United Nations Development Group Iraq Trust Fund Lessons

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United NationsDevelopment GroupIraq Trust FundLessons Learned Exercise

Final Report v1.3

29 June 2011

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United NationsDevelopment GroupIraq Trust FundLessons Learned Exercise

Final Report

Development Group

Lessons Learned Exercise

UNDG Iraq Trust Fund Lessons Learned Exercise

Final Report v1.3PwC Page 2 of 271

Table of Contents1. Executive Summary 9

Introduction 9

Methodology 9

Context of the LLE 10

Operational Effectiveness Review 11

Development Effectiveness Review 16

Conclusion 19

2. Introduction 22

2.1. Objective and Scope of the LLE 22

2.2. Methodology 24

2.2.1 Principles of the LLE methodology 24

2.2.2 Approach adopted and tools used 25

2.2.3 Performance constraints of the LLE 26

3. Context of the LLE 28

3.1. Response of the International Community 28

3.1.1 The International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI) 28

3.2. The UNDG ITF 29

Challenges faced by the UNDG ITF 31

4. Operational Effectiveness Review 33

4.1. Introduction 33

Context 33

Concept of MDTFs 33

Overview of stakeholders 35

Typical governance structures of MDTFs 37

4.2. IRFFI and UNDG ITF Design and Governance 38

IRFFI design and governance—the effectiveness of the two-window model 38

UNDG ITF design 40

4.3. Alignment 49

4.4. Harmonization 54

4.5. National Ownership 59

4.6. Development of National Capacity 70

4.7. Management for Development Results 77

4.8. Accountability for Development and Operational Effectiveness 84



5. Development Effectiveness Review 91

5.1. Introduction 91

5.2. Overall Achievements of the UNDG ITF 95

The evolution of Iraq’s needs 95

The UNDG ITF response 97

Overview of the results of UNDG ITF projects and programmes 100

5.3. Relevance 106

Needs assessment during project design 106

Challenges of remote management 108

5.4. Effectiveness 110

5.5. Efficiency 118

Duration of implementation 118

Cost of implementation 119

Qualitative assessment of efficiency 121

5.6. Results 123

Examples of results from the reviewed projects and programmes 125

5.7. Sustainability 129

6. Summary of Lessons Learned and Recommendations 134

6.1. Lessons Learned and Recommendations by Parameter 134

6.2. Recommendations by Stakeholder 147



Annexes

Annex 1 – Case Studies

1. Case Study 1: Local Area Development Programme (LADP)

2. Case Study 2: Disease Eradication, Elimination and Introducing New Vaccines Project

3. Case Study 3: Remote Management

Annex 2 – Questionnaires

1. Inception Questionnaire

2. Inception Questionnaire for Donors

3. Main Questionnaire for Government of Iraq (GoI)

4. Main Questionnaire for Donors

5. Main Questionnaire for UN Agencies

6. Main Questionnaire for Multi-Donor Trust Fund Office

7. Main Questionnaire for Non-Governmental Organizations

Annex 3 – List of People Interviewed

Annex 4 – List of Documents Reviewed

Annex 5 – List of Projects / Programmes Reviewed

Annex 6 – List of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs)

Annex 7 – List of Projects / Programmes Analyzed for the Remote Management Case Study

Annex 8 – List of Projects / Programmes that Underwent Gap Analysis

Annex 9 – Online Survey

Annex 10 – Focus Group Discussion Guide

Annex 11 – Distribution of Urban & Rural Population by Governorate

Annex 12 – List of 60 Projects / Programmes Reviewed and their Extensions

Annex 13 – List of Joint Programmes

Annex 14 – List of Iraq’s Needs Extracted from the Joint Needs Assessment and National Development Strategy

Annex 15 – Projects Focusing on Electoral Support

Annex 16 – Projects in the Governance Sector (excluding Elections)

Annex 17 – Differences between UNDG ITF and DaO



Tables

Table 1 – Number of Projects and Amount by UN Agency

Table 2 – UNDG ITF Funding Status as of December 2010

Table 3 – Breakdown of Earmarked and Un-Earmarked Donor Deposits and Interest

Table 4 – European Commission Multilateral and Bilateral Contributions 2004-2009

Table 5 – Contribution of GoI to UNDG ITF Funded Projects

Table 6 – Joint Programmes by UN Agency

Table 7 – Iraq’s GDP per Capita Post-2003

Table 8 – Increasing Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Inflows to Iraq

Table 9 – The Evolution from Cluster to Sector Outcome Team (SOT)

Table 10 – Projects’ Focus and Results

Table 11 – Percentage of Projects Completed by Governorate

Table 12 – UNDG ITF Harmonization of Budget Categories

Table 13 – LADP Outputs and Achievements by Agency

Table 14 – D2-19 Planned Objectives and Actual Results

Figures

Figure 1 – UNDG ITF Stakeholders

Figure 2 – Donor Coordination by Iraqi Entities and IRFFI Governance Structure

Figure 3 – UNDG ITF Governance Structure

Figure 4 – UNDG ITF Project Approval Process

Figure 5 – Enhanced Donor Coordination Mechanism Proposed in the National Development Strategy

Figure 6 – Funding Sources, 2003-2010

Figure 7 – International Grants and Loans

Figure 8 – Number of Projects and Joint Programmes Approved by Year

Figure 9 – Number of Joint Programmes by Sector Outcome Team (SOT)

Figure 10 – Level of Deprivation by Governorate

Figure 11 – Living Standard Index by Governorate and Percentage of Population

Figure 12 – Distribution of the 60 Reviewed Projects and Programmes by Sector

Figure 13 – LADP Budget (in US$)



List of AcronymsAA Administrative Agent

AFP Acute Flaccid Paralysis

BoP Balance of Payments

BHSP Basic Health Service Package

BPG Baghdad Policy Group

BSA Board of Supreme Audit

CBI Community Based Initiative

CCA Common Country Assessment

CD Capacity Development

CIC Council for International Coordination

COSIT Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology

CPA Coalition Provisional Authority

CSO Civil Society Organization

DAD Donor Assistance Database

DoEd Directorate of Education

DaO Delivering as One

DDG Danish De-mining Group

DMA Directorate of Mine Action

DoH Department of Health

DoS Department of State

DSRSG Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General

EC European Commission

ERW Explosive Remnants of War

ESCWA Economic & Social Commission for Western Asia

EPI Expanded Program on Immunization

EU European Union

FAO Food & Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations

FCC Facility Coordination Committee

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GIS Geographic Information System

GPFs General Political Funds

GPS Global Program Funds

GoI Government of Iraq

Hib Haemophilus Influenzae Type B

HIV Human Immunodeficiency Virus

HQ Headquarter

HR Human Resource

IAU Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit

ICI International Compact for Iraq

ICT Information and Communication Technology

IDP Internally Displaced Persons

IDMS Iraq Development Management System

IEAT International Electoral Assistance Team

IECI Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq

IIC Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme

IFIs International Financial Institutions

IHEC Independent High Electoral Commission

ILO International Labour Organisation

IMCI Integrated Management of Childhood Illness



IMF International Monetary Fund

IOM International Organisation for Migration

IP Implementing Partner

I-PSM Iraq Public Sector Modernisation Programme

IRFFI International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq

ISRB Iraq Strategic Review Board

IZ International Zone

JNA Joint Needs Assessment

JP Joint Programme

KPI Key Performance Indicator

KRSO Kurdistan Region Statistical Office

LoA Letter of Agreement

LADP Local Area Development Programme

MDG Millennium Development Goals

MDTF Multi-Donor Trust Fund

M&E Monitoring and Evaluation

MICS Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey

MMR Measles, Mumps and Rubella

MoB Mayoralty of Baghdad

MoC Ministry of Communications

MoCH Ministry of Construction and Housing

MoDM Ministry of Displacement and Migration

MoEd Ministry of Education

MoEn Ministry of Environment

MoF Ministry of Finance

MoH Ministry of Health

MoLSA Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs

MoMPW Ministry of Municipalities and Public Works

MoP Ministry of Planning

MoPDC Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation

MoU Memorandum of Understanding

MoWR Ministry of Water Resources

NCCI NGO Coordination Committee for Iraq

NDP National Development Plan

NDS National Development Strategy

NGO Non-Governmental Organisation

OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

ODA Official Development Assistance

OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

OECD DAC OECD Development Assistance Committee

OFF Oil-for-Food Programme

OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

OPEC Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries

OPV Oral Polio Vaccine

PCN Project Concept Note

PDS Public Distribution System

PHC Primary Health Care

PHCC Primary Health Care Center

PM&E Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation

PRG Peer Review Group

PwC PricewaterhouseCoopers

PWG Priority Working Group



QIP Quick Impact Project

RBM Results Based Management

RC Resident Coordinator

RCO Resident Coordinator’s Office

RDO Rafidain De-mining Organization

SC Steering Committee

SCSO Steering Committee Support Office

SDU Staff Development Unit

SIGIR Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction

SME Small and Medium Enterprise

SOT Sector Outcome Team

SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary General

SWG Sector Working Group

TB Tuberculosis

TDP Technology Dissemination Programme

ToR Terms of Reference

ToT Training of Trainers

TVE Technical and Vocational Education

TVET Technical and Vocational Education and Training

UN United Nations

UNAMI United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq

UNCT United Nations Country Team

UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

UNDAF United Nations Development Assistance Framework

UNDG United Nations Development Group

UNDG ITF United Nations Development Group Iraq Trust Fund

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNDSS United Nations Department of Safety and Security

UNEAD United Nations Electoral Assistance Division

UNEP United Nations Environment Programme

UNESCO United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organisation

UN-ESCWA United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia

UNFPA United Nationals Population Fund

UN-HABITAT United Nations Human Settlements Programme

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund

UNIDO United Nations Industrial Development Organization

UNIFEM United Nations Development Fund for Women

UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

UNOPS United Nations Office for Project Services

UN SCR United Nations Security Council Resolution

USAID United States Agency for International Development

USD United States Dollar

WATSAN Water and Sanitation

WB World Bank

WFP World Food Programme

WHO World Health Organization

WMF World Monument Fund



1. Executive Summary

Introduction

The United Nations Development Group Iraq Trust Fund (UNDG ITF or the Trust Fund), was established in2004 as part of a two-window funding mechanism of the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq(IRFFI). PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) was selected in a competitive bidding process to conduct anindependent Lessons Learned Exercise (LLE) which began in August 2010 and was completed end of June2011.

The objectives of the LLE as stated in the UNDG ITF LLE Terms of Reference (ToR) are:

1. To assess the development effectiveness of the programmes and projects administered under the UNDGITF and to showcase the contributions and results of UNDG ITF towards recovery, reconstruction anddevelopment efforts in Iraq.

2. To assess the effectiveness of the UNDG ITF processes in supporting compliance with the ParisDeclaration on Aid Effectiveness principles and the United Nations (UN) reform process in Iraq.

3. To understand the relevance of design, legal arrangements and governance mechanisms for the UNDGITF as well as the UN internal coordination arrangements within a two-window fund in terms ofrecovery, reconstruction and development priorities and challenges, highlighting their contribution tothe achievement of development results in Iraq.

4. To provide an evidence base for the UN system and the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) Office for thedevelopment and refinement of new and existing MDTFs, respectively.

5. To guide the Government of Iraq (GoI), donors and United Nations Country Teams (UNCTs) inestablishing effective coordination and operational mechanisms in support of aid and developmenteffectiveness.

Methodology

The LLE builds on findings from 60 independent evaluations of UNDG ITF programmes and projects that werecommissioned by the UN agencies participating in the UNDG ITF, as well as on lessons learned from earlierreviews of the UNDG ITF conducted by PwC in 2005 and Scanteam in 2008. The LLE takes a methodicalapproach to generating lessons learned over the life of UNDG ITF. The key guiding principles include:

1. Fact- and evidence-based review: Numbers and figures were sought throughout the LLE to supportstakeholder perspectives received during the exercise as well as to supplement the information receivedfrom secondary information sources.

2. A two-perspective approach to analysis: As the UNDG ITF approached its planned closure, theLLE considered the overall contribution of the Trust Fund to the development of Iraq, and how the fundstructure supported the programmatic operations of the UN Country Team (UNCT) at a macro level. Inaddition, the LLE performed a detailed analysis of the evaluation reports of 60 projects and programmesto generate lessons around the operational and development effectiveness of UNDG ITF at a micro level.These two lenses contributed significantly to identifying lessons learned and producing evidence-basedrecommendations.

3. Multi-stakeholder review: More than 120 interviews were conducted during the various stages of theLLE, with key implementing partners represented by donors at headquarters and field level, staff atnational and local levels of the GoI, all participating UN agencies, and the major Non-GovernmentalOrganizations (NGOs). While most interviews were conducted in person in Amman, Baghdad, Erbil andNew York, a few interviews were held over the phone. In addition, several meetings organized with theChairperson of the UNDG ITF Steering Committee (SC), the Steering Committee Support Office (SCSO)and the UN MDTF Office provided numerous details and perspectives on the UNDG ITF that were usedthroughout the LLE.

4. Use of pre-defined parameters for the operations and development reviews: As indicated inthe UNDG ITF LLE ToR, the operational-effectiveness review was guided by the Paris Declaration on AidEffectiveness principles endorsed by the donor community as general guidelines for aid effectiveness in



2005 and adopted by the GoI in 2008. The agreed-on parameters for operational effectiveness includedTrust Fund design and structure, alignment, harmonization, national ownership, development ofnational capacity, management for development results, and accountability.

The development effectiveness review was guided by the parameters of the Organisation for EconomicCo-operation and Development – Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC)’s criteria forassessing development aid. The parameters ensured the use of clear, globally defined concepts andcriteria that facilitated the review and analysis. The development effectiveness review was based ondevelopment results, efficiency, effectiveness, relevance and sustainability.

Context of the LLE

Any discussion of lessons learned must take into consideration the unique and challenging situation that Iraqhas faced for more than two decades. Two successive Gulf wars followed by economic sanctions; politicalinstability; the centralized nature of governance mechanisms; an imbalanced allocation of resources; and a lackof investment in infrastructure, environment and social services have had a devastating impact on the country’sability to grow its economy and support the needs of the population.

In the aftermath of the 2003 conflict, a critical period, the UN played a key role in supporting the evolution ofthe electoral and democratic processes in Iraq. The emerging political process in Iraq has faced majorchallenges, however, as violence and insurgency continue to hamper the pace of the country’s political,economic and social reform and decentralization processes.

The UNDG ITF was created as part of the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI) in 2003.The facility helped donors channel their contributions through international organizations—the UN and theWorld Bank (WB)—and provided a platform for smaller donors without the means or will to be directly presentin Iraq to make contributions. In addition, donors welcomed the involvement of the UN and the WB in therecovery and reconstruction efforts in Iraq given their reliable and transparent procurement and operationalpractices and implementation capacities.

Out of the total of US$33 billion pledged by donors, US$1.86 billion were allocated to IRFFI, including US$1.36billion for the UNDG ITF and US$496 million for the World Bank ITF. As defined in the original IRFFI ToR,the UNDG ITF was asked to focus on quick-impact projects and transition activities to be implemented in arapid and flexible way1. Over the years, the UNDG ITF proved to be one of the main funding mechanisms forthe UNCT in Iraq to undertake its planned projects and programmes. The United Nations DevelopmentProgramme (UNDP) was mandated to act as the Administrative Agent (AA) of the UNDG ITF.

After the attack on UN Headquarters in August 2003, both UN and WB physically relocated the Iraq operationsto neighbouring countries, principally to Jordan, and resumed operations remotely. At the end of 2003, manyinternational stakeholders in Iraq worked under the assumption that the extremely difficult situation in Iraqwould gradually improve. Based on that assumption, donors expected rapid disbursement, quick projectimplementation and visible impact on the ground. Unfortunately, most of these expectations proved unrealisticand the political and security situation in Iraq continued to deteriorate, especially between 2004 and 2007.

During and after this period, the instability on the ground in Iraq severely affected reconstruction efforts by theUN and other international organizations. The security situation forced the UN to use innovative means to workin Iraq from remote locations until personnel and operations could safely return to Iraq. The UN's desire andIRFFI’s requirement to show quick results through quick impact projects resulted in setting unrealisticallyshort project durations during the design phase. As a result, the average delay in project implementationagainst initial plans ended up reaching 122 percent (based on 60 projects analyzed in detail). Although thesituation has shown some improvement recently, the extremely difficult and particular work environment inIraq has to be kept in mind while drawing lessons from the UNDG ITF experience.

The significant challenges that the UN faced in Iraq included weak government capacity and weak nationalleadership. In principle, IRFFI was designed to focus on strong government ownership by placing the IraqiStrategic Review Board (ISRB) at the center of the IRFFI governance structure. Soliciting desired levels ofgovernment involvement remained a challenge, however, mainly due to the centralized nature of Iraqi

1 IRFFI ToR, 11 December 2003. The ToR for IRFFI was amended in 2007 at the Donors' Meeting in Bari, Italy.



governance structures that limited the development of sustained capacities and necessary coordination andcommunication structures.

The earmarking of donor contributions was another challenge for the UNDG ITF. Close to 90 percent of allcontributions were earmarked for either a sector or an agency for reconstruction and recovery projects. Facedwith the continuing violence on the ground and the displacement of thousands of people within Iraq, the UNwas required to provide emergency and humanitarian response but could use only the un-earmarked funds forthe purpose.

Despite these challenges, it is considered a significant achievement that the UNDG ITF continued to operate forseven years without significant interruption and that the participating UN organizations have been able toimplement projects and deliver significant results under extremely difficult security conditions.

As of 31 December 2010, the 16 participating UN agencies approved 2002 projects and programmes under theUNDG ITF. Of these, 43 are financially closed, 93 are operationally closed and 64 are under implementation.The last projects funded by the UNDG ITF were approved on 30 September 2010 – the cut-off date for projectapproval. All UNDG ITF funded projects and programmes have been implemented in eight sectors: education;water and sanitation; health and nutrition; housing and shelter; food security: agriculture, food assistance;protection; governance; and economic reform and diversification. At the end of 2010, US$1.43 billion had beendisbursed, including all donor contributions and earned interest income. A balance of US$150,603 million3

remains with the participating organizations for the ongoing projects.

Operational Effectiveness Review

The operational effectiveness of the UNDG ITF was examined according to the five parameters of the ParisDeclaration on Aid Effectiveness (the Paris Declaration): alignment, harmonization, national ownership,management of development results, and accountability for development and operational effectiveness. Inaddition, the strengths and weaknesses of the fund design and governance structures as well as the effectivenessof the development of national capacity have been assessed.

It must be noted at the outset that the Paris Declaration acknowledges that its principles cannot be applied in astraightforward manner to fragile states or other environments with weak governance and capacity. Anunderstanding of the gradual improvement in Iraq’s fragile condition is a key to assessing how effectively theParis Declaration principles were applied over time to maximize aid effectiveness.

UNDG ITF design and governance

The governance structure of the UNDG ITF was defined in the initial IRFFI ToR in 2004, but underwent anumber of refinements over the years. Over the Trust Fund’s seven years of operations, many lessons have beenlearned that relate to ensuring transparency, avoiding or minimizing conflicts of interest, strengtheningnational ownership, stakeholder engagement, and management for results. Many of these lessons wereidentified in earlier reviews by PwC and Scanteam, and a number of them have been acted upon.

The UNDG ITF presented a particular opportunity for the UN to adopt a common planning, funding,implementation and reporting arrangement, following the ‘UN Cluster Approach.’ Iraq was the first country toadopt and implement this approach on such a large scale. All clusters were comprised of a number of UNorganizations having mandate and relevant expertise within each cluster. The cluster system was revised in2008 and was replaced with sectors that were managed by Sector Outcome Teams (SOTs).

The governance of the UNDG ITF as well as the process of approving projects was designed to enhancestakeholder engagement. The current design of the project development and approval process, updated in2008, includes all stakeholders involved in MDTF: the GoI, donors and UN agencies. The high level ofcoordination and collaboration among the 16 participating UN agencies was hitherto unprecedented within theUN system and has been recognized by many as a good practice example widely seen in the Delivering as One(DaO) approach.

2 When a joint program is proposed that involves two or more agencies, each of which is undertaking a part of implementation, funding isallocated to each agency separately and shown on the UNDG ITF records as a project with a sub-code of the program code.3 Source: MDTF Office Gateway website, UNDG Iraq Trust Fund page at URL: http://mdtf.undp.org/factsheet/fund/ITF00



The political and economic situation in Iraq has improved in recent years as a result of increasingly transparentand democratic electoral processes, increased oil revenue and greater national capacity, and the lessons learnedfrom the review of UNDG ITF governance structures. It is imperative for the UN to renew its engagement withthe GoI and other development partners in the following ways, to further enhance the ability and credibility ofany future trust fund:

• Participation of the GoI on the Trust Fund Steering Committee: The GoI should be invited toparticipate on the Trust Fund Steering Committee (SC) as a joint chair, to allow the government greaterdecision making about projects, strengthen the capacity of the GoI to review those projects and increasethe efficiency of the approval process. The engagement of the government authorities on fund SCs is acommon practice for many other trust funds.

• Evolve the Trust Fund governance structures over time: While the UNDG ITF is commended forsupporting two reviews of the Trust Fund and addressing most recommendations, especially those relatedto governance of the fund, any future fund in a post-conflict country like Iraq should adopt a structuredprocess of frequent review with stakeholders to allow for objective analysis and the adaptation of funddesign and governance structures to maintain alignment with evolving national priorities.

• Greater involvement of Government and NGOs in programme design and implementation:In such an immediate post-conflict situation as Iraq, the UN has a comparative advantage in supportingthe implementation of recovery and reconstruction work. In the case of Iraq, the UN agencies played asignificant role both as decision makers on the UNDG ITF SC and as recipients of funds to implementprojects. While this could be deemed a conflict of interest, UNDG ITF was the first MDTF designed on itsown, so it was important for the UN to participate as well as to engage other partners, includingGovernment and NGOs, in the governance structure of the MDTF for greater ownership, reduced conflictof interest and shared accountability. Likewise, over the life of the MDTF and subject to political, securityand other external factors, the UN should shift implementation to national partners and should continueto act as a convenor, policy advisor and coordinator for the MDTF.

• Strengthen accountability and independent evaluation: A key concern expressed by donors andthe GoI is the lack of mandate of the UNDG ITF SC to exercise greater programmatic oversight. As per theagreed upon Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the participating UN organizations and theAdministrative Agent (AA), all participating UN agencies were to undertake monitoring and evaluation inaccordance with their own corporate guidelines and procedures. The lack of a uniform and decentralizedapproach to project monitoring and evaluation is evident from the quality of the documents, includingprogress reports and evaluations, which have been reviewed as part of the LLE. Additionally, the authorityof the SC to allocate, approve and oversee funds can result in conflict of interest. One option to enhanceoversight and accountability is to establish an independent monitoring and/or evaluating agent. Amanagement unit, preferably with credible independence, responsible for monitoring projectperformances and holding UN agencies accountable for results, would certainly increase the cost ofoperations if added to the existing governance structure. A different model of a trust fund could beconsidered, however, one with a leaner governance structure such as The Global Fund to Fight AIDS,Tuberculosis and Malaria. This trust fund engages an independent third party local fund agent in eachcountry to assess, monitor and report on implementing partners. The World Bank's trust fund model alsoincorporates engagement of an approved, independent monitoring agent, usually locally based, whichkeeps the overall governance structure lean and reduces the direct involvement of Bank staff, thusreducing operational costs. Any efforts to enhance the accountability function of the MDTF are contingentupon necessary revisions in the MoU between the AA and participating UN agencies.

Alignment

According to the Paris Declaration, alignment implies that donors align their overall support with partnercountries’ national development strategies, institutions and procedures.

In principle, the UNDG ITF projects approval process was aligned with national processes because it used theexisting structure of the Iraqi Strategic Review Board (ISRB). In practice, the process was parallel and remoterather than fully aligned with national processes. The process of alignment with the UNDG ITF funded projectsand programmes and the national priorities was facilitated largely by the Sector Outcome Teams (SOTs), whichhad a mandate to work closely with the relevant GoI institutions and line ministries as part of the programme



and project planning process. Despite the engagement of the GoI in project design, many non-UN stakeholdersfelt that the whole process was nonetheless owned and guided by the UN. While most SOT members travelledto Iraq as and when needed, the SOTs were based in Amman, which limited the frequency of quality interactionwith national counterparts. This was particularly an issue in the initial years of the UNDG ITF when most of theUN operations were managed remotely. Even though some UN agencies relocated to Baghdad in recent years,their location within the International Zone and the prevailing security conditions restricted the movement ofstaff and limited in-person interaction with the GoI and other national partners. Some GoI representatives feltthat because of the remote nature of UN Country Team (UNCT) operations, the government was often abystander during programme and project design and planning processes. As the UN agencies took the lead onkey discussions at the planning stages without soliciting the GoI’s active participation, GoI officials not onlymissed the opportunity to have greater ownership of UNDG ITF activities but also the ability to develop theirown capacities in design and planning. The situation has improved credibly in recent years, however, with theincreased presence of the UN in Iraq as well as due to concerted efforts to enhance the level of GoI and UNengagement.

Another major challenge faced by the UN teams was the high level of turnover of GoI staff. In an environmentcharacterized by weak national capacity and lack of continuity and institutional memory, the UN teams oftenhad little option but to design projects remotely. In the short-term, this approach resulted in projects beingdesigned and launched quickly, because they did not go through an extensive engagement with the GoI. Thecost of this speedy progress, however, was some missed opportunities, including alignment with nationalstructures, national ownership and capacity development for the GoI.

Given the nature of a pool funding mechanism such as an MDTF, information on projects by donor is notmaintained. Over the years, many donors in Iraq chose to direct more funding to bilateral programmes ratherthan to an MDTF, to get direct visibility for their contributions. The UNDG ITF donors should, through theirrespective Headquarter (HQ), encourage engagement with the UNDG to address some of their concernsregarding the legal instruments and operations of MDTFs relating to issues of visibility and tracking donorearmarking at the project level. The MDTF Office, as AA, operates according to the legal instruments and AAprotocol, and thus cannot make decisions on its own.

Harmonization

According to the Paris Declaration, harmonization refers to creating common agreements and arrangements atcountry level for planning, funding, disbursement, monitoring and reporting on donor activities and aid flow.

There is a broad consensus among development practitioners that MDTFs are useful mechanisms to encouragegreater harmonization and coordination of the aid provided to a country. Given the lack of government capacityand leadership in setting priorities and systems following the 2003 conflict in Iraq and the absence of donors onthe ground, the UNDG ITF provided the necessary medium and mechanism for donors to channel theirrespective aid contributions to Iraq’s recovery in a harmonized manner. A total of 25 donor countriescontributed to a pooled funding mechanism with established structures and processes that evolved over theyears to remain relevant to Iraq’s fast-changing context, ensuring effective UN engagement with the GoI. Manyof these donors had no presence in Iraq and, in the absence of a trust fund, would not have been able tocontribute to the international efforts relating to Iraq’s reconstruction. The UNDG ITF created commonarrangements for planning, funding, disbursement and reporting on activities and aid flows, and thus reducedthe cost of establishing separate processes by individual donors.

Outside of the UNDG ITF model, there was little evidence of harmonization among donors in Iraq. In fact, thestudy concludes that many donors failed to provide the Ministry of Planning (MoP) with adequate, timelyinformation on bilateral contributions, thereby diminishing its ability to coordinate aid and take a leadershiprole in the strategic allocation of contributions to national priorities. In fact, there was a high level of donorfragmentation, with more than 40 donors contributing a total of close to US$70 billion in aid. Despite this,further analysis of the aid flow from 2004 to 2010 together with interviews and discussions with donorshighlight the fact that donors’ preferences have shifted over time to channelling aid bilaterally rather thanthrough a trust fund mechanism.

National ownership

Under the Paris Declaration, donors are committed to respecting partner-country leadership and helpingstrengthen their capacity to exercise it.



Despite strong individual commitment demonstrated by Iraqi officials, the level of national ownership after the2003 conflict has remained low due to weak institutions, lack of stable government with centralized decisionmaking power, and inadequate human capacity resulting from outmigration and/or high personnel turnover inthe public sector.

Given the mandate of the UNDG ITF for reconstruction and recovery and its focus on demonstrating quickresults, there was less emphasis on fostering government capacity and ownership. For example, as noted in theUNDP project document for the Iraq Public Sector Modernization (I-PSM) programme, “an effectivedecentralization and modernization of public sector has not yet been achieved in Iraq.” Despite the welcomeemphasis in the UN-WB Joint Needs Assessment (JNA) and other UN strategy documents on the need tosupport national ownership and to develop a system for decentralized and consultative formulation ofdevelopment strategies, the contribution of UNDG ITF has remained inadequate even though the UNDG ITFgovernance mechanisms encouraged GoI engagement at all levels and the ISRB continued to serve as thehighest GoI authority in approving UNDG ITF programmes and projects.

Co-financing from the government is an important aspect of national ownership, especially in the case of Iraq,which falls under the middle-income-country bracket. Consequently, there has been a strong expectationamong donors and international organizations of greater contribution from the GoI towards its owndevelopment. Government co-financing allows the country to exercise stronger leadership in guiding thenational development and the aid agenda while enhancing ownership of development interventions. Despiteefforts of the UN to secure GoI co-financing, only limited GoI co-financing was provided. Securing such co-financing was easier in sectors where the UN has established strong and long-term relationships with lineministries. The limited co-financing is also due to the fact that the current legal framework in Iraq does notallow for government to make direct funding to an MDTF though there is high degree of commitment andinterest in favour of GoI cost-sharing of UN programmes and projects.

Development of national capacity

According to the Paris Declaration, the "capacity to plan, manage, implement and account for results...is criticalfor achieving development objectives."

The UNDG ITF stakeholders corroborated the overall efforts of the UN agencies in developing Iraqi capacitiesbetween 2004 and 2010, at both institutional and individual levels. Of the 60 UNDG ITF programmes orprojects reviewed, 73.3 percent had a clear focus on capacity development.

A major weakness on the part of the UN and other international partners has been the absence of a structuredassessment of available capacities in order to effectively address capacity gaps as part of UNDG ITFprogrammes and projects. Most evaluation reports consulted during the LLE fail to provide evidence thatdemonstrates the level of change or improvement in capacities or to track the ripple effects of UNDG ITFsupported capacity development. The ability to measure capacity development is also affected by weakness inthe results frameworks of programmes and projects that were reviewed as part of this lessons learned exercise.There is also a lack of post-training follow-up to track the effects of capacity development. In the absence of astructured approach to track and assess capacity development, evidence that might be used to measure progressis mostly anecdotal.

The most significant focus of the UNDG ITF-funded projects that relates to capacity development was at anindividual level, with training conducted both inside and outside of Iraq. In addition to individual trainings, anumber of training-of-trainers exercises and study tours were conducted. Most of the participants whobenefited from these interventions were involved in project implementation, including governmentcounterparts, project staff or other implementing partners. Another challenge that the UN agencies faced,however, was the selection of participants for the organized training events. According to some GoIstakeholders, the UN did not follow a robust approach to selecting participants for various capacitydevelopment activities. On the other hand, the UN agencies mostly relied on the Government to nominateofficials for such events. The Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation (MoPDC) recommended thateach ministry should establish a Human Resources Directorate with a well-defined capacity-developmentstrategy for its staff. Each ministry should also have a database to keep stock of its staff capacities that couldassist the international organizations in selecting GoI participants.



Management of development results

The Paris Declaration calls for "managing and implementing aid in a way that focuses on the desired results anduses information to improve decision making."

One of the most acknowledged achievements of the UNDG ITF has been the high level of coordination amongUN agencies in Iraq; this was noted by most interviewees from UN agencies, donors and the GoI. The pooledfunding available under the UNDG ITF brought together the 16 participating UN agencies to offer a coordinatedand coherent response to Iraq’s recovery, reconstruction and development priorities without competing forfunds. The use of a cluster/ sector approach and joint programming also facilitated the coordination andmanagement for results. Further, the level of transparency and access to financial and programme informationabout the activities of the UNDG ITF significantly exceeded that of bilaterally funded projects.

Between 2004 and 2010, the UNDG ITF funded 45 joint programmes and 155 projects for a total of 200programmes and projects. In this context, project refers to activities managed by a single agency, whileprogramme refers to activities managed by two or more agencies. The LLE identified a number of benefits aswell as challenges that the UN agencies faced in the programmes, including:

Benefits of Joint Programmes Challenges of Joint Programmes

Availability of greater technical expertise withinthe programme.

Difficulty coordinating activities between oramong the involved agencies and confusionregarding the protocols for communication,reporting and decision making.

Coordinated approach to cross-cutting issues. Lack of clarity on the overall accountability forresults.

Greater coverage of wider geographic areas. The absence of a lead agency with overallprogrammatic oversight resulted in each agencyfocusing only on delivering its own set ofprogramme components.

Healthy competition among participatingagencies and hence improved management forresults.

Increased costs as more efforts, time and logisticalresources were spent on coordination andcommunications among the participatingagencies.

Lower cost of operations due to sharing projectmanagers among agencies, and jointly assessingneeds and/ or evaluations.

Slow reaction and/or response to issues andproblems due to the sharing of responsibilities.

Accountability for development and operational results

The Paris Declaration calls upon donors and partner countries to be mutually accountable for development.

As per the MoU between the AA and the participating UN organizations, each UN agency was required to followits internal, corporately agreed Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) processes. This arrangement did not foster aculture of joint M&E for mutual or shared accountability. In addition, due to the decentralized nature of the UNsystem, the UNDG ITF SC lacked the mandate to maintain broad programmatic oversight of UN agency work.This issue was often visible in joint programmes when one agency fell behind schedule, affecting the flow of ajoint programme, while neither the other participating UN agency or agencies, nor the SC had the mandate tohold that agency to account.

The overall responsibility of reporting on the progress of the UNDG ITF to donors and the GoI was in the handsof the AA. Initially on a semi-annual and later on an annual basis, the AA produced comprehensive narrativeand financial reports on progress against the results stipulated in the clusters/ sectors funded by the UNDGITF. The semi-annual and annual reports included comprehensive sector reports that provided information onthe operating context, challenges, status of individual project implementation and achievement toward outputsand outcomes. In addition, quarterly reports were produced by each implementing agency that summarized theprogress and achievements of all UNDG ITF projects and programmes, along with key implementation-relatedchallenges. The AA provided real value to UNDG ITF stakeholders and partners by providing comprehensiveinformation. Created in early 2010, the MDTF Gateway website has all documents related to the UNDG ITF and



other MDTFs managed by UNDP MDTF Office. The website has further improved access to UNDG ITF relatedinformation, creating greater transparency.

Despite the extensive reporting process, almost all interviewed donors shared similar concerns regardingUNDG ITF reporting. The key issue identified by predominately field-based donors—with whom the majority ofinterviews were conducted—was the inability to receive information about which specific projects theircontributions were supporting. Their expectation that they would receive such information contradicts the legalarrangements of the pooled funding MDTF mechanism, which the same donors have signed. This may indicatea lack of understanding among field-level donors about the pooled-funding mechanism; the UNDG ITF legalagreement between the AA and the contributing donor most often was signed at the headquarter level. As donorstaff assigned to Amman or Baghdad changed over time they were not informed by their headquarter of theMDTF legal terms, perhaps resulting in inaccurate expectations.

Development Effectiveness Review

Context

The development effectiveness of the UNDG ITF in Iraq was assessed on the basis of evidence of itscontribution to the economic growth of the country and any significant achievements against the MillenniumDevelopment Goals (MDG).

The findings revealed that despite some encouraging economic trends in Iraq, there are still significant gaps inthe essential development indicators across the wider population. This warrants a need for continueddevelopment assistance and collaboration with Iraq.

Although it is the largest of the UN MDTFs, the UNDG ITF was much smaller than Iraq’s total bilateral aidsince 2003. The overall results and development impact in Iraq is only partly attributable to the UNDG ITF, arelatively small contributor.

Overall achievements of the UNDG ITF

Iraq’s needs were identified from three strategic documents: the Joint Iraq Needs Assessment (JNA) (2003),undertaken by the UN and WB; the National Development Strategy (NDS) (2005) issued by the MoPDC; andthe revised NDS (2007). Based on these needs, the UN Iraq Assistance Strategies of 2005 and 2008 weredrafted. The identified needs presented a dual challenge for Iraq’s newly elected government as there was acontinuing and pressing need to deliver essential services for the majority of the population and to overcomecurrent and historical disparities in the standards of living and quality of life among the various populationgroups. Additionally, there was also a need to take strides towards nation building and to set the foundation forstability and growth in an attempt to overcome the remnants of more than three decades of war, dictatorshipand sanctions. In part, the UNDG ITF served as an important mechanism to support the GoI and the people ofIraq in overcoming these major challenges.

At the start of the UNDG ITF in January 2004, there were clear needs identified in a number of sectors andfundamental themes further reiterated by the UN Iraq Assistance Strategies. Such needs ranged from short-term recovery and rehabilitation to longer-term development and state building. At the onset, and in line withthe IRFFI ToRs, the UNDG ITF focused on rehabilitation projects including basic infrastructure, resumptionand provision of essential services and electoral processes. As a result, attention did not focus on some of thestrategic longer-term development needs, such as physical infrastructure, institutional development andreform, and policy and regulatory frameworks necessary for long-term sustainable development, until relativelylate in the life of the UNDG ITF. This trend was evident in the changing nature of the projects approved in lateryears, although it was restricted by the limited availability of funds due to the disbursement of a majorproportion of the UNDG ITF funds in the first three years of operations. Overall, Iraq’s long-term developmentneeds, especially policy and regulatory reform across sectors, improvements to the business and investmentenvironment, strengthening the private sector, and reform of the public sector and civil administration,received less attention. An examination of the 200 projects and programmes approved by the UNDG ITFsupports this finding. While this can be understood in the particular context of Iraq, in retrospect anopportunity was missed to balance the activities of the UNDG ITF-funded projects along with a spectrum ofshort- and medium-term development interventions.

On a positive note, throughout the lifespan of the UNDG ITF, projects were implemented with an intentionalbalance across all governorates of Iraq. A Key Performance Indicator (KPI) on coverage by governorates based



on completed4 projects and programmes by 2010 shows a near-equal distribution of the implemented projectsacross all 18 governorates.

In order to complete the assessment of the development effectiveness of the UNDG ITF, the LLE teamconducted an in-depth review of 60 projects and programmes using the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) criteria on aid effectiveness:Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Results and Sustainability.

Relevance

The OECD DAC defines relevance as “the extent to which the objectives of a development intervention areconsistent with beneficiaries’ requirements, country needs, global priorities and partners’ and donors’policies.”5 The definition also includes the relevance of the objective or design of a development intervention ascircumstances change on the ground.

To assess relevance, a number of KPIs were considered. Accordingly, 43 percent of the reviewed projectsundertook either a project-level needs assessment or another form of baseline study. This is seen as a positivefinding within the challenging context of Iraq, as project-specific needs assessment would ensure relevancebetween project design and the needs of the target beneficiaries. In addition, 17 percent of the reviewed projectsreferred to a sector-level needs assessment during the design stage, while 26 percent of the reviewed projectsreferred to the National Development Strategy (NDS) or the UN Iraq Assistance Strategy. The remaining 31percent of the reviewed projects did not provide any evidence of any needs assessment undertaken during theplanning stage. While the evaluation reports generally linked to the NDS or JNA, the lack of concrete evidenceof a specific basis for the design of the project activities indicated that some projects may not have been directlylinked to specific needs of the beneficiaries.

Discussions with UNCT staff indicated that a project-specific needs assessment was difficult given the Iraqicontext. However, the GoI representatives interviewed felt that considering the UN conducted most planning-level activities remotely, many UN projects were not relevant or did not directly correspond with the prioritiesof the GoI. It may therefore be concluded that working more rigorously and consistently with GoI counterpartsto jointly assess the needs prior to implementation, or at least confirming the needs and priorities and reflectingthis in the project design, would result in more relevant projects.

In addition, a case study undertaken by the LLE team on remote management indicates that the UN workingremotely since 2004 has had an impact on the relevance of the projects despite the creative measures taken toovercome the challenges of managing remotely.

Effectiveness

The OECD DAC defines effectiveness as “the extent to which the development intervention’s objectives wereachieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.”

The LLE used a gap analysis approach on a sample of 11 projects to assess effectiveness. The gap analysisexercise was used to analyze the extent to which the actual implementation and realized results deviated fromthe planned project activities and results.

Based on the analysis, it can be concluded that the UNDG ITF projects have achieved significant progress in linewith the planned objectives, despite the challenges faced during implementation and the earlier findingsconcerning relevance and the prevalence of short-term, quick impact projects over longer-term developmentprojects. Flexibility during implementation and the ability to extend project durations and reallocate budgetsbetween project activities enabled agencies to provide additional services and benefits on many of the 11projects. The difficulties of managing remotely were overcome by different means. Some agencies recruitednational staff and worked with local contractors and monitoring agents to ensure implementation success.Other agencies depended on working closely with their GoI counterparts at national and local levels to ensurenational ownership at the implementation level. Notably, the involvement of GoI counterparts in needsassessment in addition to day-to-day implementation has led to more effective results and longer-term benefitsthan in cases where the GoI was less involved during project implementation. Another key technique for some

4 The LLE team measured the KPI based on completed projects, as sometimes projects change the location of some activities duringimplementation due to constraints in the field in the initial geographic regions.5 The definitions for all parameters are based on Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management, OECD Publication,1007001 04 3P – No. 31678 2002.



projects was working with qualified international or national NGOs that had better access in the field andmanaged to work more directly in Iraq, although also managing their involvement remotely.

Efficiency

According to OECD DAC, efficiency is “a measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time,etc.) are converted to results.”

A review of the UNDG ITF projects suggests frequent delays during implementation. Reviewed projects onaverage had actual durations in excess of their planned duration by 18.3 months, or 122 percent of the plannedduration. The actual implementation duration was up to 63 and 64 months respectively on two projects. While20.3 percent of projects were delayed due to security conditions, other reasons were also prevalent. Delay dueto lack of delivery capacity of the UN was indicated in 14.2 percent of the reviewed projects. A similar 14.2percent of project delays was attributed to lack of delivery capacity of partners. GoI-side delays in the approvalor implementation of major tasks or processes caused another 14.7 percent of project delays. Only 7.1 percent ofdelays were attributed to changes in the scope of work, where a change of scope request would be eligible ifthere was a change in the project location or a major change in the project activities. Based on this, it is evidentthat security conditions are an important factor, yet almost equally important are other factors relating todelivery capabilities of all partners including human and/or institutional capacities.

Delays are not always negative indicators, however. In several projects, delays were due to a request to expandthe scope of work to other locations and/or to provide additional activities to remain relevant to the needs andrequirements of the target groups. Therefore, while project delays could be seen as inefficient, the fact thatsome delays were due to an expansion of the level of service or geographic coverage of the project activitiesindicate the willingness and the flexibility of the UN to remain effective and relevant within the approvedproject allocations.

An equally important measure of efficiency is the cost of implementation. While most projects were completedbelow budget and unused funds were returned to the UNDG ITF, this might be attributable to delays inimplementation and the cancellation of some activities. But it could also be attributable to over-ambitiousbudgeting during planning. The KPIs used to measure the composition of the budget for the 60 reviewedprojects and programmes revealed the relative distribution of budget allocation across projects. Little insightwas provided in the evaluation reports and the design of the budget line items did not provide enough clarityabout programmatic costs versus non-programmatic or indirect costs to enable in-depth analysis of costefficiency. In the future, a budget design that enables easier efficiency measurement is recommended.

Project-specific examples further indicated that practical delays and inefficiencies were faced during projectactivities. Most related to delays caused by limited institutional capacity or weak infrastructure in Iraq. Inaddition, security incidents or tightened security measures caused delays for many projects. Two specificexamples, however, indicated that despite the major security challenges of 2006 and 2007, the agenciesmanaged to achieve project completion within the planned duration, 12 and 9 months respectively, byleveraging the experience of implementation partners and working closely with local government andcommunities. Two other projects were completed in less than the planned durations of 8 and 18 months, by onemonth each.

Achievement of results

The OECD DAC criteria for assessing development aid looks at the impact of development interventions. Giventhe overall context of the UNDG ITF implementation and the transitional scope of interventions under UNDGITF that ranged from quick-impact relief and recovery projects to long-term development initiatives, the LLEhas looked at the realization of intended results and their contribution to the broader development outlook inIraq. The OECD DAC defines results as “the output, outcome or impact (intended or unintended, positiveand/or negative) of a development intervention.”

An overall assessment of the scope of the selected 60 UNDG ITF programmes and projects indicate that 38.3percent had a focus on physical asset creation or rehabilitation of physical infrastructure; 73.3 percent had aclear capacity development focus while 38.3 percent of the reviewed projects had a focus on provision ofservices such as distribution of goods or vaccines.

Another KPI analyzed the number of jobs created by the reviewed projects, based on the fact that employmentcreation was a cross-cutting theme for UNDG ITF funded activities. This KPI generated slightly unreliable



results due to lack of consistency in the information available. However, a rough estimate based on the reviewof 60 evaluated projects suggests that 55,846 temporary jobs were created. In addition, 309,400 person dayswere created in 13 of the 60 projects. Finally, aggregated data from seven different projects indicated that171,031 permanent jobs and 266 person days of employment were created from only 60 projects andprogrammes when the actual number of implemented programmes and project is 200.

The analysis based on the 60 UNDG ITF projects, scores of secondary documents including progress reportsand feedback from stakeholders, indicate positive contributions of UNDG ITF towards the overall developmentof Iraq despite the many challenges faced during implementation. The results spread across the spectrum fromtangible to intangible deliverables and contribution, with varying numbers and levels of completion at the timeof the review. Projects have also contributed to employment and income generation in different geographicalareas, with varying degrees of success and sustainability of jobs created. The degree of achievement andrealization of results has varied across the sectors. For example, the water and sanitation sector continued tosuffer, with many indicators still showing very slow progress towards meeting the minimum water access andquality benchmarks. On the other hand, sectors such as education and health have contributed significantlytowards the achievement of relevant Millennium Development Goals (MDG) targets.

Overall, and based on the current status of Iraq’s progress against the MDG, it is evident that there remainssignificant work to be done in each sector to meet the MDG targets by 2015. On the economic growth front,there is still much to be done in a number of key economic and infrastructure sectors to pave the way for fasterand more sustainable economic growth.

Sustainability

The OECD DAC defines sustainability as “the continuation of benefits from a development intervention aftermajor development assistance has been completed. The probability of continued long-term benefits. Theresilience to risk of the net benefit flows over time.”

The LLE depended on the 60 independent evaluation reports as the basis of assessing the developmenteffectiveness parameters, including sustainability. Neither the evaluation reports nor the other projectdocuments provided consistent or reliable enough information to enable a quantitative assessment of thesustainability dimension. The analysis eventually depended on evidence provided for some projects in theevaluation reports.

While many projects have produced sustainable results, there are a considerable number of projects that facethe risk of unsustainable outputs and outcomes on either tangible or intangible results. This is a major area ofconcern, particularly to the GoI and donors who expect their investments to be sustainable in order to deliver acontinued stream of benefits upon completion of programmes and projects. A GoI interviewee furthercommented, “There is a problem with quick disbursements of projects. Quick disbursement doesn't mean goodperformance. UN is always in a hurry to get the project started and to show results. Quick results don't meangood results and often are not sustainable. Iraq is a special case, where things take longer time to getaccomplished.”

