TRAINING IN UN OPERATING TECHNIQUES

PKOs differ from one another and the operational techniques re-

quired will also differ. In designing the correct training module an

assessment of the needs of the particular mission will be necessary. This is

relatively easy in dealing with a PKO which has been ongoing for several

years. It is more difficult when training for a new mission. In training for a

new mission the training module will have to concentrate on the elements

common to most, if not all, PKOs in the hope that techniques covered may

be utilized once the PKO is deployed. This Part will cover some of these

techniques and is laid out as follows:

Section 1 - IntroductionSection 2 - Positions and Observation PostsSection 3 - Checkpoints, Road-blocks, SearchesSection 4 - PatrollingSection 5 - InvestigationsSection 6 - Negotiations/LiaisonSection 7 - Use of ForceSection 8 - Leadership

The level of training required will vary from one contributing

country to another. Full-time professional soldiers will require less

grounding than reserves. Full-time professionals with experience in aid to

the civil power or internal security will have encountered the techniques

before but will be required to direct them towards peace-keeping, which

may involve a less aggres-sive mode.

Positions and observation postsPosition (Posn) A Posn is a tactically sited location permanently

occupied by military members of a PKO from where they carry out various

operational tasks such as check points, road-blocks, observation, patrols. A

Posn is normally occupied by armed troops

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Observation Post. An OP is a permanently occupied location from

where UN peace-keepers carry out ìobserve and report missions. In

locating OPs one may often have to sacrifice good tactical siting for good

observation. An OP can be occupied by armed troops or unarmed

observers. It is not current practice to man OPs with a mixture of armed

troops and unarmed observers.

Temporary Posns/OPs.

These are manned as required on a temporary basis, for a limited

period of time, for an observation or control task. They are not

administratively selfcontained but may be located in old permanent

positions or OPs, in which case they will contain some of the features from

their previous status.

Marking and protection

All Posns/OPs must be well delineated, distinctively marked and

provide protection for the occupants.

They should be surrounded by a protective wall (earth mound, rock

construction wall, gabions, T-walls, etc.). Outside the perimeter wall

should be extensive wire entanglements and the entrance gate should be

zigzagged.

The Posn/OP should be painted white with UN markings in black or

blue. The Posn/OP number should also be prominently displayed. These

markings should be visible from the air. The UN flag should be flown at

all times from a prominently placed flagpole. The Posn/OP and flag should

be well lit at night.

The Posn/OP should incorporate a shelter capable of with standing

the type of fire which is likely in the area. With scarce resources a

categorization and priority programme may be necessary.

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Posns/OPs should have:

a. line and radio communications to next higher HQ;

b. specific written orders;

c. a specified minimum strength

Training aid

The ideal training aid would be an actual Posn/OP constructed in the

concentration area of the contributing country, where economically

feasible, or perhaps under a regional training arrangement. Other training,

covered below, such as checkpoints, searches and shelters, could also be

carried out in the location.

If such a fully developed training aid is not possible, a less

sophisticated ìmock-upî may suffice. As a last resort, use can be made of

detailed audiovisual training aids (e.g. diagrams, slides, VCRs,

etc.). A diagrammatic plan for a position is attached as Annex B.

The training periods should cover:

Daily routine

Observing techniques.

Daily routine

This can be covered initially by briefing and lectures. Where a properly

constructed location as described above is available, the briefing can be

followed up by actually having trainees live there while doing other

aspects of training, although it is recognized that this may not always be

possible. The following areas should be covered

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a. hygiene and cleaning programmes;b. minor maintenance tasks;c. generator operation and care;d. cooking (UNMO’s).

Observing techniques.

Training in observation should include:

a. technique for searching ground;

b. use of binoculars;

c. use of Night Vision Equipment.

The climax to training should be a training exercise involving day and

night observation where troops/observers would be tested on their ability

to observe and report on some contrived incidents.

Checkpoints, road-blocks, searches

A checkpoint is a manned point used as a means of controlling

movement and checking vehicles and pedestrians, in order to enforce

control measures, orders and regulations. Although used widely by some

PKOs, the nature and frequency of their use would depend on the mandate

and concept of operation as well as the status of forces agreement, which

may limit UN powers of search. Closed checkpoints are called road-

blocks. They can also form the basis of blocking positions if these are

required because of developments on the ground (e.g. incursions by the

parties).

Checkpoints as outlined here are relevant only in a situation where

the PKOís mandate requires it to maintain a high profile in circumstances

of actual or potential conflict. The training will require adjustment for

missions where such conditions do not exist.

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Checkpoints (CHPs) can be classified as:

a. static;

b. mobile.

Static CHPs are deployed permanently at fixed locations. Normally a

position adjoins the installation. Troops who man the CHP will live at the

position. CHPs are deployed on a road or major track, normally at a

crossroads or junction or at the entrance to a controlled area. Annex ìCî

gives suggested layouts for CHPs.

All CHPs will have a method of slowing traffic (ramps and/or a zigzag

device) and a search bay for the more thorough searches.

The CHP is manned on a 7-day week/24-hour day basis, but it can be

closed and converted to a road-block where movement is forbidden during

given hours. The blocking of the road/track does not relieve the position of

its normal security/observation mission. CHPs sometimes vary in the

degree of search they are required to carry out (e.g. military vehicles only,

all vehicles, random proportion of vehicle). Depending on local circum-

stances, searches may also include the searching of individuals or at least

males.

Mobile CHPs are deployed where the PKO has difficulties covering

all roads and tracks with static CHPs.

Mobile CHPs will be composed of a minimum of one section in two

armoured vehicles. This group will leave base, operate over a given road-

track network and set up snap CHPs en route for short periods. Annex D

covers the operation of mobile CHPs.

Training in the operation of CHPs, road-blocks and searches is best

conducted in sequence as follows:

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a. introductory lecture/discussion;

b. practical application;

c. exercise.

The lecture/discussion and practical application should cover the theory,

layout, siting and operation of CHPs, road-blocks and searches. While the

initial part can be done in a classroom/lecture hall, the practical application

can only be attempted on the ground. If a training position/OP has been

constructed, it would be useful to incorporate a static CHP into the training

area. This would be ideal for training in all three areas. Otherwise a simple

mock-up should be used. For training in mobile CHPs the necessary

equipment can usually be easily provided from local resources. Thereafter

a training circuit can be laid out and the operation of mobile CHPs

practised. Annex D is the operations Directive from UNIFIL on mobile

CHPs. It may prove beneficial when constructing a training period in this

area.

The final phase of training in this area should be an exercise

involving the operation of static and mobile CHPs, the conversion of CHPs

to road-blocks and the actual searching of personnel and vehicles where

Some will actually be carrying contraband goods.

The normal subsidiary problems encountered at CHPs should also be

included in exercises (e.g. build-up of traffic and consequent loss of

tempers, truculent subjects of search, crash through incidents and follow-

up action, etc.).

The exercise and training leading towards it should include the following

areas:

a. security and deployment of personnel;

b. method of search;

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c. what to do when people:

refuse to produce ID card,

refuse to open the boot of the car,

produce a weapon;

d. training in traffic control;

e. training for junior leaders in:

isolating problems quickly, preventing their escalation,scaling down and

defusing problems quickly

Patrolling

Patrolling is an essential part of UN peace-keeping. It is virtually

impossible to conceive of a mission in which there would be no patrolling.

This activity is conducted by PKOs whether they are observer groups,

peace-keeping Forces or a mixture of both.

Predeployment training on patrolling must cover the following areas:

a. types of patrol to be undertaken;

b. aims of patrolling in the PKO;

c. principles to be adhered to by patrols;

d. conduct of the patrolling.

