TodayisTuesday,June23,2015

AurelioM.Umaliv.COMELEC,G.R.No.203974,22April2014Decision,Velasco,Jr.[J]DissentingOpinion,Leonen[J]

RepublicofthePhilippinesSUPREMECOURT

Manila

ENBANC

G.R.No.203974April22,2014

AURELIOM.UMALI,Petitioner,vs.COMMISSIONONELECTIONS,JULIUSCESARV.VERGARA,andTHECITYGOVERNMENTOFCABANATUAN,Respondents.

xx

G.R.No.204371

J.V.BAUTISTA,Petitioner,vs.COMMISSIONONELECTIONS,Respondent.

DECISION

VELASCO,JR.,J.:

BeforetheCourtistheconsolidatedcaseforPetitionforCertiorariandProhibitionwithprayerforinjunctiverelief,docketasG.R.No.203974,assailingMinuteResolutionNo.1207971andMinuteResolutionNo.1209252datedSeptember11,2012andOctober16,2012,respectively,bothpromulgatedbypublicrespondentCommissiononElections (COMELEC), and Petition for Mandamus, docketed G.R. No. 204371, seeking to compel publicrespondenttoimplementthesame.

TheFacts

On July 11, 2011, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cabanatuan City passed Resolution No. 1832011,requestingthePresidenttodeclaretheconversionofCabanatuanCityfromacomponentcityoftheprovinceofNueva Ecija into a highly urbanized city (HUC). Acceding to the request, the President issued PresidentialProclamationNo.418,Seriesof2012,proclaimingtheCityofCabanatuanasanHUCsubjectto"ratificationinaplebiscitebythequalifiedvoterstherein,asprovidedforinSection453oftheLocalGovernmentCodeof1991."

RespondentCOMELEC,actingon theproclamation, issued theassailedMinuteResolutionNo. 120797whichreads:

WHEREFORE,theCommissionRESOLVED,asitherebyRESOLVES,thatforpurposesoftheplebiscitefortheconversionofCabanatuanCity fromcomponentcity tohighlyurbanizedcity,only those registered residentsofCabanatuanCityshouldparticipateinthesaidplebiscite.

The COMELEC based this resolution on Sec. 453 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC), citingconversioncasesinvolvingPuertoPrincesaCityinPalawan,TaclobanCityinSouthernLeyte,andLapuLapuCityinCebu,whereonlytheresidentsofthecityproposedtobeconvertedwereallowedtovoteinthecorrespondingplebiscite.

In due time, petitioner AurelioM.Umali,Governor of NuevaEcija, filed a VerifiedMotion for Reconsideration,maintaining that theproposedconversion inquestionwillnecessarilyanddirectlyaffect themotherprovinceofNuevaEcija.HismainargumentisthatSection453oftheLGCshouldbeinterpretedinconjunctionwithSec.10,Art.XoftheConstitution.Hearguesthatwhiletheconversioninquestiondoesnotinvolvethecreationofanewor the dissolution of an existing city, the spirit of the Constitutional provision calls for the people of the localgovernmentunit(LGU)directlyaffectedtovoteinaplebiscitewheneverthereisamaterialchangeintheirrightsandresponsibilities.Thephrase"qualifiedvoterstherein"usedinSec.453oftheLGCshouldthenbeinterpretedtorefertothequalifiedvotersoftheunitsdirectlyaffectedbytheconversionandnotjustthoseinthecomponentcityproposedtobeupgraded.PetitionerUmalijustifiedhispositionbyenumeratingthevariousadverseeffectsoftheCabanatuanCitys conversionandhow itwill causematerial changenotonly in thepolitical andeconomicrightsofthecityanditsresidentsbutalsooftheprovinceasawhole.

TotheVerifiedMotionforReconsideration,privaterespondentJuliusCesarVergara,citymayorofCabanatuan,interposedanoppositiononthegroundthatSec.10,Art.Xdoesnotapplytoconversions,whichisthemeatofthematter.HelikewisearguesthataspecificprovisionoftheLGC,Sec.453,ascouched,allowsonlythequalifiedvotersofCabanatuanCitytovoteintheplebiscite.Lastly,privaterespondentpointedoutthatwhenSantiagoCitywasconvertedin1994fromamunicipalitytoanindependentcomponentcitypursuanttoRepublicActNo.(RA)7720,theplebisciteheldwaslimitedtotheregisteredvotersofthethenmunicipalityofSantiago.

FollowingahearingconductedonOctober4,2012,3theCOMELECEnBanconOctober16,2012,inE.MNo.12045(PLEB),byavoteof524 ruled in favorof respondentVergara through theassailedMinuteResolution120925.Thedispositiveportionreads:

The Commission, taking into consideration the arguments of counsels including the Replymemorandum ofOppositor,afterduedeliberation,RESOLVED,asitherebyRESOLVES,asfollows:

1)ToDENYtheMotionforReconsiderationofoppositorGovernorAurelioM.Umaliand

2)ToSCHEDULEtheconductofPlebiscitefortheconversionofCabanatuanCityfromcomponentcityintohighlyurbanizedcitywithregisteredresidentsonlyofCabanatuanCitytoparticipateinsaidplebiscite.

LettheDeputyExecutiveDirectorforOperationsimplementthisresolution.

SOORDERED.

Hence, thePetition forCertiorariwithprayer for injunctiverelief,docketedasG.R.No.203974,onsubstantiallythesameargumentsearliertakenbypetitionerUmalibeforethepollbody.Ontheotherhand,publicrespondentCOMELEC,throughtheOfficeoftheSolicitorGeneral,maintainedinitsCommentthatCabanatuanCityismerelybeingconvertedfromacomponentcityintoanHUCandthatthepoliticalunitdirectlyaffectedbytheconversionwillonlybethecityitself.Itarguesthatinthisinstance,nopoliticalunitwillbecreated,mergedwithanother,orwillberemovedfromanotherLGU,andthatnoboundarieswillbealtered.Theconversionwouldmerelyreinforcethepowersandprerogativesalreadybeingexercisedbythecity,withthepoliticalunitsprobableelevationtothatofanHUCasdemandedbyitscompliancewiththecriteriaestablishedundertheLGC.Thus,theparticipationofthevotersoftheentireprovinceintheplebiscitewillnotbenecessary.

PrivaterespondentwilllatermanifestthatitisadoptingtheCommentoftheCOMELEC.