Conclusion

Lessons learned—things that were done well

The UNDG ITF was implemented in a post-conflict environment with high levels of violence, weak governmentcapacity and the inability of UNCT to operate effectively within the country. Given this very challenging context,the UNDG ITF performed well and was able to disburse donor funds to address a wide range of issues that werein line with Iraq’s needs and priorities. Despite the security challenges, the UNDG ITF has been operatingcontinuously for seven years thus far and has remained flexible in adapting to the changing contextualenvironment and the expectations of donors and the GoI. This is evident in the transition in the scope of theUNDG ITF-supported programmatic interventions and the evolution in the UNDG ITF governance structuresover the years.

The UNDG ITF was an indispensible mechanism in the Iraq development efforts for much of the period from2004 to 2010. It enabled the UNCT to provide much-needed support to the Iraqi people in key areas andsectors of importance. In particular, projects funded by the UNDG ITF made a significant contribution toestablishing a modern electoral process and support for a democratic system in Iraq, which is a unique outcome



within the region. The projects also provided needed services and goods in the key sectors of health andeducation, which resulted in Iraq being able to provide these two basic social services across the country. In

addition, the projects addressed historical disparities between the 18 Governorates of Iraq, and UN agencies

made efforts to address the neediest and most vulnerable population groups. The projects contributedsubstantially towards recovery and rehabilitation across sectors from agriculture to housing, electricity, waterand sanitation, and cultural heritage.

The efforts funded by the UNDG ITF would have been much less feasible if the fund had not been in place. Onone hand, the availability of funding under the UNDG ITF enabled the UN agencies to undertake a coordinatedapproach to planning, implementation and reporting. Resource mobilization costs have been very low especiallyduring the initial few years of UNDF ITF and efforts required were lower, especially at the start of the UNDGITF’s life when financial resources were abundant. On the other hand, coordination for project design throughthe cluster and the Sector Outcome Team (SOT) mechanisms enabled the UN agencies to reduce duplication,ensure programmatic synergies and work jointly.

As the first MDTF to be administered by the UN, the UNDG ITF experience has demonstrated the UN system’sability to adapt to the fast-evolving challenges of an unusual post-conflict environment. The significantimprovements and shifts in the operational parameters and the status of development parameters indicate thecommitment and the abilities of the UN and its partners to effectively meet the terms set out in the IRFFI ToRfor the benefit of the people of Iraq. The varying degree of stakeholder involvement has had varying effects onthe programmatic and operational dimensions of the UNDG ITF. Over time and to a great extent, however, theUN managed to enhance stakeholder engagement in the spirit of national ownership, mutual accountability,and improved management for results.

Lessons learned—things that could be done better

As elaborated in the report, there are many lessons learned that suggest need for further improvement not only

for the next phase of multi-donor funding for Iraq but also for other UN-administered MDTFs. Of particularimportance in the context of a post-conflict situation is the need to maintain simultaneous focus on short- andlong-term (transition) needs and priorities from the very outset. The longer-term vision should be reflected inthe short-term interventions. In line with the IRFFI ToR, a high proportion of UNDG ITF programmes andprojects had a short-term focus, combined with a mandate to implement quickly and show results. This madesense for emergency interventions and was also in line with the donor agenda to provide quick, demonstrablesupport to the people of Iraq. With the benefit of hindsight, however, it indicates a missed opportunity to planfor transition from short-term needs to the longer-term development. The missed opportunity can be attributedto two primary factors:

– The GoI’s involvement in defining the priorities for the UNDG ITF interventions was not optimized.While the GoI was involved in the process by design, real GoI counterpart contribution andengagement varied by agency, sector and the project being implemented.

– The focus on short-term results and quick results-oriented recovery and rehabilitation projectscontinued until 2008, after which the focus shifted to institutional and capacity development with along-term development focus. The lack of attention to the long-term was in itself an obstacle to theimplementation of many projects. For example, weaknesses in institutional capacity and processes ofgovernment counterparts, as well as weak or non-existent codes and regulations, caused delays inproject implementation. A country that is rebuilding from scratch warrants as much focus on long-term development, including the development and strengthening of institutional, governance andhuman assets, as key immediate and shorter-term needs such as rehabilitation of basic services andinfrastructure.

Most donors are insistent on earmarking their contributions to specific areas and/or agencies in line with theirown aid agendas. By doing so, the donors feel they are better able to track the use of their contributions andhave some demonstrable visibility. These donors persist in demanding that almost all their contributions beearmarked and continue to complain, despite significant improvements, about the UNDG ITF reporting by theMDTF Office. The PwC opines that the donors and the UN must resolve this particular issue in light of the ParisDeclaration to realistically manage the donor expectations in any future MDTF. At the same time, both the



donors and the UN need to provide much greater initial focus on setting up strong, consistent, independent,high quality monitoring, reporting and evaluation processes which will provide the required and accessiblelevels of detail and transparency. A credible accountability mechanism will generate increased levels of trustand will provide timely, reliable and evidence-based information to all stakeholders for improved decisionmaking and policy setting.



2. Introduction

2.1. Objective and Scope of the LLE

The UNDG ITF is the first and largest MDTF within the UN system. Established in 2004 as part of a two-window funding mechanism for the IRFFI, it is administered by UNDP. The UNDG ITF was in operation forseven years from early 2004 until 30 September 2010 when the final projects were approved. A total of US$1.36billion was disbursed by the UNDG ITF to 16 participating UN organizations for the implementation of 200projects and programmes.

As the fund was nearing its closure in 2010, an independent Lessons Learned Exercise (LLE) wascommissioned by the UNDG ITF Steering Committee (SC) to provide lessons learned during the course of theimplementation of programmes and projects.

The objectives of the LLE as stated in the Terms of Reference (ToR) are:

1. To assess the development effectiveness of the programmes and projects administered under the UNDGITF and to showcase the contributions and results of UNDG ITF to recovery, reconstruction anddevelopment efforts in Iraq.

2. To assess the effectiveness of the UNDG ITF processes in supporting compliance with the ParisDeclaration on Aid Effectiveness principles and the UN reform process in Iraq.

3. To understand the relevance of design, legal arrangements and governance mechanisms for the UNDGITF as well as the UN internal coordination arrangements within a two-window fund vis-à-vis recovery,reconstruction and development priorities and challenges, highlighting their contribution to theachievement of development results in Iraq. This exercise will also provide an evidence base for the UNsystem and the MDTF Office for the development and refinement of new and existing MDTFs,respectively.

4. To guide the Government of Iraq (GoI), donors, and the UN Country Team (UNCT) in establishingeffective coordination and operational mechanisms in support of aid and development effectiveness.

PwC was selected in a competitive bidding process to conduct the independent study, which began in August2010 and is due to be completed at end of June 2011. To achieve the intended objectives, the LLE wasundertaken in a fact-based and multidimensional approach, as detailed in the methodology section. At itsinception, the expectations of all key stakeholders were identified and discussed in order to be addressed duringthe review. The interrelations of stakeholders and the relevance of the LLE to their expectations are illustratedin the following diagram:



FIGURE 1: UNDG ITF STAKEHOLDERS

The UNDG ITF operated for seven years, starting in January 2004, providing support to Iraq developmentefforts at a time when the country had tremendous immediate, as well as longer-term needs. Through donorchannels and UN agencies, the UNDG ITF enabled the international community to support the people of Iraq ata critical time in their history. For the purposes of the LLE, three strategic stakeholder groups were identified:

1. Donors: Donor countries, of which there were 25, contributed more than US$1.36 billion to the UNDGITF. They expected the recovery and reconstruction objectives of the UNDG ITF to be effectively andoptimally achieved. They also expected the Trust Fund to operate efficiently and maximize the value ofmoney provided to the people and government of Iraq. The LLE examined the role of the donorcommunity in addressing post-conflict recovery, reconstruction and development efforts, and theoperational coordination of UNDG ITF. The exercise provides lessons learned for the donor communityregarding harmonization of aid and its alignment with national priorities.

2. UN Agencies: Sixteen UN agencies received funding from the UNDG ITF in Iraq. The LLE identifieslessons learned for the participating UN agencies on the effectiveness of their developmentinterventions in Iraq and formulates recommendations for further improving joint-programmeplanning, design and management processes. These recommendations also shed light on ways toimprove coordination, programming and management mechanisms for the implementation of the firstUnited Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for Iraq. In addition, the lessons learnedidentify ways in which the UNDG ITF facilitated the UN Agencies’ coherent response to Iraq'schallenges, which in some regard could be compared to Delivering as One (DaO) principles.

3. Government of Iraq (GoI): National representation at the UNDG ITF included the Ministry ofPlanning and Development Cooperation (MoPDC)6 and other line ministries. The GoI had a decision-making voice from the beginning in approving projects and guiding the strategic direction of the TrustFund which, for the GoI, was a key mechanism for international development cooperation. The LLEsought to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the GoI's role in the management, coordination andoversight of the UNDG ITF and its effectiveness in donor coordination.

All stakeholders expected the LLE to provide fact-based findings and lessons learned about the performance ofthe fund over its life span. The findings and lessons learned, together with associated recommendations, willguide the future policy direction of each stakeholder group. While this may be most relevant to Iraq, it is alsoexpected that the LLE will guide policy and decision making generally for the UN system, donors and recipientsof other Multi-Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs), especially in post-conflict countries. The LLE can also contribute

6 The Ministry was renamed to the Ministry of Planning (MoP) in 2010, but for the purpose of consistency the name MoPDC will be usedthroughout this report.

Donors

UNDG ITF

UN Agencies

GoI

ImplementingPartners andContractors

Constituencies

HQ and mandate

Constituencies &Beneficiaries

Goods and Services

Funds

Needs &priorities



to the overall debate on using MDTFs as an alternative and/or supplement to other funding such as bilateral aidand other non-UN funds.

2.2. Methodology

2.2.1 Principles of the LLE methodology

The LLE is the third large-scale review of the UNDG ITF in its lifetime. An independent review of thegovernance structure and financial operations of the UNDG ITF one year after implementation was conductedby PwC during the third quarter of 2005; the final report was released in mid-2006. After one year of UNDGITF operations, the review identified a number of key strengths concerning the governance and financialoperations of the Trust Fund, and provided a number of recommendations, most of which have been addressedby the leadership of UNDG ITF. In 2008 another independent review was undertaken by Scanteam whichaddressed both the UNDG ITF and the WB ITF. The Scanteam final report, released in January 2009, alsoidentified a number of lessons learned and points of strength for both funds, and provided a number ofrecommendations. Most findings from these two reviews were, however, based mainly on interviews andanecdotal evidence, in addition to reviews of 16 projects in the case of the Scanteam report. To provide factualevidence to support this LLE, the UNDG ITF Steering Committee (SC) commissioned independent evaluationsof 37 projects and programmes to supplement the 23 earlier evaluations implemented by the UNDG ITF.Building on the findings and lessons from these evaluations and from the previous PwC and Scanteam reviews,the current PwC LL team undertook the LLE review based on a number of key principles:

1. Fact and evidence-based review: Numbers and figures were sought throughout the LLE to supportthe views and statements provided by the various people interviewed as well as to supplement theinformation received from secondary information sources.

2. A two-perspective approach to analysis: As the Trust Fund approached its planned closure, theLLE considered the overall contribution of the Trust Fund to the development of Iraq, and how the fundstructure supported the operations of the UN Country Team (UNCT) at a macro level. In addition, ananalysis of a sample of 60 projects and programmes for which independent evaluations were availableprovided details of findings and evidence at the project-specific or micro level, based on the scope ofwork of each project. These two lenses helped identify lessons learned and produce recommendations ata strategic level that were based on realistic and field-level issues and findings.

3. Multi-stakeholder review: More than 120 interviews were conducted during the various stages of theLLE, with representatives from key implementing partners including donors at headquarters and fieldlevel, the GoI at national and local levels, all participating UN agencies, and the major NGOs. Mostinterviews were conducted in person in Amman, Baghdad, Erbil and New York while a few interviewswere held over the phone. In addition, meetings with the Steering Committee (SC) chairperson, theSteering Committee Support Office (SCSO) and the UN MDTF Office were undertaken throughout thereview. These meetings provided numerous details and perspectives on the UNDG ITF that were usedthroughout the LLE.

4. Use of pre-defined parameters for the operations and development reviews: As indicated inthe UNDG ITF LLE ToR, the operational-effectiveness review was guided by the Paris Declaration on AidEffectiveness principles endorsed by the donor community as general guidelines for aid effectiveness in2005 and adopted by the GoI in 2008. The agreed-on parameters for operational effectiveness includedTrust Fund design and structure, alignment, harmonization, national ownership, development of nationalcapacity, management for development results, and accountability.

The development effectiveness review was guided by the parameters of the Organization for EconomicCo-operation and Development – Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC)’s criteria forassessing development aid. The parameters ensured the use of clear, globally defined concepts andcriteria that facilitated the review and analysis. The development effectiveness review was based ondevelopment results, efficiency, effectiveness, relevance and sustainability.



2.2.2 Approach adopted and tools used

The LLE work was organized in five phases including:

1. Engagement initiation2. Design3. Implementation4. Analysis and report writing5. Engagement closure

The LLE examined both development and operational effectiveness concurrently under this phased approach.Throughout the five phases, a number of tools were deployed in order to complete the review:

1. Desk review: A number of key documents were reviewed and used throughout the LLE. Thesedocuments can be clustered into: 1) UN documents of relevance to the UNDG ITF or the UN work inIraq in general; 2) GoI documents, such as the national development strategies and reports ondevelopment cooperation; 3) Academic literature relating to the structure and operations of Multi-Donor Trust Funds and development effectiveness in post-conflict situations; 4) UNDG ITF documentssuch as financial and project data, information sourced from the MDTF Gateway website; 5) Publicdomain documents and sources related to Iraq (see Annex 4, ‘List of Documents Reviewed’).

2. Questionnaires and surveys: Based on the initial feedback obtained during the inception missionand the findings of the desk review, a number of questionnaires were developed: 1) Tailored interviewquestionnaires for different stakeholders addressing the development and operational effectivenessparameters (see Annex 2, ‘Questionnaires’); 2) An online survey deployed for the GoI respondents withwhom, despite best efforts, in-person interviews were not possible (see Annex 9, ‘Online Survey’).

3. Key Performance Indicators: In order to provide not only factual but measurable findings tosupport the LLE, a set of key performance indicators (KPIs) were defined, which were measured basedon information collected from the UNDG ITF data sources. KPIs were designed in relation to theparameters of both the operational and development reviews. KPIs were calculated for the 60 projectsthat underwent in-depth review, and for projects that were operationally closed by October 2010 (seeAnnex 6, ‘List of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs)’).

4. Data capture tool: Based on the inception mission, it was agreed with the Lessons LearnedManagement Team (LLMT)7 that 60 projects and programmes for which independent evaluations wereavailable would be used for the review. The LLE team used the 60 projects and programmes as thebasis for micro-level analysis with evidence and facts on a project level to support the findings. AMicrosoft Excel tool was designed to capture details, data and findings for the 60 projects andprogrammes. In addition to the evaluation reports, the LLE team consulted all project-relateddocuments such as the project proposal, quarterly progress reports, financial budget sheets, annualprogress reports, and requests for extension documents. Input and support from the SteeringCommittee Support Office (SCSO) in providing additional documentation and data upon request waskey to completing the data collection. Once all 60 projects were reviewed and data collected, the toolwas then also used to calculate the KPIs (see Annex 5, ‘List of Projects / Programmes Reviewed’).

5. Analysis of the projects and programmes final sheet: A detailed Microsoft Excel spreadsheetincluding details of all projects and programmes approved and funded by the UNDG ITF was collected

7 The LLE will be coordinated and managed by the inter-office Lessons Learned Management Team (LLMT) that includes the Planning,Monitoring and Evaluation (PM&E) unit, the UNDG ITF Steering Committee Support Office (SCSO) and the MDTF Office. The LLMT willdirectly manage the LLE on a daily basis whereby the operational management will be handled by SCSO and the technical management ofthe process will be supervised and managed by the PM&E unit. The LLMT will report to the Deputy Special Representative of the SecretaryGeneral (DSRSG) and the SC chairperson on a regular basis for guidance and management support and to escalate any issues affecting theLLE. The LLMT will:

Provide project background information and any other secondary data; Ensure that all stakeholders are informed about the LLE and its underlying objectives; Liaise with the LLE team to finalize the methodology and detailed work plan, and to provide necessary inputs and guidance to the

LLE team; Oversee the process, on behalf of the SC, in accordance to the agreed ToR and UN standards to ensure that the process remains

objective, neutral, impartial and independent; Review and approve the LLE report and ensure its dissemination to all stakeholders; Facilitate, as necessary, the field work and provide logistical support for the LLE team; Brief UNDG ITF SC on the LLE process and seek guidance, as and when needed; and Manage contractual obligations and verification of deliverables and payments.



from the MDTF Gateway website, along with an update as of 31 October 2010 obtained from the SCSO.The sheet was an important source of information about the overall performance of the ITF as itincluded details of all 274 interventions funded by the Trust Fund. These are grouped into 200 projectsand programmes. A programme is a project implemented by two or more agencies.

6. Interviews: Interviews were an important component of the LLE, but unlike in previous reviews, theywere not the main tool. Interviews were used predominantly for guidance and exploration, andsubsequently for confirmation of issues and findings. The LLE team conducted 121 interviews withstakeholders including 19 representatives of donor organizations, 60 UN agency staff members,including the MDTF Office and the SCSO, 11 representatives from NGOs and other internationalorganizations and 31 government officials from both central and local government. Interviews wereconducted either face-to face in Baghdad, Erbil, Amman and New York or over the telephone withstakeholders based in other locations. Detailed questionnaires were used for each stakeholder group(see Annex 3, ‘List of People Interviewed’).

7. Case studies: The LLE team conducted an in-depth analysis of two selected programmes. Using acase study approach, the team collected input from multiple stakeholders to showcase findings andresults against the development and operational effectiveness criteria. A third case study focused on thetheme of remote management (where projects undertook key management functions from a remotelocation in another country—in this case from Amman, Jordan—due to security concerns) and a sampleof 11 projects from eight sectors were used to assess the pros and cons of remote management in theIraqi context (see Annex 1, ‘Case Studies’ and Annex 7, ‘List of Projects / Programmes Analyzed for theRemote Management Case Study’).

8. Gap analysis: Based on their evaluation reports, coverage of sectors and implementation time frame,eleven projects were selected for review to assess the variance between plan and implementation of thesample projects, and to analyze factors and drivers for this variance (see Annex 8, ‘List of Projects /Programmes that Underwent Gap Analysis’).

9. Focus Group: Based on consultations with the UN agencies, more than 100 GoI staff who wereinvolved during project implementation were identified for interviews as part of the LLE. While 31 wereinterviewed in one-to-one meetings, approximately 10 were engaged through an electronic survey. Inaddition, more than 80 were approached with an invitation to participate in a focus group discussion atthe MoPDC in Baghdad. A detailed guide was developed for the focus group session, but the number ofconfirmed attendants did not reach the required threshold to undertake the session (see Annex 10,‘Focus Group Discussion Guide’).

10. Presentation and discussion of initial findings: Throughout the LLE duration, twopresentations of initial findings were prepared and delivered. The first to the Deputy SpecialRepresentative of the Secretary General (DSRSG) on 20 October 2010, and the second to the DonorCommittee that met in Baghdad on 13 December 2010. In addition, regular meetings were held with theLLMT throughout the project duration to discuss the LLE’s progress and challenges.

2.2.3 Performance constraints of the LLE

A number of constraints which presented challenges to the team were encountered during the performance ofthe LLE. As far as possible, these were addressed and mitigated, but there remained some residual impactwhich may have limited the LLE findings and conclusions. As a result, the LLE cannot be expected to addressall possible outcomes. These constraints included:

1. Limited institutional memory: Many of the individuals who were interviewed, from all stakeholdergroups, had on average two years of experience with the UNDG ITF. This limited the depth of theirfeedback, which was sometimes based on anecdotal evidence obtained from predecessors andcolleagues. To overcome this limitation, the LLE team identified where other people who had earlierexperience in Iraq were now located and made attempts to reach them. This was a time-consumingexercise that achieved only limited success.

2. Lack of awareness of the UNDG ITF: Many individual GoI representatives who were interviewed,particularly less senior staff, had little knowledge of the UNDG ITF. They were familiar with the UNagency with which they interacted directly but were either unaware of or insufficiently informed aboutthe source of project funding. This made it difficult to distill feedback and perceptions of relevancerelating to the UNDG ITF itself from comments on the UN system in general or how the individualagencies interacted with their GoI counterparts. The LLE team used a variety of tools and approachedthe GoI from different angles to collect additional feedback to provide at least some mitigation of thislimitation.



3. Response rate of some stakeholders: Even though the LLE team managed to conduct a significantnumber of interviews, the delay in obtaining GoI-side responses to the survey and the cancellation ofthe focus group discussion represent a loss of some additional perspectives from this key group.

4. Limitations of the project evaluation reports: While the LLE initially intended to rely on the 60project evaluation reports which were commissioned by the UN agencies for all information related tospecific projects funded by the UNDG ITF, our review of these reports revealed a number ofweaknesses. These included inconsistency in the quality and level of detail provided in the evaluationreports and a lack of fundamental information in some cases. The LLE team therefore had to revert toadditional project documentation such as proposals, budgets and progress reports to complete theanalysis and worked closely with the SCSO to access additional documents and data. Given the fact thatthe reporting requirements and templates had also evolved and changed over the life span of the TrustFund, there were some differences in the structure of data sources, which resulted in some gaps as well.Two challenges resulted from this: first, the data collection and analysis consumed a lot more time thaninitially envisioned, and second, some initially designed KPIs had to be revised to work with what wasconsistently available.

Despite these limitations, many of which will be recognized as unavoidable in any exercise with the context,scope and complexity of this LLE, the PwC team was able to complete the review on time and to present thefindings, lessons learned and recommended actions in a manner which, it is hoped, will meet the expectationsof all concerned parties.



3. Context of the LLE

3.1. Response of the International Community

3.1.1 The International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI)

UNDG ITF was created as part of the IRFFI agreed on at the International Donors Conference for theReconstruction of Iraq in Madrid, Spain on 23-24 October 2003. The conference was organized by the UnitedStates to solicit pledges from donor countries, both those involved in the ‘coalition of the willing’ and thoseopposing or not involved in the war. In total, 25 participating donor countries pledged US$33 billion in grantsand loans including US$18.4 billion from the United States (US), US$5 billion from Japan, US$812 millionfrom the European Union (EU), and US$500 million from Kuwait, amongst others. In addition, the WorldBank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) proposed loans for Iraq amounting to US$5.5 billion toUS$9.25 billion. Many countries promised in Madrid to cooperate with the US-led effort to reduce Iraq's largedebt burden. The estimate of Iraq's reconstruction needs based on the Joint Needs Assessment (JNA)conducted by the WB and the UN in the summer of 2003, was at about US$55 billion over several years.8

As the Council on Foreign Relations reported in October 2003, many countries that opposed the war did notwish to appear to support the US-led occupation of Iraq but wanted to be involved in the reconstruction andrecovery work after the war. Thus the new facility helped the donors channel their contribution throughinternational organizations (the UN and WB) rather than through the United States. The IRFFI also provided aplatform for the involvement of smaller donors who did not have the means or will to develop their presence inIraq. In addition, donors welcomed the involvement of international organizations in reconstruction efforts inIraq as their procurement practices were deemed to be more reliable and transparent. Another added incentiveto work with the international organizations was the fact that the UN had been present in Iraq for decades andthat the Oil-for-Food Programme (OFF) had provided the organization with a good understanding of thecountry’s situation and needs. This is despite controversy at the time based on the investigations into the OFFprogramme, in particular the October 2005 report by the Independent Inquiry Committee into the UnitedNations Oil-for-Food Programme (IIC), also known as the ‘Volcker report.’

Out of the US$33 billion pledged in Madrid, US$1.8 billion was allocated to the IRFFI, including US$1.36 forthe UNDG ITF and US$484 million for the WB ITF. The objective of the IRFFI as described in the ToR dated 11December 2003, was "…to ensure coordinated, flexible and swift donor response for financing priorityexpenditures, including reconstruction activities, sector-wide programmes, investment projects, technicalassistance and other development activities." The principles set for IRFFI operations stressed nationalownership, development of sustainable local capabilities, efficient and prompt implementation and unifieddonor coordination.9

As defined in the ToR, the UNDG ITF was asked to focus on funding quick-impact projects and transitionactivities that need to be implemented in a rapid and flexible way. "Its functions will cover technical assistanceand capacity building across the following areas, in particular: (i) capacity and institution building for humandevelopment and social justice; (ii) the delivery of essential social services, in the area of health in particular;(iii) the empowerment of civil society and local communities; (iv) water resources and food security; (v)infrastructure rehabilitation, building in particular on expertise gained under the Oil-for-Food Programme; (vi)the protection and reintegration of vulnerable groups; (vii) the promotion of human rights and the rule of law;and (viii) private sector development and employment generation, with due regard to cross-sectoral issues suchas gender equality and environmental protection and management." 10

The World Bank was asked to focus on the following areas: “(i) capacity building of Iraqi counterparts in areasthat will help facilitate sound implementation; (ii) sectoral programmes that will include a menu of specific

8 Council on Foreign Relations, October 30, 2003, http://www.cfr.org/publication/7682/iraq.html9 IRFFI ToR, December 11, 2003.10 Ibid



projects at the subsector level which can be expanded opportunistically as circumstances improve; and (iii)start-up operations that will establish building blocks for sectoral and structural policy reforms and larger scaledevelopment projects.”11

3.2. The UNDG ITF

In response to the OFF investigation, the work of the IIC and the Volcker report, there was strong external aswell as internal pressure for the UN to provide full disclosure of its operations in Iraq and elsewhere. TheUNDG ITF stepped up to the challenge and took highly innovative steps to ensure transparency and disclosureof information, which can be considered a best practice in the area of development assistance.

The UNDG ITF, set up in January 2004, was a unique mechanism since it was the first time that the UN hadadministered a multi-donor reconstruction trust fund in a joint partnership with the World Bank as one of thetwo trust funds of the IRFFI. It was also the first time that the UNDG members, pursuant to the Secretary-General’s reform agenda, adopted a common planning, funding, implementation and reporting arrangement,which is referred to as the ‘UN Cluster Approach.’ The UNDG ITF arrangement reduced transaction costs fordonors and facilitated a more effective, coordinated UN operation as well as provided donor and aidcoordination for the Iraqi government. The UNDG ITF was implemented through the UN Cluster Approachwhich responded to the strategy established by the UN Country Team (UNCT) in Iraq. This allowed lineministries and the Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation (MoPDC) to liaise with the UN as oneentity rather than with 16 different agencies, allowing collaborative joint programming. The clusters werecomposed of a number of UN organizations with a mandate and expertise in the particular cluster area, withone UN organization representing others as the cluster manager. The cluster approach was revised in 2008 andwas replaced by the Sector Outcome Team (SOT) system that prevailed till the end of 2010 and is to be replacedby the new coordination structures of Priority Working Groups (PWGs) to support the UNDG implementation.

The UNDG ITF was one of the funding mechanisms available for the UNCT for Iraq to undertake projects andprogrammes within their agency mandates. Most UN agencies interviewed during the LLE indicated that theydepended on UNDG ITF funding for the majority of their projects in Iraq over the period 2003-2010. TheUNDP was mandated to act as the AA of the UNDG ITF, through what is now referred to as the Multi-DonorTrust Fund (MDTF) Office12. Initially, the AA signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with 19participating UN organizations. By 2010, 16 organizations had received funds from the UNDG ITF toimplement projects in Iraq. The table below lists all participating UN organizations along with number ofapproved projects and funds received by each organization.

11 Ibid.12 Initially, an Executive Coordinator for the Fund was assigned, prior to the MDTF Office being set up.



TABLE 1: NUMBER OF PROJECTS AND AMOUNTS BY UN AGENCY, VALUES IN US$

Participating UN Organization Funded Amount (US$ million) No. of Projects13

ESCWA 11.83 6

FAO 114.29 19

ILO 7.91 6

IOM14 0.52 1

UNDPA/EAD 7.80 1

UNDP 371.38 43

UNEP 16.61 3

UNESCO 70.53 29

UNFPA 24.61 8

UN-HABITAT 89.28 21

UNHCR 14.98 5

UNICEF 182.37 30

UNIDO 57.31 16

UNIFEM 9.18 7

UNOPS 235.77 43

WFP 18.89 5

WHO 128.16 31

TOTAL 1,361.42 274

Source: MDTF Gateway as of December 2010

The last project was approved on 30 September 2010. As of 31 December 2010, the 16 participating UNagencies have implemented 20015 projects and programmes under UNDG ITF. Of these, 43 projects andprogrammes are financially closed, 93 are operationally closed and 64 are currently under implementation.UNDG ITF-funded projects and programmes were implemented in the following eight sectors: education; waterand sanitation; health and nutrition; housing and shelter; food security: agriculture, food assistance;protection; governance; economic reform and diversification. At the end of 2010, US$1.43 billion had beendisbursed that included the total donor contributions and earned interest income. A balance of US$150,603million16 remains with the participating organizations for the ongoing projects.The table below shows thefunding status as of December 2010.

13 In total there were 200 projects and joint programmes or 274 individual agency projects (based on transfers to agencies).14 IOM was not a signatory of the MoU with the AA and it mainly received funding through participation with other UN agencies.15 When a programme is proposed, including many agencies each undertaking a part of implementation, funding is allocated to each agencyseparately and shows on UNDG ITF records as a project with a sub-code of the programme code.16 MDTF Office Gateway, UNDG Iraq Trust Fund page, http://mdtf.undp.org/factsheet/fund/ITF00



TABLE 2: UNDG ITF FUNDING STATUS AS OF DECEMBER 2010, VALUES IN US$

Funds with Administrative Agent

Deposits 1,358,392,474.26

Interest (from Trust Fund) 34,040,924.70

Interest (from Participating Organizations) 39,559,724.53

Total source of funds 1,431,993,123.49

Transferred to Participating Organizations 1,361,416,945.76

Refunds from Participating Organizations (17,195,547.09)

Administrative Agent Fee 10,818,920.35

Direct Costs 4,608,960.69

Bank Charges 24,221.47

Total use of funds 1,359,673,501.18

Balance with Administrative Agent 72,319,622.31

As a percentage of contributions 5.3%

Funds with participating organizations

Transferred to Participating Organizations 1,361,416,945.76

Total resources 1,361,416,945.76

Participating Organizations' Expenditure 1,096,968,362.67

Refunds from Participating Organizations 17,195,547.09

Total expenses 1,114,163,909.76

Balance with Participating Organizations 247,253,036.00

As a percentage of transfers 18.2%

Total balance of funds 319,572,658.31

As a percentage of contributions 23.5%Source: Multi-Donor Trust Fund Office Gateway.

As can be seen in Table 1, above, some agencies were more involved in project implementation than others. Thefive agencies that implemented the largest number of projects were UNDP, UNOPS, WHO, UNICEF andUNESCO.

Challenges faced by the UNDG ITF

At the end of 2003, many international stakeholders in Iraq, including the UN, World Bank and donors workedunder the assumption that the situation in Iraq would gradually improve. The Scanteam in their 2008Stocktaking review of IRFFI noted that many donors in late 2003 and early 2004 had expectations for animprovement in the security situation, an ability to place national and international staff on the ground in Iraqto implement and monitor projects, a stable government able to take a leadership role in defining priorities anddirecting programme implementation, a continuity of policy and personnel, and government co-financing ofprogrammes17 Based on these assumptions, donors expected rapid disbursement, quick project implementationand visible impact on the ground. Unfortunately, most of these assumptions proved unrealistic and the politicaland security situation deteriorated in Iraq, especially between 2004 and 2007. As the situation worsened withincreased violence during 2005-07, delivering on expectations proved ever more difficult. In addition, theworsening security situation led to an increasing number of refugees and a humanitarian crisis that urgentlyneeded to be addressed. Even though the focus of the IRFFI was on recovery and reconstruction, the UN had toshift its attention to some degree, to address humanitarian needs in order to prevent an escalation of conflictand insecurity.

The instability on the ground in Iraq severely affected reconstruction efforts by the UN and other internationalagencies. The UN and the World Bank were forced to pull out all their staff and operations from Iraq after the

17 Scanteam ‘Stocktaking Review of the IRFFI,’ 2009.



bombing of the UN Headquarters in Baghdad in August 2003. The UN relocated to Amman in Jordan andconducted its activities remotely. This security situation confronted UN officials with a tremendous challengeover the following years and innovative means of working were established through remote management.Although the situation has improved in recent times, this extremely difficult environment has to be kept inmind when seeking to draw lessons for the future from the UNDG ITF experience.

Another significant challenge faced by the UN was low government capacity and the lack of stable leadership.Iraq had no elected government or constitution until 2005. As one senior official commented, “Many Iraqiofficials genuinely wanted to be involved in reconstruction and to be perceived as being in the driver’s seat, yetthe issues of high turnover among decision makers, poor communication between ministries and lack ofefficient processes in place slowed things down and made the country difficult to operate with.”

Additionally, while in principle the design of the IRFFI focused on strong government ownership by placing theMoPDC and the Iraq Strategic Review Board (ISRB) at the center of the IRFFI governance structure, in practiceit was difficult to obtain government involvement. The formal way that government ownership was ensured inthe early years was through ISRB approval for all projects prior to disbursement of funds. Since 2008 theapproval process has included requirements for the endorsement of Project Concept Notes by the relevant lineministries. A lack of good coordination and communication across the GoI made involvement more challenging.For example, several government entities deal with the UN and other donors directly, rather than coordinatingthrough the MoPDC.

On the other hand, the UN's desire to show results fast led to setting unrealistically short project durations atthe design phase. As a result, the average delay in project implementation against the initial plan ended upreaching 122 percent (based on 60 projects analyzed in detail). Clearly, this evidence shows that UN Agenciesoverestimated their ability and/ or were unrealistically optimistic to deliver given the security situation and thefact that they were managing project implementation remotely.

The earmarking of donor contributions was another challenge for the UNDG ITF. The larger portion (88percent) of contributions was earmarked by sector or agency to recovery and reconstruction projects as this wasthe purpose of the UNDG ITF. Faced with continuing violence on the ground and the displacement ofthousands within Iraq, however, the UN had to respond by providing continued emergency and humanitariansupport. Non-earmarked funds together with interest money from the UNDG ITF were used to fundhumanitarian projects implemented by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and theUnited Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS). Between 2005 and 2010, US$12 million was spent forhumanitarian and emergency projects.

Despite these challenges, the UNDG ITF was able to operate and deliver significant results throughout its sevenyears of existence, as is further explored in the body of this report.



4. Operational EffectivenessReview

4.1. Introduction

Context

The operational effectiveness of the UNDG ITF has been examined according to the five parameters of the ParisDeclaration on Aid Effectiveness. In addition, the strengths and weaknesses of the fund design and governancehave also been assessed along with the effectiveness of national capacity development.

In this section of the LLE report, assessments of the following aspects are presented:

Fund design and structure Alignment and harmonization National ownership Capacity development Management for development results Accountability for development and operational effectiveness.

The Paris Declaration was signed in March 2005 by ministers from developed and developing countriesresponsible for promoting development, plus the heads of multilateral and bilateral development institutions,who gathered in Paris to reform the way aid is delivered and managed. Following on from the commitmentsmade in Rome in 2003 to harmonize and align aid delivery, as well as the principles for Managing forDevelopment Results discussed in the Marrakech Roundtable in 2004, and preparing for a UN five-year reviewof the Millennium Declaration and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2005, the ministersestablished a new framework for aid effectiveness, which they believed would, "increase the impact aid has inreducing poverty and inequality, increasing growth, building capacity and accelerating achievement of theMDGs."18

When analyzing the effectiveness of UNDG ITF-funded aid in Iraq against the parameters of the ParisDeclaration, it must be noted at the outset that the Declaration acknowledged that its principles cannot beapplied in a straightforward manner to fragile states or other environments with weak governance and capacity.In such challenging and complex situations, the principles must be adapted according to the conditions of statestability, conflict resolution, the humanitarian situation and urgent needs for basic services. Finally, it isimportant to note that Iraq itself did not sign the Paris Declaration until 2008.

Concept of MDTFs

While the UNDG ITF is the first MDTF administered by the UN through UNDP, the modality of MDTFs hadbeen in existence for a number of years and has since been implemented in many countries. The basic premiseof MDTFs is to pool funding in order to promote harmonization of donor activities, avoid duplication of effortsand lower administrative and some delivery costs by establishing common donor institutions and processes.MDTFs have been used in recent years in post-conflict and post-disaster environments. In most situations,donors tend to pledge immediately following the crisis or disaster and the funds are then disbursed over two tofour years time.

Previous and current major MDTFs in post-conflict situations administered by the World Bank include:Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, Sudan MDTF-National, MDTF South Sudan Private SectorDevelopment, and Trust Fund for East Timor. The UNDP MDTF Office also now administers a number of post-

18 ‘Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness,’ 2 March 2005.



conflict trust funds such as: UNDG ITF (the first and the largest one), Sudan Recovery Fund - South Sudan,Sudan Common Humanitarian Fund, Darfur Community Peace and Stability Fund and Democratic Republic ofthe Congo Pooled Fund (DRCPF). The MDTF Office also administers non-crisis related MDTFs related tothematic or sector-specific issues such as UN Coherence Funds, MDG Achievement Fund or UN Action AgainstSexual Violence.

Besides country or region-specific MDTFs, there are an increasing number of global programme funds whichearmark resources to specific sectors or subsectors such as HIV/AIDS, health, education or the environment.According to the World Bank, "Global Program Funds (GPS) are large multi-country funds that contain asignificant element of earmarked funding for specific objectives with thematic, sectoral or subsectoral breadth.General Political Funds (GPFs) are financing instruments of global programmes, which are generally structuredas partnerships involving shared decision making by several different organizations or partners. GPFs oftentake a ‘vertical’ approach that targets programme funds to a specific issue (with thematic, sector, or subsectorbreadth), compared to the ‘horizontal’ approach of traditional aid instruments (bilateral and multilateral) thatcover a broad range of development issues, and to the country-based model of aid." Contributions to globalprogramme funds currently only represent around 3 percent of total Official Development Assistance flows butthey are a dominant source of finance for specific sectors such as health and environment.19

Examples of GPS include: Global Environment Facility, Global Sanitation Fund, The GAVI Alliance (formerlyThe Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation), Education for All - Fast Track Initiative (FTI) or theGlobal Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.

An independent review of various MDTFs in post-conflict situations conducted in 2007 concluded, “MDTFs inpost-crisis situations have been important instruments for resource mobilization, policy dialogue, risk andinformation management; are appreciated by host governments; are largely in line with Paris Declaration onAid Effectiveness and Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Pilot Principles for Engagement in FragileStates; and are thus generating ‘positive externalities’ that other instruments do not."20 In post-conflictenvironments, the national capacity and ownership is usually severely weakened by the conflict and instability,thus MDTFs are viewed as useful mechanisms to coordinate aid among donors and, in the absence of nationalstrategy, to guide the allocation of funds based on donors' preferences or needs assessments conducted byinternational organizations.

The weak implementation capacity in a post-conflict country makes it difficult, however, for the recipient toabsorb the generous aid channeled through MDTFs. For example, Professor Sultan Barakat argues in a 2009paper on MDTFs that "Donors are willing to contribute resources at exactly those times when the governmenthas the least capacity to use them and when the nation's needs remain minimal… As a result of this mismatchbetween absorption capacity, needs and available funding, the initial fruits of reconstruction and developmentassistance are frequently disappointing."21 Barakat points out that in such situations, donors tend to pledgelarge amounts of money at the time when international attention and media coverage are high.

Furthermore, the issue is exacerbated by the fact that MDTFs usually have a short time span (IRFFI and theAfghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund were designed to last four years), meaning that donors pressureMDTFs to disburse money relatively quickly, often on reconstruction and humanitarian projects and quick-wintypes of projects, and less on long-term national capacity development. Barakat concludes that "the lack of earlyprogress leads MDTF donors to conclude that government involvement is not possible and that the MDTF isitself an ineffectual instrument. Financing for MDTFs thus rapidly declines as direct execution regains itsleading position."22

In a number of ways this is what occurred in Iraq, where the IRFFI was set up for a four year period with theintention to deliver fast results and focus on reconstruction and recovery. Significant amounts were disbursedquickly when the GoI had limited capacity to participate in designing and implementing projects or in directing

19 World Bank, ‘Global Program Funds at Country Level: What have we learned?,’ Concessional Finance and Global Partnerships VicePresidency, The World Bank Group, July 2008.20 ‘Review of Post-Crisis Multi-Donor Trust Funds,’ Scanteam, 2007.21 Barakat, Sultan, ‘The failed promise of multi-donor trust funds: aid financing as an impediment to effective state-building in post-conflictcontexts,’ Policy Studies, Vol. 30, No.2, April 2009, pp. 107-126.22 Ibid.



and coordinating the aid. As a result, many donors are today questioning the effectiveness of the Trust Fund.This will be further discussed in subsequent sections.

Overview of stakeholders

There are usually three key actors in any MDTF in post-conflict situations: 1) Donors who provide funds to thecommon pool; 2) National authorities, who are the beneficiaries and in some MDTFs direct recipients of funds;and 3) Multilateral organizations which act as the programme implementers and fund administrators.

Donors

Donors consider MDTFs to be useful channels for engaging in countries and situations in which they may notnormally have the ability to operate bilaterally for political reasons, lack of resources and/or excessive risks.MDTFs are also useful for donors as a mechanism for collecting and sharing information, coordinatingactivities and funding with other donors to avoid duplication as well as entering into policy dialogue withnational authorities via MDTF Donor Committee meetings. MDTFs allow donors to reduce their administrativecosts by outsourcing the project preparation, implementation and monitoring and evaluation to multilateralorganizations. Given that donors often have a limited staff presence and that there is insufficient nationalcapacity to own and implement development projects in post-conflict countries, being able to rely on wellestablished organizations such as the UN or World Bank which have very experienced people and transparentprocesses and systems in place allows the donors to get involved without needing to ramp up their ownadministration.

Donors also view MDTFs as instruments that allow them to efficiently fulfill their commitments under the ParisDeclaration for the harmonization of aid. Specifically, donors committed in Paris to "Implement…commonarrangements at country level for planning, funding…disbursement, monitoring, evaluating and reporting togovernment on donor activities and aid flows."23 An evaluation of the implementation of the Paris Declarationconducted in preparation for the Accra Summit in 2008 recognized MDTFs as a proven mechanism forproviding an "aligned and harmonized approach to financing in particular in situations where there is lack ofstate capacity that may prevent direct budget support."24

Despite their actual and potential benefits, donors only channel a relatively small portion of their resourcesthrough MDTFs. In Iraq, the total contribution of international donors for reconstruction and recovery between2003 and 2010 was US$12.01 billion (not including the wider US contribution to Iraq). Out of that, onlyUS$1.86 billion, or 15 percent was channeled through the IRFFI by 25 donors. When taking into account the UScontributions (US$56.81 billion as of October 2010), the IRFFI share is only 3 percent of total donorcontribution in the country.25

Lessons already learned from other MDTFs in post-crisis situations point to a number of reasons why donorschoose to channel only a small percentage of their funding through MDTFs and instead prefer to providebilateral support. These include: 26

For political reasons, donors prefer to support their own actors on the ground; Some donors remain skeptical about the efficiency and effectiveness of MDTFs; Driven by commercial and political interests, aid is often tied to large investments, and MDTFs are not

perceived as providing added value in large infrastructure investments where complex processes requirespecialists overseeing the process;

Many donors seek recognition and visibility in the host country; these are more easily obtained frombilateral engagement;

MDTFs are mainly dominated by OECD DAC donors, and other non-traditional donors may not feelcomfortable with this instrument;

23 ‘Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness,’ 2005, pg. 6.24 OPM / IDL ‘Evaluation of the Implementation of the Paris Declaration: Thematic Study - The applicability of the Paris Declaration infragile and conflict-affected situations,’ Oxford Policy Management / the IDL Group, 2008, pg. 43.25 ‘The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) Quarterly Report to the United States Congress as of 30 October 2010.’26 ‘Review of Post-Crisis Multi-Donor Trust Funds,’ Scanteam, 2007, pg. 24.



Some donors are constrained in providing non-earmarked funding due to their own domestic budgetaryregulations.

Most of the above reasons are relevant in Iraq, where a number of larger donors preferred to implement theirprojects bilaterally through their own aid development agencies, through NGOs or through direct, bilateralcontracts with UN agencies. For example, the United States engaged mainly US companies and contractors inIraq. Japan and Korea, the other two large bilateral donors in Iraq, also implemented projects mainly throughtheir own development agencies. As larger donors they were able to contribute both bilaterally and to theMDTF. However it is notable that the largest donors in Iraq contributed the smallest amounts to the IRFFI inproportion of their total aid. For example, the United States provided US$56.7 billion to Iraq in total and onlyUS$10 million through the IRFFI. Japan provided US$1.21 billion in grants and US$3.28 billion in loans to Iraqand only US$492 million to IRFFI. Based on interviews with donors in Iraq, the main reasons for the smallpercentage of contributions channeled through the IRFFI are the commercial and political interests tied to largeinvestments as well as the importance of recognition and visibility.

National authorities

In post-conflict environments, national authorities appreciate the benefits of MDTFs, which provide funding,donor coordination and an organized platform for engagement and discussion with the internationalcommunity. The MDTF mechanism also makes it easier for national authorities to understand the progress ofthe interventions as the fund administrator usually provides consolidated reports to the government. Given thatMDTFs are often set up within the framework of the Paris Declaration principles of alignment with nationalstrategies and support for national ownership, the recipient government can expect support for its priorities aswell as a role in the allocation of funds under the MDTF. For example, the UNDG ITF engaged GoI lineministries and the IRSB in project approval. In addition, the GoI participated in the IRFFI Donor CommitteeMeetings every six or twelve months. The MoPDC appreciated the UNDG ITF as it provided a coordinatedmechanism for interaction with all UN agencies.

In Iraq, the MoPDC is the main body of the GoI responsible for coordinating and promoting overallinternational assistance to Iraq in order to ensure that resources are allocated efficiently and effectively in linewith national strategies. The mandate of the MoPDC is to develop transparent procedures for allocatinginternational assistance to geographic and/or functional sectors in Iraq and optimize the use of those resourcesto meet Iraq's prioritized needs. The main vehicle established for aid coordination in Iraq has been the IraqStrategic Review Board (ISRB). The ISRB was established in 2003 under Regulation No. 7 by the CoalitionProvisional Authority (CPA) as an Iraqi organization mandated to work on behalf of the Iraqi people to forgestrong partnerships among the GoI, donors and international organizations. Further discussion about nationalauthorities, their role and engagement with the UNDG ITF appears in the section on National Ownership.

Multilateral organizations—administrators and implementers

The UN and World Bank have been the primary two administrators of MDTFs around the world. As ofDecember 2010, the UNDP Office administered 45 MDTFs valued at more than US$5 billion. In comparison,the World Bank administered 325 MDTFs as of 30 June 2009 for a total amount of disbursements of US$22.4billion. One third of the UN portfolio of MDTFs is focused on ‘One UN Coherence’ or ‘Delivering as One’ fundswith 12 MDTFs amounting to US$360 million. Additional funds include the Common Humanitarian Fundssuch as in Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Central African Republic, and Recovery Fundssuch as in Lebanon and Southern Sudan. In addition, the UNDP MDTF Office manages global-thematic MDTFssuch as the MDG Achievement Fund; the Central Fund for Influenza Action (CFIA); UN Action Against SexualViolence; the UN Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradationin Developing Countries (UN-REDD); and others.