These training guidelines deal with the subject in broad outline. In

designing its own training programme the relevant national authority will

have to bear in mind the particular PKO and its likely patrolling

requirements.

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Types of patrolls

The types of patrolling utilized by PKOs, currently and in the past, have

been many and varied. Training should cover the type of pa- trolling to be

undertaken by the PKO in question. These patrols, which can be by day or

night, may be:

a. foot patrols;

b. vehicle patrols;

c. air patrols;

d. sea patrols;

e. special (river/marsh, ski, etc.) patrols.

Aims of patrolling

Training should specify the aims of patrolling for the PKO in ques tion.

These aims may be to:

a. confirm/supervise a cease-fire;

b. gain information;

c. check on areas which cannot be observed from OPs;

d. indicate a UN presence to parties;

e. reassure isolated communities;

f. carry out mobile CHPs;

g. inspect existing and empty positions of the parties;

h. insert ìambushî parties along infiltration lanes;

j. carry out observation from isolated and unoccupied OPs;

k. provide a physical link between adjoining but relatively iso-

lated UN positions;

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l. provide protection for parties or local population where travelling

without the UN might provoke an incident;

m. interpose standing patrols between parties during a period of tension.

Where patrolling is to be included in pre-deployment training the

suggested sequence is:

a. lecture/discussion including the stressing of UN patrolling

procedures;

b. practice;

c. exercise.

In preparing a training module covering patrolling, the lecture/discussion

sequence should cover the following:

a.Strength.

Minimum strengths for patrols should be laid down in SOPs to include use

of specialist vehicles and minimum number of vehicles if necessary.

b.Security.

Security measures should be covered. These could include:

safe (mine cleared) patrol routes/paths;

LOs/guides/interpreters;

no go area information;

night patrol restrictions/special procedures;

where necessary, overt measures to ensure patrol recognition by parties.

c.Communications.

Radio report lines system, etc.

d.Equipment Levels.

e.Reinforcement Plan.

f.Tactical Formations.

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g.Medevac Plans.

In the practice/exercise phase the following areas should be included:

a.Patrol Preparations

Briefing on mission, area, time in and out, routes in andout, etc.

Personal preparation;

Preparation and testing of equipment, vehicles, communications.

b.Patrol Execution

Maintenance of radio contact/reports;

Action on encounters;

Action on halts.

c. Debrief

Verbal to the patrol master (e.g. Coy Comd, Ops Offr, Info Offr,

etc.), followed by a written report/marked map to next higher headquarters.

The preparation and execution of an exercise on UN patrolling techniques

should be part of all pre-deployment training. The scenario should cover as

many of the aims of patrolling (see page 49) as possible. Depending on

available training time it may be necessary to concentrate on some areas

only.

The most important areaswould be:

a. information gathering patrol, including ground observation;

b. mobile CHP patrol (peace-keeping Force members only);

c. interposition patrols (more relevant to peace-keeping Forces than

Observers);

d. ambush patrols on infiltration lanes (peace-keeping Force members

only).

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Investigations

In the pre-deployment training of United Nations Military Ob-

servers, the whole area of operational investigations should be covered. It

does not have much pertinence for non-commissioned officers or privates

destined to be members of a peace-keeping Force, although officers of a

Force may be involved in such investigations.

An operational investigation is one carried out by the UN into any

special operational occurrence. It will normally evolve from:

a. a particularly serious operational incident requiring further detailed

appraisal;

b. a request by one of the parties after an alleged incident involving the

other party;

c. a complaint from one of the parties about the operational

behaviour/reaction of UN military personnel.

Operational investigations are normally held against the background of a

serious or potentially serious incident. As such they are very important

and, properly handled, can be a definite contributing factor towards

keeping potentially explosive situations in check.

To ensure that they are properly carried out the procedures should be

covered in the training of officers. A request for an operational

investigation can be initiated at headquarters or local level. An

investigation can be offered by the PKO without a request from the

party/parties if it is felt that it will defuse a potentially serious situation. If

one is requested at the unit level and involves a purely local incident, it

may be investigated at that level but only after seeking and being granted

the approval of the PKO HQ. At HQ level, depending on the seriousness of

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the incident an investigation can be instituted by the FC/CMO or one of his

senior staff officers, most probably the Chief Operations Officer.

An operational investigation should be carried out by at least two

officers who are suitably qualified. They must be properly briefed and if

possible be given written terms of reference. The parties may be asked to

provide LCs, documentary or material evidence and witnesses. The team

will carry out the investigation with efficiency, discretion and courtesy.

They will be strictly impartial and will not accept any pressure from the

parties. They will not express personal opinions, although professional

opinions will be part of their report.

The investigation will be carried out at the scene of the incident or as close

to it as possible. The team will take notes, make sketches, mark maps, take

photographs, tag material evidence items with serial number/date-time

group/map reference. The team will maintain communication with the

headquarters throughout.

ReportAt the conclusion of the investigation, a written report will be submitted to

the convening authority. This report will form the basis of reports to the

parties, UN New York, etc. The report will include:

terms of reference;

broad description of background to investigation;

actions of investigation team;

statements;

maps, physical evidence, sketches, photographs, etc.;

conclusions.

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In many Defence Forces officers will have already been involved in

operational investigations of one kind or the other. They may not,

however, have experience in UN investigations. Some officers will have

no experience whatsoever in this area. In assessing the type of training to

be covered in this module, the experience of the potential students will

have to be considered. Based on this assessment the actual training can

vary from:

a. simple lecture/discussion, to

b. lecture/discussion followed by an exercise where students are asked to

investigate a contrived incident and produce a report, with subsequent

class criticism/discussion periods.

Negotiations/liaison

Liaison with the parties is an essential element of UN peace- keeping. All

PKOs will have a liaison system in place to provide a structured link

between the UN and the parties through which negotiation of mutual

problems can take place. The liaison system will embody:

a. a high-level link at FC/CMO levels;

b. a medium working level link between PKO HQ and the parties on a

continuing day-to-day basis;

c. unit ground-level link, organized at unit level and designed to defuse

problems at source.

In the area of liaison work, certain nominated officers at PKO HQ and unit

levels may be nominated to negotiate.

Other forms of negotiation outside this formalized system exist:

a. military observers may be called to negotiate on a problem which has

arisen on the ground;

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b. junior leaders at corporal or even private level may have to negotiate a

sudden problem which has arisen in their area(e.g. a CHP dispute).

The training for negotiation and liaison will of necessity be restricted. At

the formal end of the scale, the selection of personnel with negotiating

ability and experience is all-important. As far as informal negotiation by

UNMOs and junior leaders is concerned, some general training can be

carried out.

The best format is lecture/discussion followed by simple exercises:

a. lecture/discussion should cover such areas as diplomacy, tact, firmness,

fairness, friendliness and flexibility;

b. the exercises could be at low level involving junior leaders (e.g. an

imaginary CHP incident) and could be co-ordinated with other exercises

(e.g. CHP searching, etc.).

Use of force

Training/discussion on the use of force within a PKO forms a very

important part of the training programme. It must be included for all levels

in all modules.

This is necessary because:

a. the non-enforcement nature of peace-keeping has devel oped to such a

stage that it is now an integral part of PKOs;

b. soldiers from many contributing countries will have been conditioned to

an automatic return of fire philosophy;

c. soldiers with wide experience of aid to the civil power at home will still

find differences in the application of UN doctrine;

d. soldiers with previous UN experience may find the doctrine changed

slightly as part of the ongoing evolutionary process.

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The whole ethos of peace-keeping is that it be achieved without the use of

military force. As explained in Part 1, it is quite different from ìpeace

enforcementî under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

UN PKOs are carried out by unarmed observers, armed forces equipped

only for self-defence, or a combination of both. Where armed troops are

part of a UN PKO, the topic of Use of Force must be covered in pre-

deployment training.