Meanwhile, on October 25, 2012, respondent COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9543, which adopted acalendarofactivitiesandperiodsofprohibitedactsinconnectionwiththeconversionofCabanatuanCityintoanHUC.TheResolutionsettheconductoftheplebisciteonDecember1,2012.Thereafter,acertainDr.RodolfoB.PunzalanfiledaPetitionforDeclaratoryReliefwhichwasraffledtotheRegionalTrialCourt(RTC),Branch40inPalayanCity.Inthesaidcase,PunzalanprayedthatMinuteResolutionNo.120797bedeclaredunconstitutional,thatthetrialcourtdecreethatallqualifiedvotersoftheprovinceofNuevaEcijabeincludedintheplebiscite,andthat a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) be issued enjoining public respondent from implementing thequestionedresolution.OnOctober19,2012,theRTCgrantedtheprayerforaTRO.

OnNovember6,2012,publicrespondentthroughMinuteResolutionNo.120989suspendedthepreparationsforthe event in view of the TRO issued by the RTC. On November 27, 2012, the plebiscite was once againrescheduledtogivewaytotheMay13,2013national,localandARMMregionalelectionsasperResolutionNo.9563.

After this development, petitioner J.V. Bautista, on December 3, 2012, filed a case before this Court forMandamus,docketedasG.R.No.204371,prayingthatpublicrespondentbeorderedtoscheduletheplebisciteeitheronDecember15or22,2012.PetitionerBautistaarguedthatsincetheTROissuedbytheRTChasalreadyexpired,thedutyofthepublicrespondenttoholdtheplebiscitehasbecomemandatoryandministerial.PetitionerBautistaalsoallegedthatthedelayinholdingtheplebisciteisinexcusablegiventherequirementthatitshouldbeheldwithinaperiodof120daysformthedateofthePresidentsdeclaration.

InitsCommenttotheBautistapetition,publicrespondentjustifieditspositionbyarguingthatmandamuswillnotissuetoenforcearightwhichisinsubstantialdispute.Withallthelegalconflictssurroundingthecase,itcannotbe said that there is a clear showing of petitioner Bautistas entitlement to the relief sought. RespondentCOMELEClikewisereliedonSec.5oftheOmnibusElectionCodetojustifythepostponements,citingincidentsofviolencethatensuedinthelocalityduringtheplebisciteperiod.

Aftertheconclusionofthe2013elections,publicrespondentissuedResolutionNo.1353schedulingtheplebisciteto January 25, 2014. However, a TROwas issued by this Court on January 15, 2014 inG.R. No. 203974 tosuspend theconductof theplebiscite forCabanatuanCitysconversion.Given the intertwining factualmilieuofthetwopetitionsbeforetheCourt,bothcaseswereconsolidatedonMarch18,2014.

TheIssue

Theboneof contention in thepresent controversyboilsdown towhether thequalified registeredvotersof theentire province ofNuevaEcija or only those inCabanatuanCity can participate in the plebiscite called for theconversionofCabanatuanCityfromacomponentcityintoanHUC.

Resolving the Petition for Certiorari either way will necessarily render the Petition for Mandamus moot andacademicforultimately,thepublicrespondentwillbeorderedtoholdtheplebiscite.Theonlyvariationwillbeasregardsitsparticipants.

TheCourtsRuling

ThePetitionforCertiorariismeritorious.

Sec.453oftheLGCshouldbeinterpretedinaccordancewithSec.10,Art.XoftheConstitution

Petitioner Umali asseverates that Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution should be the basis for determining thequalifiedvoterswhowillparticipateintheplebiscitetoresolvetheissue.Sec.10,Art.Xreads:

Section10,ArticleX.Noprovince,city,municipality,orbarangaymaybecreated,divided,merged,abolished,or itsboundarysubstantiallyaltered,except inaccordancewith thecriteriaestablished in the localgovernmentcodeandsubjecttoapprovalbyamajorityofthevotescast inaplebisciteinthepoliticalunitsdirectlyaffected.(emphasissupplied)

Petitioner Umali elucidates that the phrase "political units directly affected" necessarily encompasses not onlyCabanatuan City but the entire province of Nueva Ecija. Hence, all the registered voters in the province arequalifiedtocasttheirvotesinresolvingtheproposedconversionofCabanatuanCity.

On the other hand, respondents invoke Sec. 453 of the LGC to support their claim that only the City ofCabanatuanshouldbeallowedtotakepartinthevoting.Sec.453states:

Section453.DutytoDeclareHighlyUrbanizedStatus.ItshallbethedutyofthePresidenttodeclareacityashighly urbanized within thirty (30) days after it shall have met the minimum requirements prescribed in theimmediately precedingSection, upon proper application therefor and ratification in a plebiscite by the qualifiedvoterstherein.(emphasissupplied)

Respondentstakethephrase"registeredvoterstherein"inSec.453asreferringonlytotheregisteredvotersinthecitybeingconverted,excludingintheprocessthevotersintheremainingtownsandcitiesofNuevaEcija.

Beforeproceedingtounraveltheseemingconflictbetweenthetwoprovisions, it isbutproperthatweascertainfirsttherelationshipbetweenSec.10,Art.XoftheConstitutionandSec.453oftheLGC.

Firstofall,wehavetorestatethegeneralprinciplethatlegislativepowercannotbedelegated.Nonetheless,thegeneralrulebarringdelegationissubjecttocertainexceptionsallowedintheConstitution,namely:

(1) Delegation by Congress to the President of the power to fix "tariff rates, import and export quotas,tonnageandwharfagedues,andotherdutiesorimpostswithintheframeworkofthenationaldevelopmentprogramoftheGovernment"underSection28(2)ofArticleVIoftheConstitutionand

(2) Delegation of emergency powers by Congress to the President "to exercise powers necessary andpropertocarryoutadeclarednationalpolicy"intimesofwarandothernationalemergencyunderSection23(2)ofArticleVIoftheConstitution.

Thepowertocreate,divide,merge,abolishorsubstantiallyalterboundariesofprovinces,cities,municipalitiesorbarangays, which is pertinent in the case at bar, is essentially legislative in nature.5 The framers of theConstitutionhave,however,allowedforthedelegationofsuchpowerinSec.10,Art.XoftheConstitutionaslongas(1)thecriteriaprescribedintheLGCismetand(2)thecreation,division,merger,abolitionorthesubstantialalterationoftheboundariesissubjecttotheapprovalbyamajorityvoteinaplebiscite.