The MDTF Office of UNDP currently has 54 donors and partners including the traditional DAC donors as wellas newer and non-traditional donors such as developing countries, international organizations and privatesector contributors. In the area of post-conflict MDTFs, the World Bank has been the larger administrator. The2007 Scanteam report on post-crisis MDTFs noted that even though the UN would seem a more naturaladministrator for MDTFs in post-conflict environments given its presence on the ground and experience



working in conflict zones, the World Bank has been regarded as a better risk manager and thus is more oftenentrusted with administering MDTFs. Nearly three quarters of post-crisis MDTFs and an even greater share ofother MDTF funding has been entrusted to WB. With IRRFI, however, the UNDG ITF has attracted morefunding and project activity than the World Bank Iraq Trust Fund.

The UNDP MDTF Office based in New York plays the role of AA for the UNDG ITF. Its responsibilities includethe receipt, administration and management of contributions from donors, the disbursement of funds to theParticipating UN Organizations in accordance with earmarking by donors or the Steering Committee, and theconsolidation and dissemination of progress reports to the GoI and donors. The MDTF Office also manages theGateway website, which since 2009 has had documents and information on UNDG ITF. Prior to the creation ofthe Gateway, the MDTF Office was responsible for the UNDG ITF section of the IRFFI website. Normally, theUNDP MDTF Office charges a fee equivalent to 1 percent of the fund’s value for fund administration, but for theUNDG ITF the fee is 0.8 percent.

Even though the AA was based within the UNDP Office, it functions as an independent body. The fact that theAA is placed within UNDP and thus is familiar with the UN system facilitated the ease of transfer of funds andcommunication with UN agencies, the Steering Committee (SC) and the Steering Committee Support Office(SCSO). It should also be noted that within the UN system, the UNDP is mandated to lead countrywidecoordination processes between UN agencies. The independence of the AA is ensured by a policy directiveissued in 2007 which outlines the separation of UNDP's role as AA from UNDP's role as a participatingorganization in the MDTFs. Furthermore, the MDTF Office relationship with UNDP as a participating UNorganization is maintained on the same basis as other UN organizations; the UNDP has to sign the same MDTFOffice MoU as other UN organizations. The MDTF Office was relocated from the Partnership Bureau (theResource Mobilization unit of the UNDP) to the Bureau of Management in February 2009. Furthermore, theindependence of the MDTF Office is ensured by the fact that the AA did not have the ability to assign any fundsto sectors or agencies. Given that 88 percent of all funds were earmarked, the AA assigned funds to sectors oragencies according to earmarking set by donors. Funds and interest which were not earmarked wereapportioned by the SC to Sector Outcome Teams.

Typical governance structures of MDTFs

There is no typical governance structure for MDTFs as each situation requires different organization, leadershipand involvement of various stakeholders. There are, however, a few lessons that can be learned from examininggovernance structures of MDTFs in post-conflict countries. The following practices were identified throughreview of other UNDP MDTFs including those in Sudan, Afghanistan and Timor-Leste:

Involvement of government on the Steering Committee as a co-chair together with an internationalorganization such as the UN or World Bank.

Involvement of donors on the Steering Committee or another oversight committee. Involvement of sector groups, including implementing agencies and line ministries or other

government representatives, to set priorities and select programmes. Use of a Secretariat to support the administrative functions of the Steering Committee. Use of an external, independent committee or an agent to provide monitoring of projects and an overall

oversight of financial and procurement operations of the MDTF. The World Bank engages a MonitoringAgent or Financial Management and Procurement Agent for most of its MDTFs that provide budgetsupport.

Establishment of regular supervision missions to monitor MDTFs projects. The World Bank conductssuch missions jointly with task team leader, donors, government official and members of projectimplementing agency27

Further discussion on governance structure and fund design is included in the section on IRFFI and UNDG ITFdesign.

27 ‘Review of Post-Crisis Multi-Donor Trust Funds,’ Scanteam, 2007, pg. 47.



4.2. IRFFI and UNDG ITF Design and Governance

IRFFI design and governance—the effectiveness of the two-windowmodel

The IRFFI was the first fund facility ever to be designed as a two-window model with both UN and World Bankparticipation. Never before have the WB and UN partnered in this way on an MDTF. This was also the first timean MDTF was administered by the UN.

On 24 June 2003, the UN hosted a conference with 50 nations, called the Liaison Group, during which the UNand the World Bank were asked to conduct a Joint Needs Assessment in Iraq and to develop a commonproposal for a multi-donor funding framework for Iraq. This proposal was discussed during a DonorConference in Madrid in October 2003, where the ToR for the IRFFI was officially approved. In principle, atwo-window trust fund model was adopted to create a platform for both international organizations to use theirexpertise and to collaborate in delivering much needed assistance to Iraq. In practice, the benefits of the two-window fund facility were never fully realized and it would be difficult to draw lessons from the collaborationbetween the World Bank and the UN under this model as it was rather limited in impact. The ToR of the IRFFIdid not specify why or how these two organizations should coordinate and work together besides the generalstatement that "the facility is a structure that establishes a coordinated arrangement whereby donors can fundactivities administered by the Participating UN Organizations and/or activities administered by the WorldBank, with an agreed structure for joint coordination and monitoring mechanisms."

The two-window model was intended to create a more efficient mechanism of coordination between WorldBank and the UN and communication with the donors and government through the establishment of a commonFacility Coordination Committee (FCC) and a Secretariat. According to the original IRFFI ToR, the FCC wassupposed to be based in Baghdad and be responsible for review and coordination of the overall programme ofactivities funded by the IRFFI. The role of the FCC was also to liaise closely with Iraqi counterparts "to ensureboth programme and implementation coherence with Iraqi priorities." As shown on the IRFFI governancestructure model below, the IRFFI facilities (UN and World Bank) were to share a common Secretariat thatwould support the FCC and provide consolidated reports to the Donor Committee. Due to security treats, boththe UN and World Bank pulled out of Iraq in 2003 and until today never fully relocated to the country. The FCCwas established briefly, but its coordination became more remote with less direct interaction with thegovernment and occasional meetings. Also, the Secretariat in its original design was never established inBaghdad. In reality, the only formal collaboration between UN and the World Bank was the Joint NeedsAssessment conducted in 2003.



FIGURE 2: DONOR COORDINATION BY IRAQI ENTITIES AND IRFFI GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE

The donor coordination structure presented in Figure 2, above, placed the GoI at the center of the coordination.In the original design, the IRSB and the MoPDC were positioned as the key decision makers, with the Ministryof Finance (MoF) ensuring the alignment of projects with national budgets. While this design granted the GoIsome decision making power for approving projects and coordinating aid, in practice, as will be discussed later,the GoI was not in a position to lead the design and implementation of projects.

The UNDG ITF and World Bank ITF operated as separate funds and there was limited collaboration on thedesign and implementation of projects. The potential benefits of the two-window model were not fully realizedfor three main reasons:

1. The two organizations had different implementation approaches;2. The World Bank had a significantly smaller presence in Iraq;3. A common Secretariat could not be established in Iraq for security reasons.

All interviewed UN representatives and donors indicated that while the relationship between the World Bankand the UN staff in Iraq was good and collegial, there was limited collaboration in of the design andimplementation of projects. Also, the World Bank did not formally participate in the Steering Committee andonly occasionally participated on the Peer Review Group for UNDG ITF as an observer.

The main reason for the lack of common programming was a difference in approach. The World Bankimplemented projects through the government (‘National Execution’ or NEX), while the UN implementedprojects directly (‘Direct Execution’ or DEX), but where possible in collaboration with the government or NGOs.As noted in the ToR, the two organizations' mandates were different. The World Bank's mandate was to focuson capacity development of the GoI, while the UN was to "focus on funding quick-impact projects andtransition activities which need to be implemented in a rapid and flexible way." The different approaches andmandates produced different results as well. Donors noted that they initially preferred the UN model ofimplementation as the UN was able to disburse funds much faster. However, as the focus shifted to institutionalcapacity development in the later years, donors indicated that the World Bank model gained more recognitionfor contributing to develop national capacity.

A comparison of actual projects implemented by the UN and WB shows striking similarities in scope eventhough their approaches differed. The WB, similarly to the UN, focused on the rehabilitation of school



infrastructure, water supply and sanitation, electricity reconstruction, health rehabilitation, textbook provision,social protection and household surveys. In addition, the WB had two capacity-development projects focusedon training the Iraqi authorities to define, prioritize and implement international programmes of support andplay a leading role in the reconstruction process. Despite the similarities in the interventions, however, therewas very little collaboration and joint programming. A review of UN project documents showed that the WBwas never indicated as an implementing partner or advisor.

The main tangible benefit of the two-window model MDTF has been the creation of a common DonorCommittee for the IRFFI, which reduced the cost and time spent on donor coordination. The Donor Committeeheld annual or semi-annual meetings in international locations for donors to discuss the progress of the IRFFI.The UN and WB had observers' status on this Donor Committee, and the GoI was also an active participant.According to the ToR of the IRFFI, the Donor Committee was intended to be responsible for endorsing overallpriorities and providing strategic guidance to the facility’s two trust funds. Ten meetings of the DonorCommittee have been held to date, the last one on 13 December 2010 in Baghdad.

It is also important to note that the IRFFI was set up for an initial period of four years and then extended twicefor four additional years. During that period two ad-hoc reviews of the structure of the fund facility and trustfunds were carried out, but there was no initial plan in place at the start of the IRFFI to review and assess thestructure on an ongoing basis. In a post-conflict situation with constantly changing needs, actors and politicalpressures, it would be necessary for periodic reviews of the governance model on an annual or semi-annualbasis be embedded in the design of the fund. This would allow the donors to assess to what extent thegovernment is ready and able to be more directly engaged in a trust fund and whether the pool of implementingpartners can be expanded beyond just the WB and UN. This approach of critical self-evaluation on an ongoingbasis may allow donors to feel more comfortable setting up trust funds for a longer period of time than fouryears and thus contributing to longer-term priorities of capacity development and national ownership.

UNDG ITF design

Overview

Given that a large MDTF like the UNDG ITF involves many stakeholders, addresses a variety of developmentaspects in often challenging environments and touches many lives, a solid and well designed governancestructure with transparent processes and efficient decision-making mechanisms is key to running effectiveoperations and achieving the Trust Fund's objectives. The governance structure of UNDG ITF was defined fromthe start in the initial Terms of Reference (ToR) in 2004, and it went through a number of refinements over theyears. Many lessons have already been learned during the fund’s seven years of operations about ensuringtransparency, avoiding or minimizing conflicts of interest, strengthening national ownership and engagingvarious stakeholders. Many of these lessons were identified in earlier reviews by PwC and Scanteam, and anumber of them have been acted upon. The lessons, even if they have been already drawn and addressed in thepast, will be reviewed in this section as they are important to the overall learning from the MDTF operations. Inaddition, new lessons are identified and recommendations for future MDTFs are formulated. The chart belowoutlines the governance structure of the UNDG ITF.



FIGURE 3: UNDG ITF GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE

The anchor point of operational governance of UNDG ITF resides in the hands of the Steering Committee(SC), which is chaired by the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General (DSRSG) for Iraq, who isalso the Resident Coordinator, Humanitarian Coordinator, and Resident Representative for UNDP. The SC alsoincludes heads of the participating UN agencies, and its role is to coordinate and oversee the operations of theUNDG ITF and to provide overall strategic guidance and oversight as well as to make decisions on fundallocation for the non-earmarked donor contributions and accrued interests. Since 2008, the SC also includesdonor representation from two donors, currently Canada and the European Union (EU).

The Steering Committee Support Office (SCSO) provides the necessary administrative and technicalsupport to the SC and UN agencies in the process of reviewing, approving, monitoring and closing projects andprogrammes. The SCSO was strengthened in 2008 following recommendations from previous reviews of UNDGITF; the recruitment of a SCSO Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Specialist has supported the review ofprogramme documents mainly in relation to Results Frameworks. In addition the SCSO M&E Specialisttogether with the Resident Coordinator (RC) Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation (PM&E) unit providedplanning, monitoring and evaluation support to UN agencies including review of programme and projectdocuments, evaluations and M&E capacity development.

Sector Outcome Teams (SOTs) serve as a coordinating mechanism for the technical review, design,planning, prioritization and approval of projects for each of the eight priority sectors. SOTs include technicalrepresentatives of UN agencies and NGOs who meet regularly to establish priorities and intended outcomes fortheir sectors, discuss technical issues and select projects and programmes to be implemented in their sectors.According to the ToR, "the SOTs are designed to increase strategic planning, programming and coordination aswell as provide for technical review and approval of projects working closely with the relevant counterpart

Iraq StrategicReview Board

SteeringCommittee

AdministrativeAgent

(UNDP MDTFOffice)

DonorCommittee

Sector OutcomeTeams (SOTs)

Steering CommitteeSupporting

Office (SCSO)

Participating UNAgencies

Iraq LineMinistries

Peer Review



ministries and the GoI to achieve improved and equitable access to essential social services, strengthenedcivilian protection, accelerated and inclusive economic development, and strengthened governance."

The SOTs were created during the 2008 restructuring mentioned above, as an evolution from an earlier type ofbody called Cluster Groups. As a result of the restructuring, the 11 clusters were reorganized into eight sectorswhich include:

1. Education2. Water and sanitation3. Health and nutrition4. Housing and shelter5. Food Security, Agriculture and Food Assistance6. Protection7. Governance8. Economic reform and diversification

Each SOT is chaired by a UN agency which has a mandate and expertise for that particular sector, and itsdeputy chair is selected from another agency with relevant sector focus. For example, the food security andagriculture SOT is chaired by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and has arepresentative of the World Food Programme (WFP) as deputy chair. Other UN agencies can participate in anySOT of their choice. For example, a UN Women (formerly, the UNIFEM) representative was invited to sit on anumber of SOTs, but due to time constraints she could actively participate in only four SOTs to ensure thatgender issues were being addressed in those sectors. Since the reform in 2008, NGOs were also invited toparticipate in SOT meetings.

The Peer Review Group (PRG) consists of SOT leads and deputies who are responsible for reviewing andrecommending projects for approval by the SC. According to the ToR, the main role of the PRG was to "providean objective strategic review of programme proposals, [to] ensure transparency, programmatic coherence andstakeholder involvement in the identification, design and implementation of UN-supported activities in Iraq."Since the reform of 2008, donors were also invited to participate in these cross-sector reviews of proposedprojects.

UN Country Team Baghdad Policy Groups (UNCT BPGs) are comprised of senior advisory staff fromUN agencies based in Baghdad to enable close cooperation with the GoI and to review draft project submissionsto ensure they are aligned with the priorities of the GoI in relation to the National Development Strategy (NDS)and the International Compact for Iraq (ICI). The BPG included four advisors, one each from Essential SocialServices, Protection, Governance and Economic Development.

The participation of the GoI in the approval of projects was ensured through engagement of the IraqiStrategic Review Board (ISRB), a government body initially established by the Coalition ProvisionalAuthority (CPA) in 2003 to provide strategic guidance and ensure the alignment of reconstruction projectsfunded by donors with Iraq national priorities. The ISRB is based in Baghdad and is chaired by the MoPDC andco-chaired by the MoF. According to the MoPDC website, "ISRB works on behalf of the Iraqi people to forge astrong partnership among the interim Iraqi administration, contributing governments, internationalorganizations as well as other entities that provide grants, loans, guarantees, or other financial and technicalassistance in support of Iraq's relief, recovery and development efforts." The UNDG ITF actively engaged theISRB in the review and approval of most projects funded by the Trust Fund, with the exception of electionprojects which were approved by independent commissions such as the Independent High ElectoralCommission of Iraq (IHEC).

The Administrative Agent (AA) of the UNDG ITF is the MDTF Office based in New York. Its responsibilitiesinclude the receipt, administration and management of contributions from donors, the disbursement of fundsto the participating UN agencies per instructions from the SC, and the consolidation and dissemination ofprogress reports to the MoPDC and donors. The MDTF Office also manages the Gateway website which since2009 includes documents and information on the ITF. Prior to the creation of the Gateway, the MDTF Officewas responsible for the UNDG ITF section of the IRFFI website.



Project approval process—lessons learned from previous reviews

The governance of the UNDG ITF, as well as the process of approving projects, is designed to engage allimplementing UN agencies, contributing donors and the GoI. The current version of the project developmentand approval process, updated in 2008, includes all stakeholders involved in MDTF: the above mentionedgovernance bodies and stakeholders, implementing agencies, GoI and donors. The process, which stakeholdersfound meticulous and complex, includes the following steps:

1. The Participating UN Organization(s), in consultation with the GoI partner(s), prepares Programme orProject Concept Notes (PCNs) that are aligned with the ICI and NDS, and receives letter(s) ofendorsement from the relevant government partner(s).

2. The PCNs and accompanying government endorsement letter(s) are reviewed and endorsed by theSector Outcome Team (SOT) and the relevant documents are forwarded to the SCSO.

3. The SCSO documents the relevant information and forwards it to the ISRB, which has a five-working-days’ ‘no objection’ period in which to respond.

4. With the ISRB endorsement in hand, the Participating UN Organization(s) proceeds to develop a fullproposal with the relevant line ministries and submit it to the SOT lead for review. The SOT will review,consult with the SCSO and present a final document that is then submitted to the Peer Review Group(PRG).

5. The PRG reviews the proposal and either endorses it, endorses it with comments or rejects it.

6. Following endorsement by the PRG, the proposal is forwarded to the ISRB with the exception ofelectoral proposals, which are fast-tracked. (The UNDG ITF provides a 'Fast Track Process' to allowSteering Committee members to expedite project documents for urgent time-bound activities,particularly relating to the electoral process.)

7. Following ISRB approval, the SCSO informs the UNDG ITF Steering Committee Chair and a meeting ofthe SC is convened within two weeks.

8. The SOT leads, along with the representative of the implementing agency, present the final proposal tothe SC. The SC approves it, approves it with comments or rejects the proposal. Approved proposals aresigned and forwarded to the MDTF Office for release of funds within one week of signature.



FIGURE 4: UNDG ITF PROJECT APPROVAL PROCESS

Stage Actors Time FrameI IDENTIFICATION /

NEGOTIATION /FORUMLATION, includingProject Concept Notes,endorsed by the SOT andsubmitted to ISRB through theSCSO.

UN AGENCY(IES), IRAQIMINISTRY/AUTHORITY,MoPDC/ISRB, OTHER SECTORACTORS

This is an ongoing / continuousprocess

Upon receipt of concept notes fromSCSO, MoPDC/ISRB has fiveworking days ‘no objection’ period.

II Project DocumentDevelopment/SOT REVIEW

SOT MEMBERS, IRAQI MINISTRY,CROSS CUTTING THEMES

Two weeks

III SCSO REVIEWSCSO, SUBMITTING SOT LEADERSAND AGENCIES

Within one week of receivingcomplete documentation, SCSO, theSOT leader and the proposingagency meet for an informal review.The agency submits final docs, withany agreed-on changes, to SCSO.SCSO sends docs to PRG for nextscheduled meeting.

IVPEER REVIEW GROUP (PRG)REVIEW

BAGHDAD POLICY GROUP, SOTLEADERS, CROSS CUTTINGTHEMES, SCSO, SUMBITTINGAGENCIES, and (on observer /invitation basis) WB, donors, NGOs,GoI representatives can be included.

PRG convenes within ten workingdays of receiving documents.Agencies have four working daysafter PRG review to make revisionsand submit to SCSO, which ensureschanges have been made andsubmits docs to PRG and ISRB onthe next working day.

ISRB

VSTEERING COMMITTEEREVIEW

DSRSG, UN COUNTRY TEAM, SOTLEADERS, UNDG ITF, DONORS

Once ISRB approval is received,SCSO will ask the SC to convenewithin two weeks. Agencies thenhave four working days to make anyrevisions, followed by a three-working-days electronic ‘noobjection’ period. SCSO forwardssigned docs to the MDTF Office,agencies and ISRB within one week.

VI RELEASE OF FUNDSUNDG ITF EXECTUIVECOORDINATOR

The Executive Coordinator willrelease funds, notifying agencies andSCSO, within one week of receipt ofsigned documents and SC meetingminutes from SCSO.

There were a number of lessons learned about this process throughout the years. Most of these lessons wereaddressed and acted upon in the reforms of 2008.

1. Importance of engaging the line ministries in the design of projects. Initially the involvement ofline ministries in the design of projects was difficult to obtain due to weak capacity within ministries, highturnover of government officials, and security issues, which prevented the UN from interacting face-to-facewith ministers and officials in Baghdad. In 2008, the idea of Project Concept Notes (PCN) was enforced bythe UNDG ITF, and all UN agencies were mandated to receive endorsements of concept notes from therelevant line ministries. This step ensured that ministries were properly informed of UN plans and agreedon the relevance and alignment of proposed projects to government strategies.



2. Importance of informing the ISRB at an early stage about PCNs and of obtaining no-objection endorsement. There are communication challenges between line ministries and the MoPDC,as line ministries do not report up to the MoPDC and ISRB. Since 2008 the UNDG ITF facilitated improvedinformation sharing regarding planned activities among line ministries, the MoPDC and the UN. This madethe ISRB much more aware of the project pipeline.

3. Importance of institutionalizing fund-governance structures and processes at the outset.Given the urgent needs in Iraq in 2003-04 and the pressure from donors to demonstrate results quickly,the UNDG ITF was established and made operational in a rapid manner. The idea of creating a trust fundwas discussed in October 2003 at the Madrid Conference, and the first meeting of the UNDG ITF SteeringCommittee, where five projects were approved, took place only five months later, on 3 May 2004. The SCapproved 16 projects in May 2004 and 35 additional projects during the reminder of that year. Thisdemonstrated a great urgency in mobilizing UN resources and establishing the mechanism. In the firstyears of operations, however, the fund had a very lean support office which meant that proposed projectswere not subject to sufficient scrutiny. As the capacity of the SCSO was strengthened in 2008 by hiringadditional staff, new standards for project templates and an improved Results Based Management (RBM)framework were put in place. Many UN agencies noted the value that SCSO provided from 2008 inreviewing project documents, providing support with the development of result frameworks, and quicklyprocessing extensions and budget revisions. SCSO's reviews ensured adherence to the agreed-on UNDG ITFguidelines and templates and provided appropriate quality control. In this respect, the control that SCSOenforced for each project ensured that all projects were clearly linked to a national priority (or a set ofpriorities), received an endorsement from line ministries at the concept note stage and were later approvedby ISRB, thus contributing to greater alignment with national priorities and processes.

4. Importance of involvement of donors in the project-approval process to ensure donorcoordination and improved transparency. From 2004 to October 2008, donors were not involved inany governing body of the UNDG ITF. They were only involved at the high level of the IRFFI DonorCommittee, which met semi-annually to review the progress of both UNDG ITF and WB ITF. Since thereforms of 2008, donors were invited to join both the UNDG ITF SC and the PRG. Two donors were invitedto sit on the SC on a rotational basis for two years, and since 2008 those seats have been occupied by theEU and Canada. The attendance of the PRG was open to all donors but mainly the EU, Canada, Denmarkand Italy participated on regular basis. By inviting donors to participate in the PRG, the UNDG ITFaddressed the issue of an apparent conflict of interest within the project-approval process noted in earlierreviews by PwC and Scanteam. The PwC report of 2006 noted that the review of projects at PRG levelsuffered from a ‘friendly culture’ or a reluctance of UN agencies to critically assess possible weaknesses inproject proposals presented by fellow agencies given that their own proposals would be discussed next. Areview of PRG meeting minutes since 2008 shows that representatives of between one and three donorsactively participated in those meetings, questioning and providing comments on how projects could beimproved.

5. Importance of the involvement of the ISRB in UNDG ITF project approval to providelegitimacy to the government and support alignment with national priorities. Initially, in theearly half of 2004, the ISRB was not engaged in reviewing UNDG ITF projects. The first projects to bereviewed by the ISRB were in July 2004, which means that the first 16 projects worth US$230,000 wereapproved by the SC without being shared with the ISRB for its review / approval. As noted above, however,the ISRB has since then been actively engaged in reviewing proposed projects at two stages: during aninitial concept note stage when projects are being designed by UN agencies together with line ministries,and during an approval stage after project documents have been developed but before they are submitted tothe SC for final approval. This involvement of the ISRB in the UNDG ITF governance structure and project-approval process fostered the alignment of the Trust Fund projects with existing national institutions andprocesses. Indeed, as noted by the MoPDC, the UNDG ITF was consistent in submitting its projects forapproval to the ISRB, while many other donors failed to comply with this national process.

6. Importance of realistic expectation for results. As agreed in the IRFFI ToR, the UN was asked tofocus on "funding quick impact projects and transition activities which need to be implemented in a rapidand flexible way." One of the criteria for the allocation of programme funding by the Cluster Group to aprogramme or project was its implementability in 2004 given the security situation and delivery capacity ofthe participating UN agency at the time. The focus was clearly on implementing as many projects aspossible as quickly as possible. Almost half of the UNDG ITF funds were disbursed in the first two years.Projects were approved as the UNDG ITF structures, as well as the Iraqi mechanisms for approval, werestill evolving, which impacted project results negatively. Many project designs were not properly reviewed



nor were the implementation capacities of UN agencies (such as availability of resources and staff)assessed. UN agencies faced tremendous difficulties in procuring goods and hiring staff, as well asarranging for appropriate security in Iraq. All those factors caused delays in project implementation. Onaverage, projects were delayed by 17 months. Expectations for results were unrealistic among the UNagencies given the overly optimistic assessment of conditions in Iraq at the time.

The above lessons have been learned and addressed with positive results throughout the life span of the fundand specifically in 2008 when a moratorium on project approval was placed for seven months in order forreforms to be enacted. Yet, there are number of other important lessons still to be learned and acted upon.

Lessons since 2008

As the political and economic situation in Iraq has improved in recent years with effective democratic elections,increased oil revenue and greater national capacity, there is a need for the UN and other development partnersto engage with the government in a new way. In addition, as donors around the world are facing increasingbudgetary pressure, the UN needs, more than ever before, to be responsive to donors' requests for monitoringand reporting on results.

Engagement of the GoI in the Steering Committee. While the UNDG ITF project-approval processengaged line ministries and the ISRB, it was nonetheless a step removed from the government and did not fullyexploit the opportunity to strengthen national capacity and build ownership. The process was very muchdirected and owned by the UN, and the government only fulfilled a few specific roles within it rather thantaking more holistic ownership. This ownership of the process by the UN was fully justified in the early yearswhen the government either did not exist or had weak capacity. The GoI has gained more capacity in recentyears, however, and should be integrated to a greater extent in the process. Specifically, the GoI should beinvited to participate on the SC of the fund as a co-chair. This will allow the government to have not only adecision-making power about proposed projects but will also support building and strengthening the capacityof the GoI to review those projects and increase the efficiency of the approval process by eliminating the sidestep of ISRB approval. In addition, engaging the GoI on the SC and providing it with the mandate to reviewprogress of ongoing projects on an ongoing basis will enhance the mutual accountability of projects. Theengagement of government authorities on the SC is a common practice for many other trust funds, whetheradministered by the WB or the UN. Most reviewed MDTFs administered by the UNDP MDTF Office includegovernment authorities on the SCs.

Importance of the evolution of governance structures over time. This also points to anotherimportant lesson from the UNDG ITF relating to the importance of flexibility of fund design and governancestructure over time. While the design might have been appropriate at the start of the fund in 2004, over thefollowing seven years the Trust Fund had to adapt as the situation changed and the needs and capacities ofvarious stakeholders evolved. While it is commendable that the UNDG ITF and donors commissioned tworeviews of the fund and addressed certain recommendations, in the future there is a need for a more structuredand ongoing review and adaptation of the Trust Fund’s design. In other words, the SC should considerconducting annual or bi-annual reviews to assess achievements against plans and address any challenges in theprocess. Ideally these reviews would involve participation of or input from the government and donors.

In the future, the UN should empower the government and NGOs more to implement projects:In a situation such as immediate post-conflict Iraq, UN agencies were almost the only reliable implementationpartner for donors. Thus these agencies had a significant role both as decision makers on the SC and as fundsrecipients for project implementation. This, arguably, is a conflict of interest but, in such circumstances, it washard to find alternatives. As the situation has now evolved, the UNDG ITF should consider the possibility of andoptions for expanding funding to other organizations beyond the UN. This will build the capacity of localorganizations and government. In fact, the UN should become the implementer of last resort and partner moreclosely with the governments and NGOs to empower them to implement projects. In some ways this is alreadybeing done under the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), where the GoI has a moreprominent role as an implementing partner. UN's role could still be critical but more as a convenor, policyadvisor and active collaborator in future funding issues.

Strengthening accountability: A key concern expressed by donors and the GoI is the lack of mandate of theleadership of the Trust Fund (i.e. the SC) to provide oversight and monitoring of ongoing projects and thus



ensure overall accountability for results. Due to the decentralized nature of the UN system, each UN agency isonly accountable to its head office and not to any other agency or any UN body, such as the SC of an MDTF.While every agency has to submit its update reports to the MDTF office, it is not accountable for results toeither the SC or the MDTF Office and neither the SC nor the MDTF Office can evaluate the agency performance.This was clearly outlined in the MoU signed between UN agencies and the MDTF Office, which gave the soleresponsibility for monitoring and evaluating projects to the UN agencies themselves. This represents an issue inthe setup phase, whereby many agencies implement projects funded by a trust fund, yet the trust fund officedoes not necessarily have a mandate to monitor and/or evaluate those projects.

The lack of a mandate for the SC to directly and universally monitor projects proved to be an issue, especiallywhen agencies were experiencing delays to project implementation and completion. The committee couldintervene only when agencies asked for project extensions or additional budget (see Annex 12, ‘List of 60Projects / Programmes Reviewed and their Extensions’). Some project evaluations indicate that poor projectresults could in some cases have been prevented had there been a proper system in place for the SC to review orstop ongoing projects that were not progressing well.

This matter is not easy to resolve within the UN system as each agency is independent. One solution, which wassuggested by other reviewers, would be to establish a third-party monitoring and/or evaluating agent. Forexample, the Scanteam review recommended creating a “central management point with final accountability forquality and performance.” Of course, the benefits of adding a central management unit with accountability forquality and performance need to be weighed against the potential costs. A management unit, preferably withcredible independence, responsible for monitoring project performances and holding UN agencies accountablefor results, would certainly increase the cost of operations if added to the existing governance structure. Adifferent model of a trust fund could be considered, however—one with a leaner governance structure such asthe Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, where the trust fund engages an independent localfund agent in each country to assess, monitor and report on implementing partners. The WB's trust fund modelalso incorporates engagement of an approved, independent monitoring agent, usually locally based, whichkeeps the overall governance structure lean and reduces the direct involvement of WB staff, thus reducingoperational costs.

Lessons learned:

4.2.a: There was limited joint programming between the UN and WB under IRFFI due to differencesin approach and the inability to set up a common Secretariat due to security restrictions. Thefull potential of the design of the IRFFI’s two-window model could have been better realized forIraq had the WB and the UN worked more closely together in joint programming andcoordinating their activities.

4.2.b: The designers of IRFFI could have set up more effective structures for remote cooperationbetween the WB and the UN if they had had more realistic expectations about Iraq's securitysituation in 2003.

4.2.c: The placing of the GoI at the helm of the IRFFI governance structure gave the ISRB a certainlevel of credibility as being responsible for the coordination of international assistance. AllUNDG ITF and WB ITF projects were channeled for approval through ISRB. The fact that in theoriginal design, the ISRB and MoPDC were positioned as the key decision makers with theMinistry of Finance (MoF) ensured the alignment of projects with national priorities andoverall budgetary framework.

4.2.d: The main tangible benefit of the two-window model MDTF has been the creation of a commonDonor Committee for the IRFFI, which reduced the cost and time spent on donor coordination.Annual or semi-annual meetings of the Donor Committee are a useful venue for donors,government and fund administrators to discuss the country priorities and progress ofinterventions.



4.2.e: The rapid approval of projects between 2004-2007, with limited review from the GoI anddonors, negatively impacted project results in the early years as many projects were designed tolast for a short period yet experienced significant challenges and were delayed. More extensivereview in the early stages could have prevented such delays.

4.2.f: Until 2008, the quick approval and implementation of projects without consultation, wherepossible, with GoI line ministries compromised the involvement of the GoI in the design ofprojects, and an opportunity was thus missed for developing capacity within government todesign and lead implementation of such projects.

4.2.g: The active involvement of donors in the process of project review and approval provedimportant to ensuring transparency and preventing conflicts of interest.

4.2.h: Including the GoI on the SC of the UNDG ITF could have enabled greater capacity developmentfor the GoI in the areas of project design, stakeholder engagement, implementation and overallgreater accountability by the GoI.

4.2.i: The lack of a central body responsible for oversight and evaluation of results of all projectsunder the Trust Fund raised a number of issues. Due to the decentralized nature of the UNsystem and based on the MoU signed between UNDG ITF and UN agencies, each agency wasindeed responsible for monitoring and evaluating its own projects. The SC did not have amandate to oversee or monitor ongoing projects funded by the UNDG ITF.

Recommendations:

4.2.1 Appropriate structures and processes should be established for the fund from the start, beforeprojects are approved and funds are disbursed. This process should also include an earlyassessment of agencies’ capacity to deliver on projects.

4.2.2 Donors should be encouraged to consider expanding the duration of the MDTF and reducingthe pressure for quick results at the start of the MDTF lifecycle in order to provide time foroperations to be properly established and to allow for greater involvement of the government,even at the price of slower implementation.

4.2.3 The two-window model of the WB and the UN implementing under one fund facility such asthat of IRFFI should be revisited and strengthened in the future. Unless a two-window modelprovides a genuine choice of donor channels and implementation capabilities and also can besupported by an effective joint-governing body and support mechanism, it should not beestablished.

4.2.4 The involvement of donor representatives in the project approval process should be ensuredfrom the start. Such involvement is beneficial as it ensures transparency, enhancescoordination and prevents conflict of interests within the UN system.

4.2.5 A future trust fund could consider creating an independent body to monitor ongoing projectsand provide oversight. This would address the issue of lack of accountability and leadership forthe overall results of a trust fund given that no single UN body has a mandate to oversee andmonitor other agencies. Models could be drawn from the World Bank Administrative Agent orGlobal Fund Local Fund Agent.

4.2.6 A future trust fund may wish to consider including the government on the SC as co-chair of thefund. As part of the SC, the UN and the GoI would jointly develop strategy and oversee theresults of projects. The SC should consider conducting annual or bi-annual review to assessachievements against plans and address any challenges in the process. Ideally this review wouldinvolve participation of or input from the government and donors.



4.3. Alignment28

According to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, alignment implies that donors align their overallsupport to partner countries’ national development strategies, institutions and procedures. The specific aspectsof alignment covered by the Paris Declaration include:

- Donors align with partners' strategies;- Donors use strengthened country systems;- With support from donors, partner countries strengthen development capacity, public financial

management capacity and national procurement systems.

The assessment of the alignment of UNDG ITF projects with national priorities at macro and micro levels willbe discussed in the section on ‘relevance’ under the subsequent development effectiveness chapter (see section5.3). This alignment section will focus instead on the UNDG ITF's alignment with existing GoI systems andmechanisms related to project-approval processes. In addition, the extent of donor earmarking and how itimpacted alignment with country strategies will be considered.

Alignment of project approval process with national processes

In principle, the process of approval for UNDG ITF projects, as discussed in a previous section underGovernance, was aligned with national processes as it used the existing structure of the ISRB at the early designstage of a project as well as at the final approval stage. Since 2008, the process has also required input from GoIline ministries at the start of project design.

The key element in the process of aligning UNDG ITF-funded projects and programmes with national prioritieswere the Sector Outcome Teams (SOTs), formerly known as Cluster Groups. SOTs have been designed toincrease strategic planning, programming and coordination among UN agencies. Interviewed SOT memberspointed out the value the SOT structure provided for the UN system’s coherence in Iraq. The SOT meetings,which were held on average once a month in Amman or Baghdad, provided an inter-agency platform fordiscussing progress towards reaching the intended outputs and outcomes, resolving technical issues anddeciding on which projects should be funded within the sector.

The SOTs had a mandate to work closely with national counterparts to ensure alignment with nationalpriorities. Despite this engagement of the GoI in project design, the whole process was nonetheless owned anddirected by UN teams. Also, due to the primary location of the SOTs in Amman, interaction with the GoI was ona remote basis especially in the early days of the Trust Fund. Even after some UN agencies relocated to Baghdadin recent years, their location within the International Zone made in-person interaction with GoI difficult due tosecurity restrictions. The GoI proposed its own structure for identifying priorities and projects within sectors inthe 2005 National Development Strategy (NDS), yet that structure was never fully implemented and instead aparallel process existed within the UN teams. As shown in the graphic below, the NDS proposed theestablishment of Sector Working Groups (SWGs) to be chaired by each ministry and that included relevantdonors and organizations. The intention was for those SWGs to meet regularly to discuss priorities and proposeprojects. Yet during the lifespan of the UNDG ITF only a few SWGs were operational and attended by theUNCTs, instead a parallel system of SOT was used by the UN. The SWGs that were operational were health andeducation. For example, the World Health Organization (WHO) participated in the Health and Nutrition SectorWorking Group, which was chaired by the Minister of Health and involved representatives from GoI, UN, WB,US Agency for International Development (USAID) and donors.

Government representatives pointed out that in this remote approach the government was often a bystanderwhile most of the project design was done by the UN teams, which were often working remotely. In the process,GoI officials therefore missed the chance to develop their own project design capacity as well as to gain greaterownership of funded projects. An alternative would be for the UN to request proposals from the GoI as is donein a number of other MDTFs such as the Afghanistan and Sudan trust funds.

28 The ToR for the LLE set out to discuss alignment and harmonization under one section. For the purpose of clarity, however, and to alignwith the Paris Declaration principles, the two sections are split in this report.



FIGURE 5: ENHANCED DONOR COORDINATION MECHANISM PROPOSED IN NDS

The fact that the UN operated remotely for security reasons made it difficult for UN teams to spend sufficienttime meeting in person with line ministries to discuss project concepts and how they are aligned with nationalpriorities. Another challenge faced by UN teams was the high level of turnover of GoI staff. Between 2004 and2010, the GoI changed several times and new officials and government staff came to power with each newgovernment while previous representatives left office. In an environment characterized by weak nationalcapacity and a lack of continuity or institutional memory, UN teams often chose to drive the concept note andproject document designs remotely from Amman. In the short-term, this approach resulted in projects beingdesigned and launched more quickly, without GoI participation. In the long term, however, this approachresulted in missed opportunities for greater alignment with national structures, national ownership andcapacity development for the government.

The frequent disconnection of GoI line ministries from the projects can be seen in the meeting minutes of ISRBmeetings, where many ministry representatives expected to present projects either did not attend the meetingsor were not sufficiently informed about the projects. The ISRB postponed 24 percent of project reviews (38 outof a total of 158 approved projects), in most cases because line ministry representatives were not present orprepared to present justification for those projects. Interviews with ISRB members and observers also pointedout that many line ministries were not informed about the projects and had not been involved in project design,which indicates that project design was owned and driven by the UN, often with only peripheral involvementfrom the government.

There were some exceptions, however, including a bigger involvement by line ministries in project design in thehealth, education and agriculture sectors. A more direct and extensive collaboration between the UN and theGoI in those sectors can also be deduced from the amount of government co-financing. The government wasmore willing to co-finance or contribute in-kind to projects where it had greater involvement and ownership.



Also, based on comments from the MoF, the government could only co-finance projects if there was anallowance for them in the budget, which required long-term planning from the UN and ongoing collaborationwith line ministries to ensure that budget would be appropriated for certain activities in future years.Government co-financing is discussed in detail in Section 4.5 on National Ownership.

Other aspects of alignment with country systems and procedures beyond the project-approval process includealignment with existing public financial management, accounting, auditing, procurement, national programmesand strategic frameworks and monitoring. The Paris Declaration encourages using a beneficiary country's owninstitutions and systems "where these provide assurance that aid will be used for agreed purposes, [to] increaseaid effectiveness by strengthening the partner country's sustainable capacity to develop, implement and accountfor its policies to its citizens and parliament."29 Given the weakness of institutions and systems in Iraq in 2004,UN agencies implemented most of their projects directly using their own procurement, accounting, planningand monitoring and evaluation systems. A major issue with the use of national systems in Iraq was that eitherthey did not exist, were not efficient or were subject to corruption. Only in the final years of the UNDG ITF wereprojects focusing on strengthening public sector management designed, such as the Public SectorModernization Programme.

Donor alignment

One of the key commitments of donors in the Paris Declaration was to, "base their overall support—countrystrategies, policy dialogues and development co-operation programmes—on partners' national developmentstrategies and periodic reviews of progress in implementing these strategies."30 As noted by the MoPDC,however, given the weakness of national mechanisms for developing a comprehensive vision for reconstructionand the weakness of national and local institutions’ capacity to plan and implement projects, donors were theones designing programmes which were consistent with donors' national policies for aid provision.31 This wasdone mainly through earmarking funds contributed to the UNDG ITF and setting preferences for fundscontributed to the WB ITF. While in theory earmarking can be regarded as contradicting the concept of pooledfunding through an MDTF, donor earmarking or preference allocation was permitted at certain levels under theIRFFI.

The following guidance was given regarding donor earmarking in the UNDG ITF. "Pursuant to the UN rules andregulations, the IRFFI ToR and the Letter of Agreement signed with IRFFI donors, the UNDG ITF enablesdonors to provide contributions either as earmarked or un-earmarked. Donors may earmark contributions bycluster/cross cutting themes or for a specific Participating UN Organization. Earmarking for specific projects isnot permitted. The contributions received will be mingled with other contributions to the UNDG ITF accountand will not be separately administered or separately identified for expenditure reporting purposes, exceptwhere such a contribution is earmarked for a specific Participating UN Organization."32

As shown in the table below, 88 percent of funds provided by donors to the UNDG ITF were earmarked eitherto a sector or to specific agencies. Some of the funds were given with earmarking to a number of sectors but alsowere "available to fund activities in other Policy Groups/ Sector Outcome Teams, based on prior consultations."Hence, the contribution was treated as ‘un-earmarked.’ Other funds were provided as un-earmarked with somepreferences for specific types of intervention such as elections, human rights, women's rights, good governanceand institution building, or responding to urgent basic needs of Iraqis, including Internally Displaced Persons(IDPs) and de-mining.33

29 ‘The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, 2005/2008,’ pg. 13.30

‘The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, 2005/2008,’ pg. 3.31

Malik, Huda A. Director General of International Cooperation Directorate, MoP, ‘Position paper on aid management in Iraq.’32

IRFFI website, www.irffi.org33

‘Breakdown of Earmarked and Un-earmarked Donor Deposits, as of 30 April 2010.’ Available on the MDTF Office Gateway website,http://mdtf.undp.org



TABLE 3: BREAKDOWN OF EARMARKED AND UN-EARMARKED DONOR DEPOSITS AND INTEREST

Donor Deposits

(US$ 000s)

Interest Earned

(US$ 000s)

Earmarked 1,195,680.02 60,253.28

Un-earmarked 158,959.35 10,061.35

Total 1,354,639.37 70,314.63

% Earmarked 88% 86%

Studies of other post-conflict MDTFs show that in countries where earmarking is high, the direction of theoverall development programme tends to be driven by donor priorities rather than by national developmentstrategies. In countries where trust funds have been established without earmarking, such as the AfghanistanReconstruction Trust Fund under the World Bank's administration, the trust fund has been able to demonstratestronger support for the emerging government priorities such as the National Solidarity Programme inAfghanistan. 34

In Iraq, where donor earmarking focused on reconstruction and recovery and later on capacity development, itwas difficult to address humanitarian crises, emergencies and other emerging priorities as there were no fundsearmarked for humanitarian interventions. In such situations the UNDG ITF had to rely on the use of thelimited funds that were not earmarked or on interest funds which did not have pre-assigned earmarking. As willbe further discussed in the section on development effectiveness, earmarking also prevented or inhibited theUN agencies from engaging in certain sectors such as transport (a priority area identified by the GoI in theNDS). According to the Scanteam review of MDTFs in post-conflict countries, "earmarking weakens UNsupport for national ownership and leadership, and creates incentives for UN agencies to strengthenpartnerships with individual donors instead of developing coordination structures that also include governmentand civil society."35

There are a number of reasons why donors chose to earmark their funds when contributing to a trust fund: Donor funds might be linked to specific budget lines in their national budgets for international

assistance, and those may have been pre-assigned to specific sectors and types of interventions basedon the donor-country assistance strategy.

In a post-conflict situation where there is no national strategy or institutional strength, donorearmarking may provide some form of direction, which may be needed due to the lack of appropriateleadership or direction.

Earmarking funds provides the ability to know how funds are being spent even in the context of anMDTF. Donor representatives in the field have an obligation to report back to their headquarters andtheir constituencies, to explain how the funds are spent. Without an ability to earmark their funds,donors would have only limited ability to obtain details on how these are used under an MDTF.

While donors agreed in 2004 to earmark funds only at sector or agency level, towards the end of the UNDG ITFmany seemed to wish they could earmark funds at a project level in order to know which specific projects werefunded from their contribution. Many interviewed donors expressed their concerns and often disappointmentat the lack of visibility into where their funds had been used. Indeed, a number of donors based in Amman andBaghdad interviewed for the LLE recognized that they had a ‘change of heart’ over the years of IRFFIimplementation. While initially some donors were willing to contribute un-earmarked funds in 2004, with timethey felt pressure from their home governments to show concrete results and thus demanded more visibilityfrom the UN. This time-related evolution of the fund, the GoI’s emergence and increasing donor participationhad a direct impact on the levels of earmarking. It has not been a static characteristic.

There are various definitions of visibility in this context. For some donors visibility means, for example, havingtheir country's flag posted on a school, hospital or another building constructed with their funding. This was notconsidered best practice in Iraq as people and assets associated with international development aid were oftentargeted by insurgents. Other donors wanted to see their flags on project documents as a form of

34Barakat, Sultan. ‘The failed promise of multi-donor trust funds: aid financing as an impediment to effective state-building in post-conflict

contexts.’ Policy Studies, Vol. 30, No.2, April 2009, pg. 110.35

Scanteam ‘Review of Post-Crisis Multi-Donor Trust Funds,’ Norad, 2007, pg. 41.



acknowledgement for their contribution. For others still, visibility means being able to obtain detailedinformation from the trust fund on which projects they funded.

Given the nature of a pooled funding mechanism such as an MDTF, however, detailed information on whichprojects were funded by which donor cannot be made available. The MDTF Office does not have a system inplace to earmark funds nor is it entitled to do such earmarking at project level or to provide detailedinformation to donors. Such earmarking at project level goes against the very idea of pooled funding. Thus theonly visibility most UNDG ITF donors received was information about their contribution to sectors and semi-annual and annual reports including updates about projects implemented across all sectors. For this reason, astime passed, many donors in Iraq chose to direct more funding to bilateral programmes rather than to anMDTF.

The ToR for IRFFI states that donors would be recognized for their contribution and would receive visibility."Whenever possible and to the extent that it does not jeopardize the privileges and immunities accorded tothem and the safety and security of their staff, the participating UN Organisations and the World Bank, inconsultation with the appropriate Iraqi authorities, promote donor visibility on information, project materialsand at project sites."36 The specific level of visibility donors would be entitled to was not clearly defined at thestart, however, and expectations changed over time as the situation in Iraq evolved and donor's prioritieschanged.