It is suggested that the subject be dealt with in the following order:

definition of force;

when force can be used;

principles in the application of force;

how force is to be applied;

authority for the use of force;

actions after force has been applied.

Definition

Force is the use of physical means to impose one’s will.

The Report of the Secretary-General on the establishment of UNIFIL

summed up the basic principle on the use of force by PKOs when it stated

inter alia that ìthe Force will be provided with weapons of a defensive

character and shall not use force except in self-defence. Self-defence

would include resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent it from

discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council.

Force can be used only in self-defence against direct attacks on, or threats

to the lives of UN personnel or when UN security in general is under

threat. This would include attempts at forceful entry into UN positions and

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their environs by one party for us as a fire base against the other and

attempts by force to disarm UN troops.

Principles in the application of force

Once a decision to use force is taken, certain principles will be adhered to

by the UN:

a. only the minimum force consistent with achieving the aim will be

employed;

b. if possible, prevention by negotiation or persuasion should precede

force. This escalatory process is, however, an ideal which it may not

always be possible to realize;

c. if a situation develops where firing for effect seems the only option, it

will be preceded by warnings. These can be oral, firing of flares which are

understood by the parties as being a warning, warning shots in the air,

firing short, etc.;

d. fire for effect will be initiated after the procedures above have been

exhausted. However, if there is an immediate threat to UN lives or if UN

casualties have already occurred, fire for effect may be initiated without

delay. Fire for effect is firing to hit;

e. in firing for effect there should be no escalations in type of fire. The idea

should be to return like with like;

f. fire should be controlled and should cease once the aim has been

achieved;

g. after the incident the UN Commander involved must immediately

transmit a full SITREP to HQ, including the type and number of rounds

fired by UN forces.

The Force Commander may wish to reserve to himself the

authorization to fire heavy support weapons (120 mm mortars) with

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authorization for the firing of other heavy weapons being reserved to the

Battalion CO.

A request in clear or radio for authorization to fire such weapons can

incidentally have a deterrent effect on its own. In the final analysis,

however, it is the commander on the spot who must assess his situation and

take what he sees as appropriate action.

During training the broad principles stated above should be

expanded on, especially for the junior soldier. Consideration should be

given to utilizing the medium of simple scenarios based on situations the

soldier is likely to encounter

Leadership

Peace-keeping places a large amount of responsibility on leaders, at

the junior officer and non-commissioned officer levels. Unlike

conventional operations where senior leaders will very often be near at

hand, peace-keeping is often carried out in isolated positions, scattered

checkpoints, small patrols, etc.

Leaders, senior and junior, officers and NCOs, are selected for their

innate or acquired abilities in this field. They will, in most cases, have

received adequate career training in leadership tech-

niques as part of their professional education. It is not therefore necessary,

in most cases, to undertake separate instruction in leadership in the pre-

deployment phase.

What is required is an emphasis on the exercise of responsibility and

command. To assist in the development of the leadership potential of the

section and sub-section commanders, their responsibilities should be

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emphasized from the commencement of training and their sections should

train as a team throughout.

Close supervision of junior leaders should be exercised by those

responsible for the training, with on-the-spot remedial action employed as

re quired.

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SAFETY MEASURES AND PRECAUTIONS

No commander at any level wishes his troops to sustain casualties. It

is therefore important that security measures at all levels be dealt with

during pre-deployment training. This part will look at troop safety under

the following headings:

Section 1 - Introduction

Section 2 - Shelters

Section 3 - Equipment

Section 4 - Travelling and Movement

Section 5 - Non-operational Safety Measures

It must be emphasized that maintenance of the security drills learned

in basic training will always be pertinent.

All UN positions and observation posts should include a shelter or

shelters large enough to accommodate the manning strength as well as

some extra personnel. Each shelter should be well stocked with sufficient

water and pack rations to allow personnel to survive without resupply for a

given number of days, as laid down by the commander in SOPs (ten days

is a suggested minimum). There will be a holdings chart and checks will be

carried out regular intervals (at least once a month). Proper paper stock

rotation should take place.

The construction of shelters will depend on:

a. how immediate a threat to UN personnel is perceived;

b. the resources available.

Where resources are not immediately available to achieve the standard laid

down in the preceding paragraph, the positions most likely to be involved

in observing and reporting a major outbreak of hostilities should have first

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priority, followed by positions in the likely area of fighting, followed by

other positions. To meet relevant requirements, pre-deployment training

should cover:

a. the theory and practice of shelter construction;

b. the development of shelters;

c. the organization, daily routine and maintenance of established shelters.

Training is best implemented by lecture/discussions followed by practical

experience.

a. The theory and practice of shelter construction can focus on the

necessity for shelters, the high priority which should be given to the shelter

in the development of a position, materials used in the construction of

shelters (sandbags, T walls, earth mounds, concrete blocks, gabions,

Damascus shelters etc.).

The practical aspect should involve familiarization with materials

and some practical construction.

b. The topic of the development of shelters should cover the addition of

comfort and practical innovations in the shelter once the priority of

protection has been achieved (e.g. sleeping bunks, ration storage, radio

remotes, drainage, lighting, power, etc.).

c. Established shelter training is best done in a mock up or real training

shelter. Training can centre around the daily checks of foods, medical kit,

radio, etc. which should be undertaken. If it is felt necessary, troops can

experience living in a shelter while undertaking other training activities al-

though this will be restricted by the number of personnel involved and the

number of shelters in the training area

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Equipment

The security of troops engaged in peace-keeping can be enhanced by the

issue and utilization of protective items of equipment.

Steel helmets

These are NOT a UN issued item but all personnel engaged in peace-

keeping should be issued with them. The operational situation will dictate

when they should be worn

Fragmentation vests

These are NOT a UN issued but should be made available by the

contributing country. They can be issued as a personal item of kit to all

soldiers or a pre-designated quantity could be deployed with the unit to

enable an adequate pool system to be set up. They should be carried or

worn by all personnel when on exposed operational duty

NBC suits

There are NOT a UN issued item, nor is it normal for troops engaged in

peace-keeping to have them as a personal kit item or thatthey be available

from a unit pool. However, where the UN assesses that a nuclear,

biological or chemical threat exists, contributing countries may be asked to

make NBC suits available for issue to personnel on operational duty in risk

areas.

From a training viewpoint, it should be sufficient just to emphasize the

carrying of helmets and fragmentation vests by way of lecture. If it is felt

that additional emphasis is necessary, helmets and fragmentation vest can

be scheduled as dress for certain training periods (e.g. operational

training). It may also be necessary to include a period of familiarization

with, and wearing of, the NBC suit for all troops. Ideally all soldiers

should be obliged to wear and work in the suit for at least 30 minutes.

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Failing this they should at least know how to don the suit and be aware

how uncomfortable it can be to personnel who are not used to wearing it.

Travelling and movement

UN personnel, depending on the threat in their area of operations, can be at

special risk when travelling. Pre- deployment training must cover this area

with particular emphasis on convoy driving and hijack drills.

a. United Nations Military Observers are almost always un- armed. When

it is judged that there is a threat to their security, SOPs will probably

require them to travel in two vehicle convoys with reliable

communications. Consideration can also be given to supplying them with

arms and/or an armed escort, but studies of this question in the past have

almost in variably led to the conclusion that arming the observer would

compromise their ability to carry out their duties and would create a

potentially dangerous confusion between armed troops and unarmed

military observers, whose methods of operation are quite different and

must be so perceived by those with whom they deal.

b. A United Nations Force might be in a low-risk situation. It should

nevertheless employ security measures such as a minimum number of

armed personnel to travel in each vehicle.

c. In high risk situations, a UN Force should employ the convoy system

with:

two vehicles at least in each convoy;

four armed personnel in each convoy;

radio in at least one vehicle;

convoy procedures employed (e.g. keeping vehicle behind always in

view);

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no predictable travel patterns;

limited after-dark movement (e.g. operations only, armoured vehicles only,

etc.);

no progress reports in clear on radio (e.g. use report lines or brief HQ

before leaving, report by telephone on arrival, use radio in emergency

only).

