the pronoun

him in sentence (7) could also receive an index distinct from Frank’s index and be

interpreted as someone else than Frank, let say John. Since Condition B works at syntax

level, it must just prevent the production of not-well-formed sentences, such as (6).

Finally, Condition C:

(8) *Hei loves Franki

(9) *Hei thinks [that Miriamj loves Franki]

In both cases, the R-expression Frank is bound by a pronoun, as the co-indexing shows,

but, since Condition C states that R-expressions are free (i.e. not bound), both sentences

are ruled out. In other words, Condition C simply states that R-expression cannot be

bound. In (8) and (9), Frank is bound by he, violating the condition.

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1.1.2 Governing category

The binding conditions of CBT imply a locality concept, namely that of ‘minimal

domain.’ We took the minimal domain of an NP to be the clause embedding the NP. This

definition of minimal domain is contradicted by examples like (10):

(10) Franki believes [himselfi to be a hero]

This is a so-called Exceptional Case Marking (ECM) construction. It is a perfectly well

formed sentence of English although it contradicts Condition A. Problems like this has

been solved assuming a more detailed definition of minimal domain which involves

reference to government.4 The minimal domain of an NP is defined as its Governing

Category (GC):

(11) Governing Category

The governing category of α is the minimal clause containing α, α’s governor and

a SUBJECT.5

4 Government and m-command are defined as follows (Chomsky 1986:8): (i) Government α governs β iff a. α is a governor; b. α m-commands β; c. no barrier intervenes between α and β. Maximal projection are barriers to government. Governors are heads. (ii) M-command α m-commands β iff α does not dominates β and the first maximal projection that dominates α also dominates β. 5 A more detailed definition of GC is (i):

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The governor of himself, in example (10), is the verb believes. This means that the GC for

himself has to be the entire sentence. Then, defining the minimal domain in terms of GC

prevents this kind of counterexamples.

1.1.3 NPs as feature matrices

Chomsky (1982) states that NPs types such as anaphors, pronouns and R-expressions

cannot be taken as syntactic primitives. Therefore he proposes to replace these categories

with syntactic matrices. Two two-valued features, [±anaphor] and [±pronominal], are

assumed. NPs characterized by the feature [+anaphor] are subject to Condition A, whilst

NPs characterized by the feature [+pronominal] are subject to Condition B. NPs are

classified as in (12):

(12) Anaphors [+anaphor, -pronominal]

Pronouns [-anaphor, +pronominal]

(i) Governing Category The governing category of α is the minimal clause containing α, α’s governor and an accessible subject. The notion of accessible subject is defined as (ii): (ii) Accessible subject α is an accessible subject for β if the co-indexation of α and β does not violate any grammatical principle. The grammatical principle should be the i-within-i filter (Chomsky 1981:211-2), whose goal is to avoid circularity in reference. Given the purposes of this presentation, I do not intend to go deeper into this subject. For interesting discussions on the subject see, among others, Aoun (1986); Lasnik (1986); Giorgi (1987); Graffi (1988).

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R-expression [-anaphor, -pronominal]6

Given the definition of GC and the classification of NP types just proposed, CBT can be

reformulated as in (13):

(13) Canonical Binding Theory

(Condition A) An NP [+anaphor] is bound in its GC.

(Condition B) An NP [+pronominal] is free in its GC.

There is no more need for stating Condition C since R-expressions are negatively

specified for both features, i.e. they are independently referential.

1.2 What’s wrong with CBT

1.2.1 Explanatory inadequacy

Since the early works of Chomsky (Chomsky 1957; 1965), it has been stated that a

linguistic theory must attain both descriptive and explanatory adequacy. A linguistic

theory is descriptively adequate if it can characterize a certain state attained by the

language faculty. A linguistic theory attains explanatory adequacy if it can characterize the

initial state of the language faculty and show how it maps experience to the state attained

(Chomsky 1995:3). Within a minimalist framework (Chomsky 1995; 2000) the claim that

6 Since the features just proposed are binary features, we would predict an NP positively specified for both features, i.e. [+anaphor, +pronominal]; this NP is PRO, the understood empty subject of non-finite clauses, whose distribution is governed by control theory.

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a linguistic theory must attain explanatory adequacy is made even sharper. In fact one of

the prerequisites for attaining the goals of the Minimalist Program (MP) is to draw the

boundaries of syntax in a principled way. The properties of the human language faculty

should reflect the combinatorial properties of a morpho-syntactic vocabulary. The

morpho-syntactic vocabulary is explained in terms of primitive features. Every lexical

item (LI) contained in the lexicon is understood as a set of primitive features.

Given these assumptions, CBT is descriptively adequate although it has no

explanatory power. In fact, it can characterize a certain state of the language faculty but it

does not explain how experience is mapped to that state. If this is the case, CBT is not a

theory of the initial state of the language faculty, but just a description (not always correct)

of a certain state. As pointed out by Reuland (2001a:441), the binding conditions of CBT

are arbitrary as stated. They reflect no conceptual necessity in the sense that they follow

neither from any of the basic properties of the grammatical system nor from the

combinatorial properties of the morpho-syntactic vocabulary.

The linguistic distinction between anaphors and pronouns does not make a lot of

sense in such a framework. Anaphors and pronouns are not linguistic primitives, neither

the features [±anaphor] and [±pronominal]. In fact, these features do not explain what

anaphors and pronouns are and why they behave the way they do. It is also well known,

that many languages have much more complex systems of anaphoric expressions, which,

for instance, distinguish between complex anaphors (SELF anaphors like English himself)

and simplex anaphors (SE anaphors like Dutch zich). Given minimalist assumptions,

anaphoric expressions should be characterized in terms of primitive morpho-syntactic

features, and their behavior should follow from these features.

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1.2.2 Binding conditions at the Conceptual-Intentional interface

In MP (Chomsky 1995; 2000) it is claimed that the computational system of the human

language (CHL) is a perfect system. A computational system is perfect when it meets the

Inclusiveness Condition (IC). IC states that any structure formed by the computation is

constituted of elements already present in the LIs selected. This means that no new

syntactic object can be added in the course of the derivation. Hence, the introduction of

indices in the course of the derivation violates IC7. Therefore, given a set of (empirical)

proofs8, Chomsky (1995) claims that binding conditions can apply only at the Conceptual-

Intentional (C-I) interface. In other words, since computation (narrow syntax) is a closed

system, which operates only with the material selected from the lexicon, binding

conditions must apply at the interface between the syntactic component and the

interpretative component (broad syntax).

The claim that binding conditions must apply at C-I interface leaves us with two

open questions: (i) since binding is defined as co-indexation under c-command and co-

indexation is not available anymore, how are we to define binding? (ii) Since binding

conditions imply locality conditions (namely, the notion of GC defined above), how is

locality to be defined at C-I interface? Both questions involve the same problem: how can

we define purely syntactic notions at the C-I interface?

Let us start asking how binding can be defined at C-I interface. At the level of C-I

interface the interpretative system is called for interpreting the logical forms computed by

7 Reinhart (2000) claims correctly that syntactic co-indexation is just a technical device with no psychological reality. Higginbotham (1983) notes that co-indexing is a mere typographical means of expressing the antecedence relation. 8 See Chomsky (1995:191-212).

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CHL. At this level referential dependencies are encoded and binding can be

straightforwardly understood as ‘logical binding’ (Reuland 2001a:440). Logical binding,

as defined by Reinhart (2000), is the procedure of closing a property. A widely assumed

technical implementation of this procedure is obtained by binding a free variable to a λ-

operator. The definition of ‘logical binding’ is given in (1):

(1) Logical/variable Binding

α binds β iff α is the sister of a λ-predicate whose operator binds β9

The differences between logical and syntactic binding are clear. Logical binding is a

relation between operators and variables while syntactic binding is a relation between

indices (i.e. variables).10

Once binding at C-I interface is defined, binding conditions should apply at this

level. In line with Reuland (2001a), I will show that this is not possible since logical

binding is blind to locality conditions. Binding conditions, in fact, imply notions of

9 Reinhart (2000) calls the relation (1) A(rgument)-binding, to avoid confusion with just the standard logical binding. As pointed out by Reinhart, the term A-binding is not to be confused with the term used in syntactic binding theory, in which A-binding means binding between A-positions. Note that this definition of logical binding has interesting consequences: (i) it entails that α c-commands β; the welcome result in this case is that c-command follows straightforwardly from the definition, but has no independent role in defining binding; (ii) it eliminates the need to assume something like Condition C. In fact, we expect logical binding to respect the standard laws of logical syntax. Hence, only variable can be bound and just by one operator. Referential expressions are not variable. Wh-traces are already bound, since they result from movement. 10 Higginbotham (1983) points out that co-indexing is a problematic notion since it abstracts from the direction in which the anaphor-antecedent relation was assigned; in his article he proposes to represent the assignment of the anaphor-antecedent relation between two positions in a syntactic structure by linking those positions with a headed arrow, whose head points to the antecedent. Linking has the advantage of being an anti-symmetric relation. Note that the definition of binding just given has also the advantage of being an anti-symmetric relation, in fact it is a relation between an operator and a variable; it is then clear-cut the distinction between binder and bindee. Thus, this conception of binding solves also the problem posed by Higginbotham.

27

locality such as minimal domain or GC. These notions can be defined only in terms of

syntactic structures but not in logical terms.

That logical binding is blind to locality can be proved by the fact that it is not

sensitive to syntactic islands. This example should be sufficient:

(2) a. Miriam thought that John would tell Brian that the room Frank reserved

was supposed to be for her mother

b. Miriam λx (x thought that John would tell Brian that the room Frank

reserved was supposed to be for x’s mother)

The conclusion is that locality requirements, such as minimal domain or Governing

Category, find no natural expression in a logical syntax conception of binding since

binding at C-I interface can be understood only as a logical notion, not sensitive to

locality. Logical Forms, which are the objects taken by the interpretative system at C-I

interface, cannot express locality requirements.

1.2.3 Logophoric use of anaphors

A problem for CBT is the so-called ‘logophoric use of anaphors’. Recall that Condition A

of CBT states that an anaphor must always be bound in its local domain, i.e. it cannot

occur free and it cannot be bound by an antecedent outside its local domain. This is not

always true.

There are well known cases of logophoric use of anaphors. Very roughly, an

anaphor is used logophorically when, in particular contexts, it is used as a free variable

28

(Bonato 2006:37). The notion of logophoric pronoun is due to Hagège (1974) and

Clements (1975). Clements (1975:171) characterizes logophoric pronouns as elements that

satisfy conditions (i) to (iii):

(i) logophoric pronouns are restricted to reportive contexts transmitting the words or

thought of an individual or individual other than the speaker or narrator;

(ii) the antecedent does not occur in the same reportive context as the logophoric

pronoun;

(iii) the antecedent designates the individual or individuals whose words or thoughts

are transmitted in the reportive context in which the logophoric pronoun occurs.

Note that CBT does not prevent logophoric use of pronouns. In fact Condition B states

that a pronoun is free (i.e. not bound) in its Governing Category; this means that it can be

bound outside its local domain or it can correspond to a free variable. For instance,

sentence (3) can be mapped into two logical forms: (3a) and (3b):

(3) Frank thinks that Miriam loves him

a. Frank (λx (x thinks that Miriam loves x))

b. Frank (λx (x thinks that Miriam loves y))

In (3b) the pronoun can be used logophorically and, in this case, it is interpreted by means

of discourse factors.

29

Condition A, on the other hand, does not allow logophoric use of anaphors.

However, the are well known examples in the literature:

(4) Max saw a gun next to himself (Reinhart and Reuland 1993)

(5) Physicist like yourself are a godsend (Ross 1970)

(6) She gave both Brenda and myself a dirty look (Zribi-Hertz 1989)

In example (4) the anaphor himself clearly refers to Max, although it is not bound within

its governing category. In examples (5) and (6) an antecedent is lacking at all. Intuitively,

in (5) the anaphor refers to the hearer (yourself); in (6) it refers to the speaker (myself).

Other cases of logophoric use of anaphors, which I want to present in more details,

come from Icelandic. The following examples were first introduced by Thráinsson

(1976)11; in all these sentences sig, an anaphor, refers to Jón, which is outside the

anaphor’s GC. The main difference between the sentences in (7) and the sentences in (8)

is that in (7) sig is embedded in a subjunctive clause while in (8) it is embedded in a

infinitive clause:

(7) a. [Skoδun Jóns] er [aδ sig vanti hæfileika]

Opinion John’s is that SIG lacks talents

‘John’s opinion is that he (= John) lacks talents’

b. [Álit Jóns] virδist [vera [aδ ég hati sig]]

Belief John’s seems be that I hate SIG

11 See also Thráinsson (1990; 1991).

30

‘John’s belief seems to be that I hate him (= John)’

(8) a. Jón skipaδi mér [aδ PRO lemja sig]

‘John ordered me to hit SIG’

b. Jón skipaδi Pétri [aδ PRO raka sig á hverjum degi]

‘John ordered Peter to shave SIG every day’

Two groups of proposals have been developed in the literature to account for the

anaphoric use of sig. One group aims to give a unified syntactic account of sig.12 The

other group claims that the use of sig is ruled by discourse factors rather than syntactic

principles.13 However, both approaches treat the long distance uses of sig in subjunctive

and infinitive clauses as instances of the same phenomenon.

At this point, I do not intend to propose a solution; rather, I want to analyze the

differences between the sentences in (7) and those in (8), following Reuland and

Sigurjónsdóttir (1997). Let us start with subjunctives. In subjunctives, sig can take as its

antecedent a non c-commanding NP. However, the antecedent of sig must be the person,

distinct from the speaker, whose point of view is reported in the sentence.14 On the other

hand, sig shows a different behavior in infinitives clauses. In this case, sig can only take as 12 Along this first line different analysis has been proposed. Anderson (1986) postulates an ‘anaphoric domain’ in which sig has to be bound by a super-ordinate subject. Pica (1987) proposes that sig moves out of infinitive and subjunctive clause at LF level. 13 Along this second line are Thráinsson (1976, 1990, 1991); Mailing (1984; 1986); Sells (1987); Sigurδsson (1990) and Sigurjónsdóttir (1992). 14 This is proved by the agrammaticality of sentences like (i): (i) *[Vinur Jóns] telur [aδ ég hati sig] Friend John’s believes that I hate SIG ‘John’s friend believes that I hate him (=John)’ Compare it with (7). Other examples and relevant discussion can be found in Mailing (1984:222) and in Sigurδsson (1990:335).

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antecedent the subject of the matrix sentence.15 Moreover, sig in infinitives cannot take a

non-c-commanding NP as antecedent, even if it is a possible perspective holder. The

antecedent of sig in infinitives is subjected to structural conditions and its interpretation is

not ruled by discourse factors. In the case of infinitives, the anomaly is that the antecedent

is outside the GC. Hence, it is an instance of long-distance binding16, rather than

logophoric use. All in all, it seems reasonable to think that sig is ruled by discourse factors

when it occurs in subjunctives and by syntactic principles when it occurs in infinitives.

CBT cannot account for the phenomena just presented. In particular, all instances

of logophoric use of anaphors and long distance binding contrast with Condition A’s

claim that anaphors must be bound within their local domain. In the case of logophoric

use, an anaphor is not syntactically bound by an antecedent. In the case of long distance

binding, an anaphor is bound outside its local domain. Are these phenomena to be

considered exceptions to the theory or do we need to propose a different theory of

anaphoric relations that can explain in terms of general principles these phenomena? In the

following section I will expose how Reinhart and Reuland has pursued this second line in

their works. Before that, I want to point out some other phenomena that CBT leaves

unexplained.

