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Unconventional gas as a component of energy balance in Ukraine: The myth of the transition fuel 26/09/2013 Unconventional gas production in Ukraine Heinrich Boell Foundation Ukraine

Unconventional gas as a component of energy balance in Ukraine: The myth of the transition fuel

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Unconventional gas as a component of energy balance in Ukraine: The myth of the transition fuel. 26/09/2013 Unconventional gas production in Ukraine Heinrich Boell Foundation Ukraine. Shale Gas / Fracking – Technological issue. Shale Gas / Fracking – Technological issue. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: Unconventional gas  as a component of  energy  balance in Ukraine: The myth of the transition fuel

Unconventional gas as a component of energy balance in

Ukraine:The myth of the transition fuel

26/09/2013Unconventional gas production in Ukraine

Heinrich Boell Foundation Ukraine

Page 2: Unconventional gas  as a component of  energy  balance in Ukraine: The myth of the transition fuel

Shale Gas / Fracking – Technological issue

Page 3: Unconventional gas  as a component of  energy  balance in Ukraine: The myth of the transition fuel

Shale Gas / Fracking – Technological issue

Page 4: Unconventional gas  as a component of  energy  balance in Ukraine: The myth of the transition fuel

Shale Gas / Fracking – Technological issue

NG Magazine – March 2013 75 miles X 50 miles - 3000 wells

Page 5: Unconventional gas  as a component of  energy  balance in Ukraine: The myth of the transition fuel

Shale Gas / Fracking – Technological Issue

Page 6: Unconventional gas  as a component of  energy  balance in Ukraine: The myth of the transition fuel

Debunking the mythsShale gas as a “bridging fuel” - A climate non-sense

• Once burnt, gas is 50% less GHG-intensive than coal: Assumption that switching from coal to gas would be an improvement

helping to transition to a decarbonised economy.• But misleading: Emissions also come from intentional or unintentional (fugitive)

emissions of methane during well construction, gas production, storage & transport.• Evidence that hydraulic fracturing can induce underground release of methane by

enhancing seepage, from imperfect well casings or older abandoned gas wells, or by natural pathways such as faults (Osborn et al., 2011)

Page 7: Unconventional gas  as a component of  energy  balance in Ukraine: The myth of the transition fuel

Debunking the mythsShale gas as a “bridging fuel” - A climate non-sense

The methane controversy:• Methane, a gas significantly more potent than CO2 (Shindell et al, 2009):

– On a 100-year time scale: Global warming potential 25 to 33 times higher– On a 20-year time scale: Global warming potential 83 to 105 times higher

• How much fugitive methane leaks? – A controversial scientific debate– Howarth et al, 2011: Between 1.4 to 3.6% of fugitive methane.– Alvarez et al, 2012: 2.1% for power plant use of gas & 3.0% for gas used in vehicles – No climate benefit

for shale gas compared to coal if more than 3,2% of methane leakage,– Pétron et al, 2012: Between 2.3 and 7.7% of fugitive methane (best guess at 4%).– Karion et al, 2013: Between 6 and 12% of fugitive methane (best guess at around 9%).

International Energy Agency, Golden Rules for a Golden Age of Gas, 2012“The Golden Rules Case puts CO2 emissions on a long-term trajectory […] consistent with a probable temperature rise of more than 3.5°C in the long term, well above the widely accepted 2°C target”

No bridging fuel if climate change impact comparable to coal

Page 8: Unconventional gas  as a component of  energy  balance in Ukraine: The myth of the transition fuel

Debunking the mythsShale gas as a “bridging fuel” – An economic non-sense

The Resources/Reserves ambiguity

Shale gas, a short-term capital-guzzler option:• A short-term option:

– Inherent steep decline of the productivity: Well productivity declines between 63% and 80% in the first year, and up to 85% after 36 months.