Hijack

Where a danger of hijacking exists, SOPs will include an anti- hijack drill.

this should include:

a. an initial hijack message from vehicle under threat or OP/vehicle

observing incident, giving:

posn (e.g. 1 Km N of Posn 6-34);

who (e.g. 4 armed elements);

in what (e.g. Blue Volvo);

other details (e.g. going North)

b. hijack alert to all stations with resulting action:

closing of CHPs to create road-blocks;

alerting of mobile reserves (unit and force);

mobile patrol from nearest unit to location of incident;

ñ helicopters on standby (if deployed with PKO); dog teams on standby (if

deployed with PKO);

liaison with local authorities and others in a position to help

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Non-operational safety measures

A high proportion of deaths and serious injuries in PKOs come not from

operational causes but from so-called natural causes and accidents. These

include:

a. health reasons;

b. traffic accidents;

c. fire;

d. suicide;

e. weapon handling accidents;

f. accidents while on leave.

Proper briefing and preventive measures prior to deployment can reduce

these unnecessary casualties:

a. The pre-UN service medical examination must be thorough and it must

pay particular attention to conditions which might be adversely affected by

stress, new climatic conditions etc.;

b. Great stress must be laid on briefing drivers on the different road and

track conditions they will meet (e.g. the treacherously slippery conditions

which come after the first rains in some areas) and the local driving

practices. Defensive driving must be emphasized;

c. training in fire prevention, fire precaution, fire fighting and rescue is

necessary.

Emphasis should be placed on:

identification of fire hazards;

the exercising of personnel in the use of fire fighting equipment;

first aid and general rescue measures;

evacuation of buildings;

safety measures in the handling of inflammable materials.

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d. Troops must be briefed on how to recognize and deal with depression in

themselves and in their companions; they must be pre-warned on the

dangers of loneliness and stress and on the effect these can have in over-

emphasizing reactions to such things as bad news for home;

e. Although a normal military attribute, care in weapon handling must also

be stressed during training. Troops serving in PKOs will probably handle

their personal weapons much more than in the home environment. Over-

familiarity and carelessness can prove a fatal combination and troops

should be aware of this. There are training films and videos widely

available on this subject;

f. Leave, after a prolonged period of tension and abstinence, can often lead

to over-indulgence, especially in alcohol, which in turn can create the

conditions for serious accidents while on leave. Troops should be briefed

on this prior to service with a PKO and again prior to taking leave in the

mission area.

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NATO’s FUNDAMENTAL SECURITY TASKS

NATO’s essential and enduring purpose is to safeguard the freedom and

security of all its members by political and military means. Collective defence is

at the heart of the Alliance and creates a spirit of solidarity and cohesion among

its members. NATO strives to secure a lasting peace in Europe, based on

common values of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of

law. Since the outbreak of crises and conflicts beyond the borders of NATO

member countries can jeopardize this objective, the Alliance also contributes to

peace and stability through crisis management operations and partnerships.

Essentially, NATO not only helps to defend the territory of its members, but

engages where possible and when necessary to project its values further afield,

prevent crises, manage crises, stabilize post-conflict situations and support

reconstruction. 

NATO also embodies the transatlantic link by which the security of North

America is tied to the security of Europe. It is an intergovernmental organization

which provides a forum where members can consult together on any issues they

may choose to raise and take decisions on political and military matters

affecting their security. No single member country is forced to rely soley on its

national capabilities to meet its essential national security objectives. The

resulting sense of shared security among members contributes to stability in the

Euro-Atlantic area.

NATO’s fundamental security tasks are laid down in the Washington

Treaty. They are sufficiently general to withstand the test of time and are

translated into more detail in strategic concepts. Strategic concepts are the

authoritative statement of the Alliance’s objectives and provide the highest level

of guidance on the political and military means to be used in achieving these

26

goals; they remain the basis for the implementation of Alliance policy as a

whole.

During the Cold War, NATO focused on collective defence and the

protection of its members from potential threats emanating from the Soviet

Union. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, along with the rise of non-state

actors affecting international security, many new security threats emerged.

NATO now focuses on countering these threats by utilizing collective defence,

managing crisis situations and encouraging cooperative security, as outlined in

the 2010 Strategic Concept.

NATO’S CRISIS MANAGEMENT

Crisis management is one of NATO's fundamental security tasks. It can

involve military and non-military measures to address the full spectrum of crises

– before, during and after conflicts – as outlined in the 2010 Strategic Concept.

One of NATO’s strengths is its crisis management capacity, based on

experience, tried and tested crisis management procedures and an integrated

military command structure. This enables it to deal with a wide range of crises

in an increasingly complex security environment, employing an appropriate mix

of political and military tools to help manage emerging crises, which could pose

a threat to the security of the Alliance’s territory and populations.

Within the framework of the Alliance, members work and train together in order

to be able to plan and conduct multinational crisis management operations, often

at short notice.  In this context, NATO is an enabler which helps members and

partners train and operate together, sometimes with other actors where

appropriate, for combined crisis management operations and missions.

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NATO’s role in crisis management goes beyond military operations aimed at

deterring and defending against threats to Alliance territory and the safety and

security of Allied populations.  A crisis can be political, military or

humanitarian and can also arise from a natural disaster or as a consequence of

technological disruptions.

Allies decide on a case-by-case basis and by consensus, to contribute to

effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management,

including non-Article 5 response operations. Some operations may also include

partners, non-NATO countries and other international actors. NATO recognises

that the military alone cannot resolve a crisis or conflict, and lessons learned

from previous operations make it clear that a comprehensive political, civilian

and military approach is necessary for effective crisis management.  

Many crisis management operations have their own objectives and end-state

depending on the nature of the crisis, which will define the scope and scale of

the response. To ensure effectiveness and resilience, NATO’s crisis

management instruments are continuously adapted to the evolving security

context. Over time, NATO has led and conducted a number of crisis

management operations, including beyond the Euro-Atlantic area.

Highlights Crisis management is one of NATO’s essential core tasks. NATO’s robust crisis management capabilities allow it to deal

with a wide range of emerging crises in an increasingly complex security environment.

It derives this capability from its experience, tried and tested procedures and integrated military command structure.

NATO decides whether to engage in a crisis management operation on a case-by-case basis and by consensus.

28

NATO’S ROLE IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT

The manner of dealing with a crisis depends on its nature, scale and seriousness.

In some cases, crises can be prevented through diplomacy or other measures,

while other situations may require more robust measures, including the use of

military force. In this regard, NATO has a holistic approach to crisis

management, envisaging involvement at all stages of a crisis and considering a

broad range of tools to be effective across the crisis management spectrum. This

approach is clearly reflected in the Alliance’s 2010 Strategic Concept.

In effect, NATO has had the capacity to deal with crisis management and, more

specifically, collective defence and disaster relief operations for a long time.

Only at a later stage, during the 1990s, did it become involved in non-Article 5

operations, that is, those that are mainly conducted in non-NATO member

countries to prevent a conflict from spreading and destabilising the region.

Prepared for Article 5 operations

Since its creation in 1949, the primary role and the greatest responsibility of the

Alliance is to protect and defend Allied territory and populations against attack.

