Understanding Ethno-Religious Groups in Iraq: Displacement and … · FOREWORD Ninewa governorate, in the north western part of Iraq, is home to a multiplicity of ethno-religious

IOM IRAQ

UNDERSTANDING ETHNO-RELIGIOUS GROUPS IN IRAQ: DISPLACEMENT AND RETURNFEBRUARY 2019

The opinions expressed in the report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the International Organization for Migration (IOM). The designations employed and the presentation of material throughout the report do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of IOM concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning its frontiers or boundaries.

IOM is committed to the principle that humane and orderly migration benefits migrants and society. As an intergovernmental organization, IOM acts with its partners in the international community to: assist in meeting the operational challenges of migration; advance understanding of migration issues; encourage social and economic development through migration; and uphold the human dignity and well-being of migrants.

The information contained in this report is for general information purposes only. Names and boundaries on DTM information products do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by IOM. The information in the DTM portal and in this report is the result of data collected by IOM field teams and complements information provided and generated by governmental and other entities in Iraq. IOM Iraq endeavors to keep this information as up to date and accurate as possible, but makes no claim —expressed or implied— on the completeness, accuracy and suitability of the information provided through this report. Challenges that should be taken into account when using DTM data in Iraq include the fluidity of the displaced population movements along with repeated emergencies and limited or no access to parts of the country. In no event will IOM be liable for any loss or damage, whether direct, indirect or consequential, related to the use of this report and the information provided herein.

This publication has been issued without formal editing by the Publications Unit.

IOM Iraq thanks the United States Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) for its continued support. IOM Iraq also expresses its gratitude to IOM Iraq’s Rapid Assessment and Response Team (RART) members for their work in collecting the data, often in very difficult circumstances; their tireless efforts are the groundwork of this report.

International Organization for Migration Iraq Mission, Main Office in Baghdad UNAMI Compound (Diwan 2) International Zone, Baghdad, Iraq Tel.: + 3908 3105 2600 Email: [email protected] Website: www.iomiraq.net

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© 2019 International Organization for Migration (IOM)

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acronyms and definitions 5

Executive summary 5

Introduction 7

Objectives 8

Methodology 9

1. Ethno-religious identity and socioeconomic characteristics 10

2. Factors driving decisions to return or remain 17

2.1 IDPs: What drives decisions to stay in displacement? 17

2.2 Returnees: What drives decisions to return? 20

3. Housing, land and property 24

4. Perception of own group, host community and other groups 26

4.1 Identity layers and perception of the own group 26

4.2 Perception of host community in displacement and other groups in origin 27

5. Future intentions 30

5.1 Returnee intentions 30

5.2 IDP intentions 33

5.3 Ethno-religious groups and intentions to return: Which factors affect intentions the most? 37

Conclusion 42

Annexes 43

FOREWORDNinewa governorate, in the north western part of Iraq, is home to a multiplicity of ethno-religious

groups illustrating the country’s rich and diverse population. Ninewa was heavily impacted by the

fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levante (ISIL) that started in 2014 and concluded in

2017 with military forces retaking Ninewa’s cities such as Mosul, Tel Afar and Sinjar.

Since then, rehabilitation efforts have been underway and many internally displaced persons (IDPs)

have returned to their communities of origin. However, the levels of return among minority ethno-

religious groups remain low and their intention to return in the short term is much lower than

among other IDPs. Thus, the need to investigate the specific dynamics affecting the displacement

and return of IDPs and returnees from different ethno-religious groups to facilitate durable

solutions to their displacement.

This research identifies socioeconomic characteristics of returnee and IDP populations within

four ethno-religious groups: Shabak Shia, Turkmen Shia, Christian and Yazidi. In addition, the

study broadens our understanding of the main factors driving decisions to return or remain in

displacement, including how housing, land and property issues impact decisions to return; explores

whether IDPs and returnees have different perceptions of their own group and other groups in

their areas of origin and maps short and long-term intentions of IDP and returnee households

by ethno-religious group.

Obtaining answers to these topics contributes to a better understanding of the specific challenges

faced by families from different ethno-religious groups both in displacement and after return and

therefore represents an important step in formulating targeted approaches to find durable solutions

to displacement and facilitate sustainable reintegration of returned IDPs.

We hope you will find the study useful and we look forward to receiving your feedback.

Gerard Waite

Chief of Mission, Iraq

FOREWORDNinewa governorate, in the north western part of Iraq, is home to a multiplicity of ethno-religious

groups illustrating the country’s rich and diverse population. Ninewa was heavily impacted by the

fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levante (ISIL) that started in 2014 and concluded in

2017 with military forces retaking Ninewa’s cities such as Mosul, Tel Afar and Sinjar.

Since then, rehabilitation efforts have been underway and many internally displaced persons (IDPs)

have returned to their communities of origin. However, the levels of return among minority ethno-

religious groups remain low and their intention to return in the short term is much lower than

among other IDPs. Thus, the need to investigate the specific dynamics affecting the displacement

and return of IDPs and returnees from different ethno-religious groups to facilitate durable

solutions to their displacement.

This research identifies socioeconomic characteristics of returnee and IDP populations within

four ethno-religious groups: Shabak Shia, Turkmen Shia, Christian and Yazidi. In addition, the

study broadens our understanding of the main factors driving decisions to return or remain in

displacement, including how housing, land and property issues impact decisions to return; explores

whether IDPs and returnees have different perceptions of their own group and other groups in

their areas of origin and maps short and long-term intentions of IDP and returnee households

by ethno-religious group.

Obtaining answers to these topics contributes to a better understanding of the specific challenges

faced by families from different ethno-religious groups both in displacement and after return and

therefore represents an important step in formulating targeted approaches to find durable solutions

to displacement and facilitate sustainable reintegration of returned IDPs.

We hope you will find the study useful and we look forward to receiving your feedback.

Gerard Waite

Chief of Mission, Iraq

IOM IRAQ5

UNDERSTANDING ETHNO-RELIGIOUS GROUPS IN IRAQ: DISPLACEMENT AND RETURN

ACRONYMS AND DEFINITIONS

DTM Displacement Tracking Matrix

IDP Internally Displaced Person

HC Host Community

ILA Integrated Location Assessment

ISIL Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant

KRI Kurdistan Region of Iraq

WASH Water, Sanitation and Hygiene

1 United Nations, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 22 July 1998.

IDPs: According to the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, internally displaced persons (IDPs) are “persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border.”1

DTM considers as IDPs all Iraqis who were forced to flee from their location of origin from 1 January 2014 onwards and are still displaced within national borders at the moment of the assessment.

Returnees: All those previously displaced from their location of origin since January 2014 who return to their subdistrict of origin, irrespective of whether they have returned to their former residence or to another shelter type. The definition of returnees is neither related to the criteria of returning in safety and dignity, nor with a defined strategy of durable solution.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This study focuses on four ethno-religious groups affected by displacement as a result of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) crisis: Turkmen Shias, Shabak Shias, Yazidis and Christians. The study explored the displaced groups’ decision to return to their location of origin or to stay in displace-ment by examining factors of: socioeconomic characteristics;

barriers to return and obstacles faced in displacement; and perception of own group, other groups in location of origin and host community in displacement. The study is based on a face-to-face survey with 1605 individuals, using a conveni-ence sample in areas of displacement and return.

IOM IRAQ6


Key findings of the study are as follows:

Levels of education are similar across all groups except for Yazidis; 50 per cent of the respondents of this group had not received any formal education.

Unemployment is widespread among both IDP and returnee households: 31 per cent of IDPs and 23 per cent of returnees say they are unemployed and looking for work. Unemployment is roughly similar among the groups (24%), except for Yazidis where 50 per cent of IDPs are unemployed and looking for work. The finding that returnees have, on average, lower education levels than IDPs suggests that IDPs with higher education are returning at slower rates. Unemployment is roughly similar between Christians, Shabak Shia and Turkmen Shia IDPs (24%). However, this level is significantly higher among Yazidi IDPs, with 49.6 per cent of the interviewed Yazidi IDPs indicating that they are unem-ployed. Among returnee communities, Shabak Shia have the highest level of unemployment (30%).

Differences between IDPs' and returnees’ living arrange-ments in displacement: households staying in camps or with host families have returned at slower rates than those who rent accommodation. Turkmen Shia and Shabak Shia IDPs are more often hosted in religious buildings (25%). Yazidis are most often in camps (49%) or unfinished/aban-doned buildings (20%).

The average Christian household size is smaller than the other groups (5 members) and that of Turkmen Shia the largest (9 members). Shabak Shia and Turkmen Shia IDP families are more likely to have split up due to the return of family members: 7 per cent and 8.3 per cent respectively.

Both returnee and IDP households claim to have received various forms of humanitarian assistance, however aid was discontinued while in displacement for both IDPs and returnees. This suggests that cutting aid does not significantly affect the decision to either return or remain in displacement. The study also found that a move to return to the area of origin is not always associated with an improvement in living stand-ards or income. A total of 25 per cent of respondents claimed their income worsened after return, and 16.4 per cent said their living standards deteriorated. Yazidis and Turkmen Shia were generally most positive about their household income and living standards after return. Interestingly however, nearly half of Christian returnees stated they perceived no significant difference between their lives in displacement and after return.

The main driver for IDPs to stay displaced is clearly better safety in the location of displacement (91%). Access to public services also plays an important role for over 73 per cent of respondents. More specifically, with regards to access to services, a majority of IDP households (70%) are

postponing or deciding against return because their chil-dren are enrolled in school. Many families appear unwilling to interrupt the education of their children for a chance to return home. A total of 40 per cent of IDP households said that better work opportunities in displacement are a strong or very strong reason to remain. Also, 37 per cent of IDPs express concerns about not being welcomed in their location of origin, with Christians being the group most concerned (112 out of 200 interviewed Christian IDPs).

Returnees report four major pull factors: missing home (95%), return of other people (76%) and family members (56%), improved safety situation in the location of origin (59%) and saving on living costs associated to returning to their habitual residence (51%). IDPs who own property return at faster rates.

Feelings of empowerment play a role in the decision to return. Returnees are more likely to say that they feel their group is more empowered than IDPs. Returns are more likely to occur, and at a faster rate, in locations where individ-uals feel their group is empowered or dominant in relation to other groups. IDPs are also more likely than returnees to report that they faced discrimination in their location of origin, again suggesting that those who have faced discrim-ination before are now less inclined to return.

Regarding satisfaction with return, a vast majority (87%) of returnees are not satisfied. The top three areas where returnees demand improvements are public service provision, security and economic opportunities (62%, 47.5% and 43% respectively).

