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Unit 3 Freedom Thursday, October 16, 14

Unit 3 - dhaydock.org 3/Unit three lecture... · III. Hard Determinism A. Definitions • Determinism is simply the belief that everything that happens is determined by prior causes

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Unit 3Freedom

Thursday, October 16, 14

I. Introduction

A. What is the problem?

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B. Why does it matter?

• From a practical perspective - we want to believe we have choice regarding our actions

• If we do have choice, how does this choice occur?

• Are people morally responsible for their actions?

• Is it fair to punish people for actions which they did not choose?

• If we have no free will, do words like good and evil still have meaning?

• Without free will, does existence have meaning?

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3 1/2 approaches to the problem(a preview)

1. Fatalism and Predestination

2. Hard determinism - All events are caused (necessary); caused (necessary) events are never free

3. Soft determinism/Compatibilism - All events are caused (necessary); caused events are not necessarily inconsistent with freedom.

4. Libertarianism - Not all events are caused, so even though caused events are not free, the fact that not all events are caused means some events are free.

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II. Fate, God and freedom

A. Fatalism

B. Predestination/Divine foreknowledge

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Predestination

• God determines, before the beginning of time, everything that will happen

• Free will is impossible

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Divine Foreknowledge

• God knows everything that will happen

• This may or may not threaten free will

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Nelson Pike - Foreknowledge means no free will

• God* is everlasting

• God knew before I was born that I would give this lecture

• I have no power to do other than what God knows will happen

Therefore: I have no free will

*Western definition of GodOmnipotentOmniscient

Omnibenevolent

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Boethius, 480-524

• God is Eternal (outside of time)

• God possesses his existence “completely and simultaneously”

• Thus God knows what will happen “as it happens”

• Thus Divine knowledge does not threaten free will, because it is not “foreknowledge”

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III. Hard Determinism

A. Definitions

• Determinism is simply the belief that everything that happens is determined by prior causes.

• By contrast, indeterminism is the belief that some events are not causally determined and therefore are impossible to predict with certainty

• Free will is the belief that people have the power to make choices.

• Hard determinism is the belief that determinism is true and that this truth means man has no free will

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• Leucippus (5th century BCE) - “Naught happens for nothing but everything from a ground of necessity”

• Democritus (5th-4th century BCE) - Everything is composed of atoms in motion

B. Historical development

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2. The Scientific Revolution

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3. The Enlightenment

Paul-Henri Thiri - Baron d’Holbach (1723-1789)

"If we go back to the beginning we shall find that ignorance and fear created the gods; that fancy, enthusiasm, or deceit adorned or disfigured them; that weakness worships them; that credulity preserves them, and that custom, respect and tyranny support them in order to make the blindness of men serve their own interests."

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d’ Holbach’s Argument1.The universe is made up of only matter and motion (materialism)

2.The behavior of all matter and motion are determined by the laws of nature

3.Man is a part of nature

“In what ever manner man is considered, he is connected to universal nature, and submitted to the necessary and immutable laws that she imposes on all the beings she contains . . . “

Therefore: Man and his actions are determined by the laws of nature

“Man’s life is a line that nature commands him to describe upon the surface of the Earth, without him ever being able to swerve from it, even for an instant . . . “

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Another way of stating this is . . .

1. The universe is governed by physical laws

2. People are part of the universe

Therefore: People are governed by physical laws

3. Events governed by physical laws are necessary (they must logically happen)

4. Necessity negates choice

Therefore: People have no freedom of choice

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All human actions are caused by factors beyond their control

• “His ideas come to him involuntarily”(1)

• “He is good, or bad, happy or miserable, wise or foolish, reasonable or irrational without his will being for anything in these various states.” (1)

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What we consider to be our will is determined by outside factors

• D’ Holbach uses the example of the thirsty man and the poisoned fountain (3)

• “Nevertheless, in either case, whether he partakes of the water, or whether he does not, the two actions will be equally necessary; they will be the effect of that motive which finds itself most puissant (powerful, influential); which consequently acts in the most coercive manner on his will.” (3 end)

