Ukraine and EU: Challenges that Loom Ahead

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Foreign Policy and Civil Society Program

February 2012

1744 R Street NWWashington, DC 20009

T 1 202 745 3950

F 1 202 265 1662E [email protected]

Summary: Participants at the

December 19, 2011 Ukraine-EU

Summit were able to deliver

only a formal announcement on

nalization of negotiations that

stated that chief negotiators

had reached a common

understanding on the full text of

the Association Agreement. It

became clear that real reason of

EU reluctance to move forwardwas their concern with the way

Ukraine was developing in the

eld of democracy. Comments

on the Summits results differed

drastically depending on their

origin. This paper explains what

the authors feel should be

really made out of the Summits

results, and lays out Ukraines

path forward. It also examines

Ukrainian polling data to show

increasing support for that

country joining the EU.

Ukraine and EU:

Challenges that Loom Ahead

by Mykola Kapitonenko, Oleh Shamshur, and Valeryi Chalyi

The 15th Ukraine-EU Summit is Over:

Whats Next?Te 15th Ukraine-EU Summit, whichtook place in Kyiv on December 19,was initially expected to consummateat the highest level the long lasting andextremely complicated negotiations onconcluding the Association Agreementbetween Ukraine and EU, thus sealingUkraines European strategic choice.Several days beore the Summit, Presi-dent Victor Yanukovych once againunderscored its utmost importance or

Ukraine, having said that 2012 wouldbecome the year o European integra-tion or this country (Ukraine will hostthe European Football Championshipsjointly with Poland then).

Ukraines negotiations with the EUover the Association Agreement werelaunched more than our years agounder President Victor Yuschenko asa part o his policies o European andEuro-Atlantic integration. Notwith-

standing noticeable changes that havetaken place in Ukrainian domesticand external policies o late, Euro-pean aspirations have been shared byvirtually all segments o Ukrainiansociety. Te majority o Ukrainianshave supported the idea o the countryjoining the European Union, orEurope, to which Ukraine belongsgeographically, historically, and cultur-ally.

While designing his electoral strategy,

then-presidential candidate VictorYanukovych embraced the idea oEuropean integration. Aer becomingUkraines ourth president and in spiteo signing the highly controversialKharkiv Accords, which prolongedthe Russian Black Sea Fleets presencein Sebastopol or another 25 yearsin exchange or a natural gas pricediscount, and in spite o eectivelyhalting Ukraines NAO membershipdrive by pushing or the law estab-

lishing Ukraines non-block (non-aliated) status, he has declared theEuropean direction to be a top priorityo Ukraines oreign policy. Continua-tion o the negotiations on the Asso-ciation Agreement, including theDeep and Comprehensive Free radeArea (DCFA), was thereore givena green light, and since then, theyprogressed at a considerable speed.By December 2011, negotiating teamshad managed to resolve practically allsignicant outstanding issues: substan-tively, the Association Agreement wasready or initialing, at least. However,perorming this purely technical acthas turned out to be impossible or theEuropean Union, and the participantsat the December 19 Summit were notable to deliver anything more than aormal announcement on nalizationo negotiations that stated that chienegotiators had reached a common


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understanding on the ull text o the Association Agree-

ment. Ocially this non-lieu was explained throughremaining unaddressed problems and some incompleteprocedures, such as documents legal verication.

At the same time, it became clear that real reason o EUreluctance to move orward was their concern with theway Ukraine was developing, or rather regressing, in theeld o democracy. Te most obvious and, as President othe European Council Herman van Rompuy put it, moststriking point o concern was the trials o Ukraines ormerprime minister, Yulia ymoshenko, and a number o otherormer government ocials. Quite clearly, the Ukrainian

powers-that-be either misperceived the signals they hadbeen receiving rom their European counterparts sinceAugust, or theyve badly blundered in their calculations.Te point that seems to have been completely missed orignored by them was the act that the European Union, andhence Ukraines European integration, is as much aboutshared democratic values and undamental reedoms asit is about economic co-operation and ree trade. By thesame token, the substantial progress achieved by Ukraineand the EU in negotiations on economic issues (in act, theparties managed to agree on many extremely sensitive andcontentious problems that had been standing in the way

o their economic relations or years) couldnt have osetthe problems that emerged in the political eld related tomaintaining a certain level o democratic standards in thepolitical and social lie o Ukraine.