15 Compare (i) with (8): (i) *Ég hótaδi Jóni [aδ PRO lemja sig] ‘I threatened John to hit SIG (=John)’ 16 For an introduction to long-distance binding and relevant discussion on the subject see, among others, Giorgi (1983/1984; 2004).

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1.2.4 Locally bound pronouns

Condition B of CBT states that a pronoun must be free, i.e. not bound, in its Governing

Category. However, also in this case there are counterexamples. The first kind of

counterexample was first introduced in the literature by Reinhart (1983:169):

(9) I know what Bill and Mary have in common. Mary adores Bill and Bill adores him

too.

In sentence (9), the second occurrence of him must admit Bill as its value. This means that

him’s antecedent is within him’s GC, contravening Condition B.

Another kind of counterexample comes from Frisian. This language allows

pronouns instead of anaphors in local binding relations. In fact, in Frisian, sentence (10)

means ‘Willem shames himself,’ although the Frisian him is a pronoun.

(10) Willem skammet him

The same sentence in Dutch would require a SE anaphor (zich), but, since Frisian does not

have SE anaphors, it allows a pronoun (him), violating again Condition B.

1.2.5 Complementarity

Condition A and Condition B of CBT predict strict complementarity in the distribution of

pronouns and anaphors. It means that the same interpretation cannot be obtained using

33

either an anaphor or a pronoun. However, there are well known contexts where

complementarity breaks down. In the following examples both an anaphor and a pronoun

can occur, producing grammatical sentences with same meanings:

(11) a. Frank saw a gun near himself/him

b. Miriam counted three tourist apart from herself/her

(12) a. Miriam saw a picture of herself/her

b. Frank likes jokes about himself/him17

These examples must show a violation of at least one of the canonical binding conditions.

1.3 A theory of anaphoric relations based on economy

principles

1.3.1 Preliminary questions

As we have seen above, some languages allow logophoric use of anaphors. An anaphor is

used logophorically when it is not bound by an antecedent and it is interpreted by means

of discourse factors. Logophoricity is a rather puzzling phenomenon for CBT. In fact,

within CBT the logophoric use remains an exception to be explained.

17 Note also that the anaphors used in these examples represent instances of logophoric use of such elements.

34

The problem raised by logophoricity can be understood in two different ways. A

first line is to assume statement (1), known as the ‘deficiency thesis,’ and then ask

question (2).

(1) In order for an argument α to be interpreted, it must have a full specification for φ-

features. (Bouchard 1984)

(2) Why, under certain conditions, is logophoric interpretation of anaphors allowed?

Statement (1)’s consequence is that referentially defective arguments, as anaphors, are

forced to take a linguistic antecedent to be interpreted. If (1) is assumed to hold,

logophoricity must be understood as an exceptional phenomenon which, under certain

conditions, can be allowed.

A second approach is to assume (3) and ask (4).

(3) If α has fewer φ-features than β, there are fewer constraints on the interpretation of

α than on the interpretation of β.

(4) Why, under certain conditions, is logophoric interpretation of anaphors blocked?

Statement (3) entails that there is no intrinsic property of anaphors that prohibits an

unbound interpretation. As a consequence a logophoric interpretation is always possible

but blocked under certain conditions. The goal of the theory is then to describe these

circumstances.

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Questions similar to (4) can be addressed, given the other counterexamples to CBT

raised in the preceding section. Take for instance the Frisian sentence (5), interpreted as

(5a):

(5) Willem skammet him

a. Willem λx (x skammet x)

Sentence (5), interpreted as (5a), is a grammatical sentence of Frisian. Again, instead of

asking why under certain circumstances local binding of a pronoun is allowed, we can

assume that there is no intrinsic property of pronouns that prohibits a bound interpretation

and ask (6).

(6) Why, under certain circumstances, is local binding of a pronoun blocked?

Let me sum up questions (4) and (6) in just one more basic question:

(7) Why, under certain circumstances, a certain interpretative procedure is blocked?

The theory I’m going to expose provides an answer to such a question.

1.3.2 Interpreting procedures and economy principles

How is a pronominal element, which lacks lexical features, to be interpreted? Consider the

tree structure σ in (8).

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(8)

We will focus on an argument β in δ. If α has lexical features it will be directly interpreted

as a suitable element in the domain of discourse. If β lacks of lexical features it functions

as a semantic variable and it can be interpreted, according to Chierchia (1995), by means

of two strategies. It can be taken as a free variable or as a bound variable. In the first case,

α takes as its value an element in the discourse domain. In the second case, α is bound by

an operator and it receives its value from that operator. The difference between the two

strategies can be seen in example (9):

(9) Miriam thinks that she is smart

a. Miriam (λx (x thinks that y is smart))

b. Miriam (λx (x thinks that x is smart))

The pronominal expression she is interpreted as a free variable in (9a) (it is not bound by

the λ-operator) and as a bound variable in (9b) (it is bound by the λ-operator). In the

second case, when the open λ-expression receives Miriam as its argument all the

occurrences of the bound variable receive Miriam as their value.

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Now, suppose expressions α and β, in σ, have to be assigned the same value. This

goal may be reach, according to Reuland (2001b:353), by means of three different

operations:

(10) a. α and β may be members of the same syntactic chain;

b. α and β may be identical variables bound by the same operator;

c. α and β may independently be assigned the same object from the domain of

discourse.

If α and β are members of the same syntactic chain, they are interpreted as occurrences of

the same variable and the chain represents one semantic object. If α and β are bound by

the same operator, they receive the same value; this is what happens in example (9b). If α

and β are different variables nothing prevents them form receiving the same value; this is

what can happen in (9c) if y receives Miriam has its value18.

Still according to Reuland (2001a; 2001b), I will assume that the three operations

in (10) pertain to three different cognitive components or different modules of human

communicative competence. Rule (10a) pertains to the syntactic component (i.e.

Chomsky’s CHL, see Chomsky 1995). Rule (10b) pertains to the semantic component.

Rule (10c) operates at the discourse level19. The central point in the theory I am going to

18 Formally: (i) Miriam (λx (x thinks that y is smart)) & y=Miriam 19 We are actually claiming that there exists a separate semantic component among our cognitive faculties. Note that, in the works of both Reinhart and Reuland, the semantic component is taken to be part of the computational system of human language in its broad sense (in Chomsky’s terms: broad syntax). Hence, we assume a first opposition between computational system (broad syntax) and discourse level, and a second opposition, within broad syntax, between the proper syntactic

38

present is that the choice between these three rules is governed by economy principles.

The idea can be understand considering scheme (11):

(11)

a. Discourse level (objects) A

Semantic level (varables) x1

Syntactic level (chains) C1 (Op. 3a) C1

Basic expressions α … β

b. Discourse level (objects) A

Semantic level (varables) x1 (Op. 3b) x1

Syntactic level (chains) C1 C2

Basic expressions α … β

component (narrow syntax) and the semantic component. The first opposition can be understood in terms of psychological modularity (as, for instance, in Fodor 1983; for the purposes of the present discussion, let us take a module as an encapsulated computational system, relatively domain-specific and characterized by a monotonic-logic, opposed to the central systems characterized by the opposite features): thus, broad syntax pertains to the cognitive module of language, while discourse level operations rely on general cognitive resources. The second opposition can be characterized by the fact that only narrow syntax obey to IC (Inclusiveness Condition); according to Chomsky (1995:219) a language L is a generative procedure that construct pairs (π; λ), where π provides the instruction for the sensorimotor system and λ the instruction for the system of thoughts; Reuland (2001a:471) assumes that CHL (narrow syntax) generates pairs (π′; λ′) which obey IC, and that the C-I interface contains a translation procedure that maps λ′ into λ, where λ differs from λ′ in that it does not obey IC. (It is naturally assumed that something similar must happen at A-P (articulatory-perceptual) interface). Some of the rules of the translation procedure, actually just those concerning the present discussion, will be illustrated in (22).

39

c. Discourse level (objects) A (Op. 3c) a

Semantic level (varables) x1 x2

Syntactic level (chains) C1 C2

Basic expressions α … β

The down-top arrows represent cross-modular operations, i.e. operations that map objects

relevant at a certain level into object relevant at the higher level. For instance, a cross-

modular operation is the operation that translates a syntactic chain into a semantic

variable. Each cross-modular operation is associated with a certain cost. This means that

different interpretative strategies would have different costs. This is represented in (11).

Let us start with (11a); the goal is to assign the two basics expressions α and β the same

value; α and β are linked in the same chain at the syntactic level; therefore, the chain is

translated in one semantic variable (first cross-modular operation), which receives as a

value one object of the discourse domain (second cross-modular operation). The result is

achieved: α and β have received the same value. The rule used was (10a) and it applied at

the syntactic level. The total cost was of two cross-modular operations (as indicated by the

down-top arrows). Consider now (11b); α and β are translated as variable bound by the

same operator (operation 10b). The result is achieved again, but the cost was of three

cross-modular operations. Finally, in (11c), α and β represent two syntactic object mapped

into two variables which receive the same value at discourse level. This procedure

required four cross-modular operations.

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The cheapest way to assign a value to some element α is to do it at the level of

syntax; the costliest way is to do it at discourse-level. There is only one last thing left

unexplained: which principle governs the choice between the interpretative procedures

available. I give in (12) a very informal version of such a principle:

(12) An interpretative procedure is blocked whenever a cheaper procedure that leads to

the same interpretation is available.

We have seen above that the question this theory should answer is why, under certain

conditions, an interpretative procedure is blocked. (12) answers such a question.

At this stage, our theory is composed by: (i) three possible operations for encoding

linguistic dependencies, operating at distinct levels, and (ii) a principle of economy. In the

following discussion I will analyze in more technical details these notions.

1.3.3 Encoding linguistic dependencies

In the present framework, linguistic dependencies can be encoded at three distinct levels:

(i) syntactic level; (ii) semantic level; (iii) discourse level. Each level encodes linguistic

dependencies by means of different operations: (i′) syntactic chain; (ii′) variable binding;

(iii′) co-reference. In this section I shall give a detailed account of these operations.

1.3.3.1 Syntactic encoding

1.3.3.1.1 Encoding a syntactic dependency

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So far, we have considered syntactic encoding of a linguistic dependency as chain

formation. A chain is formed by the operation Move, which moves a LI or some of its

features to a new position in the syntactic structure. The material moved in the new

position and the material left in the base position (a copy or a trace) form a chain. A chain

is one syntactic object which is mapped into one semantic object, i.e. one argument.

This kind of syntactic dependency is not the one we are looking for. In fact the

chain configuration, as just exposed, cannot establish a dependency between two lexical

items. Rather it establishes a relation between a moved lexical item and its trace or copy.

The kind of syntactic configuration we are looking for must be able to relate two lexical

items, since the goal of the operation is to assign the same value to two expressions. Given

two expressions α and β, we need a certain syntactic relation R such that α R β forms one

syntactic object. This relation is formalized by Reuland (2001a) and it is provided by the

interaction between two basic operations of CHL, namely Move/Attract and Check. In MP,

these two operations are defined as follows:

(13) Move/Attract

K attracts F if F is the closest feature that can enter into a checking relation with a

sublabel of K. (Chomsky 1995:297)

(14) a. A checked feature is deleted when possible.

b. A deleted feature is erased when possible. (Chomsky 1995:280)

42

(14) means that checking takes place as soon as a checking configuration is established.

The difference between deletion and erasure is that deleted features can be recovered

while erased features cannot. The expression ‘when possible’ is to be understood as ‘when

it does not contradict the principles of UG.’ The principle of UG that must be respected in

this case is the Principle of Recoverability of Deletion (PRD), which requires that no

information be lost by the operation (see Chomsky 1965:182 and Chomsky 1995:44). The

consequences of the PRD are, according to Chomsky (1995:280-1), that (i) only

uninterpretable features can be erased and (ii) interpretable features cannot be deleted.

One of Reuland’s main claims (Reuland 2001a) is that the second consequence is not

correct. These are his considerations: (i) the core syntactic dependency is that between two

occurrences of a feature, one being deleted by the other (let us take ‘occurrences’ of a

feature two copies of the same feature within a checking configuration); this is Chomsky’s

(1995, 2000) basic idea behind Move/Attract, i.e. movement is triggered by the need to

eliminate (erase) redundant features; (ii) there is features’ redundancy every time two

occurrences of a feature enter a checking configuration; (iii) suppose an interpretable

feature F1 enters a checking relation with an occurrence of the same feature, call it F1′, by

Move/Attract; at this point, Checking applies blindly, as all the other operations within

CHL; F1′ deletes F1, and this is possible because deleted features can be recovered. This is

Reuland main assumption: interpretable features can be deleted and then recovered

without contradicting the PRD, and it is exactly this process of deleting/recovering that

expresses the presence of a linguistic dependency.

1.3.3.1.2 chain, Chain and CHAIN

43

Let me explain, with an example, how the idea just exposed works. Consider the Dutch

sentence in (15):

(15) Oscar voelde zich wegglijden

Oscar felt SE slide-away

Then consider the stage of the derivation exposed in (16):

(16) [Oscar [[I,I voelde I] [tOscar [tv [zich I [wegglijden]]]]]]

This structure is derived by first adjoining voelde to I and then moving Oscar to [spec, IP].

In covert syntax, i.e. after Spell-out, zich’s Formal Features (FFzich) must move covertly

for Case checking of the verb. The only place for FFzich to move is the matrix V/I complex

giving rise to structure (17)20:

(17) [Oscar [[I,I FFzich [I,I voelde I]] [tOscar [tv [zich I [wegglijden]]]]]]

FFzich enters a checking configuration with FFOscar. FFzich are just D and 3rd person and

they are both interpretable. Moreover, both features are also included in FFOscar. Given our

assumptions on Checking and the PRD, these features are occurrences of the same feature,

i.e. they are copies of the same feature within a checking configuration; hence, FFzich will

20 As noted by Chomsky (1995:304), the trace of the moved V is not a possible target for FFzich. The reason is that the verb undergoes pied-piping, since it moves before Spell-out, and it does not leave functional material in its base position. Functional material could constitute a possible target for FFzich. This problem is still subject of debate.

44

be deleted and then recovered under identity, since they are interpretable features. As we

have seen, the process of deleting/recovering expresses the presence of a linguistic

dependency, and this is exactly the case. Let us call the relation between FFzich and Oscar

‘checking chain,’ abbreviated as ‘Chain’ and formalized as follows:

(18) Chain

(α, β) forms a Chain iff

a. β’s features have been (deleted by and)21 recovered from α, and

b. (α, β) meets standard conditions on chains such us uniformity, c-command,

and locality.

It is worth noticing that this definition has no theoretical cost. The Chain relation is just

the result of the blind/automatic application of the rules of CHL. In other words, (18) does

not introduce a new operation within CHL, rather it describes a certain configuration that

can be obtained given certain LIs and the basic rules of computation.

Structure (17) shows two syntactic dependencies. The first dependency is a chain

relation between FFzich and zich; this relation is the result of Move/Attract. The second

relation is a Chain relation between Oscar and FFzich; this relation is the result of

Checking. Given that these two relations can undergoes composition, in a way similar to

the chain linking proposed by Chomsky and Lasnik (1993), we can allow linking between

Chains and chains. Call the resulting relation CHAIN:

21 Since there is no recovery without previous deletion, the ‘deleted by’ part of the definition can be omitted.

45

(19) CHAIN

If (α1, α2) is a Chain and (β1, β2) is a chain and α2=β1, then (α1, β2) is a CHAIN.

