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UNCLASSIFIED
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J O TNI
S TA F FC H I E F S OF
World Wide Chemical Conference
October 15, 2004
Joint Requirements Office for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense
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Agenda
Joint Combat Developer
JCIDS
Training, Doctrine, and Exercises
FY 06-11 POM Study
Installation Protection
Upcoming Targets
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Joint Combat Developer for CBRN Defense
• Implementation plan tasks Army, as Executive Agent, to serve as JCD- Directed by JRO- Force Protection FCB oversight
• Focus is concept experimentation
• Medical and non-medical
• Resources:- D049- USACMLS
• Objectives:- Support JCIDS analysis- Validate doctrine/TTP- New applications for existing capabilities- Support JPEO materiel development, fielding plans
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JCIDS Acceleration of CBRN Capabilities Documents
• CJCSI 3170.01C, 24 Jun 2003, established the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) and implemented the Knowledge Management / Decision Support (KM/DS) Tool
• Integrated Concept Teams
• CbtWMD Issue Team
• Force Protection Functional Capabilities Board
• Results
– Since JCIDS was instituted, 16 CBRN capabilities documents have been staffed and approved
– The rate of production of approved CBRN capabilities documents increased 220% in the last two years under JCIDS
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UNCLASSIFIEDAs of 20 Sep 04
Sense JCBRAWM ICD J Chem Bio Rad Agent Water MonitorSense JBSDS [C] J Bio Standoff Detect SysSense JSLBNCRS [C] J Svc Lt Wt NBC Recon SysSense JSLSCAD [C] J Svc Lt Wt Standoff Chem Agent DetSense JBTDS [B] J Bio Tactical Detection SysSense JBPDS J Bio Point Detection SysSustain JSTDS [B] J Svc Transportable Decon SysSustain JSSED [B] J Svc Sensitive Equip DeconSustain JSPDS [B] J Svc Personnel/Skin Decon SysSustain JPDS [B] J Portable Decon SysSustain JBAIDS [B] J Bio Agent Ident & Diag SysShield BIO PROPHY ICD J Med Bio Warfare Agent ProphylaxisShield JSCESM [C] J Svc Chem Enviro Survivability MaskShield JSMLT [C] J Svc Mask Leakage TesterShield JECP ICD J Expeditionary Collective ProtectionShape JEM [B] J Effects ModelSense JSLBNCRS [C] J Svc Lt Wt NBC Recon SysSense JSLSCAD [C] J Svc Lt Wt Standoff Chem Agent DetSense JBTDS [B] J Bio Tactical Detection SysSense JBPDS J Bio Point Detection Sys
JRO Approved 02 Apr 04
JRO Approved 08 Dec 03
STATUS
JROC Approved 28 Jun 04JRO Approved 02 Apr 04
JRO Approved 01 Mar 04
JRO Approved 03 Oct 03JRO Approved 21 Jul 03
JRO Approved 02 Apr 04JRO Approved 02 Apr 04
Area Acronym Document Description
JRO Approved 08 Jul 03
JRO Approved 21 Jul 03
JRO Approved 08 Dec 03JRO Approved 08 Jul 03JRO Approved 03 Oct 03
JROC Approved 02 Aug 04
JRO Approved 20 Feb 03
JRO Approved 06 May 03
JRO Approved 08 Jan 04
JRO Approved 15 Apr 04
JROC Approved 14 Sep 04
Approved Capabilities Documents
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CBRN Joint Capabilities Improvement Initiative Team (CIIT)
• Purpose:
– To integrate new JCBRN processes and developments into the Joint National Training Center
– Create capability to train and exercise CBRN and other war fighting skills
• Objectives:
– Develop the capability to train the force under CBRN conditions
– Identify/address CBRN capability gaps
• Implementation:
– CIIT Charter approved – USJFCOM/JRO-CBRN collaborative effort
– Staffed with 2 JRO-CBRN funded and 2 USJFCOM funded contractors
– Support to COCOMs – USEUCOM AGILE RESPONSE, USPACOM UFL-04, NORTHCOM DETERMINED PROMISE 03 and 04, Senior Leadership Seminars at three COCOMs, CBRN Familiarization Courses at three COCOMs
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• National Strategy to Combat WMD published in Sep 2002
• JROC approved the CBRN Defense Concept, Baseline Capabilities Assessment and its attributes, assumptions, and metrics; the prioritized insights; and the core capability gaps, July 2003
• 2004 SPG directed Department to reduce gaps/risk
Combating WMD Enhanced Planning Process Study
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• Procurement: Enough equipment for most Homeland Defense and Win Decisively needs, but not for Swiftly Defeat and Deter Forward needs
• RDT&E: Leaves 39 gaps identified by JROC, particularly in
– Defense against Non-Traditional Agents
– Medical countermeasures
– Standoff bio detection
– Genetically-engineered bio threats
• Infrastructure: Program can be executed, but testing incomplete and slower, leading to fielding equipment of potentially lesser reliability. Scientists harder to retain.