Interviewed representatives of UN agencies also underlined the issue of insufficient donor visibility. Some UNagencies went an extra mile to create separate reports (not required by the UNDG ITF) to outline thecontribution to specific projects of donors who had earmarked their funds. Even though the UNDG ITFAdministrative Agent fulfilled the function of managing donor relations, some agencies maintained activerelationships with UNDG ITF donors. These agencies facilitated donor visits to project sites and, in some cases,provided reports with donor flags on cover pages. UNDP representatives pointed out that they considered thisway of handling donor relations to be effective and that the UNDG ITF reporting became an additional burdenfor them. A number of other interviewed UN agencies also expressed their concern as to whether donorsreceived sufficient visibility from the MDTF Office.

Lessons Learned:

4.3.a: The UNDG ITF process for approving projects was designed to facilitate alignment with nationalstrategies and seek input and approval from national institutions. In practice, however, the processfaced a number of challenges as a result of weak government capacity, high turnover of GoI officials andthe UN's deciding to operate through remote management. By moving the process largely out ofBaghdad for security reasons, opportunities for government capacity development and institutionstrengthening were understandably not optimized.

4.3.b: While earmarking by donors did not significantly impact alignment with national priorities in the earlyyears given the vast needs in Iraq, it prevented the UN from quickly addressing humanitarian needs inthe country as only small portion of funds was un-earmarked and thus able to be allocated toemergency needs.

4.3.c: A number of donors remain unclear as to which specific projects their funds were used for by theUNDG ITF, and more comprehensive communication is needed between donors and the MDTF Officeregarding the desired and actual reporting. While there is an agreement in place between the MDTFOffice and donors regarding the type and frequency of reports the MDTF Office can provide, donorscontinue to ask for more detailed reports that would help them understand which projects were fundedfrom their contributions. This points to a need for the MDTF Office to set up and frequently clarifyexpectations regarding reporting.

36IRFFI ToR, 2007, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IRFFI/Resources/IRFFITORRevisedOct2007.pdf



Recommendations:

4.3.1: As the security situation has improved in recent years, the UN may consider relocating more staff inIraq to engage more directly with government officials during the design stage of projects in order toensure greater alignment with national priorities and processes and to provide more opportunities forcapacity development through interactions with UN teams.

4.3.2: The MDTF Office should consider establishing more effective ways of communicating with donorsthroughout the life span of the Trust Fund and of managing expectations regarding the level of visibilityand detail donors can expect to obtain. This would help prevent or reduce some of the frustrationexpressed by donors relating to the lack of detailed information on how their funds were spent.

4.3.3 The UNDG ITF donors should, through, their respective HQ, encourage engagement with the UNDG toaddress some of their concerns regarding the legal instruments’ and MDTF operations’ impact onvisibility and tracking donor earmarking at the project level. The MDTF Office, as AA, operatesfollowing the legal instruments and AA protocol and thus cannot take such decisions on its own.

4.3.4: Going forward, and as the government is now able to articulate its priorities more clearly, donorsshould be encouraged to avoid earmarking their funds in order to ensure greater alignment andflexibility of interventions. Donors should also be reminded of their commitments to the principles ofthe Paris Declaration and be encouraged to reconsider their earmarking and visibility requirementsfrom MDTFs.

4.4. Harmonization

The Paris Declaration calls for more harmonized and collectively effective donor actions and activities.Specifically, donors have committed under the Paris Declaration to, "Implement, where feasible, commonarrangements at country level for planning, funding…disbursement, monitoring and reporting to governmenton donor activities and aid flows."37 In addition, donors should aim to work together to reduce the number ofseparate, duplicatory missions to the field and diagnostic reviews.

There is a broad perception among development practitioners that MDTFs are useful mechanisms to encouragegreater harmonization and coordination of the aid provided to a country. It is important to understand,however, the difference between the concepts of coordination and harmonization, which are often usedinterchangeably in the literature and interviews. Harmonization, as noted in the paragraph above, refers tocreating common agreements and arrangements for processes and systems. Coordination, on the other hand,refers to enhanced interaction, communication and information sharing. The ‘Joint Evaluation of the UNDGContribution to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness’ published by the UNDP Evaluation Team in 2008provides the following distinction between coordination and harmonization: "Coordinating donor missions maymean maintaining a large number of missions running in a well coordinated parallel fashion; harmonizingmeans combining missions of different agencies…. Coordination may mean harmonization but the test for realharmonization is reduced cost and/or a measurably improved service."38

This section will cover: 1) the harmonization of aid among donors in Iraq and 2) the coordination of donoractivities in Iraq.39

Harmonization of aid among donors

Given the lack of government capacity and leadership in setting priorities and systems following the 2003conflict and the absence of donors on the ground, the UNDG ITF provided a much-needed mechanism fordonors to harmonize their aid. Twenty-five donor countries contributed to a pooled funding mechanism withestablished structures and processes; many of these countries had no presence in Iraq and would not have beenable to contribute to the country’s reconstruction in the absence of the trust fund. The UNDG ITF created

37 ‘The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, 2005/2008,’ http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/30/63/43911948.pdf38 ‘Joint Evaluation of the UNDG Contribution to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness,’ UNDP Evaluation Team, 2008, pg. 38.39 While a discussion on harmonization of UN processes and systems might fit well in this section, it will be addressed in the section onManagement for Results.



common arrangements for planning, funding, disbursement and reporting on activities and aid flows, and thusreduced the potential costs of establishing separate processes by individual donors. All those arrangementswere agreed upon in the ToR for the UNDG ITF and enforced by the SC, the SCSO, the AA and the DonorCommittee. All of these harmonized processes were presented and discussed in earlier sections of this report onfund design and alignment.

Based on the definition of harmonization provided in the Paris Declaration, there was actually littleharmonization among donors in Iraq outside of the UNDG ITF. On the contrary, as noted by the MoPDC therewas a significant level of donor fragmentation. While the UNDG ITF was a good example of aid harmonizationin Iraq, it was nonetheless a relatively small example. The IRFFI indeed only constituted 3 percent of the totalof US$68.82 billion that Iraq received from the United States and the international community during the2003-2010 period. Details about funding sources in Iraq from 2003 to 2010 are provided in the graph below,which is extracted from the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) Quarterly Report to theUnited States Congress on 30 October 2010.

FIGURE 6: FUNDING SOURCES 2003-2010

Analysis of the aid flow from 2004 to 2010 together with interview discussions with donors highlight the factthat donors preference has shifted over time to channeling aid bilaterally rather than through a trust fundmechanism. As reported by SIGIR in January 2005, the majority of assistance pledged by individual nationstates, excluding the United States in 2004, was channeled through international organizations. At that time,commitments for bilateral assistance (US$1,120 million) were almost equal to commitments to the IRFFI(US$1,058 million).40 As of December 2005, the Department of State (DoS) estimated that approximatelyUS$1.5 billion in bilateral project assistance had been donated to Iraq. This compared to US$1.3 billion incommitments by donors to the IRFFI in 2005.

The balance shifted significantly in later years away from pooled funding and towards bilateral aid. In 2010, asshown on the SIGIR graph above, only US$1.8 billion of the US$12.1 billion in international aid provided toIraq was channeled through the IRFFI. The rest was channeled through bilateral aid or directly to the UN orWB (multilateral) outside of the trust funds. Overall, the IRFFI amounted to only 15 percent of totalinternational donor contribution (excluding the US) between 2004 and 2010.

40 ‘Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) Quarterly Report to the United States Congress as of 30 October 2010.’



It is important to note that about half of all international donor commitments (excluding the US) were in theform of loans (US$5.85 billion) rather than grants (US$6.15 billion). This is shown on the graph below, which isbased on information provided in the SIGIR quarterly report of 30 October 2010.

FIGURE 7: INTERNATIONAL GRANTS AND LOANS

The contribution pattern of the European Commission, the largest donor to the IRFFI, provides a good exampleof the shift in donors' preferences from multilateral to bilateral aid. As noted in the independent evaluation ofUNDP governance programmes, the European Commission’s contributions to the UNDG ITF were substantialbetween 2004 and 2006, but diminished over time in favor of contributions provided bilaterally to UNagencies. "As the European Commission became disillusioned with UNDG ITF functioning, the EuropeanCommission diminished funding to the UNDG ITF and increased the amount allotted bilaterally."41

TABLE 4: EUROPEAN COMMISSION MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL CONTRIBUTIONS 2004-2009($000S)42

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total

EC ITF contributions 101.798 195.327 164.072 76.158 31.011 0 568.366

EC direct funding toUN agencies

1.2 4.4 0 14.0 30.0 0 49.6

Source: UNAMI IRFFI records and European Commission financial records

Furthermore, the evaluation notes that while the amounts contributed bilaterally were not significant, "…whatis involved is a matter of principle. The European Commission doubts the UNDG ITF's ability to realistically

41 Freedman, Dr. Jim and Balasem, Dr. Abbas. ‘Evaluation of UNDP Governance Projects Funded by the Iraq Trust Fund,’ UNDP, 10 June2010, pg. 17.42 According to the MDTF Office, EC contributions were made in 2004, 2005, and 2006 and, finally, in 2007, all with tranches released

based on expenditure.



assess a UN Organization's capacity to perform, and it consequently prefers to make funding decisions directlywith implementers it believes, by its own estimation, are the more promising."43

Thus despite the apparently obvious harmonization benefits provided by a trust fund mechanism, donors werenot too keen on harmonizing their funding in Iraq through the UNDG ITF. One clear reason for this is thatdonors were not able to obtain the expected level of visibility, as discussed in the above section on alignment.For reasons of political and commercial interest, donors were in many cases eager to gain better recognitionfrom the GoI for the contribution they made via bilateral aid rather than through a trust fund. Another reasonfor the decreasing share of aid channeled through the trust fund is an issue of scale, whereby the larger donorssuch as the US, Japan or the EC are unwilling to harmonize their processes and systems with other smallerdonors and relinquish the control that bilateral channels allow. The US, for instance, may have been willing toprovide US$10 million to the IRFFI just to have a seat on the Donor Committee, yet as noted by the former USDeputy Ambassador in Iraq it never had any intention of channeling funds through a trust fund. Finally,geopolitical relationships also influence the possible degree of harmonization in the recipient country, and somedonors are not necessarily willing to work with all other donor countries. This may have been the case given thehighly politicized environment in which the Iraq war started and the tensions it gave rise to in the internationalcommunity. A promising trend was noted with the recent issue of a joint strategy for Iraq by the EuropeanCommission, Italy and Sweden. This first ‘Joint Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme for Iraq’developed for the period 2011-2013 builds on earlier assistance and focuses on institution-building in the fieldsof governance, rule of law and basic services. For consistency in joint programming, the European Commission,Sweden and Italy noted that they will be working closely on the coherence and harmonization of everycomponent of their joint response strategy. As noted in the strategy paper, all three parties will identify themain areas of intervention and focus on specific elements within the same sectors, in order to gain a broadersocial impact and maintain a holistic and integrated approach.44

As noted by the MoPDC, the fragmentation of aid led to smaller project sizes and thus increased the overallimplementation costs as each project needed its own security.45 Speaking about projects funded bilaterally bydonors outside of the UNDG ITF, the MoPDC noted that the security costs in some cases exceeded 40 percent ofthe total project cost (especially in the case of US-funded projects). Fragmentation of aid also meant that manynew projects were implemented at the expense of sustaining existing ones which had already established somestructures, processes and capacity for implementation.

Coordination of donor activities in Iraq

While donors are increasingly reluctant to harmonize their aid in Iraq, most of them are interested in enhancedcoordination. There are a number of channels for donor aid coordination in Iraq, some of them created andfacilitated by the UN and the World Bank, others by donors or the GoI. The main forums are listed below, but itis important to note that this list is not exhaustive as some donors may have established more or less formalforums over the past seven years and there is no formal record keeping of aid coordination.

- IRFFI Donor Committee. Ten donor coordination meetings were held since 2004 in internationallocations, with the latest on 13 December 2010 in Baghdad. The objective of these meetings has been todiscuss the progress of the IRFFI implementation, emerging priorities and IRFFI programmatic andadministrative matters. Only donors who contributed US$10 million or more to the IRFFI were invitedto take part in the Donor Committee.

- Peer Review Group of the UNDG ITF. Since the reform of UNDG ITF governance processes in2008, the Peer Review Group (PRG) invited donors to participate in meetings in which projects weretechnically and programmatically reviewed and agreed upon for approval by the UNDG ITF SC. Thisallowed donors to contribute to programme and project planning while sharing information about

43 Op. cit. Freedman J. and Balasem, A., pg. 18.44 ‘EU Joint Strategy Paper for Iraq 2011-2013 Concept Note,’ published by the European Commission – External Relations on the ECwebsite, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/iraq/docs/2011_2013_concept_note_en.pdf45 According to the MoPDC, the trend in Iraq is towards donor fragmentation rather than harmonization. Based on the informationavailable in the Donor Assistance Database, more than 40 donors provided aid to Iraq since 2003. There were more than 20,000 projectsfunded and implemented through either multilateral or bilateral channels. The average size of projects implemented in Iraq was aboutUS$800,000, if US projects are taken into consideration, and US$6 million excluding US projects.



ongoing projects, to build on complementarities and prevent duplication through bilateral aid. Only afew donors (mainly the EU, Canada and Italy) participated in the PRG meetings on a regular basis.

- Iraqi Partners Forum. Created in 2009, the forum is co-chaired by the WB and the UN and isintended to enhance coordination among donors. Representatives from the GoI are invited to attendthe meetings. Interviewed MoPDC representatives pointed out that while those meetings are useful forsharing information about projects donors are funding or implementing, the information is oftenshared after projects have been approved, with little focus on common planning and aid harmonization.In addition, Iraqi stakeholders felt that this type of forum should be led by the GoI rather than the UNor World Bank.

- Sector Working Groups. The concept of the Sector Working Group (SWG) was created under theNDS in 2005, with a view to providing a forum for discussing priorities in certain sectors. SWGs wereonly operational in a few sectors, however, and the concept only has been maintained for certain sectorssuch as education and health.

The GoI has a strong role in and responsibility for coordinating foreign aid. The primary role of coordination ofdonor aid in Iraq has been in the hands of the MoPDC. While staffed by capable individuals, the ministry hasstruggled to collaborate with line ministries on selecting priorities and projects. As the MoPDC is on the samelevel as other line ministries, it cannot exercise an oversight role over other line ministries, and some lineministries even do not recognize the role the MoPDC plays. Also, donors do not always inform the MoPDCabout what projects they are planning or currently implementing. According to MoPDC representatives, someagencies and donors do not consult the MoPDC regarding their plans and projects and not all projectsimplemented in Iraq pass through the ISRB. Moreover, some donors implemented their programmes directlywith local authorities without any consultation with the federal government or line ministries, thus causingconfusion, wasting financial resources and undermining the government’s role in coordinating the country’sdevelopment. In order to strengthen the role of donor coordination, plans have been made to elevate theDevelopment Cooperation unit to the Prime Minister’s office or to create a unit that would stand above all otherline ministries.

Many donors interviewed in Iraq noted that they appreciated the fact that they could consult and coordinatetheir bilateral activities with the MoPDC. In this way, they were able to maintain good relationships with theGoI and gain the right level of visibility. Those donors who were operating outside of Iraq and who contributedtheir funding to Iraq primarily through the IRFFI felt otherwise. This, of course, is the sentiment of the donorsin 2010, when the situation is more stable than previously and the government is more capable of engaging withdonors. In the early post-conflict period, donors were choosing to contribute their funds through UNDG ITF asthey were not able to engage directly with the government. Thus, as the situation becomes more stable donorsprefer to engage directly with the government rather than through a trust fund.

This preference is not in contradiction with the Paris Declaration principles of aid harmonization.Harmonization and coordination can still take place provided aid can be directed by the MoPDC or a similargovernment body. In a stable country, the government, not a trust fund or another donor committee, should becoordinating foreign aid and approving projects. The role of a trust fund such as UNDG ITF should be tosupport the development of capacity for the government to set priorities, coordinate foreign aid and improvefinancial management. The trust fund should not create a separate mechanism to coordinate donor aid, butinstead work with the government to enhance the government's capacity to do so. Once the trust fund iscompleted, further technical advice could be provided to the government’s coordination unit so that it can fullytake over the donor aid coordination.

As the UNDG ITF drew to a close and plans were in place for the establishment of a new fund, the UNDG ITFSC needs to focus on strengthening the capacity of the MoPDC as the international aid coordination body. Itmeans handing over the leadership and coordination efforts to the government. UN advisors for particularsectors should hold meetings in Baghdad with line ministries and the MoPDC (or the new GoI coordinationbody) to determine priorities and design projects. The UNDG ITF has laid good foundations for assisting thegovernment in developing its capacity, setting national priorities and coordinating donor aid. This form ofassistance needs to have greater focus for any future intervention.



Lessons learned:

4.4.a: The UNDG ITF as a pool-funding mechanism contributed to the harmonization of donor aid in Iraq byestablishing processes for planning, funding, disbursement, monitoring and reporting on activities andaid flows. This harmonization allowed donors, especially smaller ones, to achieve significant savings bynot establishing their own operations in Iraq, and instead engaging with one UN entity and channelingfunds through a trust fund.

4.4.b: On a large scale, considering the US$68.82 billion of aid given to Iraq by the international community,the UNDG ITF was a small example of aid harmonization in the country. Given the donors' currentpreference to channel their aid bilaterally, the UN and the World Bank did not encourage donors tofurther harmonize their aid spending in Iraq through a trust fund in the most recent years.

4.4.c: Given the lack of overall government capacity and leadership in the early years, the IRFFI providedmuch-needed coordination among donors, the GoI and implementing agencies through the IRFFIDonor Committee and other coordination mechanisms. While this coordination was useful forstakeholders in Iraq, greater capacity for GoI to coordinate international aid could have been developedif a parallel UN structure for project design outside the control of the GoI had not been established.

Recommendations

4.4.1: As committed in the Paris Declaration, donors should be encouraged, especially where circumstancesare challenging such as in a conflict zone like Iraq, to continue harmonizing their aid and their in-country missions and activities either through a trust fund or through other mechanisms.

4.4.2: For a future MDTF with an exclusive or a high level of implementation capability being entrusted to UNagencies, more emphasis needs to be put on providing donors up-front with confidence in a credible,unified monitoring, evaluation and reporting mechanism to promote greater levels of donor trust in thefunds accountability and ability to deliver effective results.

4.4.3: Instead of creating a parallel mechanism for project-approval processes and sector strategies, the UNshould focus on building government capacity to coordinate international aid and design sectorstrategies.

4.4.4: The GoI needs to strengthen its internal coordination mechanisms to provide clear direction to donorsabout national priorities.

4.5. National Ownership

Many lessons learned from development interventions around the world point to the importance of nationalownership and commitment from national players in achieving sustainable results. Under the ParisDeclaration, partner countries are committed to exercising effective leadership over their development policiesand strategies, and to coordinating development actions. Specifically, partner countries are committed to thefollowing:

1. Exercising leadership in developing and implementing their national development strategies throughbroad consultative processes.

2. Translating these national development strategies into prioritized results-oriented operationalprogrammes, reflected in medium-term expenditure frameworks and annual budgets.

3. Taking the lead in coordinating aid at all levels in conjunction with other development resources indialogue with donors and encouraging the participation of civil society and the private sector.

In parallel, donors committed themselves to respecting partner country leadership and helping strengthen itscapacity to exercise that leadership.

Research on interventions in fragile states shows that achieving national ownership is very challenging in mosttransition environments because national actors do not have the capacity to assert effective leadership overpolicies and strategies or to coordinate transition activities in their country as foreseen in the Paris



Declaration.46 Likewise, Iraq faced difficulties and challenges in its efforts to exercise national ownershipfollowing the war due to weak institutions, lack of stable government, centralized decision making power,inadequate human capacity due to the emigration of skilled officials and high turnover at government offices.

Since the beginning of international engagement in Iraq in 2003, donors have recognized the need to supportand foster national ownership. The JNA emphasized the need for the transition to be owned by the Iraqi peopleand noted that Iraqis should be defining the direction and pace of policy reform and development. Also, theToR for the IRFFI noted that all projects should be implemented with the participation of the GoI. The numberone challenge in achieving national ownership in Iraq has been the country’s difficulty in establishing a solidand consistent political leadership. Until 2005, there was no elected government in place and the interimgovernment established by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) lacked legitimacy. Since the first electionstook place in January 2005, the government has been anything but stable. The results of the latest elections in2010 left the country without a government in place for almost a year. In such an environment of politicalinstability, national ownership is often out of reach.

In principle, MDTFs in post-conflict countries should be designed with the intention of empowering nationalownership, providing legitimacy for the government and developing national capacity. Also, the use of MDTFassistance should be designed to follow a government-led strategy in which needs and priorities are identified.In practice, however, the experience shows that MDTFs are often set up soon after a conflict, war or disasteroccurs and that large amounts of money are usually channeled through them when international actors haveinfluence on donors to make pledges. At that time, the government normally does not have the capacity toabsorb large contributions, and MDTF administrators and implementers end up governing and in effect owningthe development interventions.47 This presents a significant dilemma for the development community—how toefficiently contribute aid to a country in need, while at the same time developing capacity and fostering nationalownership.

In this section, key aspects of Iraq national ownership will be examined on a macro level, including leadershipin developing and implementing national development strategies through broad consultative processes, as wellas GoI ownership of the coordination of international aid. On a micro level, the discussion will focus on the roleof the GoI in implementing projects and co-financing.

Leadership in developing and implementing national developmentstrategies through broad consultative processes

One of the key areas where a country can demonstrate national ownership is its ability to formulate andimplement national development strategies through a broad consultative process. Before this broadconsultative process can be achieved in Iraq, the country needs to modernize and decentralize its public sector.As noted in a recent UNDP assessment of the Iraqi Public Sector, despite the billions of dollars committed bythe international community and the GoI since 2003 and the number of strategies identifying the need for atransition towards a democratic, representative, decentralized and service delivery oriented state, an effectivedecentralization and modernization of the public sector has not yet been achieved in Iraq.48

In the process of developing national strategies over the years, the government managed to graduallyincorporate input from the regions. The first NDS was prepared in 2004-05 in a centralized manner by theMoPDC in consultation with line ministries and the MoF, then discussed by the economic team of the cabinetand presented to the High Economic Council and later to the Council of Ministers. The second NDS wasdeveloped in 2007 for the period of 2008-2010. The latest National Development Plan, released in 2010,involved regional input to a larger extent, which shows a significant improvement in the national consultativeprocess.

A key challenge identified in the first NDS for the GoI was the centralized nature of the government and thedifficulty in effectively involving the regions in planning and prioritizing development needs. According to the

46 Ball, Nicole and van Beijnum, Mariska. ‘Pooled funding for transition at the country level,’ prepared for the UNDG/ECHA task team onfinancing for transition, 8 November 2010, pg. 11.47 Barakat, Sultan. ‘The failed promise of multi-donor trust funds: aid financing as an impediment to effective state-building in post-conflictcontexts,’ Policy Studies, Vol. 30, No.2, April 2009.48 Iraq Public Sector Modernisation (I-PSM) Programme.



2005 NDS, "There is need to reform the current planning framework because it is a legacy of the centralplanning system utilized by the previous regime with disastrous results. Decentralization is key to Iraq’s visionof transforming itself into prosperous, federal democratic nation. The process of decentralization involves thetransfer of responsibilities for identifying local priorities, budgeting, project formulation and implementation toprovincial and municipal governments."49

The NDS proposed the following four strategies to effectively involve the regions in the process of planning andbudgeting:

1. Abandon the centralized system of economic management that was the hallmark of the previousregime;

2. Use regional governments to contribute to the formulation, prioritization and implementation ofdevelopment projects;

3. Distribute investment funds equitably among the regions, based primarily on population size but withconsideration of addressing inequities;

4. Urge donors to adhere to the regional distribution of foreign resources as determined by the nationalbudget.

Since the adoption of the two NDSs, the ‘International Compact with Iraq’ (2006) and the ‘UN Iraq AssistanceStrategy’ (2008) also identified as priorities strengthening institutions, processes and regulatory frameworks ofnational and local governance as priorities. The main recommendations were:

International Compact with Iraq: Develop a machinery of government (modernization) strategy todetermine the size, shape, mandate and functions of government bodies at national and sub-nationallevels, in accordance with the new Civil Service Council Law to support enhanced service delivery.

UN Iraq Assistance Strategy: Improve policy-making, planning, budgeting and delivery capacity ofdecentralized governance stakeholders.

Despite the clear prioritization of public sector reform, according to the needs assessment conducted for theIraq Public Sector Modernization (I-PSM) Programme approved by the UNDG ITF in April 2010, "no formal,comprehensive public administration and civil service reform programme has been adopted by the GoI. Plansto decentralize delivery have not progressed due to a poorly coordinated devolution process, ill-defined rolesand responsibilities and the continued existence of highly centralized functional structures of governance."50 Assuch, the GoI's capacity to develop and implement national development strategies through broad consultativeprocesses including all regions and local representatives remains fairly limited.

Also, the ‘Common Country Assessment’ of Iraq conducted in 2009 identified several challenges affecting goodgovernance in Iraq including: 1) a non-inclusive and non-transparent political system, weak rule of law andpersistent human rights violations; 2) a centralized, inefficient public sector; 3) a nascent decentralizationprocess; 4) corruption; 5) limited capacity to address regional disparities and vulnerable population groups; 6)lack of equal economic and political opportunities for women and challenges related to ensuring the protectionof their rights; and 7) weak capacity to anticipate tensions linked to demographic patterns and environmentalchange.51

The fragmented bilateral donor contributions in Iraq have in many ways undermined GoI efforts to distributefunds equitably among the regions. As noted by the MoPDC, donors would often go directly to local authoritiesin the area they wanted to work in and provide funds to them without first verifying and informing the centralgovernment and adhering to the regional distribution scheme as determined by the national budget. This madeit difficult for the GoI to keep track of the regions’ needs and the amounts of funding those regions were alreadyreceiving. In effect, it can be argued that this behavior of bilateral donors undermined national ownership.

Given the mandate of the UNDG ITF for reconstruction and recovery and its focus on demonstrating quickresults, there was less emphasis on fostering government capacity and ownership. Consequently, as noted in theUNDP project document for the I-PSM Programme, despite the billions of dollars committed by the GoI and

49 ‘National Development Strategy 2005-2007,’ published by the Republic of Iraq, Iraqi Strategic Review Board, Ministry of Planning andDevelopment Cooperation, 30 June 2005, pg. 46.50 Iraq Public Sector Modernization (I-PSM) Programme document.51 ’Common Country Assessment, Iraq,’ UNDAF for Iraq 2011-2014, pg. 17.



international community since 2003 to transition towards a democratic, representative, decentralized andservice-delivery oriented state, an effective decentralization and modernization of public sector has not yet beenachieved in Iraq. Despite the emphasis in the JNA, NDS and ICI on the need to support national ownership andto develop a system for decentralized and consultative formulation of development strategies, the UNDG ITF'scontribution in this area has been rather limited over the past seven years.

One programme funded by the UNDG ITF has made some inroads in developing regional capacity to plan andprioritize. The Local Area Development Programme (LADP) was jointly implemented by seven UN agenciesincluding the UNDP, UN-HABITAT, ILO, WHO, UNOPS, UNESCO and UNIFEM, and the MoPDC since 2007.Its main objective was to strengthen the capabilities of local authorities in three selected areas in the north,center and south of the country to plan and manage reconstruction and development activities through theformulation and implementation of human-rights-based, gender-sensitive local-area development plans. Theproject also improved coordination and communication mechanisms between central government and localauthorities in the three areas. The component of capacity development for local areas for planning was regardedby the evaluation report as a success.

Another initiative, the Iraq Public Sector Modernization (I-PSM) Programme approved by UNDG ITF in 2010,is a US$55 million joint programme aimed at supporting the GoI in modernizing its public sector by adopting apublic sector reform strategy for all of government. The programme objectives aim at addressing "existingpublic sector governance constraints through a government-led, centrally administered and coordinatedapproach that (i) rationalizes the architecture and machinery of government (ii) improves human resourcemanagement and culture (iii) enhances administrative functionality and generalized management systems (iv)develops clearly defined and costed-service delivery models in target sectors (v) approaches decentralizationthrough a service delivery lens on a sector-by-sector basis, (vii) increases the devolution of service delivery tolocal government to secure effectiveness, efficiency, transparency and sustainability, with enhancedparticipation, and (viii) improves the capacity of local government institutions for decentralized servicedelivery."52 The programme, which expects to receive co-financing from the GoI in the future, envisages takingten years to achieve this vision.

The government is now engaged in directing the I-PSM and collaborating with the UN and USAID for thatpurpose. The GoI recently presented a paper on PSM strategy and is in the process of discussing with the UNand USAID how the work should be implemented between those two players. Thus the GoI appears to havegood ownership and involvement in the process. According to MoPDC representatives, GoI leadership isessential to the success of this project and the international organizations are generally working well with theGoI.

GoI leadership in coordinating development aid

Another objective to which partner countries committed in the Paris Declaration is taking ownership of thecoordination and management of development aid. This represented a particular challenge in the case of Iraq,which received US$68.82 billion in foreign aid from a large number of donors over the past seven years.Indeed, managing that amount of aid from more than 40 donors, each having specific preferences aboutsectors, subsectors, regions or priorities, would be a difficult task even for the well-established institutions of amodern government. For Iraq, a country isolated from international influence and assistance for many yearsand lacking strong institutions and coherent leadership, this was understandably an overwhelming endeavour.

The MoPDC is the main body of the GoI responsible for coordinating and promoting overall internationalassistance to Iraq to ensure that resources are allocated efficiently and effectively in line with nationalstrategies. The mandate of the MoPDC is to develop transparent procedures for allocating internationalassistance to geographic and/or functional sectors in Iraq and optimize the use of those resources to meet Iraq'sprioritized needs. Their main vehicle established for aid coordination in Iraq has been the Iraq Strategic ReviewBoard (ISRB).

52 ‘UNDG Iraq Trust Fund Annual Programme Narrative Progress Report, Reporting Period: 1 January-31 December 2010,’ pg. 2.



The ISRB was established in 2003 under Regulation No. 7 by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) as anIraqi organization mandated to work on behalf of the Iraqi people to forge strong partnerships among the GoI,donors and international organizations. The main functions of the ISRB are:

To provide overall policy guidance in relation to multilateral and bilateral financial and economicdevelopment assistance for Iraq, setting and prioritizing needs in a transparent manner that does notunfairly discriminate either among Iraq's geographic regions or among cultural and religious groups.

To take action on recommendations from the MoPDC regarding the allocation of international financialand other assistance to meet Iraq's needs.

In close cooperation with the MoPDC and the Ministry of Finance, to ensure that internationalassistance for Iraq is actively fostered, properly allocated to meet Iraq's prioritized needs, effectivelyutilized and monitored, and integrated into the Iraqi national budget.

Decisions of the ISRB shall be made by consensus whenever possible and otherwise by majority voting.Each member shall have one vote, and in the event of a tie, the chair for the meeting shall cast thedeciding vote.

Initially, the board members included five individuals appointed by the Governing Council from the MoPDC(Chairman), the Ministry of Finance (Vice Chairman) and a representative of the CPA. Over time themembership evolved to include two Iraqi appointees (originally nominees of the Governing Council, nownominees of the Chair) and a donor representative.

According to MoPDC officials and other interviewees, the ISRB faced many challenges in fulfilling its role ofsetting strategies and providing directions to donors. As a result, donors often made their own independentdecisions about which priorities should be funded. "In spite of the strategic tasks entrusted to the Authority[ISRB], its function was limited to review programme and projects proposed by the donors in coordination withthe beneficiary authorities and therefore the reconstruction process lacked the comprehensive national vision,in addition to the absence of central political decision with regard to the priorities of reconstruction anddevelopment, besides the existence of multiple points of contact with international partners without a nationalconsensus on what is required from the international community. As well as the lack of links with economicdecision-making authority, this led to the dominance of the donor over the national will."53

Since its creation, the IRFFI has respected the ISRB’s function, and most projects funded by the UNDG ITF andthe WB ITF were submitted to the board for approval. In this regard, IRFFI fostered the principle of nationalownership. However, other bilateral donors have been significantly less compliant about submitting theirprojects to the ISRB. The NDS in 2005 noted that, "There has been some confusion whether bilateral Donorswho are channeling their funds outside the UN and WB trust fund system need to obtain ISRB approval. As aresult, some bilateral Donors have not entered into a legally binding MoU with the ISRB. This has resulted ingreat confusion with some Donors actually operating with no legal framework and implementing projectswithout the knowledge of MoPDC or the ISRB"54. To resolve this issue, the NDS proposed to empower the ISRBto enter into legally binding agreements with donors, which would require donors to sign a MoU after eachproject is approved. The MoU was intended to be co-signed by the MoPDC, the Ministry of Finance and therelevant line ministry and regional government where appropriate.

Despite the fact that this procedure has been in place since 2005, many donors are still not in compliance withthe GoI requirements. Interviews with MoPDC representatives indicated that many donors, especially theUnited States but also other donors, have not been seeking the board’s approval before projects are started. Thisundermines the GoI’s ownership and creates issues of misalignment with national strategies and potentialduplications of work. In this regard, the UNDG ITF should be commended for diligently using the existingstructures of the GoI to coordinate development assistance.

Since 2004, the ISRB has held more than 55 meetings. A review of ISRB meeting minutes showed that theboard reviewed 160 projects submitted by the UNDG ITF and approved most of them (158). An additional 40projects were reviewed by independent commissions (e.g. IHEC) and not the ISRB. Based on a review ofmeeting minutes, initially the ISRB approved most projects of the UNDG ITF without noted comments. Since

53 Malik, Huda A. Director General of International Cooperation Directorate, MoPDC, ‘Position paper on aid management in Iraq’(published in Arabic).54 ‘Iraq’s National Development Strategy 2005-2007,’ pg. 42.



2007 a marked improvement in the quality of comments can be noticed in the meeting minutes. Between 2004and 2010, the board rejected only two projects; 38 projects were postponed and 6 were subject to additionalrequests for revision.

The main reasons for postponing the above-mentioned projects included the absence of relevant line-ministryrepresentatives, requests for additional information regarding budget or implementation approach, requests toreduce administrative costs (project personnel or international consultants), or a recommendation that theproject be further studied by one or more line ministries to determine its relevance and approach. In oneexample, the board also required UN agencies to align project activities with the MoPDC’s technical assistanceneeds. In another example, the board noted that the UN agency "did not take into consideration the initialcomments of the MoPDC at the concept note stage" and recommended that the project be restructured in linewith GoI recommendations. In this regard it can be concluded that ISRB exercised a certain level of ownershipand leadership.

For a period of time between 2007 and 2008, for most approved projects the ISRB asked UN agencies to submitquarterly reports to be developed together with the relevant line ministries to clarify the progress ofimplementation and monitor spending. Additional recommendations included greater involvement for theMoPDC or other line ministries in the implementation of projects, the recruitment of Iraqi nationals, thesubmission of detailed budgets, and the transfer of the project after completion to Iraqi counterparts or theIraqi private sector. Another key comment related to the large shares of budgets devoted to internationalconsultants and their security in Iraq—an issue that the GoI has been concerned about continually as itperceived that a significant portion of project budgets were being channeled away from beneficiaries towardsinternational consultants.

The ISRB’s development-assistance visibility in Iraq has been limited by the fact that many donors have notconsistently submitted their projects for review. Since 2008, the ISRB relocated outside the International Zone(IZ), which made it more difficult for donors and UN agencies to participate in meetings.

Information systems

The UNDG ITF aided the GoI in coordinating international aid by providing funding and assistance for thedevelopment of information systems to track donor contributions and manage development projects. The firstsystem, created in 2005 and called the Donor Assistance Database (DAD), was designed to track current andfuture donor expenditure so the MoP could plan and allocate resources effectively. The new and upgradedsystem, called the Iraq Development Management System (IDMS), was designed in 2010 and incorporates thefunctionality found previously in DAD along with more advanced applications. The IDMS allows the GoI notonly to track donor aid but also to manage the whole cycle of government and donor-funded developmentprojects in Iraq, and track distribution of development projects according to sectors, provinces andimplementing agencies. UNDP and UNOPS worked jointly on development of both systems and the partnershipwas extended in 2010 to include USAID/Tatweer.

The main challenge with DAD, as identified in an independent evaluation of UNDP governance projectsconducted in 2010, was the fact that many donors did not use this database to report their aid to Iraq. While thesystem was fully functional and available online, donors did not keep their contributions up to date andconsequently the information contained in the database represented only a portion of total aid flows. Interviewswith donor representatives revealed that while many of them realized the usefulness and importance of DAD,some did not have the resources and incentive to update the information. Also, the GoI never fully enforced theuse of this database and the line ministries often neglected to update it with information on funds they werereceiving from international donors.

The IDMS database is a more comprehensive tool as it enables the tracking of ongoing projects, donor profileand assistance information, and capital investment projects as well as monitoring of progress against the NDP'sindicators. The IDMS has been endorsed by the Prime Minister's Office, a step many hope will lead to higherdata entry compliance by both international donors and GoI officials. Given that IDMS is still a relatively newtool, it is too early to assess its utility and effectiveness. The key success factor for the IDMS, just as with DADand any other database which relies on input from multiple stakeholders, will be the collaboration by all of



those stakeholders to ensure the accuracy and timeliness of data entered into the system. Where the DAD'sdesigners failed at establishing proper incentives and enforcements for data collection, the IDMS' designershave had the opportunity to learn that system implementation is not just about data and computers butrequires cultural adjustments and changes in human behavior.

The GoI’s role in the implementation of projects

The ToR of the IRFFI placed a high level of importance on national ownership. According to the ToR, "theactivities financed by the donor community are to be implemented as much as possible by the Iraqisthemselves, under the ownership and leadership of the Iraqi authorities, with the aim to help developsustainable local capacities."55 However, at the same time the UNDG ITF’s mandate according to the originalIRFFI ToR was to "focus on funding quick impact projects and transition activities which need to beimplemented in a rapid and flexible way."56 In many ways, this proved to be challenging to achieve as thisapproach of rapid implementation in the early years resulted in mainly direct implementation by the UN andless engagement by GoI counterparts given that the GoI had limited capacity to implement projects.

The UNDG ITF made it a requirement for all UN agencies to involve Iraqi counterparts in the process ofdesigning and implementing projects. During the design stage, as noted under the alignment section, the UNagencies had to work with line ministries to endorse the concept notes for projects. Since 2008, this has been aformally required step before any project was developed. The UNDG ITF also created structures and checks toensure the involvement of the GoI in the implementation of projects. For example, the UNDG ITF designedproject report templates, which required information on the level of cooperation with relevant line ministriesand implementing partners to be provided. A review of project documents identified a number of ways in whichUN agencies engaged counterparts during project design and implementation:

Line ministries were involved in project design. Since 2008, the UNDG ITF mandated UN agenciesto obtain a letter of endorsement from the relevant ministry for any project concept note. It is difficult todetermine from the project documents and evaluations, however, the level of line ministries’ involvement inand ownership of project design. As noted by several interviewees, in some cases the project was mainlydesigned by the UN agency and the line ministry only reviewed and endorsed the concept note, thus the GoIinvolvement was limited. In other cases, the line ministries were active counterparts in the process ofdesigning projects, particularly projects in the health, education and agriculture sectors. Prior to 2008 UNagencies were not mandated by UNDG ITF to obtain a letter of endorsement from line ministries, although(based on interviews with UN agencies) many worked closely with the GoI to design project concept notesand ensured alignment of projects with national priorities.

GoI counterparts were involved in project implementation. Their involvement varied from projectto project and in many instances included needs assessments, planning, monitoring, and participation intraining. Because of the restrictions placed on the movements of UN staff in Iraq due to security issues, UNagencies often had to rely on the involvement of Iraqi counterparts. As a result, UN agencies oftendeveloped strong partnerships with line ministries and local governorates in order to monitor projectprogress and identify priorities.

Participation in decision making process. A number of projects established a project SteeringCommittee in which GoI counterparts and civil society representatives were invited to participate. Thisprovided GoI counterparts with the opportunity to participate in the project management and decisionmaking process.

Monitoring of projects. Given the difficulty faced by UN staff in moving freely in Iraq, GoI counterpartswere often engaged in the role of monitoring agents. Some issues arose, however, including low capacity,difficulty of communication from the field and high turnover among GoI officials.

Procurement. A review of procurement files showed that a majority of goods and consulting services wereprocured from within Iraq. More than 30 percent of the total amount of all contracts issued by UN

55 IRFFI ToR, 11 December 200356 Ibid



participating 0rganizations were awarded to Iraqi suppliers. The second largest recipient of contract awardswas Japan (12 percent of total award amount) followed by China (9 percent).

Based on lessons learned identified by UN agencies in project completion documents, the following were themain challenges faced in working with GoI counterparts:

High turnover of government officials and counterparts; Weak capacity in procurement, which often led the UN to take the responsibility for procuring goods

and services; Security issues impacting the ability of UN staff and Iraqi counterparts to move freely within the

country.

GoI co-financing

Iraq is endowed with rich natural oil resources and is ranked as a middle income (per capita) country by theWorld Bank. As such, many donors and international organizations pointed out the importance of Iraq makinga greater contribution to its own development. The European Union, in its ‘Joint Strategy Paper for Iraq 2011 –2013’ indicated that "the main challenge for European Union - Iraq cooperation will be to help Iraq mobiliseand effectively use its own resources to improve the welfare of the Iraqi people and rebuild its infrastructure.The EU support in capacity building should leverage Iraqi reconstruction efforts in the direction of genuinelysustainable development."57

According to the SIGIR, as of October 2010 the GoI has contributed US$85.3 billion to the country’sreconstruction and recovery. As oil revenue continues to grow, the GoI's willingness to invest more indevelopment will be the ultimate test of ownership. GoI co-financing at sectoral level ensures that the fundedprogrammes and projects are government owned and led, and that planned projects are mapped across to thenational budget lines.

The analysis of projects funded by the UNDG ITF between 2004 and 2010 indicates that there was relativelylittle co-financing from the government. Five percent of reviewed projects (2 out of 60) received GoI co-financing and nine percent of reviewed projects (5 out of 60) received an in-kind contribution from the GoI, asillustrated in the table below. Securing such co-financing was easier in the sectors in which the UN hasestablished a strong long-term relationship with line ministries.

57 ‘EU Joint Strategy Paper for Iraq 2011-2013,’ pg. 1, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/iraq/docs/2011_2013_concept_note_en.pdf



TABLE 5: CONTRIBUTION OF GOI TO UNDG ITF FUNDED PROJECTS (BASED ON A SAMPLE OF 60 EVALUATED

PROJECTS)

Project NameGoI Contribution

Co-Financing (US$) In-kind (US$)

Education

Iraqi Networking Academies Project (B1-10) 0 1.3 Million

Iraqi Networking Academies Project (B1-17) 0 430,000

Training of trainers in teacher education (B1-23) 0 546,000

Agriculture and Food Security

Restoration of Veterinary Services in Iraq (A5-08)

One laboratory premise

was rehabilitated with

GoI's own resources.

0

Community Livelihoods and Micro-Industry Support

Project in Rural and Urban Areas of Northern Iraq (A5-17)0 500,000

Health and Nutrition

Disease Eradication, Elimination and Introducing New

Vaccines (D2-19a/D2-19b)25 million 0

Local Area Development Programme (UNDP C10-09a) 0907,245 (UNDP)

60,000 (WHO)

Interviewed donor representatives stated that the low level of co-financing by the GoI is perceived as aweakness of the UNDG ITF. A number of donors pointed out that it is likely that their contribution to anypooled funding in the future will be contingent on increased GoI contribution. Yet, according to the MoF, it isunlikely that the GoI will contribute to pooled funding and instead intends to contribute on a project by projectbasis. This approach favours bilateral funding as donors may be reluctant to contribute to a trust fund without aguarantee that the GoI would provide co-financing to the fund rather than to projects. According to a draft notefrom the Ministry of Finance regarding co-financing plans, the GoI is not considering donations directed for thesectors because "it is difficult to determine accurately the share of the beneficiary as in the case of the UNDGITF such as the education sectors (includes the Ministry of Education), energy (oil, electricity), (waterresources, agriculture)."

A common theme in the interviews conducted with UN agencies and donors is that, as a middle income countryIraq needs less financial support and more capacity development in public sector modernization and privatesector development, and technical assistance in other areas. As one interviewee noted, "It is not fair for ODA(Overseas Development Aid) funds to go to Iraq at this point while there is not enough resources available formuch more poor countries." Thus the recommendations noted by UN agencies and donors are for Iraq tocontribute higher level of co-financing and for foreign assistance to focus primarily on capacity developmentinstead of infrastructure projects.

Engagement of civil society

Another important aspect of strengthening national ownership is through the engagement of civil society indesigning national strategies and implementing projects. The Iraqi National Development Strategy for 2005-2007 defines the role of civil society in the reconstruction and transition process in the following way:“….civil society must receive sufficient support to perform the following roles:

Activate participation of youth, women, and marginalized categories in service and developmentactivities and programmes.

Establish a culture of dialogue and cooperation between nationals, and promote the concept ofvoluntary work in a manner that enhances citizenship culture (right and duty).



Participation of civil society organizations in implementing development projects and social serviceswith both public and private sectors.”58

Civil society engagement in Iraq is a real challenge as there is no organized forum for civil society. Furthermore,many of the NGOs active in the country do not appear to be genuine NGOs but instead are for-profitorganizations operating under the mantle of NGO. There are more than 200 Iraqi NGOs and 80 internationalNGOs registered with the NGO Coordination Committee for Iraq (NCCI), a network that provides a forum forthe exchange of information and the coordination of humanitarian activities and emergency aid. Besides thosethere are many organizations that claim to be NGOs but are in reality for-profit consulting companies.

The UNDG ITF has funded two key projects focused on strengthening civil society: the Civil Society Forums(2004) and the Iraqi Civil Society Empowerment Project (2008), both implemented by UNOPS.

Lessons learned from these projects based on the project documentation included the following:

1. There is a need for a better coordination system among the various Iraqi civil society organizations andalso between them and international organizations.

2. The Iraqi civil society organizations should be encouraged to engage with and involve local authorities intheir activities in order to facilitate and enhance these authorities’ understanding of the work done bycivil society.

3. Iraqi needs and priorities should be assessed and determined by Iraqis first rather than by internationalorganizations.

4. International organizations should consider simplifying their funding requirements and formalities toenable a faster implementation of projects and more fruitful working relationship with civil society.

According to the Iraq UNDAF, the UN is intending to increase its focus on engagement with civil society goingforward. "In addition to UNCT and GoI, academia, formal and informal civil society structures, and the privatesector all have a significant role to play in the design, implementation and monitoring of developmentinterventions. Taking a people-centered approach, the people of Iraq will be given every opportunity andcapacity to participate in their own future. Advocacy of this approach was undertaken during the formulation ofthe NDP and UNDAF, and will continue during implementation. There are several existing civil societynetworks that will provide access to the development process for civil society, some of which need continuedsupport and capacity development. The NDP places significant emphasis on the private sector’s responsibilityto contribute financially to the national development process, which implies a need for support from the UN

and other development partners to fulfill that expectation. Public-private partnerships as well as improved

58 Iraqi Strategic Review Board: NDS 2005-2006, September 2004, pp. 16-17

Civil Society Forums project objectives:

Provide comprehensive support to 30 civil society organizations, academic bodies and institutesthroughout Iraq, and engage civil society community and government representatives in aconsensus-building dialogue on politically relevant topics including human, minority and genderrights in Iraq now and in the future.

