UNCLASS//FOUO

Phase 1 - Day 0 (25%)

OPR: Last Updated:

Mission Focused…ValuedAirmenUNCLASS//FOUO

Dale Mabry Gate open (24/7)

Bay Shore Gate open (M/F 0600-0900/1500-1700)

Tanker Way Gate open (M/F 0600-1400 commercial

vehicles only)

Visitor Reception Facility (M/F 0600-1400)

Continue Virtual Medical Operations

Virtual Worship on Chapel FB page

Crisis counseling at Chapel during duty hours

Maintain FES at RLS (11 prsnl)

Custodial contract returns to normal

CE contracts return to normal

OG hard crews; personnel presence as required to

execute flying mission; max 5 tails per day

MXG continues Bucs/Bolts schedule; schedules

expanded 12-hr shifts support TACC tasks varying

mission take-off/land times

8

Lodging - Same as current ops

DFAC - Take out only during meal hoursWeekday Hours

Breakfast 0600-0900

Lunch 1100-1330

Dinner 1630-1830

Midnight 2230-0030

Weekend Hours

Breakfast 0630-0830

Lunch 1100-1330

Dinner 1630-1830

Midnight 2230-0030

CDC 2 & 3 / School Age Program – reopen to

mission essential only (single ratio ops)

FamCamp – Current campers only/no new guests

Golf Course – open for play; clubhouse/snack bar closed

MPF – Mission essential customers by appt only

MFRC – Virtual TAP/Emergency Financial Asst

Honor Guard w/2 Person Detail

Official Mail Center – Open Mon/Thurs 0800-1400

OPR: EOC Last Updated: 8 May 2020

UNCLASS//FOUO

Phase 2 - Day 21 (50%)

Mission Focused…ValuedAirmenUNCLASS//FOUO

■ Dale Mabry Gate open (24/7)

■ MacDill Gate (M/F 0600-0900/1500-1700

■ Bay Shore Gate open (M/F 0500-2000)

■ Tanker Way Gate open (M/F 0600-1400 commercial

vehicles only)

■ Visitor Reception Facility (M/F 0600-1500)

■ MDG mostly virtual, appts as required; some electives

■ Pharmacy and other ancillary services unchanged

■ Virtual Worship on Chapel FB page

■ Crisis counseling at Chapel during duty hours

■ FES returns to normal

■ MXG Execute scheduled Mx & unscheduled Mx & HoF

TTP

■ MXG Posture Aircraft Decon Teams

■ OG: Split crew force, eliminate “hard” crews, resume

CT training in sims, resume ground training

■ DECA (same as phase 1)

Lodging (same as Phase I)

DFAC (same as Phase I)

CDC 2 & 3/School Age Program mission essential only (same

as Phase I)

FamCamp (same as Phase I)

MPF (same as Phase I)

MFRC (same as Phase I)

Honor Guard (same as Phase I or as directed by A1)

Official Mail Center (same as Phase I)

Arts & Crafts – Limited services w/curb side pickup

Golf Course – (Same as Phase 1)

Base Education – Appointment Only

CDC/WAPS Testing w/social distancing measures

ALS – 26 May Class with PHEO recommended measures

FTAC – Backlog mass brief for congressionally mandated

blocks then sm grp shortened week for other reqs

Bucs and Bolts Split Operations end

Return augmentees to units

UNCLASS//FOUO

Gates 100%

MDG increase face-to-face appts over 1 hour periods

Virtual Worship on Chapel FB page; Accepting all counseling

requests and walk-ins

Crisis counseling at Chapel during duty hrs

EOD returns to normal

MXG Plan transition to normal shift schedules; maintain Decon

capabilities as required

MXG Plan for normal deployment/PCS/TDY cycles to return

to normal

MXG Ease (crawl/walk) into local flying execution

MXG Develop aggressive Ops/MX plan to ramp up local training

missions

MXG Plan for PE schedule/return to normal operations

OG add local flts w/receivers/ck rides/form training/spin 91st

back up for 801x

OG: Increase squadron personnel footprint, eliminate split crew

force, increase local training consistent w/AMC allocation

MDG return to routine care, virtual where feasible

DECA early bird hours

CS will begin accepting walk-ins at the customer service desk

OPR: EOC Last Updated: 8 May 2020

Mission Focused…ValuedAirmenUNCLASS//FOUO

Lodging (same as Phase I)

DFAC – Limited seating & increased food options

CDC 2/CDC 3/School Age Program expanded mission essential only,

consider opening Youth Center

FamCamp – Open to new campers

MPF (same as Phase I)

MFRC – Limited in-person appts, no TAP workshops

Honor Guard (same as Phase I or as directed by A1)

Official Mail Center – Fully operational

Arts & Crafts (same as Phase II)

Base Education – Limited Capacity Briefs

CDC/WAPS Testing (same as Phase II)

ALS (same as Phase II)

Golf Course (same as Phase II)

Fitness – Outdoor areas/AD only w/limited hours & access, no showers

FAC – Small testing groups/No sooner than 1 Jun

Surf’s Edge – Small approved official functions only

Rickenbacker’s – To-Go only/No dining-in

FTAC –(same as Phase II)

UNITE Program – Notify Squadrons to start planning

Marina open

Phase 3 - Day 42 (75%)

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON

WASHINGTON. DC 20301 - 1000

MAY 1 9 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF MANAGEMENT OFFICER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE CHIEF OF THE NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU COMMANDERSOFTHECOMBATANTCOMMANDS GENERAL COUNSEL Of THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIRECTOR OF COST ASSESSMENT AND PROGRAM

EVALUATION INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF

DEFENSE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR LEGISLATIVE

AFFAIRS ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE fOR PUBLIC

AFFAIRS DIRECTOR OF NET ASSESSMENT DIRECTORS OF DEFENSE AGENCIES DIRECTORS OF DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES

SUBJECT: Guidance for Commanders on Risk-Based Changing of Health Protection Condition Levels During the Coronavirus Disease 2019 Pandemic

References: (a) Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Guidance for Commanders on the Implementation of the Risk Based Responses to the COVID-19 Pandemic," April 1, 2020

(b) DoD Instruction 6200.03, "Public Health Emergency Management (PHEM) within the DoD," March 28, 2019

(c) ·'Guidelines for Opening Up America Again," https://www.whitehouse.gov/openingamerica/

(d) DoD Directive 6490.02E, "Comprehensive Health Surveillance,'' February 8, 2012 (e) Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Memorandum, " Force

Health Protection (Supplement 2) - Department of Defense Guidance for Military Installation Commanders' Risk-Based Measured Responses to the Novel Coronavirus Outbreak," February 25, 2020

I continue to be extremely proud of all our Service members, DoD civilian employees, contractor personnel, and their families for their superb contributions to carrying out my three priorities for the Corona virus di sease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic response: I) protect our military and civilian personnel and their families; 2) safeguard our national security capabilities;

I I OS D00489 1 -20/C M D005868-20

and 3) support the whole-of-nation response to the pandemic. Specifically, I thank our leaders and health care personnel who have done an outstanding job in keeping all of our installations safe.

This memorandum supplements reference (a) and provides guidance for commanders to consider when making decisions to change health protection condition (HPCON) leve ls as COVID-1 9 pandemic conditions on and adjacent to our installations begin to improve. I am also delegating the authority to change I IPCON levels for the Pentagon Reservation and the Armed Forces Retirement Home to the Chief Management Officer.

Changing HPCON Levels

Commanders, in consultation with their medical leadership, shall exercise their authority by making deliberate, risk-based decisions to change HPCON levels as conditions allow· and in accordance with references (a) and (b). These decisions must be informed by local conditions based on public health surveillance data; guidance from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; collaboration with State, territorial, and local authorities; and advice from the command Public Health Emergency Officer and local military medical treatment faci lity (MTF).

Commanders may set HPCON levels that are more stringent than surrounding community requirements based on mission and other risk considerations. Setting HPCO levels that are less stringent must first be reviewed by the next higher commander in the chain or command. Commanders shall coordinate changes in HPCON levels with other DoD installations in their local commuting area to facilitate consistency.

Conditions for Chan~ing I-f PCON Levels

Prior to changing HPCON levels, commanders shall ensure the following gating criteria are met and there are no indications that conditions arc worsening. The gating criteria, which are consistent with the Presidenfs guidelines in reference (c), are:

• Symptoms: Downward trajectory of reported cases of influenza-like and CO YID-like illnesses over the preceding 14-day period.

• Cases: Downward trajectory of documented COVID-1 9 cases or of positive tests as a percent of total tests over the preceding 14-day period.

• Medical Faci lities: Military Medical Treatment Facilities or local hospitals have the capacity to treat all patients without situational standards of care as defined in reference (b) and have an adequate diagnostic COVID-1 9 testing program in place for at-ri sk healthcare workers and those exhibiting symptoms of COVID-19.

Commanders, in consultation with their medical leadership, shall ensure comprehensive health surveillance processes are in place in accordance with reference (d). Processes shall include monitoring for influenza-like and COVID-li ke illnesses in DoD's Electronic Surveillance System fo r Early Notification or Community-Based Epidemics, as well as survei llance

2

laboratory testing, as appropriate. Public health surveillance e ffort s will inform installation commanders as to whether the gating criteria for changing HPCON levels are met.

