Upload
others
View
2
Download
0
Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
Understanding the interest-rate growth differential: its importance in long-term debt projections and for policy
David Turner, OECD
UN DESA Expert Group Meeting on the World Economy, LINK Project
October 24-26, 2011, New York
In long-term, fiscal problems not confined to euro area !
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 2024 2026
Gross government debt projections under a stylised and gradual fiscal consolidation rule
(% of GDP)
USA Japan Euro area
Δd = ‐pb + (r‐g) d‐1 (+sf)
where d = debt‐to‐GDP ratiopb = primary balance ratior = effective interest rate on net debtg = nominal GDP growthsf = stock‐flow adjustment
Source: OECD Economic Outlook, May 2011, chapter 4.
It matters a lot in the long-term : Small changes in (r-g) have large effects on debt projections
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
1990
1993
1996
1999
2002
2005
2008
2011
2014
2017
2020
2023
2026
2029
2032
2035
2038
2041
2044
2047
2050
2053
2056
2059
US gross government debt projections under differnt assumptions about (r‐g) differential
Baseline
(r‐g) less 1% pt
(r‐g) less 2% pt
N.B. Likely to understate differences if additional effect from lower fiscal risk premia.
Pre-crisis (r-g) differential in 2000s was much lower than over 1980s and 1990s. Where next ?
‐3.0
‐2.0
‐1.0
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
Interest rate ‐ growth differential for 23 OECD countries
Median
Lower quartile
Upper quartile
The 23 OECD countries have been chosen for consistent time series estimates for potential output and long-term interest rates on 10-year government bonds from 1983. Using nominal potential growth instead of actual GDP growth abstracts from the cycle and so gives a better impression of trend movements.
Why was the pre-crisis differential so low? Alternative, but not mutually exclusive, explanations
• Lower and less volatile inflation
• Policy rates kept too low for too long
• Under-pricing of risk
• The global savings glut
Understanding reasons for historical variation is important not only to project future, but also to understand how it might respond to policy.
Lower and less volatile inflationSupport from empirical studies (eg
Wright , AER 2011) & event study of Bank of England independence.
Medium & long-term implications
• If central bank credibility locked in then should imply a permanent long-term fall in (r-g) differential
• But also implies substantial risks from trying to inflate away debt (see also Box 1.8, OECD Economic Outlook, May 2011)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
Level and volatility of OECD inflation has fallen
OECD inflation (GDP deflator)
5‐year Standard deviation
(Too?) Low policy rates
Medium & long-term implications
• Policy rates likely to remain low for many years, but will eventually normalise
=> Reversion to higher (r-g) differential as output gaps close
‐4
‐3
‐2
‐1
0
1
2
Differential between OECD aggregate short‐rates (3 month) and long‐rates (10‐year)
Short rates unusually low for an unusually long
Risk aversion has increased
Medium & long-term implications
• Financial crisis and new capital requirements have increased risk aversion
• Clear illustration for euro area countries currently under pressure
• Financial markets more discriminating about sovereign debt risk. How much time do USA and Japan have?
‐6.0
‐4.0
‐2.0
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
GRC IRL ITA PRT ESP
(r‐g) differential for euro countries under financial pressure
Average1980‐95
Average 2000‐07
2010
The global savings glut
Bernanke (2005 & 2011)
Medium & long-term implications
• Will not disappear quickly, but may fade away over longer-term as Asian population ages, greater provision of social spending, etc‐0.4
‐0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Current Ac surplus of China and non‐OECD oil exportersas % of world GDP
Some simple econometrics to try to discriminate between explanations
• Panel regression, G7 countries, 1980-2010, country fixed effects, Dependent variable (r- g) where r is 10-year govt bond rate and g is growth rate of nominal potential GDP
• All effects statistically significant and correctly signed.
Variable Coefficient t-ratio Long-run
Inflation variability (5 year standard deviation of inflation)
0.29 2.4 0.74
Slope Yield curve(-1)(short minus long rates)
0.25 4.2 0.64
Lagged dependent variable
0.61 10.9 -
..and some support for global savings glut
• Panel regression, G7 countries, 1980-2010, country fixed effects, Dependent variable (r- g) where r is 10-year govt bond rate and g is growth rate of nominal potential GDP.Variable Coeff. t-ratio Long-run
Inflation variability (5 year standard deviation of inflation)
0.19 1.9 0.40
Slope Yield curve(-1)(short minus long rates)
0.31 3.6 0.66
Lagged dependent variable 0.53 8.6 -
Current Ac surplus, China + non-OECD oil exporters (as % world GDP)
-0.77 -2.7 1.64
Explaining the average fall in (r-g)
• These equations can be used to explain the unweighted simple average fall in (r-g) differential between 1980-95 and 2000-08
Explanatory Variable Simple eqn Extended eqn
Average fall in (r-g) -1.7 -1.7
Inflation variability (5 year standard deviation of inflation)
-0.9 -0.5
Slope Yield curve(-1)(short minus long rates)
-0.5 -0.3
Current Ac surplus, China + non-OECD oil exporters (as % world GDP)
-1.1
Conclusions (1)
• As policy rates normalise and quantitative easing ends, likely (r-g) will rise as output gaps close.
• Lower and less volatile inflation in 2000s reduced (r-g) by more than 2% pts relative to 1980s & 90s, should be permanent if central banks remain credible, …
• … but this implies risk of substantial cost from trying to inflate debt problems away.
Conclusions (2)• Also some evidence that a part of fall in (r-g) in
2000s is unexplained & so could reappear.
• Experience from euro area that financial markets are now more discriminating about risk.
• Over long-term, countries that are vulnerable include USA and Japan, especially because neither yet has a credible medium-term plan to reduce debt
• To extent that global savings glut is a factor need a global model capable of projecting long-term global savings & investment balances …. Watch this space!