Remember what we are looking for: we need a certain syntactic relation R such that α R β

forms one syntactic object. CHAIN is that relation. Oscar and zich enters a CHAIN

relation. As noted in the case of (18), also definition (19) has no theoretical cost, for the

same reasons exposed above for Chain.

1.3.3.1.3 Interpreting CHAINs

So far, two questions remain open: (i) which elements can enter a CHAIN relation and (ii)

how a CHAIN is interpreted by the semantic component.

Let us start with the first question: which elements can enter a CHAIN relation?

Only SE anaphors. To show that the answer is true, two proofs are in need: (i) a proof that

pronouns and referential (and quantified) DPs cannot enter a CHAIN relation; (ii) a proof

that SELF anaphors cannot enter a CHAIN relation. Let us analyze pronouns in terms of

formal features. The formal features of a pronoun are category, person, gender and

number. The formal features of a SE anaphor are just category and person. Category,

person and gender are inherent features. Number, on the other hand, as a nominal feature,

is both interpretable and optional (i.e. it is not inherent). Number is to be considered as a

lexical element; hence different occurrences of it in the numeration cannot be taken as just

copies of each other. Every occurrence of the number feature will give a context

dependent contribution to interpretation. Therefore, an occurrence of a number feature

cannot be deleted and recovered on the basis of another occurrence of the same feature

46

and, consequently, a Chain relation cannot be established. If a Chain relation cannot be

established, also a CHAIN relation cannot. The same point can be made for referential

(and quantified) DPs.

What about SELF anaphors? We start distinguishing two types of SELF anaphors

on the basis of their structure:

(20) a.

b.

(20a) is the case of the Dutch zichzelf, which is composed of a SE anaphor and a self

component. (20b) is the case of the English himself or the Italian lui stesso, which are

composed of a pronoun and a self component.

Just to clarify some terminology I shall use, with the term SELF I intend anaphors

with structures as either (20a) or (20b), as opposed to SE anaphors such as Dutch zich;

with the term self I intend the self component in the NP embedded in the SELF anaphor,

as in structures (20a) and (20b). Henceforth, a SELF anaphor can have a structure

47

[pronoun[self]], as in English, or a structure [SE[self]], as in Dutch; what both structures

have in common is the self component.

Structure (20a) shows a SE anaphor embedded in a DP; nothing prevents the SE

anaphor from entering a CHAIN relation when the necessary structural conditions are met.

In other words, the SELF anaphor cannot enter a CHAIN relation, but the SE anaphor

embedded in it can. This not the case of (20b) where the pronoun bears a number feature.

We can turn to the second question: how is a CHAIN interpreted? Consider a

structure like (21a), where DP heads a CHAIN tailed by SE and P is a 1-place predicate:

(21) a. DP P′ SE

b. DP (λx (x P))

c. DP (λx (x P x))

According to Reuland (2001a:477) a structure like (21a) can be translated into a semantic

object by means of two strategies. According to the first strategy, a CHAIN can be fully

reduced to a chain and, consequently, the chain 〈DP, SE〉 is translated as one semantic

object. As I understand it, this procedure produces a LF such as (21b). According to the

second strategy, a CHAIN represents a syntactic dependency which is translated as

indicated by the translation rules listed in (22).

(22) a. An expression DP[…t…] is translated as DP (λx (…x…)); vblDP is the

variable of the λ-expression derived by translating DP;

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b. A SE anaphor is translated as a variable; vblSE is the variable that the

translation assigns to SE;

c. If XP is CHAIN-linked to DP, their φ-features are copies. If so, vblXP =

vblDP;

d. A pronoun is translated as a variable.22

These rules produce the LF (21c). This second strategy is the one chosen by Reuland.

Given that P′ is a 1-place predicate, (21c) is correct only under the assumption that the two

occurrences of x in the expression P(x, x) are interpreted as one argument.23 Consider

sentence (23):

(23) a. Oscar schaamt zich

b. Oscar (λx (x schaamt x))

22 As explained in a preceding note, these rules are among the rules pertaining to the C-I interface that translate λ′ (an LF representation which obeys IC) into λ (an LF representation which does not obey IC). 23 According to Reuland, (i) can be reduced to (ii): (i) DP (λx (x P x)) (ii) DP (λx (x P)) In other words, Reuland assumes that (i) and (ii) are identical. It is not clear to me, if the wanted result is (ii), why Reuland chooses the second strategy, while, using the first strategy, (ii) could have been obtained straightforwardly without assuming that (i) and (ii) are identical. In the present discussion I will stick to Reuland’s assumption, leaving the possibility to implement the alternative strategy to further research. The assumption that (i) can be reduced to (ii) will have critical consequences on what follows, and giving it up would require a deep revision of the whole theory. Just for the sake of speculation, note that under the assumption that (i) can be reduced to (ii), a LF like (iii) is problematic; in fact, the two occurrences of x should be treated as copies, as they are in (i), and they should constitute one argument. (iii) Frank (λx (x thinks that x is stupid)) Reuland solves the problem assuming that the semantic component operates compositionally. The compositional mechanism is illustrated in the discussion of example (24).

49

Since Oscar and zich stand in a CHAIN relation, given rules (2), (23a) is translated into

(23b). According to the preceding assumption, the two occurrences of x are copies and,

therefore, they form one argument. Schamen is a 1-place predicate, hence the arity of the

predicate is respected and the sentence is correct.

What about sentence (15), repeated here as (24a)?

(24) a. Oscar voelde zich wegglijden

b. Oscar voelde [τ zich wegglijden]

The verb voelde is a two-place predicate. However, we have seen that zich enters into a

CHAIN relation. The solution proposed by Reuland is exposed in (24b). The idea is that

the two arguments of voelde are Oscar and τ. This is possible only assuming a

compositional interpretative procedure. In fact, Oscar and zich forms a CHAIN, hence a

syntactic object and a semantic argument. However, zich must saturate wegglijden and

then, in CHAIN with Oscar, it must saturate one of voelde’s arguments. Very roughly, it

seems that zich is implied, one way or another, with three arguments at the same time. It is

the argument of wegglijden; it is, in CHAIN with Oscar, the first argument of voelde; it is,

together with wegglijden within τ, the second argument of voelde. Reuland guarantees that

a compositional procedure solve the problem. First, zich is combined with wegglijden,

forming τ; hence, wegglijden’s arity is respected. Then, τ combines with voelde saturating

one of its arguments. Finally, Oscar, in CHAIN with zich, saturates voelde’s second

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argument (and it is at the moment of the CHAIN formation that zich is translated

according to Rule (22c)).24

Finally, what about reflexivized 2-place predicates? Within the proposal I’m

presenting 2-place predicates can occur only with SELF anaphors. Let us see why by

means of some examples:

(25) a. *Willem haat zich

‘William hates SE’

b. *Willem (λx (x haat x))

(26) a. Willem haat zichzelf

‘William hates SELF’

b. Willem haat [τ zich [N zelf ]]

c. Willem (λx (x haat f(x))

(25a) is ill formed since its semantic counterpart, (25b), shows an arity violation. In fact,

the two occurrence of x are copies and they form one argument. On the other hand, (26a)

is well formed. Structure (26b) is very similar to (24b), in the sense that zich enters a

CHAIN relation with Oscar but the predicate sees as its arguments Willem and τ. Reuland

(2001) proposes that zelf functions as a protective element whose role is to preserve the

arity of the predicate. The LF of (26a) is then (26c). The predicate takes two arguments,

one identical to x, the other to the value of some function of x.

24 In line with this argument, Fox (1993) proposes that chains may share their members with different predicates. According to Reuland (2001a:478 note 40) the present approach derives rather than stipulates this.

51

This proposal works for SELF anaphors embedding SE anaphors. However in

some languages, as English and Italian, SELF anaphors embed pronominal forms. In this

case self has a ‘reflexivizing’ rather than protective function. Self is a relational noun

interpreted as an identity relation that produces LFs such as (27a) or (27b):

(27) John hates himself

a. John (λx (hates (x, him) & him = x))

b. John (λx (him λy (hates (x, y) & y = x)))

The function of self is to put two arguments of the same predicate in a relation of identity.

The idea is that, given the structure (28a), self undergoes covert movement and adjoins to

the predicate, as shown in (28b):

(28) a. DP … [P] [pronoun [self]]

b. DP … [self P] [pronoun [e]]

According to Reuland, the fact that self moves onto the predicate head explains locality. In

fact, the relation is possible only between arguments of the same predicate. A predicate

with more than one argument is then necessary. The result of this operation is that the

arity of the predicate is not violated.25

25 In Reinhart and Reuland (1993) it is assumed that only SELF anaphors can reflexive mark a predicate (of course, just in the case the predicate is not inherently/lexically reflexive marked). The account just given of SELF anaphors (both for SELF anaphors embedding a SE anaphor and for SELF anaphors embedding a pronoun) gives an explanation of their ability to license reflexivity. In fact their role is to avoid arity violation, a role that cannot be covered by SE anaphors.

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1.3.3.1.4 Theoretical remarks

The syntactic relation CHAIN is derived from the basic properties of CHL. In fact it is

based on the blind application of basic computational operation (Move/Attract and

Checking) and on a purely morpho-syntactic lexicon. Nothing as indices is implied and IC

is thus respected. However, we had to consider a slightly modified version of the PRD.

1.3.3.2 Variable binding

In the preceding sections we have already introduced the notions of logical binding (and

its difference from syntactic binding) and co-reference. Here, I will just summarize the

basic concepts.

The distinction between variable binding and co-reference is due to Reinhart

(1983). Consider sentence (29):

(29) Frank thinks that he is clever

a. Frank (λx (x thinks that x is clever))

b. Frank (λx (x thinks that y is clever))

Pronouns, according to the translation rule (22d), are translated into variables. So is he in

example (29). In (29a) the variable is bound by a λ-operator while in (29b) it is not. In this

second case the variable must receive its value from the discourse storage for the sentence

to receive a truth-value.

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Variable binding is a semantic operation while co-reference applies at discourse

level. We have already seen in the previous section how variable binding is defined; I

repeat the definition as (30).

(30) Variable Binding

α binds β iff α is the sister of a λ-predicate whose operator binds β

Variable binding is just the procedure of closing a property. It is a relation between an

operator and a variable.

1.3.3.3 Co-reference

Two expressions co-refer if they refer to the same entity of the discourse domain.

Consider, for instance, a sentence like (31a) in the context (31b):

(31) a. Lili thinks she’s got the flu

b. Lucie didn’t show up today. Lili thinks she’s got the flu

c. Binding Lili (λx (x thinks x has got the flu))

d. Co-reference Lili (λx (x thinks y has got the flu)) & y = Lucie

As it is clear, she in (31b) refers to Lucie rather than Lili. The right LF in this case is (31d)

where only x is bound by the λ-operator. The other variable, y, which cannot be bound by

Lucie lacking the right configuration, will receive its value at the discourse level, picking

up a female singular entity which has been introduced, one way or another, in the

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discourse storage. In the case of (31b) the entity Lucie has been introduced by another

sentence ‘Lucie didn’t show up today,’ and it has become the focus of the conversation.

Co-reference is possible also in out-of-context sentences, for instance in (32):

(32) Most of her friends adore Lucie

Here, her is interpreted as Lucie, although it is not c-commanded. Since the structural

requirements are lacking, variable binding is not an option, and her must receive its value

at the discourse level. Then, nothing prevents her to take Lucie as its value by mean of co-

reference.

Co-reference is defined as follows:

(33) Co-reference

α and β co-refer iff neither binds the other and they refer to the same discourse

entity

An interesting case is presented in (34):

(34) a. Frank thinks that he is clever

b. Frank (λx (x thinks that x is clever))

c. Frank (λx (x thinks that z is clever)) & z = Frank

d. Frank thinks that he is clever and Bill does too.

e. Frank (λx (x thinks that x is clever)) and Bill (λy (y thinks that y is clever))

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f. Frank (λx (x thinks that z is clever)) and Bill (λy (y thinks that z is clever))

& z = Frank

Consider (34a): the reading in which he is taken as Frank can be obtained either by

variable binding (34b) or through co-reference (34c). What is the difference between these

two LFs, if there is any? According to Grodzinsky and Reinhart (1993), in the case of

variable binding, it is the property of thinking of oneself as clever which is attributed to

Frank, while, in the case of co-reference it is attributed to Frank the property of thinking

of Frank as a clever person. This difference, which is invisible in the case of (34a)26,

becomes visible in the case of elliptic VPs. Consider sentence (34d). It can have two

readings. The first reading, the so-called sloppy reading, is obtained copying (34b) and it

means that ‘Frank thinks that Frank is clever and Bill thinks that Bill is clever.’ The

second reading, the identity reading, is obtained copying (34c) and it means that ‘Frank

thinks that Frank is clever and Bill thinks that Frank is clever.’

1.3.4 Economy principles

So far I have analyzed in technical terms three possible tools for encoding linguistic

dependencies: CHAIN, which operates at syntactic level; variable binding, which operates

at semantic level; and co-reference, which operates at discourse level. The theory I am

26 As we will see later, the LF (33c) is ruled out by Rule I, at least if we take Rule I as stated in (36a); however, it is a question why (33c), although it is ruled out, is still available for copy in the case of (36f); this problem as been faced by Reinhart (2000) which proposes a modified version of Rule I. I shall present an account of this problem in the next section.

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presenting requires also an economy principle, which was informally stated in (12),

repeated as (35).

(35) An interpretative procedure is blocked whenever a cheaper procedure that leads to

the same interpretation is available.

Three principles have been proposed in the literature. They are shown in (36):

(36) a. Rule I (Interface Rule)

(Reinhart 1983; Grodzinsky and Reinhart 1993)

α cannot co-refer with β if replacing α with γ, γ a variable bound by β,

yields an indistinguishable interpretation.

b. Rule BV (Bound variable Rule)

(Reuland 2001a)

α cannot be bound by β if replacing α with γ, γ such that β heads a CHAIN

tailed by γ, yields an indistinguishable interpretation.

c. Rule L (Logophoric interpretation Rule)

(Reuland 2001a)

α cannot be used logophorically if there is a β such that a CHAIN 〈β, α〉

can be formed.

Very roughly: Rule I states that co-reference is blocked if variable binding is available;

Rule BV states that variable binding is blocked if a CHAIN relation is available; Rule L

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states that logophoric use is blocked if a CHAIN relation is available. Before considering

how these rules work through some examples, let me point out a couple of remarks. The

technical implementation of these rules and their psychological reality will be subject of

further discussion; however, it is clear by now that these rules are to be considered

economy conditions in the sense that they deal with a notion of global economy rather

than computational economy. I will leave these problems to further discussion.

I want to show now how the theory can account for Condition A, Condition B and

Condition C of CBT, and also for logophoric and long-distance anaphors, locally bound

pronouns, lack of complementarity in the distribution of anaphors and pronouns.

1.3.4.1 Condition A

Consider the following examples:

(37) a. Frank hates himself

b. Frank (λx (hates (x, him) & him = x))

c. Frank (λx (him λy (hates (x, y) & y = x)))

d. Frank haat zichzelf

e. Frank (λx (x haat f(x)))

(38) a. *Frank thinks that Miriam loves himself

b. Frank (λx (x thinks that Miriam (λy (y loves (x, him) & him = y))))

Cases like (37a) and (37d) have already been discussed in a previous section. The

interpretation of (37a) follows straightforwardly from the syntax and semantic of self. As

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we have seen above, self covertly to moves to V. The result is an identity relation between

him and the other predicate’s argument, namely Frank, as shown by the LFs (37b and c).