Tis shouldnt have come as any surprise to anyone, asadherence to democratic principles and Ukraines commit-ment to move closer to the European standards o gover-nance has been traditionally underpinned all majordocuments dening Ukraine-EU relations. It should bealso noted that the Summits joint statement specicallymentions that the Association Agreement provides or a

shared commitment to a close and lasting relationship,which is based on common values, in particular ull respector democratic principles, rule o law, good governance,human rights, and undamental reedoms. It is also quiteclear that the DCFA can exist only as an integral part othe Association Agreement. It can unction properly andbring the expected results only i the Association unctionsas a whole, including all its mechanisms and the bodies.

Not surprisingly, comments on the Summits results diered

drastically depending on their origin. Ukrainian ocialsexpressed their satisaction generally, pointing out recogni-tion o the European identity o Ukraine and its Europeanstatus in geographic terms (Ministry or Foreign Aairs)or even the mere act that the Summit was held notwith-standing the dierences on ymoshenko case (Party o theRegions). Tere was general satisaction on the govern-ments side that Ukraine has managed to hold its ground. Atthe same time, Ukrainian opposition generally character-ized the Summit as the end o European hopes or Ukrai-nians. Most o these assessments were certainly politicallymotivated, but basically they refect the overall atmosphere

o uncertainty and lack o deliverables at the Summit.

What should be really made out o the Summits results, andwhat should be Ukraines path orward? Te Summits JointStatement and the remarks o Presidents van Rompuy andJos Manuel Barroso contained a number o strong positivemessages rom EU: the relationship with Ukraine is impor-tant or the Union; nalization o our years o negotia-tions opens the way to a political association and economicintegration; urther qualitative changes in relations arenot being ruled out as Tis Association Agreement leavesopen the way or urther progressive developments in

EU-Ukraine relations; and European aspirations andEuropean identity o Ukraine have been recognized. Tesemessages (some o them appeared to be the result o the lastditch negotiations) are undoubtedly important or Ukraine,but they are hardly sucient to compensate or the absenceo initialing and the clear prospect o rapid signing andratication o the Agreement. Moreover, another o theEUs messages was no less clear: no Ukrainian integrationeorts will be successul without due respect and adherenceto European values. Te uture o that countrys Europeanintegration lies in the hands o the Ukrainian ruling classand its ability to properly do its homework.

Te Kyiv EU-Ukraine Summit underscored the serious-ness o the tasks to be perormed by Ukraine in order tocomplete the implementation process o Association Agree-ment, ideally in a not-too-distant uture. Te Summit hasalso brought the list o challenges acing all parties involvedto the ore o public and decision-makers attention, startingwith procedural issues.


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Relegated to the domain o irrelevant technicalities by

outsiders, these issues might play an important role becausethey are to be ollowed to the letter or this agreement tobecome meaningul. But they are even more so becausetheir extreme sophistication allows o the EU side to slowdown the implementation process, i necessary. It shouldbe borne in mind that it took a much smaller EU our longyears to ratiy the EU-Ukraine Partnership and Co-opera-tion Agreement.

According to available inormation, the Association Agree-ment could be initialed early in spring. Tis would meanthat the work o negotiating teams is really completed and

the document is nalized. In spite o the declaration at theSummit concerning the completion o negotiations, it wasobvious that some minor outstanding issues were still tobe ironed out, not to mention the ongoing legal assessmentand verication o the text. It is also sae to presume thatthe EU side would insist on the negotiating team leadersinitialing the document in a setting that avoids any anare.

Te next step is signing and ratication. Closer to themiddle o 2011, when Association Agreement negotiationshad momentum, it seemed that its initialing and signingwouldnt pose much o a problem. (Te quasi ocial EUline was internal politics in Ukraines will not jeopardizenegotiations.) However, as concerns related to the rule olaw and Ukraines democratic development was more andmore requently voiced in the West, it was understood thatthe EU as a whole and a number o its Member States wouldtry to use the prospect o the Association Agreements rati-cation in order to encourage a change in current Ukrainiangovernment policy.

At this moment, it looks as i both signing and ratica-tion have been put on hold. Ukrainian media have widelydisseminated the opinion o European MP Marek Sivets,who said that the situation concerning the AssociationAgreement will be rozen until the election in Ukraine,meaning the parliamentary election in October 2012. Ithey get the seal o approval o international observers, hecontinued, there is a chance to get back to the AssociationAgreement. I not Similar views were circulated in otherUkrainian media outlets. Provided this inormation is true,in practical terms this would mean that Ukraine is stuck onthe Eurotrack, at risk o remaining largely immobilized or ayear or more.