Actions to Take When Changing I JPCON Levels

Table 1 (attached) contains measured activities commanders shall consider allowing individuals on the installation to undertake at each HPCON level. These activities are consistent vvith references (a) and (b). Commanders may deem it necessary to take additional precautions for vulnerable populations (e.g., elderly, underlying health conditions, respiratory di seases. immunocompromised, etc.) and are both encouraged and authorized to do so. Concurrent with any HPCON changes, installations commanders must ensure there arc established plans and ready capability for COYID-19 testing, contact tracing, patient iso lation, and quarantine measures for those returning or arriving from high exposure locations or exposed to positive COYID-19 cases.

If upward trajectories related to these criteria are observed or medical facilities become significantly burdened by the treatment of individuals who have contracted COVID-19, then commanders shall consider increasing the HPCON level. Reference (e) provides act.ions for installation commanders to consider when elevating the I IPCON level. The Military Departments and Combatant Commands will continue to provide weekly installation status updates to the DoD COYID- 19 Task Force in accordance with reference (a).

My point of contact for this guidance is Dr. David Smith, at (703)-697-2 111 or david.j .smithl 52.civ@mail.mil.

Attachment: As stated

3

TABLE I: ACTIONS FOR fNSTALLATION COMMANDERS TO CONSIDER WI IEN CHANG ING HPCON LEVELS Severe 'Widespread comm uni ty t ra ns mission.

People are infected with COVID-1 9. but IIPCON I) how or when; they became infected may

not be known: the spread is ongoing and includes the majority of regions.

Substantial Consider cha nging to th is level if: Widespread COV ID- 19 transmission is

HPCOI\ C: no longer evident. but there remains ev idence of sustained COV I D-1 9 transmission in the local community.

Moderate Consider cha ng ing to this level if: Sustained transmission is no longer

I-IPCON B evident. but then.c: remains evidence of continued COVID- 19 transmission in the local community.

Limited Consider cha ng ing to this level if: Local COV IIJ-19 transmission is foc<1l

HPCON J\ and sporadic.

Routine Cons ider changing to this level if: COV I D- 19 is no longer detected or

IIPCON 0 reported in the loc<1l area or when a large enough portion orthe population has been either vacc inated or recovered from COVJD- 19 infeetion that allows for herd immuni121.

• •

•

• •

•

•

•

• •

• •

• • •

• •

•

• •

Vulnerabk ind ividuals (e.g .. elderly. underlying health conditions. respiratory disease. immunocompromised. etc.): Continue to shelter in place . Work: Individuals who return to work and arc living with vulnerable individuals should take precautions to iso late themselves from the vulnerable individuals. Continue to encourage tclcwork whenever possible and feasible. especially for vulnerable populations. Social Distancing: Continue to practice physical distancing (6 ft) and when physical distancing is 1101 possible. use precautionary measures (face covering). Social Activities: A void social sett ings of IO or more people that do not allow for appropriate social distancing . Common Areas: Continue to close common areas where personnel arc likely to congregate and interact. or enforce strict social distancing protocols.

• Schools/Childcare: Schools and childcare faci lities that are currently dosed should remain closed . Electi ve Surgeries: Resume outpat ient elective surgeries/procedures in accordance with Assistant Secretary of Defense for I leal th Affairs uidancc.

• Vulnerable individuals: Continue 10 shelter in place . Work: Individuals who return to work and are living with vu lnerable individuals should take precautions to isolate themselves from the vu lnerable individuals. Continue to encourage telework whenever possible and feasi ble. especial ly lor vu lnerable populations. Social l)isianeing: Continue to practice physical distancing and when physical distancing is not possible. usc precautionary measures (face covering). Common J\rcas: Continue to close common areas where personnel are likely 10 congregate and internet. ur enlorce social distancing protocols . Schools/Chi ldcare: Schools. Childcare facilities. and organized youth a..:tivities can reopen with precautionary measures. e.g .. social distancing . face coverings. good hygiene. Elective Surgeries: Resu,m: inpatient elective surgeries/procedures in accordance ,,vith Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs guidance . Large Venues (e.g .. sit-down dining. movie theaters. spo11ing venues. places of worship): Can open,te under social distancing protocols .

• Outdoor recreation areas ( 10 include parks and picnic areas. beaches. campgrounds. marinas. golf courses. and other outdoor fac ilities): May reopen/operate if they implement social distancing and sanitation protocols.

• Gyms: May reopen ii they implement social distancing and adhere to sanitation protocols .

Vulnerable individuals: Can resume public interactions. but practice social distancing and minimize exposure to social settings . Work: Resume unrestri cted staffing ofworksites. Telework practices return to normal. Vulnerable populations may need to continue 10 telework . Social Distru1cing: Encourage physical distancing but face covering is no longer required except as directed for appropriate categories of personnel. Social Activities: J\ ll should consider minimi,:ing time spent in crowded envi ronments . Common Areas and Large venues ( e.g .. s it-down dining. movie theaters. sporting venues. plac..:s ol worship): Can operate under relaxed physical distancing (3 fl) protocols. Outdoor rec reation areas (to include parks and picnic areas. beaches. campgrounds. marinas. golf courses. and other outdoor faci lities): May reopen/operate if they implement sanitat ion protocols. Ciyms: May reopen/operate if they adhere 10 sanitation protocols . Resume unrestricted acti vi ti es.

1

Department of the Air Force Return to Work Capacity Guidelines 15 MAY 2020

Version 1

2

CONTENTS

RETURN TO WORK CAPACITY GUIDELINES 3

Key Messages 3

Adjusting to Operations in COVID‐19 Environment 3

Planning Assumptions 3

Visualizing Risk 4

Considerations for High Risk 5

Lines of Effort 6

Guidance for Return to Work Capacity Phasing 6

Guidance for Reinstating Higher HPCONS 7

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX 1. Implementation Guidance – Lines of Effort 8

APPENDIX 2. Return to Work Capacity Algorithm 15

APPENDIX 3. Sample Installation Commander Ready to Return to Work Capacity 21 Checklist

APPENDIX 4. AF/A4 Facility Considerations for Reducing Potential Exposures 22

NOTE: The dynamic COVID‐19 pandemic will undoubtedly necessitate updates to these guidelines. Future updates will clearly annotate what has changed since the previous version.

3

OVERVIEW The Department of the Air Force Return to Work Capacity Guidelines provides public health guidance for Department of the Air Force (DAF) installation commanders to return their bases to work capacity in the wake of recent disruptions to installation operations, programs, services, and processes from the worldwide novel coronavirus (COVID‐19) pandemic.

Key Messages: 1. Return to work capacity does not mean return to pre‐COVID‐19 life.

2. Upon initiating installation return to work capacity plans, most of the base community will

likely remain at risk for COVID‐19 infection; older persons and those with chronic medical conditions are at highest risk for hospitalization and death.

3. Commanders must balance competing risks and institute mitigations to “buy down”

aggregate risk.

4. Robust test capacity, coupled with aggressive diagnosis, isolation1, contact tracing, and quarantine2, are critical to preventing and mitigating COVID‐19 spread in installation community.

5. Installation commanders should leverage training, experience, expertise, and consultation of

the installation public health emergency officer to manage risk IAW DoDI 6200.03, “Public Health Emergency Management Within the DoD”, 28 Mar 2019; and AFI 10‐2519, “Public Health Emergencies and Incidents of Public Health Concern”, 10 Dec 2019.

ADJUSTING TO OPERATIONS IN COVID‐19 ENVIRONMENT Full work capacity does not mean that we all return to how we worked prior to COVID‐19. We can attain full work capacity despite work structure modifications that are necessary to mitigate community risk. Moreover, efficiencies and lessons learned applied during stay‐at‐home orders may prove to be enduring and fundamentally change how we work (e.g., enhanced telework and telehealth).

PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS Fundamental questions about COVID‐19 remain which complicate planning for return to work capacity. However, these are planning assumptions based on what is known about COVID‐19 presently:

• Members of the installation community (exact number is undefined) will be at risk for COVID‐19 • Across DAF installations, there will be varying degrees of susceptibility to COVID‐19 because of

regional COVID‐19 transmission patterns to date • DoD testing capacity will not meet clinical and operational demand in some locations for at least

4 months

1 Isolation = “the separation of an individual or group infected or reasonably believed to be infected with a communicable disease from those who are healthy in such a place and manner to prevent the spread of the communicable disease” (DoDI 6200.03) 2 Quarantine = “the separation of an individual or group that has been exposed to a communicable disease, but is not yet ill, from others who have not been so exposed, in such manner and place to prevent the possible spread of the communicable disease” (DoDI 6200.03)

4

• Serological (antibody) testing will not be widely available for at least 6 months • The utility of serological testing is of strong operational interest, but presently undefined • There will be multiple “waves” of COVID‐19 in the US • COVID‐19 will impact the DAF for the next 18 months (~Fall 2021)

VISUALIZING RISK Commanders at all levels can plan a three‐phased sequence to returning to work capacity, by factoring:

• Mission criticality of the worksite • Individual risk for severe illness from COVID‐193

• Level of COVID‐19 transmission locally or amount of worksite risk4

Together, these factors result in different thresholds to return staff to worksites (Figure 1). The thresholds can be applied to inform phased sequencing of return to work capacity, and applied to individuals or worksites.

Example 1: For a worksite that permits ample physical distancing and has a young, relatively healthy population with minimal COVID‐19 transmission in the local community (lowest green column in Figure 1), the commander threshold to return to work capacity would be low.

Example 2: For a worksite in which physical distancing is unavoidable or impractical, with an older or other high‐risk population, especially in the setting of widespread COVID‐19 transmission in the local community (red column in Figure 1), the threshold to return to work capacity is high. However, greater mission criticality might drive risk acceptance and lower the threshold to return to work.