Collective defence is at the heart of the Washington Treaty and is enshrined in

Article 5. Article 5 provides that if a NATO Ally is the victim of an armed

attack, each and every other member of the Alliance will consider this as an

armed attack against all members and will take the actions it deems necessary to

assist the Ally attacked.

NATO did not conduct any operations – Article 5 or other - during the Cold

War. The Alliance’s focus during this time was ensuring the effective defence of

NATO’s territory through readiness, planning, preparations, and conducting

exercises for possible Article 5 contingencies.

29

Invocation of Article 5

Article 5 was invoked for the very first time following the Al-Qaeda terrorist

attack on the United States on September 11, 2001. Once it had been proved that

the attack had come from abroad, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) considered

it to be an act covered by Article 5. Several measures were put into place by

NATO to help prevent further attacks, including Operation Active Endeavour in

the Mediterranean to help detect, deter and protect against terrorist activity in

the area.

Engaging in non-Article 5 crisis response operations

As soon as the Soviet Union collapsed and satellite countries regained

independence, past tensions resurfaced and conflicts started among ethnic

groups.

From the former Yugoslavia to today’s operations and missions

One of the first major conflicts following the end of the Cold War broke out in

the former Yugoslavia in 1992. NATO initially provided air- and sea-based

support to the UN - enforcing economic sanctions, an arms embargo and a no-

flight zone in Bosnia and Herzegovina - and with detailed military contingency

planning concerning safe areas and the implementation of a peace plan.

The measures proved inadequate to bring an end to the war. In the summer of

1995, after violations of exclusion zones, the shelling of UN-designated safe

areas and the taking of UN hostages, NATO member countries agreed to take

military action in support of UN efforts to bring an end to the war in Bosnia.

NATO launched a two-week air campaign against Bosnian Serb forces and,

over the following months, a series of other military measures at the request of

the UN force commanders. This helped pave the way for the signing of the

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Dayton Peace Accord on 14 December 1995. The Alliance immediately

proceeded to deploy peacekeeping forces to the country, in accordance with the

terms of a UN mandate, giving NATO responsibility for the implementation of

the military aspects of the peace accord.

This was the first time that NATO became involved in a non-Article 5 crisis

management operation. Other non-Article 5 crisis management operations have

followed - in Kosovo, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*,

Afghanistan, the Mediterranean, off the Horn of Africa, over Libya and in

support of the African Union.

NATO’s Strategic Concepts

Provision for crisis management measures had already been made in the

Alliance's 1991 Strategic Concept for "the management of crises affecting the

security of its members". It was reiterated in the 1999 Strategic Concept, which

states that NATO stands ready to contribute to effective conflict prevention and

to engage actively in crisis management. In addition, the 1999 document states

that these crisis management operations would include non-Article 5 operations.

The 2010 Strategic Concept broadened NATO’s thinking on crisis management,

envisaging NATO’s involvement at all stages of a crisis: “NATO will therefore

engage, where possible and when necessary, to prevent crises, manage crises,

stabilise post-conflict situations and support reconstruction.” It also recognised

the imperative for a greater number of actors to participate and coordinate their

efforts and considered a broader range of tools to be used. More generally, it

adopted a comprehensive, all-encompassing approach to crisis management that

goes hand-in-hand with greater emphasis on training, developing local forces,

enhancing civil-military planning and interaction, and greater interoperability

between NATO and partner forces.

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NATO and disaster relief operations

Crisis management is a broad concept that goes beyond military operations to

include, for instance, the protection of populations. NATO began developing

civil protection measures in the event of a nuclear attack as early as the 1950s.

NATO member countries soon realised that these capabilities could be used

effectively against the effects of disasters induced by floods, earthquakes or

technological incidents, and against humanitarian disasters.

In 1953, the first disaster assistance scheme was implemented following

devastating flooding in northern Europe and, in 1958, NATO established

detailed procedures for the co-ordination of assistance between NATO member

countries in case of disasters. These procedures remained in place and provided

the basis for NATO to conduct work in the field of civil emergency planning in

subsequent years. They were comprehensively reviewed in 1995 when they

became applicable to partner countries in addition to NATO member countries.

In 1998, the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Co-ordination Centre (EADRCC)

was established to co-ordinate aid provided by different member and partner

countries to a disaster-stricken area in a member or partner country. NATO also

established a Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Unit, which is a non-standing,

multinational mix of national civil and military elements that have been

volunteered by member or partner countries for deployment to the area of

concern.

Civil emergency planning has become a key facet of NATO involvement in

crisis management. In recent years, NATO has provided support for many

countries. In May 2014, for instance, it provided support to Ukraine through a

team of experts who advised on the protection of critical infrastructure in the

context of the crisis with Russia. The EADRCC has coordinated assistance in

flood-devastated countries including Albania, Bosnia-and-Herzegovina, Czech

32

Republic, Hungary, Romania and Ukraine. It supported the United Nations High

Commissioner for Refugees in Kosovo; helped coordinate aid which was sent to

earthquake-stricken Turkey and Pakistan; helped to fight fires in the former

Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* and in Portugal; and supported Ukraine and

Moldova after extreme weather conditions had destroyed power transmission

capabilities. The EADRCC also conducts consequence management field

exercises on an annual basis, bringing together civil and military first response

teams to practice interoperability.

WHO DECIDES AND HOW?

Crisis decision-making at NATO

When a crisis occurs, no decisions on planning, deployment or employment of

military forces are taken without political authorisation. Decisions are taken by

the governments of each NATO member country collectively and may include

political, military or civil emergency measures, depending on the nature of the

crisis.

In addition to the regular consultations that take place to move ongoing

activities forward, at any given time, Article 4 of the Washington Treaty gives

each Ally the right to bring issues to the table for consultation and discussion

with other fellow members: “The Parties will consult together whenever, in the

opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or

security of any of the Parties is threatened.” Article 4 is critical to NATO’s

crisis management process, since consultation is at the basis of collective action.

NATO has different mechanisms in place to deal with crises. The principal

political decision-making body is the North Atlantic Council (NAC), which

exchanges intelligence, information and other data, compares different

33

perceptions and approaches, harmonises its views and takes decisions by

consensus, as do all NATO committees.

In the field of crisis management, the Council is supported by the Operations

Policy Committee, the Political Committee, the Military Committee and the

Civil Emergency Planning Committee.

Additionally, NATO communication systems, including a "Situation Centre"

(SITCEN), receive, exchange and disseminate political, economic and military

intelligence and information around the clock, every single day of the year.

The overarching NATO Crisis Response System (NCRS) is a process within

which a number of elements are geared to addressing different aspects of

NATO’s response to crises in a complementary manner. These include: the

NATO Crisis Management Process (NCMP), the NATO Intelligence and

Warning System (NIWS), NATO’s Operational Planning Process and NATO

Civil Emergency Planning Crisis Management Arrangements, which together

underpin NATO’s crisis management role and its ability to respond to crises.

Internal co-ordination

NATO is one of few international organisations that have the experience as well

as the tools to conduct crisis management operations.

The NCRS is effectively a guide to aid decision-making within the field

of crisis management. Its role is to coordinate efforts between the national

representatives at NATO Headquarters, capitals and the strategic

commands. It does this by providing the Alliance with a comprehensive

set of options and measures to prepare for, manage and respond to crises.

It complements other processes such as operations planning, civil

34

emergency planning and others, which exist within the Organization to

address crises. It was first approved in 2005 and is revised annually.

One of the core components of the NCRS is the NCMP. The NCMP

breaks down a crisis situation into six different phases, providing a

structure against which military and non-military crisis response planning

processes should be designed. It is flexible and adaptable to different

crisis situations.