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D’ Holbach’s Rejection of his Critics centers on one fundamental observation

“It is, then . . . for want of being able to analyze, for not being competent to decompose the complicated motion of his machine, that man believes himself a free agent; it is only upon his own ignorance the he founds the profound yet deceitful notion he has of his free agency . . .“ (17)

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Possible weaknesses of d’Holbach’s arguments

1. The universe is governed by physical laws

2. People are part of the universe

Therefore: People are governed by physical laws

3. Events governed by physical laws are necessary (they must logically happen)

4. Necessity negates freedom

Therefore: People are not free

2

1

3

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D’ Holbach and modern hard determinists

• In paragraph 8, d’Holbach argues that the statement “he (man) appears to be the master of choosing (in this case whether or not to move his arm); from which it is concluded that evidence has been offered of free agency.” (8)

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Sigmund Freud’s argument against free will

1. Free decisions are those that are consciously made

2. None of a person’s decisions are consciously made but rather the product of subconscious conflicts of which we are only dimly (if at all) aware.

Therefore: None of our decisions are free

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John Hospers on the implications of Freud’s argument

We may . . . say that a man is free only to the extent that his behavior is not unconsciously motivated at all. If this be our criterion, most of our behavior could not be called free: everything, including both impulses and volitions, having to do with our basic attitudes toward life, the general tenor of our tastes, whether we become philosophers, artists or business men . . . has its inevitable basis in the subconscious” (Hospers in Palmer).

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Strengths of the hard determinist position

• Hard determinism accords with the materialistic/scientific tendencies of modern philosophy - behavior and its causes can be investigated empirically

• Much of science is based on the idea that all phenomena are determined. Things don’t just happen. Why should we be any different?

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Weaknesses of the hard determinist position

• It rejects common sense (not much of a weakness)

• It rejects the possibility of the existence of the non-physical in the universe (no God, no soul, no mind etc. - again, this might not be much of a philosophical weakness)

• It rejects the idea of moral responsibility • In the twentieth century through advances in

physics we now understand that not all events are determined - the behavior of very small particles has been shown not to be deterministic - this is quantum theory

• It rejects our experience of life in favor of a methodological analysis of life

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IV. Compatibilism/Soft determinism

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A. Classical/Traditional compatibilism

• Developed and refined by Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and David Hume

• Hume’s argument - actions are free if:

1. They are caused by the will of the agent

2. They are not forced

• Hume claims that freedom is possessed by “everyone who is not a prisoner and in chains.”

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Walter T. Stace

• 1886-1967

• A native of Britain, he worked as a British civil servant and later as professor of philosophy at Princeton

• Stace’s compatibilism:

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The problem of free will can be reduced to a problem with the definition of

“freedom”

• “The problem is not a real one . . . The dispute is merely verbal, and is due to nothing but a confusion about the meaning of words” (3 bottom)

• This error stems from the erroneous belief that “determinism (the idea that all events are caused) is inconsistent with free will” and that free will is defined as “indeterminism”(5)

• The mistake here is similar to defining man as a “five legged animal”. With such a definition, man would not exist.

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Freedom must be defined such that the definition has meaning in the real world

• “Common usage is the criterion for deciding whether a definition is correct or not” (6)

• Stace’s examples in 7-8 help to illustrate the importance of definitions based on common usage and the absurdity of metaphysical definitions of freedom

• What distinguishes the free acts from those that are not free is that the free acts were chosen, therefore “being uncaused or being undetermined by causes must be an incorrect definition of free will” (12 bottom)

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This brings Stace back to Hume”s definition

“ Acts freely done are those whose immediate causes are psychological states in the agent. Acts not freely done are those whose immediate causes are states of affairs external to the agent” (13 bottom).

Thus an act is free when it is chosen (resulting from an internal state) and not forced (by external factors).

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Stace rejects the idea that determinism destroys the concept of responsibility (this was one of the weaknesses of Hard determinism)

• Punishment is a part of the the chain of cause and effect relationships

• “The punishment of a man for doing a wrong act is justified, either on the ground that it will correct his own character, or that it will deter other people from doing similar acts”(22).