By applying operational risk management, commanders can prevent or mitigate “second and third waves” of COVID‐19 that risk disrupting installation mission operations and adversely impacting the health of the base community.

Although the installation may be ready to return to work capacity, external factors may disrupt plans. Returning the workforce depends on favorable local conditions that facilitate working on the installation. Reduced transportation options, school closures, lack of child care, catching up on actions that were delayed during stay‐at‐home orders, and other extenuating circumstances may complicate transitioning. Installation commanders may carefully consider the operating status of enabling functions in the local community prior to leading the installation through return to work capacity phases.

3 Age (65 years and older); presence of underlying medical conditions, such as chronic lung disease or moderate to severe asthma; serious heart conditions; immunocompromised; severe obesity (body mass index 40 or higher); diabetes; chronic kidney disease undergoing dialysis; liver disease 4 Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s Guidance on Preparing Workplaces for COVID‐19 (OSHA 3990‐03 2020; available at https://www.osha.gov/Publications/OSHA3990.pdf) provides guidance in classifying COVID‐19 exposure risk for different jobs and employer steps to mitigate risk.

5

Figure 1. Threshold to Return to Work Capacity

CONSIDERATIONS FOR HIGH‐RISK PERSONS Commanders and supervisors may not know the full extent to which individuals in their units, or individual’s household members, are high‐risk for COVID‐19 complications. Commanders and supervisors are encouraged to operate from the presupposition that, with the exception of age, personnel are without chronic medical conditions, unless they voluntarily disclose status to leadership. Commanders who seek to determine whether personnel, or their household members, have high‐risk conditions should first consult with legal, personnel, and medical advisors.

The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and Office of Personnel Management (OPM) provided guidance to DoD and other executive departments and agencies in “Aligning Federal Agency Operations with the National Guidelines for Opening Up America Again”, 20 Apr 20205. For vulnerable populations, “Agencies and managers must continue to take precautions for vulnerable populations that are at higher risk for severe illness from COVID‐19, including older adults and people of any age who have serious underlying medical conditions. Agencies are expected to continue the maximum telework policy for these populations defined by CDC, or other populations that may be impacted by the type of work the agency performs, up until a duty station is back at normal operating status. Agencies may also take into consideration situations where an employee lives with or provides care for individuals in the vulnerable population.” In addition, the OMB and OPM guidance states, “Departments and agencies are further encouraged to approve leave for safety reasons to employees who are in a vulnerable population as identified by the CDC, not telework‐eligible, and whose duty location is not returning to normal operations.”

5 M‐20‐23. Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp‐content/uploads/2020/04/M‐20‐23.pdf

6

LINES OF EFFORT Installation commanders can buy down operational risk through 4 Lines of Effort (LOE) that are aligned with the Guidelines for Opening Up America Again and DoD Health Protection Conditions (HPCONs):

1. COVID‐19 Surveillance6: Gathering real‐time information on COVID‐19 cases,

hospitalizations, deaths, and COVID‐like illnesses, specific to the region surrounding the installation, in order to make risk‐informed decisions.

2. Reducing Potential Exposures: Minimizing person‐to‐virus interfaces via engineering controls (e.g., ventilation systems, physical barriers) and administrative policies (e.g., telework, modified work hours) that reduce potential exposures while allowing the workforce to re‐integrate to work capacity.

3. Test‐Isolation‐Trace‐Quarantine: Testing Military Treatment Facility (MTF) beneficiaries with symptoms suggestive of COVID‐19 infection, isolating them so that they do not infect others, tracing close contacts of the ill person, and quarantining those contacts, complemented by COVID‐19 screening tests of asymptomatic deployers, accessions, and other mission essential personnel, protects the installation community and preserves mission operations. Succeeding in this line of effort prevents COVID‐19 outbreaks that disrupt return to work capacity plans and endanger the health of the installation community.

4. Risk Communication: The installation commander, with the full involvement and advice of the installation Public Health Emergency Officer (PHEO) and public affairs, communicates simple, clear and consistent messages that acknowledge stakeholders’ concerns, and informs individuals what they can do to mitigate COVID‐19 risk.

GUIDANCE FOR RETURN TO WORK CAPACITY PHASING Air Force return to work capacity occurs in three phases IAW the Guidelines for Opening Up America Again (Figure 2). Entering each phase is contingent on meeting gating criteria:

• Symptoms: Downward trajectory of influenza like illnesses and COVID‐like illness cases reported

over the preceding 14‐day period. • Cases: Downward trajectory of documented COVID‐19 cases or of positive tests as a percent of

total tests over the preceding 14‐day period. • Medical Facilities: Military Medical Treatment Facilities and/or local hospitals have the capacity

to treat all patients without crisis care and have a COVID‐19 testing program in place for at‐risk healthcare workers.

Installation commanders may consult with the PHEO and MTF director to determine whether gating criteria are met to ensure appropriate transition through return to work capacity phases.

6 Surveillance in this context is public health surveillance: “ongoing, systematic collection, analysis, and interpretation of health‐related data essential to planning, implementation, and evaluation of public health practice, closely integrated with dissemination of these data to those who need to know and linked to prevention and control” (CDC).

7

Figure 2. Sample Phase‐Specific Actions

NOTE: Even under Phase 3/HPCON A, vulnerable populations of civilian employees may be legally entitled (under the Rehabilitation Act) to reasonable accommodation, including full‐time telework.

GUIDANCE FOR REINSTATING HIGHER HPCONS Despite best efforts for an orderly stepwise increase in work capacity, the dynamic nature of COVID‐19 may complicate planning. Increases in COVID‐19 infections on the military installation or surrounding community may necessitate reinstating higher HPCON levels. The installation commander determines the HPCON level in consultation with the PHEO and MTF director IAW DoDI 6200.03.7 Installation commanders should also consult with MAJCOM leaders and other installation commanders in the region to coordinate response and communication. Situations that may drive reinstating higher HPCON include clear upward trend in COVID‐19 community transmission, and multiple, simultaneous COVID‐19 outbreaks on the installation and/or surrounding community. While HPCON lowering proceeds deliberately with a minimum 14‐day prerequisite demonstrating favorable trends, commanders should consider a 5‐day sustained increase in cases as a trend to reinstate HPCONs promptly based on a clearly worrisome trajectory in COVID‐19 cases. The 5 day metric is not intended to be overly prescriptive but should be weighed along with other factors to include testing and local healthcare capacity to meet clinical demand. Ultimately, installation commanders, under the advisement of their PHEOs, best understand the situation in their local area and therefore are empowered to make the best decision.

7 See USD(P&R) memo, 25 Feb 20, “Force Health Protection (Supplement 2) – Department of Defense Guidance for Military Installation Commanders’ Risk‐Based Measured Responses to the Novel Coronavirus Outbreak” for guidance on raising HPCONs. All OSD guidance is posted at the Air Force COVID‐19 Commander’s Tool Kit: https://intelshare.intelink.gov/sites/afa3/AFCAT/Pages/Air‐Force‐COVID‐1931.aspx

8

APPENDIX 1

Implementation Guidance – Lines of Effort

LINE OF EFFORT #1: COVID‐19 SURVEILLANCE

The importance of robust public health surveillance is exemplified by the Guidelines for Opening Up America Again gating criteria, which must be satisfied before proceeding to phased opening.

Figure 3. Guidelines for Opening Up America Again Gating Criteria

Surveillance measures inform installation commanders of COVID‐19 risk in the local environment and can be used by the PHEO to advise leadership. Specific surveillance metrics include:

Table 1. COVID‐19 Surveillance Measures

Measure Description Comments COVID‐19 The number of AF cases are reported to installation public health; local Probable and probable and public health authorities; USAF School of Aerospace Confirmed Cases confirmed cases, Medicine through Disease Reporting System internet

based on standard (DRSi); and local chain of command. DoD criteria8, in the Current gaps include: cases diagnosed outside MTF (AD, base community and Reserve/Guard, family member, retiree, civilian, surrounding local contractor, volunteer); completeness of reporting in the community surrounding community may vary based on testing capacity; local public health authority capabilities, practices.

COVID‐19 In both the base Unlike outpatient cases, hospitalizations and deaths are Hospitalizations community and more likely to have complete reporting. and Deaths surrounding local

community

8 Confirmed case: detect SARS‐CoV‐2 by PCR. Probable case: meet clinical criteria AND epidemiological evidence with no confirmatory lab testing; or meet presumptive (non‐PCR) lab evidence AND either clinical criteria OR epidemiological evidence; or death certificate listing COVID‐19 or SARS‐CoV‐2 as cause with no confirmatory lab testing. Full CSTE case definitions at: www.cste.org/resource/resmgr/2020ps/Interim‐20‐ID‐01_COVID‐19.pdf

9

COVID‐19‐like Fever AND cough or Military Health System (MHS) has Electronic Surveillance illness (CLI) shortness of breath System for Early Notification of Community‐based

or difficulty breathing Epidemics (ESSENCE) or coronavirus diagnosis code

Hospital bed Assessment whether MHS has daily reporting of occupied/total beds, capacity MTF and local civilian including ICU.

hospitals have sufficient current capacity to care for possible surge of cases

Number of COVID‐ COVID‐19 tests done, To date, in US, 8‐20% of COVID‐19 lab tests are positive. 19 tests done and stratified by whether Best sign would be increasing number of tests done in % tests positive indication was clinical both symptomatic and asymptomatic persons, but low %

symptoms or force positive. This would suggest sufficient testing capacity. screening

What Installation Commanders Can Do: • Review local surveillance measure capabilities with installation PHEO • Assist in closing surveillance gaps, as needed • Review local surveillance measures periodically with installation PHEO • Encourage base community to self‐report probable/confirmed COVID‐19 early to unit

commanders LINE OF EFFORT #2: REDUCING POTENTIAL EXPOSURES

COVID‐19 appears to spread by close contact. Maintaining six feet of separation decreases the risk of transmitting COVID‐19. “Reducing potential exposures” expands upon physical distancing and includes worker cohorting and individual behavior change to further reduce risk. Additional information to guide installation commanders in modifying facility space and utilization can be found in Appendix 4 (AF/A4 Facility Considerations for Reducing Potential Exposures).

