UAA Master in Public Administration Capstone  

Friday Aug 29, 2016 

 

1. Flint’s water crisis began in 2014, when for financial reasons the city stopped 

buying treated water from the City of Detroit and started taking unfiltered 

water from the Flint River. In their Final March 2016 report of the crisis, the 

Flint Water Advisory Task Force (FWATF) stated, “We cannot begin to explain 

and learn from these events – our charge – without also highlighting that the 

framework for this decision‐making was Michigan’s Emergency Manager Law.”   

 

Analyze the decision‐making process which led to the Flint Water Crisis from a 

public administration perspectives.  

a. What went wrong?  

b. Could a different decision‐making process have averted the crisis? 

Explain your answer.   

 

2. You have been hired as a Public Administration consultant by the National 

Drinking Water Advisory Council to identify key, good governance policies that 

would promote federal, state and local checks and balances and public 

accountably in the future.    

Consider the Flint water case checks and balances and public accountably 

failures. Identify two (2) important policies that you believe would have 

strengthened democratic checks and balances and public accountability 

between federal, state and/or local governments in the Flint water crisis.  

Explain the following for each of your two (2) recommendations:  

a. What is the policy and what level of government or governments would 

be responsible for implementation?   

b. How and why will this policy strengthen the checks and balances and 

public accountably? 

c. Who are the stakeholders effected by the policy and which stakeholder 

group might be for it or which group might be against it? 

 

 

3. The Sheriff of Flint says that the people of Flint, "have lost faith in the capacity 

of government to work with them." This is a very broad statement and can be 

understood in multiple ways. It can be misinterpreted, further eroding the 

fragile relationships in the wake of the crisis. It is in the interests of the local 

and state agencies to examine if this statement is, in fact, true.  

You are asked to operationalize this statement into meaningful research 

questions that can inform public policy and practices. Explain how the words 

‘faith’, ‘capacity’, ‘government’, ‘work’, and ‘them’ might be interpreted in this 

context. Identify at least three research questions connecting these concepts, 

and describe how pursuing them might inform future public policy and 

practice. Please note that a concept diagram will greatly assist your effort.  

 

   

 

Retrieved Aug. 3, 2016 http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/01/21/us/flint-lead-water-

timeline.html

The New York Times

Events That Led to Flint’s Water Crisis

By Jeremy C.F. Lin, Jean Rutter and Haeyoun Park

Months after warning signs emerged about problems with the water in Flint, Mich., city, state

and federal officials are responding to the public health emergency. High levels of lead had

leached from pipes into the water supply.

April 25, 2014

The city switches its water supply from Detroit’s system to the Flint River. The switch was made

as a cost-saving measure for the struggling, majority-black city. Soon after, residents begin to

complain about the water’s color, taste and odor, and to report rashes and concerns about

bacteria.

“Flint water is safe to drink.”

News release from Flint city government

The Flint River, above, became Flint’s source of water in April 2014. Brittany Greeson for The

New York Times

August and September 2014

City officials issue boil-water advisories after coliform bacteria are detected in tap water.

October 2014

The Michigan Department of Environmental Quality blames cold weather, aging pipes and a

population decline.

“The city has taken operational steps to limit the potential for a boil-water advisory to re-occur.”

Stephen Busch, a district supervisor for the state’s Department of Environmental Quality

October 2014

A General Motors plant in Flint stops using municipal water, saying it corrodes car parts.

January 2015

Detroit’s water system offers to reconnect to Flint, waiving a $4 million connection fee. Three

weeks later, Flint’s state-appointed emergency manager, Jerry Ambrose, declines the offer.

February 2015

In a memo for the governor, officials play down problems and say that the water is not an

imminent “threat to public health.”

“It’s clear the nature of the threat was communicated poorly. It’s also clear that folks in Flint are

concerned about other aspects of their water — taste, smell and color being among the top

complaints.”

Memo for the governor

Feb. 18, 2015

104 parts per billion of lead are detected in drinking water at the home of Lee Anne Walters.