IDPs mostly demand improvements regarding economic opportunities and public service provision in displace-ment. Additionally, some 13 per cent (mostly Turkmen Shia) would like to receive official permission to remain in displace-ment. While 80 per cent of Turkmen Shia plan to return, only 22 per cent among Christian and 43 per cent Yazidi IDPs plan to do so. Furthermore, 42.5 per cent of Christian and 25 per cent of Yazidi IDPs intend to move and settle abroad. On average, 27.4 per cent of IDPs wish to remain and inte-grate in their current location.

As to long-term intentions of returnees, nearly all Shabak Shia and Turkmen Shia plan to remain in their location of return. Among Christians and Yazidis, 39 per cent and 25 per cent respectively, plan to migrate abroad. Yazidi returnees appear more driven to migrate abroad by factors related to security than their Christian counterparts, who more often cite economic opportunities, public services and administration as reasons for their intention to leave Iraq.

IOM IRAQ7


INTRODUCTION

Iraq’s population is made of a rich diversity of ethno-religious groups. In

addition to the three major groups – Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs and Sunni Kurds,

themselves minorities in certain geographic areas – there are many other

minority ethno-religious groups, all of whom were affected by displacement

related to the ISIL crisis. This study focuses on four of these groups:

Turkmen Shias, Shabak Shias, Yazidis and Christians.

2 DTM’s Group Assessment I. December 2014 – March 2015.

3 DTM Monthly Report. March 2015.

4 DTM Integrated Location Assessment II.

The Ninewa Plains and west Ninewa areas, in Ninewa Governorate, are home to all respondents in this study. The conflict with ISIL particularly impacted these areas. After the city of Mosul fell under ISIL’s control in June 2014, the group steadily took control of the Ninewa Plains and west Ninewa. By March 2015, 500,000 Yazidis, predominantly from Sinjar, 190,000 Turkmen Shia from Telafar, 60,000 Shabak Shias and an equal number of Christians, both from the Ninewa plains, had displaced.2 Thus, among the over one million individuals3 displaced from Ninewa Governorate at that time (March 2015) since January 2014, over 800,000 were Turkmen, Yazidis, Christians or Shabaks.

Since the operation to retake Mosul concluded in July 2017, areas of origin for these groups, such as Telafar, Sinjar and the Ninewa plains have been retaken from ISIL and rehabil-itation efforts are underway. Notwithstanding these efforts, the number of returns among certain ethno-religious groups remains low. While Yazidis, Christians, Shabak Shias and Turkmen Shias make up around 22 per cent of Iraq’s total IDP population, they only represent 2.7 per cent of returnees. The second IOM Integrated Location Assessment (ILA II) also found that their intention to return in the short term is much lower than among other groups. 4 It is therefore necessary to further investigate the specific dynamics affecting the displacement and return of IDPs and returnees from these ethno-religious groups.

This research study investigates the following questions: (i) the socioeconomic characteristics of each ethno-religious group, and how these affect the decision to return or remain in displacement, (ii) the main barriers to return and main obsta-cles faced in displacement, (iii) how housing, land and property issues affect IDPs and returnees within the four groups separately, (iv) perception of the own group, other groups in location of origin and the host community in displacement and how these perceptions affect decision-making, (v) using a different statistical model, the short- and long-term intentions of IDPs and their underlying motivations through different reasons and socioeconomic demographics.

Examining these issues will increase our understanding of the specific challenges faced by families from these ethno-re-ligious minority backgrounds, both in displacement and after return. This study therefore represents an important step in formulating targeted approaches to displacement chal-lenges, pursuing durable solutions for IDPs, and ultimately mitigating the adverse effects of conflict on the cultural and demographic diversity of Iraq.

IOM IRAQ8


OBJECTIVES

The overall objective of this research is to analyse the migration trends

affecting four displaced minority ethno-religious groups across Iraq:

Christians, Shabak Shias, Yazidis and Turkmen Shias.5

The specific objectives of the study are to:

5 The choice to limit the focus on the Shia component within the Shabak and Turkmen community was made because 93 per cent of displaced Turkmen are Shia, as are 72 per cent of displaced Shabak. Additionally, Turkmen Shia and Shabak Shia return at lower rates than their Sunni counterparts (IOM Iraq - DTM Integrated Location Assessment II).

• Uncover consistent and relevant socioeconomic differences between returnees and IDPs from each ethno-religious group.

• Better understand the main factors driving decisions to return or remain in displacement.

• Better understand how issues related to housing, land and property impact decisions to return, as well as other challenges faced by returnees.

• Reveal whether IDPs and returnees from these groups have different perceptions of their own group and the others in their area of origin, and the degree to which this plays a role in their decisions to return or remain in displacement.

• Map the short- and long-term intentions of IDP and returnee households from each of the four ethno-religious groups and how satisfied they are with their current position – whether this be return or continued displacement.

Kufa

Akre

Hilla

Najaf

Zakho

Erbil

DahukSumel

Mosul

Sinjar

Telafar

Kerbala

Al Resafa

Al-Hindiya

Al-Hamdaniya

Tilkaif

This map is for illustration

purposes only. The boundaries

and names shown and the

designations used on this map do

not imply official endorsement or

acceptance by the International

Organization for Migration.

Map 1: Assessed locations by ethno-religious groups and IDPs / returnees

YAZIDI

TURKMEN SHIA

CHRISTIAN

SHABAK SHIA

IDPs

RETURNEES

IOM IRAQ9


METHODOLOGY

The findings presented in this report are drawn from a face-to-face household

survey with a sample size of 1,605 individuals, administered to a convenience

sample of 703 returnees and 902 IDPs in nine different governorates across Iraq:

Ninewa, Dahuk, Erbil, Baghdad, Babylon, Kerbala, Najaf, Qadissiya and Wassit.

The two categories were stratified to include the four ethno-religious communities.

6 DTM Longitudinal Study on Durable Solutions in Iraq (2015–2017) estimated that the number of Female-Headed Households was between 15–20 per cent IOM field teams were therefore instructed to reach a corresponding proportion in their sample.

The number of interviews allocated to each category depended on how concentrated or dispersed these iden-tity groups are in their locations of displacement and return. Measures were taken to ensure that a represent-

ative number of female-headed households was included,6 as well as in-camp and out-of-camp IDPs.

Data was collected by IOM’s field teams during January 2018, following a two-day training held on 17 and 18 December 2017.

GOVERNORATE DISTRICTSAMPLE

TURKMEN SHIA SHABAK SHIA YAZIDI CHRISTIAN

Babylon Hilla 30

Baghdad Al Resafa 25 25

Dahuk

Sumel 125 25

Zakho 50 25

Dahuk 25

Erbil Erbil 100

KerbalaAl-Hindiya 35 20

Kerbala 35 25

NajafNajaf 50 45

Kufa 25

Ninewa

Sinjar 25 – 100

Tel Afar 100

Mosul 90 50 25

Tilkaif 50 20 25 50

Al-Hamdaniya 90 125

Akre 25

Al-Shikhan 40 25

Qadissiya Diwaniya 25 20

Wassit Kut 25 25

Total 250 – 150 200 – 200 250 – 150 200 – 200

Table 1: Sample distribution by location IDPs – RETURNEES

IOM IRAQ10


1. ETHNO-RELIGIOUS IDENTITY ANDSOCIOECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS

This section presents data on the socioeconomic characteristics of the four surveyed

ethno-religious groups and, when relevant, according to their situation as IDPs or

returnees. The data include indicators on education and occupation levels, household

size and number of children, household income and living standards, among others.

EDUCATION

The study found that levels of education are similar across all groups except the Yazidi. This group had significantly lower levels of education: almost 50 per cent of the respondents had not received any formal education. Returnees have slightly lower levels of formal education than IDPs in all groups. Again, the exception was the Yazidi. In this group, the proportion of respondents who attained secondary education or higher was higher among returnees than IDPs.

Figure 1: Education levels by ethno-religious group and displacement category

28.1 28.5 27.521.2 20.5 21.8 23.6 21.4

27.3

9.34

18

23.5 26.520.5

16.4 21.511.4

25.1 30 16.7

9.5

7.6

12.7

36.2 32.540

42.540

45

37.237.5

36.7

31.8

28.4

37.3

12.2 12.5 1219.9 18 21.8

14.1 11.119.3

49.560

32

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

CHRISTIANS

ALL IDPs RETURNEES ALL IDPs RETURNEES ALL IDPs RETURNEES ALL IDPs RETURNEES

SHABAK SHIAS TURKMEN SHIAS YAZIDIS

HIGHER

SECONDARY

PRIMARY

NONE

EMPLOYMENT

Unemployment was found to be widespread among IDP and returnee households. Nearly one in three interviewed IDPs said they are unemployed and looking for work. Christians, Shabak Shia and Turkmen Shia IDPs reported similar levels of unemployment (24% of IDPs in each group). However, levels of unemployment were significantly higher among Yazidi IDPs: half of the interviewed Yazidi IDPs were unemployed (49.6%). Among returnees, the group with the highest level of unemployment was Shabak Shia (30%).

The groups differed in terms of the type of employment they were engaged in. The group with the highest percentage of

employment in the public sector was Turkmen Shia (31%). The study found that these ethno-religious groups were rarely employed in the private sector; Christians were the only group where at least one in ten was employed in the private sector (11%). Employment in informal commerce or inconsistent daily labour as well as agriculture and animal husbandry are more prevalent among Yazidis than the other groups. Overall, agricultural activities and public sector employment are more common among returnees than among IDPs, whereas informal commerce or inconsistent daily labour is lower.

IOM IRAQ11


2.7

24.5

49.6

24.5 24.1

15.5

2.4

5.5 9.5

15

9.2

2219.4

13

15.6

13.5 11.5

11.5

13.6

10.5 13.8

11.5

1.2

4.5 3.1

8.5 5.6

1517.8

0.52.8

1

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

CHRISTIANS YAZIDIS SHABAK SHIAS TURKMEN SHIAS

18.5 20.7

30.1

20.6

15 10

11.4

8.7

15.5

9.3

10.4

16

15

14.7

10.9

14.7

14.5

17.3

17.331.3

11

2.7

5

2.5

12

8.9

5 13.34.5

3

CHRISTIANS YAZIDI SHABAK SHIA TURKMEN SHIA

1.5

IDPs RETURNEES

0.4 0.41.50.71.3

222

UNEMPLOYED / LOOKING FOR WORK

RETIRED, WITH PENSION

SELF-EMPLOYED

HOUSEWIFE

PUBLIC SECTOR

PRIVATE SECTOR

INFORMAL COMMERCE OR INCONSISTENT DAILY LABOUR

AGRICULTURE, ANIMAL HUSBANDRY

PRIVATE PROFESSIONAL CATEGORY (MEDICAL DOCTOR, LAWYER, ETC.)

STUDENT

OTHER

Figure 2: Employment per ethno-religious group and displacement category

HOUSEHOLD SIZE AND SITUATION

IDP households (average of 7 individuals per household) tend to be larger than returnee households (6). Similarly, the number of children tends to be slightly higher among IDP households: three children per IDP household and two per returnee.