Iraqi Civil Society Empowerment Project objectives:1. To establish a liberal legal and administrative framework for Iraqi NGOs that is respected bothby the authorities and the NGO community itself.2. To increase the organizational capacity for advocacy of the Iraqi civil society.3. To improve the access of Iraqi citizens to relief assistance through increasing the role of the NGOcommunity in conducting emergency response activities.4. To strengthen citizen participation in local governance processes, facilitated by civil society,which impacts positively on local economic development and social assistance delivery.5. To spearhead collaborative initiatives to counter conflict trends throughout civil society, with theultimate aim of protecting human rights and achieving community development.



relations between governmental and non-governmental structures in general will be key to the successfulrealization of both the NDP and the UNDAF."59

Lessons Learned:

4.5.a: The short-term focus of the UNDG ITF on recovery and reconstruction and delivering quick resultsmeant that important priorities such as the modernization of the public sector and decentralizationonly started to be addressed towards the end of UNDG ITF's lifespan.

4.5.b: Despite the mandate of the ISRB to provide policy guidance and prioritize needs, the board faced manychallenges in the process of comprehensively coordinating international aid and providing strategicguidance because many donors did not consult with the board in the process of approving theirprojects. A mandatory consultation with ISRB by all donors prior to designing any projects would havefacilitated more comprehensive coordination of aid, ensured alignment with national priorities andnational ownership.

4.5.c: International organizations and donors can and should strive to enhance national ownership byrespecting established government processes for aid coordination and project approvals such as theISRB. In doing so, the UN set a good precedent for other donors to follow.

4.5.d: The UNDP, with support from the UNDG ITF, contributed to developing the GoI’s capacity tocoordinate international aid by supporting the creation of the Development Assistance Database. As aresult, the GoI is better positioned to coordinate aid and optimize the use of resources to meet Iraq'sprioritized needs. Creation of such a database, however, needs to be accompanied with a strategy onhow to keep it current and mandatory requirements for donors and implementing organizations toupdate it regularly.

4.5.e: The focus on rapid implementation and a desire to show quick results meant that the UN chose in manycases to implement projects directly, with minimal initial government involvement. The short timeframe of the MDTF impacted the way money was spent, mostly during the initial years. Given that thefund was set up for supporting reconstruction and recovery over an intended initial duration of onlyfour years, UN agencies often chose to implement projects fast and directly rather than workingthrough the government.

4.5.f: Remote management, as well as the high turnover of GoI officials, made it difficult for UN officials tointeract in person with GoI staff, engage in a meaningful long-term dialogue and build relationships, inorder to ensure that UN interventions were in line with national priorities and that government was inagreement with the UN approach.

4.5.g: Government representation in a MDTF SC is key for improved national ownership, alignment withemerging priorities, especially in post-conflict environments, and overall transparency of fundmanagement.

4.5.h: While there are many indications of an active GoI involvement in project implementation, theindependent evaluations of UNDG ITF-funded projects do not provide sufficient information regardingthe GoI's leadership or ownership of projects. Based on interviews with stakeholders, leadership of GoIin UN projects was limited due to high staff turnover, weak capacity and security issues whichprevented the UN and GoI from working more closely together.

4.5.i: Government co-financing helps ensure that the programme is government owned and led, and that itstargets are mapped across to the budget process. The UN was able to secure only limited GoI co-financing for its programmes. Securing such co-financing was easier in sectors in which the UN hasestablished strong and long-term relationships with line ministries. Long-term planning is necessary toincrease co-financing; the GoI needs to approve all co-financing in its annual budget to provide it.

4.5.j: Structuring a MDTF in a way that encourages GoI to provide funding for UN projects is key forensuring greater national ownership and mutual accountability.

59 ‘United Nations Development Assistance Framework for Iraq, 2011-2014,’ Prepared by the United Nations Country Team in Iraq, 24 February 2010,pg. 30.



Recommendations:

4.5.1: For the GoI to achieve leadership in developing and implementing national development strategiesthrough broad consultative processes, further efforts need to be made to ensure decentralization and todevelop regional capacities to plan and prioritize budget needs and communicate them to centralgovernment.

4.5.2: A longer life-span of an MDTF could reduce the pressure on producing quick results and allow the UNto involve the GoI to a greater extent in the design and implementation of projects and programmes.Engagement of the GoI in project implementation may slow down the timeline of projects but will havethe benefit of building capacity and increasing government ownership. Donors and the UN systemshould consider setting up a MDTF for longer than four years in post-conflict situations.

4.5.3: Donors should consider setting up a trust fund with a longer life span and focus at an earlier stage oneffectively supporting public sector modernization.

4.5.4: All donors should submit their projects and programmes to the IRSB for review and approval in orderto inform the GoI of planned programmes and to build the GoI's capacity in coordinating developmentaid.

4.5.5: The UN should continue to provide technical assistance to the MoPDC to ensure that the data enteredinto the Iraq Development Management System (IDMS) is accurate and timely and that donors and lineministries have proper incentives to keep the information updated.

4.5.6: Donors need to consider complying with the GoI request to enter timely and accurate information into

the IDMS and in doing so fulfill their commitment under the Paris Declaration to respect partnercountry leadership and help strengthen their capacity to exercise it. Having a reliable and crediblesource of information on overall donor contributions to Iraq will allow the government and donors tomake better decisions and further harmonize their aid and align it with national priorities.

4.5.7: Line ministries should make greater use of the IDMS to report on the projects they implement, toensure completeness of data.

4.5.8: Donors and the UN should work with the GoI to develop effective ways of co-financing and encouragethe GoI to contribute financially and in-kind to development projects.

4.6. Development of National Capacity

Contextual framework for capacity development assessment

The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness states that the "capacity to plan, manage, implement and account forresults…is critical for achieving development objectives." Through the Paris Declaration, partner countries havebeen urged to make capacity development the nexus of their development strategy, and donors to understandthat capacity development cannot be brought from outside but must be developed from within.

Despite the consensus on the need to focus on developing the capacity of partner countries and the significantefforts and resources invested in it (based on figures from the World Bank, each year aid donors spend morethan US$20 billion on products and activities designed to enhance the capacity of developing countries to carryout development plans), the results achieved so far have fallen short of expectations.60 One of the reasons forthis is the fact that there is no clear and generally acknowledged definition of capacity development.

According to the OECD, capacity is understood as "the ability of people, organizations and society as a whole tomanage their affairs successfully." And capacity development is understood by OECD as "the process wherebypeople, organizations and society as a whole unleash, strengthen, create, adapt and maintain capacity overtime."61 According to the World Bank, the capacity for development is "the availability of resources and the

60Otoo, Samuel; Agapitova, Natalia; and Behrens, Joy. ‘The Capacity Development Results Framework,’ World Bank Institute, June 2009.

61 OECD, ‘The Challenge of Capacity Development: Working toward good practice,’ DAC Guidelines and Reference Series, 2006.



efficiency and effectiveness with which societies deploy those resources to identify and pursue theirdevelopment goals on a sustainable basis." And capacity development is defined as "a locally driven process oflearning by leaders, coalitions, and other agents of change that brings about changes in socio-political, policy-related, and organizational factors to enhance local ownership for and the effectiveness and efficiency of effortsto achieve a development goal."62

This lack of clarity and common definition makes it difficult to evaluate capacity development efforts in generaland to establish links between achievements and interventions. This is certainly the case in Iraq, where manycapacity development efforts were made but many of them were fragmented, as there was no initial capacitydevelopment needs assessment carried out and only limited consistency and continuity of interventions. Inaddition, the progress of capacity development was not tracked or measured over time.

In order to frame the analysis of the development of national capacities in Iraq, it is important to understandthe definition and mandate of capacity development within the UN system. According to the UNDG, capacitydevelopment (CD) is "the process whereby people, organizations and society as a whole unleash, strengthen,create, adapt and maintain capacity over time."63 Capacity development is a perpetually evolving process ofgrowth and change. UNDG identifies the systems approach to capacity development at three levels:64

The enabling environment: policies, legislation, power relations, social norms The organizational level: policies, procedures, frameworks The individual level: skills, knowledge, experience

For any capacity development intervention to be effective, the current capacity level in those areas of enablingenvironment, organizations and individuals first needs to be assessed. This is key in any context but especiallyrelevant in a post-conflict situation. A recent UNDP paper, ‘Capacity Development in Post-Conflict Countries,’outlines a framework for reconsidering the unique challenges post-conflict contexts pose to capacitydevelopment. The paper begins by quoting the Secretary General's ‘Report on Peacebuilding in the ImmediateAftermath of Conflict’ where coherent and well-coordinated early action to support governments to build corestate capacities is called for. "Too often, capacity development is seen in the context of international exitstrategies from post-conflict countries. This is always too late. Inattention to capacity development constrainsnational actors from taking ownership of their recovery and limits accountability between the State and itspeople." 65

This underlines the need for development practitioners in post-conflict environments to understand the contextin which they operate and to focus initially on collecting baseline information. Furthermore, lessons learnedpoint to the importance of expanding the variety of capacity development interventions as developmentpractitioners often need to make a choice about how to balance direct and indirect interventions. "Too muchindirect support can result in slow progress on the development of the logistical and organizational capabilities.But too much attention to direct capacity development for formal organizations can lead to interventions thatare not sustainable or that have no legitimacy or public credibility."66

Other issues identified from the lessons learned include the risk of developing parallel systems, such astechnical assistance programmes, or locating the capacity interventions within project implementation unitsoriented solely towards getting the work done. These interventions are not sustainable in the long run. Finally,the trade-off between short-term gains and long-term sustainability needs to be considered. As the paper notes,"in many post-conflict environments, humanitarian imperatives do not cease, and the UN is held accountablesimultaneously for meeting the short-term needs of populations and building the long-term sustainability ofinstitutions."67

62 Op.cit. Otoo, Agapitova and Behrens, pg. 3.63 UNDG, ‘A Collective Approach to Supporting Capacity Development,’ August 2009 http://www.undg.org/docs/8948/Capacity-Development-UNDG-August-2009.pdf64 Ibid.65 UNDP, ‘Capacity Development in Post-Conflict Countries,’ 2010, pg. 7,http://www.capacityisdevelopment.org/doccs/transitionssituations/Capacity%20Development%20in%20Post-Conflict%20countries.pdf66 Ibid. Pg. 20.67 Ibid. Pg. 25.



The context of capacity development in Iraq

The enabling environment in Iraq in 2003 was that of a country emerging from more than 20 years ofdictatorial rule, sanctions and devastation caused by successive wars which ruined the basic infrastructure anddestroyed any safety nets. In 2003, Iraq had its laws, policies and institutional arrangements imposed by aninvading power. On top of this, the continued violence in Iraq made the environment not conducive to normalcapacity development interventions. The enabling environment improved gradually over the past seven years,with elected governments taking office and national laws and policies being established.

On the organizational level, the internal structure, policies and procedures of the country were in a shambles inthe early years of the UNDG ITF. Given the instability of the government, the deBaathification (i.e. the policy ofremoving Baath Party members from Iraqi government positions) and the constant turnover at ministries, theorganizational capacity was severely weakened. The October 2003 ‘United Nations/World Bank Joint IraqNeeds Assessment’ (JNA) noted that the state institutions were severely degraded and that the process ofcapacity development on both the legal and institutional fronts would need to keep pace with the reconstructionprocess. "Nearly all of the sector assessments highlight the need to build internal capacity within ministries totackle the challenges of the transition."68

Finally, the individual level of capacity was also severely affected by the wars, violence and political instability.Iraq had one of the best-regarded education systems in the region until the 1980s. Due to the wars andsanctions imposed upon the country, however, education suffered significant decline in the 1990s. In addition,due to wars and security concerns, many educated Iraqis left the country, leaving a capacity gap that would takeyears to be filled.

A major weakness of capacity development efforts in Iraq was that there was no capacity development needsassessment conducted at the beginning of the international engagement. This made it very difficult to assess theresults achieved over the past seven years. Also, the projects that were implemented rarely included a resultsframework for capacity development, with specific indicators to show how the counterparts’ capacity was beingdeveloped. In the absence of such results framework, the evidence for judgment is mostly anecdotal, as wasnoted in number of evaluations.

In the absence of a capacity-needs assessment, the JNA performed in 2003 provided some guidelines oncapacity needs in the early years. According to the JNA, there was a great need for all sectors to develop Iraqicapacity for project identification, design prioritization, implementation, supervision, and audit. "Overall focusis needed to develop a transparent, open, and competitive programme execution (procurement, disbursement,supervision, and reporting systems) and financial management. Procurement and project implementation thatis undertaken by Iraqis will develop capacity and also support local businesses."69

Results of capacity development efforts

The UN made an effort to develop capacity in Iraq between 2004 and 2010, at both institutional and individuallevels. Most projects funded by the UNDG ITF included some form of capacity development. Out of the 60reviewed projects, more than 73 percent incorporated a capacity-development component including individualtraining, training of trainers, study tours and/or on-the-job training. As prescribed in the JNA, the focus ofcapacity development efforts in the early years was on project identification, design prioritization, supervisionand evaluation.

Because the UN was under political pressure to demonstrate quick results to donors and the internationalcommunity at large, the capacity development efforts were often compromised in order to achieve quickerresults. Where a capacity development intervention was implemented, it focused primarily on training projectstaff or GoI counterparts who were implementing the projects, with significantly less focus on long-termcapacity development efforts until 2008, when the UNDG ITF strategy shifted from reconstruction andrecovery to capacity development. The type of projects that receive funding has changed since 2008, with agreater focus on longer-term institutional capacity interventions.

68 ‘United Nations/World Bank Joint Iraq Needs Assessment,’ October, 2003, pg. 3.69 Ibid. pg. 13.



Despite the many efforts made by UN agencies to develop capacity in Iraq, results have been obtained primarilyat the individual level and in relation to project implementation. There are still significant gaps and needs at alllevels: enabling environment, organizational and individual capacity. The UNDP project document for the IraqPublic Sector Modernization (I-PSM) produced in 2010 summarizes the results of capacity development in Iraqas well as the pressing needs: "The billions of dollars of foreign assistance spent in Iraq since 2003 have not yetchanged the capacity of government to use Iraq’s rich traditions, culture, human resources and oil wealth fordevelopment in the 21st century, and for Iraq to recover the leadership role it should take in the region. Aconcerted, holistic, comprehensive approach to capacity development of government is necessary and istimely."70

The following section will examine the achievements and challenges in the three key dimensions of capacitydevelopment in Iraq, including the enabling environment, the organizational level and the individual level.

1. Enabling environment

Improving the enabling environment following a war is the most important first step in addressing thecountry's capacity development needs, as without it other capacity development efforts at organizational andindividual levels would not be effective. Given its initial focus on reconstruction and recovery, the UNDG ITFfocused its capacity-development approach on the enabling environment by restoring physical infrastructure,enhancing delivery of social services and supporting the electoral process.

With regard to improving the delivery of social services, the UNDG ITF invested more than US$520 million inthe water and sanitation, health, education, food and agriculture, and housing and shelter sectors. In addition,US$107 million was invested in the electricity infrastructure. In the early years of the UNDG ITF, a significantamount of these funds were allocated to rehabilitating physical infrastructure as exemplified by some projects71

approved in 2004.

In later years, the focus changed to developing capacity rather than restoring infrastructure. Projects focusingon supporting local government in improving services and strengthening their capacity to operate effectivelybecame more common, such as those approved since 200872.

Since 2008, when the focus of the UNDG ITF and donors shifted to capacity development, only a few projects73

focused on infrastructure rehabilitation were approved.

This indicates that the UN effectively shifted its focus from infrastructure rehabilitation to capacitydevelopment. However, many observers from both UN agencies and donors noted that this shift could haveoccurred earlier in order to more effectively invest UN resources and use UN technical knowledge to supportthe government's capacity development. For example, the head of one UN agency noted that "the focus shouldhave been earlier on investment in bigger picture and not only in infrastructure projects, i.e. build bridges. Weneed to think about how to add value using our technical capabilities. There has been so much investment madein Iraq, and in the future we should focus on capacity building and not infrastructure."74

The most important contribution to creating an enabling environment in Iraq has been in the governancesector, where UN agencies focused on developing the capacity of independent election bodies to organize andmonitor elections. Out of the portfolio of 200 projects and programmes implemented by the UNDG ITFbetween 2004 and 2010, 19 projects and programmes focused on support for the electoral process (see Annex

70 Iraq Public Sector Modernization (I-PSM) Programme document, pg. 5.71 Dredging of Umm Qasr port approach channel, Drainage Conditions in Agricultural Areas, Rehabilitation of Pumping Stations,Emergency Power Supply, Community Irrigation Schemes, Restoration and Development of Essential Livestock Services in Iraq,Rehabilitation of Mosul Gas Turbine Power Station, and Rehabilitation of Dairy Plants.72 Local Government Association and Urban Development Capacity Building, Supporting the Efforts of the GoI in Developing the Capacityof the Iraqi Education Sector through Enhancing the Learning Environment in Vulnerable Areas in Iraq for Meeting the Education for All(EFA) Goals, Strengthening the Capacity of the Iraqi Veterinary Services for Control of Zoonotic and Transboundary Animal Diseases,Improving the Housing Delivery System in Erbil, Water and Sanitation Master Planning and Capacity Building Programme, PreparatoryPhase: HIV/AIDS Policy Support and Capacity Building Programme, Support to the Government of Iraq's National Measles and PolioVaccination Campaign, and Developing Iraqi Agricultural and Agro-Industrial Data, Information Systems and Analytical Capacities.73 Modernization and Development of the Dairy Cattle Sector in Iraq, Improvement of Water Supply and Irrigation Provisions through theRehabilitation of Abu Sabkha Pumping Station, and Rehabilitation of the Mosul Dairy Plant.74 Notes from an interview with a representative of a UN agency.



15, ‘Projects Focusing on Electoral Support’). These projects amounted to more than US$200 million. Mostprojects and programmes were implemented by UNDP and UNOPS in collaboration with UN ElectoralAssistance Division (UNEAD). These projects were aligned with the following objectives identified under theSupport to Electoral Process Cluster and later the Governance SOT:

Increased institutional capacity of the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) toindependently carry out elections;

Increased electoral awareness and citizen engagement in electoral processes; Select electoral operations supported; Capacity of electoral and media observers strengthened.

2. Organizational level

The UNDG ITF funded 28 projects and programmes in the governance sector focusing on the organizationallevel of capacity development (besides the electoral support), with a total investment of more than US$70million (see Annex 16, ‘Projects in the Governance Sector (excluding Elections)’). These projects focused on thefollowing key objectives:

Strengthened national dialogue and civil society for governance and reconciliation; Enhanced rule of law and respect for human rights in line with international standards; Strengthened regulatory frameworks, institutions, and processes of national and local governance.

Besides the governance sector, the focus of organizational-level capacity development was on strengthening thegovernment’s capacity to collect, analyze and report data and key indicators related to food security, agricultureand health sectors. The main beneficiary of these projects was the Central Organization for Statistics andInformation Technology (COSIT), which is part of the MoPDC.

The following are examples of projects that contributed to this organizational-level capacity developmentoutside of the governance sector:

Enhancing the Iraqi Institutions' Capacity in Analyzing and Reporting Food Security and Vulnerabilityin Iraq

Developing Iraqi Agricultural and Agro-Industrial Data, Information Systems and Analytical Capacities Development of National Gender Statistics in Iraq Capacity Development in Census and Survey

The results of those organizational-level capacity programmes were mixed. An evaluation of four UNDPgovernance projects (including the Board of Supreme Audit, Donor Assistance Database, InstitutionalDevelopment and Capacity Building for the Independent High Electoral Commission and Institutional Supportfor the Constitutional Drafting Process), which the evaluator notes are representative of UNDP performance inthis sector, indicated that only one project performed well and the three others performed “less well."

According to the evaluation, the main reason for sub-optimal results was that the UNDP itself did not havesufficient capacity to support the government in developing its capacity. "These project assessments suggestthat UNDP has not always been prepared to mobilize staff or facilities for implementation once projects wereapproved. Account must be taken of the laborious recruitment process in UNDP. Recruitment of new staff maytake up to half a year, and filling…positions that have become vacant is equally time-consuming. Procurementremains ill-adapted to rapid response. Maintaining critical management standards has not always beenaccorded the high priority it should have. For all the four projects, in different degrees, slippage has occurred inachieving project objectives."75

Another evaluation report focusing on UNESCO's contribution to a joint programme on Institutional Supportfor the Constitutional Drafting Process noted that while the project was successful, it focused primarily onindividual training rather than institutional capacity development. "The most substantial block of activities wastraining—from safety training to professional development, to the training of police officers, officials and

75Freedman, Jim. ‘Evaluation of UNDP Governance Projects Funded by the Iraq Trust Fund,’ UNDP, 10 June 2010.



schoolteachers in Iraq itself. Several hundred participants were trained in Iraq, Amman and Cairo." Many ofthese training sessions were conducted outside of Iraq, which significantly increased the project costs. It wasoften necessary, however, due to security reasons.

An evaluation of another UNESCO project, ‘Training of Trainers in Teacher Education,’ also outlined theextensive focus on individual training rather than institutional capacity development. "The project, asimplemented, has focused on individual-level capacity development. As such, while the individuals trained willno doubt sustain their new knowledge and skills, the institutional capacity is lacking to make best use of theseinvestments." The evaluator further noted that the institutionalization of capacity development efforts was notaddressed. "Sustainability and institutionalization go hand in hand, and it is somewhat precarious for projectinvestments in technical assistance to be concentrated at the individual level. It appears that in terms ofinstitutionalization of training, it has been left up to the targeted institutions to take up the task and carry itforward."

Due to the frequent choice of direct implementation by UN agencies and the remote management modality, theGoI perceived that UN capacity development efforts were often less effective than those of the World Bank,which implemented its programmes through national counterparts. Good examples of institutional capacitydevelopment, according to the GoI, include approaches that focus on placing an international technical expertinside a ministry to provide day-to-day advice and on-the-job coaching. This was the approach often taken bythe World Bank and USAID. According to representative of MoPDC, "the World Bank was able to providebetter, institutional and more sustainable capacity development than the UN due to their nationalimplementation modality. The World Bank is slower through this implementation but more effective and theirresults are more sustainable."76

3. Individual level

The most significant capacity-development focus of the UNDG ITF-funded projects was on the individual level.Of the 60 projects reviewed, 73 percent had some level of individual capacity development. Training wasconducted both inside and outside Iraq. In addition to individual training, a number of train-the-trainerexercises were conducted, as well as study tours. Most of the participants were people involved in projectimplementation, such as government counterparts, project staff or other implementing partners.

Evaluation reports noted a number of issues and challenges with capacity development at an individual level:

Due to security issues in Iraq and the remote management by UN agencies, a significant portion oftrainings took place outside Iraq, which increased their costs and limited the number of participants.(e.g. Contract Constitutional Development for Iraq (C9-10c))

Some training was delivered in English instead of Arabic or Kurdish, which made it difficult forparticipants to learn (e.g. Contract Constitutional Development for Iraq (C9-10c))

The UN faced some difficulties in recruiting qualified trainers. In one project, Support to Elections(G11-02), the Iraqi counterpart (IECI) requested stronger involvement in the selection andmanagement of the experts, and that greater emphasis be given to experts’ ability to build capacity

Widespread politicalization of the ministries and the high turnover of staff at senior/middlemanagement levels also negatively affected programme implementation and capacity developmentefforts. Special efforts continue to be required to build relationships with newly appointed managersand build their capacity to effectively manage UN assistance programmes. (e.g. StrengtheningImmunization Services in Iraq (D2-06))

The selection of participants was often done quickly and without proper vetting. The individual training approach was often not sustainable as people who participated in the training

often did not receive follow-up training or on-the-job support or left the job due to high turnover ingovernment.

A key challenge faced by UN agencies has been the selection of participants for the training. As pointed out byrepresentatives of the GoI, the selection of candidates was in many cases less than transparent or strategic.

Nominations were often made on the basis of personal interest, in most cases the government did not fulfill its

76Notes from an interview.



responsibility to properly screen and carefully select participants, and implementing agencies did not reviewand question the selections or failed to provide specific enough criteria for nominations. As a result, as noted bythe GoI and UN agencies, many people were selected who did not have the proper background or preparationfor the training, or who did not need the training and never did the job for which they were trained.77

A MoPDC representative insisted that capacity development should be a mutual effort between the governmentand donors, and that there should be a demand-supply type relationship between government bodies andimplementing agencies or donors. In Iraq, due to weak institutional arrangements, capacity developmentefforts were primarily supply-driven in that implementing agencies defined the type of training on offer andministries were only asked to select candidate participants.

According to a recommendation of the MoPDC, each ministry should establish a human-resources directoratetasked with defining and implementing a capacity-development strategy for its staff. Each ministry should alsohave a database to track the capacity development of its staff. Ministries should lead this process and not waitfor donors or implementing agencies to offer ad-hoc training, as this will make it easier for donors to contributeto the areas of most need. Clear roles and terms of references need to be established within the GoI to facilitatethe recruitment and capacity development of staff. Finally, there is a need to reform civil service laws to ensuregreater job security for government staff, so as to avoid, for example, people being trained and then losing theirjob after a change of government.78

Some positive aspects of capacity development in Iraq involved the use of local implementers, partners andcontractors. An evaluation of the UN-HABITAT School Rehabilitation and Capacity Building for SchoolMaintenance project (B1-22b) indicated that the use of local contractors for rehabilitation work had manyadvantages, including building the capacity of local contractors, supporting the local economy, creating jobs forlocal workers, ensuring the support and buy-in of the local community, and raising the profile of the importanceof education. "This in turn, helped to cultivate a sense of community ownership for the completed works, whichwill have an important role to play in the sustainability of the interventions. Community members who havecontributed to the project naturally have a heightened interest in its continued success."

Lessons Learned:

4.6.a: Early focus on capacity development is key in post-conflict interventions. The UNDG ITF shifted itsfocus on capacity development in 2008, however, this shift could have been made earlier.

4.6.b: A weakness of capacity development efforts in Iraq has been the absence of a capacity-developmentneeds assessment at the beginning of the international engagement. A well-defined strategy for capacitydevelopment at the start of development intervention is key to ensure comprehensive approach as wellas baseline for measuring achieved results.

4.6.c: The focus on supporting elections and investment of more than US$200 million in election supportprojects resulted in strengthening of capacity for independent election monitors and media monitorsand contributed to successful democratic elections.

4.6.d: The GoI has learned that that the preferred approach for institutional capacity development is placingan international technical expert inside a ministry to provide day-to-day advice and on-the-jobcoaching, as practiced by the World Bank and USAID.

4.6.e: Examples of successful approaches to capacity development involved the use of local implementers,partners and contractors, who received hands-on experience, took ownership and accountability ofprojects and contributed to their sustainability.

4.6.f: The selection of training participants represented a significant challenge for the UN. Properly screeningand selecting participants by the government as well as careful verification of candidates byimplementing agencies is key to successful and sustainable individual capacity development activitiessuch as training.

77Notes from interviews with UN and GoI staff.

78Notes from an interview with a MoPDC representative.



4.6.g: Due in part to the high staff turnover of government bodies, the full potential of the UN’s capacitydevelopment work could not be realized, and the interviewed stakeholders insisted that capacity-development activities should focus less on individual training and more on train-the-trainer exercises,institutional capacity development and technical assistance.

Recommendations:

4.6.1: Capacity development should be seen as a mutual effort by government and donors, and a demand-supply type of relationship should be established between government bodies and implementingagencies or donors. Ministries should lead the capacity-development efforts and establish a humanresources directorate tasked with defining and implementing a capacity-development strategy for itsstaff.

4.6.2: Clear roles and terms of reference should be established within the GoI in order to facilitate therecruitment and capacity development of staff.

4.6.3: Civil service laws should be reformed to ensure greater job security for government staff, so thatofficials who are trained do not then lose their job each time a government changes.

4.6.4: The UN should continue to develop the capacity of government counterparts and other partners toenable them to design, procure, implement and monitor projects.

4.7. Management for Development Results

According to the Paris Declaration, management for development results means "managing and implementingaid in a way that focuses on the desired results and uses information to improve decision making." Under theDeclaration, partner countries are committed to strengthening the links between national developmentstrategies and annual and multi-annual budget processes, and to establish results-oriented reporting andassessment frameworks. Donors on the other hand are committed to:

Link country programming and resources to results and align them with effective partner countryperformance assessment frameworks, refraining from requesting the introduction of performanceindicators that are not consistent with partners’ national development strategies.

Work with partner countries to rely, as far as possible, on partner countries’ results-oriented reportingand monitoring frameworks.

Harmonize their monitoring and reporting requirements with partner countries to the maximum extentpossible, until they can rely more extensively on partner countries’ statistical, monitoring andevaluation systems, and on joint formats for periodic reporting.79

Given that many of the above commitments do not fully apply to a post-conflict situation where a country doesnot have results-oriented reporting and monitoring frameworks or performance-assessment frameworks inplace, this section will focus on the following key aspects:

Strengths and weaknesses of UNDG ITF programme and project design and the added value in scaleand scope of joint programmes,

Harmonization of monitoring and reporting requirements, Integration of cross-cutting issues into programming, Strengths and weaknesses of the UN Joint Analysis Unit.

Joint programming

One of the most often acknowledged achievements of the UNDG ITF has been the high level of coordinationamong UN agencies in Iraq. Many interviewees from UN agencies, donors and the GoI noted that UN CountryTeams in Iraq collaborated exceptionally well together and operated in the spirit of the 'Delivering as One'

79 ‘The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness,’ 2 March 2005, pg. 7.



(DaO) approach80 even though Iraq was not one of the DaO pilot countries. Given the incentive of pooledfunding available from the UNDG ITF, 16 UN agencies were able to work together, coordinate their activitiesand avoid unhealthy competition. This was mainly accomplished through the promotion of joint programmesand the Sector/Cluster system.

Before discussing joint programming, it is important to distinguish between joint programming and jointprogrammes. Joint programming refers to a "collective effort through which the UN organizations and nationalpartners work together to prepare, implement, monitor and evaluate the activities aimed at effectively andefficiently achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and other international commitments." 81 Ajoint programme, on the other hand, is defined as a set of activities contained in a common work plan andrelated budget, involving two or more UN organizations and (sub-) national partners. 82 The distinction isimportant as the two terms tend to be used interchangeably.

The UNDG ITF exemplified aspects of both joint programming and joint programmes. While operationssupported by the UNDG ITF in Iraq are not strictly speaking an example of joint programming, a jointprogramming approach was nevertheless adopted in drafting the UN Assistance Strategy for Iraq as well asthrough the cluster approach. On the other hand, joint programmes were promoted frequently under the UNDGITF.

One of the best examples in the UN System of joint programmes and joint programming efforts is the DaOinitiative which has been piloted since 2007. Iraq was not one of the DaO pilot countries, but the UNDG ITF iswidely seen as a "forerunner" of DaO. There are indeed a number of similarities between the UNDG ITF andDaO pilot countries, but there are also some significant differences (see Annex 17, ‘Differences between UNDGITF and DaO’).

In summary, the UNDG ITF successfully managed to engage resident and non-resident agencies in a coherentand coordinated effort of planning and implementing development activities and certainly decreased the levelof programmatic fragmentation among UN agencies. Involvement of smaller and specialized agencies thatotherwise would not be operating allowed for expertise from 16 different UN agencies to support the GoI.Overall, the UNDG ITF was a good forerunner for DaO and stakeholders in Iraq including UN agencies, GoI anddonors commended the UN for its ability to collaborate effectively under the UNDG ITF. Going forward, the UNis well positioned to continue this collaboration under UNDAF, which has been a good example of jointprogramming among UN agencies and together with the GoI.

Joint programmes under the UNDG ITF

As noted before, the UNDG ITF has significantly enhanced the coordination among UN agencies in Iraqthrough the creation of joint programmes which have been encouraged by the UNDG ITF Steering Committeesince 2005. A Joint Programme (JP) is defined as a set of activities contained in a common work plan andrelated budget, involving two or more UN organizations and (sub-) national partners.83 In the 2003 UNDGGuidance Note on Joint Programming, UN organizations were encouraged to identify where they plan tosupport common results, where they have common national or sub-national partners, and/or work in the samegeographical area. Where such elements were identified, the concerned UN organizations were advised tocreate joint programmes to increase efficiency and effectiveness.84

Between 2004 and 2010, the UNDG ITF funded 45 joint programmes and 155 projects. In this context, ‘Project’refers to activities managed by a single agency, while ‘Programme’ refers to activities managed by two or moreagencies. Projects sometimes involved more than one agency in joint implementation, however only one agencyreceived funding from UNDG ITF for that project and subsequently subcontracted another agency. Forexample, UNAMI often partnered with UNOPS to receive funds from the trust fund. Similarly, IOM, which wasnot one of the original signatories of an MoU with the AA (IOM signed an MOU in 2010), partnered with otheragencies, most often with UNDP or UNHCR, in order to receive funding from the Trust Fund. In the case of

80 Further information about DaO can be found on the UNDG website at www.undg.org/?P=781 ‘Guidance on Joint Programming,’ UNDG, 19 December 2003.82 Ibid.83

Ibid.84

Ibid.



joint programmes, two or more agencies applied together with a common programme proposal for funding andeach agency received funding from UNDG ITF.

The following graph presents the number of project and joint programmes approved each year by the UNDGITF Steering Committee (see Annex 13, ‘List of Joint Programmes’). Joint programmes (JPs) have beenencouraged since 2005, when the first two were approved. The percentage of JPs in the total of interventionsfunded increased from 7 percent in 2005 to 43 percent in 2010. The only decline in the proportion of JPs tototal number of approved projects during the period occurred in 2008, most likely due to the overallmoratorium on project approval around the times of the UNDG ITF reforms.

FIGURE 8: NUMBER OF PROJECTS AND JOINT PROGRAMMES APPROVED BY YEAR

Most JPs involved two or three UN agencies. There were only five JPs which involved five or more agencies, upto a maximum of seven agencies. These programmes included:

Strengthening of the Constitutional Process and Good Governance—UNDP, UNESCO, UNICEF,UNIFEM and UNOPS.

Supporting the Efforts of Government of Iraq in Developing the Capacity of the Iraqi Education Sectorthrough Enhancing the Learning Environment in Vulnerable Areas in Iraq for Meeting the EFA Goals—UNICEF, UN-HABITAT, UNESCO, WHO and UNIFEM.

Iraq Public Sector Modernization (I-PSM) Programme—UNDP, UNICEF, WHO, UNESCO and UN-HABITAT.

Area Based Development Programme - Local Area Development Plans (LADP)—UNDP, UNOPS, UN-HABITAT, UNESCO, WHO, ILO and UNIFEM.

Private Sector Development Programme for Iraq—UNDP, ILO, UNOPS, UNIDO, FAO, UN-HABITATand UNIFEM.

As shown in the table below, the largest agencies had the highest participation in joint programmes. UNICEFwas involved in 25, WHO in 17, UNDP in 15, UNOPS in 13 and UNESCO and UN-HABITAT in 12 each. In termsof percentage of by agency, UNIFEM, ILO and UNICEF had the highest participation with more than 80percent of all projects implemented being shared. IOM is not counted in this as they were not the signatory ofthe MoU under the UNDG ITF. UNDP and UNOPS, which implemented the largest number of projects andprogrammes under the UNDG ITF (43 each), had a relatively low percentage of participation in JPs—35 percentand 30 percent respectively. Smaller and more specialized agencies such as UNIFEM and ILO participated inJPs more often. For example, UNIFEM implemented seven projects and out of those, only one was a standaloneproject. Similarly, ILO implemented six programmes with only one being stand alone.

51

2725

32

26

11

28

02

6

12

6 5

12

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Single agency projectsand joint programmes

Joint Programmes



TABLE 6: JOINT PROGRAMMES BY UN AGENCY

AgencyNumber of Projects and

ProgrammesJoint Programmes85 % of Joint Programmes

IOM86 1 1 100%

UNIFEM 7 6 86%

ILO 6 5 83%

UNICEF 30 25 83%

UN-HABITAT 21 12 57%

WHO 31 17 55%

UNFPA 8 4 50%

UNESCO 29 12 41%

UNHCR 5 2 40%

UNDP 43 15 35%

ESCWA 6 2 33%

UNIDO 16 5 31%

UNOPS 43 13 30%

FAO 19 5 26%

UNDPA/EAD 1 0 0%

UNEP 3 0 0%

WFP 5 0 0%

TOTAL 274 124 45%

Governance and education SOTs had the largest number of JPs, as demonstrated in the figure below:

FIGURE 9: NUMBER OF JOINT PROGRAMMES BY SECTOR OUTCOME TEAM (SOT)

85 This number of JPs indicates the count of individual projects which composed joint programmes and it takes into account the number ofparticipating agencies.86 IOM signed an MoU with UNDG ITF in 2010 and received direct funding for one programme.

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Governance Education EconomicReform

Health Water &Sanitation

Protection FoodSecurity,

Agriculture,Food

Assistance

Housing &Shelter



Benefits of joint programmes

Collaboration among many agencies allowed for more diverse technical expertise within a programme. JPs allowed for a coordinated approach to cross-cutting issues, which could be tackled at more than one

level. This was especially evident in the participation of UNIFEM in the largest JPs, which allowed forintroduction of gender cross-cutting themes to the programmes.

Some JPs allowed for coverage of wider geographic areas. For example in the LADP programme, asdiscussed in the case study, three agencies each took responsibility for one of three large geographicareas of Iraq and implemented a similar programme in each.

The engagement of a number of agencies in one programme allowed for healthy competition amongparticipating agencies. This was especially noted in the LADP programme, as discussed in the casestudy.

The cost of operations in the Joint Programmes was lowered through the following:

- Agencies often hired one project manager for the entire programme, thus saving on staffingcosts. For example the LADP had one overall Programme Manager (from UNDP), IT Manager,Media Officer, Monitoring and Reporting Officer.

- All agencies worked together to create a joint-capacity development plan

- Agencies conducted joint evaluation and auditing.

Challenges of joint programmes

A key challenge was coordination among the involved agencies. As noted in the example of one of thelargest JPs—the LADP—at the start of the programme there was often confusion regarding theprotocols for communication, coordination and decision making.

There was often a lack of clarity as to who was accountable for the overall results. Since each agencyimplemented its part and received separate funding from UNDG ITF, ultimately they were eachaccountable for their own part of the programme. No agency had the mandate to provide oversight andmonitoring of other agencies' activities, thus if one agency did not deliver on time, other agencies didnot have the mandate to intervene. Even the lead agency in a JP did not have a right to oversee thework and progress of other agencies.

Absence of a lead agency with overall programmatic oversight resulted in each agency focused ondelivering on its own set of programme components.

Despite some cost reduction due to sharing of project managers, evaluation and needs assessmentactivities, the total transaction cost savings may not have been significant as more effort, time andresources were spent on coordination among the participating agencies.

Logistical and practical challenges of managing communication, coordination and decision makingamong several agencies.

Possible personal divergences and occasional conflicts between individuals from different agencies andwith positions of authority.

Slow reaction and/ or response to issues and problems due to the sharing of responsibilities. In some cases, one of the participating agencies dominates and tends to take credit for the overall

programme, overshadowing the work of other agencies.

In addition, some programmes reported separately to their stakeholders and donors in different formats. Forexample, the LADP created one report for its stakeholders on the overall progress of the programme, while eachagency provided its own reports to the UNDP for consolidation and submission to the UNDG ITF. While JPsfacilitated harmonization of activities to a certain level, due to the decentralized nature of the UN system anyharmonization of processes at field level doubles the work for UN agencies as they have to comply with their HQrequirements along with the Trust Fund requirements. For that reason, a number of interviewees from UNagencies pointed out that they prefer to receive bilateral funding as they do not have to comply with additionalreporting requirements from the Trust Fund.

While UNDG ITF, with 16 participating agencies, provided a broader technical base to draw from among UNagencies, interviewees noted that joint programmes could have been more effective and efficient with feweragencies involved in implementation. This was an especially common remark from staff at larger agencies who



felt they had the expertise in house or could obtain the expertise to address the same area for which aspecialized agency was engaged. In the opinion of larger agencies, having fewer players in the joint programmescould have saved money. A similar lesson was learned from DaO pilots where the importance of optimal use ofresources and capacities available according to a clear division of labor and comparative advantage was noted.87

Cost effectiveness of joint programmesWhile the UNDG ITF as a whole reduced transaction costs to the government and donors by establishing onepoint of contact of the AA and a single reporting source, there is little data and evidence that there was any costsaving for participating UN agencies and the Trust Fund from joint programmes. In fact, representatives fromUN agencies noted that there were additional costs incurred for coordination of agencies’ efforts, jointmanagement arrangements as well as the simple fact of bringing all parties involved to the table to plan andmake decisions. Also, the administrative fee for joint programmes was the same as in single agency projects(between 6.5 percent and 7 percent), thus there was little cost saving for the UNDG ITF as a whole. Even if therewere common mechanisms for the monitoring and management of the joint programme which may have savedoverall costs, those savings did not translate in lower administrative fees. A similar lesson was learned from thepilot countries of DaO where costs of communication with external partners decreased but the internal UNtransaction costs increased due to enhanced coordination.88 Overall, it is important to note that there is verylittle data available to conduct further detailed analysis. Further analysis on cost effectiveness of individualprojects appears in the development-effectiveness section.

Cross-cutting themes

The UNDG ITF encouraged UN agencies to incorporate cross-cutting themes into programming activitiesincluding gender, employment creation, environment and human rights. Seventy-five percent of the 60evaluated projects reviewed addressed one or more cross-cutting themes. Gender was the most common themenoted, representing 63 percent of the reviewed projects, followed by employment creation (52 percent), humanrights (48 percent) and the environment (45 percent). The inclusion of cross-cutting themes was enforced bythe design of templates for project reports, which included a section on cross-cutting themes.

It is difficult to determine to what extent the cross-cutting themes were fully integrated in programming effortsor whether they were simply mentioned in the project documents. Very few project evaluations address thisissue and since field visits to the evaluated projects was not within the scope of the LLE, it is not possible toassess the extent of changes in relation to the cross-cutting issues. For example, many evaluations indicatedthat the gender theme was considered as being addressed by a project in the field of water and sanitationrehabilitation, since women benefited from it. The report did not elaborate, however, on the extent of women’sengagement in programme planning and implementation or the degree of empowerment resulting from theprogramme. Interviewed UNIFEM staff noted that gender issues were generally considered seriously in allproject design and UNIFEM participated as an implementing partner in a number of joint programmes.

As for other cross-cutting themes, employment and human rights were mentioned often. Again, the projectevaluations do not provide enough evidence to draw lessons or conclusions on the extent of integration andresulting changes. Some evaluation reports claim that the hiring of national staff or temporary contractorsduring the project implementation was sufficient to consider the employment theme as having been addressed.This is questionable, as some of those jobs were temporary and were discontinued once the project ended.

Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit (IAU)

The Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit (IAU) was established in February 2008 in order to improvecollaboration and information sharing among UN agencies in Iraq and the NGO community and to reduceduplication of analysis and data collection in the humanitarian and development areas. The IAU is integral tothe office of the RC / Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq while being based within OCHA. It is co-funded fromOCHA and UNAMI. The IAU maintains a website and a database where all of the data, key humanitarian and

87 ‘Lessons Learned, Delivering as One UN pilot countries,’ http://www.unethiopia.org/NewsDocs/Lessons-Learned-DaO-Final-Doc.pdf88 Ibid. "Joint programming has clearly meant an increase of internal UN transactions costs with an increase in time and resources spent incoordination, but such cost increase needs to be assessed against the expected benefits in terms of improved development impact.Furthermore, transaction costs with external partners, government and donors, have substantially decreased, ensuring more transparentand streamlined communication, decision making, monitoring and evaluation." Pg. 9.



development figures and analysis are published (http://www.iauiraq.org). Key analysis and publicationscompleted in the past few years by the IAU include: district-level vulnerability analysis, labor-force trendsanalysis 2003-2008, impact of rising food prices, the MDG booklet, factsheets and maps.

The IAU is not a separate UN agency but an inter-agency unit. This status provides it with a number ofadvantages and disadvantages. On the positive side, the IAU receives funding from UN agencies and it does nothave to do its own fundraising. Being strategically positioned as an inter-agency unit, it is able to contribute tobuilding common evidence on needs, results and impact in Iraq of development practitioners in Iraq. Byspanning cross-agency mandates, it is able to provide a holistic picture of needs in Iraq and establishpartnerships for data collection and analysis among the international community, Iraqi governmentalauthorities and civil society.

As noted by an interviewed IAU representative, however, the IAU has limited autonomy as it can only work onrequests from UN agencies and NGOs. In the past, the IAU was criticized for acting as an agency and pursuingits own projects, and as a result it was asked not to collect data unless explicitly requested by a UN agency or anNGO. Also, the IAU's collaboration with the GoI is limited as all interactions with the GoI have to filter throughUN agencies. Finally, given that the IAU is closely integrated with activities of other UN agencies, its budget andwork plan are dependent on activities of other agencies. The IAU did not receive any direct funding from theUNDG ITF.

Overall, the IAU is a useful instrument for sharing information and collaboration among agencies on collectingdata, conducting analysis and maintaining a single online data repository. While it reduces the duplication ofwork among UN agencies and some NGOs, it does not address the problem of duplication of mandates withstakeholders in Iraq including the GoI, the World Bank, USAID and other donors. Given that the World Bankconducts similar data collection and analysis for the UN, it could be more cost efficient for the twoorganizations to collaborate in this regard. Also, there is no formal collaboration between the IAU and USAIDand other donor agencies on data collection and analysis. Interviews conducted with IAU representativesrevealed that an information-sharing agreement existed with the US military, but that the information wasoften outdated and it will not be updated going forward because of the US military withdrawal.

Finally, the IAU mandate is in many ways similar to that of COSIT, which is housed within the MoPDC. Themain tasks of COSIT include the following89:

Implementation of general population and housing censuses; Implementation of statistical processes which are connected with the different fields and surveys in a

sample, as well as carrying out all processes and statistical procedures (agricultural and industry … etc); Collect, unify, prepare, analyze and summarize the statistical processes results; Publish and print the statistical pamphlets and reports; Establish integrated data banks; Prepare and update special election databases as required; Prepare research and studies to help with statistical operations development.

While many UN agencies have been working with COSIT and provided capacity development for theorganization, the next step for the UN system in Iraq is to build the capacity of the GoI to take on ownership ofall data collection and analysis, which should thus eliminate the need for maintaining the IAU. In principle,there should indeed be no need for a separate UN unit to collect data separately from the GoI, as thisundermines national ownership and takes away resources which could be devoted to GoI capacity developmentefforts. The ToR of the IAU were recently updated in September 2010 in order to revise its role under theUNDAF, yet there is no mention in the new ToR of how the unit may collaborate better with the GoI andenhance the GoI capacity.

Lessons Learned:

4.7.a: One of the most often noted achievements of the UNDG ITF has been the level of coordination it hastriggered among UN agencies. Many interviewees from UN agencies, donors and the GoI noted that

89 COSIT website: http://www.mop.gov.iq/mop/index.jsp?sid=1&id=245&pid=243



without a trust fund in place, UN agencies would tend to compete for funds and rarely or insufficientlybe coordinated their activities. Due partially to the incentive of funds available from the UNDG ITF, 16UN agencies present in Iraq were able to efficiently work together and coordinate their activities.

4.7.b: While the UNDG ITF as a whole reduced transaction costs to the government and donors byestablishing one point of contact (the Administrative Agent) and a single reporting source, there is littledata available to assess if there were any further cost savings for participating UN agencies and theTrust Fund from joint programmes.

4.7.c: The UNDG ITF encouraged UN agencies to incorporate cross cutting themes into programmingactivities including gender, employment creation, environment and human rights. Seventy-five percentof the 60 evaluated projects reviewed addressed one or more cross-cutting themes. Gender was themost common theme noted as being addressed, representing 63 percent of the reviewed projects.