The Guidelines for Opening Up America Again recommend actions that all employers and individuals can take through all phases:

10

Figure 4. Guidelines for All Phases

Methods to reduce potential exposures include: • Promote telework, including activities requiring secure (classified) communication when

available • Engineering controls and administrative policies to promote physical distancing • Personal protective equipment (N95 respirators) in selected career fields outside of healthcare

facilities • Worker cohorting to minimize the number of potential exposures to unique persons • Continued aggressive disinfection of common and high‐traffic areas • Voluntary systematic symptom screen9 at beginning of work shift • Individual behaviors: good hygiene at all times; isolate immediately if sick

Promote telework, including activities requiring secure (classified) communication when available: Even before COVID‐19, telework policies enabled many workers to telework on a regular or situational basis. For certain work populations, teleworking, supported by sufficient technological infrastructure, can be an effective means of preserving productivity in disaggregated working conditions. However, network and VPN capacity must be able to support the greater number of teleworkers.

9 COVID‐19 has wide range of symptoms. Screen for fever, cough, shortness of breath (or difficulty breathing), chills, repeated shaking with chills, muscle pain, headache, sore throat, new loss of taste or smell (can be assessed by simple household items such as coffee, peppermint, cinnamon, etc.)

11

Engineering controls and administrative policies to promote physical distancing: Many work units and businesses have already devised creative means to promote social distancing, such as drive‐through pharmacy; plastic barriers in take‐out restaurants; markers noting safe separation distances at commissary. To the extent practicable, worksites should be configured to promote physical distancing. Waiting areas that crowd multiple persons into a small area must be eliminated. Services that can be conducted effectively through virtual means should be considered the default. This may necessitate process changes, such as changing manning in customer services sections, developing online appointment portals, and accelerating video conferencing capabilities. Commanders are encouraged to invite bioenvironmental engineering, public health, and flight and operational medicine to provide their worksites with multi‐disciplinary COVID‐19 risk mitigation consultations.

Personal protective equipment in selected career fields outside of healthcare facilities: The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) recommends personal protective equipment (N95 respirators) in limited occupational settings outside of healthcare, including correctional facilities, law enforcement, firefighting, emergency medical services, and mortuary affairs. For DAF, this public health recommendation would extend to Chaplain Corps personnel called to support these settings. N95 respirators must be additive to engineering and administrative controls to prevent COVID‐19 transmission.

Worker cohorting to minimize the number of potential exposures to unique persons: Many work units have already developed and implemented policies to minimize the amount of “mixing” that occurs among Airmen and Space Professionals in the unit, such as dividing personnel into Blue or Silver teams. Dividing the squadron into smaller self‐contained work cohorts reduces the number of potential exposures if one member becomes ill with COVID‐19.

Continued aggressive disinfection of common and high‐traffic areas: The current COVID‐19 environment requires a much higher level of disinfection. Integrating aggressive disinfection may require modifying hours of operation for public services, such as fitness centers, commissaries, or libraries. In addition, commanders should plan for cleaning and disinfecting a workplace after a COVID‐19 case. Installation planning should specify what needs cleaning and disinfecting IAW CDC guidelines and consider resources and equipment needed. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)‐approved COVID‐19 disinfectants are available at www.epa.gov/pesticide‐ registration/list‐n‐disinfectants‐use‐against‐sars‐cov‐2. Shortages of disinfectants from disruptions in the supply chain may factor into return to work capacity pacing. Per CDC guidance, additional measures beyond routine cleaning and disinfection are unnecessary after seven days since a COVID‐19 infected person has visited or used the facility.

Voluntary systematic symptom screen at beginning of work shift10

10 Thermal imaging systems have logistic challenges and unclear value beyond symptom screen. Additional information on thermal imaging systems may be found at: https://www.fda.gov/medical‐devices/general‐hospital‐ devices‐and‐supplies/thermal‐imaging‐systems‐infrared‐thermographic‐systems‐thermal‐imaging‐cameras If temperature checks are implemented, commanders may consider standard thermometers (purchase in bulk for individual use) or non‐contact infrared thermometers (requires a properly trained screener). Additional imaging on non‐contact infrared thermometers may be found at: https://www.fda.gov/medical‐devices/general‐hospital‐ devices‐and‐supplies/non‐contact‐infrared‐thermometers

12

Prior to starting work shifts, workers can ascertain that they don’t have any symptoms compatible with COVID‐19. This can be as simple as a sign at the entrance of the workspace listing the symptoms and instructing the worker to “Stop” if they have any of the symptoms. In addition, commanders and supervisors can encourage awareness and use of the DoD COVID‐19 Symptom Checker (https://mysymptoms.mil).

Individual behaviors: Individuals can mitigate risk by practicing good hygiene, wearing face coverings while in public, isolating immediately if sick (not going to work), adhering to social distancing protocols (stsaying at least six feet away from others), and limiting exposures while off‐duty (Figure 4).

What Installation Commanders Can Do:

• Promote maximum and flexible telework policies, to the extent that the mission allows • Take care of Airmen and Space Professionals and their families by supporting flexible telework

policies for Airmen and Space Professionals with high‐risk family members and/or childcare challenges due to closed childcare, schools, after‐school activities, and summer camps, to the extent that the mission allows

• Promote continued creativity to minimize potential exposures as the best ideas may well come from the most junior member in a work section; however, ideas should be validated by medical professionals (e.g., PHEO, Bioenvironmental Engineering, Public Health) prior to implementation

• Review unit commanders’ plans to minimize potential exposures; encourage sharing within installation and across installations on leading practices

• Work with commanders at all levels to apply the a “Warm/Hot Zone” framework where hyper‐ local conditions with variable risk drive tailored return to work capacity plans

• Temper expectations that return to work capacity equates to return to pre‐COVID‐19 life • Consult with the installation PHEO in managing risk, particularly in areas of the installation that

may have high prevalence of persons at risk for COVID‐19 complications • Reinforce the imperative that ill persons must not go to work, but must consult with their

healthcare provider and get tested for COVID‐19 if indicated • Provide workplaces with signs that list the symptoms of COVID‐19 and instructions to consult

with healthcare personnel and not work until cleared • Encourage commanders to invite bioenvironmental engineering, public health, and flight and

operational medicine to provide multidisciplinary COVID‐19 risk mitigation consultations • Encourage workers to use the DoD COVID‐19 Symptom Checker

LINE OF EFFORT #3: TEST‐ISOLATION‐TRACE‐QUARANTINE

The ability for the MTF and installation to rapidly test‐isolate‐trace‐quarantine is critical to containing any COVID‐19 that occurs on the installation. This line of effort will require the active involvement of all installation stakeholders to function effectively.

Test is the capability for the MTF (and broader local medical community) to rapidly administer a COVID‐ 19 diagnostic test for a patient who has symptoms compatible with COVID‐19 and obtain the result expeditiously (preferably one day). Ill persons should be placed in provisional isolation, unless sick enough to warrant hospitalization. Once COVID‐19 is confirmed, isolation should continue in accordance with public health recommendations. Contact tracing is investigating household members

13

and all other close contacts11 that the patient had while symptomatic and up to 48 hours before onset of symptoms. These contacts should be asked about whether they are ill and placed into quarantine for 14 days as long as they are without symptoms.12

The need for clinical and operational testing requires robust testing capacity. Table 2. Testing Categories Description Comments MTF beneficiaries with clinician suspicion for COVID‐1913

DoD Force Health Protection Guidance Supp 6 discourages testing for “mildly symptomatic”. However, as we transition to Return to Work Capacity posture and build our testing capacity, it’s imperative that every patient with suspected COVID‐19 be tested.

Contact tracing: Persons potentially exposed to COVID‐ 19 patient14

Testing identifies additional cases and helps contain outbreak. Identifying additional cases then leads to additional contact tracing. Test contacts twice: immediately and after 14‐day quarantine.

Screening of deployers, accessions, other mission essential (all asymptomatic)

Testing at end of restriction of movement just prior to training/mission.

Installation Commander Considerations for Isolation and Quarantine The installation commander retains broad public health emergency powers to compel isolation (and quarantine) IAW DoDI 6200.03, Public Health Emergency Management, although the powers are constrained by the scope of the military commander’s authority. The installation commander does not have legal authority to require isolation or quarantine for a civilian or contractor. Despite the absence of legal authority to compel behavior, many individuals may nonetheless comply with a request to self‐ isolate, particularly if the rationale is communicated effectively by healthcare staff, public health personnel, and leadership.