Trueenough,CongressdelegatedsuchpowertotheSangguniangPanlalawiganorSangguniangPanlungsodtocreatebarangayspursuanttoSec.6oftheLGC,whichprovides:

Section 6. Authority to Create Local Government Units. A local government unit may be created, divided,merged, abolished, or its boundaries substantially altered either by law enacted byCongress in the case of aprovince, city, municipality, or any other political subdivision, or by ordinance passed by the sangguniangpanlalawigan or sangguniang panlungsod concerned in the case of a barangay located within its territorialjurisdiction,subjecttosuchlimitationsandrequirementsprescribedinthisCode."(emphasissupplied)

The guidelines for the exercise of this authority have sufficiently been outlined by the various LGC provisionsdetailing the requirements for the creation of barangays6, municipalities7, cities8, and provinces9. Moreover,compliancewith theplebiscite requirementunder theConstitutionhasalsobeendirectedby theLGCunder itsSec.10,whichreads:

Section 10. Plebiscite Requirement. No creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration ofboundaries of local government units shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in aplebiscitecalledforthepurposeinthepoliticalunitorunitsdirectlyaffected."(emphasissupplied)

With thetwincriteriaofstandardandplebiscitesatisfied, thedelegationtoLGUsof thepower tocreate,divide,merge, abolish or substantially alter boundaries has become a recognized exception to the doctrine of nondelegationoflegislativepowers.

Likewise, legislative power was delegated to the President under Sec. 453 of the LGC quoted earlier, whichstates:

Section453.DutytoDeclareHighlyUrbanizedStatus.ItshallbethedutyofthePresidenttodeclareacityashighly urbanized within thirty (30) days after it shall have met the minimum requirements prescribed in theimmediately precedingSection, upon proper application therefor and ratification in a plebiscite by the qualifiedvoterstherein.

In this case, the provision merely authorized the President to make a determination on whether or not therequirementsunderSec.45210oftheLGCarecompliedwith.TheprovisionmakesitministerialforthePresident,uponproperapplication,todeclareacomponentcityashighlyurbanizedoncetheminimumrequirements,whicharebasedoncertifiableandmeasurable indicesunderSec.452,aresatisfied.Themandatory language"shall"usedintheprovisionleavesthePresidentwithnoroomfordiscretion.

Insodoing,Sec.453,ineffect,automaticallycallsfortheconductofaplebisciteforpurposesofconversionsoncetherequirementsaremet.Nofurtherlegislationisnecessarybeforethecityproposedtobeconvertedbecomeseligible tobecomeanHUC through ratification,as thebasis for thedelegationof the legislativeauthority is theveryLGC.

In viewof the foregoing considerations, theCourt concludes that the sourceof thedelegationof power to theLGUsunderSec.6oftheLGCandtothePresidentunderSec.453ofthesamecodeisnoneotherthanSec.10,Art.XoftheConstitution.

Respondents, however, posit that Sec. 453 of the LGC is actually outside the ambit of Sec. 10, Art. X of theConstitution, considering that the conversion of a component city to anHUC is not "creation, division,merge,abolitionorsubstantialalternationofboundaries"encompassedbythesaidconstitutionalprovision.

Thispropositionisbereftofmerit.

First, the Courts pronouncement in Miranda vs. Aguirre11 is apropos and may be applied by analogy. WhileMiranda involves the downgrading, instead of upgrading, as here, of an independent component city into acomponentcity, itsapplicationtothecaseatbarisnonethelessmaterial inascertainingthepropertreatmentofconversions.Inthatseminalcase,theCourtheldthatthedowngradingofanindependentcomponentcityintoacomponentcitycomeswithinthepurviewofSec.10,Art.XoftheConstitution.

In Miranda, the rationale behind the aforequoted constitutional provision and its application to cases ofconversionwerediscussedthusly:

A close analysis of the said constitutional provision will reveal that the creation, division, merger, abolition orsubstantial alteration of boundaries of local government units involve a common denominator materialchange in thepoliticalandeconomicrightsof the localgovernmentunitsdirectlyaffectedaswellas thepeopletherein.ItispreciselyforthisreasonthattheConstitutionrequirestheapprovalofthepeople"inthepoliticalunitsdirectly affected." It is not difficult to appreciate the rationale of this constitutional requirement. The 1987

Constitution,morethananyofourpreviousConstitutions,gavemorerealitytothesovereigntyofourpeopleforitwas borne out of the people power in the 1986 EDSA revolution. Its Section 10, Article X addressed theundesirablepractice inthepastwhereby localgovernmentunitswerecreated,abolished,mergedordividedonthebasisofthevagariesofpoliticsandnotofthewelfareofthepeople.Thus,theconsentofthepeopleofthelocal government unit directly affected was required to serve as a checking mechanism to any exercise oflegislativepowercreating,dividing,abolishing,mergingoralteringtheboundariesoflocalgovernmentunits.Itisone instance where the people in their sovereign capacity decide on a matter that affects them directdemocracyofthepeopleasopposedtodemocracythrupeoplesrepresentatives.ThisplebisciterequirementisalsoinaccordwiththephilosophyoftheConstitutiongrantingmoreautonomytolocalgovernmentunits.12

Itwasdeterminedinthecasethatthechangesthatwillresultfromtheconversionaretoosubstantialthatthereisa necessity for the plurality of those that will be affected to approve it. Similar to the enumerated acts in theconstitutionalprovision,conversionswerefoundtoresultinmaterialchangesintheeconomicandpoliticalrightsofthepeopleandLGUsaffected.Giventhefarreachingramificationsofconvertingthestatusofacity,weheldthat the plebiscite requirement under the constitutional provision should equally apply to conversions as well.Thus,RA852813wasdeclaredunconstitutionalinMirandaonthegroundthatthelawdowngradedSantiagoCityinIsabelawithoutsubmittingitforratificationinaplebiscite,incontraventionofSec.10,Art.XoftheConstitution.

Second, while conversion to an HUC is not explicitly provided in Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution weneverthelessobservethattheconversionofacomponentcityintoanHUCissubstantialalterationofboundaries.

As the phrase implies, "substantial alteration of boundaries" involves and necessarily entails a change in thegeographicalconfigurationofa localgovernmentunitorunits.However, thephrase"boundaries"shouldnotbelimitedtothemerephysicalone,referringtothemetesandboundsoftheLGU,butalsotoitspoliticalboundaries.Italsoconnotesamodificationofthedemarcationlinesbetweenpoliticalsubdivisions,wheretheLGUsexerciseofcorporatepowerendsandthatoftheotherbegins.Andasaqualifier,thealterationmustbe"substantial"forittobewithintheambitoftheconstitutionalprovision.

PertinentisArt.12(c)oftheLGCsImplementingRulesandRegulations,whichreads:

Art.12.ConversionofaComponentCityintoaHighlyUrbanizedCity.