The study found that Christian households were smaller than others, with an average of five family members. Turkmen Shia IDP households were the largest with an average of nine people.

Figure 3: Average household size per ethno-religious group and displacement category

6.2

5.8

6.3

7.2

5.2

7.1

8.9

7.6

7.1

4.6

CHRISTIAN

YAZIDI

SHABAK SHIA

TURKMEN SHIA

TOTAL

IDPs RETURNEES

IOM IRAQ12


In most ethno-religious groups, household members have largely stayed together, regardless of whether they are returnee or IDP households. Nevertheless, Shabak Shia and Turkmen Shia IDP families are more likely to have split up due to the return of family members: 7 per cent and 8.3 per cent respectively; and 4 per cent of Christian IDPs have at least one family member abroad. In terms of returnee households, Turkmen Shias and Yazidis have a significantly larger proportion of divided households. Yazidi households reported that they either have family members who went abroad (19%) or members who remain displaced (8.7%). For Turkmen Shia, 9.3 per cent of interviewed households have one or more members who remain in displacement. Turkmen Shia returnees are also the group with the highest number of members killed or missing (1.3% of households compared to the 0.6% average). Among IDPs, the Yazidi are the group with the highest percentage of members killed or missing (2% of households compared to the 1.2% average).

Table 2: Percentage of split households per ethno-religious group and displacement category

IDPs CHRISTIANS YAZIDISSHABAK

SHIASTURKMEN

SHIAS IDP

TOTAL

We are all together 94 93.2 90 87.7 91.1

One or more members abroad 4 2.8 0 0.4 1.8

One or more members detained by authorities 0 0.8 0 0.8 0.2

One or more members displaced in another governorate 2 1.2 2 2 1.8

One or more members missing or killed 0 2 1 1.6 1.2

One or more members returned 0 0 7 8.3 3.9

RETURNEES

We are all together 95.5 71.3 99.5 88.7 90

One or more members abroad 3 19.3 0.5 0.7 5.3

One or more members remain in displacement 1 8.7 0 9.3 4.1

One or more members missing or killed 0.5 0.7 0 1.3 0.6

SHELTER DURING DISPLACEMENT

Rented accommodation was found to be the most common shelter arrangement for Christians, Shabak Shia and Turkmen Shia IDP and returnee households while in displacement. This was particularly the case among Christian households: eight out of ten Christian IDPs and six out of ten Christian returnees reported that they were living in rented accommodation during displacement. More than half of Shabak Shia and Turkmen Shia also reported that they reside (if still in displacement) or resided while in displacement (for those who returned) in rented accommodation.

In contrast, Yazidis are (if still in displacement) or were (for those who returned) mainly hosted in camps, with five out of ten Yazidi IDPs and four out of ten Yazidi returnees staying in camps while in displacement.

Almost three out of ten Turkmen Shia IDP families

and two out of ten Shabak Shia IDP families

reported that they are hosted in religious buildings.

IOM IRAQ13


The percentage of Yazidis living (if still in displacement) or who lived (for those who returned) in unfinished or abandoned buildings is higher than the average of these ethno-religious groups. Two out of ten Yazidi families live or were living in such buildings while in displacement. The percentage of Christian returnees who were living in informal or irregular settlements while in displacement is also higher than the

average, with almost two out of ten Christian returnee fami-lies living in such arrangements while in displacement.

Households staying with host families tend to return at a slower rate than those staying in other shelter arrange-ments. This trend can be observed across the four groups. Most returnees (83%) go back to their habitual residence, a trend shared across all four groups.

RENTED HOUSING

HOST FAMILIES

INFORMAL / IRREGULAR SETTLEMENTS

CAMP

HOTEL / MOTEL

RELIGIOUS BUILDING

UNFINISHED / ABANDONED BUILDING

SCHOOL BUILDING

UNKNOWN

7765.5

2.8

34

5665.3

51.460

8.5

6

13.6

13.56.4

7.1

4

8

18

6

3

6.73.3

4.55

54.8

40

3.5

12.9

4.30.5

2.5

17.5

3.5

27.3 27.3

0.5

21.6 20.7

8.5 7.42.7

2.7 1.5 1.2 0.70.5 0.8 0.5

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

IDPs RETURNEES IDPs RETURNEES IDPs RETURNEES IDPs RETURNEES

1 10.5

0.7

1.5 0.4 2

2

2

CHRISTIANS YAZIDIS SHABAK SHIAS TURKMEN SHIAS

Figure 4: Shelter arrangement during displacement per ethno-religious group

ACCESS TO HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

The percentage of households who received humanitarian assistance at some point is slightly lower among returnees than IDPs but there are no significant differences among IDPs who still receive assistance and returnees who were receiving assistance until they returned.

At the time of data collection, humanitarian

assistance had been discontinued for a large

segment of IDP households – and returnee

households just before they returned – most

notably food, shelter, cash and non-food items

(NFI). Cash and NFI were the types of assistance

discontinued for a larger number of IDPs.

IOM IRAQ14


Figure 5: Access to humanitarian assistance per displacement category

97.1

50.1

79.5

92.4

60.7

50.1 48.8

57.1

27

39.7

9.211.6

25.7

32.1

37.4

32.2

94.9

49.9

59.4

81.3

67.4

44.6

25.8

47.944.2

37.6

7.812.3

3431.3

8.8

27.9

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

FOOD SHELTER CASH NFI HEALTH EDUCATION PROTECTION WASH

IDP EVER RECEIVED IDP STILL RECEIVING RET. UNTIL MOMENT OF RETURN RET. DURING DISPLACEMENT

Yazidis are the group that currently receives the most assistance. This holds true for all forms of assistance but especially shelter, health, education, protection and water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) services, which are being provided to over 50 per cent of Yazidi IDPs. This is partially explained by the fact that the proportion of Yazidi IDPs

who reside in camp settings is much higher than for other groups. Turkmen Shia IDPs are the group receiving the least amount of assistance, although 27.6 per cent of interviewed Turkmen Shia IDPs are living in religious buildings, a particu-larly vulnerable type of critical shelter.

Figure 6: IDPs currently receiving assistance per ethno-religious group

34.4

7.5

1.2 2.4

7.912.6

3.6 4.7

24

51

4

16

26.5

33.5

22.5

8.5 9 7 7

26 27.5

40

3336.8

55.2

25.6

30.8

51.2

60

72.8

67.2

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

FOOD SHELTER CASH NFI HEALTH EDUCATION PROTECTION WASH

TURKMEN SHIAS SHABAK SHIAS CHRISTIANS YAZIDIS

IOM IRAQ15


HOUSEHOLD INCOME AND LIVING STANDARDS

A total of 75 per cent of IDP respondents and 72 per cent of returnee respondents stated that their household’s income levels during displacement is or was worse or much worse compared to before displacement. There were no major differences among ethno-religious groups.

Regarding living standards, 76 per cent of IDP and 68 per cent of returnee households considered that they had worse or much worse current living standards than

before they were displaced. However, 8.4 per cent of IDPs and 6.7 per cent of returnees reported that their living stand-ards were better than before they were displaced, and a quarter of returnees stated that there was no real difference. This opinion was more prevalent among Shabak Shia and Turkmen Shia (IDPs and returnees combined), with two out of ten interviewed households stating that they had similar living standards before and during displacement.

2.1 1.4 2 0.3

6.8 10.1 6.4 6.4

15.616.7

15.825.4

47.747 50.6

52.4

27.8 24.7 25.115.4

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

IDP TOTAL RETURNEE TOTAL IDP TOTAL RETURNEE TOTAL

MUCH BETTER BETTER MORE OR LESS THE SAME WORSE MUCH WORSE

INCOME LIVING STANDARDS

Figure 7: Household income and living standards during displacement compared to before displacement per displacement category

IOM IRAQ16


However, a return to the area of origin is not always asso-ciated with an improvement in income or living standards. On average, one in four returnee respondents reported that their income levels were lower and 16.4 per cent said their living standards deteriorated after they had returned. Roughly one in three respondents says there was no signif-icant improvement in their income or living standards with their return. This perception is stronger among Christians: nearly half of Christian returnee households stated that they perceive no significant difference between their lives in displacement and after return.

Yazidi and Turkmen Shia respondents were the most posi-tive about their household’s income and living standards improving after return. More than half of returnee house-holds from these two ethno-religious groups considered that their income was better and more than 60 per cent said their living standards improved after return.

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

CHRISTIANS SHABAK SHIAS TURKMEN SHIAS YAZIDIS TOTAL CHRISTIANS SHABAK SHIAS TURKMEN SHIAS YAZIDIS TOTAL

MUCH BETTER BETTER MORE OR LESS THE SAME WORSE MUCH WORSE

4

23.3

4.1 7

32.5

25.8

32

50.734.3

33.5

35.9

16

41.2

32

21.529.3

24

3.4

20.4

8.5 9 4.70.7

6.23

3 5.4

29.3

6 10

30

39.1

29.3

6038.9

4933.2

20

32.7

34.8

1315.3 18 12.1

5 6.9 3.30.7

4.30.7

Figure 8: Household income after return – compared to during displacement – per ethno-religious group

Figure 9: Living standards after return compared to displacement per ethno-religious group

IOM IRAQ17


2. FACTORS DRIVING DECISIONSTO RETURN OR STAY IN DISPLACEMENT

This section examines the factors driving the respondents’ decision

to return or remain in displacement.7 The study found that

these decisions are driven by factors related to the situation in

displacement and affected by changes in the location of origin.

2.1 IDPs: WHAT DRIVES DECISIONS TO STAY IN DISPLACEMENT?

Factors in area of displacement

7 Respondents were asked to select from a list of factors which ones played a very strong, strong, moderate, weak or very weak role in their decision. If a factor did not match their circumstance, they could also indicate not applicable. Some of the questions related to the respondents’ current location, while others applied to the situation in displacement (for returnees) or in their area of origin (IDPs).

The study found that the main reason why IDPs from these four ethno-religious groups are not returning is that there is better safety in the location of displacement: 91 per cent of IDPs stated that safety played a “strong” or “very strong” role in their decision not to return to their home location. In terms of the ethno-religious breakdown, over 90 per cent of the Christian, Yazidi and Shabak Shia respondents reported that this is the main reason why they are still displaced. For Turkmen Shia, it was the second most important factor and the percentage was still very high (81%).

Access to public services was also important for 74 per cent of respondents. Of the four groups, Christian and Yazidi IDPs were more likely to cite better public services as a reason to remain displaced (88% for both groups). However, these differences may be driven by location of displace-ment rather than identity. Most interviewed Christians and all Yazidi IDPs are displaced in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), which has better public services than the rest of Iraq, while Shabak Shia and Turkmen Shia are displaced mainly in the central governorates.