Ms. Walters notifies the Environmental Protection Agency. Even small amounts of lead can

cause lasting health and developmental problems in children. The E.P.A. does not require action

until levels reach 15 parts per billion, but public health scientists say there is no safe level for

lead in water.

Feb. 26, 2015

A water expert from the E.P.A. and the Department of Environmental Quality discuss high levels

of lead found in a resident’s water sample.

Feb. 27, 2015

Miguel Del Toral, an E.P.A. expert, says that the state was testing the water in a way that could

profoundly understate the lead levels.

“Given the very high lead levels found at one home and the preflushing happening in Flint, I’m

worried that the whole town may have much higher lead levels than the compliance results

indicated.”

Memo from Miguel Del Toral to a state aide

March 3, 2015

Second testing detects 397 parts per billion of lead in drinking water at Ms. Walters’s home.

March 12, 2015

Veolia, a consultant group hired by Flint, reports that the city’s water meets state and federal

standards; it does not report specifically on lead levels.

May 6, 2015

Tests reveal high lead levels in two more homes in Flint.

July 2, 2015

An E.P.A. administrator tells Flint’s mayor that “it would be premature to draw any

conclusions” based on a leaked internal E.P.A. memo regarding lead.

July 22, 2015

Dennis Muchmore, Gov. Rick Snyder’s chief of staff, expresses concern about the lead issue in an

email, and asks about Flint test results, blood testing and the state’s response.

A 6-year-old girl in Flint gets her blood tested for lead in January 2016. Jake May/The Flint

Journal-MLive.com, via Associated Press

Aug. 17, 2015

Based on results showing lead levels at 11 parts per billion from January to June 2015, the

Department of Environmental Quality tells Flint to optimize corrosion control.

Sept. 2, 2015

Marc Edwards, an expert on municipal water quality and professor at Virginia Tech, reports that

corrosiveness of water is causing lead to leach into the supply. Soon after, the Department of

Environmental Quality disputes those conclusions.

Sept. 24-25, 2015

A group of doctors led by Dr. Mona Hanna-Attisha of Hurley Medical Center in Flint urges the

city to stop using the Flint River for water after finding high levels of lead in the blood of

children. State regulators insist the water is safe.

“D.E.Q. and D.C.H. feel that some in Flint are taking the very sensitive issue of children’s

exposure to lead and trying to turn it into a political football claiming the departments are

underestimating the impacts on the populations and particularly trying to shift responsibility to

the state.”

Mr. Muchmore in an email, referring to the departments of environmental quality and

community health

Sept. 28, 2015

The governor is briefed on lead problems in a phone call with the state environment department

and federal officials.

Oct. 1, 2015

Flint city officials urges residents to stop drinking water after government epidemiologists

validate Dr. Hanna-Attisha’s finding of high lead levels. Mr. Snyder orders the distribution of

filters, the testing of water in schools, and the expansion of water and blood testing.

Oct. 16, 2015

Flint reconnects to Detroit’s water. Residents are advised not to use unfiltered tap water for

drinking, cooking or bathing.

A filter that showed signs of corrosion and lead and copper particles. Laura McDermott for The

New York Times

Oct. 19, 2015

The Department of Environmental Quality director, Dan Wyant, reports that his staff used

inappropriate federal protocol for corrosion control.

Oct. 21, 2015

Mr. Snyder announces that an independent advisory task force will review water use and testing

in Flint.

Dec. 9, 2015

Flint adds additional corrosion controls.

Dec. 14, 2015

Flint declares an emergency.

Dec. 29, 2015

The task force says the Department of Environmental Quality must be held accountable. Mr.

Wyant, the director of the state environment agency, resigns.

“We believe the primary responsibility for what happened in Flint rests with the Michigan

Department of Environmental Quality.”

Flint Water Advisory Task Force

Jan. 5, 2016

Mr. Snyder declares a state of emergency for Genesee County, which includes Flint.

Jan. 16, 2016

President Obama declares a state of emergency in the city and surrounding county, allowing the

Federal Emergency Management Agency to provide up to $5 million in aid.

National Guard troops arrived on Jan. 12 to help distribute bottled water. Brittany Greeson for

The New York Times

Jan. 20, 2016

President Obama says he “would be beside myself” if he were a parent in the city. The Michigan

House approves $28 million requested by the governor to assist the city.