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(c) Effect of Conversion The conversion of a component city into a highlyurbanized city shall make itindependentoftheprovincewhereitisgeographicallylocated.(emphasisadded)

Verily,theupwardconversionofacomponentcity,inthiscaseCabanatuanCity,intoanHUCwillcomeatasteepprice.ItcanbegleanedfromtheabovecitedrulethattheprovincewillinevitablysufferacorrespondingdecreaseinterritorybroughtaboutbyCabanatuanCitysgainof independence.Withthecitysnewfoundautonomy,itwillbefreefromtheoversightpowersoftheprovince,which,ineffect,reducestheterritorialjurisdictionofthelatter.WhatonceformedpartofNuevaEcijawillnolongerbesubjecttosupervisionbytheprovince.Inmoreconcreteterms,NuevaEcija stands to lose282.75sq. km.of its territorial jurisdictionwithCabanatuanCitys severancefromitsmotherprovince.Thisisequivalenttocarvingoutalmost5%ofNuevaEcijas5,751.3sq.km.area.Thissufficientlysatisfiestherequirementthatthealterationbe"substantial."

Needless to stress, the alteration of boundaries would necessarily follow Cabanatuan Citys conversion in thesame way that creations, divisions, mergers, and abolitions generally cannot take place without entailing thealteration.Theenumeratedacts,afterall,arenotmutuallyexclusive,andmoreoftenthannot,acombinationoftheseactsattendsthereconfigurationofLGUs.

In light of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court rules that conversion to an HUC is substantial alternation ofboundariesgovernedbySec.10,Art.Xand resultantly, saidprovisionapplies,governsandprevailsoverSec.453oftheLGC.

Moreover,therulesofstatutoryconstructiondictatethataparticularprovisionshouldbeinterpretedwiththeotherrelevant provisions in the law The Court finds that it is actually Sec. 10 of the LGC which is undeniably theapplicableprovisionontheconductofplebiscites.Thetitleoftheprovisionitself,"PlebisciteRequirement",makesthisobvious. It requiresamajorityof thevotescast inaplebiscitecalled for thepurpose in thepoliticalunitorunits directly affected. On the other hand, Sec. 453 of the LGC, entitled "Duty to Declare Highly UrbanizedStatus",isonlyonthedutytodeclareacityashighlyurbanized.ItmandatestheOfficeofthePresidenttomakethe declaration after the city has met the requirements under Sec. 452, and upon proper application andratification inaplebiscite.Theconductofaplebiscite is thena requirementbeforeadeclarationcanbemade.Thus,theCourtfindsthatSec.10oftheLGCprevailsoverSec.453oftheLGContheplebisciterequirement.

WenowtakethebullbythehornsandresolvetheissuewhetherSec.453oftheLGCtrenchesonSec.10,Art.XoftheConstitution.

Hornbookdoctrineisthatneitherthelegislative,theexecutive,northejudiciaryhasthepowertoactbeyondtheConstitutionsmandate.TheConstitutionissupremeanyexerciseofpowerbeyondwhatiscircumscribedbytheConstitution isultraviresandanullity.AselucidatedbyformerChiefJusticeEnriqueFernandoinFernandezv.Cuerva:14

WheretheassailedlegislativeorexecutiveactisfoundbythejudiciarytobecontrarytotheConstitution,itisnullandvoid.AsthenewCivilCodeputsit:"WhenthecourtsdeclarealawtobeinconsistentwiththeConstitution,theformershallbevoidandthelattershallgovern."Administrativeorexecutiveacts,ordersandregulationsshallbevalidonlywhen theyarenot contrary to the lawsor theConstitution.Theaboveprovisionof thecivilCodereflects theorthodoxview thatanunconstitutionalact,whether legislativeorexecutive, isnota law,confersnorights,imposesnoduties,andaffordsnoprotection.xxx

Applyingthisorthodoxview,alawshouldbeconstruedinharmonywithandnotinviolationoftheConstitution.15Inalonglineofcases,thecardinalprincipleofconstructionestablishedisthatastatuteshouldbeinterpretedtoassure itsbeing in consonancewith, rather than repugnant to,anyconstitutional commandorprescription.16 Ifthereisdoubtoruncertaintyastothemeaningofthelegislative,ifthewordsorprovisionsareobscureoriftheenactment is fairly susceptible of two or more constitution, that interpretation which will avoid the effect ofunconstitutionalitywillbeadopted,eventhoughitmaybenecessary,forthispurpose,todisregardthemoreusualorapparentimportofthelanguageused.17

Pursuant to established jurisprudence, the phrase "by the qualified voters therein" in Sec. 453 should beconstruedinamannerthatwillavoidconflictwiththeConstitution.Ifonetakestheplainmeaningofthephraseinrelation to thedeclarationby thePresident thatacity isanHUC, then,Sec.453of theLGCwillclashwith theexplicitprovisionunderSec.10,Art.Xthatthevotersinthe"politicalunitsdirectlyaffected"shallparticipateintheplebiscite. Such construction should be avoided in view of the supremacy of theConstitution. Thus, theCourttreats the phrase "by the qualified voters therein" inSec. 453 tomean the qualified voters not only in the cityproposedtobeconvertedtoanHUCbutalsothevotersofthepoliticalunitsdirectlyaffectedbysuchconversioninordertoharmonizeSec.453withSec.10,Art.XoftheConstitution.

TheCourt finds that respondentsaremistaken inconstruingSec.453 inavacuum.Their interpretationofSec.453of theLGCrunsafoulofSec.10,Art.Xof theConstitutionwhichexplicitlyrequiresthatall residents in the"politicalunitsdirectlyaffected"shouldbemadetovote.

RespondentsmakemuchoftheplebiscitesconductedinconnectionwiththeconversionofPuertoPrincesaCity,TaclobanCityandLapuLapuCitywheretheratificationwasmadebytheregisteredvotersinsaidcitiesalone.Itisclear,however,thattheissueofwhoareentitledtovoteinsaidplebisciteswasnotproperlyraisedorbroughtup inanactual controversy.The issueonwhowill vote inaplebiscite involvingaconversion intoanHUC isanovelissue,andthisisthefirsttimethattheCourtisaskedtoresolvethequestion.Assuch,thepastplebiscitesin the aforementioned cities have no materiality or relevance to the instant petition. Suffice it to say thatconversionofsaidcitiespriortothisjudicialdeclarationwillnotbeaffectedorprejudicedinanymannerfollowingtheoperative factdoctrinethat theactualexistenceofastatuteprior tosuchadetermination isanoperativefactandmayhaveconsequenceswhichcannotalwaysbeerasedbyanewjudicialdeclaration.18

TheentireprovinceofNuevaEcijawillbedirectlyaffectedbyCabanatuanCitysconversion

AftertheCourthasresolvedtheseemingirreconcilabilityofSec.10,Art.XoftheConstitutionandSec.453oftheLGC,itisnowtimetoelucidatethemeaningofthephrase"politicalunitsdirectlyaffected"underSec.10,Art.X.

a."Politicalunitsdirectlyaffected"defined

In identifying the LGU or LGUs that should be allowed to take part in the plebiscite, what should primarily bedeterminediswhetherornottheunitorunitsthatdesiretoparticipatewillbe"directlyaffected"bythechange.Tointerpretthephrase,Tanv.COMELEC19andPadillav.COMELEC20areworthrevisiting.