A large majority of IDP households (70%) reported that they decided to remain displaced because their children are enrolled in school. This is the main factor driving the decision to stay in displacement for Turkmen Shia (83%). The propor-tion of households remaining in displacement because they have children enrolled in school is lower among Christian households, potentially because they have relatively smaller households and fewer children (52%).

IDP households are less driven by economic considerations. Only 40 per cent of IDP households say that better work opportunities in the location of displacement is a strong or very strong reason for them to remain.

Less than half of IDPs interviewed overall reported that having a common language with the host community was a reason to remain in their location of displacement. In terms of group breakdown, however, it was important for Yazidi respondents: eight out of ten reported that it was a strong factor for staying in these locations.

Decisions to remain displaced are also influenced by the actions of other IDPs, particularly family members and rela-tives: 47 per cent of IDP households stated that the fact that other people are not yet returning plays an important role in their decision to remain, a percentage that grows to 53 per cent when these are family members or relatives. However, when community or religious leaders discourage returns, this only has a marginal effect on IDP households. Nearly 16 per cent of IDPs say this is not applicable to their situation, and where this does happen only 11 per cent of IDPs say it plays a strong role in their decision-making.

IOM IRAQ18


Figure 10: Factors that play a role in decision to stay in displacement (very strong and strong answers combined), related to location of displacement by ethno-religious background.

9197

90

81

98

74

88

65

55

88

70

52

73

83

67

5449 51 49

60

4744 44

49 5046 45

38

19

80

40 4247

4034

24 26 24

17

30

11 913

8

15

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

IDP SAMPLE CHRISTIAN IDPS SHABAK SHIA IDPS TURKMEN SHIA IDPS YAZIDI IDPS

BETTER SAFETY IN DISPLACEMENT

BETTER SERVICES IN DISPLACEMENT

CHILDREN ATTENDING SCHOOL

FAMILY / RELATIVES NOT RETURNING

OTHER PEOPLE NOT RETURNING

LANGUAGE SPOKEN BY HOST COMMUNITY (HC) IS SIMILAR / EASY TO COMMUNICATE

BETTER WORK OPPORTUNITIES

THE LIVING COSTS IN THIS LOCATION

COMMUNITY / RELIGIOUS LEADERS NOT ENCOURAGING RETURN

Factors in location of origin

A lack of services in their location of origin was a very strong or strong factor influencing the decision to remain displaced for 75 per cent of interviewed IDPs. The group most likely to report this were Christian IDPs (85%).

Lack of safety is the second most likely factor, mentioned by 68 per cent of IDP households, with higher averages among Christian (85%) and Yazidi (79%) IDPs. Lack of work oppor-tunities was mentioned as a significant factor by 62 per cent of IDPs, particularly Christian IDPs (76%).

Seven out of ten Turkmen Shia interviewed

considered the cost associated with the return,

such as repairing their home or property,

as a very strong or strong factor to remain

displaced. This is a much higher percentage

than across the rest of the groups, where less

than half reported this as a major issue.

IOM IRAQ19


Emotions related to their location of origin were also a factor in the interviewed IDP households’ intentions to return. Negative emotions associated with the location of origin were mentioned by almost half of the inter-viewed IDPs. The group least likely to mention this was that of Turkmen Shia (36%) and the most likely was that of Christian IDPs (66%).

Overall 37 per cent of IDPs interviewed had concerns about not being welcome in their area of origin. However, the weight of this factor varied widely across groups. Six out of ten Christians and four out of ten Yazidis reported that this concern has a strong impact on their decision to remain displaced but it played a strong role for only fewer than two out of ten.

74

85

6569

76

68

85

5753

79

62

76

59

49

66

57

49

58

72

4749

66

48

36

50

37

56

34

19

43

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

IDP SAMPLE CHRISTIANS SHABAK SHIAS TURKMEN SHIAS YAZIDI

Figure 11: Factors that play a role in the decision to remain (very strong and strong answers combined), related to location of origin by ethno-religious background.

LACK OF SERVICES IN AREA OF ORIGIN

LACK OF SAFETY IN AREA OF ORIGIN

LACK OF WORK OPPORTUNITIES IN AREA OF ORIGIN

COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH RETURN (INCL. REPAIRS)

NEGATIVE EMOTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH AREA OF RETURN

CONCERNS ABOUT NOT BEING WELCOMED IN AREA OF ORIGIN

IOM IRAQ20


2.2 RETURNEES: WHAT DRIVES DECISIONS TO RETURN?

Factors in origin / return area

There are four leading pull factors related to the location of origin or return that over 50 per cent of returnees said played a strong or very strong role in their decision to return. First, the feeling of missing home stands out, with 95 per cent of returnees reporting that this was a strong or very strong reason for their return. Second was the return of

acquaintances (76%) and family members (56%). Third, the improving security situation in their location of origin was important for 59 per cent of returnees. Finally, the saving on living costs, associated to returning to the habitual residence, was also an important factor (51%).

57.7

14.2

12.5

12

9.7

4.3

3.4

2.8

36.9

36.3

63.5

44.3

48.6

21.5

20.7

22.5

2.7

22.8

14.8

19.2

20.5

26.1

19.9

25.5

1

17.4

4.7

10.1

15.1

24.1

18.1

29.3

6.1

5

4.1

19.1

25.2

15.2

3.1

9.4

2

5

12.7

4.7

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

I WAS MISSING HOME

LOWER LIVING COSTSIN THIS LOCATION

OTHER PEOPLEI KNOW RETURNED

JOIN FAMILY MEMBERSWHO RETURNED

SAFETY HERE IMPROVED

POSSIBILITY TO WORK /CREATE ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES

IN THIS LOCATION

COMMUNITY / RELIGIOUS LEADERSENCOURAGED RETURN

PUBLIC SERVICES HERE IMPROVED

VERY STRONG STRONG NEITHER STRONG NOR WEAK WEAK VERY WEAK N/A

0.7

2.4

1.1

2.1

Figure 12: Factors that play a role in decision to return (very strong and strong answers combined), related to location of origin.

IOM IRAQ21


Missing home was the first and most important factor reported by respondents of all four groups. The second factor, other people returning, is a more important pull factor for Turkmen Shias (91%) and Shabak Shias than it is for Christians (71%) and Yazidis (58%). Joining returned family members or relatives is also more commonly expressed by

the former two groups. A total of 85 per cent of Turkmen Shia returnees and 62 per cent of Shabak Shia returnees say that family returning played an important role in their decision to return. In contrast, only 32 per cent of Yazidis reported that this is an important factor in their decision.

9591

99 9693

51

40

52

69

41

7671

84

91

5856

47

62

85

32

58 56

75

65

3226

1714

45

35

24

47

15

26

4

25 26

18

37

16

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

SAMPLE AVERAGE CHRISTIANS SHABAK SHIAS TURKMEN SHIAS YAZIDIS

I WAS MISSING HOME

LOWER LIVING COSTS IN THIS LOCATION

OTHER PEOPLE I KNOW RETURNED

JOIN FAMILY MEMBERS WHO RETURNED

SAFETY HERE IMPROVED

POSSIBILITY TO WORK / CREATE ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES IN THIS LOCATION

COMMUNITY / RELIGIOUS LEADERS ENCOURAGED RETURN

PUBLIC SERVICES HERE IMPROVED

Figure 13: Factors that play a role in decision to return (very strong and strong answers combined), related to location of origin by ethno-religious background.

IOM IRAQ22


Three out of four Shabak Shia and over 50 per cent of Christian and Turkmen Shia returnees said an improve-ment in the safety situation in the area of origin played an important role in their decision to return. This percentage was significantly lower among Yazidis, 32 per cent of whom reported that safety played a weak or very weak role.

The study found that religious leaders encouraging IDPs to return was only a significant factor for the Christian

community: 47 per cent of interviewed Christian IDPs said that this played an important role in their decision to return. Among other communities, this factor carried less weight and occurred less frequently. Only 5 per cent of Christians responded that encouragement was not applicable, whereas 17 per cent of Shabak Shias and Turkmen Shias and 61 per cent Yazidis said so. In fact, 15 per cent of Yazidi IDPs reported that their community/religious leaders were discouraging return – the highest proportion among the four groups.

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

NO FINANCIAL MEANSTO STAY IN DISPLACEMENT

DIFFICULTY ADAPTING TOTHE NEW ENVIRONMENT IN

DISPLACEMENT (URBAN/RURAL)

LACK OF WORK OPPORTUNITIESIN DISPLACEMENT

EFFORTS MADE BY AUTHORITIESIN LOCATION OF DISPLACEMENT

TO ENCOURAGE RETURNS

LANGUAGE SPOKEN BY HCWAS DIFFERENT FROM MINE

LACK SAFETY IN LOCATIONOF DISPLACEMENT

LACK OF PUBLIC SERVICESIN DISPLACEMENT

WE DID NOT FEEL WELCOMEANYMORE IN DISPLACEMENT

VERY STRONG STRONG NEITHER STRONG NOR WEAK WEAK VERY WEAK N/A

8.8

6.8

2.4

16.8

17.5

19.8

16.8

14.2

2.6

7.1

4.8

24.8

17.8

27.8

20.5

21.9

3

16.7

6

28.3

28.6

27.6

24.6

23.9

28.9

32.5

28.9

14

15.2

16.7

24.9

22.4

36.6

22.1

30.8

7.3

14.1

5.7

11.5

16.5

28.2

21

29.5

0.6

0.7

1.1

1.7

Figure 14: Factors related to location of displacement that play a role in decision to return

IOM IRAQ23


Lack of financial means to remain in displacement played an important role in the decision to return of one in four returnee respondents.

Over 54 per cent of Turkmen Shias said that lack

of financial means to remain in displacement played

an important role in their decision to return and

mentioned lower living costs in the areas of return

as a strong or very strong factor to return (69%).

Turkmen Shia were the group most pulled by this factor. Lack of work opportunities while in displacement was a push factor mainly for Yazidi returnees (39%) and Turkmen Shia returnees (28%).

Another factor reported by IDPs in their decision to return was the difficulty in adapting to a new environment (24%). Turkmen Shias (37%) and Yazidis (35%) were the groups most affected by this factor. Interviewed Turkmen Shia returnees were mostly originally from a rural location but lived in an urban setting while they were displaced. Nearly all Yazidi returnees who reported this factor had lived in camps or critical shelters such as unfinished buildings during displace-ment. Fifty-three per cent of Yazidi returnees who lived in camps reported difficulties to adapt as a reason to return, as did 61 per cent of Yazidi returnees in critical shelters. In comparison, only 4 per cent of Yazidi returnees who lived in rented housing cited this factor as a reason for return.