NATO periodically exercises procedures through scheduled crisis

management exercises (CMX) in which the Headquarters (civilian and

military) and capitals, including partners and other bodies who may be

involved in a real-life crisis participate.

Standardization: countries need to share a common set of standards,

especially among military forces, to carry out multinational operations.

By helping to achieve interoperability – the ability of diverse systems and

organisations to work together – among NATO’s forces, as well as with

those of its partners, standardization allows for more efficient use of

resources. It therefore greatly increases the effectiveness of the Alliance’s

defence capabilities.

Through its standardization bodies, NATO develops and implements

concepts, doctrines and procedures to achieve and maintain the required

levels of compatibility, interchangeability or commonality needed to

achieve interoperability. For instance, in the field, standard procedures

allow for the transfer of supplies between ships at sea and interoperable

material such as fuel connections at airfields. It enables the many NATO

and partner countries to work together, preventing duplication and

promoting better use of economic resources.

Logistics: this is the bridge between the deployed forces and the industrial

base that produces the material and weapons that forces need to

accomplish their mission. It comprises the identification of requirements

35

as well as both the building up of stocks and capabilities, and the

sustainment of weapons and forces. As such, the scope of logistics is

huge. Among the core functions conducted by NATO are: supply,

maintenance, movement and transportation, petroleum support,

infrastructure and medical support.

The Alliance’s overarching function is to coordinate national efforts and

encourage the highest degree possible of multinational responses to

operational needs, therefore reducing the number of individual supply

chains. While NATO has this responsibility, each state is responsible for

ensuring that - individually or through cooperative arrangements – their

own forces receive the required logistic resources.

Coordinating with other international players

The North Atlantic Council decides on a case-by-case basis and by consensus

whether to engage in a crisis response operation. Increasingly, NATO

contributes to efforts by the wider international community to preserve or

restore peace and prevent conflict. It is committed to a comprehensive political,

civilian and military approach to crisis management. As a consequence, it is

building closer partnerships with civilian actors – including non-governmental

organisations and local authorities – and is focusing on several key areas of

work including cooperation with external actors; planning and conduct of

operations; lessons learned, training, education and exercises; cooperation; and

public messaging. In this context, the record of NATO’s sustained cooperation

with the UN, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)

and the European Union (EU) in the Balkans stands as a precedent.

NATO’s partnerships are and will continue to be essential to the way NATO

works. Partners have served with NATO in Afghanistan, Kosovo and other

operations, as well as in combating terrorism and piracy. NATO has built a

36

broad and cooperative security network that involves countries participating in

Partnership for Peace, the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation

Initiative, as well as with partners across the globe and troop-contributing

countries, which do not work with NATO through a formal partnership

framework. These partnerships with relevant countries and other international

organisations are developed in accordance with NATO’s Berlin Partnership

Policy. Additionally, at the Wales Summit in September 2014, NATO leaders

adopted a comprehensive Partnership Interoperability Initiative to enhance the

Alliance’s ability to tackle security challenges together with partners that have

demonstrated their commitment to reinforce their interoperability with NATO.

A WIDE RANGE OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS -

DEFINITIONS

Depending on the nature of a crisis, different types of crisis management

operations may be required.

Article 5 - Collective defence

Referred to as "Article 5 operations", collective defence implies that the

decision has been taken collectively by NATO members to consider an attack or

act of aggression against one or more members as an attack against all. NATO

invoked Article 5 for the first time in its history in September 2001 following

the terrorist attacks against the United States.

Non-Article 5 crisis response operations

Crisis response operations cover all military operations conducted by NATO in

a non-Article 5 situation.

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A “crisis response” or “peace-support operation” are generic terms that may

include conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace building, peace

enforcement and humanitarian operations. These are multi-functional operations

conducted in support of a UN/OSCE mandate or at the invitation of a sovereign

government involving military forces and diplomatic and humanitarian agencies

and are designed to achieve long-term political settlement or other conditions

specified in the mandate.

Conflict prevention: activities aimed at conflict prevention are normally

conducted under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. They range from

diplomatic initiatives to preventive deployments of forces intended to

prevent disputes from escalating into armed conflicts or from spreading.

Conflict prevention can also include fact-finding missions, consultations,

warnings, inspections and monitoring. NATO makes full use of

partnership, cooperation and dialogue and its links to other organisations

to contribute to preventing crises and, should they arise, defusing them at

an early stage.

A preventive deployment within the framework of conflict prevention is

the deployment of operational forces possessing sufficient deterrent

capabilities to prevent an outbreak of hostilities.

Peacekeeping: peacekeeping operations are generally undertaken under

Chapter VI of the UN Charter and are conducted with the consent of all

Parties to a conflict to monitor and facilitate implementation of a peace

agreement. 

Peacemaking: this covers diplomatic activities conducted after the

commencement of a conflict aimed at establishing a cease-fire or a rapid

peaceful settlement. They can include the provision of good offices,

mediation, conciliation and such actions as diplomatic pressure, isolation

or sanction.    

38

Peace building: peace building covers actions which support political,

economic, social, and military measures and structures aiming to

strengthen and solidify political settlements in order to redress the causes

of a conflict. This includes mechanisms to identify and support structures

which can play a role in consolidating peace, advance a sense of

confidence and well-being and supporting economic reconstruction.

Peace enforcement: these operations are undertaken under Chapter VII of

the UN Charter. They are coercive in nature and are conducted when the

consent of all Parties to a conflict has not been achieved or might be

uncertain. They are designed to maintain or re-establish peace or enforce

the terms specified in the mandate. 

Humanitarian operations: these operations are conducted to alleviate

human suffering. Humanitarian operations may precede or accompany

humanitarian activities provided by specialised civilian organisations.

Natural, technological or humanitarian disaster operations

Operations to assist member and partner countries that are affected by disasters

also fall under the scope of crisis management. In 2005, NATO assisted

Pakistan when it was hit by a devastating earthquake that claimed the lives of an

estimated 80,000 people. NATO also regularly responds to requests for

assistance following natural disasters such as heavy flooding and forest fires.

39

NATO LED OPERATIONS IN BALKANS

NATO is an active and leading contributor to peace and security on the

international stage. It promotes democratic values and is committed to the

peaceful resolution of disputes. However, if diplomatic efforts fail, it has the

military capacity needed to undertake crisis-management operations, alone or in

cooperation with other countries and international organisations. Through its

crisis-management operations, the Alliance demonstrates both its willingness to

act as a positive force for change and its capacity to meet the security challenges

of the 21st century.

Since its first major peace-support operation in the Balkans in the early

1990s, the tempo and diversity of NATO operations have increased. NATO has

been engaged in missions that cover the full spectrum of crisis-management

operations – from deterrence and peacekeeping, to training and logistics

support, to surveillance and humanitarian relief. Today, approximately 18,000

military personnel are engaged in NATO missions around the world, managing

often complex ground, air and naval operations in all types of environment.

They  are currently operating in Afghanistan, Kosovo, the Mediterranean and

off the Horn of Africa. NATO is also assisting the African Union, conducting

air policing missions on the request of NATO member countries and  supporting

Turkey’s air defence system with the deployment of Patriot missiles.

Highlights NATO is a crisis-management organisation that has the capacity to

undertake a wide range of military operations and missions. The tempo and diversity of operations and missions in which NATO is

involved have increased since the early 1990s. Currently, NATO is operating in Afghanistan, Kosovo, the Mediterranean

and off the Horn of Africa.

40

NATO is also supporting the African Union and conducting air policing missions on the request of its Allies; it also has Patriot missiles deployed in Turkey.