4.7.d: The Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit (IAU) established in 2008 has been a usefulinstrument for sharing information and collaboration between agencies on collecting data, conductinganalysis and maintaining a central online data repository. While it addresses the issue of duplication ofwork among UN agencies and some NGOs, it does not address the problem of duplication of mandatesamong wider stakeholders in Iraq including the GoI, World Bank, USAID and other donors.

Recommendations:

4.7.1: Going forward, UN Country Teams need to ensure the continuation of effective coordination among UNagencies as well as with the government. This is already being set in place with the establishment of thePriority Working Groups (PWG) for the implementation of the UNDAF 2011-2014, which engagesnational counterparts, civil society and donors to a greater extent than the SOTs.

4.7.2: UN agencies should be encouraged to work together to design a solid and streamlined division of laborbased on their capacity, comparative advantages and mandates. This may require senior managementto pull out of certain sectors, reduce field presence and encourage greater involvement and ownershipfrom GoI and civil society organizations. Instead, the UN should focus on those sectors and activitieswhere it can make a lasting difference.

4.7.3: Develop formal collaboration between IAU and other relevant stakeholders like the GoI, WB, USAIDand other donor agencies to prevent duplication of effort.

4.8. Accountability for Development and OperationalEffectiveness

The Paris Declaration calls upon donors and partner countries to be mutually accountable for development.Partner countries are committed to strengthen their parliaments' roles in national development strategies andto reinforce participatory approaches and involve partners in formulating and assessing progress inimplementing national development strategies. At the same time donors committed to providing timely,transparent and comprehensive information on aid flow.90

Within the context of UNDG ITF and in line with the ToR, the following accountability aspects are examined inthis section:

Evolution, strengths and weaknesses of monitoring, reporting and evaluation, Role of the GoI and national partners towards accountability in UNDG ITF projects, Strengths and weaknesses of remote management.

90 ‘The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, 2005/2008,’ pg. 8, paragraph 47-49. http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/30/63/43911948.pdf



Monitoring strengths and weaknesses

In accordance with the MOU between MDTF and the PUNOs, each agency was responsible for monitoring itsown activities. The monitoring process for UNDG ITF funded projects was therefore based primarily on eachagency's own monitoring arrangements in accordance with their corporate requirements.

Thus, when analyzing the strengths of monitoring under UNDG ITF, one would have to analyze each agency'smonitoring approach and arrangements. A common aspect of monitoring for all UN agencies operating in Iraqwas that it had to rely upon national staff and representatives from the GoI for security reasons, as UN staff wasnot able to freely travel in the country.

The UNDG ITF enhanced the monitoring function by establishing a shared Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E)unit funded by the SCSO and a funding grant from AusAID under the RCO. The M&E unit served as a technicalresource to the UNCT that included the Participating UN Organizations and the SCSO. The Unit and the SCSOstaff supported agencies in designing M&E frameworks for projects. As part of the 2008 reforms, projecttemplates and guidelines were redesigned to support results based programming. The M&E Unit and SCSO'sreviews ensured adherence to the agreed UNDG ITF guidelines and templates and provided quality control.

When the MDTF was set up in 2004, the M&E framework and requirements on how agencies should bereporting their project progress were not well developed. As the Trust Fund focused on disbursing moneyquickly, and given that this was the first MDTF for the UN System, it took some time before systems andstandards for M&E and reporting were developed and institutionalized. Also a common M&E UNDG ITFstandard was not agreed on up-front and each UN agency therefore followed its own standard instead. Insetting up future trust funds, such M&E frameworks would need to be designed from the start in order toensure quality and consistency of monitoring and reporting.

While project monitoring and reporting was done on a quarterly basis, rarely did the quarterly reports (knownas fiches) identify problems. As noted before, most UNDG ITF projects were delayed by an average of 17months, yet no mention of potential delays was indicated in the quarterly fiches which reported the positiveprogress of projects, with only a few noting issues with security. Initially, the fiches template did not include afield for the discussion of challenges. Only since 2007 was a request added to indicate ‘Main ImplementationConstraints & Challenges in 2-3 sentences.’ A review of 30 randomly selected fiches point to the fact that therewas little reporting on delays or analysis of project risks. This can also be attributed to the fact that, as themonitoring teams were from within the implementing UN agency itself, there was no neutrality and, as a result,perhaps a disincentive to report outwardly on any observed delays or negative conclusions on progress ordelivery achievements.

Also, project evaluations noted a number of challenges and issues faced during project implementation whichwere not mentioned in quarterly monitoring reports. A striking example of the discrepancy between indicationsof progress in quarterly reporting and the final project evaluations are four UNDP governance projectsevaluated in 2010. As noted by the independent evaluator, all four projects were delayed and faced significantchallenges during implementation. Yet, only in one instance among the many documents for those four projectswas there mention of an irregularity. “In this case it was a note-to-file to the effect that critical documentationwas not available prior to a project manager assuming responsibility of the Board of Supreme Audit file. For therest, progress reports and fiches and final reports all reiterate project objectives and show how the project hascontributed to them. Rarely is there a hint of what dilemmas need attention, what difficulties have arisen in thereporting period, what irregularities caused concerns or why little was done if this was the case."91

Based on this assessment, the evaluator recommended that a third party assessment of projects should besubmitted for UNDG ITF approval, one that is independent of the donors or the beneficiaries. Furthermore, theevaluator recommended that provisions be made within the UNDG ITF for monitoring projects reliably,obliging the implementers to submit regular progress reports to be reviewed by independent assessors as wellas sector managers within the implementing organization. Given the security situation in Iraq, UN agencieshave in the past engaged Iraqi nationals to monitor the projects. While that approach was most appropriategiven the security conditions and challenges with procuring external experts to conduct monitoring, it did not

91 Freedman, Jim. ‘Evaluation of UNDP Governance Projects Funded by the Iraq Trust Fund,’ 10 June 2010.



necessarily ensure independence or impartiality as the consultants were directly hired and reported back to UNagencies.

As discussed in the section on fund design, there was a weak monitoring mechanism at Steering Committee(SC) level. Due to the decentralized nature of the UN, the SC of the UNDG ITF did not have a mandate tomonitor projects on an ongoing basis. Instead, each agency conducted its own monitoring, and accountabilityfor the overall results of the UNDG ITF projects and programmes has been weak. A number of interviewedstakeholders mentioned the issue of gaps in accountability in ongoing projects or what the Scanteam reportcalled "incomplete accountability" within the governance structure. Specifically, the issue raised in most caseswas the inability and/or the lack of mandate of the SC or the SCSO to monitor ongoing projects. Once theprojects were approved, the full responsibility for implementing, monitoring and overseeing projects residedwith the implementing UN agency.

This issue was particularly problematic in joint programmes when one agency fell behind deadlines but otheragencies did not have a mandate to monitor their work. As noted by a representative of the GoI, there was pooraccountability and no quality control system. "The Steering Committee would approve projects but can'tmonitor them or have any oversight on agencies. They are concerned about spending money quickly but lessconcerned if the projects are linked with priorities or needs. No one is accountable for results duringimplementations. This impacts the effectiveness of UNDG ITF."92 This comment regarding lack of independentmonitoring and oversight of projects along with number of similar sentiments expressed by donors and UNagencies (discussed throughout the report) points to the importance of rethinking the operations and design ofthe Trust Fund. Greater oversight by the SC together with independent monitoring function is likely to lead togreater, more transparent results and in effect it may attract more donors.

Reporting strengths and weaknesses

Responsibility for reporting on the progress of the UNDG ITF to donors and the GoI was in the hands of the AA.From 2004 to 2008, semi-annual reports were provided to donors and beginning in 2009, annual reports wereprovided to donors on annual basis. In addition, quarterly reports were produced by each implementing agencyon the progress of their projects and programmes. The reports were comprehensive and provided a solidoverview of activities, achievements and challenges faced during implementation. The reports were available ona timely basis and were distributed to donors and the GoI. All reports were made available on the IRFFI websitefrom 2004 to 2009, and since 2010 have been available on the MDTF Office Gateway website. A great level ofeffort went into creating those reports and making them available online. The fact that the AA fulfilled theresponsibility for compiling the reports from 16 different agencies and disseminating them to donors and theGoI in a timely way allowed for consistency and cost saving. The AA provided real value to the UNDG ITFstakeholders and partners by providing comprehensive information. Especially with the creation of the Gatewaywebsite in early 2010, where all documents related to the UNDG ITF and other MDTFs managed by UNDP areposted, the transparency of information improved.

92 Notes from interviews.



Prior to the establishment of the Gateway website, in the early years of the UNDG ITF implementation, anumber of issues were raised in previous reviews regarding the lack of transparency of information on theactivities of the Trust Fund. While the IRFFI website had existed since 2004, it provided limited informationabout the Trust Fund and projects. Since the creation of the Gateway, the situation has improved markedly.

Almost every donor representative interviewed for this LLE had some form of criticism regarding UNDG ITFreporting. Their comments included the reports being too lengthy, too narrative in nature, not readily available,not specific enough. When probed further, many interviewees noted that the real issue was that they wishedthey could receive reports on the specific projects they contributed to. What is important to donors in the fieldis to be able to report back to their HQ regarding the activities they are supporting in the country. Havingcontributed to an MDTF, some donors found it challenging to report on their specific contributions as thisinformation is simply not available given that earmarking on project level was not permitted in the Trust Fund.What made it worse for some donors is that those donors who earmarked their funds to specific agencies wereable to receive tailored reports directly from those agencies. When other donors asked for specific tailoredreports on non-earmarked funds or funds earmarked to sectors but not agencies, they were not able to obtainthem.

Based on interviews with both donors and AA representatives it seems that there is a lack of understanding ofwhat the donors are expecting and what the AA is able to provide based on the fund agreements andarrangements. While there are annual Donor Committee meetings which AA representatives attend, thereneeds to be further ongoing communication with the donors to ensure that their needs are addressed and theirexpectations are clarified. At the same time, donors should, through, their respective HQ encourageengagement with the UNDG to address some of their concerns regarding the legal instruments and operationsof MDTFs to address issues of visibility and tracking donor earmarking at the project level.

Reporting requirements for UNDG ITF-funded projects and programmesAccording to the MoU with participating UN Organizations, at project level, Participating UN Organizationsthat are recipients of UNDG ITF funds are required to submit the following reports to the AA:

Quarterly Reports or fiches are submitted on a voluntary basis by each project. The two-pagesummaries provided updated information about the programme achievements and financial statusof a project for each quarter. The reports are available on the MDTF Office Gateway website on theUNDG ITF page under documents.

Annual Narrative progress reports provided no later than three months after the end of theapplicable reporting period. The reports are prepared in accordance with UNDG ITF reportguidelines.

Annual Financial reports provided no later than four months after the end of the applicablereporting period.

Final Consolidated Narrative and Financial reports, after the completion of the project activities, areto be provided no later than 30 April of the year following the financial closing.

Final Certified Financial Statement is to be provided no later than 30 June of the year following thefinancial closing of the project.

At Trust Fund level, the AA is required to submit the following reports to the Donor Committee as outlinedin the UNDG ITF ToR and LoA:

Annual Consolidated Narrative progress report provided no later than May after the end of theapplicable reporting period.

Final Consolidated Narrative and Financial report, after completion of project activities, includingthe final year of project activities, to be provided no later than 30 June of the year following thefinancial closing of the project activities.

Final Consolidated Certified Financial Statement to be provided no later than 30 days after the lastdate of receipt of the financial statements from the Participating UN organizations for the yearfollowing the financial closing of the project activities.

Financial Report and Final Certified Financial Statements on activities as AA, to be provided nolater than 30 June of the year following the financial closing of the project activities.



Evaluation strengths and weaknesses

Out of 79 operationally completed projects, 60 underwent independent evaluations by external consultants. Theremaining projects were not evaluated. Twenty four evaluations were completed before 2010 and the remaining36 were commissioned in 2010 on the request of the UNDG ITF SC as part of the preparation for the LLE. Thefollowing observations can be made about the evaluations:

The earlier evaluations (prior to 2010) did not have a standard ToR across UNDG ITF. The 2010 batchhad similar ToR which was designed by the M&E Unit and SCSO in preparation for the LLE.

Many of the 2010 evaluations were conducted long after the project closed. Some projects wereevaluated after three years following their operational closure, for example:

– UNDP's Iraqi Rebuilding Iraq project was evaluated 27 months after completion.– UNESCO's Revitalization of Technical and Vocational Educational and Training (Phase 2) was

evaluated 30 months after project completion.– UNHCR's Protection and Assistance to Persons of Concern in Southern Iraq and Support to

Local Authorities and Civil Society Organizations in Addressing Displacement Needs and Gapsproject was evaluated three years after completion.

– UNICEF's Emergency Water Supply to Unserved/Underserved/Vulnerable areas in Baghdadand the IDPs was evaluated three years and three months after completion.

One project was evaluated prior to completion (UNOPS's Elections Project). Many projects were evaluated by the same consultant, thus the evaluations are strikingly similar in

terms of their lessons learned and recommendations.– UN-HABITAT requested three evaluations in 2010. All three were conducted by the same

independent evaluation firm and have similar and at times identical recommendations.– UNICEF evaluations of its five WATSAN projects were conducted by the same independent

evaluation firm and those also have identical recommendations. Evaluations are often superficial in their analysis of the situation. For example, when discussing the

cross-cutting themes most evaluations simply noted that project objectives indicated that all themeswould be covered without questioning that statement. Also if women benefited to some extent from theproject, the gender theme has been checked as addressed.

Those challenges identified with evaluations can be partially explained by the fact that it was difficultfor UN agencies to procure qualified consultants to conduct those evaluations. Due to the securitysituation in Iraq there were few people who were qualified and willing to conduct such evaluations.

Role of GoI and national partners in mutual accountability forUNDG ITF projects

The project evaluations show that the GoI bodies were involved in the implementation and monitoring ofprojects, yet the level of their mutual accountability is difficult to determine. Overall, it is difficult to speak ofthe GoI accountability without national ownership and co-financing.The question should be asked, ‘Accountability to whom?’ It is important to distinguish here that ParisDeclaration calls for mutual accountability of all stakeholders. Certainly the GoI was not accountable to the UNfor projects, yet should be held mutually accountable for successful implementation of projects. One lessonlearned is that there was no structure in place for the GoI to have a greater level of mutual accountability.Without investment of their own funds, line ministries had little at stake in being mutually accountable for thesuccess of the projects. Accountability has to be tied to financial contributions or incentives in order to beeffective. Most often the UN projects did not even enter the budget lines of line ministries, thus there was nostructure within line ministries to monitor the financial progress of the projects and account for their progress.Also the fact that the GoI was not on the SC of UNDG ITF, and only approved the projects through ISRB, madethe GoI less accountable for the progress of projects.

Looking at financial accountability for example, an interviewee from the GoI noted that "GoI doesn't know howmoney was spent by the UN in Iraq. There needs to be more transparency on how money has been spent. As a



beneficiary country, we have a right to know that. We saw the budget at approval, but not throughout theproject or at project completion."93

The GoI had plans for establishing a robust monitoring system envisioned in the NDS in 2005, but these planswere not implemented due to a perceived lack of GoI capacity and security conditions which hindered UN'sability to conduct frequent face-to-face meetings with GoI. According to the NDS, two levels of monitoring wereenvisioned. "First, household surveys, labor force surveys, agricultural surveys and industrial censuses will needto be conducted on a timely basis so as to prepare high quality estimates of trends in employment and humanwell being. Second, there is a need to develop performance indicators for all sectors. This should be done bysectoral ministries within their Sector Working Groups." Both activities were implemented by the UN withintheir projects and the GoI was involved where possible, yet the GoI did not lead those activities.

Remote management challenges

Following the 19 August 2003 suicide bombing at Baghdad’s Canal Hotel (then the headquarters for the UnitedNations in Iraq) which killed 23 people, the UN promptly withdrew its staff from Iraq to neighboring countries,mainly Jordan and Kuwait. Since 2003, UN staff provided remote assistance to Iraq using various methods ofcommunication with the GoI, counterparts and beneficiaries including telephone, video conferences and the useof national staff to conduct field visits. Selected UN staff would occasionally travel to Iraq as well underprotection of US military or other security guards. The UN compound in Baghdad's IZ currently houses close to150 staff from all agencies. Bed spaces are limited in the IZ, and UN staff has to gain permission beforetravelling to Baghdad.

Once in the IZ, UN staff members’ movement is constricted to the housing and office compounds, and they areshuttled back and forth by bus. Travel outside of the IZ is difficult, costly and requires making arrangementsweeks ahead of time. Even visiting the MoPDC which is located right on the outskirts of the IZ is difficult toarrange for UN staff. Security costs increased significantly after the US troops withdrew from Iraq and nolonger provide protection for UN staff. The estimated cost of travelling to the airport with private security canbe as high as US$5,000 per trip. The head of one of the UN agencies indicated that he receives a significantamount of hardship allowance for his time in Iraq, thus he prefers to limit the time he spends in Iraq in order tosave money for programmatic activities.

Also, meetings with Iraqi counterparts and representatives of CSO in the IZ are difficult as those without an IZbadge have to go through hours of security check at the checkpoints. Interviewed UN staff noted that it is easierand less costly to hold those meetings in Amman than Baghdad. In fact GoI officials occasionally come toAmman, where many meetings with the UN are held. While the security situation in Erbil is better, the UN staffhas similar security constraints as in Baghdad.

UN staff should be commended for their efforts to provide assistance to Iraq remotely. They have been able toimplement many projects throughout the country and find creative ways of working with national counterpartsto ensure that ongoing monitoring and technical assistance is provided even when UN staff was not able totravel to the project site. As noted before, this was an unprecedented situation for UN teams, but they havebeen able to continue delivering on their commitment to the country and its people despite the security threats.

Going forward, as the security situation is gradually improving in Iraq, some UN agencies are makingarrangements to relocate their staff to the International Zone (IZ). UNHCR placed most of its staff within the IZand UNICEF is currently making an effort to place more staff in Baghdad. The GoI insisted that they would likethe UN staff to spend more time meeting face-to-face with line ministries and local governorates in the processof developing and implementing projects.

UNDAF indicates that as the political and security situation improves in Iraq, the UNCT intends to continue todemonstrate its commitment by increasing its presence inside Iraq, but its remote management modality willcontinue, given security concerns. "While flexible security management for UN staff will determine to a degreethe nature of engagement, the ‘remote management’ will not deter the UNCT from developing andstrengthening new and existing partnerships with national government and civil society."

93 Notes from interviews



Increasing the UN presence inside Iraq is a first step, but the real issue to be dealt with is how to facilitategreater movement of UN staff outside of the IZ as well as to arrange for safe meetings of project partners inBaghdad. Many international aid workers and donors are already operating a lot more freely in Iraq than UNstaff and are tolerating a greater level of risk. UN agencies could lobby the UN Security Council to re-examinethe security measures in light of the current risk situation and needs.

Lessons Learned:

4.8.a: Within the UN system, each participating UN agency is accountable for project results and undertakesM&E as per their own guidelines, meaning that there was no central accountability at UNDG ITF level.This may also have undermined donor confidence and boosted earmarking.

4.8.b: Donors and the GoI suggested that the SC be given a mandate to monitor the work of UN agenciesimplementing projects under the UNDG ITF to ensure a central accountability for results with aconsistent quality and format standard for reporting results.

4.8.c: A strong and well resourced SCSO is key to effective management results for an MDTF. With thepresence of the M&E capacity since 2008, the quality of project documentation has improved andincluded consistent Results Based Management frameworks and budget plans.

4.8.d: Under a very difficult security situation, the UN teams have been able to continue delivering support toIraq and its people thanks to remote-management approach and use of various communicationmechanisms such as video, tele-conference and internet as well as the use of national consultants.

4.8.e: In setting up future trust funds, such M&E frameworks would need to be designed from the start inorder to ensure quality and consistency of monitoring and reporting.

Recommendations:

4.8.1: Future MDTFs will need to consider establishing a common shared standard of effective, independentand transparent M&E and also reporting channels to provide information to their stakeholders.

4.8.2: A third-party assessment of projects should be submitted for UNDG ITF approval, one that isindependent of the donors or the beneficiaries. In addition, provision should be made within the UNDGITF for monitoring projects reliably, obliging the implementers to submit regular progress reports to bereviewed by independent assessors as well as sector managers within the implementing organization.

4.8.3: The MDTF Office should set appropriate expectations with donors regarding the level of informationthe trust fund can provide. As an MDTF does not allow earmarking at project level, donors need to beclearly informed that they cannot receive tailored reports on the projects their funds contribute to. Atthe same time, donors should, through, their respective HQ encourage engagement with the UNDG toaddress some of their concerns regarding the legal instruments and operations of MDTFs to addressissues of visibility and tracking donor earmarking at the project level.

4.8.4: The UNCT need to engage the GoI in monitoring projects and also build national capacity andstrengthen the GoI M&E system.

4.8.5: Further promotion of the MDTF Office Gateway website and awareness of the information includedthere may be useful as some stakeholders among UN agencies, donors and the GoI are not familiar withthe online database.

4.8.6 UN agencies should advocate the UN Security Council to re-examine the security measures within Iraqin light of the current risk situation and needs.



5. Development EffectivenessReview

5.1. Introduction

Assessing the development effectiveness of any significant development initiative, including the UNDG ITF overits seven years of operations, first requires the establishment of a common view of how development is defined.This is set out in the subsequent paragraphs followed by an assessment of the contribution of the UNDG ITF tothe overall development of Iraq during these seven years, building on the five parameters of developmenteffectiveness identified by the OECD-DAC criteria.

What is development?

The common view of development has evolved towards the end of the 20th century, from what had beenenvisioned after World War II at the time of the establishment of the Bretton Woods institutions. For thesecond half of the 20th Century development was, at the base level, mainly determined by the extent ofeconomic growth in a country, measured by the size of GDP growth year on year, and the GDP per capita. MostOfficial Development Assistance (ODA) and other forms of bilateral and multilateral loans and grants wereintended to achieve economic growth for the recipient countries. Most of the focus was on attempts to bridgethe widening gap between industrialized and less industrialized countries in the scope and size of economicactivity and the quality of life of their respective populations. Economic reform programmes were a mainstreamcharacteristic of development activity during this era and were principally supported by the World Bank, theIMF, and other development institutions in order to help recipient countries achieve the desired developmentstatus. Particularly in the post-cold war era, much of the development assistance was geared towardstransforming the economic systems of recipient countries to the more open market economies that prevailed inthe industrialized countries.

The underlying definition of development evolved towards the end of the millennium, however, based on therealization that while economies may grow at respectable rates, and the per capita GDP may improvesignificantly, the trickle-down effect of these achievements would most likely not reach all the population of the‘developing’ country. Towards the end of the 1990s, and after billions of dollars had been invested indevelopment assistance, millions of people in countries that received significant sums of assistance were stillsuffering from large and even growing levels of extreme poverty and hunger, continued lack of access to basicservices such as health and education, high mortality rates, and other indicators of limited development or lowliving standards. To compliment the initial view that development cannot be measured by the extent ofeconomic growth alone, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were defined and endorsed by worldleaders as global targets for achieving a more equitable and effective development for the populations of eachcountry. The MDGs have been additionally agreed to by all member states of the United Nations as a commonagenda for development from the year 2000.

Against this very general development background, the development effectiveness of the UNDG ITF in Iraq willbe assessed on the basis of its contribution to the economic growth of the country and any indicators ofachievement of the MDGs.

Development effectiveness of the Iraq Trust Fund

Two successive Gulf wars, followed by economic sanctions, imbalanced allocation of resources, and lack ofinvestment in infrastructure had a great impact on the country’s ability to grow the economy and support theneeds of the population. The 2003 occupation and the prolonged sectarian unrest and offensive attacks acrossthe country compounded matters even further.



With a population of 31.5 million in 2009, and a GDP of US$65.82 billion at current US$ rates, Iraq is nowclassified as a lower middle-income country by the World Bank. The economy remains highly dependent on oil,of which Iraq has the second largest reserves in the world.

World Bank (WB) database indicators on Iraq go back in many cases to 1960. Considering GDP per capita atcurrent US dollar rates, Iraq enjoyed high per capita GDP during most of the 1970 and 1980s, in excess ofUS$3,000 in some years and “…ranked among the most developed countries in the Middle East.”94 By 1997,these figures had dropped to US$441 for that year, reaching US$718 by 2002. The same database indicates thatper capita GDP has been improving since 2004.

TABLE 7: IRAQ’S GDP PER CAPITA POST-2003

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

GDP per capita(current US$)

927.5 1,099.6 1,543.4 1,902.8 2,817.3 2,090.5

Source: World Bank Database, Iraq

Since May 2006, the elected government took major steps to boost investment in the oil sector by offering 11development licenses in international bidding rounds in 2009. The biggest oil companies worldwide haveacquired licenses95. The sector is expected to witness significant investment over the coming years, to boost theproduction of its fields from the current levels of less than 3 million barrels per day (bpd) (the Organization ofthe Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) quota for Iraq), to an envisioned 7 million bpd in 2015 and possibly12 million bpd by 2017.96

Other economic sectors are receiving significant investment and many of the global players in the financialservices, energy, and construction and transport sectors are establishing businesses in Iraq, particularly duringthe last three years as the situation on the ground started to show improvements in security and mobility. TheWB indicates that there is an upward trend in the amount of foreign direct investment in Iraq, and anincreasing contribution of foreign direct investment (FDI) as a percentage of GDP. So, despite the commonperception and the media coverage of security incidents, there are several indicators which support the viewthat business has recently started to thrive in Iraq and that many international companies that are willing totake higher risks for higher returns and have a longer term perspective on the desired rewards are stepping intoIraq as one of the world’s highest potential markets simply because there is so much to be achieved.

TABLE 8: INCREASING FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (FDI) INFLOWS TO IRAQ

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Foreign directinvestment, net(Balance of Payment(BoP), current US$)

- 426,600,000 78,000,000 963,900,000 1,822,100,000 NA

Foreign directinvestment, net inflows(% of GDP)

1.2 1.7 0.85 1.7 2.15 1.6

Source: World Bank Database, Iraq

The MDG booklet for Iraq released in August 2010 states: “...Iraq has started to make progress towardsachieving some of the MDGs including reducing hunger, promoting gender equality and reducing childmortality. There is still much work to be done in a number of other areas including increasing participation inprimary education, reducing unemployment, and ensuring access to safe and reliable water and sanitation. Thegap in access to essential services remains wide between rural and urban areas, and this needs also to beaddressed.” Taking a closer look at the MDGs for Iraq, the Common Country Assessment (CCA) undertaken bythe UNCT for Iraq indicates, “The current status of MDG achievement presents a mixed picture. Some

94 ‘The UN Common Country Assessment for Iraq,’ 2009, pg. 13.95 Including UK, Chinese, Russian, European, Japanese, African, American, Turkish and Malaysian companies.96 ‘The New Iraq: 2011 Discovering Business,’ a publication by the National Investment Commission and the UK Trade and Investmentdepartment, pg. 42-43.



indicators have deteriorated or stagnated over the last 15 years, such as dietary energy consumption, the shareof women in non-agricultural employment, tuberculosis-related health indicators, and access to clean watersources. Others have improved—some significantly—over the same period. Extreme income poverty has fallen,child and maternal mortality rates have dropped, malaria incidence is nearly at zero, and the gender gap ineducation has narrowed. Overall, progress towards achieving the MDGs is slow and uneven, and theachievement of most goals by 2015 remains a challenge. Of particular concern are the education, health andgender goals, as well as environmental protection to ensure sustainable rural livelihoods. Additionally, wideregional disparities concerning all MDGs exist within the country.”97 The CCA also comments, “A clear exampleof the impact of the conflict in Iraq is that life expectancy at birth today is 58 years (down from the average of65 registered 30 years ago), ten years less than that of the region (67.5 years) and the world (68 years). Whencomparing its development progress with its neighbors, Iraq can be seen to have fallen behind, stagnated, orprogressed more slowly. For example, Iraq is the only country within the immediate region….to show a declinein access to a safe source of drinking water from 1990 to 2006.”

In addition, the level of within Iraq varies considerably between rural and urban areas, and more importantlyamong the 18 Governorates, which are usually classified into regions. A UNDP study in 200698 states,“Historically, development [among] the Governorates of Iraq suffered inequalities in living standards for manyreasons, including the government’s focus on the hearts of the cities in specific governorates, like Baghdad,Basra, and Mousul. With the beginning of the 1980s, other factors contributed to the rise in disparities betweenthe Governorates, including the geographic location of the Governorate in terms of its proximity to battlefields,and the social composition of the Governorates’ population, especially in the north and south. In otherGovernorates, disparities stemmed from political and tribal origins.” By 2006, the Governorates of Al-Muthanna, Qadiseyya and Babil in the South were identified as areas with very high deprivation levels, followedby Diyala, Karblaa, Wasit, and Dhi-Qar.99

FIGURE 10: LEVEL OF DEPRIVATION BY GOVERNORATE

97 ‘The UN Common Country Assessment for Iraq,’ 2009, pg. 12.98 ‘Unsatisfied Basic Needs Mapping and Livings Standards in Iraq,’ 2006.99 Map from the ‘Unsatisfied Basic Needs Mapping and Livings Standards in Iraq,’ 2006.



Published MDG indicators give a detailed picture of the life of the Iraqi people today:100

Almost seven million Iraqis live in poverty (spending less than US$2.2 per day), totaling 23 percentof the population. This percentage rises considerably to 39 percent in rural areas, and largeconcentrations of poverty remain in urban areas.

The proportion of the population consuming less than the minimum recommended energy intakewas 7 percent in 2007.

More than one in five children aged under five years (21 percent) suffer from stunted growth and 5percent suffer from wasting.

The youth unemployment rate of 30 percent is now double the national average of 15 percent. In rural areas, just 77 percent of primary school-age children are enrolled. Forty-four percent of children complete primary education at the standard age of 11 years old. Literacy rates among 15-24 year olds have shown a slight improvement to 84 percent in 2007. Just 18 percent of women aged 15 years and older participate in the labor force; 26 percent of

women are illiterate. Women’s share of wage employment outside of agriculture fell to 7 percent in 2008. The proportion of children dying before reaching the age of five has fallen from 62 to 41 for every

1,000 live births. The proportion of children dying within the first year of life has dropped from 50 to 35 for every

1,000 live births, but these infants account for 85 percent of deaths among children under age five. Immunization rates have improved, with four in five children receiving all recommended

vaccinations by the age of 12 months. The proportion of women dying in childbirth (maternal mortality ratio) currently stands at 84 per

100,000 live births, placing Iraq in a group of 68 countries globally which account for 97 percent ofall maternal and child deaths.

The proportion of births attended by skilled personnel has risen to 89 percent in 2006. New incidences of tuberculosis (TB) rose from two to 12 for every 100,000 Iraqis per year between

2000 and 2006, pushing the country further away from the target of eradication by 2015. The prevalence of Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) in Iraq is currently less than 0.1 percent

of the population, but associated vulnerability and risk factors continue to increase. The proportion of households using an improved water source has remained at around 80 percent

since 1990. In rural areas, this figure is just 57 percent. A fifth of those using an improved water source have daily problems with supply. Fourteen percent of water samples tested by the Ministry of Health in the first three quarters of

2009 were contaminated with fecal matter. Just 26 percent of the population is covered by the public sewage network, dropping to 2 percent in

rural areas. Eighty-three percent of Iraq’s waste water is left untreated, contributing to the pollution of Iraq’s

waterways and general environment. Use of new technology has increased rapidly in Iraq since 2003, with 78 percent of the population

using a mobile telephone by 2007. Personal computer ownership has also risen to 12 percent, while only 6 percent of Iraqis use the

internet daily.

As can be seen from the above indicators, despite some encouraging economic trends, there are still significantgaps in the essential services and rights-based development indicators for Iraq across the wider population.This translates into significant additional needs for development assistance and collaboration with Iraq.

The UNDG ITF had been the major funding source for most UN agencies operating in Iraq during the period2003-2010, which was confirmed by meetings with UN agencies who indicated that most of their fundingacross all projects implemented in Iraq had come from the Trust Fund, at least up until 2008. Therefore, theachievement of improvements in some indicators under the MDG, especially in areas where the UN agenciesare the only or a major player can be directly attributed to the contributions of the UNDG ITF. It is notstraightforward, however, to assess direct causal relationships between progress on particular MDGs andUNDG ITF’s activities per se.

100 Based on the ‘MDG Booklet,’ released by the UN in August 2010.



While contributions of more than US$1.36 billion have come through the UNDG ITF for development projectsin Iraq, a very significant amount of bilateral aid assistance has flowed into the country since 2003.

Given the huge volume of non-Trust Fund aid, it is important to realize that the overall results and developmentin Iraq can only in part be attributed to the UNDG ITF and that, given the sums of money involved, UNDG ITFis a relatively small contributor. Therefore, the following sections will assess the contribution of the UNDG ITFto development in Iraq, looking more closely at the activities of the Trust Fund in order to come up withconclusions regarding any positive (or negative) contribution indicators of the UNDG ITF to the overalldevelopment in Iraq.

5.2. Overall Achievements of the UNDG ITF

The evolution of Iraq’s needs

To identify the extent of Iraqi needs for the duration of the UNDG ITF, an analysis of three key strategydocuments was undertaken: the Joint Needs Assessment (JNA) performed in the summer of 2003 and releasedin October that year, the National Development Strategy (NDS) for 2005-2007, and the updated NDS for 2007-2010. Those documents were selected based on their direct link to the UN Assistance Strategy and theirconsistency in terms of the level of detail and structure presented (see Annex 14, ‘List of Iraq’s Needs Extractedfrom the Joint Needs Assessment and National Development Strategy’).

While each of the three key documents represents a different time period and is expected to showcase theevolution of Iraq’s needs, the analysis of the specific needs reported in each document reveals that in certain keysectors—education, health, water and sanitation, and electricity—the same needs prevailed over time. Thedetails of the NDS documents provided additions and fine-tuning of the needs identified in the JNA documentfor those sectors.

The level of details of the needs identified in each document varied between periods reflecting the resultsalready achieved and the fine-tuning of previously identified needs. In addition, this reflected the increasingrole played by the GoI and other national stakeholders in identifying those needs. While the JNA wasundertaken in 2003 by the WB and the UNDG, with participation from the IMF, the NDS documents werereleased by the MoPDC, although preparation was also undertaken through discussions with and involvementfrom the UN and other stakeholders.

The JNA identified many urgent needs given the severe damage that occurred prior to, during and following themilitary invasion. In many sectors, there was considerable focus on fast humanitarian and reconstruction aid,in the form of rehabilitation and recovery of many aspects of the physical infrastructure and the human capitalof the country. A distinction was made in the JNA between the immediate needs to be addressed in 2004 andmedium-term priorities to be addressed in the period 2005-2007. Out of the total estimated investment cost ofabout US$36 billion101, identified in the JNA, 68 percent was allocated to infrastructure reconstruction. Thedocument identified major efforts to be directed towards building systems and plans that would provide a basisfor the future development of the country, and contribute to the recovery of services and decent standards ofliving for Iraqis.

The NDS documents had clearer goals with outcomes and targets relating to reforming the economy andpolitical system, addressing issues of human rights and justice, revitalizing public and private enterprises,resuming the provision of quality basic services to the population, and overcoming the legacy of unfairdistribution of resources across geographic regions and population segments. Strategies in the NDS were set asimmediate, short-term and medium-term priorities. The focus was still on reconstruction yet leaning moretowards developmental activities.

The UN Country Team for Iraq built on the initial JNA of 2003, and additional sector specific needsassessment, to design a results framework for 11 sectors (clusters) identified for Iraq in 2003, and presented inthe UN Assistance Strategy for 2005-2007. The UNCT determined in the strategy, “The conventional model—inwhich development follows rehabilitation follows emergency or humanitarian—was not appropriate for Iraq”

101 Calculated from sector data provided in Annex 2 of the JNA document, and included investment and incremental O&M costs.



and ascertained that in a situation of prolonged crisis such as that in Iraq, it would adopt a model of work“…where development goes hand in hand with humanitarian interventions as development cannot bepostponed.”102 The details of the planned output in each sector under the development dimension includedlonger-term aspects such as support for policy reform and creating strategic plans, in addition to building thecapacity of government counterparts.

The subsequent ‘UN Iraq Assistance Strategy of 2008-2010’ had responded to the Security Council resolution1770 which “accentuate(d) the humanitarian role of the UN in Iraq.” The strategy was then reformulated toprovide better assistance to the GoI in addressing the needs of citizens. The strategy also builds on the NDS andthe International Compact for Iraq (ICI) as grounds for formulating the strategy. By this time, the 11 clustersidentified earlier had been restructured to seven, and by 2008 restructured into eight Sector Outcome Teams(SOTs). Each sector presented a set of outcomes and outputs in the strategy based on a sector situation analysis,and further supported by a work plan and an advocacy plan.103

TABLE 9: THE EVOLUTION FROM CLUSTER TO SECTOR OUTCOME TEAM (SOT)

Initial 11 Clusters Seven Clusters Eight Sector Outcome Teams

Education and Culture Education and Culture Education

Health Health and Nutrition Health

Food Security Agriculture, Food Security,Environment and Natural

Resource Management

Food Security, Agriculture andFood Assistance

Agriculture, Water Resources andEnvironment

Water and Sanitation

Infrastructure and HousingInfrastructure Rehabilitation Housing and Shelter

Mine Action

Internally Displaced Persons andRefugees

Refugees, Internally DisplacedPersons and Durable Solutions

Protection

Poverty and Human DevelopmentGovernance and Human Capital

Economic Reform andDiversification

Governance and Civil SocietyGovernance

Support to Electoral Process Support to Electoral Process

Source: Multiple UN documents

Based on a review of the JNA and the two NDS documents, a number of observations can be made about theevolution of the needs of Iraq over time:

There is some consistency in the needs identified throughout the three documents with particularreference to a number of sectors. In addition, the needs were organized by most consistent sector andsubsector categories across the three documents.

While the JNA had a focus on rehabilitation and reconstruction, it also included a longer-termperspective on development, tackling areas such as attracting investment, reforming state-ownedenterprises, reforming the banking and financial sector, modernizing public administration andservices, and overall building an enabling environment for transition to a market economy.

The first NDS document had an increased focus on fighting corruption, reforming the correctionalfacilities and training of personnel on human rights issues, supporting Iraqi law enforcement forces,and developing institutional capacity across sectors. Reference to specific economic sectors such as oiland gas and tourism was also included in the NDS, in addition to macroeconomic policy directions.

102 ‘United Nations Assistance Strategy for Iraq: 2005-2007.’103 ‘United Nations Iraq Assistance Strategy: 2008-2010.’



The second NDS document included additional areas of focus such as combating terrorism and WorldTrade Organization (WTO) accession. In addition, the document included additional emphasis onissues such as fighting corruption and strengthening the role of civil society. Needs identified in sectorssuch as agriculture and oil and gas were further fine-tuned in this document.

The details of the needs identified in the three documents present a dual challenge for Iraq, especially the newlyelected government. On one hand, there is a continuing and pressing need to deliver the essential services forthe majority of the population and overcome current and historical disparities in the standards of living andquality of life enjoyed by the various population groups. On the other hand, there is a need to take strides in theexercise of nation building and setting the foundation for stability and growth for a country that has suffered forover three decades of its recent history. In part, the UNDG ITF was a mechanism that managed to support theGoI and the people of Iraq in overcoming these major challenges to a great extent.

The UNDG ITF response

The original IRFFI ToR stated that “given the unique circumstances of Iraq, it is critical to mobilize the donorcommunity behind innovative solutions to help clear the way for the rapid reconstruction of Iraq.”

The IRFFI arrangement was set up to “aim to ensure... that:

Each project approved for funding is part of a priority programme of reconstruction and developmentactivities validated by the Iraqi authorities, based on the Needs Assessment and formulated inconsultation with donors and other partners.

The activities financed by the donor community are implemented as much as possible by the Iraqisthemselves, under the ownership and leadership of the Iraqi authorities, with the aim to help developsustainable local capacities.

Implementation and funding modalities: (i) provide for transparency and accountability; (ii) facilitateefficient and prompt delivery; and (iii) support the progressive development of a unified budget andcoherent public expenditures process.

A unified donor coordination and funding structure avoids the emergence of gaps and duplication infunding, inconsistency in policy advice and ensures sustained budget expenditure planning.”

The ToR further detailed expectations from each of the two funds, with specific reference to the UNDG ITF:“[It] will place emphasis on all of the sectors in which the UN has carried out needs assessments and will focuson funding quick-impact projects and transition activities which need to be implemented in a rapid and flexibleway. Its functions will cover technical assistance and capacity building across the following areas, in particular:(i) capacity and institution building for human development and social justice; (ii) the delivery of essentialsocial services, in the area of health in particular; (iii) the empowerment of civil society and local communities;(iv) water resources and food security; (v) infrastructure rehabilitation, building in particular on expertisegained under the Oil-for-Food Programme; (vi) the protection and reintegration of vulnerable groups; (vii) thepromotion of human rights and the rule of law; and (viii) private sector development and employmentgeneration, with due regard to cross-sectoral issues such as gender equality and environmental protection andmanagement.”

The UNDG ITF was designed and operated to meet the objectives defined in the IRFFI ToR. Initially, 11 clusterswere set up in order to organize project identification, design and implementation. Those clusters responded tomost of the key themes and sectors identified in the JNA and NDS documents, which were directly reflected inthe cluster systems and the cross-cutting themes.

While projects under the UNDG ITF responded to the IRFFI requirements and included key issues such asemployment as a cross-cutting theme for all projects, it is our view that employment creation was not addressedstrategically by the UNDG ITF projects and the focus was practically shifted to short-term and temporary jobcreation through the implemented projects. Our analysis (as detailed later) indicates that the UNDG ITF waslate in responding to the key strategic issue of addressing the fundamental economic foundations that



contribute to building the enabling business environment attractive to the public and private sectors to generatelong-term and sustainable employment. This is evidenced by the fact that there are key areas essential forlonger-term development and building a foundation of economic development and recovery that were notaddressed by the UNDG ITF either at all, or not in enough depth.

To illustrate this, the JNA and NDS documents identified a need to modernize the public administration andservices, including key areas such as customs. They also identified a need to undertake a reform of the trade andinvestment climate and the financial sector. Such needs were not addressed by the UNDG ITF through neither acluster nor a cross-cutting theme up to 2008 when the Economic Reform and Diversification SOT that wasestablished. Evidence shows that only projects addressing fundamental long-term development interventionssuch as the modernization of the public sector and a private sector development programme were approved in2008 and 2010. Prior to this, there were only a few exceptions of addressing the need for reform at institutionallevel such as developing the capacity of some government authorities, in support for decentralization andimproving governance at local and municipal levels. Examples include projects like Support to MoPDC (C9-02104) approved in 2004 and Strengthening Capacity of the Housing Sector - Phase I and II (E4-16).

An additional gap area not addressed by the UNDG ITF is the transport sector. The availability of propertransport infrastructure, including roads and bridges, aviation and cargo services, rail and sea transport isessential for resuming normal day-to-day and economic activities, and are fundamental for the long-term andsustainable development of any country. Of particular relevance to Iraq, this infrastructure was essential tosupport the provision of essential basic services to the larger parts of the population. Within the UNDG ITFstructure, there was no sector addressing this need and the infrastructure and housing cluster envisionedinitially did not include any projects of relevance. The UNDG ITF 200 approved projects and programmesincluded only one project addressing the rehabilitation of a port Dredging of Um Qasr Port Approach Channel(E4-06). All other subsectors such as roads and bridges, railways, and aviation were not addressed. Another keyeconomic sector, telecommunication, including postal and courier services was also not addressed as noprojects addressing any of the needs were identified for this sector.

In addition, other economic sectors such as the financial sector, oil and gas, industrial zones, tourism, andinitiating programmes and plans for including private participation in providing public services and facilities,and a public-private partnership philosophy, had all been identified and addressed in the needs documents, butnot reflected in the UNDG ITF activities, with a few exceptions such as one project addressing tourism—Assisting the GoI to Develop a National Tourism Strategy (C9-30), approved in April 2010.

The UN Assistance Strategy further argues, “If the structural and regulatory frameworks in which reform needsto take place do not exist, then the changes indicated within any proposed reform have nothing on which tograft. The institutions include the political, legal, judicial institutions and agencies, both public and private, andcivil society and others that are the ultimate source of authority and trust. Rebuilding and investing in thepolitical and social capital is the major task of nation building in post-conflict societies and economies. Solelyrebuilding destroyed physical infrastructure will not restore the torn political and social fabric, nor diminish theprobability of renewal of violence and conflict.” Based on these premises, the 11 cluster results frameworkspresented in the first assistance strategy had defined outcomes and outputs for each cluster, in many casesbroken down into humanitarian, rehabilitation or development outputs. For example, UN Strategy 2005-2007,page 9-10 and page 100-107 provide discussion of Cluster 10 which clearly indicates that the UN was clear onthe comparative advantage in helping the public sector reform and the institutional reform and capacitydevelopment of the private sector as preludes for economic development and employment creation. UNStrategy 2008-2010 – Economic-Diversification sector planned outcomes also provide clarity of plans to focuson such interventions. However, as can be judged from a review of the 200 projects and programmes under theUNDG ITF, there was more attention to recovery and rehabilitation projects throughout the life of the TrustFund and limited attention to longer-term development projects although they had been defined in the UNstrategy documents from the outset.

Based on discussions with multiple stakeholders, the focus on recovery and rehabilitation can be attributed to anumber of realities throughout the life of the UNDG ITF:

104 All UNDG ITF projects have a code that starts with an alphabet and a digit to indicate the clusters and two digits after a dash to indicateserial numbers. Those are in addition to other codes used by the agencies or on internal UN systems such as Atlas.



The donors that contributed to the UNDG ITF emphasized rapid implementation, which related toquick impact and recovery interventions, as indicated in the ToR.

The continued deterioration in the security conditions in the country from insurgencies and militantattacks resulted in a continuous need for emergency and humanitarian support, especially forvulnerable groups and the internally displaced portions of the population.

Project implementation for large-scale infrastructure projects such as power and water stations waschallenged by the difficulties of access and moving of material and equipment due to security concerns.

The size of the UNDG ITF, albeit the largest in the UN system, was still extremely small for the overallneeds of Iraq and there had to be priority given to the projects and sectors most relevant to the UNsystem.

Especially in the first years of the UNDG ITF, there was a tendency to disburse funds quickly onrehabilitation and quick impact projects. In hindsight, the GoI criticized this tendency as it resulted indisbursing significant amounts on projects not necessarily in line with the priorities of the GoI. Thecriticism continues that seeking quick results may not necessarily be good practice as quick results maynot always be sustainable, especially in the Iraqi context with the challenges of lack of absorptivecapacity on the government side on one hand, and the continued instability in the country due toviolence on the other. However, this criticism has to be balanced with donor appetite for demonstratingfast and positive evidence of results as indicated in the first point above.

It can be concluded that from the start of the UNDG ITF in January 2004, there were clear needs identified in anumber of sectors and fundamental themes further reiterated by the UN Assistance Strategy in 2005 and 2008.Such needs ranged from short-term and quick recovery and rehabilitation to longer-term development andstate-building needs. The response of the UNDG ITF, however, was focused on quick rehabilitation and basicservices and missed out on some longer-term aspects. These long-term aspects included both tangiblefoundations and infrastructure building, in addition to supporting the establishment of the institutional andregulatory infrastructure essential for long-term sustainable development as well. Attention to such longer-term development aspects was regained relatively late in the life of the UNDG ITF as indicated by the nature ofprojects approved in later years. This was naturally restricted by the limited availability of funds due to thedisbursement of the majority of ITF funds in the first three years of its operation. While this can be understoodin the particular context of Iraq, in retrospect an opportunity was missed to balance the activities of the UNDGITF-funded projects along a spectrum of short- and medium-term development interventions.

