UN-ASSING THE AO

8/8/2019 UN-ASSING THE AO

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UN-ASSING THE AO

Withdrawal action. Un-assing the AO. Retrograde action. Disengaging. Strategicwithdrawal. Getting outta Dodge. Retirement. Fall back. Turn tail. Attack inanother direction (Marines only). Beating feet. Or, as King Arthur put it soeloquently in regards to the Killer Rabbit in Monty Pythons Search for the HolyGrail, Run away! Run away!

Whatever you want to call it, there comes a time when the best course of actionis just to get the hell away from a superior enemy force. It is actually one of thehardest military tasks to perform successfully, without the withdrawal turning intoa rout. To the Western way of thinking, this is usually considered manly, but itsometimes makes good sense in a particular situation. The Eastern and guerillamentality sees it as a perfectly viable course of action with no dishonor in turningtail almost before the last shots echo out. But as the old saying goes: He whofights and runs away, lives to fight another day.

Heres a short lesson from the official U.S. Army course on the subject,INFANTRY PLATOON DEFENSE, with tactics for withdrawal, delay anddisengagement towards the end of the chapter.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/accp/in0497/lesson3.htm

Lets examine some of the tactics used by some of our enemies (and a handful offriends) in the past and in the present. Under-estimating and/or deigning to learnlessons from the enemy has often been a costly failing which could have beencorrected easily enough.


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against their front and machinegun fire against their rear. The Schmeissermachine pistol has a high cyclic rate of fire, but is by no means accurate. It wasused extensively by German snipers who placed themselves 3 or 4 miles outsidetowns or villages, along roads leading to these communities. The snipers wouldcut in on the leading element of a company or battalion in order to hold it back.

They would fire until they were out of ammunition, and then would jump out oftheir trees and come running towards our lines, shouting ;Kamerad! Each sniperwore a specially camouflaged uniform and also had camouflaged his weapon by

painting it and tying leaves to it so that it would blend with the surroundingfoliage. An important mission of German snipers was to delay the advance of ourcolumns into populated places. This was why they fired on our leading elements,instead of holding their fire and trying to engage a larger force.

German, Italy:Individual snipers armed with light machine guns, submachineguns, or rifles were concealed in the vineyards and trees forward of, and on theflanks of, the main German positions. The mission of these snipers probably was

to protect the German flanks and to harass the United Nations force.

Red Army, Russia: Red Army tactics included covering a retreat with 3-4snipers accompanied by a single automatic rifleman, with the latter cautioned tofire sparingly and change positions often.

Japanese, WWII, Burma: The Japanese in WWII made use of snipers, some ofthem armed with light machine guns, in delaying actions in Burma.

Sometimes, instead of outposts, a screen of snipers would be pushed forwardfrom the main position. On occasions when a sniper screen was used in place of

outposts, the snipers would fire a few rounds at the advance guard, slip out oftheir trees, retire 100 yards to a new position, then fire and retire again at the firstopportunity. This procedure was continued until the snipers had fallen back tothe main defense position.

FORCING THE ENEMY TO DEPLOY


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An assault is an exhausting endeavor, especially when conductedrepeatedly.

This is one of the most important missions of delaying elements or a rear guard.Every time the enemy is force to deploy his troops into battle formation, lay downcovering fire, and flank and/or assault, it robs him of time, expends prodigiousamounts of ammunition, and eventually exhausts the assault troops.


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There is also a powerful psychological effect, as the enemy is forced to react toyou and loses the initiative. As well, if the rear guard continually sneaks out thebackdoor to leave the assault teams storming vacant positions and inflicting verysmall casualties, it quickly becomes discouraging.