Sources: Office of Gov. Rick Snyder of Michigan, the Michigan auditor general’s office and the

United States Environmental Protection Agency

By Jeremy C.F. Lin, Jean Rutter and Haeyoun Park

© 2016 The New York Times Company

http://www.newyorker.com/ Retrieved Aug. 3 2016

News Desk

The Crisis in Flint Goes Deeper Than the

Water

By Evan Osnos, January 20, 2016

After numerous efforts, residents of Flint, Michigan, have finally gotten state and federal

agencies to combat lead contamination in the city’s water source. Why did it take so long?

Photograph by Bill Pugliano / Getty

Last July, after more than a year of public complaints about the drinking water in Flint,

Michigan—water so pungent and foamy that a local pastor had stopped using it for baptisms—

reporters were calling the state’s Department of Environmental Quality. The response from the

department was of limited urgency. In an internal e-mail to colleagues, a spokeswoman, Karen

Tommasulo, wrote, “Apparently it’s going to be a thing now.”

The D.E.Q. tried to stop the water from becoming a thing, partly by downplaying concerns. A

memo from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency warned that the city’s use of a new water

source was exposing the public to unsafe levels of lead, but Brad Wurfel, the department’s lead

spokesperson, told a reporter, “Let me start here—anyone who is concerned about lead in the

drinking water in Flint can relax.” Even after a group of Virginia Tech researchers found unsafe

levels of lead, Wurfel disputed the importance of the findings because, he wrote, the group

“specializes in looking for high lead problems. They pull that rabbit out of that hat everywhere

they go.” He added that “dire public health advice based on some quick testing could be seen as

fanning political flames irresponsibly. Residents of Flint concerned about the health of their

community don’t need more of that.”

As it turns out, the residents of Flint needed much more of that. The state’s inept response is now

a full-blown national scandal. President Obama has declared an emergency in Flint, making

available five million dollars in federal assistance. Much of the blame falls on Governor Rick

Snyder, who acknowledged, on Tuesday, that he had run out of excuses. “I am sorry; we will fix

this,” he said, in his State of the State address. He thanked the whistle-blowers, and promised to

seek millions more in state funds for bottled water, health care, and infrastructure fixes. Facing

calls for his resignation, he told the people of Flint and elsewhere, “You deserve accountability.

You deserve to know that the buck stops here, with me. Most of all, you deserve to know the

truth.”

In his speech, Snyder promised to release his e-mails from 2014 and 2015, which may fill in

some details of how he lost his way. Snyder, an accountant who ran on the slogan “One Tough

Nerd,” was a first-time candidate when he won in 2010, in a Republican wave that also elected

Governor Scott Walker in Wisconsin. He preached pragmatism and austerity, calling himself

America’s “token-CPA governor,” and, as recently as this spring, he talked of a possible

Presidential run. His image as a technocrat is, for the moment, finished. He acknowledged this

week that Flint is tantamount to his Hurricane Katrina.

But, as in New Orleans, unravelling what went wrong in Flint will probably require more than

the release of e-mails and a prime-time apologia. The headwaters of Flint’s crisis are not located

in the realm of technical errors; rather, there are harder questions about governance and

accountability in some of America’s most vulnerable places. Who controls policy and why? How

does the public check those who govern in its name?

The lessons apply beyond Michigan: Two years ago, in West Virginia, chemicals leaked into a

river about a mile from the largest water treatment plant in the state. It was one of American

history’s most serious incidents of chemical contamination—and, not incidentally, West

Virginia’s fifth industrial accident in eight years. As I described in the magazine in “Chemical

Valley,” that disaster was the confluence of trends in campaign finance, lobbying, and ideology,

which had allowed elected officials to scale back the state’s environmental regulations and

enforcement. (In one five-year span, the state had recorded twenty-five thousand violations of

the Clean Water Act by coal companies, but never issued a fine for them.) West Virginians were

left feeling that one of the nation’s most impoverished states had been robbed. Denise Giardina,

one of the state’s best novelists, told me, “Water—it’s the most elemental thing except for air.”