One additional aspect of the envisioned objectives stated in the ToR where the UNDG ITF may not have fullymet its objectives is the extent of building GoI capacity in a sustainable manner, and the extent of ownership ofimplementation by Iraqi authorities. Feedback from interviewees and the findings of a review of the projectsimplemented by the UNDG ITF, indicate that the UN agencies essentially used a direct implementationmodality whereby they were responsible for the implementation of projects through consultants andcontractors, NGOs, and other service providers in the field. The WB Iraq Trust Fund, in contrast, worked with anational-execution modality in which the capacity of the government counterpart was developed to implementprojects, with technical and financial support from the WB ITF. These different modalities have very differentlong-term impacts on the extent of developing the local capacity of the government counterpart, as nationalimplementation supports more practical and hands-on capacity development of government counterparts,which would result in more sustainable results. The direct execution modality used by the UN system, however,enabled faster implementation of projects and faster disbursement of funds, in line with the expectations setout in the ToR.

To illustrate the point, reference is made to the 24 projects financed through the WB ITF.105 Only six projectshad been implemented by the WB, whereas 15 projects were implemented by an Iraqi Ministry (including aKurdistan Regional Government Ministry of Health project). The remaining three projects were implementedby the Mayoralty of Baghdad, the Central Bank of Iraq, and the Prime Minister’s Advisory Committee.

105 ‘World Bank Operations in Iraq,’ May 2010, Datasheet available on www.worldbank.org



By May 2010, only four projects were closed and the remaining 20 were active. Of the closed projects, theduration of the projects ranged from six months (Capacity Building I), 32 months (Marshlands SchoolConstruction), 33 months (textbook provision), and 48 months (Community Infrastructure). The active projectsinclude projects planned for a duration of six years (School Reconstruction & Rehabilitation), or up to eightyears (Private Sector Development).

During project implementation under the UNDG ITF, all projects were implemented by one or more UNagencies. The extent of GoI counterpart involvement in and oversight of the process varied across projects, andto some extent across sectors.

As will be demonstrated later with the sample of 60 projects, the role of the GoI counterpart varied acrossprojects. In some projects, GoI had to approve documents and authorize actions only. In other projects, the GoIcounterpart was a major beneficiary, receiving training, equipment or materials. In a third type,implementation was co-handled by the GoI counterpart and the UN or its vendors and/or contractors. Therewere also cases in which the GoI was involved directly in monitoring and reporting on progress. Therefore, it isfair to conclude that while the UNDG ITF involved the GoI counterpart across different levels, and throughoutthe lifecycle of a project, the extent and depth of GoI involvement varied due to the choice of a direct executionmodality, which would have an impact on the extent of sustainable and long-term capacity development of theIraqi authorities, as envisioned at the inception of the Trust Fund.

Overview of the results of UNDG ITF projects and programmes

An exercise of mapping UNDG ITF’s 200 approved projects and programmes against the needs of Iraq overtime was conducted in order to assess their relevance. In addition, a review of the key outputs of most of theseprojects based on the most recent quarterly project progress reports was undertaken to identify the extent ofresults achieved to contribute to the overall development of Iraq. Based on this analysis, the followingobservations were made:



Project Results and Focus

TABLE 10: PROJECTS’ FOCUS AND RESULTS

Year Focus and Results of Projects

2004

The UNDG ITF approved 51 projects that amounted to US$549 million106, which isabout 41 percent of the total disbursed amount throughout the life of the fund. Most ofthese projects and funds focused on the constitution and electoral process, and therehabilitation of physical facilities across sectors, with a specific focus on water,education, electricity, and agriculture.

2005

A total of 26 projects were approved, of which two were joint programmes in whichmore than one agency partnered in implementation. The total funds for projectsapproved totaled more than US$214 million, which is less than half the amount spenton projects approved in the previous year. Most projects during this year also focusedon rehabilitation and emergency response and some elements of capacitydevelopment.

2006

Projects approved totaled 25 of which six were joint programmes, totaling almost

US$125 million. Those projects had an increased focus on capacity development andattention to institutional strengthening in some sectors, such as the National MineAction organization in Southern Iraq (A7-04), Training of Trainers in TeacherEducation for Sustained Quality Education (B1-23), and Development of NationalGender Statistics in Iraq (C10-05).

2007

Projects approved were 32 in total of which 14 were jointly implemented, amountingto US$192 million. There was an increased focus on national policy issues, such asSupport to Iraq’s National, Regional and Local Authorities and Civil SocietyOrganizations in Developing a Draft National Policy and Addressing DisplacementNeeds and Gaps (F8-04). Many projects approved that year had a renewed focus onrehabilitation, especially in the water & sanitation and agriculture sectors. It is alsoworthwhile to note that the focus on policy reform and drafting of new laws wasminimal across projects.

2008

Twenty-six projects were approved of which six were joint programmes, with a total ofUS$162 million spent in projects approved this year. The focus was on capacitydevelopment, institutional strengthening and for the first time, a Private SectorDevelopment Program for Iraq (C10-11).

2009 and 2010

With the remaining amounts of US$45 and US$61 million left, respectively, the size ofprojects was notably smaller, with some approvals relating to a Phase II or Phase III ofa previously approved project. Most projects approved during these years had acapacity development focus.

In addition, the outputs of the 200 projects and programmes of the UNDG ITF based on the latest projectprogress reports available on MDTF Gateway indicated a number of key facts:

The majority of projects have a rehabilitation and recovery focus, especially during 2004 and 2005, butcontinuing into later years.

Project outputs are mostly tangible such as rehabilitation of facilities (hospital wards, schools, labs,power stations, or water treatment stations, etc.), provision of equipment and supplies, devices or kits,and systems or databases.

Most projects included a capacity-development component focusing on training of staff on eithergeneral skills/topics, or technical training on equipment or work methods.

Few projects, especially in the earlier years, had a policy reform dimension.

106 These amounts refer to the total funds budgeted in all projects approved in a given year, after deduction of undisbursed amountsreturned to UNDG ITF. Figures are calculated from the ‘ITF List of Approved Project by Sector ‘obtained from MDTF Gateway and recentupdates received from the UNDG ITF Support Office in December 2010.



Strategic plans, national strategies or master planning activities in collaboration with GoI counterpartswere limited throughout the project outputs to only some projects.

Institutional reform and organizational support services, especially for public institutions acrosssectors, are limited throughout the projects.

The support for electoral process projects (19 projects) alone accounted for 17 percent of the totalUNDG ITF funds (amounting to actual final expenditure of US$229.5 million). Most expenses were theprocurement of material, equipment and services for elections, and providing institutional andtechnical support to the Independent High Electoral Commission, and its capacity development.

National reconciliation and conflict-resolution activities were not addressed except for one projectfocusing on the constitutional review process—‘Facilitating Reconciliation in Iraq throughConstitutional Review and National Dialogue,’ (C9-20), which is ongoing until June 2011. This runscounter to what had been stated in the first UN Assistance Strategy (2005-2007): “Conflict resolutionactivities not addressed downstream as well as upstream could render all other developmental orhumanitarian interventions inoperable or at best unsustainable.”

Employment had been a cross-cutting theme for the UNDG ITF throughout its lifespan. Employmentcreation was an objective integrated into project design in most sectors, with a focus either on short-term or permanent employment. There was no number, however, of the total employmentopportunities created by the UNDG ITF throughout its life span.

These findings further support the conclusion that at a macro level, the UNDG ITF was focused on the short-term needs of Iraq, with the bulk of funding dedicated to rehabilitation projects, governance and electoralprocess support, and basic social services. Needs relating to the long-term development of Iraq, especially inareas such as policy and regulatory reform across sectors, the improvement of the business and investmentenvironment and strengthening the private sector, in addition to reform of the public sector and civiladministration, received less attention, as can be concluded from a consideration of the 200 projects andprogrammes approved by the UNDG ITF.

While this can be justified by the degraded physical conditions in Iraq, the dire humanitarian situation, theongoing threat to individual security across the country and the political instability, a longer-term focus on keyeconomic development and policy reform issues are still to be addressed, as documented in the UN AssistanceStrategy. It is also worth noting that such examples of long-term development needs had been identified earlyin the Joint Needs Assessment of 2003, and continued to prevail through the national development strategies.

In an attempt to consider if such needs were addressed by the WB ITF, which was also established under theIRFFI, the LLE team reverted to information on the IRFFI and WB ITF websites for some analysis. Thisrevealed that most WB ITF projects also related to rehabilitation and infrastructure, in similar sectors to theUNDG ITF, such as water, schools and health. No projects are shown that relate to the transport sector, and afew projects addressed economic reform and the private sector such as107 Banking Sector Reform Project (U$10million) and the Private Sector Development Project (US$65 million).

To conclude, the fact that 40 percent of UNDG ITF funds were approved in its first year of operation, andrelatively few additional funds were committed during the following years of the UNDG ITF indicates a lack oflong-term perspective on the use of funds and relating them in a balanced approach to the short-term and long-term needs of the country. Some scholars, including Sultan Barakat, argue that “MDTFs are intended toovercome the small-scale nature of the social fund by applying the concept on a larger scale, according to alonger time-frame and in a more coordinated manner, which is by definition the rationale for developing a trustfund that can be held and managed over a longer period of time.”108 Therefore, it is crucial that at the start-up, atrust fund operates with a long-term perspective, hence maintaining a balance in disbursement betweenprojects that have a quick impact and short-term perspective, and projects that serve longer-term objectives.

In addition, amounts approved towards the end of the life of the Trust Fund for issues that are longer-term andsustainable in nature, including the capacity and institutional development of key government agencies andcounterparts, were much smaller than they should have been due to the limited availability of funding towards

107

http://www.irffi.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/IRFFI/0,,contentMDK:20241705~menuPK:497908~pagePK:64168627~piPK:64167475~theSitePK:491458,00.html108 Barakat, Sultan. ‘The failed promise of multi-donor trust funds: aid financing as an impediment to effective state-building in post-conflict contexts,’ Policy Studies, Vol. 30, No. 2, April 2009, pgs. 107-126.



the end. While this can be explained by the change of focus from rehabilitation to capacity building during thelife of the UNDG ITF, it represents a missed opportunity that could have been optimized from the start of theTrust Fund if focus on capacity development received equal attention to rehabilitation and recovery.

Lessons Learned:

5.2.a: Quick disbursement of funds during the first years of a trust fund emphasizes a short-term focus andreduces due attention to the longer-term needs of a country, especially those devastated by conflict andsanctions. While this speed of disbursement may be suitable for the donors’ political agenda, quickdisbursement does not help in qualifying real needs and selecting the most relevant projects to befinanced through the trust fund.

5.2.b: Over-spending at the initial years of a trust fund, especially when recipient capacity is lowest, missesthe opportunity of maximizing the value of the money spent on fund projects, as it reduces the amountsavailable at later years, when more realistic and relevant projects are envisioned in closer cooperationwith the recipient government.

Recommendations

5.2.1: Disbursements under a reconstruction and development MDTF should maintain a better balancebetween the short-term immediate needs for recovery, rehabilitation or humanitarian assistance, andthe long-term developmental aspects identified by the country and the development agencies.

5.2.2: Donor expectations for quick disbursement need to be modified and re-aligned at the start of a trust-fund, especially to optimize the benefit of their contribution, given the natural low recipient capacity ina post-conflict situation.

Geographical coverage

The MDG booklet released in August 2010 refers to continued inadequacy in development results among the 18Governorates of Iraq and an imbalance in progress towards targets among the different Governorates. Thisreality is due to both a historical legacy of imbalanced attention to the different geographic regions of Iraq, andthe distribution of rural and urban populations in the Governorates (See Annex 11, ‘Distribution of Urban &Rural Population by Governorate’).

The Iraqi administration under the old regime was heavily centralized, with the national government takingresponsibility for providing health, education and maintaining infrastructure and related services. Mostservices were either heavily subsidized or free of charge to all citizens, following a decentralized model ofservice delivery. The wars and international sanctions contributed to undermining quality and coverage of basicservices, particularly in rural areas. Meanwhile, local government institutions became increasinglyunderstaffed, lacked resources and were ill-equipped to deliver quality public services. This was furthercompounded by the significant brain drain of qualified and high caliber Iraqis through the last three decades.

According to the Iraq 2009 Common Country Assessment (CCA), “[S]ince 2004, Iraq adopted a decentralizedpolitical system comprising of 18 Governorates, including a federal structure to apply to the Kurdistan regionand any future regions so organized. Governorate Councils have responsibility, among others, for theformulation of local development plans and have received substantial budget transfers from the nationalgovernment. However, most services are still delivered through ministries and their departments at theGovernorate level, within which planning and resource allocation is still based on the centralized model. Themove towards greater decentralization represents, at both the political and administrative levels, a profoundtransformation from the method of government decision making under the previous regime.”

Measures were taken to further support the decentralized model of governance. The 2005 Constitution gaveGovernorates nearly full responsibility for service delivery. It provided guidelines on political andadministrative decentralization in Iraq through a process of devolving power to the 18 Governorates. Under the‘Law of Governorates not organized into a region’ which was enacted in March 2008, Governorate Councils



became responsible for the formulation of development plans for the Governorate. Governorate Councilsreceive different shares of federal revenues, coordinate with line ministers and oversee those very same lineministries regarding service delivery.

The new decentralized model of governance is meant to provide equitable distribution of national resources,and achieve balance development results for the entire country, with strong emphasis on resolving historicaldisparities. The UNDG ITF contributed several projects in direct support of the adoption of the decentralizedapproach to governing in Iraq. In addition to the electoral process and constitution support projects, in 2008 aUNDP implemented project addressed ‘Support to Decentralization and Local Governance for Service Delivery– Preparatory Phase’ (C9-24). As will be seen later, several measures indicate the UNDG ITF-funded projectswere also highly balanced between Governorates, in terms of the geographic coverage of the project activities.

Interviews conducted for the LLE indicated, however, that despite the regulatory environment supportingdecentralization, the practicalities of decentralized management are still in need of significant development. Inparticular legislation to clearly delineate fiscal, functional and administrative authorities between national andsub-national levels of government is still lacking. It is also evident that there is a need to develop theinstitutional capacity at a local level. In order for decentralization to take a full effect, the human resourcecapacity of the civil servants at the local level needs to be strengthened, in order to plan and managedevelopment needs more effectively. Interviews with staff from the UN agencies, NGOs and the GoI indicatedthat the current level and quality of capacity at the local and national level is mixed, with many gaps to be filledon both levels.

In addition to the new reform and decentralization of service provision and governance across the 18Governorates, the population of each Governorate is a mix of rural and urban populations,109 which hasimplications for the relevance of many development interventions and their design. This is mainly due to thedifferent needs, economic activities, and lifestyle and social characteristics of urban and rural populations. AUNDP report on living standards across Governorates further shows the gap in the level of basic services andquality of life among the 18 Governorates. The following diagram provides an overview about the situation pergovernorate, based on a Living Standards Index developed by UNDP:110

FIGURE 11: LIVING STANDARD INDEX BY GOVERNORATE AND PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION

Source: ‘Unsatisfied Basic Needs Mapping and Livings Standards in Iraq,’ 2006.

Keeping this disparity in living standards in mind, it was important to identify to what extent the UNDG ITFprojects have contributes to overcoming this historical disparity. A KPI addressing coverage by Governorate

109 http://www.iauiraq.org/110 ‘Unsatisfied Basic Needs Mapping and Livings Standards in Iraq,’ 2006.

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Living Standards Index Percent of population



based on completed projects and programmes by 2010 was designed to measure to what extent throughout itslife span the UNDG ITF projects were implemented with an intentional balance of providing project activitiesacross the Governorates of Iraq. Results of the KPI show a near-equal distribution of the implemented projectsacross all 18 Governorates. The below table illustrates this across the 130 projects and programmes that areeither operationally or financially closed. This clearly indicates that the UN agencies working with the GoIcounterparts and implementing partners had a keen interest in ensuring an equitable allocation of funding andinterventions across the 18 Governorates. We believe this has contributed to the progress of many Governorateson the MDG indicators over the past seven years, as evidenced by the MDG booklet.

TABLE 11: PERCENTAGE OF PROJECTS COMPLETED BY GOVERNORATE

Governorate Completed Projects (%)

Anbar 4.65%

Babil 5.43%

Baghdad 6.82%

Basrah 7.13%

Dahuk 5.12%

Diyala 5.12%

Erbil 5.89%

Kerbala 4.88%

Kirkuk 5.74%

Missan 6.05%

Muthana 5.81%

Najaf 5.35%

Ninewa 5.19%

Qadissiya 5.19%

Salah al-Din 4.88%

Sulaymaniyah 5.43%

Thi-Qar 6.05%

Wassit 5.27%

Source: PwC calculations

Therefore, it is possible to conclude that UNDG ITF Governance projects contributed to establishing adecentralized system of governing in Iraq, through support to the adoption of the 2005 Constitutions and theelections at national and local level. In addition, the UNDG ITF-funded projects were relatively balanced inaddressing the varying needs of the different Governorates, and, to a significant extent, overcame the historicalconcentration of attention in the center.

Lessons Learned

5.2.c: In a post-conflict setting where historical practices of centralized governance have resulted inimbalanced distribution of national wealth, political and economic decentralization of the governingsystem contributes to accelerating development results for the historically deprived population groups.

5.2.d: Development organizations can use pooled funding to design projects that aim to recreate a balancebetween the different population groups and geographic areas in a country where historical disparityhas significantly impacted the development results between different geographies.



Recommendations

5.2.3: A development MDTF should strategically maintain balance in funding development interventionsacross the various regional and geographic areas of any country in order to overcome traditionalimbalances in development assistance and/or government focus.

5.2.4: The design of project activities should be directly related to the situation of the population of the targetareas and their needs. In addition, the capacity and abilities of the local government authorities andorganizations should be assessed and managed through project implementation to ensure sustainabilityof results.

Parameters of Development Effectiveness

In order to complete the assessment of the development effectiveness of the UNDG ITF, an in-depth micro-levelreview of 60 projects and programmes was undertaken against the five parameters identified by the OECD-DACcriteria on aid effectiveness and provided in the ToR of the LL exercise, namely: Relevance, Effectiveness,

Efficiency, Results and Sustainability. The projects and programmes reviewed provided fact-based evidence ofthe achievements of the UNDG ITF intervention and the challenges faced during implementation. These arecombined with other sources of information and findings from the LLE in order to draw conclusions and toidentify the lessons learned and recommendations for the development effectiveness review.

The 60 projects and programmes selected had been funded by the UNDG ITF and evaluation reports preparedby independent consultants were available for all 60. Most of these reports were commissioned specifically tosupport this LL exercise.

While the 60 projects reviewed are not a representative sample of the UNDG ITF, the evaluations werecommissioned prior to the LLE and were the only independent evaluations available for analysis during theLLE. The analysis also relied on internal documents such as project documents, quarterly and annual progressreports and budgets. For these 60 projects, referred to as the ‘reviewed projects’ in the following sections, thefive parameters were assessed from a number of angles and through the use of different techniques:

1. The relationship between the definition of a parameter and the performance of the projects wasassessed through the use of KPIs developed and measured based on data collected from the 60projects and programmes.

2. Examples and findings from evaluation consultants were captured and used as evidence for thediscussion to further support views expressed during interviews.

3. Using a gaps-analysis technique, variances between project plans and achievements were assessed.

5.3. Relevance

The OECD-DAC criteria define relevance as “the extent to which the objectives of a development interventionare consistent with beneficiaries’ requirements, country needs, global priorities and partners’ and donors’policies.” The definition also includes the relevance of the objective or design of a development intervention ascircumstances change on the ground. 111

Based on the above, an in-depth analysis of the relevance parameter on the micro level of the 60 reviewedprojects is discussed below.

Needs assessment during project design

The LLE team developed KPIs to measure whether each project had a needs assessment undertaken at projectlevel, sector level, or overall national strategy level. The KPI specifically measured “the percentage of projects

111 ‘Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management,’ OECD Publication, 1007001 04 3P – No. 31678 2002.



and programmes where needs assessment was done prior to project being approved (based on the evaluationreports).” The rationale for measuring this indicator is that ideally each development intervention should start

off with practical needs identified, or a survey of the baseline state of the target beneficiaries, in order to

prioritize the project activities and outputs to ensure relevance to the beneficiaries and maximize the impactcreated by the project. Within the Iraqi context, and given the significant level of needs across sectors and thelimited amount of funding through the UNDG ITF against those needs, the LLE team believed it was importantto prioritize the expenditure made in each intervention. There were practical challenges in the field, however,that hindered a timely needs assessment for each.

Analysis of KPI results indicates that 43 percent of the reviewed projects had a project-level needs assessmentor another form of baseline study, or verification of needs prior to implementation. This is a positive findingwithin the challenging context of Iraq, as project-specific needs assessment ensures that the project design ismost relevant to the target beneficiaries at the time of planning. Projects with project level needs assessmentcame from different sectors, with different types of assessment undertaken as can be seen in the followingexamples:

Rehabilitation/ Upgrading of Basic Social Services around Child-Friendly Schools (B1-19)—UNICEFand WHO implementing: The initial needs assessment carried out indicated that only 9 Primary HealthCare Centers required renovations which were carried out in the first half of 2006. This project wasimplemented in six Governorates.

Rehabilitation of sewerage facilities in select facilities in Basra City (E3-13a), Rehabilitation of watersupply systems in select locations in Wasit governorate (E3-13b), Extension of storm water and sewernetwork in select locations in Kerbala governorate (E3-13c), Rehabilitation/ extension of water andsewage networks in select locations in Kirkuk City (E3-13d): These projects involved UNICEF, UNDPand UN-HABITAT in collaboration. The project documents indicated that an initial joint fieldassessment was carried out by government staff and UNICEF to get a first hand assessment of theseriousness of the situation and determine the areas needing priority intervention. This was followedup with a more detailed assessment of the needed interventions in the prioritized locations.

Water Quality Control and Surveillance in Iraq (Phase Two) (E3-11 a and b)—UNICEF and WHOimplementing: Needs assessment was already carried out by Ministry of the Environment (MoEn),Ministry of Municipalities and Public Works (MoMPW) and the Mayoralty of Baghdad (MoB).WHO/UNICEF in consultation with MoEn, MoMPW and MoB technical staff assessed the chemicalsand other laboratory reagents needed for water quality analysis. Similar assessments were undertakenof the laboratories identified for rehabilitation.

Disease Eradication, Elimination and Introducing New Vaccines (D2-19): This project implementationinvolved WHO as the lead agency in health, working in close collaboration with all the other HealthCluster members including UNICEF, WFP, UNFPA, UNIDO UNOPS, IOM and UNIFEM. Assessmentwas carried out using Ministry of Health (MoH) routine reports on immunization coverage and diseaseincidences. Another assessment tool used was a UNICEF MICS3112 survey that reflected good coverageduring National Immunization Days.

Institutional Development - Organizational and Human Resource (HR) Capacity Building for theIndependent Electoral Commission of Iraq (IECI) / Independent High Electoral Commission (G11-14b): UNOPS-UNDP and UNAMI implemented this project. An Electoral Needs Assessment Missionwas conducted in June 2005, which identified a range of training needs for the IECI and its personnel.UNOPS and UNAMI worked together with the IECI to identify additional areas that required furthercapacity development. UNAMI International Electoral Assistance Team (IEAT) conducted anassessment mission in November 2006 to further understand and refine the training needs of the IECI.

Strengthening the Primary Health Care System in Iraq (D2-03) was implemented by WHO. Anassessment of the situation was carried out in certain areas in order to identify gaps and shortcomingsprior to implementation of the project activities.

Promotion of Cottage Industries in Rural and Urban Areas (A5-06) was implemented by UNIDO andFAO. The evaluation report noted that a needs assessment survey on the identification of cottage

112 MICS 3 stands for government of Iraq Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 3.



industries and project sites, the selection and training of trainers, the selection of the vulnerable groupsas project beneficiaries, and the development of training material were completed without excessivedelays. A baseline study was conducted to determine what equipment was needed.

Strengthening of the Constitutional Process and Good Governance (C9-21): Implemented by UNDP,UNESCO, UNICEF, UNIFEM, and UNOPS. A training-needs assessment was carried out as part of theproject activities, as well as a study on the progress of the Iraqi media sector (Media SustainabilityIndex).

These findings showcase examples where the implementing UN agencies worked closely with their governmentcounterparts in order to define more specific and realistic needs for a project prior to implementation.

Seventeen percent of the reviewed projects referred to a sector-level needs assessment when the projects weredesigned. These sector-level assessments were conducted either by the Line Ministry or a donor, and were notspecific to a certain project:

Literacy and Life Skills Development (B1-08): An assessment of out-of-school children was undertakenin 2006. This project covered all 18 Governorates and had an actual budget of US$2.19 million.

Programme for the protection of Iraqi Cultural Heritage (B1-07): The design of the cultural Heritageproject rested on evidence provided by two damage assessment missions to Iraq in May & June of2003.

Establishment of a National Mine Action NGO in Basra (A7-04): The evaluation report indicated thatthe Mine Action project in Basra supported by UNDP was relevant to the current priorities of SouthernIraq. That was apparent from the high level of concern and commitment already shown by the IraqiDirectorate of Mine Action (DMA), as there were significant oil and other development projects thatneeded to be started in that geographical area.

In-Service Training of secondary school teachers of science, mathematics and English language (B1-05): The project was proposed by the Ministry of Education (MoEd) after undertaking a needsassessment survey in early 2004 that covered over 20,000 schools and institutes. The MoEd surveyidentified material needs, such as the rehabilitation of buildings and provision of basic furnituredestroyed by bombings or looting, as well as the need to address the vast numbers of Iraqi secondaryschool teachers requiring training and the need to update the curriculum.

In addition, 26 percent of the reviewed projects related to the national strategy or the UN Assistance Strategyfor Iraq, without specific reference to a project or sector-level needs assessment.

On the other hand, 31 percent of the reviewed projects did not have any evidence that a needs assessment wasundertaken during the planning stage. While the evaluation reports generally referred to links to the nationalstrategy or JNA, the lack of a specific basis for the design of the project activities, be it a sector level assessment,a project level assessment or a baseline survey, indicated that these projects may not have been directly linkedto realistic and specific needs of the beneficiaries.

Discussions with UN staff indicated that undertaking a project-specific needs assessment was challenged by thedifficulties of working within the Iraqi context. However, interviews with GoI representatives also indicated thatthey felt many UN projects were not considered relevant or did not directly correspond to the highest prioritiesof the GoI. This leads to the conclusion that working more rigorously and consistently with GoI counterparts tojointly assess needs prior to implementation, or at least confirm the needs and priorities and reflect this in theproject design, would yield projects which are more relevant and better appreciated by the variousstakeholders.

Challenges of remote management113

In addition, a case study undertaken by the LLE team on remote management revealed that the fact that the UNagencies were not present in Iraq since 2004 had a significant impact on the relevance of the projects duringimplementation, even if a needs assessment was undertaken at the design stage, especially that many projectimplementations were prolonged well beyond their planned duration. In addition to the challenges of remote

113 For more details on Remote Management refer to Annex 1 - Case Studies, ‘Case Study 3: Remote Management.’



management discussed in the operational effectiveness section, the following challenges impacted the relevanceof the UNDG ITF projects:

The lack of a consistent UN staff presence in Iraq created a major challenge to developing projects thatwere closely relevant to the population’s needs in the field. GoI interviewees expressed concerns thatthe UNDG ITF funded projects did not always reflect what the people of Iraq needed because UN staffwere not always on the ground to witness the situation or observe the day-to-day life to recognize thesoft components that people needed to continue and to improve their lives, or the physical facilitiesthey lacked to perform their daily activities. Such direct interaction with both beneficiaries and the localand national authorities would have supported the UNDG ITF in detailing the needs identified at thenational level, such as in the JNA and NDS documents, and also to prioritize development interventionswhere it would have created the most impact.

It is worthwhile to acknowledge that several UN agencies interviewed during the LLE have been wellaware of this reality and have either managed to stay more in touch with the Iraqi side during the yearsof operating remotely, or moved back to Iraq as soon as clearance could be obtained from their relevantauthorities.

To make up for being located remotely, it was found that missions and visits by UN agency staff wereorganized as needed and as conditions allowed. For example, in project (B1-22b) the assessment of theschools that needed rehabilitation was done by an official from UN-HABITAT with a local contractorand a government official to assess the situation. Reports were then sent to headquarters in Jordan inorder to develop plans according to the field feedback. This is in addition to a schools survey thathelped get a clearer and more complete picture of the reality on the ground.

In other circumstances the implementation provided a gap between the priorities and needs at thetime, and the output of the project. For example, in the water quality control and surveillance project(E3-11), one of the lessons learned identified in the evaluation report was that “the urgent needs andpriorities should be clearly defined and agreed upon between partners ahead of (the) start of theprojects.” When the case study team discussed this further with WHO officials, they explained thatthere was no relevance between the chemicals obtained and the equipment in use. This resulted in acase where the equipment was of no use without the right chemicals. This could have been avoided ifthere had been more interaction between technical advisors and the local counterpart.

Therefore, it is possible to conclude that only a portion of UNDG ITF projects had a baseline survey or project-specific needs assessment prior to implementation. The fact that the UN had to work remotely in Iraq from2004 onwards further presents a significant inhibition in ensuring that project activities and outputs remainrelevant for the actual needs of the target beneficiaries throughout project implementation, even if a baselinewas undertaken. Remaining in touch with the evolution of the needs of beneficiaries over time was reduced bythe fact that most UN staff worked remotely on projects, despite attempts to overcome this challenge bydifferent means. As expressed by many GoI representatives, this combination of managing remotely and littledependence on GoI counterpart for project design has created an overall impression that much more could havebeen achieved by UNDG ITF projects had those two factors been avoided. Our assertion is that the lack ofassessment of real needs on the ground for all projects using a baseline or project-level needs assessment hadcompounded this issue further.

Lessons Learned:

5.3.a: Specific project or sector needs assessment during project planning stage enhances the relevance ofprojects and ensures that beneficiaries’ needs are addressed.

5.3.b: Remote management reduces direct and regular interaction with recipient authorities and targetbeneficiaries, and accordingly reduces the maximum benefit that can be achieved from developmentinterventions.



Recommendations:

5.3.1: Project design should, with much greater frequency, refer to specific and relevant needs for the directand indirect target beneficiaries prior to the approval of funding.

5.3.2: Project monitoring activities and quarterly progress updates should include measures to confirm thatthe planned project activities and outputs remain relevant to circumstances of the beneficiaries,especially if the project implementation is significantly delayed.

5.3.3: The duration anticipated during project planning should identify a tolerance range in terms of thepercentage of delay acceptable during implementation. This should be designed based on a realistic andcomplete understanding of implementation challenges in the field. During implementation, unjustifieddelays, or those that fall within the control of the agency, should be somehow penalized in order toensure efficiency and effectiveness of development interventions.

5.4. Effectiveness

According to the OECD-DAC criteria, effectiveness is. “the extent to which the development intervention’sobjectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.” It isalso defined as, “an aggregate measure of (or judgment about) the merit or worth of an activity, i.e. the extent towhich an intervention has attained, or is expected to attain, its major relevant objectives efficiently in asustainable fashion and with a positive institutional development impact.”114

In order to assess effectiveness at the micro level, based on the 60 projects for which independent evaluationreports were available, a gap analysis approach was used to sample 11 projects. The projects were selected out ofthe 60, based on two criteria:

1. The projects represented different years of the UNDG ITF life;2. The projects came from each of the eight sectors of the UNDG ITF.

Based on the above, the evaluation reports and additional project documents were used as a source to identify:

The overall project objective; The planned objectives; The actual results achieved and the comments of the evaluators; The lessons learned provided in the evaluation report.

The gaps-analysis exercise is relevant in order to analyze to what extent the actual implemented activitiesdeviated from the planned activities. The following section discusses findings on each project.




1. Strengthening of National Mine Action Organization in Southern Iraq (A7-04)

Basic Project Data: The project was approved in 2008 and had a planned duration of 12 months. The implementingAgency was UNDP. The actual duration of the project was 36 months and the final project amount was US$3,195,797.

Project Overall Objective: To improve accountability to stakeholders and further improve the performance of theestablished Local Mine Action NGO (Rafidain De-mining Organization, RDO) in Basra, Southern Iraq.

Planned Objectives: Create a national NGO able to manage and provide clearance services and to operate independentlyof international supervision. Staff of NGO able to raise funds, plan and manage its activities. Explosive Remnants of War(ERW) obstacles cleared and land made available for further reconstruction and/or livelihood activities.

Actual Achievements: RDO, a national NGO, was officially registered in May 2007, and since then has been managed byIraqi nationals.

The National NGO capacity in relation to strategic long-term planning, organizational development and donor relationscontinued to depend on support from the international monitoring partner Danish De-mining Group (DDG) at the time ofthe evaluation.

Access to and storage of explosives and equipment, required for clearance operations, is not yet able to be fully entrusted toRDO due to the continuous security concerns in Iraq at the end of 2009. Therefore the involvement of the internationalNGO DDG continues to be required for handling and storaging explosives, and acting as a guardian of the long-terminterests of RDO. The national NGO management (including the Operations Manager) was by the end of the projectimplementation period able to prepare and manage daily activities and monthly plans, and handle funding directly providedby UNDP. A total of 30,030,060 m² of arable land has been cleared with 36,065 Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) itemsremoved in the period from October 2006 to September 2007.

Challenges to Effectiveness: The evaluators commented that the project would have been more effective if the lack ofnational capacity in mine clearance and de-mining was addressed prior to the start of implementation, allowing the choiceof applying an integrated approach through a socio-economic, community-needs prioritization system.

2. Iraqis Rebuilding Iraq (C10-03)

Basic Project Data: The project was Phase 2 (Phase one, C10-01, focused on planning only). It was approved in 2005 andhad a planned duration of 12 months and an actual duration of 30 months. The total final project amount was US$2,775,614and the implementing agency was UNDP. UNDP worked with IOM for the successful completion of the project.

Project Overall Objective: To contribute to recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts in post-conflict Iraq byestablishing viable mechanisms to bolster the country’s human resources in key areas of the public sector.

Planned Objectives: Assist the Iraqi authorities in identifying human resources gaps in key areas of the public sector, anddevelop professional profiles and eligibility criteria for the posts required to fill these gaps; Identify specific skills availableamong the Iraqi émigré community based on the needs identified by Iraqi public sector authorities; Develop a database andwebsite to serve the establishment of an Iraqi Skills Roster and to match the demand and supply of human resources;Deploy and support Iraqi expatriate experts to fill identified gaps in the ministries and other public sector institutions andto provide capacity building, professional support and training for existing staff.

Actual Achievements: The work of the Baghdad Support Cell (BSC) focused on assisting the Iraqi authorities inidentifying the human resource gaps and preparing the employer forms which were used to match the applications fromIraqi experts in view of their deployment in Iraq. A functional website providing detailed project information in variouslanguages was set up. A database containing the experts’ profiles (called the Iraqi Skills Roster) was established. The projectsucceeded in the deployment of 59 experts in Iraq (19 percent of the total potential candidates). A three-level filteringsystem was established for the selection of candidates in order to avoid personal preference and other potential biases. Atthe same time this screening also meant that more time was required until the candidate could finally be told to travel backto Iraq.

Challenges to Effectiveness; The database was unable to automatically match the application forms and the demandforms, which was an expected result of the project. However, the project was able to identify 315 complete application formsfrom experts. Among the difficulties related to the deployment of experts was the compensation package. The MoPDCpushed for lower incentives for the experts because they believed it would create some friction with colleagues in similarpositions who had stayed in the country. Feedback from the focal points during the evaluation proved the MoPDC right, asthe situation reportedly created some resentment of what was seen as preferential treatment of returning Iraqi experts.



3. Supreme Audit Board (C9-18)

Basic Project Data: This project was approved towards the end of 2005, had a planned duration of 15 months and anactual duration of 48 months. The total final project amount was US$ 4,879,535 and the implementing agency was UNDP.

Project Overall Objectives: To enhance and build competence in order to keep up with evolving techniques from otheraudit organizations in the region or globally.

Planned Objectives: Strengthen the capacity of both men and women auditors and thereby reinforce the Board ofSupreme Audit (BSA) as a government watchdog institution; Conduct a country wide training needs assessment; Supportten short courses for BSA auditors offered by international audit bodies; Develop manuals and training guides forperformance auditing, financial auditing, information technology auditing and fraud detection Improve the capacity of 30computer technicians able to digitize BSA’s operations; Form an institutional strengthening committee; Strengthen anexisting training center capable of raising funds and being self-sufficient in offering the necessary training programmes.

Actual Achievements: The plan was to provide training to 430 auditor employees and the project offered training to 437in total. The Board of Supreme Audit has six satellite offices around Baghdad, six branches in the Governorates and twotechnical offices (Management/Technical and Financial Affairs) and the training needs assessment reflected the nationwideneeds of these offices for upgrading auditing skills. Ten short courses were planned and delivered. Manuals and trainingguides were drafted but not finalized as at the time of the evaluation. Thirty computer technicians were given training andhave begun to computerize audit records to better manage audit exercises and facilitate the transfer of audits to other publicservants. With the addition of a number of experienced trainees whose courses were tailored for advanced auditors explicitlyto train trainers, the training department under a capable director has been substantially strengthened and has increasedthe frequency and number of courses offered.

Challenges to Effectiveness: The UNDP was not always ready to mobilize staff or facilities for implementation onceprojects were approved. Regarding the objective to establish an institutional strengthening committee, discussions on theformation a committee were held but the leadership of the BSA preferred not to democratize institutional strengthening andto guide the process from his office.

4. Emergency Water Supply in Unserved/Underserved/Vulnerable Areas in Baghdad andIDPs (E3-09)

Basic Project Data: This project was approved in 2006 and the lead Agency was UNICEF. The project’s planned durationwas eight months but the actual duration was seven months. The final project amount was US$ 1,058,652.

Project Overall Objectives: To support ongoing emergency water supply operations in more than ten unserved andunderserved residential areas of Baghdad City where the water distribution network is either absent or the water iscontaminated with sewage.

Planned Objectives: Testing of water at filling points; Trucking water; Distribution of water; Training of government staffin managing water tanking operations; Monitoring and evaluation of distribution.

Actual Achievements: The evaluation revealed that the visited filling points and reports reviewed showed a constantquality of water up to the time of the evaluation. This is a result of an efficient water testing mechanism put in place by thisproject that is still operational. All truckers were registered on a daily monitoring sheet that included destinations, time ofdeparture and truck number. According to evaluation activities and interviews, community leaders played a positive role inidentifying the areas most in need, and the distribution of water was very effective in addressing these communities andlocations. There was no training component for government staff on managing the water tanker operation, but theevaluation results showed that by empowering government staff to carry out day-to-day testing and supervision of water toensure constant quality, their experience and knowledge were improved. Furthermore, by tackling unemployment UNICEFhas enhanced the capacity of the local community and raised health awareness among truckers and those involved.Monitoring and evaluation of the above process was key to the continuous distribution and quality of water.

Challenges to Effectiveness: Due to the unstable security situation in Baghdad, on the job training could not beconducted. Knowledge and learning were acquired as the government staff was involved in the monitoring of quality andquantity of distributed water, identification/selection of filling points, water sampling for testing and monitoring equitablewater distribution. Due to limited health awareness among the truckers, a limited number of truckers were employed fortanking and distribution of water due to their transportation of other liquids (i.e. fuels) as well as water. High staff turnoverin the government has led to the loss of previous water sampling reports and a proper documentation system for the watertest results at the time of the evaluation.



5. Restoration of Veterinary Services in Iraq (A5-08)

Basic Project Data: The project was approved in 2004 to be implemented by FAO, with a final project amount ofUS$8,394,969. The planned duration was 24 months and the actual duration was 51 months.

Project Overall Objectives: To improve animal production by reducing economic losses and threats to public healthoriginating from livestock diseases through the rehabilitation and strengthening of veterinary services in Iraq.

Planned Objectives: Provide professional training updates for veterinary staff on animal disease control issues andstrategies; Restore the veterinary infrastructure and re-supply its various branches with materials and equipment toimprove the delivery of animal health services in the country, with a focus on the veterinary cold chain; Evolve an effectivecontrol policy for major animal trans-boundary and zoonotic diseases; Re-establish and strengthen the laboratory capacityfor disease investigation, diagnosis and surveillance; Enhance national capacity for quality control of veterinary productsand animal food safety.

Actual Achievements: 23 professional training courses held internationally including workshops and study tours for 196veterinarians. The supply and delivery of essential equipment, goods and materials such as seven cold storage rooms,refrigerated trucks, pickups, motorcycles, forklifts, personnel protective cloths, disinfectant, mist blowers, knapsacks andsprayers, computers and communication tools, has been completed according to the schedule. Special support the IraqiMinistry of Agriculture (MoA) capacity in diagnosis and control of zoonotic disease was provided. The supply and delivery ofessential laboratory equipment and supplies, as well as refresher technical training for laboratory staff, have enhanced thelaboratory capacity for disease investigation and diagnosis, especially for brucellosis and Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza(HPAI) surveillance. As a result the central and all of the regional veterinary laboratories are functioning. Several entities(General State Company for Veterinary Services, central and regional laboratories, Governorate veterinary hospitals) arenow fulfilling their important functions. However, some respondents mentioned that access to farmers is a major constraint,either because of lack of transportation or poor security.

Challenges to Effectiveness: Transportation and reaching out to farmers has been indicated by most respondents as amajor constraint. The project provided the MoA with six pickups and 100 motorcycles to compensate for this constraint.Because of the large area that each veterinary clinic needs to cover, more pickups could have been useful. Project durationdid not allow for the development of an appropriate institutional veterinary structure and animal health policy so FAO hadformulated a successor project (OSRO/IRQ/707/UDG) and secured funding for it.

6. Revitalization of Technical and Vocational Education and Training / Phase II (B1-14)

Basic Project Data: The project was approved in 2008 and implemented by UNESCO. It had an original duration of 16months and was implemented in 24 months. The final project amount was US$3,000,000.

Project Overall Objective: To provide hardware and computers for 37 vocational schools, develop nine priorityvocational education curricula and train a number of staff.

Planned Objectives: To provide essential and basic workshop equipment and computers for nine vocational high prioritydisciplines; To provide computer labs for students and computers to improve IT skills for teaching staff; To produce trainingmaterial in nine vocational disciplines in Arabic and train master instructors on the design, review and delivery of newtraining material; To train senior managers in the Vocational Education Directorate at the Ministry of Education (MoEd) onleadership and management and conduct selected study visits.

Actual Achievements: Essential and basic workshop equipment, computers and training materials for nine high priorityvocational disciplines were provided as planned. Thirty-seven vocational and technical schools began the 2007-2008 schoolyear with newly equipped workshops and computer labs for 10 vocational disciplines. Computer labs for students andcomputers for improving IT skills for teaching staff were provided. Training materials for nine vocational disciplines wereproduced in Arabic, adopted by MoEd, and used in classrooms starting in the 2007-2008 school year. Master instructorswere trained for the design, review, and delivery of new training materials. Senior managers in the Vocational EducationDirectorate of the MoEd received training on leadership and management to achieve better performance and quality inTechnical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) at the national level. Selected study visits for senior managers inthe Vocational Education Directorate at MoEd were conducted as planned. A staff Development Unit (SDU) of 10 trainers inthe Ministry of Education was successfully created. Located in Baghdad, the SDU has responsibility for the entire country.

Challenges to Effectiveness: Some of the teachers had limited knowledge in their subjects and more training wasneeded. On the positive side, in spite of the unstable security situation, implementation of the project activities waseffectively monitored by UNESCO national staff, in close collaboration with the relevant staff in the Amman office.



7. Enhancing Iraqi institutions’ capacity in monitoring and targeting the most food insecureand vulnerable segments of Iraq population (A6-03)

Basic Project Data: The project was approved in 2008 and implemented by WFP. Final amount was US$ 1022457. Theplanned duration was 12 months and the project was completed on time.

Project Overall Objectives: To strengthen the food monitoring capacity of Iraqi institutions, namely COSIT in theMinistry of Planning and Development Cooperation and the Kurdistan Regional Statistics Office (KRSO) to implement aneffective and continuous food monitoring system which will, in turn contribute to better targeted interventions concerningthe most food insecure and vulnerable segments of the population including the unemployed.

Planned Objectives: A food security monitoring tool has been established and generates analyses and reports on aregular basis; Enhanced capacity of the government in food security and nutrition monitoring and analysis and,subsequently, the development of safety net strategies strengthened through the provision of training and equipment; Stafftrained, capable and equipped to carry out food security and nutrition programming; Participation of all stakeholdersregarding food security interventions maximized; Iraqi partners’ ability to perform spatial and geographic analysisenhanced; Geographic dimensions of food insecurity, poverty and malnutrition better understood and analyzed.

Actual Achievements: One of the principal results of the intervention was the establishment of a consolidated FoodSecurity Unit within KRSO. Training was provided by WFP to the staff of this unit with the objective of improvinginstitutional methodologies for food security analysis, targeting, baselines, monitoring and impact evaluation and linkingthese to the geographic dimension. Two training sessions were conducted (train-the-trainer) for implementing partners onthe Monitoring and Evaluation System including methods of data collection, monitoring, evaluation and reporting systemsand performance reviews. Eighty participants received theoretical, practical and on-the-job training. In addition,programme supervisors were trained by WFP staff in Jordan on data entry and analysis techniques. WFP donated 20vehicles and 20 PCs to facilitate the operations of the targeted national institutions. The Post-Food Distribution MonitoringSystem has been efficiently designed and established. At the time of the evaluation, it was being implemented in all 18Governorates through knowledge transfer and training by those specialists who were trained by WFP in Amman. Themechanism for regular data collection has been established and reports in being produced and received by COSIT from all18 Governorates.

Challenges to Effectiveness: In spite of the unstable security situation in Iraq, this project went forward within theoriginal time frame with training taking place in Jordan as opposed to Iraq due to security concerns. The evaluators alsonoted that government institutions reported that in spite of the high quality of training provided by WFP technical staff,further training is still desired and adequate IT equipment and supplies are needed in order to facilitate advancedapplications.

8. Strengthening the Primary Healthcare System in Iraq (D2-03)

Basic Project Data: The project was approved in 2008 and implemented by WHO. The final project amount wasUS$37,363,516. The planned duration was 18 months and actual duration was 43 months.

Project Overall Objective: Facilitate the transition of the Iraqi healthcare delivery system from curative hospital basedinto a decentralized Primary Healthcare (PHC) based system with a focus on community outreach and communityinvolvement.

Planned Objectives: Establish 19 sustainable and functioning model PHC districts (including a functional referralssystem), with one district in each of the 18 Governorates (two in Baghdad), 2,000 trained health personnel at all levels, afamily physician and nurse practitioner model and enhanced community participation in health activities.