• Thus punishment is the cause of a desired effect

• In this sense, “moral responsibility is not only consistent with determinism, but requires it. The assumption on which punishment is based is that human behavior is causally determined” (24).

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Strengths and problems of classical compatibilism

•It accords with common sense, or as Stace would have it, common usage (weak?)

• Its principles are consistent with the logic underlying our legal system

• It doesn’t require “magic”

• Traditional compatibilism only deals with “surface freedom” (the “where’s the beef?” objection)

• Soft determinism fails to answer the following question affirmatively: “Given any situation is it possible that I could have chosen to act differently than I did?”

• It does not address the questions of compulsion or situations where psychological states make the idea of “choice” problematic

• Hume’s definition of free will applies equally well to animals, yet many see people as possessing deeper freedom than other creatures

Stregnths Problems

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B. Deep Self Compatibilism

• Harry Frankfurt,1929-

• Taught at Yale and Princeton

• “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” 1971

• On Bullshit, 2005

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People and wantons

• Frankfort distinguishes between people and wantons to make his argument.

People - Organisms that care about their will (7)

Wantons - Organisms that don’t care about their will (3)

• This idea of second order desires (Frankfort also calls them volitions) allows us to evaluate what our true or authentic desires actually are

• Inauthentic desires are desires that we do not actually identify with or endorse (with our second order desires).

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Frankfurt’s Compatibilism

• Human freedom was of a different nature than the freedom joyed by animals because human wills are different:

“one essential difference between persons and other creatures is to be found in the structure of a person’s will . . . It seems to be particularly characteristic of humans, however, that they are able to form what I shall call “second order desires” (1)

• Thus people not only have desires, but desires about their desires

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W1 W2

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W1 W2

T2 - Thehigher order thought - I

want my desire to prepare the philosophy

lecture to win

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T2 - Thehigher order thought - I

want my desire to prepare the philosophy lecture to

win

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• Frankfurt argues that, for an act to be free (and for a person to be responsible for it) a person must identify with and endorse the motives behind an action - thus Free actions are those that accord with our second order desires (8).

• Thus actions which result from psychological compulsion (drug addiction 4-7) are not free, because they do not reflect our true (second order) desires.

“the statement that a person enjoys freedom of the will means . . . that he is free to want what he wants to want. More precisely, it means that he is free to will what he wants to will, or to have the will he wants” (11).

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Strengths and problems of deep self compatibilism

• Are people who fail to follow their second order desires “of the hook” in terms of responsibility?

• A hard determinist would likely say that our second order desires (just like our first order desires) are shaped by forces over which we have not control. In this case aren’t we back at hard determinism?

Strengths Problems

• Frankfurt is closer to deeper freedom - free will.

• Deep self compatibilism takes into account internal constraints on behavior not just external ones.

• Frankfurt demonstrates that actions can be forced and free at the same time

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IV. Libertarianism

People who use indeterminism to justify free will adopt a perspective known as libertarianism. This is the view that traditional determinism is false and that freedom exists.

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Indeterminism is the position that not all events are caused. This leads to several possibilities:

1. All events are random

2. Some events are random and some are caused and all caused events are necessary

3. Some events are uncaused (random) and some are caused, but some caused events are not necessary events (The same past does not guarantee the same future)

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Two varieties of libertarian thought

A. Roderick Chisholm

Chisholm claims the “metaphysical problem of free will”, which is the conflict that arises from the idea that “Human Beings are responsible agents” and that human actions are determined, can be solved only by looking at human beings as very special cases:

“if we are responsible . . . then we have a prerogative which some would attribute only to God: each of us , when we act, is a prime mover unmoved. In doing what we do, we cause certain things to happen, and nothing - and no one - causes us to cause those events to happen” (Chisholm 1).

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“No set of statements about a man’s desires beliefs, and stimulus situation at any time implies any statement telling us what the man will try, set out or undertake to do at that time . . . This means . . . there can be no science of man” (Chisholm 12).

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This concept is called agent causation. The problem is, how can agents cause effects without their actions themselves being caused and thus determined?