What Installation Commanders Can Do:

• Consult with the installation PHEO to gauge local testing capacity, integrating MTF and local community capacity that would be available, as part of operational risk management

• Plan arrangements with lodging to immediately house isolated and quarantined persons, as necessary

• Ensure commanders have plans to support team members subject to isolation or quarantine, including attending to basic sustenance, and emotional, social and childcare needs

• Ensure first sergeants are able to arrange support (housing, food, laundry, thermometers, essential services, daily check‐ins) for those placed into isolation or quarantine, as needed

11 Close contact = being within 6 feet for at least 10‐30 minutes. In healthcare settings, this may be defined as exposures of greater than a few minutes or more. (CSTE/DoD) 12 Quarantine in this context should be considered broadly as any public health recommendation to restrict movement outside of the residence in order to prevent COVID‐19 transmission. The installation commander authority to compel quarantine is limited to declared public health emergencies and only applicable to persons within the scope of the commander’s authority, which are typically military members, IAW DoDI 6200.03. 13 Planning factor is ambulatory visit rate for respiratory symptoms of 457 per 1000 person‐years. 14 Planning factor is each COVID‐19 case has an average of 8 contacts.

14

• Educate and train Airmen and Space Professionals to get into the daily habit of recording all appointments, activities, and contacts to facilitate recall of all contacts beginning 48 hours before onset of symptoms

• Ensure MTF public health has ready access to complete contact information for everyone that is part of the installation community, to facilitate contact tracing should need arise

• Ensure resources and/or processes are in place for those under quarantine to self‐monitor their temperatures twice a day for 14 days

• Support inclusion of telework option in contracts, when practicable, commensurate with civilians and military telework capability in similar work settings

• Thank persons who complete isolation or quarantine LINE OF EFFORT #4: RISK COMMUNICATIONS

We can anticipate that individuals will have varying attitudes toward the installation return to work capacity plan. Some may embrace the plan enthusiastically expressing a desire to return to the pre‐ COVID‐19 era. Others, such as those with high‐risk conditions or with predisposition to anxiety, may be much more concerned. Many workers who have worked from home for all or most of the COVID‐19 pandemic require adjusting to modified operations under COVID‐19.

Installation commanders face a communications challenge to reassure stakeholders that conditions are safe while simultaneously ensuring everyone takes the need to reduce potential exposures seriously.

Commander outreach to installation stakeholders (e.g., retiree council, key spouse, on‐base schools) can prevent misunderstanding or conflict. Installation reporting of COVID‐19 cases, persons in isolation and quarantine, will need to be IAW DoD requirements, and with respect for privacy of individuals.

Civil authorities may have different trajectories in changing public health emergency declarations, stay‐ at‐home orders and social distancing directives. The Guidelines for Opening Up America Again state that state and local officials may need to localize application of the guidelines to local circumstances. If the installation return to work capacity plan could be perceived to conflict with civil authority directives, the installation commander will consult the staff judge advocate IAW DoDI 6200.03, 3.1.e.

Commanders at all levels will need to plan how to respond in the event of a COVID‐19‐related death or cluster of infections. They will need to be proactive in responding to stakeholder concerns expressed directly or through alternative channels like social or traditional media.

What Installation Commanders Can Do:

• Consult with the installation PHEO and public affairs on risk communications planning • Seek opportunities to listen and respond to stakeholders’ concerns • Practice effectively communicating with installation community facing COVID‐19‐related death

or cluster of infections • Communicate and coordinate actions with local civil authorities

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APPENDIX 2 Figure 5. Installation Commander Return to Work Capacity Algorithm

Question 1: Does the mission allow adherence to the Guidelines for Opening Up America Again phases?

As previously shown in Figure 3, the Guidelines for Opening Up America Again Gating Criteria rely on favorable 14‐day retrospective trends in symptoms, cases, and hospital capacity before proceeding to each of the three phases. In some situations, commanders may have no latitude and must accelerate return to work capacity; e.g., natural disaster and installation called upon to execute Defense Support to Civil Authorities mission. Commanders can use the HPCON Change Decision Support Tool (Installation Operational Risk Management [ORM] Worksheet) to help understand whether the gating criteria have been met and to understand risk.

If the answer to Question 1 is NO (i.e., Gating Criteria cannot be adhered to): Commanders can refer to the HPCON Change Decision Support Tool (Installation ORM Worksheet) (Figure 6) to help understand risk. The worksheet is regularly updated and posted at: https://intelshare.intelink.gov/sites/afa3/AFCAT/Pages/Air‐Force‐COVID‐1931.aspx

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Figure 6. HPCON Change Decision Support Tool (Installation ORM Worksheet)

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Installation Demographics Risk of negative outcomes increases with age and comorbidities (respiratory illnesses, heart conditions, obesity, etc.). Use this section to help gauge risk related to your installation

age demographics in coordination with your PHEO who can advise and assist with installation‐specific comorbidity information. Best available additional source is supporting FSS and MTF.

Age < 50 50‐64 65+ Total Active Duty 3410 11 0 3,421

Guard 1 0 0 1 Reserve 1448 112 0 1,560

DoD Civilian 549 489 48 1,086 Dependents 4785 86 0 4,871

Totals 10193 698 48 10,939 Comorbidities

Condition Heart Disease Immunity Disorders Lung Disease Diabetes Percent of Active Duty Affected 6% 5% 13% 0.40% Comparison to All USAF MTFs

(See FAQ for details) Average ‐ Middle Third Average ‐ Middle Third Poor ‐ Bottom Third Poor ‐ Bottom Third

Projected Hospitalizations: DoD ADVANA PennMed Model Use this section to understand potential peak hospitalization demand by age and component over the next 14 days

(CAUTION: Hospitalization estimates based on a single model projection and CDC planning factors) Best available additional source located in the Local Health Projections tab of CHAD found here: https://covid19dash.shinyapps.io/covid19/

Projection Length by Component < 50 50‐64 65+ Total Active Duty 3 0 0 3

Guard 0 0 0 ‐ Reserve 1 0 0 1

DoD Civilian 0 1 0 1 Dependents 4 0 0 4

Totals 8 1 0 9 Risk Considerations

Use this section to assess risk and the installation's ability to mitigate negative outcomes while executing mission. The DoD's individual risk assessment tool can be found here: https://mysymptoms.mil/assessment

LOW M OD ER A T E H IGH SEVER E

Installation have a plan for testing, isolation, quarantine for those returning from high‐

exposure ops, exhibiting symptoms, or CV‐19 positive? Do these plans include childcare

considerations?

Yes, fully executable

Yes, mostly executable

Yes, partially executable

Yes, but not executable or No

Must MET's be accomplished in‐person with less than optimized mitigation measures (i.e.

facemasks, hard shift schedules, reduced facility occupancy, hand sanitizer and

cleaning supplies widely available etc )?

No

Yes, many viable mitigation options

Yes, few viable mitigation options

Yes, mitigation impossible

Location large enough for physical distancing?

Yes

Yes, few chokepoints with mitigation options

available

Yes, many chokepoints with few mitigation options available

No, close quarters required

Current local or DoD travel restrictions? None Minor Major Prohibitive

Adequate contact tracing for all cases?

Robust contact tracing Contact tracing near

capacity Limited contact tracing, or non medical

personnel conducting tracing operations No contact tracing

capability

Operations Information Environment Considerations Use this section to consider risk for large gatherings or events

LOW

M OD ER A T E

H IGH SEVER E

Have public regional health concerns diminished in your local area?

Yes, limited to no concerns at all levels

Yes, some regional or state concerns remain

No, local concerns but no state‐level concerns

No, concerns remain at all levels

Other Services performing similar events?

All serviced performing similar events

Events performed with notable mi ti ga ti on, i.e.

social distancing

One other service performing similar events with multiple mitigations

No service performing similar events

Does Event comply with current guidance (restrictions)?

No applicable health restrictions/guidance

Complies with all restrictions/guidance

Event requires waivers to current restrictions/guidance

Does not comply with restrictions/guidance

Does this COA Support one of the three DOD

priorities for dealing with CV‐19: 1) Protecting our people

2) Maintaining mission readiness 3) Support the whole‐of‐government effort

Meets all three DOD CV‐19 priorities

Meets DOD CV‐19 any two priorities

Meets one DOD CV‐19 priority

Does not meet DOD CV‐

19 priorities

In addition, commanders can mitigate risk by:

1. Adhering to DoD Force Health Protection Supplement Guidance (https://intelshare.intelink.gov/sites/afa3/AFCAT/Pages/Air‐Force‐COVID‐1931.aspx) 2. Being familiar with Guidelines for Opening Up America Again and state/local civil authority guidance 3. Applying the Joint Risk Analysis Methodology IAW CJCSM 3105.01, cao 5 Sep 19, when installation commander decisions carry second‐order consequences to long‐term institutional risk and/or security, political, and economic cooperation. This methodology is particularly relevant in OCONUS installations

18

where host nation and regional security considerations are at play in many installation commander decisions. (https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Library/Manuals/CJCSM%203105.01.pdf?ver=2019‐12‐04‐ 183102‐540)

Question 2: Is transmission of disease controlled in the local area?

Installation commanders assess whether they see favorable trends in local Symptoms and Cases in the Guidelines for Opening Up America Again Gating Criteria:

Symptoms:

• Downward trajectory of influenza‐like illnesses (ILI) reported within a 14‐day period, AND • Downward trajectory of COVID‐like syndromic cases reported within a 14‐day period

Cases:

• Downward trajectory of documented cases within a 14‐day period, OR • Downward trajectory of positive tests as a percent of total tests within a 14‐day period (flat or

increasing volume of tests)

Commanders may pay particular attention to the number of COVID‐19 tests being done, to ensure that a decrease in documented cases is an artifact of not having tests available. Syndromic surveillance, based on MTF and civilian hospital reports of patients with COVID‐ and influenza‐like illnesses, complements lab data.