WehaveruledinTan,involvingthedivisionofNegrosOccidentalforthecreationofthenewprovinceofNegrosdelNorte,thattheLGUswhoseboundariesaretobealteredandwhoseeconomywouldbeaffectedareentitledtoparticipateintheplebiscite.Asheld:

Itcanbeplainlyseenthat theaforecitedconstitutionalprovisionmakes it imperativethat therebefirstobtained"theapprovalofamajorityofvotesintheplebisciteintheunitorunitsaffected"wheneveraprovinceiscreated,dividedormergedandthereissubstantialalterationoftheboundaries.ItisthusinescapabletoconcludethattheboundariesoftheexistingprovinceofNegrosOccidentalwouldnecessarilybesubstantiallyalteredbythedivisionofitsexistingboundariesinorderthattherecanbecreatedtheproposednewprovinceofNegrosdelNorte.Plainandsimplelogicwilldemonstratethanthattwopoliticalunitswouldbeaffected.

The first would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be substantiallyaltered.TheotheraffectedentitywouldbecomposedofthoseintheareasubtractedfromthemotherprovincetoconstitutetheproposedprovinceofNegrosdelNorte.21

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ToformthenewprovinceofNegrosdelNortenolessthanthreecitiesandeightmunicipalitieswillbesubtractedfrom theparentprovinceofNegrosOccidental.Thiswill result in the removalofapproximately2,768.4squarekilometersfromthelandareaofanexistingprovincewhoseboundarieswillbeconsequentlysubstantiallyaltered.ItbecomeseasytorealizethattheconsequenteffectsofthedivisionoftheparentprovincenecessarilywillaffectallthepeoplelivingintheseparateareasofNegrosOccidentalandtheproposedprovinceofNegrosdelNorte.Theeconomyoftheparentprovinceaswellasthatofthenewprovincewillbeinevitablyaffected,eitherforthebetteror for theworse.Whateverbe thecase,eitherorbothof thesepoliticalgroupswillbeaffectedand theyare,therefore,theunitorunitsreferredtoinSection3ofArticleXIoftheConstitutionwhichmustbeincludedintheplebiscitecontemplatedtherein.22(emphasisadded)

Sec.3,Art.XIofthe1973Constitution,asinvokedinTan,states:

SEC. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged abolished, or its boundarysubstantiallyaltered,exceptinaccordancewiththecriteriaestablishedinthelocalgovernmentcode,andsubjecttotheapprovalbyamajorityofthevotesinaplebisciteintheunitorunitsaffected.(emphasisadded)

DespitethechangeinphraseologycomparedtowhatisnowSec.10,Art.X,weaffirmedourrulinginTaninthelattercaseofPadilla.Asheld, the removalof thephrase"unitor"onlyserved tosustain theearlier finding thatwhat is contemplatedby thephase "politicalunitsdirectlyaffected" is thepluralityofpoliticalunitswhichwouldparticipateintheplebiscite.AsreflectedinthejournaloftheConstitutionalCommission:23

Mr.Maambong:Whilewehavealreadyapproved thedeletionof "unitor," Iwould like to informtheCommitteethatunder the formulation in thepresentLocalGovernmentCode, thewordsusedareactually "politicalunitorunits." However, I do not know the implication of the use of these words. Maybe there will be no substantialdifference,butIjustwanttoinformtheCommitteeaboutthis.

Mr.Nolledo:Canwenotadhere to theoriginal "unitorunits"?Will therebenoobjectionon thepartof the twoGentlemenfromthefloor?

Mr.Davide:Iwouldobject.Ipreciselyaskedforthedeletionofthewords"unitor"becauseintheplebiscitetobeconducted,itmustinvolvealltheunitsaffected.Ifitisthecreationofabarangayplebiscitebecauseitisaffected.Itwouldmeanalossofaterritory.(emphasisadded)

ThesamesentimentwassharedbytheSenateduringitsdeliberationsonSenateBillNo.155thepredecessoroftheLGCthus:

SenatorGuingona.Canwemakethatclearerbyexample?Letusassumethataprovincehasmunicipalitiesandthereisamergeroftwomunicipalities.Wouldthisthereforemeanthattheplebiscitewillbeconductedwithinthetwomergedmunicipalitiesandnotintheeightothermunicipalities?

SenatorPimentel.Thewholeprovince,Mr.President,willbeaffected,andthatisthereasonweprobablyhavetoinvolvetheentireprovince.

SenatorGuingona.Sotheplebiscitewillnotbeheldonlyinthetwomunicipalitieswhicharebeingmerged,buttheentireprovincewillnowhavetoundergo.

SenatorPimentel.IsupposethatwastherulingintheNegrosdelNortecase.

Senator Guingona. Supposing it refers to barangays, will the entiremunicipality have to vote? There are twobarangays beingmerged, say, out of 100 barangays.Would the entiremunicipality have to participate in theplebiscite?

Senator Pimentel. Yes,Mr. President, because themunicipality is affected directly by themerger of two of itsbarangay.

SenatorGuingona.And,if,outof100barangay,51arebeingmerged,abolished,whatever,wouldtherestofthemunicipalitynotparticipateintheplebiscite?

Senator Pimentel. Do all the 51 barangay that the Gentleman mentioned, Mr. President, belong to onemunicipality?

SenatorGuingona.Yes.

SenatorPimentel.Thenitwillonlyinvolvethemunicipalitywherethe51barangaysbelong.

SenatorGuingona.Yes.So,theentiremunicipalitywillnowhavetoundergoaplebiscite.

SenatorPimentel.Thatiscorrect,Mr.President.

SenatorGuingona.Intheearlierexample,ifitisonlyamergeroftwomunicipalities,letussay,inaprovincewith10municipalitiestheentireprovincewilltheothermunicipalitiesalthoughnotaffectedalsohavetoparticipateintheplebiscite?