Figure 15: Returnees per ethno-religious group who state a given factor played a strong or very strong role in decision to return

2619 16

54

2024

1219

37 35

22

13 14

28

39

19 19 18

37

0

15

26

9

22

38

1 3

25

55 3 411

23 2 4 4 30%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

SAMPLE AVERAGE CHRISTIANS SHABAK SHIAS TURKMEN SHIAS YAZIDIS

NO FINANCIAL MEANS TO STAY IN DISPLACEMENT

DIFFICULTY ADAPTING TO NEW ENVIRONMENT (URBAN/RURAL)

LACK OF WORK OPPORTUNITIES IN DISPLACEMENT

EFFORTS MADE BY AUTHORITIES IN LOCATION OF DISPLACEMENT

LANGUAGE SPOKEN BY HC WAS DIFFERENT FROM MINE

LACK OF PUBLIC SERVICES IN DISPLACEMENT

WE NO LONGER FELT WELCOME IN DISPLACEMENT

LACK OF SAFETY IN LOCATION OF DISPLACEMENT

IOM IRAQ24


3. HOUSING, LAND AND PROPERTY

House ownership

Across the sample and all four ethno-religious groups, the vast majority of IDPs and returnees (92.3%) own property in their location of origin, with relatively more returnees owning property. The study found that it was rare for households to lose ownership of property during displacement; only 13 respondents from a total of 1,264 interviewed IDPs and returnees said they had lost ownership of their property.

Most often, in these cases (7 cases), families had decided to sell the property. Of the four groups, Yazidis were the most likely to own property, almost nine out of ten families. It was the lowest among Christian respondents: almost four out of ten Christian IDP families and two out of ten Christian returnee families did not own property.

House damage

However, ownership does not necessarily mean a household faces less housing-related challenges in returning home. In some cases, owners are unable to access their property (23% of IDPs), mainly due to heavy property damage (17%). This problem was most widespread among Yazidi IDPs, with one in three reporting that they were unable to access their property. One in five Shabak Shia and Turkmen Shia IDPs also said that they were unable to access their property due to heavy damage. Among Christian IDPs, this proportion is lower, affecting 12 per cent of interviewed Christian IDPs.

Property damage was also a commonly reported issue for returnees: 68 per cent of them were able to access their house but it was previously or still damaged and an addi-tional 6 per cent were unable to access their property due to heavy damage or complete destruction. However, over half of returnees who own property have been able to repair damage to their house.

Figure 16: Proportion of ethno-religious group able to access property

CHRISTIANS SHABAK SHIAS YAZIDISTURKMEN SHIAS

88

12

78.8

21.2

78.5

21.5

67.3

32.7

% % % %

ABLE TO ACCESS UNABLE TO ACCESS

IOM IRAQ25


54%

10%

13%

17%

51%

26%

17%

4%

2%

6%

0%

0%

ABLE TO ACCESS – BUT DAMAGED

77% – TOTAL ABLE TO ACCESS – 94%

23% – TOTAL UNABLE TO ACCESS – 6%

ABLE TO ACCESS – IT WAS DAMAGED BUT NOW REPAIRED

ABLE TO ACCESS – NOT DAMAGED

UNABLE TO ACCESS – DESTROYED OR HEAVILY DAMAGED

UNABLE TO ACCESS – UNEXPLODED ORDNANCES / IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

UNABLE TO ACCESS - OTHER

IDPs RETURNEES

IDPs RETURNEES

Figure 17: Able / Unable to access house among IDP / returnee property owners

House status related to intentions to return

While the study found that facing property issues was a key factor in IDP decision-making among all four ethno-religious groups, it was not the deciding factor for all.

A total of 23 per cent of IDP respondents

who own a property had decided to remain

displaced despite the fact that their property

had been repaired or was never damaged.

Most of them (83%) planned to stay in displacement in the short term. Of the IDPs who have repaired their prop-erty but remain in displacement, nearly half are Turkmen Shias (48%). Of the IDP respondents whose house was not damaged, 47 per cent are Yazidis, but only one household intended to return in the short term.

IOM IRAQ26


4. PERCEPTION OF OWN GROUP,HOST COMMUNITY AND OTHER GROUPS

The study also analysed the way that individuals perceive their own group, how much

they identify with it, as well as how they perceive the host community in displacement

and other groups in the location of origin. This analysis aimed to explore whether this

perception plays a role in an individual’s decisions to return or stay in displacement,

because it influences the extent to which an individual follows their group’s dynamics and

shapes shared perceptions of security, vulnerability or past events related to the crisis.

4.1 IDENTITY LAYERS AND PERCEPTION OF THEIR OWN GROUP

There were differences between the ethno-religious groups in terms of what layers are most important to their iden-tity. Respondents were asked to rate, on a scale from 1 to 5, the importance of each element. Christian and Yazidi respondents identified first with their religion, followed by ethnicity. Also, Christian respondents, particularly returnees, ranked each element higher than any other group, which might indicate a strong bonding identity. For Shabak Shias

and Turkmen Shias, ethnicity carries more weight. However, these two groups differ in their ranking of religion: whereas religion is the second strongest identity component for Shabak Shias, for Turkmen Shias religion comes in fifth place.

These two groups present remarkable differences on how IDPs and returnees identify with several identity compo-nents. Religion, nationality, ethnicity and town of origin are stronger identifiers for returnees than for IDPs.

Figure 18: Average level of identification with each component per ethno-religious group

TRIBERELIGIONFAMILYNEIGHBOURHOOD BIRTHPLACENATIONALITYTOWN ETHNICITY

CH

RIS

TIA

NS

SHA

BAK

SH

IAS

TU

RK

MEN

SH

IAS

YA

ZID

IS

4.033.67

4.394.424.24

4.64.17

3.72

4.614.744.51

4.994.56

4.31

4.8

4.053.7

4.44.4

3.91

4.9

4.19

3.7

4.68

3

5

3.66 3.543.77

4.23 4.25 4.23.82

3.6

4.054.28

3.74

4.81

4.323.93

4.7

4.013.61

4.44.08

3.4

4.76

3.633.27

4

3

5

3.74 3.623.964.08 4.02 4.18

3.943.75

4.273.93

3.63

4.434.08 3.91

4.35

3.663.37

4.143.94

3.67

4.38

3.68 3.593.82

3

5

3.86 3.923.75

4.41 4.38 4.47

4.01 4.02 3.99

4.7 4.574.92

4.49 4.364.71

4.13 4.273.893.96 3.92 4.024.06 4.01 4.15

3

5

ALL IDPs RETURNEES

IOM IRAQ27


Through two series of five questions each, participants were asked about their experiences of agency and vulnerability as members of their group. After agreeing or disagreeing with a number of statements, an average score subsequently provides a measure for agency and vulnerability. When it comes to perceptions of agency as part of a group, Shabak Shia and Turkmen Shia IDPs clearly experience higher levels of agency – that is, they feel they have greater control of their groups’ actions – while this figure drops significantly for Turkmen Shia returnees. It is possible that Turkmen Shia who are displaced in Shia-majority areas in central and south Iraq perceive a larger degree of control than those returning to mixed areas that were affected by direct confrontation.

Yazidis and Christians present significantly lower levels of group agency, which might also be linked to their perception of vulnerability. For both communities, however, returnees experience slightly more agency than IDPs. For many Yazidis, return often means they are moving from a camp back to their habitual residence in their hometown, which contrib-utes to a feeling of being able to exercise control on group behavior and group outcomes.

When it comes to perception of vulnerability,

Christians and Yazidis perceive their group to be

more vulnerable than Shabak Shias and Turkmen

Shias, both for IDPs and returnees. Turkmen Shia

IDPs feel their group is the least vulnerable.

Figure 20: Vulnerability average score

TOTAL: IDPs 2.1776

RETURNEES 2.0387

1.922.46 2.61

1.722.01 2.21

1.822.07

0

1

2

3

4

5

CHRISTIAN SHABAK SHIA TURKMEN SHIA YAZIDI

3.693.31

2.91

3.723.39

3.01 3.023.31

CHRISTIAN SHABAK SHIA TURKMEN SHIA YAZIDI

TOTAL:IDPs 3.3987

RETURNEES 3.1846 IDPs RETURNEES

Figure 19: Perception of agency per ethno-religious group

4.2 PERCEPTION OF HOST COMMUNITY IN DISPLACEMENT AND OTHER GROUPS IN LOCATION OF ORIGIN

Returnees and IDPs were also asked about their perceptions of the other groups and of the host community.

Perception of host community in areas of displacement

Respondents were asked about how similar they feel to the host community. The majority (66%) of respondents felt similar or very similar, 16 per cent gave a neutral response, and 18 per cent felt different or very different from members of the host community. Across all groups, Shabak Shia

(29%) and Turkmen Shia (28%) IDPs were the groups that were more likely to feel different from the host community, whereas nine out of ten Yazidi IDP respondents stated that they felt very similar or similar to the host community.

IOM IRAQ28


VERY SIMILAR SIMILAR NEITHER SIMILAR NOR DISSIMILAR DISSIMILAR VERY DISSIMILAR

Figure 21: Feeling of similarity to host community during displacement

CHRISTIANS SHABAK SHIAS

TURKMEN SHIAS YAZIDIS

19.811

22

46.5 45.5 47.5

24 27.520.5

11.216

6.51.8 0 3.5

22.614.5

30.740.5

46.5

34.7

14.2 1018.3

12.9 12.5 13.49.716.5

3

16.1 12.322.7

36.541.5

2820.3 18.2

2419.1 19.4 18.7

7.9 8.7 6.7

33.524.8

33.3

58.565.6

46.7

6.8 2.813.3

6.5 6.8 60.2 0 0.7

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

ALL IDPs RETURNEES ALL IDPs RETURNEES

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

ALL IDPs RETURNEES ALL IDPs RETURNEES

Perception of other groups in areas of origin

8 Although this might be due to returnees having a better knowledge of the situation in the area of origin / return, IOM’s teams in the field observed that IDPs were more comfortable in answering these questions, whereas returnees might not have felt comfortable enough to openly express their views. This also applies to the questions on acceptance of other groups.

Overall, Christian (46%) and Turkmen Shia (48%) respond-ents were most likely to report differences between groups in their areas of origin. There are clear differences in the perceptions of returnees and IDPs when asked about their location of origin. More than half of IDPs (58%) perceive differences between the various groups living in their loca-tions of origin, but far fewer returnees (18%) felt this way.