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B. Robert Kane

• b. 1938

• Professor of philosophy at the university of Texas at Austin

• Specializes in questions of free will and moral responsibility

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Kane argues defenders of agent causation typically make one of two errors:

When trying to explain free will, these . . . libertarian defenders tend to fall either into “confusion” or “emptiness” - the confusion of identifying free will with indeterminism or the emptiness of mysterious accounts of agency” such as that suggested by Chisholm (Kane - paragraph just above the beginning of pt. 2)

Kane’s effort then, is to provide an explanation for agent causation that is neither mysterious or confused.

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Kane’s Argument for Free will

Basic assumption (and one that is soundly supported in the sciences)

Quantum uncertainty exists at the atomic level. We know that the behavior of certain sub atomic particles is not deterministic but probabilistic. In short this means that some sub atomic events occur without a cause or indeterministicly.

Thursday, October 16, 14

Pool Table PhysicsIn Newtonian mechanics the universe is deterministic.If we know the variables of the event (force, friction,

direction of impact), we can predict with certainty the location and trajectory of the ball at all possible times

(T1, T2 etc)

T5T4T3T2T1

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T5T4T3T2T1

T6

B

A

Pool Table PhysicsBut Quantum Physics has demonstrated that at a micro level (think atomic level and below) that such certainty is not possible, even if all the variables are known. If our pool ball was an electron, even if all the variables were known, we could not predict with 100% accuracy whether the ball

would be at point A or point B at T6.

This uncertainty is not due problems with our ability to know, but rather with the “nature of the subatomic world” (Palmer).

This means that there are some events that occur that are either uncaused or that did not happen of necessity.

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Kane’s Argument for Free Will

1. Many of our actions (in ordinary circumstances) are determined by our character (we have no choice). (Kane pt. 2 B top)

2.But our character is formed by previous decisions we have made - some of these decisions were undetermined. These decisions are called self forming actions, or SFAs.

“Not all choices or acts done “of our own free wills” have to be undetermined, but only those choices or acts in our lifetimes by which we made ourselves into the kinds of persons we are. Let us call these “self forming actions” or SFAs” (Kane pt.2B paragraph 1).

3.A self forming action occurs “when we are torn between competing visions of what we should do or become” (Kane pt.2B paragraph 2).

Kane use the example of the business woman in pt. 2B paragraph 3

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Kane’s Argument for Free Will

4.At these moments, “regions of our brains” are moved out of their “thermodynamic equilibrium . . . a kind of stirring up of chaos in the brain (Kane pt. 2B paragraph 2)

5.This chaos creates a window in which the deterministic factors are muted allowing for indeterminate factors to be causal

Recall the basic assumption:

Quantum uncertainty exists at the atomic level. We know that the behavior of certain sub atomic particles is not deterministic but probabilistic. In short this means that some sub atomic events occur without a cause or indeterministicly.

6.Ordinarily, these indeterministic forces are so small as to be of no consequence, but in moments of great stress, the balance of a decision can be tipped by the smallest of factors.

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• Think of this analogy. In a typical election the behavior of one voter does not determine the outcome of the election - their voice (or signal) is simply to small and is overwhelmed.

• But in an election where the electorate is sharply divided - one vote could make a difference.

• In ordinary times, the indeterminism in our brains is like the one voter in a normal election - overwhelmed.

• In times of great stress where the individual is torn between two possible courses of action- indeterministic forces (like the single voter) can actually control the outcome.

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But isn’t a window of indeterminism simply a window of randomness? Kane says no.

7. Each competing desire represents a neural network inside the brain. Each network has an activation threshold, that, if reached, would result in either that act of helping or the act of going to the meeting (pt 2 C, column 2 top).

8. These two networks are connected so that the indeterminacies causing the chaos at stage 4 above are caused by the competing network. (pt 2 C, column 2 top paragraph 2)

9. Thus the indeterminacy is caused by a “tension creating conflict in the will.” (pt 2 C, column 2 middle)

10. Thus whichever network “wins” (reaches the activation threshold) will win because it has overcome the indeterministic noise generated by the other network. (pt 2 C, column 2 middle)

11. Overcoming in this case represents an act of will, a choice, the result is undetermined but not random because the agent willed it to happen (pt 2 C, column 2 bottom)

12. So, according to Kane, there are two aspects of our free will: the choices we will at times of stress (SFAs) and the way these choices shape later decisions that are the product of our character - choices that are determined by prior events in our lives (SFAs) in which we were free to will a decision.