In languages like Dutch, where SELF anaphors are composed by a SE anaphor and a self

element (see (20) for a detailed representation), the dependency is still encoded within

syntax but in a different manner. Zich, in fact, tails a CHAIN headed by Frank. The

dependency is mapped into the semantic component according to the translation procedure

(22), producing (37e).

The agrammaticality of (38) is easily explained considering that self moves to the

predicate head. Since it is an argument of the predicate love, it moves to this predicate

producing an identity relation 〈him, Miriam〉, whose members do not agree in gender.

Similar considerations could account the Dutch counterpart of (38) with the only

difference that instead of self moving to V, we would have zich tailing a CHAIN headed

by Miriam. In this case, since zich does not have gender features, the sentence would be

correct but it would mean that ‘Frank thinks that Miriam love herself.’

1.3.4.2 Condition B

Consider the following examples:

(39) a. Frank hates him

b. Frank (λx (x loves x))

c. Frank (λx (x loves y)) & y = Frank

(40) a. Frank thinks that Miriam loves him

b. Frank (λx (x thinks that Miriam λy (y loves x)))

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c. Frank (λx (x thinks that Miriam λy (y loves z))) z = Frank

d. Frank (λx (x thinks that Miriam λy (y loves y)))

Consider example (39). We want to block the reading in which him refers to Frank. This

reading can be obtained by co-reference, as in (39c). Co-reference is ruled out by Rule I.

In fact, (39b), the bound variable option, and (39c) lead to undistinguishable

interpretations. Finally, (39b) is ruled out since it violates the arity of the predicate, being

love a 2-place predicate. In the case of English Rule BV, does not rule out (39b), since

English does not have SE anaphors in its lexicon, as Frisian.

On the other hand, in (40) him can refer to Frank. However, Rule I rules out (40c)

the co-reference option, since (40b) and (40c) leads to indistinguishable interpretations.

The bound variable option is not ruled out since arity is respected. Just to see Rule BV in

action, imagine that English, like Dutch, has SE anaphors in its lexicon. Bound variable

would not be ruled by rule BV, because the interpretation we would get with a CHAIN

would be (40d), which is not undistinguishable from (40c).

1.3.4.3 Condition C

Consider the following examples:

(41) He loves Frank

(42) He thinks that Miriam loves Frank

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Condition C is derived directly from the definition of logical binding. An R-expression is

not translated into a variable then it can not be bound by an operator. However, it is

interesting noticing that Rule I does not block co-reference, which, as we have seen in the

preceding sections, is an option to consider. Take for instance a sentence like ‘he is John,’

where, clearly, he refers to John.

1.3.4.4 Locally bound pronouns

Consider the following example:

(43) a. Willem skammet him

b. Willem (λx (x skammet x))

As we have seen in the preceding section, Frisian shows cases of local binding of

pronouns. Consider that skammen is a 1-place predicate (in fact the Dutch verb schaamen

requires zich and CHAIN formation). However, Frisian, like English, has no SE anaphors

at disposal. In the case of (34) Rule BV checks the lexicon for an element that can enter a

CHAIN relation, but it does not finds such elements since the Frisian lexicon does no have

SE anaphors. Then Rule BV does not rule out (43b) since an alternative with CHAIN

formation is not available. (43b) respects the arity of the predicate, since, as we have

assumed, two occurrences of the same variable are just copies, hence they form one

argument.

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1.3.4.5 Logophoric and long distance anaphors

Consider the following examples:

(44) a. [Skoδun Jóns] er [aδ sig vanti hæfileika]

Opinion John’s is that SIG lacks talents

‘John’s opinion is that he (= John) lacks talents’

b. [Álit Jóns] virδist [vera [aδ ég hati sig]]

Belief John’s seems be that I hate SIG

‘John’s belief seems to be that I hate him (= John)’

In the previous section I illustrated, in line with Reuland and Sigurjónsdóttir (1997), that

sig in subjunctives is interpreted logophorically. This follows straightforwardly once we

have seen that in subjunctives sig cannot tail a CHAIN. We assume, according to Manzini

(1993), that subjunctives must be licensed by an operator and this operator attracts the V/I

complex. Since the licensing relation must be syntactically encoded, the V/I complex must

move to the licenser, as shown in (45), where Op is the relevant operator and δ is the

starting position for the V/I movement:

(45) (a) Op [IP Oscar [[I,I FFsig [I,I V subj I]] [tOscar [tv [sig…]]]]]

(b) [Op,Op [I,I FFsig [I,I FFsubj I]] Op] [IP Oscarφ… [[δ] Vsubj]…sigφ…]

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This operation moves FFsig from the position where they can enter in Chain relation with

Oscar. Then a CHAIN cannot be formed. Given Rule L, nothing prevents a logophoric use

of sig in subjunctives since it cannot enter a CHAIN relation.

Other cases of logophoric use of anaphors were raised in the previous section.

They all dealt with SELF anaphors. It has been noticed (Reinhart and Reuland 1991; 1993

and Pollard and Sag 1992) that there is a systematic pattern in the distribution of

logophoric anaphors in English:

(46) a. Physicist like yourself are a godsend

b. *A physicist has looked for yourself

(47) a. She gave both Brenda and myself a dirty look

b. *She gave myself a dirty look

(48) a. Max boasted that the queen invited Lucie and himself for a drink

b. *Max boasted that the queen invited himself for a drink

The correct generalization is that SELF anaphors cannot occur logophorically when they

are an argument of the predicate (see the (b) cases). They can be interpreted

logophorically when they are embedded in an argument, but they do not constitute an

argument by their own. This behavior can be explained given the semantic of self as a

relational noun. In the (b) cases self try to produce an identity with a predicate’s argument.

Take (46b): the predicate is look which takes two arguments, a physicist and yourself; self

produces an identity relation 〈you, a physicist〉; the relation is then ruled out for reasons of

person’s agreement. In the (a) cases, the SELF anaphor is not a predicate’s argument. It

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seems plausible that in such cases self cannot construe a relation since it takes no part in a

predicate-arguments relation. The interpretation then must be carried by means of

discourse factors. Rule I does not rule out co-reference since, lacking c-command, variable

binding is not an option.

1.3.4.6 Complementarity

Consider the following examples:

(49) Physicist like you/yourself are a godsend

(50) She gave both Brenda and me/myself a dirty look

(51) Max boasted that the queen invited Lucie and him/himself for a drink

We have just seen that in (49-50), anaphors are used logophorically. The same argument

explains why also pronouns can occur in the same environments. Co-reference is not

blocked since variable binding is not available.

1.4 Discussion

1.4.1 Theoretical considerations

Independently from its empirical adequacy, the theory of anaphoric relation based on

economy principles meets explanatory adequacy. It respects IC since it does not use

indices. The syntactic operations (in particular the CHAIN formation), result form the

blind and automatic application of computational operations and reflect the combinatorial

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properties of a purely morpho-syntactic vocabulary. The morpho-syntactic vocabulary is

explained in terms of primitive features. Furthermore, the theory does not rely on locality

conditions, as CBT did; ‘c-command is relevant for the syntactic conditions under which

λ-predicates can be formed (compositionally), but has no independent role in defining

binding’ Reinhart (2000:7).

However, the theory relies on some non-trivial assumptions. One assumption,

which is directly related with the explanatory adequacy of the theory, is that the basic

economy principles (Rule I, Rule BV and Rule L) are primitives, in the sense that they are

not reducible to more basic properties of the human language’s cognitive system. A

possible reduction is the object of further investigations. Nevertheless, I would focus on a

couple of points.

1.4.2 Rule BV

Rule BV states that variable binding is blocked if, substituting a lexical item with a new

lexical item that can enter a CHAIN relation, leads to the same interpretation. Take an

example from Dutch:

(4) *Willem schaamt hem

Rule BV explains why hem cannot be interpreted as a variable bound by Willem.

According to this rule, we check the lexicon for an element that can enter a CHAIN

relation leading to the same interpretation. The Dutch lexicon has such an element, namely

zich. Variable binding is then blocked. But, if we move to Frisian things work differently.

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In fact, the Frisian counterpart of (4) would be correct, because Frisian does not have in its

lexicon something like zich, i.e. it has no lexical item that can tail a CHAIN.

The logic of Rule BV and Rule L are absolutely different. If a SE anaphor is

introduced in the numeration and at a certain stage of the derivation it enters a CHAIN,

this is just a matter of computational principles and not of economy principles. If it does

not enter a CHAIN then it must interpreted one way or another, maybe as a bound

variable, maybe as a free variable, i.e. logophorically.

Rule BV is a principle of global economy, as opposed to computational economy.

To appreciate the comparison, let me quickly explain what computational economy is. We

start with a numeration, i.e. a set of LIs for the computation. The computation takes these

LIs one by one until the derivation is concluded. If the derivation does not converge (i.e. it

cannot be interpreted by the interfaces) it crashes. However, it is plausible to think that

given the same numeration different converging/interpretable derivations can be

computed. In this case only the cheapest derivation would survive. The cheapest

derivation is the derivation that requires the minor number of computational steps. What

matters, then, is that economy considerations can be done on the basis of the same

numeration. The numeration is the reference-set for economy conditions to apply. Given

two derivations, we can establish which one is the cheapest only if they are computed

from the same numeration.27

This is not the case for Rule BV. Rule BV must basically confront two derivations

based on different numerations. Consider again example (4). Rule BV must compare a

derivation based on a numeration including hem with a derivation based on a numeration

27 For relevant discussion on the subject see Chomsky (2000).

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in which hem as been substituted with zich. As guaranteed by Reuland, there is no risk of

a computational blow-up. This is Reuland’s point (2001a:475),:

The features of a SE anaphor are a subset of the features of the corresponding pronominal.

This entails that the comparison does not require selecting a different lexical item, but that

the SE anaphor involved in the comparison can be construed from information already

available in the pronoun itself.

I argue that there is something wrong in Reuland’s statement. Specifically, that the SE

anaphor can be construed from information already available in the pronoun itself.

However the computation must also know if a SE anaphor is available in the lexicon. Let

me explain this point with an example. Suppose Reuland’s statement is correct; what

happens in the case of (4)? At a certain point in the derivation the process checks whether

a subset of hem’s features can enter a CHAIN relation with Willem. The answer is ‘yes,’ a

subset hem’s features can effectively enter a CHAIN relation with Willem. As a

consequence the bound variable interpretation is blocked. Now take the Frisian (5), which,

remember, means ‘Willem shames himself.’

(5) Willem skammet him

Rule BV works the same way. At a certain point in the derivation the process checks

whether a subset of him’s features can enter a CHAIN relation with Willem. The answer

will be ‘yes,’ since a subset of him’s features can effectively tail CHAIN. The difference

between Dutch and Frisian is that in Dutch the subset of hem’s features corresponds to a

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LI listed in the Dutch lexicon while in Frisian the subset of him’s features does not

correspond to a LI listed in the Frisian lexicon. If we want the correct result, Rule BV

must check the lexicon and see if it contains a SE anaphor. Then the question would be:

does the lexicon contain a SE anaphor? In the case of Dutch (4) the answer would be ‘yes’

and variable binding would be blocked; in the case of Frisian the answer would be ‘no’

and variable binding would be allowed. Then, to account for the Frisian facts, Rule BV

should state that ‘α cannot be bound by β if replacing α with γ, a γ such that β heads a

CHAIN tailed by γ and such that it correspond to an actual lexical item, yields an

indistinguishable interpretation.

However, as noted by Delfitto (p.c.), the fact that Rule BV requires a ‘look into the

lexicon’ does not lead to a computational blow-up. It is possible to implement

computationally the rule without troubles. Just think of an algorithm that, in the case of a

pronoun in a certain syntactic configuration, calls for a look into the lexicon.

Now consider a language like English, which does not have SE anaphors. In

English CHAIN formation is not an option. If we claim that Rule BV is a linguistic

universal, it is difficult to see why English should use such a rule. Moreover, as far as

English is concerned, the theory predicts some wrong judgments. Consider the following

examples:

(6) a. John behaves himself

b. *John (λx (x behaves him) & him = x)

(7) a. *John behaves him

b. John (λx (x behaves x)

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(6a) is a grammatical sentence of English. However, the LF (6b) produced by the

reflexivizing self shows an arity violation. In fact, behave is a 1-place predicate, inherently

reflexive. (7b), on the other hand, is an ungrammatical sentence of English although the

theory would predict its grammaticality. English, like Frisian, has no SE anaphors, so no

chance to build a CHAIN. Rule BV then should not block the bound variable reading (7b);

moreover, the bound variable option produces a LF that respects the arity of predicate,

given that the two occurrences of x form one argument. One possible move to rule out (7)

is to assume again a version of Rule BV in which it is not necessary to check the lexicon.

If the rule just checks the possibility for a subset of him’s features to tail a CHAIN,

without asking if the subset corresponds to a actual LI, then the bound variable

interpretation is ruled out. Yet, this is not enough for explaining the grammaticality of (6)

and, moreover, we fall back to the Frisian case which, conversely, needs the ‘check into

the lexicon.’

1.4.3 Rule I

Also Rule I deals with global economy since it does not operate within one specific

linguistic module, rather it chooses between the derivations produced by different

modules. Its computational implementation is not an easy task. We must deal with two

problems. A first problem is that there are contexts in which Rule I is systematically

violated. Take example (8):

(8) a. Frank thinks that he is clever

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b. Frank (λx (x thinks that x is clever))

c. *Frank (λx (x thinks that z is clever)) & z = Frank

d. Frank thinks that he is clever and Bill does too.

e. Frank (λx (x thinks that x is clever)) and Bill (λy (y thinks that y is clever))

f. Frank (λx (x thinks that z is clever)) and Bill (λy (y thinks that z is clever))

& z = Frank

Rule I does not allow (8c) as a possible interpretation for (8a), however in the ellipsis

contexts both the bound variable interpretation and the co-reference interpretation are

available for copy. In fact (8d) is ambiguous between (8e) and (8f).

The second problem is how to computationally implement Rule I. This problem

has also been noted by Reinhart (2000); she points out that it is not clear whether the

human processor is indeed sensitive to the type of economy considerations involved in the

processing of Rule I. She concluded that this economy view has not been on the right

track.

An alternative, proposed by Reinhart, is to turn the rule the other way around. Rule

I basically aims to formalize the intuition that co-reference is blocked whenever an

equivalent variable binding reading is possible. The alternative is that co-reference is

excluded whenever an equivalent variable binding interpretation is impossible. It is

formalized as follows; I will call this rule Rule I*28:

28 Reinhart (2000) calls this rule just Rule I. Her definition differs from the one given in (9) in that she uses ‘co-valuation’ instead of ‘co-reference.’ I leave the discussion of these two concepts apart, but see Heim (1993) and Reinhart (2000).

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(9) Rule I*

α and β cannot co-refer iff:

a. α is in a configuration to bind β;

b. α cannot bind β;

c. the co-reference interpretation is indistinguishable from what would be

obtained if α binds β.

If just one of the three clauses in (9) is violated, then the co-reference option is possible.