– 88% of US shale gas is produced in just 6 fields – 4 of these fields (68% of the production) are now plateauing or declining– A permanent ‘treadmill’: 30-50% of the production must be replaced each year

• A capital-intensive option:– 30,000 new wells drilled each year in the US (one well every 18mn) – ~$4 millions per well in the US, up to $15 millions per well in Europe– Requires to build an extremely expensive network of pipelines connecting dozens of

new gas power stations (up to $700.000 to build a 400km pipeline line)

Page 9: Unconventional gas  as a component of  energy  balance in Ukraine: The myth of the transition fuel

Debunking the mythsShale gas as a “bridging fuel” – An economic non-sense

An option directly competing with RES:• In the US, fossil fuels industries receive 5 times more federal

subsidies than the renewable energy industry (US Government Accountability Office)

• However, RES industry is almost cost-competitive: The cost of onshore wind power in the US is now very roughly at the same level as gas generation (US Department of Energy)

• Investments made to develop shale gas are investments which will not finance the RES sector:– 2012: U.S. investment in renewable power and energy efficiency fell 54%– 2013: 16 of the 29 US states with renewable portfolio standards are considering

legislation that would reduce the need for wind and solar power.

Page 10: Unconventional gas  as a component of  energy  balance in Ukraine: The myth of the transition fuel

Debunking the mythsShale gas as a “bridging fuel” – A political non-sense

• Will governments and gas companies really agree to close new gas power stations for the sake of the transition?

• Will gas really replace coal ? Will the coal industry let this happen ? Won’t gas simply add up to coal instead ?

Shale gas is not a transition fuel, but a direction and diversion fuel

Page 11: Unconventional gas  as a component of  energy  balance in Ukraine: The myth of the transition fuel

Shale Gas / Fracking – A European issue

Page 12: Unconventional gas  as a component of  energy  balance in Ukraine: The myth of the transition fuel

Shale Gas / Fracking – A European issue

Page 13: Unconventional gas  as a component of  energy  balance in Ukraine: The myth of the transition fuel

Unconventional gas as a component of energy balance in

Ukraine:The myth of the transition fuel

26/09/2013Unconventional gas production in Ukraine

Heinrich Boell Foundation Ukraine

Page 14: Unconventional gas  as a component of  energy  balance in Ukraine: The myth of the transition fuel

Differences between conventional and unconventional techniques

• Difference between hydraulic fracturing and high volume of hydraulic fracturing (HVHF)– Relatively new technology:

• First horizontal drilling: 1991 • First « slickwater » fracture: 1996

Source Hydraulic fracturing High volume of hydraulic fracturing (HVHF)Pressure used 206 bar 725 bar (x3,5)Water Consumption 75.000 – 300.000 litres 13 million litres (x100)Longevity of production life 30-40 years ~5 years (÷8) – Up to 90% production recuperated after 3 yearsProduction decline Relatively constant production Fast decline rate. Typically 65% in the first yearRecovery rate Between 75 and 80% ~6,5%Chemicals used Limited Systematic and repeated use (for the drilling and the fracking) of

more than 700 different types of chemicals (volatile organic compounds, endocrine disruptors, neurotoxins, carcinogenic, mutagenic and/or toxic for reproduction) – Up to 300,000 litres per fracking operation

Water treatment Small volumes of produced water return to surface

Between 30-70% of the high volumes of fracking fluids return to the surface

Fugitive methane Almost only an issue in transport and distribution

Major issue in extraction phase. If more than 3,2% of gas leaks in lifecycle production, carbon footprint of shale gas is worse than coal

Cumulative impacts Limited due to limited number of wells

Major challenges due to great number of wells (30.000 new wells drilled each year in the US)

Page 15: Unconventional gas  as a component of  energy  balance in Ukraine: The myth of the transition fuel

Shale gas campaign at the EU level – FoEE

– 2011• First mobilisations in Europe – Beginning of the discussions at the EU Level

– November 2011• First meeting with FoE national member groups working on the issue (6 groups)

– Beginning of 2012• Building of a network of EU NGOs (HEAL, FoEE, F&WE, Greenpeace, WWF) and national groups

– February 2012• European Parliament work – Two new own-initiative reports

– April 2012• Publication of the first NGO joint statement, drafted by FoEE, HEAL, FWW and Greenpeace, and signed

by more than 40 organisations

– September 2012• Publication of 3 studies commissioned by the European Commission • First global day against fracking (the ‘Global Frackdown’) – by F&WW

– October 2012• Publication of the first background report on shale in Europe - by FoEE • First European shale gas campaigners meeting (40 participants, 15 pays) – by FoEE

– November 2012• Final vote of the two EP own-initiative reports – ambiguous results

Page 16: Unconventional gas  as a component of  energy  balance in Ukraine: The myth of the transition fuel