NATO carries out disaster-relief operations and missions to protect populations against natural, technological or humanitarian disasters.

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan

Established under the request of the Afghan authorities and a UN mandate in 2001, the

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was led by NATO from August 2003 to

December 2014.

Its mission was to develop new Afghan security forces and enable Afghan authorities to

provide effective security across the country in order to create an environment conducive to

the functioning of democratic institutions and the establishment of the rule of law, with the

aim to prevent Afghanistan from once again becoming a safe haven for terrorists.

ISAF also contributed to reconstruction and development in Afghanistan. This was done

primarily through multinational Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) - led by individual

ISAF countries - securing areas in which reconstruction work could be conducted by national

and international actors.  PRTs also helped the Afghan authorities progressively strengthen

the institutions required to fully establish good governance and the rule of law, as well as to

promote human rights. The principal role of the PRTs in this respect was to build capacity,

support the growth of governance structures and promote an environment in which

governance can improve.

ISAF was one of the largest international crisis-management operations ever, bringing

together contributions from up to 51 different countries. By end 2014, the process of

transitioning full security responsibility from ISAF troops to the Afghan army and police

forces was completed and the ISAF mission came to a close.  On 1 January 2015, a new

NATO-led non-combat mission called “Resolute Support” to train, advise and assist the

Afghan security forces and institutions was launched.  

41

NATO in Bosnia and Herzegovina

With the break-up of Yugoslavia, violent conflict started in Bosnia and Herzegovina in April

1992. The Alliance responded as early as summer 1992 when it enforced the UN arms

embargo on weapons in the Adriatic Sea (in cooperation with the Western European Union

from 1993) and enforced a no-fly-zone declared by the UN Security Council. It was during

the monitoring of the no-fly-zone that NATO engaged in the first combat operations in its

history by shooting down four Bosnian Serb fighter-bombers conducting a bombing mission

on 28 February 1994.

In August 1995, to compel an end to Serb-led violence in the country, UN peacekeepers

requested NATO airstrikes. Operation Deadeye began on 30 August against Bosnian Serb air

forces, but failed to result in Bosnian Serb compliance with the UN’s demands to withdraw.

This led to Operation Deliberate Force, which targeted Bosnian Serb command and control

installations and ammunition facilities. This NATO air campaign was a key factor in bringing

the Serbs to the negotiating table and ending the war in Bosnia.

With the signing of the Dayton Peace Accord in December 1995, NATO immediately

deployed a UN-mandated Implementation Force (IFOR) comprising some 60,000 troops.

This operation (Operation Joint Endeavour) was followed in December 1996 by the

deployment of a 32,000-strong Stabilisation Force (SFOR).

In light of the improved security situation, NATO brought its peace-support operation to a

conclusion in December 2004 and the European Union deployed a new force called Operation

Althea. The Alliance has maintained a military headquarters in the country to carry out a

number of specific tasks related, in particular, to assisting the government in reforming its

defence structures.

NATO in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia¹

Responding to a request from the Government in Skopje to help mitigate rising ethnic

tension, NATO implemented three successive operations there from August 2001 to March

2003.

First, Operation Essential Harvest disarmed ethnic Albanian groups operating throughout the

country.

42

The follow-on Operation Amber Fox provided protection for international monitors

overseeing the implementation of the peace plan.

Finally, Operation Allied Harmony was launched in December 2002 to provide advisory

elements to assist the government in ensuring stability throughout the country.

These operations in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia¹ demonstrated the strong

inter-institutional cooperation between NATO, the European Union and the Organization for

Security and Co-operation in Europe. NATO remains committed to helping the former

Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia¹ integrate into Euro-Atlantic structures. To that end, NATO

Headquarters Skopje was created in April 2002 to advise on military aspects of security

sector reform; it still operates today.

NATO’s first counter-terrorism operation

On 4 October 2001, once it had been determined that the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York

and Washington D.C. had come from abroad, NATO agreed on a package of eight measures

to support the United States. On the request of the United States, the Alliance launched its

first-ever counter-terrorism operation – Operation Eagle Assist - from mid-October 2001 to

mid-May 2002.

It consisted of seven NATO AWACS radar aircraft that helped patrol the skies over the

United States; in total 830 crew members from 13 NATO countries flew over 360 sorties.

This was the first time that NATO military assets were deployed in support of an Article 5

operation.

The second Gulf Conflict

During the second Gulf Conflict, NATO deployed NATO AWACS radar aircraft and air

defence batteries to enhance the defence of Turkey. The operation started on 20 February,

lasted until 16 April 2003 and was called Operation Display Deterrence. The AWACS

aircraft flew 100 missions with a total of 950 flying hours.

43

Protecting public events

In response to a request by the Greek government, NATO provided assistance to the Olympic

and Paralympic Games held in Athens with Operation Distinguished Games on 18 June – 29

September 2004. NATO provided intelligence support, provision of Chemical, Biological

Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) defence assets and AWACS radar aircraft. This was the

first operation in which non-Article 4 or 5 NATO assistance was provided within the borders

of a member country.

In the same vein, NATO responded to a request made by the Latvian government for

assistance in assuring the security of the Riga Summit in November 2006. NATO provided

technical security, CBRN response capabilities, air and sea policing, improvised explosive

device (IED) detections, communications and information systems and medical evacuation

support.

NATO and Iraq 

NATO conducted a relatively small but important support operation in Iraq from 2004 to

2011 that consisted of training, mentoring and assisting the Iraqi Security Forces. At the

Istanbul Summit in June 2004, the Allies rose above their differences and agreed to be part of

the international effort to help Iraq establish effective and accountable security forces. The

outcome was the creation of the NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I). The NTM-I

delivered its training, advice and mentoring support in a number of different settings. All

NATO member countries contributed to the training effort either in or outside of Iraq, through

financial contributions or donations of equipment. In parallel and reinforcing this initiative,

NATO also worked with the Iraqi government on a structured cooperation framework to

develop the Alliance’s long-term relationship with Iraq.

Hurricane Katrina

After Hurricane Katrina struck the south of the United States on 29 August 2005, causing

many fatalities and widespread damage and flooding, the US government requested food,

medical and logistics supplies and assistance in moving these supplies to stricken areas. On 9

September 2005, the North Atlantic Council approved a military plan to assist the United

States, which consisted of helping to coordinate the movement of urgently needed material

44

and supporting humanitarian relief operations. During the operation (9 September-2 October),

nine member countries provided 189 tons of material to the United States.

Pakistan earthquake relief assistance

Just before the onset of the harsh Himalayan winter, a devastating earthquake hit Pakistan on

8 October 2005, killing an estimated 53,000 people, injuring 75,000 and making at least four

million homeless. On 11 October, in response to a request from Pakistan, NATO assisted in

the urgent relief effort, airlifting close to 3,500 tons of supplies and deploying engineers,

medical units and specialist equipment. This was one of NATO’s largest humanitarian relief

initiatives, which came to an end on 1 February 2006.

Over time, the Alliance has helped to coordinate assistance to other countries hit by natural

disasters, including Turkey, Ukraine and Portugal. It does this through its Euro-Atlantic

Disaster Response Coordination Centre.

Assisting the African Union in Darfur, Sudan

The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) aimed to end violence and improve the

humanitarian situation in a region that has been suffering from conflict since 2003. From June

2005 to 31 December 2007, NATO provided air transport for some 37,000 AMIS personnel,

as well as trained and mentored over 250 AMIS officials. While NATO’s support to this

mission ended when AMIS was succeeded by the UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), the

Alliance immediately expressed its readiness to consider any request for support to the new

peacekeeping mission.