If the answer to Question 2 is NO: Installation Commander then assesses whether mitigation is optimized IAW the relevant HPCON. In most situations, mitigation will already be optimized for the HPCON level. Then commanders continue to:

1. Optimize surveillance; 2. Reassess disease control after an additional 14‐day period; AND 3. Evaluate whether the current HPCON is appropriate to the public health situation

before returning to Question 2.

Question 3: Is there sufficient healthcare and public health capacity?

Question 3 is a modification of the Guidelines for Opening Up America Again Gating Criteria to include public health capacity:

• Treat all patients without crisis care, AND • Robust testing program in place for at‐risk healthcare workers, AND • Presence of public health capacity to investigate possible COVID‐19 cases

If the answer to Question 3 is NO:

Installation Commander, in consultation with the PHEO and MTF Director, assesses whether healthcare capacity on the installation and surrounding local community can be strengthened. A no response

19

should prompt re‐assessment of Question 1 as to whether the installation mission permits adherence to the Guidelines for Opening Up America Again phasing process. Once the answer to Question 3 is YES, further action depends on the Phase that the installation is entering.

Question 4: What Phase are you entering?

Each phase is designed to last a minimum of two weeks before the gating criteria (Questions 2 and 3) are applied again to determine whether it is safe to progress to the next phase.

For Phase 1, the supervisor optimizes the hierarchy of workplace controls first (Figure 7).

Figure 7. Workplace Controls

Individual ORM Worksheet: Specific return to work capacity plans may vary based on installation mission, demographics of base community, medical capabilities, COVID‐19 epidemiology, and operational risk management. Supervisors may use the Individual ORM Worksheet (Figure 8) in determining which phase to allow an individual to return to work (Figure 2). Unlike the HPCON Change Decision Support Tool in Figure 6, which is applied to manage overall risk for installation return to work capacity planning, the ORM Individual Worksheet is more tactical, and meant to provide commanders and supervisors with a tool to manage risk in individual workers.

20

Figure 8. Individual ORM Worksheet

NOTE: Not intended for use as a workforce management tool.

21

APPENDIX 3: Sample Installation Commander Ready to Return to Work Capacity Checklist

Meet with PHEO:

• Are Guidelines for Opening Up America Again gating criteria met? • Review local surveillance measure capabilities • Assist in closing surveillance gaps, as needed • Discuss managing risk in installation sections that have high prevalence of persons at risk for

COVID‐19 complications Discuss risk communications planning with public affairs and PHEO

• Schedule outreach to stakeholder communities • Plan crisis communication in event of COVID‐19 death or cluster of infections • Temper expectations that return to work capacity equates to return to pre‐COVID‐19 life

Meet with Commanders:

• Communicate expectation that ill persons must not work, but must consult with healthcare provider

• Ensure commanders have plans to support team members subject to isolation or quarantine, including attending to emotional and social needs

• Promote continued creativity to minimize workplace and base facility potential exposures to COVID‐19

• Review unit commanders’ plans to minimize potential exposures; encourage sharing within installation and across installations on leading practices

• Promote continued telework policies, as appropriate to specific unit work Ensure installation is ready for Test‐Isolate‐Trace‐Quarantine

• Medical Group has local testing capacity • Public Health has complete contact information to efficiently track down contacts • Sufficient supply of thermometers for those in quarantine • Civilians are informed of leave and telework options • Medical Group is ready to report appropriate metrics • Lodging can support isolated and quarantined service members and civilians, as necessary

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APPENDIX 4:

AF/A4 Facility Considerations for Reducing Potential Exposures

This guidance is intended to provide Installation Commanders facility space and utilization modification recommendations to promote physical distancing when developing “return to the workplace” plans. Commanders should implement telework optimization and administrative policies first before making significant or permanent alterations to existing workspaces. These efforts will help achieve the desired effect of reducing potential exposures and prevent the creation of workplace modifications that could introduce inefficiencies.

1. Administrative Policies to Reduce Potential Exposures

Administrative policies should be the primary method used to reduce potential exposure when developing “return to the workplace” plans.

Employees should self‐assess their health before leaving home. If experiencing a temperature, or not feeling well, employees should remain at home and not enter the workplace.

All personnel shall wear cloth face coverings inside buildings where physical distancing cannot be maintained, based on current CDC and local guidance and advisories.

All personnel shall wash their hands or utilize hand sanitizer frequently throughout the work day, per CDC guidelines.

Commanders and supervisors should continue to maximize the use of virtual meetings.

1.1 Cleaning Standards

Increased workspace cleaning standards will be an integral part of a “return to the workplace” plan. Commanders should consider the following:

- Consult with HQ Air Force Installation and Mission Support Center (AFIMSC) guidance and CDC

guidelines to increase the cleaning of common and high‐traffic areas

- Install self‐cleaning sanitation stations (wipes and/or hand sanitizer) to support increased cleaning of personal workspaces and common areas, per CDC guidelines

- Implement requirements for Airmen to be responsible for their own spaces such as wiping down

frequently touched surfaces in the immediate work area

- Wipe down door handles/fixtures frequently

1.2 Telework Optimization

Leverage teleworking protocols. Any potential funds spent to reconfigure a workplace should first be measured against investing in a strengthened Virtual Private Network (VPN) back‐bone and suite of on‐

23

line collaboration tools. Additionally, Commanders should consider adding web‐based conferencing capabilities to meeting rooms that are compatible with programs (such as Microsoft Teams) to maximize the ability to collaborate between in‐office workers and teleworkers.

1.3 Administrative Work Areas

To the extent practicable, reconfigure administrative space furniture to promote physical distancing.

- As appropriate, adjust workforce time and attendance; take into consideration other factors such as Blue/Silver shifts, continued telework, ability to ‘distance’, etc.

- Reconfigure waiting areas by reducing seating capacity to accomplish physical distancing

- Encourage virtual / online customer services

- Encourage the use of surface materials that are easier to sanitize.

- Encourage reducing or modifying the equipment needed at each shared workstation to

eliminate shared materials.

- Encourage use of virtual collaboration tools instead of in person meetings

- Reduce the number of students in instructor‐led classroom courses

- Enable on‐line appointments in advance for services that require in‐person customer interaction

1.4 Industrial Work Areas

A telework solution may not be as applicable for industrial workspaces. Consideration to reduce potential exposure in an industrial area should include:

- Reduce personnel density in industrial areas through workforce time and attendance; take into

consideration other factors such as Blue/Silver shifts, ability to ‘distance’, etc.

- Encourage aggressive use of personal protective equipment (PPE)

- Utilize additional handwashing/sanitizing stations in the shop spaces

2. Facility Enhancements

To the extent practicable, facility enhancements aimed to physically eliminate hazards should be paired with administrative policies to promote physical distancing. This can be done though user purchased and installed equipment items or Real Property Installed Equipment (RPIE). Time and cost intensive facility modifications should be avoided. Focus RPIE investment in high traffic and/or high density locations. Some low cost, easy to execute, potentially reversible actions to consider are:

- Equipment Purchases

24

a. Adding temporary plastic sheeting or Plexiglas dividers between critical high density workspaces

b. Place floor markings as guides for physical distancing in areas where employees may

congregate, such as common printers and copiers; refrigerators, etc.

c. Purchase portable High‐Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA)/Ultraviolet (UV) filtration units for high‐risk areas

- RPIE

a. Install touchless fixtures (kick plates, sensors, door openers, water fountains, paper towel

dispensers, soap dispensers, etc.)

b. Install the highest Minimum Efficiency Reporting Value rated Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) filter available based on the system design

c. Consult subject matter experts on potentially increasing outside‐air configurations on HVAC

systems

Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Screening

Questionnaire

Please ask the patient the following questions:

Yes

No

Don’t

Know

1. Within the last 14 days, have you traveled anywhere to

include internationally?

1. Have you had close contact (within 6 feet/2 meters) with a

person known or suspected to have COVID-19, as discussed

with Public Health through contact tracing?

2. Are you currently experiencing symptoms, such as: cough,

difficulty breathing, shortness of breath, fever, chills, repeated

shakes w/chills, muscle pain, headache, new loss of taste, smell,

gastrointestinal symptoms, nausea, vomiting, and/or diarrhea

If answered “Yes” or “Don’t Know” to any question and are eligible for care at the MDG,

proceed to the MDG Drive Thru Entrance. Otherwise, please seek care from your health care

provider

DO NOT ENTER THE MDG!

CAO 8 May 2020

Request all members read

the “COVID 19 Screener”

document.

Response is “NO” to all questions Response is “YES” or “DON’T

KNOW” to any question

Infrared temp greater than or = 99.5

Infrared temp less than 99.5

Take infrared temp

Allow entry into facility

Do Not Allow Entry to facility.

Direct member to MDG Drive Thru

for additional screening if eligible for

care or send home to seek additional

medical care as needed

START

STAFF SCREENING MANPOWER/SECURITY

ROLES & RESPONSIBILITIES

All Shifts:

Maintain social distancing at all times.

ABU/OCP tops and caps are optional and do not need to be worn during

shift.

PPE:

o Support Screeners (asking questions): cloth masks

o Temperature Screeners: cloth masks, eye protection

(glasses/sunglasses suffice), and gloves

Screening Instructions:

o Refer to flow chart (attached)

Members entering the building must have a mask prior to entering the

building.

Inclement weather plan:

In the event of inclement weather (lightning within 5, extreme rain, etc)

move inside to conduct staff screening.

Example: XXXX-XXXX Shift:

Report time is 0545. Must be in place ready to go at 0600.

Setup table and chairs.

XXXX-XXXX Shift:

Teardown table and chairs. Place inside screened building.