Rebels, Chechnya:The insurgents intend ambushesto impedethe enemy.The type of ambush chosen depends on the combat situation, the correlation offorces, and the terrain. If the purpose is to delay the movement of forces andassets, to alter their direction, or to force a premature deployment into combat

positions, then the insurgents can use a significantly smaller force than theywould need for ambushes to destroy or capture the enemyonly a fewinsurgents can detain a company-size or smaller unit for several hours

Japanese, WWII, Burma: It was the function of the outposts to open fire assoon as the Allied advance guard came within range, and so pin down theleading elements and force them to deploy and waste time probing for the flanks

of the Jap position. This accomplished, the outpost would retire before it wasencircled

Native fighters, German East Africa [Tanzania]: After discharging theirfirearms, the natives retire hastilyto get ahead of the column so that they mayrepeat their attackBy constantly harassing their enemy in this way, they hope,while avoiding serious losses on their own side, to tire him out, compel him toexpend his ammunition and gradually reduce his power of resistance till he canfinally be overwhelmed

German, Italy: Fire will be opened at extreme ranges on an enemy advancing

for a major attack[to force them to deploy early.]

AMBUSH, OBSTACLES & LIMITED COUNTER-ATTACKS

German, Mountain Ski Troops: German Gebirgsjaegermountain and skitroops, especially small raiding parties who often encountered larger enemygroups, employed the age-old and still-used fish hook technique of ambushingtheir back trail during withdrawals.


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Figure 28.-Ambush position on a ridge.

If possible, ambush positions will be established on ridges from which it ispossible to direct effective enfilading fire at the enemy during his slow ascent,while the troops not yet in position dodge quickly to the rear (fig. 28).

German, WWII, Italy: Every opportunity to inflict casualties on an enemyadvancing recklessly must be taken by carrying out limited counterattacks.

British, Crete: When Allied forces on Crete were forced to retreat from theGerman airborne forces on Crete, the paratroops were quick to spot the

withdrawal. Fortunately for the retreating British, Greek and Commonwealthtroops, their retrograde was covered by a company of Maoris. With their warriorhearts, chilling cries, and unexpected, aggressive bayonet charges, theyrepeatedly sent the pursuing Germans fleeing in disarray. Due in large part to theMaoris and their unconventional tactics, the British retreat was successfullyconducted overnight with very few casualties.

Red Chinese, Korea: Tactical traps were employed by the enemy to lureUnited Nations troops into an area. Withdrawals weremade by some enemytroops to entice UN forces into a hasty exploitation. Other enemy troops

positioned themselves to strike the flank or flanks force, in an attempt to destroy

small UN units. In selecting an ambush site, the number of riflemen on the firstline decreased, but an increase of automatic weapons was provided. The bulk ofthe enemy troops deployed under coverto afford a quick attack.

Rebels, Chechnya: [Guidelines for jihadist commanders include] Conduct anorganized withdrawal in small groups while deploying ambushes and deliveringretaliatory fire if the forces of law and order launch a surprise attack on a broad


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front. Maintain psychological pressure on the forces of law and order by firing onthem regularly.

Viet Cong, Vietnam: It should be noted that the VC have a negligible ability tosupport a withdrawal with indirect fire weapons. His chief defenses against

pursuit are the use of rapid movement, ambushes, booby traps and snipersalong his routes of withdrawal.

USE OF RESTRICTIVE OR IMPASSABLE TERRAIN


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The worse the terrain, the easier it is for a small rearguard to greatly delaythe opponents advance with a relative handful of men. In addition to

mountains, urban terrain can be considered a formidable terrain barrier.

Taliban, Afghanistan: The Taliban used Afghanistans varying terrain to theiradvantage when defending against Coalition offensives. In the mountainousGumbad valley of northern Kandahar, insurgents fought from behind piles ofrocks on a mountain face, fled through irrigation ducts designed to channel


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snowmelt, and disappeared over the ridgeline into a nearby mountain rangetotally inaccessible to Coalition forces except by airIn Kandahars lush andheavily cultivated Panjwayi valley, the Taliban fired from the cover of fields andorchards, and moved unobserved through the valleys many irrigation canalsInthe third offensive, insurgents ambushed advancing troops in outlying areas to

the south, and employed a sniper whose position was never identified. In allthree instances, the insurgents fled using pre-planned escape routes minutesbefore air support arrived...The insurgents broke contact shortly before theaircraft arrived. They escaped by climbing up a set of irrigation ducts runningdown the mountain. They then flooded the ducts to prevent the soldiers belowfrom giving chase.Red Chinese, Korea: The covering force or delaying party which covered anenemy withdrawal was usually selected from the last unit to break contact withUnited Nations Forces.The covering forces ranged in size from a 3-man groupto a platoon, although a squad was normally employedThese delaying parties

were placed at strategic points where the land was least favorable to attack,where the roads were poor and natural approaches few. Thus, a small number ofmen armed with automatic weapons were able to hinder a United Nationsattack.