In particular, among Yazidis and Shabak Shias, IDPs and returnees from the same group expressed opposing views. Of the Yazidi respondents, 44 per cent of IDPs felt that there were differences between groups, in contrast to only 8 per cent of returnees. Among Shabak Shias, the difference is wider: 61.5 per cent of IDPs but only 12 per cent of returnees reported that such differences existed.8

MANY SIMILARITIES SOME SIMILARITIES NEITHER DIFFERENT NOR SIMILAR SOME DIFFERENCES MANY DIFFERENCES

Figure 22: Perceptions about other groups in location of origin

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

ALL IDPs RETURNEES RETURNEES RETURNEES RETURNEESALL IDPs ALL IDPs ALL IDPs

13.55.5

21.56

5.5

6.5

34.2

21.5

47

33.2

45.5

2113

22

4

24.1

4.5

43.611.4

5.5

17.327.4

28

26.728.1

45

10.99

16.51.5

11.2 7.118

10.26.7

16

30.8

24.9

40.7

3848.6

20

9.9 12.65.3

39.832.4

52

15.8

7.6

29.313.8

15.6

10.722

30.4

88.8 14

CHRISTIANS SHABAK SHIAS TURKMEN SHIAS YAZIDIS

IOM IRAQ29


Acceptance of other groups in areas of origin / return

When asked about whether they felt accepted by other groups living in their location of origin, returnees and IDPs also had different perceptions. Less than 1 per cent of returnee respondents felt rejected by other ethno-religious groups living in the same location of origin but almost 18 per cent of IDPs reported this issue. This proportion was highest among Yazidis (22.4%) and lowest among Shabak Shias (15.5%) IDPs

%

20.6

41.5

19.6

15.5

2.8

44.6

49.6

5.1

0.7

RETURNEES

%

Figure 23: Feeling of acceptance among other groups living in location of origin/return

COMPLETELY ACCEPTED

SOMEWHAT ACCEPTED

NEITHER ACCEPTED NOR REJECTED

SOMEWHAT REJECTED

COMPLETELY REJECTED

COMPLETELY ACCEPTED SOMEWHAT ACCEPTED NEITHER ACCEPTED NOR REJECTED

SOMEWHAT REJECTED COMPLETELY REJECTED

Figure 24: Feeling of acceptance by other ethno-religious groups living in location of origin/return

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

28.7 2334.5

52.2

40.5

64

9.8

18

1.5

7.515

1.8 3.5

34.3

17.5

51

42.3

37.5

47

15.7

29.5

2

6.212.5

1.5 3

22.6 1928.7

44.939.5

54

21.125.3

1410.4 14.6

3.31 1.6

38.8

22.8

65.3

40.8

47.6

29.36.5

7.2

5.3

1219.2

2 3.2

CHRISTIANS SHABAK SHIAS TURKMEN SHIAS YAZIDIS

ALL IDPs RETURNEES ALL IDPs RETURNEES ALL IDPs RETURNEES ALL IDPs RETURNEES

Group empowerment in the location of origin

Over 50 per cent of IDP respondents reported that, compared to other groups, their group is disempowered in their location of origin. Among those who had returned, only about 30 per cent of respondents held the same view and 61.5 per cent felt that their ethno-religious group was empowered, with similar percentages across all four

ethno-religious groups. This might suggest that feelings of community empowerment play an important role in the deci-sion to return, and that individuals are less likely to do so when they feel their group is disempowered in their area of origin.

CHRISTIANS SHABAKSHIAS

SHABAKSHIAS

TURKMENSHIAS

YAZIDIS TOTAL CHRISTIANS TURKMENSHIAS

YAZIDIS TOTAL

FEELS GROUP ISDISEMPOWERED

NEUTRAL

FEELS GROUP ISEMPOWERED

IDPs RETURNEES

51%70.3%

62.7% 62.7% 61.5%

10.5%

7.4% 16%8.5%

38.5%22.3% 21.3%

37.3% 29.9%

50%35.5%

4.4%

12.3%

45.6% 52.2%

28.9%

18.6%

52.6%

30.5% 31%

6%20.5%

63.5%48.5%

Figure 25: Perceptions of group empowerment vis-à-vis other groups in location of origin

IOM IRAQ30


5. FUTURE INTENTIONS

This section reports on the future intentions of returnees and IDPs and has

three parts: (i) levels of satisfaction among returnees and intentions to move

in the future, (ii) short- and long-term intentions of IDPs and the different

factors that drive their decisions to return, remain in displacement or migrate

abroad, and (iii) regression models to explain future intentions to return

within each ethno-religious group separately.

5.1 RETURNEE INTENTIONS

Satisfaction with return

Respondents were also asked whether they were satisfied with their current location (return or remain in displace-ment). A vast majority of returnees (87%) were not satisfied with having returned, reporting that they were somewhat

(26.5%) or very dissatisfied (60.9%). Levels of dissatisfac-tion are greatest among Shabak Shia and Turkmen Shia returnees (90% dissatisfied, 72% of whom reported that they were very dissatisfied).

Figure 26: Satisfaction with return

12.14 5.3

3

2

4

4.5 6.7 9.3 5.9

30.8

19.4 17.3

39.326.5

50

72.1 72

49.360.9

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

CHRISTIANS SHABAK SHIAS TURKMEN SHIAS YAZIDIS TOTAL

2 1.3 1.40.7

VERY SATISFIED SOMEWHAT SATISFIED NEITHER SATISFIED NOR DISSATISFIED

SOMEWHAT DISSATISFIED VERY DISSATISFIED

IOM IRAQ31


Consulting others about returning

The majority of returnees interviewed sought advice from other relatives who had already returned or who were in displace-ment, before returning. However, less than half of Christian respondents reported advice from others as a factor in their decision-making. In terms of other factors, Christians were more likely to seek advice from religious leaders than other groups, and Turkmen Shias reported that they consulted tribal leaders and armed forces prior to their return. For all groups in displacement, local community representatives were also consulted the least regarding the respondents’ decision to return.

RELATIVES WHO HAVE RETURNED

RELATIVES IN DISPLACEMENT

SECURITY ACTORS

RELIGIOUS LEADERS

TRIBAL LEADERS

AUTHORITIES IN DISPLACEMENT

LOCAL REPRESENTATIVES

Figure 27: Proportion of respondents that sought advice regarding their decision to return

48

65.8

76.7

70

64

34.5

61.9 63.366

55.3

13.5 12.9

55.3

9.3

21.4

33

8.9

20.7

4.7

17.4

4

15.8

34.7

9.3

15.117.513.4

17.3

1014.713 11.4

6

12 10.8

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%


Areas for improvement

The top three areas where returnees demanded improve-ments were public service provision (62%), security (47.5%) and economic opportunities (43%). Nearly 20 per cent of

returnees also prioritized infrastructure and house rehabil-itation. The need for additional efforts to prevent the return of ISIL was reported by 17 per cent of respondents.

Figure 28: Areas for improvement

1.4%Trust between community and armed groups

2.5%Cooperation and trust between armed groups

2.7%Trust between different ethnic and religious groups

2.9%Tolerance for ethno-religious differences

16.6%Prevent ISIL return

19.8%Infrastructure/ house rehabilitation

43.2%Economic opportunities

47.5%Security

IOM IRAQ32


When it comes to future intentions, despite the high

levels of dissatisfaction associated with returning,

the majority of returnees (78%) were not planning

to move again. This percentage is the highest among

Shabak Shias (95%) and Turkmen Shias (85%).

For those who were planning on moving again, very few were planning to move to a different location in Iraq. However, a significant percentage of Christians and Yazidis (39% and 25% respectively) reported that they planned to migrate abroad.

SHABAK SHIASCHRISTIANS TURKMEN SHIAS YAZIDIS TOTAL

59

39

2

%

94.6

1.5

4

%

84.7

105.3

%

77.8

18.93

%

74.3

25

0.7

%

Figure 29: Intention to displace again

NO YES, PLANNING TO MIGRATE ABROAD YES, TO A DIFFERENT LOCATION IN IRAQ

When asked about why they planned to migrate abroad, a lack of trust in the future and better security elsewhere were the two most commonly selected reasons. Other reasons included lack of trust in the leadership in their location, better economic opportunities, better public services such as educa-tion and healthcare, and fear of the return of ISIL. The location of family members was also a significant factor reported by households regarding their decision to move abroad. Of the 133 returnees planning to migrate abroad, nearly half (43.6%)

already had family members living abroad. In contrast, among returnees not planning to move again, only 14.7 per cent of households had one or more family members living abroad.

Yazidi returnees appear more driven in their intention to migrate abroad by factors related to security (better secu-rity and fear of ISIL return) than their Christian counterparts, who were more likely to cite economic opportunities, better public services and administration as the top reasons why they intended to leave Iraq.

Figure 30: Returnees’ reasons to migrate abroad

60.9

71.8

51.449.6

35.9

83.8

10.514.1

2.7

16.5 16.7

8.1

25.6 28.2

18.919.516.7

10.811.3 9

21.6

2.3 1.3 2.70.8 1.3 03 5.1

00%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

CHRISTIAN RETURNEES YAZIDI RETURNEES % OF RESPONDENTS WHOWISH TO MIGRATE ABROAD

LACK OF TRUST IN THE FUTURE

BETTER SECURITY

LACK OF TRUST IN ACTORS CONTROLLING AREA

LACK OF TRUST IN POLITICAL ACTORS ADMINISTERING THIS AREA

BETTER ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES

BETTER PUBLIC SERVICES

FEAR OF ISIL RETURN

MORE TOLERANCE FOR ETHNO-RELIGIOUS DIFFERENCES

PROPERTY AT HOME DESTROYED / LOST

OTHER

IOM IRAQ33


5.2 IDP INTENTIONS

Satisfaction with decision not to return

Around 77 per cent of IDPs say they are dissatisfied with their decision to remain in displacement. Unlike returnees, however, most say they are somewhat dissatisfied (54.9%) rather than very dissatisfied (22%). There are no significant differences between ethno-religious groups or between IDPs displaced in the central/south of Iraq and those in the KRI.

Figure 31: Satisfaction with decision to remain in current location


VERY SATISFIED SOMEWHAT SATISFIED NEITHER SATISFIED NOR DISSATISFIED

SOMEWHAT DISSATISFIED VERY DISSATISFIED

4 2.88 6 8.7 9.2 8.1

13.5 915.4

11.6 12.5

53.556

56.154 54.9

23.5 2517

23.6 22

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

1.51.5 1.51.6 1.52.4

Consulting others about returning

Similar to returnees, most IDPs seek advice from relatives who have returned and from those who have chosen to remain in displacement when deciding whether to return or not. Yazidis and Christians are more likely to seek advice from security actors and religious leaders than the other

two groups. Again, IDP respondents also reported that they barely consulted authorities in displacement and local community representatives during their decision-making process. Religious and tribal leaders were less likely to be consulted by IDPs than by returnees.