In Flint, people feel a similar sense of injustice, although the political causes are different. Many

blame Michigan’s Emergency Manager Law, which allows the state to hire managers who

receive unusually broad powers to address communities in financial distress. In April 2014, city

managers approved a switch of Flint’s water source from Detroit to the Flint River until a

pipeline from Lake Huron was completed. Around town, the Flint River was best known as a

graveyard for old refrigerators and grocery carts. Soon local media was reporting on the

complaints, but the city and state assured people that the water was safe. Even after the General

Motors plant in Flint refused to use the water because it was rusting car parts, residents were not

offered alternatives.

It was only after Flint residents organized their own campaign—attracting experts and activists

and national media—that the state acknowledged the scale of the problem. To some critics,

Michigan’s use of emergency managers has been especially harmful to African-Americans. By

one account, approximately half of the state’s African-American population is now governed by

an emergency manager. Flint has had six emergency financial managers, or E.F.M.s, in thirteen

years. Writing in The Root, Louise Seamster and Jessica Welburn described it as a policy

derived from the “premise that democracy in predominantly African-American cities is

unnecessary and that the state knows best.” N.A.A.C.P. leaders in Detroit have filed a federal

lawsuit against the law that governs emergency managers, citing predominantly white

municipalities with serious financial problems that did not receive the same treatment.

It’s not yet clear how long it will take to restore healthy water, and political trust, in Flint. The

state has given out filters that remove lead, but people aren’t quick to believe that they will work.

The sheriff of Flint, who has been going door to door talking to people, said, “They have lost

faith in the capacity of government to work with them. And it’s hard to say, ‘You know, you’re

wrong.’ ”

Reading about Flint this morning, I thought of Denise Giardina, in Charleston, and asked her

how she and her neighbors are doing in the wake of the chemical leak. “We just had our second

anniversary last week,” she said. “Most people are drinking and cooking with the water again.

After a while you just wear down and give in to it. I think most of us try not to think about it. But

it stays in the back of the mind.” She had been watching the news from Flint and felt an unhappy

kinship. “The water crises happen to Charleston and Flint because they are struggling, neglected

cities. They struggle because of things like the water crises. And the crumbling of the auto and

coal and chemical industries, and because no one pays attention.”

America is finally paying attention to Flint, but not in the way the city’s residents might have

wanted. A cartoon making the rounds this week is labelled “Michigan 2016.” It shows two water

fountains: one, marked “White,” has clean water flowing from the spout; the other, marked

“Colored,” offers a geyser of red muck.

Evan Osnos joined The New Yorker as a staff writer in 2008, and covers politics and foreign

affairs.

More

More:

Environmental Protection Agency (E.P.A.)

Most Popular

1.

“Suicide Squad” Reviewed

by Anthony Lane

2.

Why Donald Trump Can’t Stop Talking About the Pallets of Cash

by Benjamin Wallace-Wells

3.

Daily Cartoon: Friday, August 5th

by Kim Warp

4.

An Isolated Tribe Emerges from the Rain Forest

by Jon Lee Anderson

5.

Donald Trump’s Ghostwriter Tells All

by Jane Mayer

Our thirty most popular

More From the New Yorker

Letter from West Virginia

Chemical Valley

By Evan Osnos

News Desk

China Tries a New Tactic to Combat Pollution:

Transparency

By Christopher Beam

Cultural Comment

“Suicide Squad” Reviewed

By Anthony Lane

Benjamin Wallace-Wells

Why Donald Trump Can’t Stop Talking About the Pallets of

Cash

By Benjamin Wallace-Wells

About Us

FAQ

Strongbox

Customer Care

Cartoon Bank

On The Town

RSS

Contact Us

Store

Careers

Reprints/Permissions

Press

Media Kit

Use of this site constitutes acceptance of our User Agreement (effective January 1, 2014) and Privacy Policy

(effective January 1, 2014). Your California Privacy Rights The material on this site may not be reproduced,

distributed, transmitted, cached or otherwise used, except with the prior written permission of Condé Nast. Ad

Choices