Take (8): (i) Frank is in a configuration such that it can bind he, then clause (9a) is

satisfied; (ii) Frank can bind he, then clause (9b) is not satisfied. The co-reference option

is hence available. Note that we did not need to check clause (9c). This solves the problem

of (8) but still we have to face the problem of the computational implementation of clause

(9c). Consider example (10):

(10) She said we should invite Lucie

a. She (λx (x said we should invite Lucie)) & she = Lucie

b. She (λx (x said we should invite x)) & she = Lucie

We want to block co-reference between she and Lucie. Condition (9a) and (9b) are

satisfied: she is in a configuration to bind Lucie and she cannot bind Lucie since Lucie is

not a variable. Then we need to check also clause (9c), and for this we need to construct a

reference-set including the current derivation and the derivation with the variable binding

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interpretation. If the two members are indistinguishable, the co-reference option is

blocked. The procedure is specified as follows (Reinhart 2000):

(11) To check clause (9c) construct a comparison-representation by replacing β with a

variable bound by α.

In the case of (10) also condition (9c) is satisfied, then the coreference option is rule out.

We should expect that such a complex strategy, as the one exposed in (11), would

correspond to a visible processing cost. The data from applied linguistics seem to confirm

this expectation29.

1.5 Conclusions

CBT encounters both theoretical and empirical problems. The theoretical problem is that

CBT does not attain explanatory adequacy and violates the IC. Among the empirical

problems, particular attention was given to the phenomenon of logophoric use of

anaphors. To overcome such problems I proposed to follow the road paved by Reinhart

and Reuland, and then to pursue a deep revision of the theory of anaphoric relations.

To overcome the theoretical problems we substituted the notion of syntactic

binding, with three different mechanisms for encoding a linguistic dependency between

two expressions:

29 For relevant discussion and references on the subject see, among others, Avrutin (1999, 2004), Baauw (2000), Baauw and Delfitto (1999),Grodzinsky (2000a), Grodzinsky and Reinhart (1993), Manzini and Wexler (1987), Piñango (2002), Piñango and Burkhard (2001), Wexler and Chien (1991).

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(1) Syntactic encoding (i.e. CHAIN formation)

(2) Variable-binding

(3) Co-reference

The syntactic mechanism proposed does not violates the IC since it does not entail the use

of indices. Moreover, it results from the blind and automatic application of primitive

operations of the computational system, i.e. movement and checking. The structural

conditions on CHAIN are straightforwardly derived from the structural conditions on

these primitive operations.

The mechanism of variable-binding is a relation between operators and variables

and it applies at the C-I interface. As is expected at this level the mechanisms is blind to

locality, hence not sensitive to syntactic island.

As far as the logophoric use of anaphors is concerned, we have seen that this

phenomenon turns out to be a problem under the assumption that the deficiency thesis of

Bouchard holds. According to this thesis, anaphors are referentially deficient expressions

since they lack a full specification of φ-features, hence they must be bound by an

antecedent to be interpreted. If we take this thesis as correct, logophoricity turns out to be

an unexplained exception. Henceforth, according to Reuland (2001b) we assumed that the

deficiency thesis is incorrect: the fact that an expression lacks a full specification of φ-

features simply means that there are fewer constraints on its interpretation. Under this

assumption, the logophoric interpretation is the ‘default’ option and the question we must

answer is why under certain conditions logophoric interpretation is blocked. This question

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finds its answer in the basic economy principles characterizing the theory. Such economy

principles state that a certain interpretative procedure is blocked whenever the same

interpretation can be achieved by means of a cheaper interpretative procedure. Therefore,

the logophoric interpretation is blocked whenever the same interpretation can be obtained

by means of variable-binding or CHAIN formation.

The economy principles, namely Rule I and Rule BV, are the primitive principles

at the basis of the theory. They are principles of global economy since they work

comparing two derivations based on two distinct numerations. Economy conditions that

does not take as their reference set the initial numeration, i.e. the initial array of lexical

items, are seen as dangerous since they could raise the risk of a computational blow up.

This problem has been considered by both Reinhart (2000) and Reuland (2001a). It seems

to me that Reinhart’s proposal is on the right track. Her modified Rule I, which I dubbed

Rule I* (see example (9) in the previous paragraph), calls for the substitution of a lexical

item only in few cases. Moreover, the formalization of a comparison procedure, as in

example (11) in the previous paragraph, provides a precise instruction for the

computational system.

The interesting result of this theory is that different anaphoric relations are

associated with different computational costs. It is an intriguing subject for further

research, to check the data from applied and clinical linguistic and see if different

computational costs are correspond to different processing costs in production,

comprehension and acquisition. Moreover, since different operations are said to pertain to

different linguistic levels, we should expect subjects with specific linguistic impairment to

fail in specific tasks and succeed in others. For instance, a well-founded hypothesis is that

Broca’s patients are limited in their abilty to construct syntactic dependencies in real-

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time30, hence we expect them to fail in the comprehension of those anaphoric relations that

requires computation at the syntactic level (for example, in the case of Rule BV).

30 This is known as the ‘Slow Syntax Hypothesis,’ see for instance Piñango (2002) and Avrutin (2006) and references cited.

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2 ATTITUDES DE SE

2.0 Introduction

It has been noted in the philosophical literature (Castañeda 1966; Kaplan 1977; Lewis

1979) that sentences like (1) are ambiguous:

(1) John believes that he is a musical genius

Consider the interpretation in which he is anaphoric of John. Such a sentence is

ambiguous since it can mean that John believes that he is a genius and he is aware of the

fact that the belief he is entertaining is about himself, but it can also mean that John

believes that he is a genius although he is not aware of the fact that the thing he is having a

belief about is actually himself. To appreciate this second interpretation consider the

following context: John reads an article on a newspaper and he believes that the journalist

who has written that article is a genius; however, John is not aware of the fact that he

himself wrote the article; in fact, he has written that article years before but now he has no

recollection of that. From a philosophical point of view, the difference between the two

interpretations stems from the different epistemic access that John has to himself. In both

cases John is having a belief about a certain res, namely John, but just in one case he

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recognize that res as himself. Yet, in spite of this difference, both situations can be

reported by sentence (1).

It is an interesting question, and, I believe, an intriguing challenge for a theory of

anaphora, whether this ambiguity has some linguistic relevance. If we assume that the

ambiguity has linguistic relevance we must show that the two distinct interpretations

correspond to two distinct logical forms. In other words we must show how the ambiguity

is encoded in grammar. This possibility has not received much attention in the linguistic

literature, except from the texts that will be discussed here and few others31. However, I

believe it can be an interesting ground on which a theory of anaphora can be tested.

In this chapter I will not propose an original theory or an enrichment of an already

existing theory. Rather, I will try to provide a detailed account of the phenomenon and of

the relevant literature on the subject. The problem of the ambiguity of sentences like (1)

has been first brought to the attention of the linguistic community by Gennaro Chierchia

in his article Anaphora and Attitudes De Se (1989). In this article, he analyzes some

instances of the phenomenon under consideration and proposes a theory based on an

attributive account of embedded clauses. Very roughly, he proposes that in the case of a de

se belief, i.e. a belief in which the subject is aware of the fact that the res he is having a

belief about is himself, what the subject does is to attribute to himself a property. For

instance, John, in the de se interpretation of sentence (1), attributes to himself the property

of being a genius. This idea was first introduced by Lewis (1979), who demonstrated by

means of some thought experiments that propositions have not enough structure to

31 Reinhart (1990) and Higginbotham (1992) are discussed in the present chapter. Relevant contributions to the study of the subject, although not discussed here, are Schlenker (2003) and Higginbotham (2003).

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represent essential indexicality. It means that a proposition P(ε) is true whether or not ε is

aware of having the property P. For instance, the proposition ‘John is a musical genius’

does not necessarily entail the proposition ‘I am a musical genius’ uttered by John. Hence,

Lewis proposed that in the case of de se beliefs what is at hand is a property rather than a

proposition. Chierchia (1989), capitalizing on Lewis’s idea, proposes a linguistic theory

according to which the two interpretations of sentences like (1) correspond to two distinct

logical forms. Chierchia’s theory makes two very interesting predictions: (i) that

controlled structures, like infinitivals, are always interpreted de se and (ii) that logophors

are always associated with a de se interpretation.

Objections have been raised against Chierchia’s theory. In this chapter I will

consider two articles: Reinhart (1990) and Higginbotham (1992). Reinhart raises two

empirical problems. A first problem is that Chierchia’s theory predicts that the sloppy

reading of a deleted VP is always interpreted de se. As shown by Reinhart, this is a wrong

prediction since also deleted VPs can be interpreted de re even when they are assigned a

sloppy reading. A second problem is that it is not true that logophors are always associated

with a de se interpretation. Reinhart considers some examples, taken from written

narrative, of logophors occurring in structures that Chierchia’s theory cannot account for.

Henceforth, Reinhart proposes an alternative theory, which is based on the work of

Kaplan.

Objections of a slightly different kind are raised by Higginbotham (1992). He

shows that (i) an attributive account of embedded clauses and, particularly, of controlled

structures runs against serious empirical problems and (ii) that attitudes de se simply

results from a different strategy of interpretation of pronouns. It must be noted that

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Higginbotham has serious doubts not only about the linguistic relevance of attitudes de se,

but also about their philosophical relevance. In my presentation of Higginbotham’s article

I will devote some attention to the theory of controlled structures that the author proposes

since it conctitutes the necessary background for understanding his objections and his

proposals.

The chapter is organized as follows: in the first paragraph I will introduce and

explain with some examples the distinction between attitudes de dicto and attitudes de re

(2.1.1) and the distinction between attitudes de re and attitudes de se (2.1.2). In the second

paragraph I will introduce Chierchia (1989)’s theory. In the third paragraph I will discuss

Reinhart (1990)’s objections to Chierchia (2.3.1) and I will present her alternative

proposal (2.3.2). In the fourth paragraph I will discuss Higginbotham (1992)’s article with

particular attention to his theory of control structures; in a final appendix to the paragraph

I will propose some lines of further investigation in the theory of control. Finally, in the

concluding notes I will try to summarize the empirical evidence against Chierchia’s theory

of attitudes de se, introducing some original counterexamples to that theory.

2.1 Attitudes de dicto, de re, de se

2.1.1 Attitudes de dicto and attitudes de re

It has been noticed in the philosophical literature (Castañeda 1966; Kaplan 1977; Lewis

1979) that there maybe a significant difference between a thought one is entertaining

about a certain res and a thought one is entertaining without referring to a certain res. To

appreciate this difference consider the following example (Chierchia 1989):

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(1) Pavarotti believes that the one who can sing ‘O che gelide manine’ without

mistakes is a musical genius

Sentence (1) is ambiguous since it can be true in two distinct sets of circumstances. In the

first case, Pavarotti’s belief is purely conceptual; he does not know if there is a singer that

can sing ‘O che gelide manine’ without mistakes but he does know that, if there is one,

that singer is a musical genius. In the second case, Pavarotti knows that Domingo is the

only singer that can sing ‘O che gelide manine’ without mistakes; then, what Pavarotti

means with sentence (1) is that he believes that Domingo is a musical genius.

In the first case, Pavarotti’s belief is called de dicto. In the second case, Pavarotti’s

belief is called de re.

2.1.2 Attitudes de re and attitudes de se

It has also been noticed that, within de re beliefs, two different kinds of belief may be

further distinguished. Suppose that the res one is having a belief about is her/himself; two

cases can then be distinguished: on one hand the subject can just know the res she/he is

having a belief about; on the other hand the subject can know the res and also recognize

that res as her/himself. In the first case the belief would be de re, in the second case it

would be de se.

Note that in both cases the belief is about a certain res; then, a de se belief entails a

de re belief; in fact, only if we are having a belief about a certain res we can recognize

that res as ourselves. On the contrary, the opposite entailment does not hold, i.e. a de re

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belief does not entail a de se belief; the fact that we are entertaining a belief about a

certain res does not entail that we recognize that res as ourselves.

The most famous example of ambiguity between a de re and a de se reading is due

to Kaplan (1977). Consider this scenario: John is looking in the mirror and sees someone

whose pants are on fire; the person he sees is actually himself. Then, sentence (2) can be

true in two different sets of circumstances:

(2) John believes that his pants are on fire

On one hand, John is aware that his belief concerns himself. In this case John’s belief

would be something like the direct speech assertion ‘my pants are on fire.’ On the other

hand, John may not be aware of the fact that the man he sees is himself. In this second

case his belief would be ‘his pants are on fire.’

In both cases John’s belief is de re. In fact, there exists a specific entity whom John

has a belief about. However, he may still not be aware of the fact that that specific entity is

himself. Only in the case John recognizes that the entity he is having a belief about is

himself, we have, according to Lewis (1979), a de se belief.

Another example of the same ambiguity, although with a more realistic setting, is

due to Reinhart (1990). Suppose Lucie is a broadcast manager and is looking for the right

female voice for a radio commercial. She listens to some samples of female voices.

Unbeknown to Lucie, the sound technician records her too and dubs her sample as number

18. While listening to sample 18, Lucie does not recognize her own voice and rules out

sample 18 because she thinks the woman she has listened to in the sample sounds too

aggressive. In this scenario, sentence (3) cannot be true de se:

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(3) Lucie believes that she sounds too aggressive

Sentence (3) is true de re, since Lucie knows the res whom she is having a belief about,

but she does not recognizes that entity as herself, hence it is not true de se.

Sentence (3) has the same ambiguity shown in (2). It can present a belief that Lucie

has about a certain entity that she does not recognize as herself, and this belief is de re; but

it can also present a belief that Lucie has about an entity that she fully recognizes as

herself, and this belief is de se.

To sum up, de re attitudes are attitudes that a subject has about a certain entity; de

se attitudes are attitudes that a subject has about a certain entity that she/he recognizes as

her/himself.

2.2 Chierchia’s property-account of attitudes de se

2.2.1 Linguistic relevance of attitudes de se

The de se/de re ambiguity suggests that there is a qualitatively relevant difference between

accessing a certain res and accessing ourselves. Take sentence (1), for instance:

(1) Lucie believes that she sounds too aggressive

In both readings Lucie has a certain belief about a certain res but only in one reading, the

de se reading, she recognizes that entity as herself. A de se attitude can then be seen as a

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special case of the de re attitude since the epistemic access to oneself necessarily requires

the access to a certain res: the de se reading entails the de re reading.

It is an intriguing question whether the de re/de se ambiguity has some linguistic

relevance and more specifically whether it can be resolved at some level in the grammar.

In effect, two lines of research have been pursued: the first line takes the ambiguity to be

connected to a more general epistemic problem regarding the way one can access a certain

res; since an object can be accessed by different perspectives (even leading to the

attribution of contradictory properties to the same object), the problem of de se attitudes

can be reduced to a more general problem of de re attitudes.32

A second approach to the problem is to assume that the ambiguity has actual

linguistic significance and that it can be resolved at some level in the grammar assigning

distinct logical forms to sentences like (1). Chierchia (1989) pursues this second line: his

aim is to demonstrate that: (i) de se readings are associated with specific linguistic

structures and (ii) the compositional semantics of such structures resorts to properties

rather than propositions.

2.2.2 Lewis (1979): a ‘self-locational’ view of beliefs

The idea that a de se attitude is a relation between an agent and a property, rather than a

proposition, is due to Lewis (1979). Lewis claims that it is in principle possible to know

the truth-value of all the propositions in a given world and still not know the relation

between oneself and these propositions. For any entity ε in a world W, we might know

32 Indeed, this is the position the position taken by Higginbotham (1992) who does not believe that the distinction between de se and de re attitudes has neither philosophical nor truth-conditional relevance; further details will be given below.

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whether ε has the property P without knowing if we are ε. This is the case of John, who

knows that a certain res has the property of having pants on fire, without knowing that that

res is himself. It is also the case of Lucie, who knows that a certain res sounds too

aggressive without knowing that she is the res in question.