Mujahideen, Afghanistan: The Mujahideen from Lezhi retreated south while a20-man Mujahideen force blocked the Manay Kandow pass. The pass isdominated by a high peak which is capped with a thick rock slab. Under the slabwas a natural cave which the Mujahideen improved. The cave couldaccommodate the 20 Mujahideen during artillery and air strikes. The Mujahideenalso dug communications trenches so that they could quickly reoccupy their

fighting positions once the firing stopped. The firing positions dominated the Tani plain and were well positioned to stop any infantry attack. The DRA [Sovietpuppet government forces] repeatedly attacked the pass but could make noheadway. The infantry would attack, meet withering Mujahideen fire and stop.Then massed air and artillery would pound the area. The infantry would again tryto attack, but would again be stopped immediately. The procedure would thenrepeat itself, but the DRA made no headway during its 10-day attack. After 10days, the DRA called in heavy Soviet airstrikes which continuously hit themountain top. The thick rock slab began to sway and rock. The Mujahideen wereafraid that the rock slab might shift and crush their cave, so they finallywithdrew.

Finnish, Finland: Grossly outnumbered by Soviet forces equipped with moderntanks, aircraft and artily, the Finnish Defense Forces during the 1939-40 WinterWar became masters of the unseen delay and withdrawal with extreme economyof forces. In the thick forests and deep snow of the central regions, themechanized Soviet Army was literally trapped on the few existing roads, unableto maneuver or flank. Without skis or snowshoes, not even the infantrymen couldmove off the roads in snow several feet deep. It didnt take much for small groups


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of snipers to halt a Soviet advance. In one case near Lake Suojarvi, a wellcamouflaged sharpshooter with a Lahti automatic rifle held up an entire Russianregiment for over an hour.

Above the Arctic Circle in Lapland, a flat endless tundra devoid of trees seemed

to be made for rapid advances. But in a scorched earth policy, the Finns, out-numbered five to one and without any tanks or anti-tanks guns, destroyed eachand every man-made or natural feature which might provide Red Army soldiersany food, shelter or warmth as the winter temperatures dropped to as low as 40below zero. Despite a lack of cover, the Arctic nights provided long hoursdarkness and blizzards swept the landscape, allowing warmly dressed nativeLapp snipers to whittle away at the Russian soldiers practically at will.

DISPERSAL & PRE-PLANNED ESCAPE ROUTES

Viet Cong, Vietnam: Recognition of the VC doctrine of emergency dispersal is

of vital importance to successful pursuit. The VC commander may exercise oneof two options, both of which are based on prior planning. He may elect towithdraw his force as a unit(s) or order dispersal into small groups. If emergencydispersal should be required due to pursuit, blocking of the withdrawal route orintensive air effort, small unit leaders take over again, possibly ordering totaldispersal on a man for man basis. If the unit commander sends a few men off indifferent directions to draw fire and mislead the aircraft, when dispersing asindividuals and being pursued by ground forces.

Japanese, Burma: After the withdrawal had begun, the Japanese woulddisperse in groups of three or four men, who would work their way back over

unmapped trails and rendezvous at an assembly point about to 1 mile to therear. From here the rear guard would proceed in column down the trail until itcame to the position selected for the next stand.

German, Mountain Ski Troops: As long as the raiding party is under fire, it willretreat, if possible, on previously prepared tracks made from one assembly pointto another, as designated by the leader. Ski tracks often remain visible for a longtime and betray the route. Therefore, the enemy must be deceived as to thereturn route by dummy tracks, loops, and false route signs. In newly fallen snowthe tracks may be blurred by spruce branches dragged by the last skier. If theenemy pursues, as many delays as possible must be arranged for him. Theseinclude sudden fire from ambush, trail-breaking through difficult terrain,

preparation of road blocks and obstacles, and mining of trails.