SenatorPimentel.Yes.Thereason is that themunicipalitiesarewithin the territorialboundariesof theprovinceitself,itwillhavetobealteredasaresultofthetwomunicipalitiesthattheGentlemanmentioned.24

In the more recent case of Miranda, the interpretation in Tan and Padilla was modified to include not onlychanges in economic but also political rights in the criteria for determining whether or not an LGU shall beconsidered"directlyaffected."Nevertheless,therequirementthattheplebiscitebeparticipatedinbythepluralityofpoliticalunitsdirectlyaffectedremained.

b.ImpactonEconomicRights

To recall, it was held in Miranda that the changes that will result in the downgrading of an LGU from anindependent component city toa component city cannotbe categorizedas insubstantial, therebynecessitatingthe conduct of a plebiscite for its ratification. In a similar fashion, herein petitionerUmali itemized the adverseeffectsofCabanatuanCitysconversiontotheprovinceofNuevaEcijatojustifytheprovincesparticipationintheplebiscitetobeconducted.

OftenraisedisthatCabanatuanCitysconversionintoanHUCanditsseverancefromNuevaEcijawill result inthe reductionof the InternalRevenueAllotment (IRA) to theprovincebasedonSec.285of theLGC.The lawstates:

Section285.AllocationtoLocalGovernmentUnits.Theshareoflocalgovernmentunitsintheinternalrevenueallotmentshallbecollectedinthefollowingmanner:

(a)ProvincesTwentythreepercent(23%)

(b)CitiesTwentythreepercent(23%)

(c)MunicipalitiesThirtyfourpercent(34%)and

(d)BarangaysTwentypercent(20%)

Provided,however,Thattheshareofeachprovince,city,andmunicipalityshallbedeterminedonthebasisofthefollowingformula:

(a)PopulationFiftypercent(50%)

(b)LandAreaTwentyfivepercent(25%)and

(c)EqualsharingTwentyfivepercent(25%)

In our earlier disquisitions, we have explained that the conversion into an HUC carries the accessory ofsubstantialalterationofboundariesandthattheprovinceofNuevaEcijawill,withoutadoubt,sufferareductioninterritory because of the severance of Cabanatuan City. The residents of the city will cease to be politicalconstituencies of theprovince, effectively reducing the latters population.Taking this decrease in territory andpopulationinconnectionwiththeaboveformula,itisconcededthatNuevaEcijawillindeedsufferareductioninIRA given the decrease of its multipliers values. As assessed by the Regional Director of the Department ofBudgetandManagement(DBM)forRegionIII:25

BasisforIRAComputation

ProvinceofNuevaEcija

CabanatuanCity

ProvinceofNuevaEcijaNetofCabanatuan

City

No.ofPopulationCY2007Census

1,843,853 259,267 259,267

LandArea(sq.km.)

5,751.33 282.75 5,468.58

IRAShareofNuevaEcija

ActualIRAShare

EstimatedIRAshareexcludingCabanatuan

City

Reduction

BasedonPopulation

P800,772,618.45 P688,174,751.66 P112,597,866.79

BasedonLandArea

P263,470,472.62 P250,517,594.56 P12,952,878.06

Total P125,550,744.85

Clear as crystal is that the province of NuevaEcijawill suffer a substantial reduction of its share in IRA onceCabanatuanCityattainsautonomy. Inviewof theeconomic impactofCabanatuanCitysconversion,petitionerUmaliscontention,thatitseffectontheprovinceisnotonlydirectbutalsoadverse,deservesmerit.

Moreover, his claim that the province will lose shares in provincial taxes imposed in Cabanatuan City is wellfounded.ThisisbasedonSec.151oftheLGC,whichstates:

SECTION151.ScopeofTaxingPowers.ExceptasotherwiseprovidedinthisCode,thecity,maylevythetaxes,fees,andchargeswhichtheprovinceormunicipalitymay impose:Provided,however,That thetaxes, feesandcharges levied and collected by highly urbanized and independent component cities shall accrue to them anddistributedinaccordancewiththeprovisionsofthisCode.(emphasisadded)

Once converted, the taxes imposed by the HUC will accrue to itself. Prior to this, the province enjoys theprerogativetoimposeandcollecttaxessuchasthoseonsand,gravelandotherquarryresources,26professionaltaxes,27andamusementtaxes28overthecomponentcity.While,itmaybearguedthatthisisnotaderogationoftheprovinces taxingpowerbecause it is innowaydeprivedof itsright tocollect thementionedtaxesfromtherest of its territory, the conversionwill still reduce the provinces taxing jurisdiction, and corollary to this, it willexperienceacorrespondingdecrease inshares in local taxcollections.Thisreduction inboth taxing jurisdictionandsharesposesamaterialandsubstantialchangetotheprovinceseconomicrights,warrantingitsparticipationintheplebiscite.

Tofurtherexemplify the impactof thesechanges,aperusalofSecs.452(a)and461(a)of theLGCis inorder,viz:

Section452.HighlyUrbanizedCities.

(a) Cities with aminimum population of two hundred thousand (200,000) inhabitants as certified by theNational Statistics Office, and within the latest annual income of at least Fifty Million Pesos(P50,000,000.00)basedon1991constantprices,ascertifiedby thecity treasurer, shall beclassifiedashighlyurbanizedcities.

Section461.RequisitesforCreation.

(a)Aprovincemaybecreatedifithasanaverageannualincome,ascertifiedbytheDepartmentofFinance,ofnot less thanTwentymillionpesos(P20,000,000.00)basedon1991constantpricesandeitherof the followingrequisites:

(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the LandsManagementBureauor

(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by theNationalStatisticsOffice:

Provided,That,thecreationthereofshallnotreducethelandarea,population,andincomeoftheoriginalunitorunitsatthetimeofsaidcreationtolessthantheminimumrequirementsprescribedherein.

AcomponentcitysconversionintoanHUCanditsresultantautonomyfromtheprovinceisathreattothelatterseconomicviability.Noteworthy is that the incomecriterion foracomponentcity tobeconverted intoanHUC ishigher than the income requirement for the creation of a province. The ensuing reduction in income uponseparationwouldclearly leaveacripplingeffecton theprovincesoperationsas therewouldbe less funding tofinance infrastructureprojectsand todefrayoverheadcosts.Moreover, thequalityofservicesbeingofferedbytheprovincemaysufferbecauseof loomingausteritymeasures.Thesearebuta fewof thesocialcostsof thedecline in the provinces economic performance, which Nueva Ecija is bound to experience once its mostprogressivecityofCabanatuanattainsindependence.

c.ImpactonPoliticalRights

Asidefromthealterationofeconomicrights,thepoliticalrightsofNuevaEcijaandthoseofitsresidentswillalsobeaffectedbyCabanatuansconversionintoanHUC.Notably,theadministrativesupervisionoftheprovinceoverthecitywilleffectivelyberevokeduponconversion.Secs.4and12,Art.XoftheConstitutionread:

Sec.4.ThePresidentofthePhilippinesshallexercisegeneralsupervisionoverlocalgovernments.Provinceswithrespecttocomponentcitiesandmunicipalities,andcitiesandmunicipalitieswithrespecttocomponentbarangaysshallensurethattheactsoftheircomponentunitsarewithinthescopeoftheirprescribedpowersandfunctions.