Propositions, according to Lewis, do not have the structure needed to represent

essential indexicality: a proposition P(ε) does not entail that ε is aware of being P. In fact,

for P(ε) to be true, ε must have the property P; but the fact that ε is or is not aware that he

is ε does not change the truth-value of the proposition P(ε). For instance, the truth of the

proposition ‘Lucie sounds too aggressive’ does not necessarily entail the truth of the

proposition ‘I am too aggressive’ uttered by Lucie.

Lewis proposes that the mechanism underlying de se beliefs is that of ‘self-

ascription’ of a property. A property is an open formula, an unsaturated expression which

cannot receive a truth-value unless it is saturated by an argument. A property must contain

an open position, i.e. a variable. If ε believes de se that ψ, then ε is attributing to

her/himself the property of being in a world W where ψ is true. Take, for instance, the de

se reading of (1), in which Lucie is aware of the fact that the person sounding too

aggressive is herself: according to Lewis, Lucie attributes to herself the property of

sounding too rude.

2.2.3 Chierchia (1989): properties versus propositions

Lewis’s proposal forces us to interpret that-clauses as properties, a move that, somehow,

runs against our pre-theoretic intuitions. Chierchia’s proposal (1989:6) is to take an

intermediate position: that-clauses normally denote propositions, but in certain cases, i.e.

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when de se reports are involved, they may denote properties. In formalized terms, the two

readings of (1), de se and de re, correspond to the logical forms in (2):

(2) a. Lucie λx ( believe (x, x sounds too aggressive))

b. believe (Lucie, λx (x sounds too aggressive))

(2a) represents the de re reading of (1). Here the predicate believe is a relation between an

agent and a proposition, which turns out to be about Lucie. On the other hand, (2b)

represents the de se reading, where believe is a self-ascriptive relation, in the sense of

Lewis (1979), between Lucie and a property, i.e. the property of being too aggressive.

Note that a relation towards self entails a relation towards a certain res, and not

vice versa. In fact, the truth of a de se belief entails the truth of a de re belief but not vice

versa. A self-ascriptive relation is then defined as follows (Chierchia 1989:7):

(3) A relation of x to a property P is self-ascriptive iff it entails a de re relation to the

proposition P(x) without being entailed by it.

According to Chierchia, although this definition will be assumed in what follows, it

should be regarded as provisional.33

33 Chierchia (1989:7-9) suggests different strategies to implement a definition of self-ascriptive relation such that it yields as a consequence that the truth of a de se belief entails the truth of a de re belief. One way (not far from Cresswell (1985)’s speaker-centered worlds discourse semantics) is to adopt (i) and (ii): (i) x stands in a self-ascriptive relation with the property P iff x believes de re that P and furthermore K(x, x), where K is the cognitive access we have to ourselves. (ii) K(x, x) =df x is disposed to describe the relevant belief by referring to x by means of the first person pronoun.

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2.2.4 The grammar of de se

Chierchia assumes that semantic entities must result from a non-trivial relation with

syntactic structures. That is, the logical forms (2a) and (2b) must be mapped from

different syntactic representations. It is very important to note that the possibility of a de

se reading is crucially linked to the presence of a pronominal element. Since pronominals

are translated into variables, a sentence containing a pronominal expression can act as an

open/unsaturated formula or, in other words, a property. As we know, variables can get

their values from the context or being bound by an operator. Chierchia’s proposal is that

pronouns can also be bound by a property-abstractor. Technically, the two logical forms

(2a) and (2b), here repeated as (4b) and (5b), are mapped from two different syntactic

structures, respectively (4a) and (5a):

(4) a. Lucie believes [CP that [IP she sounds too aggressive]

b. Lucie λx ( believe (x, x sounds too aggressive))

(5) a. Lucie believes [CP O that [IP she sounds too aggressive]

b. believe (Lucie, λx (x sounds too aggressive))

A possible objection to this definition is that cognitive access to self is taken as a primitive, as in (ii), which could lead to think that creatures with limited symbolic capacity are incapable of de se beliefs. Another way is to consider de re beliefs relative to a certain perspective, as argued by Quine and Kaplan, and de se beliefs as ‘absolute.’ This line would lead to a definition like (iii): (iii) x stands in a self-ascriptive relation R with the property Q iff R(x, Q(x)) (iii) presupposes that the only thing we can access from an absolute point of you is ourselves. However, crucial for Chierchia’s proposal is that attitudes de se are construed from relation between agents and properties. Then, definition (3) would suffice.

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O, in (5a), is an operator adjoined to CP that binds the pronoun and is in turn controlled by

Lucie. In the case of (4a) the pronoun is directly bound by the c-commanding NP Lucie,

while in the case of (5a) it is bound indirectly via the operator. The operator O is

understood as a λ-abstractor hence (5a) is translated as (5b), which is the desired result.

2.2.5 Infinitives and gerunds: PRO as a λ-abstractor and self-ascription

revised

Chierchia (1984) argues that infinitives and gerunds denote properties. The correctness of

this statement is proved by the following inferences:

(6) a. Pavarotti tried/practiced/began everything that Domingo

tried/practiced/began

b. Domingo tried/practiced/began singing Rigoletto

c. Pavarotti tried/practiced/began singing Rigoletto

(7) a. The cat wanted to eat the cheese

b. The mouse got what the cat wanted

c. The mouse got to eat the cheese (Fodor 1977:142ff)

The validity of the arguments in (6) and (7) follows straightforwardly if we assume that

gerunds and infinitives denote properties. If we assume, alternatively, that they denote

genuine propositions, the inferences in (6) and (7) become difficult. Suppose in fact that

the arguments of tried in (6b) are Domingo and the proposition P = sing(Domingo,

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Rigoletto). Premise (6a) states that Pavarotti is going to try everything that Domingo tried.

Since what Domingo tried was the proposition P, Pavarotti is going to try the proposition

P as well. The unwanted result is that what Pavarotti tries is P = sing(Domingo, Rigoletto).

(7) represents a similar problem: if want takes a proposition as its complement, the result

of premises (7a) and (7b) would be that what the mouse got was the proposition ‘the cat

eats the cheese.’

If infinitives and gerunds denote properties, as it seems correct, we expect them to

be interpreted unambiguously de se. Chierchia’s proposal is that PRO headed sentences

must be regarded as unsaturated structures and PRO must be interpreted as a λ-abstractor.

This would explain (i) the fact that infinitives and gerunds denote properties and (ii) the

fact that gerunds and infinitives are unambiguously interpreted de se. According to this

proposal, a sentence like (7a) is mapped from the logical form (8b), which in turn is

mapped from the syntactic structure (8a):

(8) a. the cati wants [PROi to eat the cheese]34

b. the cat wants (λx (x eats the cheese))

Sentences like (7a) are unambiguously interpreted de se. The cat wants PRO to eat the

cheese means that the cat wants to bring about a situation where he (and only he) eats the

cheese. John wants PRO to be fired means that John wants to bring about a situation

where he (and only he) is fired. What happens in all these sentences is that a property is

34 Here co-indexing means control. Alternatively, Chierchia proposes that the interpretation of PRO as a λ-abstractor is mediated by an operator at LF, as in (i). (i) the cati wants Oi [PROi to eat the cheese]

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attributed to an agent. However, it is clear that the relation between the agent and the

property is not of self-ascription, since it is not the subject-agent who does the self-

ascription. For instance, in John persuaded Mary PRO to be fired, it is not Mary who

attribute to herself the property of being fired. Chierchia proposes to keep the label of

‘self-ascription,’ generalizing the definition to every relevant relation:

(9) An n-place relation R is self-ascriptive iff it (asymmetrically) licenses the

following entailment:

R(…x…Q…) → R(…x…Q(x)…)

Just to see an example, the definition in (9) claims that (10a) asymmetrically entails (10b),

i.e. if (10a) is true then (10b) is also true but not vice versa:

(10) a. John wants to be fired

b. John wants to bring about a situation where he is fired

(11) a. John persuaded Mary to be fired

b. John persuaded Mary to bring about a situation where she is fired

Self-ascription is then the semantic translation of syntactic control.

As noted by Chierchia, it is a curious circumstance that English verbs of attitudes,

as believe, do not subcategorize for infinitives. Since these verbs admit properties as one

of their relata we should expect them to allow as arguments those syntactic structures that

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denote unambiguously properties. However, this is what actually happens in languages as

Italian, where sentences (12) and (13) are unambiguously interpreted de se.

(12) Gianni crede di essere intelligente

‘John believes to be intelligent’

(13) Gianni sa di essere intelligente

‘John knows to be intelligent’

2.2.6 Anaphora and attitudes de se

Attitudes de se are thus always associated with properties rather than propositions.

Henceforth, attitudes de se are also always associated with the presence of a pronoun in

the embedded clause. A sentence like (14), in fact, is not ambiguous between a de se and a

de re reading.

(14) Pavarotti believes that Domingo is a genius

If attitudes de se are associated with properties, rather than propositions, and properties are

unsaturated expressions then the only way to obtain a property is through a bound

variable. As we know variables are the semantic translation of pronouns.

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The theory of de se attitudes proposed has an interesting connection with the

interpretation of long distance reflexives since they seem to be always associated with a de

se reading. Consider the following examples from Italian35:

(15) a. Pavarotti crede che i suoi pantaloni siano in fiamme. Ma non si è accorto

che i pantaloni sono i propri.

‘Pavarotti believes that his pants are on fire. But he hasn’t realized that the

pants are his own.’

b. # Pavarotti crede che i propri pantaloni siano in fiamme. Ma non si è

accorto che i pantaloni sono i propri.

‘Pavarotti believes that self pants are on fire. But he hasn’t realized that the

pants are his own.’

c. # Pavarotti crede di avere i pantaloni in fiamme. Ma non si è accorto che i

pantaloni sono i propri.

‘Pavarotti believes [PRO to have pants on fire. But he hasn’t realized that

the pants are his own.’

The Italian proprio is a long-distance reflexive, whose interpretation is self-oriented. The

contradictoriness of (15b) confirms that proprio can be associated only with a de se

reading. Moreover, the contradictoriness of (15b) parallels the contradictoriness of (15c).

Thus proprio can be said to patterns like PRO and, perhaps, it can be viewed as the

35 Examples (15a) and (15b) were personally communicated to Chierchia by Bonomi (Chierchia 1989:24).

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phonologically counterpart of PRO. Chierchia proposes that (16a) has that logical form

represented in (16b), which is mapped from the syntactic-structure (16c).

(16) a. Pavarotti crede che i propri pantaloni siano in fiamme

b. crede (Pavarotti, λx (i pantaloni di x sono in fiamme))

c. Pavarottii crede [CP Oi che [IP i proprii pantaloni siano in fiamme]]

(16b) is a self-ascriptive relation between Pavarotti and the property of having pants on

fire; as a consequence the belief is de se.

Concluding, one of Chierchia’s claims (Chierchia 1989:24) is that self-oriented

long-distance reflexives are a case of pronominal elements associated with a de se

interpretation.

2.3 Reinhart (1990)

2.3.1 Empirical objections to Chierchia (1989)

2.3.1.1 Attitudes de se and variable-binding

Let me briefly summarize Chierchia’s proposal about the mechanism underlying attitudes

de se. Following Lewis, Chierchia takes attitudes de se as relations between agents and

properties, rather than between agents and propositions. As demonstrated by Lewis

(1979), we can in principle know all the true propositions in a given world without

knowing whether we are the agent of those propositions. Then, what happens with de se

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readings, and only in such cases, is that the agent attributes to himself/herself a certain

property. The sentence in (1a) can thus be interpreted by means of two distinct LFs.

(1) a. Lucie believes that she sounds too aggressive

b. λx (believe (x, x sounds too aggressive)) (Lucie)

c. believe (Lucie, λx (x sounds too aggressive))

The LF (1b) represents the de re reading, where the predicate believe is a relation between

an agent, namely Lucie, and a proposition, which turns out to be about Lucie. The LF (1c)

represents the de se reading, where believe is a self-ascriptive relation between an agent

and a property: in this case Lucie attributes to herself the property of sounding too

aggressive. The relation of self-ascription, which is taken as the linguistic primitive

underlying attitudes de se, is defined as follows:

(2) An n-place relation R is self-ascriptive iff it (asymmetrically) licenses the

following entailment:

R(…x…Q…) → R(…x…Q(x)…)

The conditional guarantees that the de se reading entails the de re reading.

It follows straightforwardly from the theory that attitudes de se are always

associated with the mechanism of variable binding. First, recall that properties are

unsaturated expressions which, once they are assigned an argument, turn into proposition.

It is then clear that properties require an open position; an open position is a variable,

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which is the semantic translation of a pronominal expression bound by an operator,

technically implemented as a λ-abstractor. This is what we see in (1c), where the pronoun

she is translated into a variable bound by a λ-abstractor.

This analysis has interesting consequences in the case of coordinate structures with

VP deletion. Consider example (3):

(3) Lucie believes that she sounds too aggressive and Lili believes it too

(4) a. Lili believes Lucie sounds too aggressive

b. it = Lucie sounds too aggressive

(5) a. λx (believe (x, x sounds too aggressive)) (Lucie)

b. believe (Lucie, λx (x sounds too aggressive))

c. believe (Lucie, λx (x sounds too aggressive)) & believe (Lili, λy (y sounds

too aggressive))

The question is what Lili believes, a question that can be reduced to the interpretation of

the pronoun it in Lili believes it too. As we know by now, (3) is ambiguous between a

strict and a sloppy reading. Under the strict reading, Lili believes that Lucie sounds too

aggressive. In this case it denotes a proposition, as shown in (4b). Under the sloppy

reading, conversely what Lili believes is that she, i.e. Lili, sounds too aggressive. How is

this interpretation obtained? Suppose the first clause of (3) is analyzed as (5a); the

embedded clause ‘x sounds too aggressive’ cannot serve as a denotation for it since it is

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just an open proposition whose variable would not be bound by any operator. The only

available alternative is to take (5b) as the LF of the first clause of (3). Here we have a

property ‘λx (x sounds too aggressive)’ that can be taken as the denotation of it. The result

is (5c). Comparing (1c), (5b) and (5c), the conclusion is that the sloppy reading of (3) is

possible only if the first clause of (3) is interpreted de se. As a consequence also the

second clause of (3) must be interpreted de se.

If this line of reasoning is correct we expect that sloppy readings of sentences like

(3) may only be understood de se. In other words, sentence (3) can mean that Lucie

believes that she, Lucie, sounds too aggressive and Lili believes that she, Lili, is too

aggressive but such interpretation is possible only if Lucie’s belief is de se and Lili’s

belief is de se as well. Reinhart (1990) correctly points out that this is mistaken. Suppose

for instance that both Lucie’s and Lili’s voices are recorded. Then suppose that Lucie,

listening to her own voice, believes that it is too aggressive although she does not

recognize that it is her own voice. Suppose also that Lili listens to her own voice and, still

not recognizing her own voice, believes that it is too aggressive. This state of affairs can

be reported by sentence (3) and both Lucie’s and Lili’s beliefs would be de re. In other

words, sentence (3), in its sloppy reading, is ambiguous between a de re and a de se

interpretation in the same way as (1), although Chierchia’s theory predicts only the de se

interpretation. Reinhart (1990) concludes that the anaphoric process illustrated in these

contexts is independent of the de se issue.