IOM IRAQ34


RELATIVES IN DISPLACEMENT

RELATIVES WHO HAVE RETURNED

SECURITY ACTORS

TRIBAL LEADERS

RELIGIOUS LEADERS

AUTHORITIES IN DISPLACEMENT

LOCAL REPRESENTATIVES

Figure 32: Proportion of respondents that sought advice regarding their decision to return

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%


68.5 69

60.9

84.4

70.9

50

6560.1

5256.7

18.5

9.5 10.3

27.2

16.6

713 12.3 13.6 11.6

20

4.5 4.7

17.211.5

1510

6.3

15.211.512.5

7 6.7

15.610.5

Areas for improvement

The main reasons why IDPs were dissatisfied with their current locations were the lack of economic opportunities (76%) and public service provision (72%). Nearly three out of four IDPs selected both of these as one of the two areas where they would like to see improvement. Security was much less of an issue for IDPs than for returnees; however, it

was still a concern for nearly one in every seven interviewed IDP households. Just over 13 per cent of IDPs reported that the process of receiving an official permission to remain in the location of displacement needed to be improved. These were predominantly Turkmen Shias displaced in Najaf and Wassit, as well as Shabak Shias in Najaf and Kerbala.

Figure 33: Areas for improvement

1%Trust between community and armed groups

2%Other

5%Trust between different ethnic and religious groups

5%Less restriction on movement

6%Tolerance for ethno-religious differences

13%Official permission to stay in current location in the future

15%Security

72%Public service provision

76%Economic opportunities

IOM IRAQ35


IDPs’ short-term intentions

9 Coded from open-ended question filled when selecting “Other”.

In the short term (<12 months) the vast majority of inter-viewed IDPs (85%) planned to stay in their current location. Turkmen Shias (21.3%) were most likely to report that they wanted to return and Christians (1.5%) were the least likely. Christian IDPs were the most likely to be planning to move and

settle abroad in the short term, followed by Yazidis. The main reasons cited by Christians and Yazidis for planning to move abroad were better security and better economic opportuni-ties. More tolerance for ethno-religious differences was also cited as a reason by nearly 20 per cent wishing to migrate.

SHABAK SHIASCHRISTIANS TURKMEN SHIAS YAZIDIS TOTAL

122

1.5

84.5

%

11.5

88.5

%

21.3

78.7

%

4

0.6

10.2

85.3

%

4.8

0.4

4.8

90

%

Figure 34: IDPs’ short-term intentions

MOVE AND SETTLE ABROAD MOVE TO THIRD LOCATION IN IRAQ RETURN TO AREA OF ORIGIN STAY IN CURRENT LOCATION

For the 85 per cent of IDPs who intend to stay in displace-ment in the short term, better security, public services and economic opportunities were the primary drivers. However, between 10 per cent and 15 per cent of IDPs across all four groups also cited a more tolerant climate for ethno-reli-gious differences as a reason to remain in their location of

displacement. Turkmen Shias, were more likely to cite trust in local actors controlling their location of displacement than the other groups. Responses that fell in the “other” category were mainly issues related to housing, land and property, or a lack of education services in the location of origin.9

BETTER SECURITY IN THIS AREA

BETTER PUBLIC SERVICES IN THIS AREA

BETTER ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES IN THIS AREA

MORE TOLERANCE FOR ETHNO- RELIGIOUS DIFFERENCES IN THIS AREA

TRUST IN ACTORS CONTROLLING THIS AREA

TRUST IN THE FUTURE OF THIS AREA

FREE FROM FEAR OF ISIL RETURN IN THIS AREA

TRUST IN POLITICAL ACTORS ADMINISTERING THIS AREA

OTHER

Figure 35: Reasons for IDPs wishing to remain in displacement in the short term

66.970.1

59.8

78.2

69.1

56.2

32.8

41.2

62.2

48.746.7

57.1

44.7

37.8

46

11.214.7 13.6

9.812.2

5.99

17.6

1.8

8.45.3 6.2 8

4 5.84.72.3 4 4 3.82.4 1.1

40.9 2.10.6

6.8 71.3

3.9

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%


IOM IRAQ36


IDPs’ long-term intentions

In the long term, most IDP respondents (55%) wished to return to their area of origin, but this differed between ethno-religious communities: 80 per cent of Turkmen Shias planned to return, in contrast to only 22 per cent of Christians and 43 per cent of Yazidis.

Almost three out of ten IDPs wished to stay

and integrate in their current location.

This proportion is roughly similar among Christian, Yazidi and Shabak Shia IDPs (30%) but significantly lower among Turkmen Shia IDPs (20%), who were also more likely to report that they wished to return.

As with the returnees, the IDP respondents that were most likely to report that they intended to move and settle abroad were Christians (42.5%) and Yazidis (25.6%).

Figure 36: IDP long-term intentions

42.5

25.616.8

4

22

6980.6

43.2 54.7

31.5 29.519

30.8 27.4

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

CHRISTIANS SHABAKSHIAS

TURKMENSHIAS

YAZIDIS TOTAL

STAY AND INTEGRATEIN CURRENT LOCATION

MOVE TO THIRDLOCATION IN IRAQ

1.5 0.4

0.4

1.1

MOVE AND SETTLE ABROAD RETURN TO AREA OF ORIGIN

Individual motivations for wanting to leave Iraq, return, or stay and integrate differed depending on intentions. IDPs intending to return were mainly motivated by optimism regarding the future of their hometowns. They had trust in the future of the return area as well as in the civil and military

actors controlling it, and they believed that ISIL would not return there. Improvements in economic opportunities and public service provision appeared to carry less weight in their decision about whether or not to return.

TRUST IN THE FUTURE

NO FEAR OF ISIL RETURNING

TRUST IN ACTORS CONTROLLING AREA

BETTER ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES DIFFERENCES IN THIS AREA

BETTER PUBLIC SERVICES

BETTER SECURITY

IT IS HOME

MORE TOLERANCE FOR ETHNO-RELIGIOUS DIFFERENCES

TRUST IN POLITICAL ACTORS ADMINISTERING THE AREA

Figure 37: Reasons for intending to return, stay displaced or move abroad

56.5

23.5

39.545.7

5.7-

41

4 4.6

23.9

37.2

54.6

13

41.3

28.3

8.5

73.3

46

7.3-- - -4

12.5

25.7

0.40%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

RETURN STAY MOVE ABROAD

The roughly 27 per cent of IDP respondents who wished to stay in displacement are motivated by different factors: 73 per cent cited better security, followed by better public services (41%) and economic opportunities (37%). There were also 13 per cent of respondents who cited “a more tolerant climate for ethno-religious differences” as a reason to stay. This factor was also mentioned by a quarter of IDPs who intended to migrate abroad. Around half of those wishing to leave Iraq cited better economic opportunities and security elsewhere as main reasons to move abroad.

IOM IRAQ37


5.3 ETHNO-RELIGIOUS GROUPS AND INTENTIONS TO RETURN: WHICH FACTORS AFFECT INTENTIONS THE MOST?

10 In each model, a number of demographic controls were included to better explore the effects of particular perceptions and other socioeconomic factors on the odds for a particular outcome. These control variables are: gender of head of household, age of the head of household, education level, unemployment and ownership of property in location of origin.

Within each group, certain characteristics associated with intentions to return, stay in displacement or migrate abroad differ between groups; therefore it was necessary to analyse each ethno-religious group separately. The following are

findings of the logistic regression undertaken to analyse factors of intention to return in the long term for each ethnic group separately.10

Christian IDPs' long-term intentions to return

FACTORS REDUCING LIKELIHOOD TO RETURN

FEMALE-HEADED HOUSEHOLDSFemale-headed households are four times less likely to intend to return than households headed by males.

SAFETYThose who state safety is an important factor are less likely to intend to return.

HOST COMMUNITYThose who feel similar to the host community (65%) are less likely to intend to return.

FACTORS INCREASING LIKELIHOOD TO RETURN

PROPERTY OWNERSHIPThose who own property in their location of origin are more than twice as likely to intend to return than those who do not – all other factors being equal.

GROUP IDENTITYThose who identify more strongly with their ethno-religious group are more likely to intend to return.

OTHER PEOPLEThose who indicate that their decision to return/remain is strongly influenced by the actions of others are more likely to intend to return.

The most important factor affecting intentions to return among Christian IDP respondents is property ownership in the location of origin. Those who own property in their location of origin are more than twice as likely to intend to return than those who do not – all other factors being equal. Another two related factors also increase the likelihood of Christian IDPs wanting to return: the extent to which they identify with their group and whether or not the respond-ents attribute importance to the actions and decisions of other IDPs. Respondents who do not find these two factors important are more likely to return.

Several factors reduce the likelihood of a respondent intending to return. First, the odds of female-headed house-holds intending to return are four times lower compared to that for a male-headed household – all other factors being equal. Second, Christian IDPs who attributed a great impor-tance to safety are less likely to return in the long term. Finally, Christian IDPs who report that they feel similar to their host community (almost six out of ten Christian IDPs) are 65 per cent less likely to return than Christian IDPs who do not feel similar to their host community.

IOM IRAQ38


Christian IDPs' and returnees' intentions to move abroad11


OWNING PROPERTYThose who own property in origin are 0.50 times less likely to intend to migrate abroad.

ELDERLY IN HOUSEHOLDHouseholds with one or more older person are also 0.50 times less likely to intend to migrate.

GROUP IDENTITYHouseholds with one or more older person are also 0.50 times less likely to intend to migrate.

POLITICAL CONFIDENCEThose who have a positive view of their group’s leadership are 0.44 times less likely to intend to migrate.


FRIENDS ABROADChristians who have friends abroad are four times more likely to intend to migrate as well.

NOT FEELING WELCOMEThose who do not feel welcome in displacement and/or return are 1.5 times more likely to intend to migrate abroad.

11 The statistical model to assess factors affecting the intention to move abroad was not applied to Shabak Shias and Turkmen Shias as the percentage of respondents from the sample among these two groups intending to move abroad was too low to apply the regression.

As seen previously in the report, the intention to migrate abroad among Christian respondents is nearly 30 per cent. Six factors significantly impact the long-term intentions of Christian IDP and returnee respondents to migrate abroad. Two factors increase the likelihood of wishing to migrate abroad: having friends who have already migrated (four times more likely) and not feeling welcome in the current location (1.5 times more likely).

Four factors reduce the wish to emigrate: owning property in their location of origin, the presence of older people in their household – both factors halve this likelihood – the extent to which they identify with their own ethno-religious group and whether they have a positive perception of local political leaders.

IOM IRAQ39


Yazidi IDPs' intentions to return


FEMALE-HEADED HOUSEHOLDSFemale-headed households are half as likely to intend to return than households headed by males.

GROUP VULNERABILITYThe more vulnerable Yazidis feel their group is, the less likely they are to intend to return.

DISCRIMINATIONThose who have faced discrimination in their location of origin prior to displacement are less inclined to return.


PERCEPTIONS OF EMPOWERMENTYazidis who feel their group is powerful in relation to other groups living in their location of origin are more likely to intend to return.

ACTIONS OF FAMILY MEMBERS

Yazidis who say the actions of family members are important to their decision are more likely to intend to return than those who say this is not important to them.