Sec12.Citiesthatarehighlyurbanized,asdeterminedbylaw,andcomponentcitieswhosechartersprohibittheir

votersfromvotingforprovincialelectiveofficials,shallbeindependentoftheprovince.Thevotersofcomponentcitieswithinaprovince,whosecharterscontainnosuchprohibition,shallnotbedeprivedoftheirrighttovoteforelectiveprovincialofficials.

Duties, privilegesandobligationsappertaining toHUCswill attach toCabanatuanCity if it is converted intoanHUC. This includes the right to be outside the general supervision of the province and be under the directsupervision of the President. An HUC is not subject to provincial oversight because the complex and variedproblems inanHUCdue toabiggerpopulationandgreatereconomicactivity requiregreaterautonomy.29 TheprovincialgovernmentstandstolosethepowertoensurethatthelocalgovernmentofficialsofCabanatuanCityactwithinthescopeofitsprescribedpowersandfunctions,30toreviewexecutiveordersissuedbythecitymayor,and toapprove resolutionsandordinancesenactedby the city council.31 Theprovincewill also bedivestedofjurisdictionoverdisciplinarycasesconcerningtheelectedcityofficialsofthenewHUC,andtheappealprocessforadministrativecasedecisionsagainstbarangayofficialsof thecitywillalsobemodifiedaccordingly.32 Likewise,theregisteredvotersofthecitywillnolongerbeentitledtovoteforandbevoteduponasprovincialofficials.33

IncuttingtheumbilicalcordbetweenCabanatuanCityandtheprovinceofNuevaEcija,thecitywillbeseparatedfromthe territorial jurisdictionof theprovince,asearlierexplained.Theprovincialgovernmentwillno longerberesponsiblefordeliveringbasicservicesforthecityresidentsbenefit.Ordinancesandresolutionspassedbytheprovincialcouncilwillnolongercoverthecity.ProjectsqueuedbytheprovincialgovernmenttobeexecutedinthecitywillalsobesuspendedifnotscrappedtopreventtheLGUfromperformingfunctionsoutsidetheboundsofitsterritorialjurisdiction,andfromexpendingitslimitedresourcesforventuresthatdonotcatertoitsconstituents.1 w p h i1

InviewofthesechangesintheeconomicandpoliticalrightsoftheprovinceofNuevaEcijaanditsresidents,theentire province certainly stands to be directly affected by the conversion of Cabanatuan City into an HUC.Following the doctrines in Tan and Padilla, all the qualified registered voters of Nueva Ecija should then beallowedtoparticipateintheplebiscitecalledforthatpurpose.

Respondentsapprehensionthatrequiringtheentireprovincetoparticipateintheplebiscitewillsetadangerousprecedentleadingtothefailureofcitiestoconvertisunfounded.Theirfearthatprovinceswillalwaysbeexpectedtoopposetheconversioninordertoretainthecitysdependenceisspeculativeatbest.Inanyevent,anyvoteofdisapprovalcastbythosedirectlyaffectedbytheconversionisavalidexerciseoftheirrighttosuffrage,andourdemocraticprocessesaredesigned touphold thedecisionof themajority, regardlessof themotivebehind thevote.Itisunfathomablehowtheprovincecanbedeprivedoftheopportunitytoexercisetherightofsuffrageinamatter that ispotentiallydeleterious to itseconomicviabilityandcoulddiminish therightsof itsconstituents.Tolimit theplebiscite toonly thevotersof theareas tobepartitionedandsecededfromtheprovince isasabsurdandillogicalasallowingonlythesecessioniststovoteforthesecessionthattheydemandedagainstthewishesofthemajorityandtonullifythebasicprincipleofmajorityrule.34

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 203974, is herebyGRANTED.COMELECMinuteResolutionNo.120797datedSeptember11,2012andMinuteResolutionNo.120925 dated October 16, 2012 are hereby declared NULL and VOID. Public respondent COMELEC is herebyenjoined from implementing the said Resolutions. Additionally, COMELEC is hereby ordered to conduct aplebisciteforthepurposeofconvertingCabanatuanCityintoaHighlyUrbanizedCitytobeparticipatedinbythequalified registered voters of Nueva Ecij a within 120 days from the finality of this Decision. The Petition forMandamus,docketedasG.R.No.204371,isherebyDISMISSED.

SOORDERED.

PRESBITEROJ.VELASCO,JR.AssociateJustice

WECONCUR:

IjoinDissentofJ.LeonenMA.LOURDESP.A.SERENO

ChiefJustice

ANTONIOT.CARPIOAssociateJustice

TERESITAJ.LEONARDODECASTROAssociateJustice

ARTUROD.BRIONAssociateJustice

DIOSDADOM.PERALTAAssociateJustice

LUCASP.BERSAMINAssociateJustice

MARIANOC.DELCASTILLOAssociateJustice

Tooknopart.ROBERTOA.ABADAssociateJustice

IjointheDissentofJ.LeonenMARTINS.VILLARAMA,JR.

AssociateJustice

JOSEPORTUGALPEREZAssociateJustice

IjointhedissentofJ.LeonenJOSECATRALMENDOZA

AssociateJustice

BIENVENIDOL.REYESAssociateJustice

ESTELAM.PERLASBERNABEAssociateJustice

Idissent.SeeSeparateOpinionMARVICMARIOVICTORF.LEONEN

AssociateJustice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the aboveDecisionhadbeenreachedinconsultationbeforethecasewasassignedtothewriteroftheopinionoftheCourt.

MA.LOURDESP.A.SERENOChiefJustice

CERTIFIEDTRUECOPYENRIQUEESGUERRAVIDALClerkofCourtOCCEnBancSupremeCourt

Footnotes1Rollo,pp.113115.2Id.at6465.3Id.at143146.4COMELECChairpersonSixtoBrillantesandCommissionerArmandoVelascocastthedissentingvotes.5Mendenillav.Onandia,115Phil.534(1962).6RA7160,Sec.3853867Id.,Sec.4414428Id.,Sec.4494509Id.,Sec.46046110Section452.HighlyUrbanizedCities.