It seems that only the release o ormer Prime Minister

Yulia ymoshenko will positively infuence the currentsituation and restore at least a part o condence andgood-will on the part o EU. However, the chances or suchturnaround are dim at best: she was recently transerred to apenitentiary outside Kyiv. Possibilities to deuse the situ-ation are still available, but the government doesnt showany intentions to seize them. Some hold out hope or thecomplaint led by ymoshenkos deense at the EuropeanCourt o Human Rights, but it looks like a long shot or tworeasons: review will start in March at the earliest, and eveni the ruling is in her avor, it would still have to be ollowedin Ukraine.

ymoshenkos and some other cases are widely believed tobe directly related to the October 30 parliamentary election.Te latest polling conducted by the Razumkov Centre hasshown that ymoshenkos Fatherland Party would have themost voter support, 15.6%, compared with 13.9% or thepro-presidential Party o the Regions. ymoshenkos ownrating has exceeded that o President Yanukovych 16.3%to 13.3%. One should, however, be aware that polling resultsrefect not so much the increase in the main oppositionactors popularity as the rapidly declining popular approvalo the governing party.

Te October election is set to become an event that willdetermine both Ukraines internal development and itsrelations with the West, at least in the mid-term perspec-tive. A air, transparent, and democratic election processmight not only diversiy the Ukrainian political landscapeand make the atmosphere in politics a lot healthier. It mightalso persuade Ukraines political partners in Europe thatUkrainian democratic mechanisms are screeching but stillmoving and the process o Ukraines association with EUcan proceed. Te opposite would have nearious eectsor Ukrainian political lie and would urther imperil the

prospects o the countrys European integration. Te partyo power has to make the choice between its selsh politicalinterest and the countrys uture. (According to opinionpolls, opposition parties stand a chance o winning majorityin the new Verkhovna Rada, Ukraines parliament, thoughthis is only a possibility). Tere were not so many momentsin Ukraines contemporary history when the stakes havebeen so high and the price that the country could pay orthe wrongdoing o the ruling elite were so dear.


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Te situation is urther exacerbated but the relentless

pressure exerted by the current Russian leadership onUkraine. It has become especially intense in the run-upto the Russian presidential election, which is supposed toconrm Vladimir Putins second accession to the presidencyin the Russian Federation. Ukraine is being regarded byKremlin as the most coveted prize in its race to retain Sovietsuccessor states within Russias privileged interests zone.o thwart Ukraines European ambitions, Russian leadersare presenting lucrative alternatives such as the CustomsUnion and the Eurasian Economic Community, whoseSummit was attended by President Yanukovych aer theclosure o the Summit with EU. Moscow has packaged these

oers with the ongoing and so ar unsuccessul negotiationson the price o the Russian natural gas exported to Ukraine.(It should be borne in mind that Ukrainian economyconsumes approximately two times more energy or each $1o GDP than worlds average.) In order to exert additionalpressure, Russia has been extending already existing proj-ects like Nord Stream and the planned South Stream, whichurther undermine Ukraines negotiating positions.

On the whole, Russias policy targets two immediate objec-tives: to get hold o the Ukrainian transportation and gasstorage systems, which are still the cheapest and best ways

to transport Russias energy resources to European markets,and to keep Ukraine away rom the European alternativesto the Russian integration projects on the post-Soviet space.Te signicance o the Association Agreement or the uturedevelopment o Ukraine, its economy, and its socio-politicaland oreign policy direction is very well understood by theRussian government strategists. Tus, the unconvincingresults o the Summit must be seen as a generous and verywelcome gi in Moscow, which is the only clear winnersin the current situation, partly due to its own deness andpartly due to the aux pas or shortsightedness o the majorprotagonists in this drama.

Is there a way out o the political impasse in Ukraine-EUrelations? aking into account all the previously mentionedcircumstances, the prospects or any orward movementdont look promising, at least not until aer Ukrainianparliamentary elections. Te scope and substance oUkraines homework is quite clear: reverse troubling trendsin democratic development, organize a transparent electionprocess, and carry out consistent and ar-reaching economicreorms. At the same time, the European Union should

understand that giving up on Ukraine is not an option,

no matter how infuential those who would like to keepUkraine at arms length might be. For some period o time,starting even beore presidential election o 2010, it wasalready relatively easy to nd pretexts not to engage withUkraine.