Taliban, Afghanistan: Most ambush positions were carefully placed tofacilitate a quick retreat. Fields, irrigation ditches, bunkers, and small compounds

provided cover for insurgents to escape unnoticed from the air or to wait outbombardment.


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Native fighters, Tanzania: [The native soldiers]mobility and incrediblemarching powers, coupled with accurate knowledge of the country, maker himable to carry out apparently impossible detours. He has no fixed line of retreat,for after a defeat his forces break up into small parties, which retire in alldirections and concentrate again at points previously agreed upon, often in the

rear of the victorious troops.

USE OF LIMITED VISIBILITY

Bad weather has always been a mixed blessing to the infantryman. (I never reallydid see the Armys thinking that one needs to go out and practice being cold, wetand miserable. Ma Nature and Mr. Murphy will take care of that eventually. Butthats neither here nor there.) When it comes time for an undetected advance orwithdrawal, Infantry Sunshine becomes the grunts best friend.

Infantry Sunshine provides cover for a withdrawal.

Japanese, Burma: When the Jap rear guard abandoned a delaying position,

such a move was made at night, usually starting about 1 hour after sunset theywere accustomed to leaving a light machine gunner or a sniper in position untilfirst light. He would fire an occasional burst to create the impression that the

position was still occupied.

German, Italy: In the Italian campaign, it was noted that the Germans usuallywithdrew in the early morning, between 0200 and 0400 hours. The rearmost


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delaying parties were equipped with smoke grenades, pots, and candles toconcealment of their movements with smoke screens

Red Army, Russia: [Organized withdrawals were conducted] Especially at nightand during the extended periods of morning and evening fog that are

characteristic of damp forests and swamps, the evacuation of a position cannotbe observed from the air or ground.

Mujahideen, Afghanistan: That night, the weather cooperated with thebreakout. There was a heavy gusty wind which blew sand around. The noise ofthe wind and the dust concealed us as we moved between the enemy tanks.There were many Mujahideen in that cordon. There were Mujahideen from twodistricts and other areas as well. About 2,000 Mujahideen escaped into the night.The dust and wind also helped the civilians exfiltrate and covered their escape.When we got out, the wind died down.

PRESERVATION OF FRIENDLY FORCES

This is the crux of the whole matter. A withdrawal that leaves your forcesscattered and in disarray, without cohesive units, is a wide open invitation fordefeat in detail or a complete rout. Its a tricky matter to pull it off successfully.But there are ways.

Japanese, Burma: By such actions [small rearguards & snipers firing andretreating] the Japs avoided the isolation and eventual destruction of any sizable

portion of their troops.

Native fighters, Tanzania:The natives think themselves beaten in a fight onlywhen they have suffered great losses: flight and escape with small losses theyregard as success.

Viet Cong, Vietnam: VC will seek concealment in the local area in preferenceto panic and purposeless flight. The individuals knowledge of fieldcraft, evasiontechniques, and familiarity with the local area are decisive factors. If pursued to asettlement, he is taught to hide his weapon and other equipment and demandconcealment from the villagers whose fear of possible reprisal from the VC may

provide him temporary protection. His personal safety is the VCS onlyresponsibility. If VC personnel have to hide out for weeks before returning to theirunit, this is acceptable as they have no requirement to be back by reveille, and intheir absence, they leave no vital installations unguarded or in danger of attack.

Taliban, Afghanistan: In populated areas, insurgents often hid their weapons,mingled with civilians, and waited until nightfall to retrieve their arms. Theinsurgents rarely took serious casualties in hit-and-run ambushes. Theircommand-and-control often broke down when US or British forces struck frommultiple directions and closed. Yet, Taliban fighters were rarely cornered. When


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assaulted by a large, heavily armed force, they tended to melt away well aheadof time particularly in the mountains and return later after Coalition forceswithdrew.

Unfortunately, even after all this, you cant just kick back and have a brewski, eh.

Its time to get your poop in a group and get ready for the next round. Still, it surebeats being tits up in the mud or locked in a POW cage.

Documents

UN-ASSING THE AO