Col Jennifer Hatzfeld/HAF 3/4O/DSN 761-7577/jjh/26 May 2020

Air Force Testing Strategy – 26 May 2020 Update

Preamble: As we plan for a return to the workplace and return to full capacity, we are all striving to preserve and protect the force. Testing affords commanders options and decision tools to support risk mitigation. The national call for increased testing is underpinned by the need to better understand the prevalence of COVID in the population and to aid in more fully understanding the course of this disease. Bottom line, we need clarity on the benefits and limitations of currently available testing. Currently available testing is diagnostic in nature. It is extremely useful in determining if COVID is the cause of symptoms in a patient….ruling in disease. Diagnostic testing has limitations as a screening tool in an asymptomatic patient…ruling out disease, because the results only matter at the time of testing. If we test asymptomatic patients and the test is negative, that does not mean they do not have COVID. It only means COVID was not detectable at the time the test was performed. A negative result today is no assurance of a negative result tomorrow. Currently, diagnostic testing does have value in an asymptomatic patient if it is performed in conjunction with at least a 14-day Restriction of Movement (ROM). In that case, the 14 days will allow for a potentially exposed patient to move through the infection long enough for the virus to be detectable. Therefore, a negative test at the end of 14 days provides a higher level of confidence the person is actually disease free. Additionally, sentinel surveillance (systematic testing of a specific group of people regardless of their symptoms) can enable early detection of transmission among our force and support contact tracing as well as the need for other mitigation measures. This will involve testing asymptomatic individuals who have not completed a ROM.

The Air Force strategy accounts for testing of symptomatic patients with a lower threshold of testing based on COVID like symptoms as determined by a medical provider. We endorse the testing of potentially exposed patients along with a 14-day ROM or quarantine. We support the testing (in accordance with current law and policy) of asymptomatic mission essential personnel, accessions, and deployers/redeployers in conjunction with a ROM/quarantine to add useful risk mitigation information to the decision before return to work. Accessions will be tested at the start of training in addition to following a 14 day ROM. Mission essential personnel and deployers/redeployers will be tested at the end of a 14 day ROM. DoD strongly recommends that deploying AF civilian personnel and DoD and AF contractor employees undergo a 14-day ROM as well. As testing capacity increases, sentinel surveillance testing of a percentage of asymptomatic health care personnel and the remaining installation workforce will occur every 14 days under the guidance of Public Health. Testing prioritization needs to focus on Tier 0 through Tier 3 based on monthly requirements before conducting Tier 4 surveillance testing.

Population Tests/Month Planning Factors

Symptomatic Personnel & COVID Exposed (Tier 0)

10K Historical data from last two months.

Asymptomatic Mission Essential (Tier 1)

500 Service-retained MAJCOMs; Tested at the end of ROM to enter mission.

Asymptomatic Accessions (Tier 1) 6.5K BMT & OTS; Tested at the start of training and a follow-up after ROM.

Asymptomatic Deployers (Tier 2/3) 7K Average deploy/redeploy for May-Jul of all 6 Geographic COCOMs; Tested at the end of ROM.

Asymptomatic Sentinel Surveillance - Medics (Tier 4)

5.7K 10% of clinical health care personnel (Military & DoD Civ) every 14 days; Random testing.

Asymptomatic Sentinel Surveillance - Non-Medics (Tier 4)

10K No less than 1% of total base workforce (minus health care personnel) every 14 days; Random testing.

Total 39.7K

WORKING DRAFT // FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // PRE-DECISIONAL

Supporting the Nation, Protecting Our People, & Preserving Readiness!

UNCLASSIFIED 1

TIER 1: Critical National Capabilities – 135,000

• Strategic and Nuclear Deterrence Forces

- STRATCOM

- SPACECOM

• Homeland Defense Forces

- NORAD/NORTHCOM

- CYBERCOM

• SOCOM National Mission Force

• CYBERCOM National Mission Force

• Accessions Sources

TIER 2: Engaged Field Forces – 200,000

• NORTHCOM COVID-19 Response Forces

• Critical Capabilities/Assets

- CYBERCOM

- SPACECOM

- TRANSCOM

- CENTCOM

- AFRICOM

TIER 3: Forward Deployed/Re-Deploying Forces – 100,000

- SOUTHCOM

- INDOPACOM

- EUCOM

TIER 4: All Other Forces ~1,000,000

Secretary of Defense PrioritiesDiagnostic and Screening Testing

(Tier Examples Not All Inclusive)

Col Jennifer Hatzfeld/usaf.pentagon.af-sg.mbx.covid-19-lab-team@mail.mil/5 Jun 2020

AF COVID-19 Lab Testing Guidance: Pre/Post-Deployment (Tier 2/3) Testing

The goal of pre- and post-deployment testing is to ensure mission success and the safety of personnel despite the higher risk of exposure to COVID-19 through international travel, close living quarters, and limited healthcare resources in the deployed environment.

Pre-Deployment

− All deployers are required to be tested for COVID-19 per DoD COVID-19 Task Force Testing and Reporting of DoD COVID-19 Screening dated 21 May 2020 and AF GENADMIN directive dated 20 May 2020.

− If ROM is occurring at the deployed location there is no need for ROM or testing at home station prior to deployment.

− If ROM is not occurring at the deployed location, ROM followed by testing would occur at home station or designated pre-deployment ROM locations (consider additional direction from pending DAF addendum to FHP Supplement 9).

Post-Deployment

− USD (P&R) Force Health Protection Guidance (Supplement 9) - Department of Defense Guidance for Deployment and Redeployment of Individuals and Units during the Novel Coronavirus Disease 2019 Pandemic (dated 26 May 2020) states “All Service members redeploying, whether from a COVID-19 operational area or not, will undergo a risk-based screening to determine if a 14-day ROM is indicated.

− CDC currently recommends staying at home for 14-days following all international travel (https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/travelers/after-travel-precautions.html)

− The current AF Testing Strategy dated 26 May 2020 states "deployers/redeployers will be tested at the end of a 14 day ROM” as an expectation that post-deployment ROM and testing will ensure the safety of the returning deployer, family members, community, and unit mission.

− PHEOs and Public Health should utilize a risk-based approach to develop a specific ROM and testing plan based on the unit’s or service member’s deployment location, transportation route/mode, possible contact with ill personnel, and other factors.

− If circumstances prevent full implementation of the AF post-deployment ROM/testing strategy, this must be reported through MAJCOM PHEO/Public Health channels.

MISSION FOCUSED…VALUED AIRMEN

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE6TH AIR REFUELING WING (AMC)

MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA

16 June 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR INDIVIDUALS ON MACDILL AFB

FROM: 6 ARW/CC

SUBJECT: Health Protection Condition Charlie Second Update For MacDill AFB

Reference: (a) Secretary of Defense, “Guidance for Commanders on Risk-Based Changing of Health Protection Condition Levels During the Coronavirus Disease 2019 Pandemic”, 19 May 2020 (b) Department of the Air Force, “DAF Return to Work Capacity Guidelines,Version 1”, 15 May 2020(c) 6 ARW/CC, “Guidance on Use of Cloth Face Coverings on MacDill AFB”,8 April 2020(d) 6 ARW/CC, “Updated Restriction on Personal Leave and Non-Official TravelOutside the Local Area”, 12 June 2020(e) 6 ARW/CC, “Health Protection Condition Charlie Update For MacDill AFB”,3 June 2020 (hereby superseded)

1. This letter supersedes the previous HPCON Charlie Update memorandum, dated 3 June 2020.On 9 March 2020, Florida Governor Ron DeSantis declared a state of emergency due to severeacute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), commonly referred to as COVID-19.On 23 March 2020, we declared a Public Health Emergency (PHE) for MacDill AFB and on26 March 2020 transitioned into Health Protection Condition (HPCON) Charlie to help mitigatethe substantial health risk of contracting or spreading COVID-19.

2. The Secretary of the Air Force implemented HPCON Charlie for all Air Force installations toprotect the health and safety of our personnel, and to posture our teams to help mitigate the riskof contracting or spreading respiratory illnesses like the flu or COVID-19. Although theSecretary of Defense granted the installation commander the authority to transition to lowerHPCONs in accordance with Reference (a), MacDill AFB remains in HCPON Charlie until wecan be certain COVID-19 is no longer a substantial disease threat. I remain in close consultationwith the Public Health Emergency Officer (PHEO) and his team, who will help inform mydecision to safely transition to HPCON Bravo and increased work capacity pursuant toReferences (a) - (b). While the installation remains in HPCON Charlie, we will transition intoPhase 2 of returning to work, which allows 50% manning as prioritized by unit and missionpartner commanders. All personnel on MacDill AFB will maintain strict hygiene measures offrequently washing and/or sanitizing hands; wiping common-use items with disinfectant;covering mouths and noses with a tissue or sleeve when coughing or sneezing; and staying homewhen sick. Additionally, personnel will continue to follow CDC guidelines including the wearof cloth face coverings when in public, practice social distancing (maintaining a distance of

2

greater than 6 feet), and refrain from physical contact such as hand shaking, fist bumps, etc., both on and off base.

As we continue in HPCON Charlie, in-person meetings will be limited to the amount ofpeople who can adhere to strict social distancing, unless approved by me after a public healthreview. Pursuant to Reference (c), wearing face coverings is required at all times when peopleare unable to maintain social distancing in the work center. Face coverings are still mandatoryinside all public areas such as the AAFES Gas Station Express Store, dining facility (DFAC),Base Exchange Complex, Commissary, and other public spaces where social distancing may notbe possible.