However, the opposite is true: there should more EUengagement with Ukraine. Even i the EU has decided topause, co-operation should continue in the areas wherethere is mutual interest and opportunities to achievetangible results (or instance, people-to-people contactsand moving towards visa-ree travel or Ukrainian citizens,

energy and other economic projects, and political dialogueon a number o issues). As or the Association Agreementitsel, we think it should be initialed without unneces-sary delay and the process o its implementation should beallowed to go ahead. Tere is no other instrument that canprovide such a robust ramework or transorming Ukraineinto a truly democratic, prosperous, and independentcountry. Tis, and nothing else, will serve the EUs own bestinterest.

Mykola Kapitonenko and Oleh Shamshur

Ukraines European Integration:

A Public Opinion Perspective

Eective implementation o policies aimed at Ukrainesaccession to the EU is impossible without the broad andstable support o Ukrainian citizens. In a circular depen-dence, public enthusiasm or European integration (orthe lack o it) depends heavily on the practical results ocooperation with the EU, and on the concrete and positivechanges this brings to the lives o ordinary citizens.

It is evident that the problems, achievements, and prospects

o Ukraines integration in the EU should be a matter ogeneral public discussion, ree o petty political consid-erations and cheap arguments. Tis discussion should bebased upon the solid basis o the objective public opinionpolling. Polls make it possible to determine the dynamics ocitizens geopolitical positions, and their assessment o thelevel and character o Ukraines cooperation with the EU.

Te aim o this analysis is to assess the current state and pros-

pects o Ukraines European integration in light o public opinion


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trends. It is based on the results o surveys conducted by

the Razumkov Center rom February 2000 to October2011. Te polls were conducted in all regions o Ukraine(including Kyiv and Crimea) by a multistage randomsampling based on the quota method o respondent recruit-ment at the nal stage, who represent an adult populationcorresponding to the main socio-demographic indicators(i.e. region o residence, type and size o locality, age, sex).Te sampling error does not exceed 2.3%. Te latest surveywas conducted rom September 29, 2011 to October 4,2011. wo-thousand nine respondents aged 18 years andolder were interviewed.

Te respondents were asked to assess the governmentsoreign and European integration policy and to evaluateUkraines relations with the EU. Tese results and theircomparison with previous monitoring data allow or theollowing conclusions.

Geopolitical Orientation of Ukrainian Citizens

Public opinion surveys show that Ukrainian citizenstraditionally closely watch the development o their coun-trys relations with its two main oreign partners: the EUand Russia. From 2006 to 2010, relations with Russia werelargely regarded as the main priority in oreign policy, but

2011 became the year o change. Tis trend was reversed asUkrainian publics attention and interest switched to the EU.While this is the general trend, the geopolitical orientationo Ukrainian public varies signicantly by region and age.

Unsurprisingly, a solid pro-European orientation is char-acteristic o the western part o Ukraine and a pro-Russianorientation o the south and the east. Te center o Ukraineis a swing region, where geopolitical preerences areconstantly changing. While in November 2009, a majorityo the residents o central Ukraine avored the developmento relations with Russia (50.9%) and only a quarter o those

avored the EU countries, in October 2011, the situationreversed. Almost hal (47.7%) now prioritize the develop-ment o relations with the EU, and only a quarter prioritizeRussia.

Regional dierences in oreign policy orientation are largelycaused by the dierences in culture, ethnic composition,and religious allegiances, but also by domestic politiciza-tion o oreign policy decisions. Consequently, the levelo support or each o the two main oreign policy direc-

tions depends inter alia on the political situation within the

country. Tereore, the decline o support or a pro-Russianoreign policy orientation in 2011 might have been caused,in addition to other actors, by the inability o the currentgovernment to establish and develop an equal partnershipwith Russia, though this was one o Victor Yanukovichsmain political messages during the presidential electioncampaign o 2010.

Concerning age dierences, the cohort o Ukrainian citizensyounger than 50 years is overwhelmingly in avor o a Euro-pean direction o Ukraines oreign policy, and those whoare over 50 years old are more likely to support the Russian

oreign policy vector.