The conclusion that the mechanism underlying de se readings must be distinct

from that of variable binding is supported by other facts. Consider the following example:

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(6) Frank strongly believes that he will be remembered as a war hero

Sentence (6), as the other examples we have faced so far, is ambiguous between a de re

and a de se reading. To appreciate the ambiguity, imagine a context a la Castañeda (1966):

Frank has been a famous war hero but now is a very old man who suffers from amnesia.

In fact, he does not remember anything of his time in the army. One day Frank reads a

book whose subject is Frank himself and his military enterprises, but he does not

recognize the subject of the book as himself. Frank, however, believes that the man who

he has read about will be remembered as war hero and this situation can be reported by the

sentence in (6); Frank’s belief would be de re. The de se reading can be obtained just if

Frank has a strong feeling that he will be remember as a war hero and he is aware of the

fact that the belief is about himself. Recall again that, given Chierchia’s theory, the

presence of a pronominal element in the embedded clause is crucial for expressing a de se

belief. However, if we just turn (6) into a passive sentence, as in (7), a pronominal element

in the embedded clause would be lacking:

(7) That Frank will be remembered as a war hero is strongly believed by him

Reinhart’s example, reported in (8), presents a two-folded problem.

(8) That the president will be remembered as a war hero is strongly believed by him

Things here get more complicated. (8) can of course be ambiguous in the way (6) and (7)

are, but there is more. Consider the context proposed by Reinhart (1990:6): suppose Frank

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was appointed as president of a veterans’ association as a result of his military enterprises.

He now suffers from temporary amnesia and he remembers only his time in the army but

he is not aware of being president of anything. He strongly believes, given his vivid

memories of the war, that he will be remembered as a war hero. This situation could be

reported with a sentence like (8) and the belief would be de se, since Frank is aware of the

fact that the belief is about himself. However, he is not aware that he is the president. In

other words, the president knows that he is entertaining a certain belief about himself

whether or not he is disposed to refer to himself as the president. The fact that (8) can be

true either in a context in which Frank would refer to himself as ‘the president’ and in a

context in which he would not, simply correspond to the ambiguity de se/de re.36

However, the mechanism of variable binding cannot be responsible of such ambiguity.

The conclusion drawn by Reinhart is that there is no sufficient evidence to assume that de

se readings are allowed only for pronominal elements and the procedure translating belief

complements into properties cannot depend on the presence of a pronominal element.

Henceforth, if the presence of a pronominal element is not linked to the availability of a de

se interpretation, also the mechanism of variable binding turn out to be distinct from the

mechanism underlying de se interpretations.37

36 Note that the context presented guarantees that we are not talking about a de dicto belief. 37 In Chierchia’s theory the fact that the mechanism underlying attitudes de se is that of variable binding explains also why constructions with infinitives and gerunds are always interpreted de se. In fact, PRO is always translated as a variable bound by a λ-operator. The issue is not discussed in Reinhart’s paper but the behavior of such constructions and their property status, represent a central topic in Higginbotham’s (1992) discussion of Chierchia’s article. I will present Higginbotham’s paper in the next section.

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2.3.1.2 Attitudes de se and long-distance anaphors

Another important claim made by Chierchia (1989), and criticized by Reinhart, is that

logophoric anaphors are always associated with a de se interpretation. Chierchia’s basic

idea, which is drawn from Sells (1987), is that self-oriented long-distance reflexives are

mediated by a certain discourse role; this role is associated with the argument of a relation

whose mental state or attitude is described. In Chierchia’s terms, it means that self-

oriented long-distance reflexives can be only associated with a de se interpretation.

However, there are examples, taken from written narrative, that contradict Chierchia’s

claim. Consider the following examples:

(9) He [Sapp] sat down at the desk and opened the drawers. In the top right-hand one

there was an envelope addressed to himself.

(Zribi-Hertz 1989, quoted from Lodge)

(10) Suddenly he said aloud: ‘Possessiveness is the devil.’ Maggie looked at him. Did

he mean herself and the baby?’ (Zribi-Hertz 1989, quoted from Y. Woolf)

(11) That no one can cook apart form himself is one of Alfred’s recent beliefs

In examples (9) and (10) there is neither a predicate of belief nor a believer argument. The

anaphors refer to a narrative character rather than a believer: in (9) himself refers to Sapp,

which is not entertaining any belief about himself, and, similarly, in (10) herself refers to

Maggie. In example (11) there is a belief that Alfred is entertaining about himself but this

belief is not a complement of a belief predicate.

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Obviously, the theory proposed by Chierchia cannot deal with such examples. In

particular, its compositional procedure is inapplicable in these cases. It is possible to

translate the clauses embedding the anaphors as properties, but the result would be

uninterpretable. In fact, according to the theory, the property must be a co-argument of the

subject of a belief predicate. For instance, the second sentence of (9) can be translated as a

property, as in (9′), but (9′) alone would be uninterpretable.

(9′) λx (in the top right shelf there was an envelope addressed to x)

Reinhart concludes that to account for these cases a substantial enrichment of the

mechanism would be needed.

2.3.2 Reinhart’s alternative proposal

2.3.2.1 Self-representational relation

The analysis developed by Reinhart (1990) points out several empirical problems for

Chierchia’s theory of attitudes de se. The analysis demonstrates that a property-account of

de se readings lacks independent motivations. Reinhart proposes a theory of attitudes de se

alternative to Chierchia’s theory, based on a unified propositional account of embedded

clauses, an account that would enable us to maintain a unified analysis of tensed clauses.

She then pursues the analysis initiated by Kaplan (1971).

Let us start with attitudes de re. According to Kaplan, a belief sentence reports a

belief of a certain person, that we will call the center (C) of the belief. The belief C is

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entertaining is about a certain entity (call it ε), independently of the name C would use to

refer to ε. Then Kaplan proposes that a belief report is true de re iff there is a name or

expression by which C refers to ε and C believes the proposition expressed in the sentence

using this name. The idea is captured through a 3-place relation of representation R,

defined as follows:

(12) R (k, ε, C) iff

a. k denotes ε;

b. k is a name of ε for C;

c. C (vividly) associates k with ε.

The meaning of (12) is that a name or expression k represents an entity ε for the center C

if and only if clauses (12a-c) hold. To appreciate this idea, consider sentence (1a),

repeated below as (13a), under its de re reading. Recall the context proposed above: Lucie

listen to sample number 18 and has a belief that the person recorded sounds too

aggressive; however, Lucie is not aware of the fact that the voice she is listening to is her

own voice. Hence, Lucie is both the center of the belief and the entity Lucie is having a

belief about, independently of the name Lucie would use to refer to the entity Lucie. Then

the sentence is true de re if there is a name or expression k by which C (= Lucie) refers to

ε (= Lucie) and C believes that k sounds too aggressive. For instance, Lucie could refer to

the entity Lucie with the expression ‘sample 18.’ Hence, (13a) would be true de re if

Lucie believes that ‘sample 18’ sounds too aggressive. It must be noted that in examples

such (13a) two arguments of the representational relation R happen to be identical,

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namely, the center (Lucie) and the entity (Lucie). However, nothing changes in the

interpretation of the relation since it holds as long as there is a name by which C refers to

ε, independently of the fact that C and ε are identical. Imagine a context in which every

manager believes de re that she sounds too aggressive. Such a situation could be depicted

by sentence (14a), where (14b) represents the de re interpretation. These examples show

that the identity between C and ε and the interpretation of such identity (by means of

variable-binding or co-reference) is irrelevant for the representational relation.

(13) a. Lucie believes that she sounds too aggressive

b. ∃k (R (k, Lucie, Lucie) & Lucie believes |k sounds too aggressive|)

(14) a. Every manager believes that she sounds too aggressive

b. ∀x (manager (x) (∃k (R (k, x, x) & x believes |k sounds too aggressive|)))

The representational relation R accounts for de re readings only. The identity of two

arguments of R is clearly insufficient for representing de se readings. (13b), for instance,

says that there is a certain name by which Lucie refers to a certain entity. The fact that that

entity turns out to be Lucie herself does not entail that Lucie is aware of such identity. For

representing de se readings, Reinhart introduces a new primitive relation that she calls

self-representational relation. Self-representation (abbreviated as SELF-R) is a 2-place

relation between a center C and a name k that self-represents for a person C. The de se

reading of (13a) is represented in (15).

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(15) ∃k (SELF-R (k, Lucie) & Lucie believes |k sounds too aggressive|)

Sentence (13a) is true de se, iff there is a name self-representing for Lucie such that she

believes the sentence expressed in a sentence using this name. A self-representing name

for Lucie may be ‘I,’ hence, for the sentence to be true de se, Lucie must believe the

proposition expressed by ‘I sound too aggressive.’

Three considerations are necessary. (i): Reinhart’s proposal parallels Chierchia’s

one, in that it relies on the assumption of a primitive notion. Chierchia, following the path

of Lewis, assumes the self-ascriptive relation, by means of which an agent ascribes to

him/herself a certain property. Reinhart assumes the self-representational relation, by

means of which the center of a certain belief accept to use a certain name to represents

him/herself. (ii): Reinhart’s self-representational relation, as illustrated so far, does not

entail that there must be a referential identity between the denoter and the denoted of the

name k. This entailment is necessary since we must guarantee that the de se reading

entails the de re reading, as Chierchia’s theory did. Hence, following Chierchia’s line,

Reinhart assumes the meaning postulate (16):

(16) ∀x∀k (SELF-R (k, x) → R (k, x, x))

(16) guarantees that a self-representational relation always entails a basic representational

relation, as defined in (12), where the center C and the entity ε are identical. (iii) Also in

the case of SELF-R, the choice of the name k is free as long as k self-represents for C.

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Reinhart’s proposal can easily be applied to examples like (13), repeated here as

(17a):

(17) a. That no one can cook apart from himself is one of Alfred’s recent beliefs

b. ∃k (SELF-R (k, Alfred) & |no one can cook apart from k| is one of Alfred’s

recent beliefs

c. ∃k (R (k, Alfred, Alfred) & |no one can cook apart from k| is one of

Alfred’s recent beliefs

If, for instance, a name self-representing for Alfred is ‘I’, then the proposition expressed

by ‘No one can cook apart from me’ must be one of Alfred’s recent belief, for the

sentence to be true in its de se reading. Moreover, given the meaning postulate (16), the de

se reading entails the de re reading, i.e. (17b) entails (17c).

Although this line seems to be suitable, at least in principle, for cases like (9) and

(10) repeated as (18) and (19), where no belief-predicate is involved, Reinhart fails to

account for the precise interpretation of these cases (unless postulating some abstract

belief-predicate).

(18) He [Sapp] sat down at the desk and opened the drawers. In the top right-hand one

there was an envelope addressed to himself.

(19) Suddenly he said aloud: ‘Possessiveness is the devil.’ Maggie looked at him. Did

he mean herself and the baby?’

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The ambiguity of (8), repeated as (20), can be captured assuming that the definite

description ‘the president’ can be translated as a variable existentially bound.

(20) That the president will be remembered as a war hero is strongly believed by him

The role of logophors, in this theory, is understood as a self-representational

relation to the center, rather than a variable-binding relation. In other words, a logophoric

anaphor has the role of self-representing the center.

2.3.2.2 Argument reduction and θ-reduction

According to Reinhart’s proposal, the primitive notion underlying attitudes de se is the

self-representational relation SELF-R. In her paper (Reinhart 1990:9 note 7), she explores

the possibility to derive the self-representational relation from the representational relation

R by means of a more basic operation. The operation reduces two identical arguments to

one, as illustrated in (21):

(21) R (k, x, x) ⇒ SELF-R (k, x)

This operation is very similar to the lexical operation that turns a transitive verb into a

reflexive one. For instance, the verb wash can be reflexivized both in syntax, as in

example (22), and in the lexicon, as in example (23):

(22) a. William washed himself

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b. wash (θ1, θ2)

(23) a. William washed

b. wash (θ1)

(23) is obtain by means of a lexical operation that reduces two arguments of the verb’s θ-

grid to one.38

Hence, a possibility to explore is that the same operation derives the self-

representational relation from the representational relation. However, according to

Reinhart, it is not yet possible to fully spell out this proposal. The problem is that it is not

clear whether the semantic relation between a de re and a de se reading is equivalent to the

semantic relation between, for instance, (22) and (23). In fact, while it is clear the

difference between a de se and de re reading, it is not clear the semantic difference

between (22) and (23).

2.4 Higginbotham (1992)

2.4.1 Attributive versus propositional account of control

The theory that Chierchia (1989) proposes for attitudes de se has significant consequences

on the area of grammar known as theory of control. In Chierchia’s account, controlled

structures, i.e. structures whose subject is PRO, are interpreted as unsaturated structures,

i.e. properties. The semantic interpretation of controlled structures is obtained by

38 According to Reinhart (2000:5) the operation can apply to a pair of roles one of which is the external role. For an introduction to argument-structure and relevant discussion on the subject see Williams (1981) and Grimshaw (1990).

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translating PRO into a λ-abstractor or, alternatively, by associating it with an operator

which is translated as a λ-abstractor. Apart from technical details, what matters is that the

result of the translation of a controlled structure is a property rather than a proposition.

However, Chierchia correctly observes that controlled structures are understood as having

a subject. For example, sentence (1) means that John wants to bring about a situation

where he, John and not someone else, wants to win.

(1) John expects PRO to win

How is then that the property of being an x such that x wins is attributed to John

and not to someone else? According to Chierchia’s theory, the solution is that the relation

between the agent and the property is that of self-ascription. This meaning postulate

prevents the attribution of the property to someone distinct from the agent. For instance, in

the case of (1), the self-ascriptive relation assures that the property of winning is attributed

to John. Such an account gives us a clear-cut explanation of two phenomena: (i) that

controlled structures are unambiguously interpreted de se and (ii) that PRO, in contexts of

VP-ellipsis, allows sloppy reading only. These two phenomena are illustrated in the

following examples:

(2) a. Frank expects that he will turn out to be a hero

b. Frank expects PRO to turn out to be a hero

(3) a. Frank expects that he will win and Bill does too

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b. Frank expects PRO to win and Bill does too

The first phenomenon is illustrated by example (2): while (2a) is ambiguous between a de

re and a de se reading, (2b) is unambiguously interpreted de se. The second phenomenon

is detected in examples such as (3): while (3a) can allow both a sloppy and a strict

reading, (3b) allows the sloppy reading only. It should be clear that, whatever account of

controlled structures turns out to be correct, it must face and explain these two

phenomena.

In Chierchia’s framework, the fact that controlled structure are always interpreted

de se is a direct consequence of the self-ascriptive relation they entail. The sloppy

interpretation of PRO follows from the property status of control structures.

The attributive account of control structures, an account that takes them as

properties, is not uncontroversial. Chierchia himself finds such an account somewhat

contrary to our pre-theoretical intuitions. Higginbotham (1992) rejects the attributive view

and sustains a propositional account of control, an account that takes controlled structures

as propositions. Higginbotham strongest objection to the attributive account of control

stems from examples such as (4):

(4) John and Mary expect PRO to learn the same language

Suppose the following context: John and Mary are studying in a foreign country; they

speak different languages and they do not communicate to each other; however, they are

so simpatico to each other that they independently think they will end up learning the

same language. Under the attributive account the logical form of the complement of

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expect can be represented as in (5), assuming, correctly, that same is construed with

respect to the embedded subject:

(5) ||λx (x learn the same language)||

The problem is that (5) cannot truly apply to John or Mary since same is construed within

(5) and the predicate expect is plural. To solve the trick we could assume that expect is not

distributive and it applies to John and Mary as one entity, which is implausible, or that

each of John and Mary has a de se expectation expressed by a predicate that does not

apply to either of them. Both solutions are clearly implausible. Henceforth, Higginbotham

claims that the attributive account of control structures is not correct and that a

propositional account is to be preferred.