(a)Citieswithaminimumpopulationof twohundredthousand(200,000) inhabitantsascertifiedbythe National Statistics Office, and within the latest annual income of at least Fifty Million Pesos(P50,000,000.00)basedon1991constantprices,ascertifiedbythecitytreasurer,shallbeclassifiedashighlyurbanizedcities.

(b) Cities which do not meet above requirements shall be considered component cities of theprovince in which they are geographically located. If a component city is located within theboundariesoftwo(2)ormoreprovinces,suchcityshallbeconsideredacomponentoftheprovinceofwhichitusedtobeamunicipality.

(c)Qualifiedvotersofhighlyurbanizedcitiesshallremainexcludedfromvotingforelectiveprovincialofficials.

Unless otherwise provided in the Constitution or this Code, qualified voters of independentcomponentcitiesshallbegovernedbytheirrespectivecharters,asamended,ontheparticipationofvotersinprovincialelections.

QualifiedvotersofcitieswhoacquiredtherighttovoteforelectiveprovincialofficialspriortotheclassificationofsaidcitiesashighlyurbanizedaftertheratificationoftheConstitutionandbeforetheeffectivityofthisCode,shallcontinuetoexercisesuchright.

11G.R.No.133064,September16,1999,314SCRA603.12Id.at610.13AnActAmendingCertainSectionsofRepublicActNumbered7720AnActConvertingtheMunicipalityofSantiagointoanIndependentComponentCitytoBeKnownastheCityofSantiago.14No.L21114,November28,1967,21SCRA1095,1106.15Garciav.COMELEC,G.R.No.111230,September30,1994,237SCRA279,29116Mutucv.COMELEC,G.R.No.32717,Nov.26,1970,36SCRA228.17Garciav.COMELEC,supranote15.18Fernandezv.Cuerva,supranote14.19No.L73155,July11,1986,142SCRA727.20G.R.No.103328,October19,1992,214SCRA735.21Tanv.COMELEC,supranote19,at742743.22Id.at745746.23IIIRECORD,CONSTITUTIONALCOMMISSION486.24SenateBillNo.155,IIRECORDSOFTHESENATE121,4thRegularSession(July26,1990).25Rollo,p.89.26RA7160,Sec.138.

27Id.,Sec.139.28Id.,Sec.140.29DeLeon,HectorS.&DeLeon,HectorJr.,TEXTBOOKONTHEPHILIPPINECONSTITUTION(2011).30LGC,Section29.ProvincialRelationswithComponentCitiesandMunicipalities.Theprovince,throughthegovernor,shallensure thateverycomponentcityandmunicipalitywithin its territorial jurisdictionactswithin the scope of its prescribed powers and functions. Highly urbanized cities and independentcomponentcitiesshallbeindependentoftheprovince.

Id.,Section465.TheChiefExecutive:Powers,Duties,Functions,andCompensation.

xxxx

(b)Forefficient,effectiveandeconomicalgovernancethepurposeofwhichisthegeneralwelfareoftheprovinceanditsinhabitantspursuanttoSection16ofthisCode,theprovincialgovernorshall:

xxxx

(2)Enforcealllawsandordinancesrelativetothegovernanceoftheprovinceandtheexerciseoftheappropriate corporate powersprovided for underSection22of thisCode, implement all approvedpolicies,programs,projects,servicesandactivitiesoftheprovinceand,inadditiontotheforegoing,shall:

(i)Ensurethattheactsofthecomponentcitiesandmunicipalitiesoftheprovinceandofitsofficialsandemployeesarewithinthescopeoftheirprescribedpowers,dutiesandfunctions.

31Id.,Section30.ReviewofExecutiveOrders.

(a) Except as otherwise provided under the Constitution and special statutes, the governor shallreview all executive orders promulgated by the component city or municipal mayor within hisjurisdiction.Thecityormunicipalmayorshallreviewallexecutiveorderspromulgatedbythepunongbarangaywithinhisjurisdiction.Copiesofsuchordersshallbeforwardedtothegovernororthecityormunicipalmayor,asthecasemaybe,withinthree(3)daysfromtheirissuance.Inallinstancesofreview, the local chief executive concerned shall ensure that such executive orders arewithin thepowersgrantedbylawandinconformitywithprovincial,city,ormunicipalordinances.

(b)Ifthegovernororthecityormunicipalmayorfailstoactonsaidexecutiveorderswithinthirty(30)daysaftertheirsubmission,thesameshallbedeemedconsistentwithlawandthereforevalid.

xxxx

Id.,Section455.ChiefExecutivePowers,DutiesandCompensation.

xxxx

(b)Forefficient,effectiveandeconomicalgovernancethepurposeofwhichisthegeneralwelfareofthecityanditsinhabitantspursuanttoSection16ofthisCode,thecitymayorshall:

(1)Exercisegeneral supervisionandcontroloverall programs,projects, services,andactivitiesofthecitygovernment.andinthisconnection,shall:

xxxx

(xii) Furnish copies of executive orders issued by him, to the provincial governor in the case ofcomponentcitymayors,totheOfficeofthePresidentinthecaseofhighlyurbanizedcitymayorsandtotheir respectivemetropolitancouncilchairmen in thecaseofmayorsofcities in theMetropolitanManila Area and othermetropolitan political subdivisions,within seventytwo (72) hours after theirissuances

xxxx

(xx)Submittotheprovincialgovernor,incaseofcomponentcitiestotheOfficeofthePresident,inthecaseofhighlyurbanizedcitiestotheirrespectivemetropolitanauthoritycouncilchairmenandtotheOfficeof thePresident, incaseofcitiesof theMetropolitanManilaAreaandothermetropolitanpolitical subdivisions, the following reports: an annual report containing a summary of all matterspertinent to themanagement, administration and development of the city and all information anddata relative to its political, social and economic conditions and supplemental reports whenunexpectedeventsandsituationsariseatanytimeduringtheyear,particularlywhenmanmadeornaturaldisastersorcalamitiesaffectthegeneralwelfareofthecity,province,regionorcountry.

32 Id.,Section67.AdministrativeAppeals. Decisions inadministrativecasesmay,within thirty (30)daysfromreceiptthereof,beappealedtothefollowing:

(a) The sangguniang panlalawigan, in the case of decisions of the sangguniang panlungsod ofcomponentcitiesandthesangguniangbayanand

(b)TheOfficeof thePresident, in thecaseofdecisionsof thesangguniangpanlalawiganand thesangguniangpanlungsodofhighlyurbanizedcitiesandindependentcomponentcities.

DecisionsoftheOfficeofthePresidentshallbefinalandexecutory.33Id.,Secs.451452(c).34Tanv.COMELEC,supranote19,at747,ConcurringOpinion,Teehankee,C.J.

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