Ukraine-EU Relations as Assessed by Ukrainians

Te majority o Ukrainian citizens (54.6%) characterizeUkraines relations with the EU as unstable; a minority(15.4%) consider them to be poor and only 14.3%reer to them as good. Tese unsatisactory results canbe explained primarily by the assessment o the paceo Ukraines European integration: 13% o respondentsdescribe it as zero, and 47.8% as low. Interestingly, thisopinion is shared by both those who support the EU inte-gration o Ukraine, and those who do not.

Public opinion largely links instability in Ukraine-EU rela-tions to the inconsistent European integration policy o theUkrainian government. Te majority o Ukrainian citizensregard this policy as inconsistent and incoherent (55.2%),opaque and covert (59.5%), ineective (62.6%), and incom-prehensible to the public (62.1%). A relative majority oUkrainians (46.5%) also considers it to be conusing or theEU states.

When considering why the EU is interested in Ukraine,most respondents indicated the Ukrainian labor orce

(48.9%), energy transit to EU countries (48.6%), Ukrainianmarket or the EU goods (46.8%), and Ukraines naturalresources (46.6%). o a lesser extent, citizens believe the EUinterest lies with Ukraines intellectual and scientic poten-tial (26%); in limiting Russias infuence (20.3%); in importo the Ukrainian goods (15.6%); in a joint ght againstillegal migration, international crime, terrorism (15.5%);in strengthening security and stability in Europe (13.4%);in military potential o Ukraine (11.2%); and in Ukrainesnational culture, traditions, and history (6.1%).


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As or Ukraines interest in the EU, most respondents

reerred to the EU nancial resources (42%); the EU marketor Ukrainian goods (35.3%); and the EU system o gover-nance, democratic norms, rules, and standards o living(35%).

Positive Attitude toward Joining the European Union

Te results o recent surveys indicate a continuous domi-nance o the supporters or Ukraines EU membership overits opponents (in October 2011, their numbers were 51.2%and 30.3%, respectively).

Te younger the respondents are, the more they avor

joining the European Union. Sixty-three percent o respon-dents aged 18 to 29 and 40.8% o respondents aged over 60support the EU-membership.

When asked to choose between the EU or a Customs Unionwith Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, a plurality o Ukrai-nians support the EU membership (43.7%), while 30.5% orespondents chose the Customs Union.

Stable pluralities o Ukrainians (44.1% in 2011 and 41.4%in 2009) believe that in the coming years, relations betweenUkraine and the EU will not progress. At the same time,

in November 2009, the proportion o respondents whobelieved that Ukraine-EU relations would improve (30.7%)was six times larger than the proportion o those whothought relations would get worse (5.1%). Now the generalmood has noticeably soured: in October 2011 the numbero optimists decreased to 22.8% and the group o pessimistsgrew to 7.3%.

Valeryi Chalyi

About the Authors

Mykola Kapitonenko is the Executive Director o the Center or

International Studies, Kyiv. Oleh Shamshur is a German Marshal Fund

Transatlantic Fellow in Kyiv. Valeryi Chalyi is the Deputy Director

General o the Razumkov Centre. All three authors are participants in

the GMF-unded project, Ukraines quest or European integration:

internal and external dimensions.

About GMF

Te German Marshall Fund o the United States (GMF) is a non-

partisan American public policy and grantmaking institution dedi-

cated to promoting better understanding and cooperation between

North America and Europe on transatlantic and global issues. GMF

does this by supporting individuals and institutions working in the

transatlantic sphere, by convening leaders and members o the policy

and business communities, by contributing research and analysis on

transatlantic topics, and by providing exchange opportunities to oster

renewed commitment to the transatlantic relationship. In addition,

GMF supports a number o initiatives to strengthen democracies.

Founded in 1972 through a gi rom Germany as a permanent memo-

rial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence on

both sides o the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Wash-

ington, DC, GMF has seven oces in Europe: Berlin, Paris, Brussels,

Belgrade, Ankara, Bucharest, and Warsaw. GMF also has smaller

representations in Bratislava, urin, and Stockholm.

About the On Wider Europe Series

This series is designed to ocus in on key intellectual and policy

debates regarding Western policy toward Wider Europe that other-

wise might receive insufcient attention. The views presented in

these papers are the personal views o the authors and not those o

the institutions they represent or The German Marshall Fund o the

United States.


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Documents

Ukraine and EU: Challenges that Loom Ahead