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Deterministic

SFA Indeterministic and self chosen

Even deterministic actions after the SFA are determined by

our character which in turn we chose as a

result of the SFA

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Yes, but . . . isn’t it still indeterminism at the end (at the SFA), and indeterminism is anathema to choice, right? ( or, Why have you made me read this whole essay just to dump me back in the lap of chaos?)

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Kane’s reply from another essay (“Responsibility, Luck and Chance” 1999):

238 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

whichever of the options you will or most want, when you will to do so,

for the reasons you will to do so, without being coerced or compelled

in doing so. And the businesswoman (orJohn) has this power, be-

cause whichever of the options she chooses (to help the victim or go

on to her meeting) will be endorsed by her as wllat she wills or most

wants to do at the moment when she chooses it (though not necessar-

ily beforehand); she will choose it for the reasons she most wants to

act on then and there (moral or selfish reasons, as the case may be);

slle need not have been coerced by anyone else into choosing one

rather than the other; and she will not be choosing either compul-

sively, since neither choice is such that she could not have chosen it

then and tllere, even if she most wanted to.25

One must add, of course, that such plural voluntary control is not

tlle same as what may be called antece.dent letermining controWthe abil-

ity to determine or guarantee which of a set of options will occur before

it occurs (ibid., p. 144). With respect to undetermined self-forming

clloices (SFAs), agents cannot determine or guarantee which choice

outcome will occur beforehand; for that could only be done by predeteF

mining the outcome. But it does not follow that, because one cannot

determine which of a set of outcomes will occur before it occurs, one

does not determine which of them occurs when it occurs. When tlle

conditions of plural voluntary control are satisfied, agents exercise

control over their present and future lives then and there by deciding.

But can we not at least say that, if indeterminism is involved, then

which option is chosen is ''arbitraly''? I grant that there is a sense in

which this is true. An ultimate arbitrariness remains in all undeter-

mined SFAs because tllere cannot, in principle, be sufficient or over-

riding prior reasons for making one set of competing reasons prevail

over the other. But I argue that such arbitrariness relative to prior

reasons tells us something important about free will. It tells us, as I

have elsewhere expressed it, that every undetermined self-forming

choice (SFA) "is the initiation of a 'value experiment' whose justifi-

cation lies in the future and is not fully explained by the past. [Mak-

ing such a choice], we say in effect, 'Let's try this. It is not required

by my past, but is consistent with my past and is one branching path-

way my life could now meaningfully take. I am willing to take respon-

sibility for it one way or the other' " (ibid., pp. 145-46). To initiate

and take responsibility for such value experiments whose justifica-

tion lies in the future, is to "take cllances'' without prior guarantees

of success. Genuine self-formation requires this sort of risk-taking

and indeterminism is a part of it. If there are persons who need to

'>5 Ibid., pp. 133-38, where a mol-e detailed case is made for each of these clailus. Thursday, October 16, 14

Strengths and problems of Kane’s theory

• His explanation is grounded in modern scientific understandings of both physics and the brain

• It makes an effort to explain where free will arises and doesn’t rely (so much) on “magic”

• It deals with deeper free will rather than surface freedom

• It offers a clearer (more satisfying) definition of freedom than compatiblism. Freedom requires both real alternative possibilities and that we be ultimately responsible for causing those outcomes

•Kane’s assertion that during SFAs deterministic forces are muted is speculative rather than empirical

•At its heart, critics argue that Kane’s theory still equates freedom with indeterminism and thus freedom with randomness, which Kane himself sees as a problem

Strengths Problems

Thursday, October 16, 14

A video of Robert Kane explaining his own theory can be found here:

http://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/philosophers/kane/

I will put a link to this on the website. The page it is associated with, the Information Philosopher is a very interesting site as well.

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