Summary of Risk in PB05-09 FYDP
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• Testing with simulants, not live agents
– Most problematic: detection, decontamination
• Testing components, not entire system
– Most problematic: standoff detection, bio point detection, and integrated early warning
• Testing with aging instrumentation and outdated methodologies
– Limited production capacity
•Most problematic: medical countermeasures, especially product-testing bottlenecks
– Delay in ability to meet future needs
•Most problematic: decontaminants; detectors; medical countermeasures
– Limited ability to attract and retain scientists
• Relying on models, especially for Non-Traditional Agents
Current Infrastructure Capability
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Enhanced Planning Process Guidance
• Combating the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) is a SECDEF top-10 priority
• SPG Guidance: Develop funding options to reduce risk for:
– Chem-Bio Defense Program: Address the Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, Nuclear Defense Program (CBRNDP) capability
gaps identified in the Defense Baseline Capabilities Assessment
(DBCA)
– Combating WMD Operations: Identify executive agents for new
missions – Addressed separately through Functional Area
Assessment process
– WMD Infrastructure: Address intellectual and physical
infrastructure recapitalization for medical and non-medical
laboratories and key WMD testing and evaluation (T&E) facilities
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Concepts ArchitecturesBCA:
•Attributes
•Assumptions
•Metrics
Enhanced Planning Process
JPG Language
EPP Analytical Process
Force Protection Architecture
Personnel
Assets
Information
Functional Concepts
Functional Concepts
Joint OperatingConcepts
Joint OperatingConcepts
Joint VisionJoint Vision
NationalMilitary Strategy
NationalMilitary Strategy
National Strategy to
Combat WMD
National Strategy to
Combat WMD
CBRN Operational Elements
Infra
stru
ctu
reS
&T
- T&
E - T
rainin
g
Infra
stru
ctu
reS
&T
- T&
E - T
rainin
g
DETERFORWARD
DETERFORWARD DETER
FORWARD
DETERFORWARD
SWIFTLY DEFEAT
SWIFTLY DEFEAT
WINDECISIVELY
DETERFORWARD
DETERFORWARD
Homeland DefenseHomeland Defense (HLD) (HLD)Must win, while conducting one of the following scenariosMust win, while conducting one of the following scenarios
(1)(1)
Counterproliferation
Consequence Management
Nonproliferation
SWIFTLY DEFEAT
DETERFORWARD
SHAPE
SHIELD
SENSE
SUST
AIN
CbtWMD Architecture
Non Proliferation
Counter Proliferation
ConsequenceManagement
(4)(4) (1)(1)(2)(2)
DETERFORWARD
Resourcing Options
Risk Assessment
Op
eration
al
CBRNDPInfrastructureNew Missions
Fu
ture
Fo
rce Mg
t
Institu
tion
al
Green Green – full capability, minimal risk YellowYellow – partial capability, moderate risk
RedRed – minimum capability, high risk
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Infrastru
cture
S&
T - T
&E
- Tra
inin
g
Infrastru
cture
S&
T - T
&E
- Tra
inin
g
DETERFORWARD
DETERFORWARD
DETERFORWARD
DETERFORWARD
DETERFORWARD
SWIFTLY DEFEAT
SWIFTLY DEFEAT
WINWINDECISIVELYDECISIVELY
DETERFORWARD
DETERFORWARD
(4)(4) (2)(2) (1)(1)
Homeland DefenseHomeland Defense
(1)(1)
Counterproliferation
Consequence Management
Nonproliferation
• Interdiction = Proliferation Security Initiative, etc.• Elimination = WMD + Delivery Systems IAW JP 3-40
Methodology Derived from Strategy
DETERFORWARD
Most demanding
planning scenarios
used
SWIFTLY DEFEAT
SWIFTLY DEFEAT
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• EPP issue team developed five options to address shortfalls in CBRND Program and related infrastructure
– Cost-benefit model optimizes content of each option
• Objective: Balance procurement and RDT&E to support the most demanding 1-4-2-1 scenarios:
–Simultaneous HD, WD, SD, and DF
–CBRN threat in all scenarios
– Each option incrementally reduces risk to the force
Options Development
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IPP Implementation Approach
Urgent RequirementCapability Document
InstallationPrioritization
InstallationStandards
CBRNE
Concept ofOperations
DOD Force ProtectionDOD Force Protection
Review Annually
Project GuardianImplementation
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Installation Priority List
{• Services confirm list annually
• Installations can be slightly reordered
to coincide with adjacent DOD installations
• Learn lessons first, then do OCONUS
• JSIPP / IPP Implementation Timeline
9 JSIPP 15 IPP
20 IPP
FY 039 JSIPP
FY 0415 IPP
FY 0520 IPP
FY 0630 IPP
FY 0740 IPP
FY 0845 IPP
FY 0950 IPP
30 IPP 40 IPP 45 IPP 50 IPP
From these, 15 are OCONUS
FY 10?? IPP
FY 11?? IPP
~75 IPP
TBD
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Upcoming Targets
• COCOM Conference
• Consequence Management Baseline Capabilities Assessment
• Emerging Missions Functional Area/Needs Analyses
• R & N
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JRO-CBRND Way Ahead
• Strengthening the alliance with
JSTO, JPEO, industry
• Using/adapting existing methodologies to
address emerging mission areas
• JRO for Combating WMD
COMBATING WMD
Consequence Management
Homeland Security
Nonproliferation
Counterproliferation