12 In situations where all else is equal. Note that the relation is only significant at the 10 per cent level.

13 Note that this absence of effect is partially explained by a lack of variance in the variables; among Yazidis, ownership of property is so high and education levels so low that these variables lose much of their distinguishing feature.

14 This variable is a scale of an average of five questions related to group vulnerability; every unit increase on this scale is paired with a decrease of a factor .611 in the odds of intention to return. However, this relation has a p. value of 0.052 and is therefore only significant at the 10 per cent level.

15 The statistical model to assess factors affecting the intention to move abroad was not applied to Shabak Shias and Turkmen Shias as the percentage of respondents from the sample among these two groups intending to move abroad was too low to apply the regression.

Among Yazidi IDPs, female-headed households are half as likely to return than male-headed households.12 Other demographic variables, such as age or education level of the head of household, do not appear to have a significant effect on intentions to return.13 Yazidi IDPs who have declared that keeping their family together in one place is important, are 3.6 times more likely to intend to return home. Another

factor that made Yazidis more likely to intend to return is the perception that their group is empowered in their location of origin (2.5 times more likely).

One factor that negatively impacts Yazidi IDPs intention to return is the perception of group vulnerability, which is nega-tively related to the intention to return (0.6 times).14

Yazidi IDPs' and returnees' intentions to return15


FAMILY ABROAD

The 36 per cent of Yazidis who say they have family abroad are four times more likely to intend to leave Iraq than the 64 per cent that do not – all other factors being equal.

DISCRIMINATIONThose who have faced discrimination are 1.5 times more likely to intend to migrate abroad.

AGEHouseholds headed by younger persons (under 45 years of age) are twice as likely to intend to migrate abroad than those headed by older persons (over 45 years of age).

IOM IRAQ40


A quarter of Yazidi respondents (IDPs and returnees combined) intend to move abroad in the long term. Three factors signif-icantly impact the likelihood of Yazidis to migrate abroad. First, having family members who have already done so (36% of the Yazidi sample). Having members who have migrated abroad increases the likelihood that the respondent intends to move abroad (four times more likely), followed by having

faced discrimination while in displacement. For every increase in the number of areas where discrimination occurred (e.g. access to public services, employment or housing based on ethno-religious identity), households are 1.5 times more likely to intend to migrate abroad. Finally, households headed by people younger than 45 are twice as likely to intend to migrate abroad than those headed by older individuals.

Shabak Shia IDPs' intentions to return


HOST COMMUNITYLike Christians, Shabak Shia who feel similar to the host community are less likely to intend to return.

GROUP VULNERABILITYThose who feel their group is more vulnerable in the location of origin are less inclined to return.

PUBLIC SERVICESThose who say public services are important for their decision are less likely to intend to return than those who say public services are not important for their decision to return.


EDUCATION LEVELSShabak Shia with higher education are more than twice as likely to intend to return than others.

OTHER PEOPLE

Shabak Shia who say the actions of other people are important to their decision-making are 3.6 times more likely to intend to return than those who say this is not important to them. This suggests that there are Shabak Shia IDPs who intend to return but have not yet done so in part because other people have remained as well.

LIVING STANDARDS IN DISPLACEMENT

Those who say their living standards were worse than before displacement are more likely to intend to return.

Three factors increase the intention to return of Shabak Shia IDPs. The first is the level of education. Shabak Shias with higher education are more than twice as likely to intend to return than others. The second factor is the decision being taken by other members of the community. Shabak Shias who say the actions of other people are important to their decision-making are more likely to intend to return (3.6 times more likely). Finally, those who say their living stand-ards are worse in displacement than before are more likely to intend to return (3 times more likely).

The likelihood of Shabak Shia IDPs intending to return significantly decreases when the respondents perceive few differences with the host community (61% of the sample). It also decreases when the respondent perceives his/her group as more vulnerable and disempowered than the other groups in the location of origin.

Among Shabak Shia IDPs, there is no link between male- or female-headed households and their intentions to return. Also, neither property ownership nor employment are significantly associated with the intention to return among Shabak Shias.

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Turkmen Shia IDPs' intentions to return


SHELTER IN DISPLACEMENT

Turkmen Shia who rent accommodation in displacement are less inclined to return than those who stay in other shelter types (often religious buildings). Renting accommodation in this case should be seen as a measure of affluence and households who can afford it may be under less pressure to return than others.

EDUCATION LEVELSTurkmen Shia households headed by a person with higher education are less likely to return.


PROPERTY OWNERSHIP

Those who own property in the location of origin are more than twice as likely to intend to return than those who do not – all other factors being equal.

GROUP IDENTITYLike Christians, Turkmen Shia IDPs who identify stronger with their group are more likely to intend to return.

HOUSEHOLD INCOME

Turkmen Shia who say their household income deteriorated in displacement are more than 3 times as likely to intend to return than others. This concerns 61 per cent of Turkmen Shia IDPs.

OTHER PEOPLE

Those who indicated that living costs are an important factor in their decision-making are four times more likely to want to return than those who said this played no or a weak role.

16 Note that the relation is only significant at the 10 per cent level.

The housing situation and living costs seem to affect the intentions to return for Turkmen Shia IDP respondents more than those from other groups. First, Turkmen Shia IDPs who own property in their location of origin are nearly 5 times more likely to want to return than those who don’t. Second, the Turkmen IDPs who live in rented accommo-dation in displacement (approximately 50% of the sample) are less likely to want to return than those IDPs staying in other shelter types including critical shelters, religious build-ings, unfinished buildings or collective centers. Third, IDPs who indicate that living costs are a strong or very strong reason to return are 4 times more likely to want to return than those respondents who indicate that living costs

play no role or a weak role in their decision. Those who reported a deterioration in household income during displacement are 3 times more likely to want to return than those whose income is similar or better than before (nearly 61% of the Turkmen Shia IDP sample). Also, Turkmen Shia IDPs who identify more strongly with their ethno-religious group are more likely to intend to return (1.5 more likely). The education level of the head of household is relevant to a certain extent: higher educated heads of households are less likely to return.16

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CONCLUSION

Iraq is home to a rich and diverse population composed of many ethno-religious groups. This diversity is reflected in the heterogeneity of the country’s IDP and returnee population: each ethno-religious group has different characteristics, displacement and return patterns, challenges and needs.

While the Shabak Shias, Turkmen Shias, Christians and Yazidis included in this study share many similarities with the overall Iraqi IDP and returnee population and between groups, group specificities need to be understood to better tailour programming efforts of humanitarian and develop-ment actors and to inform targeted assistance to returnees and IDPs from these four ethno-religious groups.

This research sheds light on the socioeconomic character-istics of these groups as well as on the reasons behind their displacement status and future intentions. For IDPs, better safety and access to services, as well as not feeling welcome in the area of origin, were found to be key drivers in the decision to remain in displacement. For returnees, missing home, the return of family members and friends and an improvement in the security situation were the main reasons for returning home. Despite these similarities, there were also dispari-ties between the four groups. For instance, Turkmen Shia

and Shabak Shia IDPs are more likely to be hosted in reli-gious buildings and Yazidis live predominantly in camps or unfinished/abandoned buildings; and while Turkmen Shias and Shabak Shias want to stay in Iraq, Christian and Yazidi IDPs and returnees are more likely to want to emigrate. Yazidis wish to go abroad because of security issues and their fear of a return of ISIL, whereas Christians are moti-vated by economic prospects and lack of trust in the future.

However, further research on intra-group dynamics and their effect on displacement and return is needed. Group vulnerability and identification to one’s group were impor-tant factors affecting the likelihood to return, but a more in-depth understanding of how and why these two factors affect displacement dynamics is necessary. The study also showed disparities within all groups in terms of the effect of specific household characteristics and vulnerabilities on displacement patterns and future intentions; these findings call for further study.

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ANNEXES

Exp(B)

Female-headed household ** .249**

Head of household over 45 years old .833

Secondary education or above .783

Unemployed .648

Own property in location of origin * 2.232*

Importance given to safety in displacement ** .126**

Importance given to safety levels in location of origin *** .226***

Perception of similarity with host community ** .346**

Measure of identification with group (scale) ** 1.494**

Actions of other people are important to my decision ** 2.418

Concerns of not being welcomed in location of origin .538

Constant 2.527

R= .282, 82% correct case categorization.*p. < .1, **p. < .05, ***p. < .01

Table 1: Christian IDPs intention to return

Exp(B)

Female-headed household 1.370

Head of household over 45 years old 1.078

Presence of an older person (60+) in household ** .564**


Unemployed 1.423

Own property in location of origin ** .595**

Having family who moved abroad .765

Having friends who moved abroad *** 4.216***

Measure of identification with group (scale) ** .828**

Faced discrimination during displacement 1.236

Positive perception of political representatives of group ** .562**

Not feeling welcome in location of origin/displacement * 1.520*

Constant .574


Table 2: Christian IDPs and returnees intention to move abroad

IOM IRAQ44


Exp(B)

Female-headed household* 0.478*

Head of household over 45 years old 1.520


Unemployed .950

Own property in location of origin 1.037

Perceptions of group vulnerability (scale)* .611*

Faced discrimination in location of origin*** .061***

Perception that group is empowered*** 2.537***

Keeping the family together in one place is important*** 3.630***

Constant .715


Table 3: Yazidi IDPs intention to return

Exp(B)

Female-headed household .815

Head of household over 45 years old*** .481***

Presence of older people (60+) in household 1.250

Secondary education or above 1.136

Unemployed .691

Own property in location of origin .974

Having family who moved abroad *** 4.059***

Having friends who moved abroad 1.471

Measure of identification with group (scale) .871

Faced discrimination during displacement (scale) *** 1.521***

Positive perception of political representatives of group .702

Not feeling welcome in location of origin/displacement 1.436

Constant .295


Table 4: Yazidi IDPs and returnees intentions to move abroad

IOM IRAQ45


Exp(B)


Head of household over 45 years old 2.036*

Secondary education or above 2.362**

Unemployed .971

Own property in location of origin .994

Perception that group is disempowered .364**

Living standards in displacement worse than before 3.064***

Perception of similarity with host community .210***

Services in displacement are important to my decision .295***

Perceptions of group vulnerability (scale) .517**

Actions of other people are important to my decision 3.628***

Constant 39.023


Table 5: Shabak Shia IDPs intentions to return

Exp(B)


Head of household over 45 years old .671

Secondary education or above .470*

Unemployed 1.393

Own property in location of origin 4.978***

Stay in rented housing .367**

Importance given to living costs in decisions on migration 4.143**

Household income during displacement worse than before 2.992***

Measure of identification with group (scale) 1.499**

Constant .761

R = .349 =, 85.4% correct case categorization.*p. < .1, **p. < .05, ***p. < .01

Table 6: Turkmen Shia IDPs intentions to return

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