Counter-piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa

From October to December 2008, NATO launched Operation Allied Provider, which

involved counter-piracy activities off the coast of Somalia. Responding to a request from UN

Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, NATO naval forces provided escorts to UN World Food

Programme (WFP) vessels transiting through the dangerous waters in the Gulf of Aden,

where growing piracy has threatened to undermine international humanitarian efforts in

Africa.

45

Concurrently, in response to an urgent request from the African Union, these same NATO

naval forces escorted a vessel chartered by the AU carrying equipment for the Burundi

contingent deployed to AMISOM.

From March to August 2009, NATO launched Operation Allied Protector, a counter-piracy

operation, to improve the safety of commercial maritime routes and international navigation

off the Horn of Africa. The force conducted surveillance tasks and provided protection to

deter and suppress piracy and armed robbery, which are threatening sea lines of

communication and economic interests.

NATO and Libya

Following the popular uprising against the Qadhafi regime in Benghazi, Libya, in February

2011, the UN Security Council adopted Resolutions 1970 and 1973 in support of the Libyan

people, “condemning the gross and systematic violation of human rights”. The resolutions

introduced active measures including a no-fly-zone, an arms embargo and the authorisation

for member countries, acting as appropriate through regional organisations, to take “all

necessary measures” to protect Libyan civilians.

Initially, NATO enforced the no-fly-zone and then, on 31 March, NATO took over sole

command and control of all military operations for Libya. The NATO-led “Operation Unified

Protector” had three distinct components:

the enforcement of an arms embargo on the high seas of the Mediterranean to prevent

the transfer of arms, related material and mercenaries to Libya;

the enforcement of a no-fly-zone in order to prevent any aircraft from bombing

civilian targets; and

air and naval strikes against those military forces involved in attacks or threats to

attack Libyan civilians and civilian-populated areas.

The UN mandate was carried out to the letter and the operation was terminated on 31 October

2011 after having fulfilled its objectives.

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THE WIDER INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

COOPERATION WITH OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

NATO is keen to deepen its relations with other international

organisations to share information and promote appropriate and effective action

in areas of common interest. The primary focus of its relations with other

international organisations concerns cooperation with the European Union, the

United Nations and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe,

as described in the previous chapters. NATO also holds consultations and

engages in differing forms of cooperation with a number of other important

international institutions.

The Council of Europe

The Council of Europe was established on 5 May 1949, “to achieve a

greater unity between its members for the purpose of safeguarding and realising

the ideals and principles which are their common heritage and facilitating their

social and economic progress”. The Council’s overall aim is to maintain the

basic principles of humanitarian rights, pluralist democracy and the rule of law,

and to enhance the quality of life of European citizens.

NATO regularly receives documents, reports and records from the

Council of Europe and is kept informed of different parliamentary sessions or

upcoming events. The outcome of various sessions and reports on issues of

common interest is monitored by NATO’s International Staff and this

information is distributed to relevant divisions within the organisation.

The International Organisation for Migration

The International Organisation for Migration is the leading international

organisation working with migrant populations and governments on issues

relating to migration challenges. It is committed to the principle that humane

and orderly migration benefits both migrants and the societies in which they

live. Established in 1951 and tasked with the resettlement of European dis-

placed persons, refugees and migrants, the organisation now encompasses a

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variety of migration-management issues and other activities throughout the

world.

With offices and operations on every continent, the organisation helps

governments and civil societies, for example, in responding to sudden migration

lows, post-emergency returns and reintegration programmes, and providing

assistance to migrants on their way to new homes. It also promotes the training

of officials and measures to counter trafficking in human beings. Cooperation

with NATO takes place in several fields such as combating trafficking in

human beings, border security and reconstruction in post-conflict regions.

Regions where there is great potential for cooperation include the Caucasus and

Central Asia. The first formal and structured contacts between the two

organisations took place in staff-level meetings in September 2004.

The Assembly of the Western European Union

NATO also has contacts with the Assembly of the Western European Union

(WEU). Although not an international organisation in the strict sense of the

term, the Assembly was created in 1954 under the modified Brussels Treaty of

1948, which is the founding document of the Western European Union. Called

upon in 1984 to contribute to the process of establishing a stronger European

security and defence identity, the Western European Union was later relieved of

these responsibilities, which were transferred to the European Union at the end

of 1999 in the context of the latter’s evolving European Security and Defence

Policy (see Part VIII). The Western European Union itself remains extant with a

small secretariat located in Brussels with residual responsibilities.

The WEU Assembly remains active as an interparliamentary forum for general

strategic reflection and contributes to intergovernmental and public debate on

security and defence matters. National parliamentarians from 28 European

countries send delegations to the Assembly, which currently has 370 members.

Its work is allocated to four principal committees dealing respectively with

defence matters, political issues, matters relating to technology and aero-space,

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and parliamentary and public relations. The WEU Assembly meets at least twice

a year for plenary sessions and throughout the year in committee meetings,

conferences and colloquia.

The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

Another of the organisations with which NATO cooperates in the field of civil

emergency planning is the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical

Weapons. The Organisation, established in 1997 by the countries that joined the

Chemical Weapons Convention, seeks to ensure that the Convention

workseffectively and achieves its purpose. All NATO Allies are members of the

Organisation, which currently totals 174 member states. One of the

Organisation’s responsibilities is to provide assistance and protection to

countries if they are attacked or threatened with chemical weapons, including by

terrorists. It is in this area in particular that the Organisation can be helpful to

NATO’s civil protection efforts which, following the September 2001 terrorist

attacks on the United States, have increasingly focused on protecting

populations against the potential consequences of attacks using chemical,

biological, radiological and nuclear agents.

NATO cooperates with parliamentarians and non-governmental organisations,

which contributes to understanding and support for NATO’s policies and

objectives beyond the arena of international organisations

The International Committee of the Red Cross

One of the most significant non-governmental organisations with which NATO

cooperates is the International Committee of the Red Cross – an impartial,

neutral and independent organisation exclusively concerned with humanitarian

action to protect the lives and dignity of victims of war and internal violence

and to provide them with necessary assistance.

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The NATO Parliamentary Assembly

The NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NATO PA) is an interparliamentary

organisation which, since its creation in 1955, has acted as a forum for

legislators from the North American and western European member countries of

the Alliance to meet together to consider issues of common interest and concern.

While its principal objective is to foster mutual understanding among Alliance

parliamentarians of the key security challenges facing the transatlantic

partnership, its discussions also contribute to the development of the consensus

among member countries that underpins the decision-making process in the

Alliance.

The specific aims of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly include the

following:

• to foster dialogue among parliamentarians on major security issues;

• to facilitate parliamentary awareness and understanding of key secu-

rity issues and Alliance policies;

• to provide NATO and its member governments with an indication of

collective parliamentary opinion;

• to provide greater transparency in NATO policies as well as collective

accountability;

• to strengthen the transatlantic relationship.

The Atlantic Treaty Association

The Atlantic Treaty Association, created on 18 June 1954, brings

together, as members, national voluntary and non-governmental organisations

in Alliance member states to support the activities of NATO and promote the

objectives of the North Atlantic Treaty. Since the beginning of the 1990s, the

ATA has regularly admitted as associate members national voluntary and non-

governmental organisations established in NATO’s Partner countries. There are

currently 18 associations which are associate members. In accordance with the

constitution of the ATA, associate members may become full members of the

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Association when their countries become members of NATO and when their

new position has been recognised by the ATA Assembly upon the proposal of

the ATA Council.

Since 1999, following the amendment of the constitution, the ATA

Assembly may also, on proposal by the Council, grant observer member status

to non-governmental organisations created in the countries participating in

NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue or in those which are directly or

geographically concerned with Euro-Atlantic security problems, even if they

have not signed Partnership for Peace agreements.

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