Servicemembers Quarantine and Isolation procedures have not changed, although thescenarios requiring quarantine have been updated. If you have returned from international travelwithin the past 14 days or have received a “Notice of Quarantine” memorandum signed by thePHEO, you must remain in your residence or designated lodging for the duration of thequarantine period. You are not allowed to leave your residence or yard except to receiverequired medical care or as approved by the PHEO. You should have no person-to-personcontact with any non-quarantined individuals. If you are given a “Notice of Isolation”memorandum signed by our PHEO, due to illness or positive COVID-19 test results, you are notallowed to leave your residence except to receive required medical care. You should have noperson-to-person contact with any non-isolation individuals except as approved by the PHEO.

Mission essential functions are allowed as directed by your unit commander, not to exceed 50people while practicing social distancing to the greatest extent practical. Avoid social gatheringsin groups of more than 10 people in circumstances that do not readily allow for social distancing.This applies to all areas to include dorms, lodging facilities, base housing, smoking areas, andFAMCAMP. Personnel may continue to exercise outside on the installation as long as socialdistancing is maintained. 6 ARW Servicemembers are restricted to the local area, in accordancewith Reference (d), which was recently updated on 12 Ju 2020. Above all, stay safe andremember that your cooperation in adhering to social distancing and restriction of movement isour best defense against COVID-19.

BENJAMIN S. ROBINS, Colonel, USAF Commander

Joint Travel Regulations Revisions

13 March 2020

040102. Allowances if Isolation or Quarantine is Required When Returning from

Government-Funded Leave Travel

If a public health official, medical official, or authorizing/order issuing official orders a Service

member to isolate or quarantine before proceeding to the PDS, then the Service member may be issued

TDY orders and is authorized standard travel and transportation allowances in accordance with JTR,

Chapter 2. If lodging in kind or meals in kind are provided, then per diem is not payable.

050106. Isolation or Quarantine

If a public health official, medical official, or authorizing/order issuing official orders a Service

member and a Service member’s dependents to isolate or quarantine after detaching or signing out of the

unit, then per diem may be authorized for both the Service member and dependents at the location

specified in the orders. If the Service member or dependents are required to travel to an alternate

location, then standard PCS allowances are paid in accordance with JTR, Chapter 5, Part A. If lodging in

kind or meals in kind are provided, then per diem is not payable. If dependents refuse to isolate or

quarantine, then per diem is not authorized.

050603. Isolation or Quarantine is Required After Arrival at the New PDS and

Before TLE Begins

If a public health official, medical official, or authorizing/order issuing official orders a Service

member and a Service member’s dependents to isolate or quarantine after arrival at the new PDS and

before TLE begins, then the Service member and dependents may be authorized per diem in accordance

with JTR Chapter 5, Part A. If lodging in kind or meals in kind are provided, then per diem is not

payable. If dependents refuse to isolate or quarantine, then per diem is not authorized.

050816-D

4. Isolation or Quarantine. If a public health official, medical official, or

authorizing/order issuing official orders the dependent to isolate or quarantine, then per diem may be

authorized. If the dependent’s authorization or member’s orders are amended to travel to an alternate

location, then transportation and per diem may be authorized in accordance with JTR Chapter 5, Part A.

If lodging in kind or meals in kind are provided, then per diem is not payable. If dependents refuse to

isolate or quarantine, then per diem is not authorized.

051206. Allowances if Ordered to Delay Proceeding after Departing or Detaching

from the Old PDS

A. Service Members. If a Service member is ordered to temporarily return to the old PDS or to

an alternate location, then the Service member could be issued TDY orders and may be authorized

standard travel and transportation allowances in accordance with JTR, Chapter 2. If the Service member

is ordered to remain in place or to an alternate location to await transportation, then per diem may be

authorized in accordance with JTR Chapter 5, Part A. If lodging in kind or meals in kind are provided,

then per diem is not payable.

Joint Travel Regulations Revisions

13 March 2020

B. Service Member’s Dependents. If the Service member’s dependents remain in place awaiting

transportation, then per diem may be authorized in accordance with JTR Chapter 5, Part A. If dependents

do not remain in place awaiting transportation, then per diem is not authorized. If the dependents are

authorized to temporarily return to the old PDS or to an alternate location to await transportation, then the

dependents may be authorized standard PCS allowances from the location where notified of the delay to

the location named in the amended PCS order, in accordance with JTR, Chapter 5, Part A. If lodging in

kind or meals in kind are provided, then per diem is not payable.

LODGING SUPPORT FORM:

Member Needing Lodging:

Name: _____________________________ Rank: ___________ Contact #:________________________

Unit: __________Unit POC/1st Sgt: _______________________ Contact #: ______________________

Return date (from OCONUS): _______________________ Country: ____________________________

Date checking in: ________________________ Date 14 days after return: _________________________

Unit’s Care Plan:

How will you get food/supplies to member? (Consider: Food allergies, Paper products, Toiletries, Technology/Chargers, Meds, Laundry if in VQ, etc.)

Delivery Times:

BREAKFAST LUNCH DINNER OTHER

MDG Care Team Rep:__________________________________________________________________

Specialized Requirements:_______________________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________________________________________

Validation Check:

Does member have a residence in the local area that can be utilized for self-isolation? YES NO

Does the member have family members living with him/her who are immunocompromised? YES NO

Who will be paying the Lodging bill for these accommodations? UNIT MEMBER

To be completed by the unit POC.

Please do not have member requesting self-isolation handle this form.

Unit POC will check into lodging and provide key to the member.

For same day reservations Unit POC call lodging @ DSN 312-968-4259 or 813-828-4259

For great than 24 hour reservations, email form to macdill.inn@us.af.mil.

Please remember that lodging personnel will not be authorized to enter rooms or to provide service to this

secured area of the MacDill Inn. Units bear the responsibility of ensuring members’ needs for sustainment,

health and morale are addressed and part of a care plan.

Authorized Area VISUALS

Authorized Area RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

Quarantined individuals are not authorized to enter the

lodging room of another quarantined individual.

When leaving the room for any reason, a mask will be

worn and mandatory six foot separation is required.

At NO TIME will quarantined guests enter common areas

of lodging, to include the main lobby or fitness center.

Guests will stay within designated areas and not cross any

quarantine boundary (Reference above visuals)

No smoking or vaping is authorized indoors: violation of

this policy will result in additional charges for cleaning to

the individual (A smoker’s outpost will be provided in the

outdoor area).

Sanitation wipes are provided at each entrance/exit to the

outdoor area to clean the door handles with each use.

LAUNDRY

MacDill AFB has coordinated for contract laundry services

for guests in lodging quarantine at no cost to the member.

Pick up and Drop off are twice a week.

Laundry bins are located at the first floor main entrance of

the West Wing to billeting.

Guests will place dirty laundry inside two trash bags and

write their name and room number on the bag with black

sharpie (provided by FSS).

Guests will place bagged laundry into bins the night prior

to pick up (Sunday and Thursday nights)

Clean laundry will be returned in the bins, wrapped and

labeled with name and room number (Monday and Friday)

Laundry days

DIRTY LAUNDRY: Sunday and Thursday night in the bins at the end of the hallway

CLEAN LAUNDRY: Monday and Friday mid-day in the bins at the end of the hallway

Dirty laundry drop Sunday Night will be returned Friday

Dirty laundry drop Thursday Night will be returned Monday

Trash

Guests are responsible for taking out their own trash.

Trash Bins are located at first floor main entrance of the

West Wing to billeting.

Tie all trash bags and place in the pictured containers as

needed.

Do not allow Unit POCs to pick up your trash as this risks

contamination.

Procedures for Requesting COVID-19 Cleaning The following procedures are effective immediately for requesting COVID-19 cleaning of rooms/buildings on MacDill AFB. All organizational Facility Managers (FMs) must ensure their subordinate building FMs understand and follow these procedures. 1. Upon identification of a potential or confirmed COVID-19 case, the building FM shall close affected room(s) from re-entry. Based on the unit’s risk assessment they may also need to consider closure of other rooms (bathrooms, elevators, etc.) 2. The building FM will immediately notify the following individuals by email and request a COVID-19 cleaning:

a. Organizational FM b. COR office: telina.thompson@us.af.mil, paul.hohn.2@us.af.mil c. Contracting Office: steven.belk@us.af.mil; maria.mckenzie-williams@us.af.mil.

3. Notifications must include the information listed below. If any information is not immediately available, provide it as soon it is known. Cleaning cannot commence until this information is provided.

a. Building number and common name of the building b. Room number(s)/area name(s) for each room/area that must be cleaned, including size

and use of each room/area. Include any entrances/exits, touchpoints, elevators and restrooms that may have been used.

c. Date/time when infected individual was last in the room(s). 4. In accordance with current CDC guidelines, the exposed area(s) will be allowed to sit a minimum of

24 hours after exposure before cleaning will occur. Currently, the base custodial contractor, GCE, is the company who will perform disinfectant cleanings of contaminated areas in accordance with CDC guidelines. This is based on their capability to accomplish such cleanings and comparative market research to determine fair and reasonable pricing. Should a situation require cleaning beyond their capabilities, an alternate source will be used as determined by the Contracting Officer.

5. For COVID-19 cleaning requirements that do not exceed $2500, the organization is responsible for payment and may use their GPC as payment. The Contracting Office is establishing COVID-19 pricing on the existing custodial contract, against which future requirements may be placed.

6. Organizations experiencing a suspected or actual COVID-19 exposure are reminded to make other reports as required by local commands. A cleaning request made using these procedures does not fulfill those reporting requirements.