Naturally, we expect that this alternative will be also able to explain the

phenomena we noticed. In the following sections I will expose Higginbotham’s theory of

control and I will explain, given the theory, why PRO is subject to the interpretative

constrains we have seen above.

2.4.2 Higginbotham’s theory of control

Consider example (1), repeated as (4):

(4) John expects to win

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(4) shows an instance of the phenomenon that Higginbotham dubs as ‘understood

reference’ and defines as follows: ‘a reference to a thing x is said to be understood with

respect to a given position of a given head if there is no expression in that position

referring to x, but one takes it that the position is appropriately related to x, either through

another independent argument or position in the sentence or discourse in question, or as

pragmatically supplied’ (Higginbotham 1992:79)39. In sentence (1), for instance, the

argument of the head win is understood. In fact, although there is no expression in the

argument position we understand such argument as John.

In generative grammar it is assumed that understood elements are present in the

syntactic structure, although they have no phonological content, hence are not visible at

the level of Phonetic Form (PF). The syntactic structure of (4) is roughly represented in

(4′), where PRO represents the understood element:

(4′) John expects [PRO to win]

Semantically, understood elements are arguments. However, since they are not

independently referential, they are anaphorically related to an antecedent (assuming also

that the anaphoric relation is constrained by structural factors). For the moment, and apart

from technical details, I shall represent the anaphoric relation the way Higginbotham does,

that is by means of co-indexing, as in (4′′):

39 Raising and NP movement in passive sentences are not to be considered instances of understood reference; the difference between these cases and understood reference is accounted for in Higginbotham (1989).

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(4′′) Johni expects [PROi to win]

Understood elements, like all anaphoric elements, inherit their value from the value of

their antecedent. Hence, the complement of expect is a proposition, represented in (5), and

that John must be the value of PRO follows from co-indexing.

(5) ||win(x)||

This account of control structures crucially differs from Chierchia’s. In Chierchia

(1989), PRO is interpreted as a λ-abstractor and consequently the control structure is

interpreted as a property, as shown in (6a); the postulated self-ascriptive relation

guarantees that the property is attributed to the agent and not to someone else. In

Higginbotham (1992), PRO is interpreted as an argument, although phonologically silent,

and the control structures as a proposition. The understood element receives its value

through the anaphoric relation. This account is represented in (6b).

(6) a. John expects (λx (x to win))

b. Johni expects ||win(xi)||

We might ask now, how the propositional account explains that control structures

are subjected to certain interpretative constrains: they are unambiguously interpreted de se

and they allow sloppy reading only. However, before doing this, let me introduce

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Higginbotham’s account of attitudes de se since it will be crucial for the following

discussion.

2.4.3 Attitudes de se

The discussion of the theory of control is obviously connected with the discussion of

attitudes de se which, nevertheless, is the central topic of the present chapter. It should be

clear by now that a theory of control must entail an explanation of the fact that control

structures can only be interpreted de se and, conversely, a theory of attitude de se must be

implemented in a way such that it predicts the unambiguous interpretation of control

structures. The two things are henceforth deeply connected to each other.

Higginbotham’s account of attitudes de se begins with the analysis of Castañeda

(1966) and his examples. Consider sentence (7):

(7) The unfortunate man believes that he is a hero

As other examples we have analyzed so far, also (7) can be true in two different situations.

In the first case, the unfortunate man has a belief about himself being aware of the fact

that the res he is having a belief about is himself. This is the de se reading. However,

suppose the unfortunate man suffers from amnesia; he has been a war hero but he has no

memory about that; suppose then that this unfortunate person reads a book about the war

he was in and he finds in the book a detailed account of his own exploits. Then what he

believes is that the man he has read about is a hero, unaware of the fact that that man is

actually himself.

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Both Castañeda and Lewis claim that a belief about oneself pertains to a category

distinct from that of beliefs about a certain res. In fact, Lewis decides to dub this special

category of beliefs as ‘de se’. Higginbotham claims that there is no reason to introduce a

new category since both beliefs are just beliefs de re. The distinction unearthed by

Castañeda and Lewis, according to Higginbotham, can be simply reduced to two different

strategies of interpretation of the pronoun and de se beliefs can be reduced to de re beliefs.

Consider again example (7). Suppose that the pronoun he in the embedded clause can be

interpreted by means of two strategies. According to the first strategy, the pronoun simply

takes the subject as its antecedent. According to the second strategy, the pronoun,

although taking the subject as its antecedent, goes proxy for something more complex in

which the subject himself perhaps figures. Using Higginbotham’s terminology, let us call

this more complex thing a ‘concept of’ the thing to which the pronouns refers. For

instance, in the case of (7) the referent of he could be something like (8):

(8) ||the person whom x is reading about||

Hence, the ambiguity of (7) can be represented by the two logical forms (9a) and (9b),

where co-indexing simply indicates the presence of an anaphoric relation:

(9) a. [The unfortunate man]i believes that ||xi is a hero||

b. [The unfortunate man]i believes that ||the person whom xi is reading about

is a hero||

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We will say that in the case of (9a) the pronoun is interpreted ‘directly’ and what is

attributed to the agent is a ‘direct’ belief while in the case of (9b) the pronoun is

interpreted ‘indirectly’ and what is attributed to the agent is an ‘indirect’ belief. Both

beliefs, however, are about a certain res which, in the indirect case, namely (9b), turn out

to be a concept of that res. Higginbotham’s conclusion is that ‘de se belief amounts to de

re belief, and that no evidence has been produce that justifies the introduction of the new

category’ (Higginbotham 1992:86).

2.4.4 Features of PRO

Higginbotham’s account of attitudes de se does not solve the problems left open in the

preceding section but it casts a different light on them. Consider examples (10) and (11):

(10) The unfortunate man expects that he will turn out to be a hero

(11) The unfortunate man expects PRO to turn out to be a hero

While in sentence (10) he can be interpreted both directly and indirectly, hence both a

direct and an indirect thought can be attributed to the agent, in sentence (11) PRO can only

be interpreted directly, hence only a direct thought can be attributed to the agent.

Therefore, what must be explained is why PRO can only be interpreted directly.

The second question left open is why controlled structures allow sloppy

interpretation only, as shown in (3). According to Higginbotham, both properties of

controlled PRO belong to properties of understood reference in general. In particular

understood elements are featured by two properties: (i) they are purely referential, i.e. they

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can never stand alone and can never have any sense attached to them; (ii) they are local

anaphors, i.e. they must always find a local antecedent.

The first property explains why they are always interpreted directly. Differently

from pronominals, silent elements can never stand-alone and cannot take a reference on

their own; henceforth they must rely completely on the presence of an antecedent from

which they receive a value. The second property, explains why understood elements

allows sloppy interpretation only. In fact, they must find a local antecedent under any

process that involves copying.

2.4.5 Appendix: a theory of control based on economy principles?

Let me summarize the main properties of PRO, and of understood reference in general,

according to Higginbotham’s account; I will refer to those to properties as (PRO1) and

(PRO2):

(PRO1) Referentiality:

An understood element cannot be autonomously referential, rather it must

receive its value from an antecedent.

(PRO2) Locality:

The antecedent of an understood element must be found locally.

It should be clear that the present approach to understood reference would

encounter theoretical and empirical problems similar to those raised against CBT. In fact,

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(PRO1) seems to be strictly connected to something similar to the deficiency hypothesis

of Bouchard (1984), repeated below as (12):

(12) In order for an argument α to be interpreted, it must have a full specification for φ-

features. (Bouchard 1984)

According to (12), since understood elements are referentially defective arguments, they

are forced to take a linguistic antecedent. We could easily assume, according to

Higginbotham’s view, that understood elements are not fully specified for φ-features,

hence they must take an antecedent, i.e. that (PRO1) follows from (12).

Recall that the main reason to give up (12) was represented by the logophoric use

of anaphors. In fact, under such an approach, logophoricity was an exception to explain.

The open question was: why, under certain conditions, logophoric interpretation of

anaphors is allowed? What is very interesting in the present discussion is that, as well as

for anaphors, there are cases of ‘logophoric interpretation of PRO.’ Bach (1977) presents

examples of what he calls ‘pragmatic control:’

(13) Here’s a book [PRO to read to each other]

In example (13) PRO has no antecedent; a possible solution, considered also by

Higginbotham (1992), is to assume an understood benefactive. However, it seems to me

that such a solution would be based on a mere stipulation that would contradict the

minimalist assumptions I decided to stick to.

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This becomes clear if we look at (PRO2). Locality, as in the case of canonical

binding principles, is just a stipulation since it does not follow from the combinatorial

properties of a morpho-syntactic lexicon. In other words, (PRO1) and (PRO2) are just a

descriptive statements, if correct: they explain how understood elements behave but they

do not explain why.

Given these premises, it seems to me that an interesting plan for further research

would be the following: (i) assume (14) instead of (12).

(14) If α has fewer φ-features than β, there are fewer constraints on the interpretation of

α than on the interpretation of β.

It follows from (14) that no intrinsic property of understood reference would block its

‘pragmatic’ interpretation; (ii) describe understood reference in terms of morpho-syntactic

features; (iii) describe the combinatorial properties of understood reference on the basis of

its morpho-syntactic features and the basic combinatorial operation of CHL; (iv) answer

question (15):

(15) Why under certain interpretation is ‘pragmatic’ interpretation of control blocked?

The result would be a theory of control similar to the theory of anaphoric relations I

presented in the previous chapter, a theory that attains explanatory adequacy and satisfies

of minimalist assumptions.

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2.5 Conclusions

I would like to dedicate these concluding remarks to three main points: (i) give a brief

account of the theory of attitudes de se proposed by Chierchia (1989); (ii) give a summary

of the empirical problems raised by Reinhart (1990) and Higginbotham (1992); (iii) add

some further evidence against the attributive account of attitudes de se.

Chierchia’s theory of attitudes is based on Lewis’s idea that propositions lack the

structure necessary for entailing essential indexicality. Henceforth, attitudes de se result

from the agent’s self-attribution of a property, while attitudes de re are predicative

relations between agents and propositions. The primitive notion underlying attitudes de se

is that of self-ascription and a meaning postulate guarantees that attitudes de se entail

attitudes de re. The distinct interpretations, de re and de se, correspond to distinct LFs,

and the distinct LFs result from distinct syntactic structures. In Chierchia’s theory,

controlled structure are interpreted as properties, since PRO is translated into a λ-

abstractor, and this explains why they are unambiguously interpreted de se. Moreover,

according to Chierchia’s attributive account, logophors are always associated with a de se

interpretation.

Reinhart’s objections are the following:

(i) Chierchia’s theory predicts that the sloppy reading of deleted VPs is always

interpreted de se. This can be seen in example (1). The sloppy interpretation of (1a) is

obtained through the LF (1b) but (1b) is the LF of de se readings.

(1) a. Lucie believes that she sounds too aggressive and Lili believes it too

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b. believes (Lucie, λx (x sounds too aggressive)) and believes (Lili, λy (y

sounds too aggressive))

This prediction is incorrect since sentences like (1a) can be interpreted both de re and de

se.

(ii) According to Chierchia’s theory, the mechanism underlying attitudes de se is

that of variable-binding; this is contradicted by sentence (2), where the believer can or

cannot be aware of the fact that he is the president. Hence, the expression ‘the president’ is

ambiguous between a de re and a de se interpretation, although the mechanism of

variable-binding cannot be responsible for this ambiguity.

(2) That the president will be remembered as a war hero is strongly believed by him

(iii) According to Chierchia, logophors are always associated with a de se

interpretation. However, Reinhart collects some examples from written narrative that

contradict this claim. Just to recall one of such examples, consider (3). Chierchia’s theory

wouldn’t be able to account for (3) since, according to the theory, the second sentence of

the example would be translated as a property, as in (3b); however, since there is no agent

to which ascribe the property, (3b) remains an open proposition that cannot receive a

truth-value.

(3) a. He [Sapp] sat down at the desk and opened the drawers. In the top right-

hand one there was an envelope addressed to himself.

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(Zribi-Hertz 1989, quoted from Lodge)

b. (λx (in the top right-hand one there was an envelope addressed to x))

Higginbotham’s objections are the following:

(i) Chierchia’s attributive account of controlled structures runs against problems of

the kind presented by sentence (4):

(4) a. John and Mary expect PRO to learn the same language

b. expect (John and Mary, λx (x learn the same language))

Under the attributive account, (4a) is problematic since ‘expect’ is distributive and ‘same’

is construed with respect to the embedded subject. Hence, (4b) is not well-formed.

(ii) ‘de se belief amounts to de re belief, and […] no evidence has been produce

that justifies the introduction of the new category’ (Higginbotham 1992:86). Henceforth,

according to Higginbotham, the distinction between de re and de se is nothing more than

the result of two strategies of interpretation of pronouns.

An important feature of Chierchia’s theory of attitudes de se is that it requires the

presence of a predicate of attitude, a predicate that takes at least two arguments, one of

which is syntactically realized as an embedded clause. Then, the presence of an embedded

clause is crucial for the theory to work correctly. This can be seen in example (3): in fact,

the second sentence of (3a) does not contain an embedded clause, hence, as shown by

Reinhart, Chierchia’s theory cannot work correctly. In other words, Chierchia’s theory

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predicts that the ambiguity de re/de se can show up only in certain syntactic contexts, i.e.

where a verb takes an embedded clause as one of its complements.

I believe that this prediction is incorrect since the ambiguity de se/de re can be

seen also in much simpler syntactic context. I will present two examples, one mine and

one from Delfitto (p.c.). The first example is the following:

(5) Narcissus loves himself

Sentence (5) can be true in two different sets of circumstances. In the first case, Narcissus

loves himself, and he is perfectly aware of the fact that the res he loves is himself; in fact

he would say ‘I love myself.’ In the second case, Narcissus is in love with the man he sees

in the water, unaware of the fact that that man is his own reflection. This situation can also

be reported using sentence (1); however, Narcissus would not say ‘I love myself;’ he

would rather say ‘I love the man below the water.’ I believe this ambiguity is just the

ambiguity de re/de se. However, the structure of (1) (roughly [NP [VP [NP ]]]), which is

a simple proposition, does not allow us to use Chierchia’s theory.

The second example is much more interesting:

(6) Oedipus loves his mother

The sentence is ambiguous between a de dicto, a de re and a de se interpretation. Let us

consider the three cases. (i) Oedipus does not know his mother since she abandoned him

right after he was born; however, he forgives his mother and says: ‘I love my mother,

whoever she is.’ This situation can be reported by sentence (6). (ii) Oedipus loves Jocasta,

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unbeknownst of the fact that Jocasta is his mother. Also this situation can be reported by

sentence (6). (iii) Oedipus discovers that Jocasta is his mother and, hence, he discovers

that the person he loves is actually his mother. Again, this situation can be reported by

sentence (6).

The conclusion I draw from these examples and the examples from Reinhart and

Higginbotham is that Chierchia’s theory is wrong. I believe that if the problem of attitudes

de se has a linguistic relevance, the line of research to pursue is that of a deeper analysis of

anaphoric relations. In particular, it seems to me that what shouldd be investigated in

much more details is the amount of information that an anaphoric relation can bear and the

role this information has in assigning a meaning to an anaphoric expression.

121

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