Shale gas campaign at the EU level – FoEE

– January 2013• New legislative initiative by the European Commission (results end of 2013)• Launch of European public consultation + 2 new studies• Review of the EU Environment Impact Assessment Directive

– March 2013• Beroun Conference (Cz) – Creation (?) of a European coalition against fracking

– May 2013• European Summit calling to explore the European indigenous potential of its

unconventional resources• Organisation of a conference on the economics of shale gas – by F&WE and FoEE• Publication of two factsheets of the economics of shale gas – by FoEE

– June 2013• Publication of WWF’s EU position paper on shale gas

– October 2013• Second Global Frackdown (19)

– December 2013• EU Proposal to regulate the UFF industry

Page 17: Unconventional gas  as a component of  energy  balance in Ukraine: The myth of the transition fuel

Shale gas – Economic and energy benefits

• Shale gas = cheap energy– 2008: 10,4$/tcf (thousands cubic feet) – April 2012: 1,89$/tcf

• Shale gas = long term energy security– Obama: “We have a supply of natural gas that can last America nearly 100 years” (January

2012)

Page 18: Unconventional gas  as a component of  energy  balance in Ukraine: The myth of the transition fuel

The cheap energy myth

– Artificially low prices, result of an oversupply of gas, speculation and industry overestimates– “What I can tell you is the cost to supply is not $2.50. We are all losing our shirts today, we’re making no money. It’s all in the red” Rex Tillerson, ExxonMobil CEO (June 2012)– Producing shale gas is NOT cheap and in extremely capital-intensive (30,000 new wells each year in the US, one well every 18mn, ~$4 millions / well)– According to many experts, the breakeven price is around $8-$9/tcf– Important net losses: $9.3 billion in 2012 ($42 billion of annual capital investment to

maintain production for $32,5 billion of benefits)– Since April 2012, the US gas price has more than doubled ($4,30/tcf) & continues to rise.– Cheap from whom? Where spot prices fell by 70%, this has only translated into a 10% gas price reduction for households

Shale gas – Debunk the myths

Page 19: Unconventional gas  as a component of  energy  balance in Ukraine: The myth of the transition fuel

The abundance myth – When the US dreams of energy independence

– Confusion between resources et reserves– Sweet spots are declining Need for more wells each year to maintain

• 88% of US shale gas is produced in just 6 fields • 4 of these fields (68% of the production) are now plateauing or declining• The permanent treadmill: 30-50% of the production must be replaced each year

Shale gas – Debunk the myths

Page 20: Unconventional gas  as a component of  energy  balance in Ukraine: The myth of the transition fuel

Shale gas – Debunk the myths

Page 21: Unconventional gas  as a component of  energy  balance in Ukraine: The myth of the transition fuel

Shale gas – Debunk the myths

The abundance myth – When the US dreams of energy independence

– The myth of the US energy independence• Large-scale development based on high 2008 gas prices• US EIA – In 2012, estimates of “unproved technically recoverable shale gas resources” revised downward by

42%• Far from initial estimates… no energy independence possible.

Page 22: Unconventional gas  as a component of  energy  balance in Ukraine: The myth of the transition fuel

Shale gas – Debunk the myths

The myth of repeating the US example in Europe– Steep decline of the European conventional reserves– More complex geology – 50% deeper Higher costs of production

• Schlumberger (2011): Need to triple costs of production• KPMG (2012): Marcellus - ~$4millions per well, Poland – $10-15millions per well

– Water costs x10 (source: KPMG) – Shale gas fields in urban areas (with very high population density)– Low development of infrastructures and know-how

• 2500 drilling rig in the US – 72 in Europe• Transfer of know-how from the US to Europe not necessarily applicable

– Impact on gas price: none or increase• Wood MacKenzie, Bloomberg New Energy Finance, Pöyry, Grantham Institute: available at current gas• prices at best, not competitive with cheaper imports,• ZEW – German economic research institute (2013): Viable if gas between $15,5 and $19,5 /tcf (today: $10,5/tcf)

– Slow pace of development• In the US: Shale gas production rose by a factor of 20 in just 12 years• In Europe: Shale gas would not even manage to offset the decline of conventional reserves in 2020

– Pöyry: 1-4% of the UK gas demand in 2020– AIE (WEO 2012): 2-3% of the European gas demand in 2030

Page 23: Unconventional gas  as a component of  energy  balance in Ukraine: The myth of the transition fuel

Shale gas – Debunk the myths