Actual Achievements: The rehabilitation activities implemented under this project mostly consisted of repair orreplacement of service systems (e.g. electric or sanitation systems), general repairs (painting, tiling, plastering, roofing,etc.), provision of generators, and the replacement of windows and doors. This rehabilitation and capacity building was 100percent completed. These facilities were also provided with medical equipment, supplies, drugs, kits, furniture, andinformation equipment such as computers. Project activities also provided for the construction and supply of 19 traininghalls, one for each district. Training was provided to more than double the planned number, to 4,004 individuals. Trainingstook place across Iraq and in 16 different countries. The project also supported Primary Healthcare Centers (PHCC)115

through procuring and delivering 19 four-wheel drive ambulances, 38 four-wheel drive pickup trucks, and 300 motorcycles.The SOC evaluation teams’ review of receipts indicated that these vehicles were delivered as planned. The project alsodeveloped more effective MoH vaccine management, the implementation of the Expanded Program on Immunization (EPI),and surveillance systems to counteract public health threats. Additionally, this activity supported the public health labs inBaghdad, Erbil and Mosul, the central blood bank, National Drug Quality Control Lab, and food safety. This was

115 Primary Health Care Centers.



accomplished through the training of staff, rehabilitation of buildings and/or provision of equipment. The projectcontributed to developing several policies facilitating the shift to a PHC-based system. The MoH, with WHO support,developed a national plan to provide a Basic Health Service Package (BHSP). In addition, Integrated Management ofChildhood Illness (IMCI) & Community Based Initiatives (CBI) were planned and delivered across several locations.

Challenges to Effectiveness: The effectiveness of rehabilitated/new facilities as well as new supplies and equipment waslimited in some areas by a lack of maintenance of facilities and equipment, as well as inadequate replacement of supplies.Also, some PHCCs reported to the evaluators that new medical technology went unused. Additionally, the security situationimpeded the process of gathering health information, as many people were afraid to give their name to the surveyors. ThePHCC in Mosul indicated that their effectiveness was limited by a lack of equipment and staff.

9. Diseases Eradication, Elimination and Introducing New Vaccines (D2-19)

Basic Project Data: The project was approved in 2007 and implemented by UNICEF and WHO. The total amount wasUS$ 12,000,000. The planned duration was 13 month and actual was 31 months.

Project Overall Objective: To assist the Ministry of Health of Iraq to revitalize the vaccination programme for infantsand children and reverse the downward trend of coverage of infants by essential vaccines, decentralize vaccine storagefacilities and assess the need to introduce new vaccines into the national immunization programme. The key developmentalgoal of the project was to contribute to the reduction of infant and child morbidity and mortality through protecting morechildren against vaccine preventable diseases.

Planned Objectives: By the end of 2007, achieve coverage of at least 80 percent of all essential vaccines among infants inevery district; Maintain polio-virus-free status through 2007 and eliminate measles from Iraq by the end of 2007; Provideevidence base for the introduction of rotavirus and Haemophilus Influenzae Type B (Hib) vaccines in the ExpandedProgramme on Immunization (EPI) by the end of 2007; Decentralization of vaccine storage and management by the end of2007.

Actual Achievements: Supply of urgently needed vaccines, syringes and measles laboratory equipment and supplies was90 percent achieved as verified during the evaluation through field visiting WHO and UNICEF staff as well as by reviewingreports from vaccine warehouses. The MoH is now procuring all necessary vaccines, syringes and cold chain equipment.WHO and UNICEF are bridging gaps and providing special reagents. As of 31 December 2008, only 60 percent of districtsreported 80 percent coverage. The non-polio Acute Flaccid Paralysis (AFP) rate increased from 1.6 in 1999 to 2.8 in 2005and 3.0 in 2006. Stool adequacy rate has also increased from 79.7 percent in 1992 to 94 percent in 2005 and 92 percent in2006. Except in high risk areas such as Anbar, all governorates achieved the non-polio rate of 2/100,000. Measles aggregatebased reporting was replaced with measles case-based reporting and, laboratory based classification of measles introducedinstead of clinical based classification. As of 31 December 2008, measles case-based surveillance and measles laboratorybased diagnosis were well established. Three regional vaccine stores in Erbil, Babil and Basra were constructed andfunctioning, as confirmed by UNICEF and WHO field reports. Intensive training was undertaken to strengthen the capacitydevelopment of staff.

Challenges to Effectiveness: Evaluators’ review of reports and data revealed that 92 percent of children were reachedduring the April/May 2008 Measles, Mumps and Rubella (MMR) vaccination campaign, with a range from 15 percent inNajaf Department of Health (DoH) to 61 percent in Baghdad, Karkh. The lower rates were in districts affected by high ratesof violence—mainly Baghdad/Karkh, Sulymania, Dyala, Anbar, and Salah-Din. The evaluators commented that the projectwas able to achieve the stipulated results, with a few exceptions relevant to inadequate vaccination coverage in certain sub-districts, incomplete reporting from some districts, non-completion of the bacterial meningitis surveillance and the deferralof the decision on introducing new vaccines in the national EPI pending further assessment of needs and costs.

On the positive side, The above results were achieved through the vigorous efforts exerted by WHO and UNICEF in closecoordination with MoH staff. In addition, flexibility was exercised in re-programming funds within budget lines in order toimplement project activities in a cost-effective manner in the Iraqi context, including responses to unforeseen developmentsand newly emerging needs, and priorities such as the sudden surge of violence in certain districts, disease outbreaks andadditional demands arising during implementation. Examples of such situations include the cholera outbreak in Sulymaniain January 2007 and measles outbreaks in March/April 2008 in Anbar, Ninewa, Baghdad, Salah Al-Din and Kirkukprovinces, which witnessed high violence.



10. Protecting Iraqi Cultural Heritage (B1-07)

Basic Project Data: Project was approved in 2004 and implemented by UNESCO. The final project amount wasUS$1,960,443. The planned duration was 12 months and actual duration was 18 months.

Project Overall Objective: To rebuild the national identity of the Iraqi people through the protection of Iraqi culturalheritage.

Planned Objectives: Strengthening overall cultural heritage management; Strengthening the surveillance ofarchaeological sites and historic buildings; Rehabilitation of museums and cultural institutions, libraries and archives;Improving the condition of intangible heritage.

Actual Achievements: The main activity was to provide site protection for Iraqi cultural property. To this end, 45specialized cars equipped with radios and satellite communication equipment were purchased and sent to regions withtargeted archaeological sites. The World Monument Fund (WMF)116 and the Getty Foundation assessed conditions atarchaeological sites and developed the relevant databases for the sites. Subsequently, the WMF organized GeographicInformation system (GIS) training. In spite of delays caused by fighting, four major cultural institutions were subject torefurbishment: Repairs to the Child Museum and the National Library were both completed in June 2006. Additionally,equipment such as computers, furniture, and telephones enabled the National Library staff to return to work.Unfortunately, the opening of the Child Museum has been delayed due to continuing violence in the area. The MelodicStudies Institute was rehabilitated in July 2005. The Regional Center for Conservation is a complex of nine units thateventually aims to be restored to full capacity. The architectural and structural designs for the complete rehabilitation werecompleted as planned for Phase I and submitted to the Ministry of Communications (MoC) in December 2005. In terms ofcapacity building, there were three main training events that trained a total of 45 people. Two large handbooks (Running aMuseum: A Practical Handbook and the accompanying Trainer’s Manual) and two smaller handbooks (Security atMuseums and Care and Handling of Manuscripts) were also produced in English and Arabic during the life of the project.

Challenges to Effectiveness: Although the Child Museum was renovated, the educational programmes associated with

the project were not developed. Even when the Museum is fully repaired, without programmes in place geared specificallyto children, the value of the Museum will be diminished. In addition, during the transit from Baghdad eight of thespecialized security vehicles were hijacked by bandits. Although there were delays in delivering the vehicles to their planneddestinations, caused by the vehicles not being properly registered and the security situation, they were eventually delivered.

11. Rehabilitation of Community Facilities and Infrastructure (E4-14)

Basic Project Data: Project was approved in 2005 and implemented by UN-HABITAT. The project final amount wasUS$16,025,007. The planned duration was 13 months and actual duration was 48 months.

Project Overall Objectives: to improve the living conditions of the most vulnerable groups in Iraqi society, primarily theurban poor, female-headed households, and/or persons living in disadvantaged neighborhoods of Iraqi cities and towns.

Planned Objectives: Improve housing conditions for 2,000 vulnerable families (15,000 persons) and provide adequateshelter and ancillary facilities for about 1,100 orphans; Improve water supply and sanitation infrastructure in eight urbanareas benefiting about 650,000 persons; Promote community based approaches to solid waste management; Expand jobopportunities for about 3,000 construction workers (on average) during the implementation phase of the project(amounting to about 570,000 person days of direct employment)

Actual Achievements: The evaluators commented that conditions of houses have improved; areas which did notpreviously have safe drinking water now have functional water networks and sanitation facilities. These changes areattributable to project interventions, through the construction or rehabilitation work on water treatment plants, sewernetworks and/or water tanks. An orphanage care center was also constructed in Al-Muthanna, and is presently servingapproximately 300 orphans. A primary health center was constructed in Al-Muthanna and another was extended inBaghdad, serving more than 200 patients per day. The project also targeted the rehabilitation of water treatment units andwater network facilities. This component was implemented in close consultation and coordination with MoMPW andMoH/DoHs, and included two water treatment plants, one storage tank in Al-Muthanna and 13 compact potable water unitsin Basra, as well as works on the storm water networks in three areas of Al-Muthanna, the rehabilitation of the pumps andfilters, and the construction of new platforms for cylinders. Ten garbage collection vehicles and five tippers were procured tofacilitate solid waste collection. Rehabilitation activities were implemented by approximately 50 local contractors inBaghdad, Basra, Al-Muthanna, Najaf and Erbil. The project played a positive role in improving the capacity of thesecontractors in planning, implementation and reporting as the structured approach of the project to implementing theconstruction tasks resulted in the improved capacity of these contractors. On-the-job training was provided to localauthorities and office spaces were built. In addition to the employment opportunities for contractors and tradesmen whichwere generated directly by the project, an immense volume of work and opportunity was also generated by the necessary

116 World Monument Fund.



related tasks of supplying of raw building materials, transportation, and loading/unloading of construction materials to andfrom the targeted areas. The evaluators commented that the cumulative investment in the local communities goes wellbeyond the numbers reported in association with direct project interventions.

Challenges to Effectiveness: None noted in the evaluation report. On the positive side, the project was managedremotely from Amman, but the project implementation was done in close coordination with GoI, and the rehabilitationwork was supervised by UN-HABITAT site engineers who monitored the implementation progress and documented theprogress through weekly reports supported by photographs. Monthly reports were submitted to UN-HABITAT on theimplementation status of the project components, and focal points were in almost daily contact with the Directorate ofEducation (DoEd) to monitor and provide technical advice to staff. The UN-HABITAT office in Amman received feedbackon a regular basis from Iraq in order to inform decision making.

Based on the above details of 11 projects, we can conclude that the UNDG ITF projects have managed to makesignificant achievements that are in line with the planned objectives, despite the challenges faced duringimplementation and the earlier findings concerning relevance and more short-term, quick-impact projects thanlonger term development-oriented projects. Flexibility during implementation and the ability to extend projectdurations and reallocate budget between project activities enabled agencies to provide additional services andbenefits in many projects. The difficulties of managing remotely were overcome by different means. Someagencies recruited national staff and worked with local contractors and monitors to ensure implementationsuccess. Other agencies depended on working closely with the GoI counterpart at national and local level inorder to ensure the ownership of for the project during implementation. It is noted from the above details thatwhen the GoI counterpart is involved in assessing the needs in addition to day to day implementation,effectiveness of results and longer-term benefits is more likely to occur than in other cases where the GoI is lessinvolved during the project implementation. Another key resort for some projects was working with qualifiedinternational or national NGOs who had better accessibility in the field and managed to work more directly inIraq, although also managing their involvement remotely.

What was also noted during this analysis is that in some cases the project title indicated a much larger orgrander statement, than what the exact scope of the project entailed. Examples include ‘Protecting IraqiCultural Heritage’ or ‘Iraqis Rebuilding Iraq.’ While this may be a relatively trivial observation, for a casualobserver or a person who quickly looks at a list of UNDG ITF projects, it is nonetheless an important issue. Thisis because, for the quick reviewer or observer, such project titles may give a sense of much bigger achievementsor objectives than what actually may be realistic and covered within the project scope. In the absence of detailedevaluations for all UNDG ITF projects for the more diligent or informed reviewer, the observation becomeseven more important.

Overall, at a micro level given a sample of 11 projects, UNDG ITF-funded projects managed to achieve theirobjectives to a large extent, and some projects achieved more than their objectives for some activities. Inaddition, many UN agencies managed to work around the challenges of the context within Iraq usingalternative means.

Lessons Learned:

5.4.a: Working more closely with the government counterparts during project planning and implementationprovides a better chance of project success and sustainability.

5.4.b: Developing the institutional capacity of the government counterpart during project implementation,and the transfer of knowledge and technical know-how on the job builds the foundation for transfer ofownership after project completion and improves the chances of sustainability of project outcomes inthe longer term.



Recommendations:

5.4.1: To improve the chances of success and more importantly the sustainability of project achievements, thegovernment should be involved more closely during the planning and implementation of the project.

5.4.2: Developing the institutional capacity of government counterparts should be incorporated duringproject design and implementation.

5.4.3: Project titles should be more carefully worded to express the scope of work more accurately.

5.5. Efficiency

The definition for efficiency states that it is “a measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise,time, etc.) are converted to results.” 117

The analysis of efficiency will mainly address time and cost elements, based on KPIs and additional findings ofthe in-depth review of the 60 projects and programmes.

Duration of implementationUNDG ITF projects were often delayed during implementation for a number of reasons. Reviewed projects onaverage had actual duration in excess of planned duration by an average of 18.3 months, or 122 percent of theplanned duration. Actual implementation was up to 64 and 63 months on two projects. Of the reviewedprojects, only 7 percent were extended due to a change in scope of work. The majority of projects received timeextensions or movements of funds without changes in scope.

Based on the 60 projects reviewed in depth, a KPI was developed to measure efficiency, particularly measuringthe percentage of projects and programmes completed on time versus those delayed for zero months, 1-6months, 7-12 months, 13-18 months, 19-24 months, and over 24 months. The rationale for this KPI was that theplanned project duration is expected to be realistic to a large extent and reflect the context in the field, and the

needs of the beneficiaries, to maximize efficiency. Moreover, the LLE team believed that delays in

implementation would cause inefficiencies, particularly related to the project activities becoming irrelevant, or

involving extra cost in terms of personnel allocated on the project, or of the resources remaining idle forprolonged durations. Based on this KPI, results indicated that most delays were of 7-12 months (20 percent),13-18 months (26.7 percent), and more than 24 months (26.7 percent). Delays as a percentage of originalduration were as high as 300 percent for one project and several projects had over 200 percent delay.

During interviews, feedback indicated that delays were mostly due to the security conditions and thuspotentially unavoidable. Others indicated that the original timelines planned were often too ambitious orunrealistic given the situation in the field. Some indicated that there was a rule, probably informal, that projectdurations in the proposal were not expected to exceed 12 months.

Therefore, another KPI was developed by the LLE team to measure the reasons for time extensions granted toprojects, based on extension requests presented to the SCSO. Specifically, the KPI measured “the percentage oftime extensions granted due to: security conditions, lack of delivery capability by the UN, lack of deliverycapability by partners, delay from the GoI side in approval or implementation of major tasks or process neededto proceed with the project, change of scope of work, or other.”

While 20.3 percent of projects were delayed due to security conditions, other reasons were equally prevalent.Delay due to lack of delivery capability by the UN was indicated in 14.2 percent of the reviewed projects. Asimilar 14.2 percent was attributed to delay due to lack of delivery capability by partners. 14.7 percent faceddelay due to the GoI side delaying the approval or implementation of major tasks or processes needed toproceed with the project. Only 7.1 percent of delays were attributed to changes in the scope of work, where a




change of scope request would be eligible if there was a change of project location or a major change in projectactivities. Based on this, it is evident that security conditions are an important factor, yet almost equallyimportant are other factors relating to delivery capability on all sides. Such capabilities were related toinstitutional and human capacities or lack of processes and systems.

Delays are not always negative indicators, however. In several projects, delays were requested to extend theproject activities into other locations or to provide more activities:

Rehabilitation of Water Distribution Systems in Sidakan and Rawanduz (E3-12a): Revision A:(Extended until 8 June 2008) changed water resources agreement with government due to oppositionfrom local community which local counterparts were unable to dispel. New location required newsurveys and hence new technical experts. Revision B: (Extended until 31 December 2008) requiredadditional work and extension of project scope.

Assessment and rehabilitation of community irrigation schemes and restorations of irrigation water inrural areas (A5-01): Revision A: (until 31 December 2007) a change in location from Ramadi toHashimiya resulted in substantial delay and enhanced expenditure, as the estimated quantities ofexcavation would be insufficient to complete the rehabilitation.

Rehabilitation of Pumping Stations (A5-02) Revision A: (until 31 December 2007) to rehabilitate fouradditional pumping stations, as Italy has earmarked 11.65 million for FAO. Revision B: (until 31December 2008) delay from contractors to finish activities and FAO was requested to rehabilitate(funding permitting) a thirteenth pumping station.

Capacity Building of Water Institutions of Iraq (A5-12): Revision D (until 31 Dec 2006) because theministry asked for some follow up activities that included an international water resources modelingworkshop and other workshops.

Support for Emergency Obstetrics Care in Iraq (D2-02): Revision C (until 30 June 2008) since thescope of work was expanded to cover three northern Governorates.

Therefore, while project delays may seem to be a sign of inefficiency, this cannot be generalized as in someprojects delay was in fact to expand the level of service or geographic coverage of the project activities.

Cost of implementationAn equally important measure of efficiency is the cost of implementation. While most projects were completedbelow budget and unused funds were returned to the UNDG ITF AA, this might be attributable to the delay inimplementation and cancellation of some activities. It could also be attributed, however, to overly ambitiousbudgeting.

In order to gain a deeper insight into efficiency, an initial KPI was designed to compare programmatic versusnon-programmatic costs, on the basis that the larger the allocation made for programmatic activities, the moreefficient the intervention would be. Unfortunately this KPI could not be measured for a number of reasons. Onone hand, the budget line items are designed in a way that does not clearly differentiate programmatic fromnon-programmatic activities. A key example is Personnel costs, which include both agency staff (non-programmatic costs) and project consultants (programmatic costs). On the other hand, although the SCSOwould have more descriptive details about the breakdown of the personnel costs, the quantitative value may notbe available for all projects, especially older ones. Therefore, it was difficult to collect a complete and consistentlevel of detail of data about this measure to comfortably assess the KPI. Another line item is Contracts, whichincludes companies, professional services and grants lumped together. As such, this budget line item designdoes not enable a clear assessment of the desired KPI.

It is also worth noting that the budget line items have been harmonized over the life of the UNDG ITF, from aninitial list of 10, to the current harmonized list of six line items:



TABLE 12: UNDG ITF HARMONIZATION OF BUDGET CATEGORIES

New Harmonized Budget Categories Original Budget Line Items under the New Categories

1) Personnel Includes personnel and travel

2) Supplies, Commodities and Equipment Includes supplies, commodities, equipment and transport

3) Training Training

4) Contracts Contracts

5) Other Direct Costs Includes miscellaneous and security

6) Indirect Support Costs Agency management support

Source: LLE Team Discussions with SCSO and data received from SCSO

Therefore, and to overcome this challenge, a new KPI was designed by the LLE team to measure the percentageof each budget line item in relation to the total budget. It is worth noting at this point that these were measuredat the budget level because actual expenses differed from the budget for some projects and no one source couldbe relied on to provide the final actual costs per line item for all 60 projects and programmes.

Based on this analysis, the two largest line items were Contracts and Equipment at 36.5percent and 23.4percent of total project budgets. This means that about 60 percent of project costs are directed to those twoitems. Since the contracts item includes a mix of elements, it is very difficult to judge the efficiency of such apercentage. Training is 11 percent of total budgets, so this means a significant amount is spent on trainingactivities across projects, which supports the earlier finding that capacity development activities were a keycomponent of most projects. Personnel is the second largest item at 10.1 percent, including both consultantsand staff costs. 6.7 percent is spent on supplies and commodities. Later, in the harmonized budget categories,these were combined with equipment and transport, the later standing at 0.4 percent.

The remaining four line items may be subject to more scrutiny from an efficiency perspective. Travel costs are1.2 percent and security costs 2 percent. The miscellaneous/contingencies line items including communication,rent and sundries stand at 2.8 percent. Those are in addition to an Agency Management Support line item thatstands at 5.9 percent. As those can easily be classified as non-programmatic costs, they collectively add up to11.9 percent, which is more than one tenth of a project’s budget. Moreover, as agency staff salaries and life-support costs during work on a project are included in the personnel costs, and the overheads of rents andcommunication, etc. are included in miscellaneous costs, which are considered direct project related costs, theagency management support costs may seem like a duplication to cover the indirect costs of any given project.

Further discussions revealed, however, that agency management support cost is typically charged by any UNagency for all types of funding, whether pooled or bilateral. The level of the charge is defined by the governingboard of the agency, and it varies across agencies. The UNDG ITF unified the agency management support to 7percent at the start of the fund, and this was later amended down to 6.25 percent or less. In effect, the sample of60 projects and programmes reviewed had an overall agency management support charge average of 5.9percent across the 60 projects and programmes, which is less than the ceiling of 6.25 percent.

To conclude, the indicators used to measure the composition of the budget for the 60 projects and programmesrevealed the relative distribution of budget allocation across projects. In order to judge the efficiency of thespending, little insight was provided in the evaluation reports and the design of the budget line items did notprovide enough clarity as to programmatic cost items versus non-programmatic or indirect cost items to enablean in-depth analysis of cost efficiency. Therefore, in future a budget design that enables easier means ofmeasuring efficiency is recommended. To illustrate, a project budget is expected to clearly distinguish between



the costs that are directly related to the beneficiaries or the project activities that achieve the project objectives,

and other indirect costs that are not related to the beneficiaries. The first categories would be classified asprogrammatic costs and may include different elements such as the cost of consulting work where the

beneficiaries receive the service, procurement of materials and equipment received by the beneficiaries,

contractor costs and fees for providing an asset, or training costs and fees where the audience would be mostly

the beneficiaries. Non-programmatic costs such as administrative costs or indirect charges that are not received

by beneficiaries should be indicated separately. These may include elements such as agency staff salaries andbenefits, agency or implementer travel and security coverage charges, agency support fees, and other overheadssuch as rent and utilities. These examples of non-programmatic costs should be highlighted in detail andseparately, in order to assess the actual value added efficiency of any intervention. In addition, and particularlyrelevant for bilateral funding, some donors are increasingly insisting on not funding staff salaries and expectthe agency, or implementer, to bear these costs from other sources of funding available to the agency.Therefore, and for the purposes of pooled funding under an MDTF modality, clarity and distinction of budgetbreakdowns should be designed in order to provide more details and transparency regarding the cost allocationof each project.

Qualitative assessment of efficiencyA review of the details of 60 projects and programmes provided additional qualitative evidence regarding theefficiency parameter.

Calculating the percentage of delay for each of the 60 projects and programmes revealed a number ofobservations:

Two projects were completed before the planned duration, namely Emergency Water Supply toUnserved/Underserved/Vulnerable Areas in Baghdad and the IDPs (E3-09) and Protection andAssistance to Persons of Concern in Southern Iraq and Support to Local Authorities and Civil SocietyOrganizations in Addressing Displacement Needs and Gaps (F8-05).

Two projects were completed on time, namely Enhancing the Iraqi Institutions' Capacity in Monitoringand Targeting the Most Food Insecure and Vulnerable Segments of Iraq Population (A6-03) andSupport to National Electoral Observer Groups for the Electoral Events of Iraq (G11-21).

Nine projects were completed with a delay of 50 percent or less additional time over the plannedduration.

Looking into the two projects that were completed before the planned duration to identify the reasons for thisachievement revealed the following:

Protection and Assistance to Persons of Concern in Southern Iraq and Support to Local Authorities andCivil Society Organizations in Addressing Displacement Needs and Gaps (F8-05): The project wasapproved in January 2007 and the implementing agency, UNHCR, worked in close cooperation andcoordination with the local branch offices of the GoI counterpart, the Ministry of Displacement andMigration (MoDM) in the governorates of Basra, Thi Qar and Muthanna. MoDM responsibilitiesincluded identifying areas and communities that require support, identifying technical staff toundertake Joint Needs Assessment visits to areas where project activities were to be implemented andproviding advice to UNHCR and its implementing partners on protection of local field staff. Inaddition, UNHCR relied on three experienced international NGOs for operational interventions inSouthern Iraq, namely Intersos, the Danish Refugee Council, and the Millennium Relief andDevelopment Services. Because of the withdrawal of most international staff by UN agencies since2003, UNHCR managed the project remotely from Kuwait. The international staff of the threeImplementing Partners (IPs) was based in Kuwait and senior staff from each NGO headquarters paidmonitoring and supervision visits to Kuwait to provide technical and management support tointernational staff based in Kuwait and local staff based inside Iraq. UNHCR developed a matrixshowing the divisions of programme activities and locations among the three NGOs, each of whichhired local staff in Southern Iraq to implement the range of its project activities. The local staff all hadappropriate expertise and easy access to the areas of intervention, and created partnerships with local



MoDM branch offices and NGOs. Local departments of the Ministry of Environment were consultedwhen carrying out Quick Impact Project (QIP) infrastructure or rehabilitation and refurbishment work.

Emergency Water Supply to Unserved/Underserved/Vulnerable Areas in Baghdad and the IDPs (E3-09): the project was approved in July 2006 and was implemented by UNICEF. The evaluation reportnotes that UNICEF has empowered the water authorities in Baghdad by closely involving them in theassessment of the needs, preparation of bills of quantities and the day-to-day supervision of workduring the implementation. Due to the security limitations the evaluation team noted that newpartnerships were forged with local community leaders, who facilitated access of project personnel tothe targeted sites and secured the cooperation of the local population.

These two examples indicate that despite the major challenges of the insecurity during 2006 and 2007, theagencies managed to achieve project completion in a timely manner and before the planned duration, throughleveraging experienced implementation partners in the field and working closely with the local governmentbranches and local communities.

Additional examples for the 60 projects and programmes based on the evaluation reports indicating reasons fordelay or inefficiency include:

Integrated Community-based Project to Deliver Quality Basic Social Services in Iraq (B1-19): Thiseducation- and culture-focused project successfully managed to upgrade 90 schools, completedistribution of 47,000 student chairs and 23,500 student desks, and develop a manual on ‘SchoolHealth, General and Personal Hygiene for Education Supervisors and Teachers.’ In addition, ninePrimary Health Care centers were renovated. Progress on the remaining nine schools was less thansatisfactory, however, due to the poor performance of the contractor. Multiple project sites beingimplemented by the same contractor led to delays due, in some cases, to poor management andinappropriate coordination between the sites, further exacerbated by the insecurity. Fluctuations in theprices of raw materials and other basic commodities impacted unfavorably on the value of contractsand contributed to several re-bidding exercises adding to delays in awarding contracts and subsequentimplementation. Delays to rehabilitate the three PHCCs118 located in Baghdad resulted from Ministry ofHealth not emptying the premises on schedule to allow the work to begin.

Iraqi Networking Academies Project (B1-10) & (B1-17): Four Regional Networking Academies wereestablished in four major universities and six Local Networking Academies were established in PhaseII. But obtaining the customs clearance documents proved to be a lengthy process.

Strengthening Secondary Education in Iraq Phase I (B1-15): A total of 701 staff members from the 55schools were trained. Thirty-one ‘Laboratory Experiment Manuals’ were developed and 450 copies ofeach distributed to schools. Three science laboratories and one library in each selected school wererehabilitated. Furniture, laboratory apparatus, tools, glasses, ICT equipment, books, maps, and othereducational resources were made available to be used by approximately 33,000 students and 2,100teachers. The shipment of chemical materials was delayed, however, due to the abundance ofregulations and limitations concerning the exchange and the transport of chemical materials betweencountries. Due to the reduction of the equipment quantities as a result of insufficient allocations, labswere not provided with basic equipment. The low participation of Iraqi suppliers in the projectactivities was mainly due to the lack of Internet services in Iraq, as the bidding process was announcedmostly on the Internet and the evaluation report presented a recommendation to publishannouncements in newspapers to overcome this hurdle.

Textbooks Quality Improvement Programme (B1-18): UNESCO had to send all messages to MoEd byemail and deliver a copy by hand through its Baghdad team to ensure delivery.

Water Quality Control and Surveillance in Iraq (E3-11): Delays by the authorities in formulating theirneeds and articulating their requirements. Frequent changes in the authorities’ requirements leading towork repetition. This was further delayed by the protracted review and provision of comments by theauthorities to the contractor, and the contractor’s inability to manage multiple authorities with theirdiffering needs simultaneously.

118 Primary Healthcare Centers.



Rehabilitation of Sewage Facilities in Select Facilities in Basra City (E3-13a): Lengthy governmentalprocedures in releasing the payments and issuing taking-over certificates continue to delay projectimplementation and completion. Some inhabitants in Basra built illegal settlements on the plannedroutes of the sewer lines. This uncontrolled settlement has caused delays in implementation due tochanges made to the sewer line route and resulting adjustment of the network design. Kerbala Cityreceives a large number of visitors during certain periods throughout the year, and during these visitstight security measures were applied that either stopped or slowed down the progress of activities in thecity. Restrictions on visas for Iraqi staff imposed by the Jordanian authorities until May 2008 adverselyaffected a number of trainings in Amman.

As can be seen from the examples, practical delays and inefficiencies were faced during the project activities.Most of those related to delays caused by the limited institutional capacity or weak infrastructure in Iraq. Inaddition, security incidents or tightened security measures caused delays for many projects.

Lessons Learned:

5.5.a: Attributing delays in project implementation mostly or solely to security conditions in post-conflictcountries obscures other important factors such as lack of human, technical, or institutional capabilityby implementing partners, including the UN agencies themselves, which experienced delays inrecruiting a project manager, for example.

5.5.b: The budget breakdown for projects is important to be able to measure cost efficiency in sufficientdepth, especially for projects where financial closure and audit is not yet achieved. Therefore it isimportant that the budget sheet is designed and filled out with the best-available details and linked toresults and milestones, in order to allow a measure of cost efficiency for the independent reviewer.

Recommendations:

5.5.1: Planning for project durations should consider the realistic capabilities of implementation partners,ideally to be assessed during the detailed design of the project proposal, and should accordingly bereflected on the planned duration.

5.5.2: For MDTFs and other pooled funding modalities where contributions cannot be directly traced tocertain projects, a detailed breakdown of and distinction between programmatic costs and non-programmatic costs at the project level should be designed in order to enable the assessment ofefficiency after implementation.

5.6. Results

OECD-DAC criteria on aid effectiveness define results as “the output, outcome or impact (intended orunintended, positive and/or negative of a development intervention.” 119

The definition of impact according to OECD-DAC is, “positive and negative, primary and secondary long-termeffects produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended.” Impactassessment studies are usually undertaken a number of years after an intervention is completed in order tomeasure the long-term effects, ideally on dimensions pre-defined in the planned activities and outcomes for theprojects. During the LLE, it was found that no impact assessment studies were undertaken at UNDG ITF levelto date, or for any of its projects, even those completed early in the life of the Trust Fund. It is also not clear ifsuch assessments were planned for projects or programmes during inception.

Accordingly, the LLE focus shifted to outputs and outcomes as a measure of results. One KPI was developed bythe LLE team to measure the extent to which project activities had tangible and intangible outputs. The KPI




measured “the percentage of projects that had an output of either of: a physical asset creation or rehabilitation,a capacity development component, or a service delivery component.” The rationale of this KPI was the fact thatany development intervention should have one or more of these common output categories indicated abovedefined at the design stage, to ensure that project results were achieved at the end of the intervention.Measuring the KPI, of the 60 projects and programmes reviewed, assessing the percentage of projects that hada physical asset creation or rehabilitation element indicated that 38.3 percent of the reviewed projects had atangible output of this nature. An investigation of whether capacity-development activities were included as oneof the main objectives of the projects indicated that 73.3 percent of the reviewed projects had a capacitydevelopment output. Service delivery elements, such as the distribution of goods or vaccines were representedin 38.3 percent of projects under review.

Another KPI was developed to assess the number of jobs created by the reviewed projects based on informationpresented in the evaluation reports. This KPI generated slightly unreliable results as there was significantinconsistency in the information available for calculation. Sometimes the numbers are given in person days andsometimes in the number of jobs created, while in many cases it wasn’t mentioned at all. The result for all theprojects reviewed, given this limitation, is that 55,846 temporary jobs were created as aggregated from the dataavailable for the 60 projects. In addition, 309,400 person days were created in 13 out of the 60 projects andprogrammes. Data relating to another group of seven projects indicated that 171,031 permanent jobs and 266person days were created by those seven projects.

Two other KPIs that the LLE team faced major difficulty in measuring were those intended to measure thenumber and categories of physical assets completed by each of the projects and programmes, either built orrehabilitated, and the status of these assets at the time of the evaluation. Measuring these KPIs was challengingdue to incomplete data between the various sources and the lack of information about the condition of assets inmost evaluation reports. Here are some examples from some of the projects:

Rehabilitation of Pumping Stations (A5-02) (FAO-UNDP-UNIDO implementing): Information indictedthat the project intended the rehabilitation of up to 125 pumping stations identified as priorities,through the local or international procurement of mechanical and electrical equipment and spare partsand their installation. But most of the pumping stations and schemes supported could not be completedduring the project period and depended on the Ministry of Water Resources (MoWR) for finalizationand installation. This is despite the fact that the project extended over 54 months, with the original planbeing 24 months.

School Rehabilitation and Capacity Development for Enhanced Access and Retention in PrimaryEducation (B1-29b) (UNICEF and UN-HABITAT implementing): The project rehabilitated 200 schoolsof which 30 were visited as a part of the evaluation. Only four schools (13 percent of the sample) were inan unsatisfactory condition. 26 schools (87 percent) were in good condition and the water andsanitation facilities were operational at the time of the evaluation.

Rehabilitation of Community Facilities and Infrastructure (E4-14) (UN-HABITAT implementing):Involved 2,460 houses, 11 schools and 17 water treatment plants. The evaluation commented that the“physical assets were improved.”

Revitalization of Technical and Vocational Education and Training in Iraq (Phase I) (B1-01) (UNESCOimplementing): Eleven TVET schools are fully equipped with the most up-to-date vocational trainingequipment which will enhance the training delivery process. The evaluation indicated that thecondition of the assets was excellent.

Re-Establishing the Food Safety and Food Processing Industry Capacity in Iraq (D2-17a) (WHO-FAO-UNIDO implementing): Three operational food control laboratories were established with food controlprotocols. The evaluation commented that the assets were operational and in good condition.

Restoration of Veterinary Services in Iraq (A5-08) (FAO implementing) : Construction of twoveterinary border check points (shared activity with D2-17) was carried out and the main project assetswere procured:

Transport equipment (refrigerated trucks, pickups, motorcycles): US$1,254,000 Laboratory equipment: US$415,000 Cold storage rooms: US$1,300,000 Data processing and communication tools: US$ 55,000

The evaluation commented that the equipment was high-quality and most of it was working properly.Some was not working, however, due to lack of biological standards. Furthermore, some equipment hadbeen damaged during transport to Baghdad.



Examples of results from the reviewed projects and programmesTo compliment this analysis based on KPIs, further consideration of the results and outcomes of the 60reviewed projects and programmes by sector was undertaken in order to identify results and challenges facedduring the implementation.

As shown in the figure below, the Education, Governance, and Agriculture and Food Security sectors accountedfor the majority of the 60 projects and programmes. The remainder was in the Housing and Shelter andEconomic Reform and Diversification sectors.

FIGURE 12: DISTRIBUTION OF 60 REVIEWED PROJECTS AND PROGRAMMES BY SECTOR

Source: PwC Calculations

EDUCATION

Reviewed projects in this sector enhanced education at the national level through the rehabilitation ofschools, setting up community learning centers, equipping and furnishing schools including laboratoriesand introduction of multi-media tools and training for teachers. In addition, nine million school textbookswere printed and distributed (39 titles) to 14,000 primary and secondary schools in all 18 Governorates.Vocational training institutions, curricula, schools and equipment were also rehabilitated and developed byprojects in his sector. In addition, the projects contributed to the sector’s longer-term development throughthe development of a national strategic plan for teacher education, formulating a national textbooks policy,developing the capacity of teachers and trainers with up-to-date training in knowledge and IT, andintroducing leadership skills and strategic development. The projects also resulted in initiating automationin the educational sector by introducing an education management-information system. The projectsreviewed delivered results for primary and secondary education as well as vocational education. Thenumber of people that received training in the sector was around 2,765 across the reviewed projects.Furthermore, the number of institutes that were created by or benefited from the projects throughimprovement and facility rehabilitation was approximately 542 across the reviewed projects. Theseinitiatives have resulted in a lower percentage of school dropouts for Iraqis, as observed through theevaluation reports.

Education16%

Water and Sanitation12%

Health & Nutrition2%

Housing and Shelter16%

Agriculture & FoodSecurity

5%

Protection21%

Governance3%



Sixty-five percent of the projects reviewed within this sector suffered from delays, many attributable to slowprocessing by the GoI counterpart or a high turnover among the focal points. Other delays were caused bydisruption of the work due to security restrictions. The capacity of the contractors to work on multiple sitesalso caused delays and re-bidding was necessary for some projects.

WATER AND SANITATION

The main target of the reviewed projects in this sector was to improve the network of water and sanitationwhich in turn would result in higher quality and access to water. This was achieved though reducedcontamination and a reduction in losses in the pipe distribution system, rehabilitating some of the existingwater and waste water quality control laboratories and testing, in addition to trucking and distribution ofwater to vulnerable population groups.

These projects generated 107,070 working days, which can be viewed positively and negativelysimultaneously as these working days created income opportunities for the subject communities. Theseengagements were seasonal and short-term, however, and generally did not involve developing workers’capacity or sustainable employment opportunities. Most training designed under these projects was heldoutside of Iraq and hence visa restrictions caused delays or cancellations at some times. This indicates theimportance of generating in-country training as the number of trained people in all water and sanitationprojects did not exceed 834. Another challenge for the projects in this sector was the lack of an independentassessment prior to project design, from both the technical and community perspectives. In addition, delaysby the authorities in formulating their needs and articulating their requirements due to bureaucracy,frequent changes in the authorities’ requirements leading to repeated work and the unstable securitysituation affecting movement of staff appeared to be common factors across projects in the sector.

AGRICULTURE AND FOOD SECURITY

The scope of the reviewed projects within this sector was to improve the quantity of water and reducewaterlogging, guaranteeing food security, improved livelihoods and flourishing agriculture in general.These projects managed to increase productivity and farmers’ income. Management of irrigation waste hasincreased and waterlogging has been substantially reduced. Moreover, a Post-Food Distribution MonitoringSystem was created. Food security was improved by increased agricultural production and livelihoodsimproved through increased income and improved living conditions.

The security situation was a key impediment during the implementation of projects in this sector. Forexample, it made it difficult to identify contractors or consultants who were willing to travel to and work inIraq across geographic areas where working with the local rural communities was necessary. Theindependent-evaluation consultants noted that project objectives were largely phrased in technical termswith little attention to the management and economic sustainability of the schemes proposed by theprojects in this sector. Most of the programmes focused on training, yet the lack of skills and knowledge oftrainers eventually lead to low impact on trainees and low quality training courses. Finally, the privatesector institutions that are highly relevant in this sector were absent in key activities for some of theprojects where they were expected to participate, such as Restoration of Veterinary Services in Iraq (A5-08)and Re-Establishing the Food Safety and Food Processing Industry Capacity in Iraq (D2-17).

ECONOMIC REFORM AND DIVERSIFICATION

Two projects were reviewed under this sector. One project’s focus was to build smart communities in AltonKopri, Dibis and Sayid Dikhil , and to develop a Technology Dissemination Program (TDP): SmartCommunity Project for Iraq (C10-04). The other focused on building a database containing a roster of Iraqiexperts living abroad who can be deployed on assignments in Iraq: Iraqis Rebuilding Iraq (C10-03)

The independent evaluation consultants commented that these projects lacked vision and strategic thinkingbehind them and lacked any monitoring and evaluation plan. This resulted in a loss of opportunity tospecify indicators to show what and how GoI counterparts’ capacity is being developed.



HEALTH AND NUTRITION

The reviewed projects in health and nutrition focused on improving access to and coverage of immunizationservices through house-to-house vaccination campaigns. In addition, vaccine safety was enhanced throughthe expansion and decentralization of vaccine storage and distribution facilities. Projects were alsosuccessful in establishing work systems, developing rules and instructions, adopting new systematicprinciples, reviewing standard specifications of products and raw materials, and improving testing andexamination methods in cooperation with health control units. Rehabilitating laboratories specialized inthe control of locally produced and imported food, as well as in increasing the efficiency of the workers’performance throughout the various training courses were additional results of the projects. And finally,emphasizing the importance of Iraq’s participation in meetings, held by international organizations thatspecialize in upgrading food related laws, regulations and food systems was achieved through the projects.

A lack of understanding among the local population regarding new systems limited their use in some areas,reiterating the importance of community-education campaigns. This was particularly evident in the projecton Strengthening the Primary Healthcare System in Iraq (D2-03). Projects encountered many challengesrelated to the unstable security situation in Iraq, which also directly affected training activities. Privatesector involvement was also limited and hence the Iraqi market did not benefit from the interventionsinitiated in the project on Re-Establishing the Food Safety and Food Processing Industry Capacity in Iraq(D2-17).

HOUSING AND SHELTER

Only one of the 60 reviewed projects was in this sector: Rehabilitation of Community Facilities andInfrastructure (E4-14). The aim was improving housing conditions for 2,000 vulnerable families andproviding adequate shelter and ancillary facilities for about 1,100 orphans. The project has improved watersupply and sanitation infrastructure in eight urban areas, benefiting about 650,000 people, and the use oflocal contractors for rehabilitation work had many advantages including building the capacity of localcontractors, supporting the local economy, creating jobs among local workers and ensuring the support andbuy-in of the local community. On the downside, the lack of availability of local raw materials forced UN-HABITAT and its contractors to procure specialized construction materials (like pipes and fittings) from theinternational market, delaying the implementation of the project due to the long process of obtaining ofcustoms clearances from the Iraqi authorities, and long border crossings.

PROTECTION

Reviewed projects under the protection sector involved mine action activities, whereby two local NGOs inthe North and South of Iraq were supported and developed to undertake mine clearing activities.Additionally, a third project aimed at meeting the emergency needs of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)such as distributing 105,000 non-food items to vulnerable families, and registering, monitoring andreporting on issues relevant to displaced groups. In addition, 131 Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) were carriedout to benefit IDPs and host community members using local labor and materials; 12 income-generationprojects implemented; literacy training for 870 women and children; 20 vocational training courses for 600beneficiaries; 603 house extensions and 58 house refurbishments. As in other sectors, the projectsencountered many challenges related to the unstable security situation.

GOVERNANCE

The reviewed projects in this sector had a number of dimensions. Two projects focused on developing thecapacity of the Independent High Electoral Commission for Iraq. Three projects focused on support to thenational electoral observer groups and the constitutional drafting process. Two other projects were focusedon supporting the media and a third addressed the creation of a Donor Assistance Database. Projects alsofocused on promoting the concepts of democracy, transparency, human rights and encouraging nationaldialogue and reconciliation among the political factions of Iraq.

The main challenges facing the reviewed projects under this sector include short time frames for projectimplementation and unrealistic financial planning—in some instances financial resources were too large to



disburse for the planned duration, such as Support of the Constitutional Drafting Process (C9-10A). Inseveral other projects the coordination between the implementing UN agencies was hampered or theassignment of project managers and operational staff was delayed.

Below is a sample list of key lessons learned and recommendations iterated in the independent evaluationreports across sectors:

SAMPLE OF EVALUATION REPORTS LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- High employment turnover in the GoI has led to loss of reports and proper documentation.- The clarification of roles assigned to responsible officers and the designation of the ultimate

decision maker at the beginning of programme implementation process is an essential step to avoidconfusion regarding management structure.

- Project logical frameworks must be measurable, objective and specific enough to demonstrategenuine change or results.

- Project design and budgets for an uncertain post-conflict environment should be appropriate andfeasible for the time-frame.

- A permanent focal point within the GoI should be secured.- Independent assessments should be conducted prior to project design, from both the technical and

community perspectives.- A lack of understanding among the local population regarding new systems limited their use in

some areas, thus reiterating the importance of community-education campaigns.- Engaging beneficiaries and Iraqi stakeholders during the project design and planning enhances the

project effectiveness.- Urgent needs and priorities should be clearly defined and agreed upon between major partners

ahead the start of the project in order to avoid delays and setting incompatible priorities duringproject implementation.

- Inter-ministerial coordination at the national level is fundamental for the implementation ofdevelopmental activities and the achievements of the contemplated objectives. Disputes anddisagreements within national partners affect their credibility and pose serious threats to the futuresustainability of projects implemented with the support of UN agencies.

- Establish norms and periodic benchmarks to measure and ensure a degree of cooperation on bothsides before the project begins. Of course that same level of cooperation needs to be presentbetween the various levels of ministry and the directorates and between the directorates.

- Lengthy governmental procedures and issuing handover certificates continue to delay projectimplementation/completion.

- There should be a more effective payment system that should be implemented in future projectsand proper mechanisms should be developed to ensure timely issue of handover certificates.

The above analysis reveals that the reviewed UNDG ITF projects and programmes have provided a numberof very positive results for the development of Iraq despite the many challenges faced duringimplementation. The results spread across the spectrum from tangible to intangible, with varying numbersand levels of completion at the time of the review. Projects have also contributed to employment andincome generation in different geographic areas, with varying degrees of success and sustainable jobcreation.

In addition to the above analysis based on the 60 projects and programmes, the SOT annual progressreports as of end of 2009, available on the MDTF Office Gateway website were consulted to assess theoverall state of progress of the sectors. Based on those two analyses, it can be concluded that results variedby sector, where achievements in some sectors rendered better results and improvements in the conditionsof the sector by the end of 2009, and others did not manage to overcome the challenges in that sector. Forexample, the water and sanitation sector continued to suffer, as many indicators still show very slowprogress to meet the basic minimum needs of water access and quality. On the other hand, sectors such aseducation and health have generated good overall results and contributed to progress towards meeting theMDGs, yet there is still significant room for improvement. What is also noticeable is that the focus of eachsector, through the life of the UNDG ITF and evolving through the cluster system, has changed slightly,evidenced from the type of projects approved under each sector over the years. While this change of focus



could contribute positively to the overall results within each sector, it also risks leaving out some sector-specific challenges. Overall, and based on the current status of Iraq’s progress against the MDGs, it isevident that there remains significant work to be done in each sector to be able to meet these targets by2015. On the economic growth front, there is still much to be done as well in a number of key economicsectors and infrastructure in order to pave the way for faster and more sustainable economic growth.

Overall, it can be concluded that UNDG ITF projects produced beneficial results in the sectors in which theyoperated, but some opportunities were missed for many projects that could have provided better results andoutcomes. While implementation challenges faced all projects, some managed to overcome them better thanothers. In addition, where the IRFFI was initially focused on reconstruction and recovery, the evaluation of 60projects and programmes failed to capture the number and state of the tangible outputs either created orrehabilitated in most incidents, which provides little insight into the current value and usefulness of suchinvestments. Lastly, although employment creation was a focus since the inception of the UNDG ITF, the dataprovided for job creation is limited and inconsistent, which makes it very hard to quantify the contribution ofthe UNDG ITF into that aspect.

Lessons Learned:

5.6.a: Independent evaluations provide specific and detailed insights about project implementation andchallenges, and identify areas for improvement for future activities.

5.6.b: When a trust fund is primarily focused on reconstruction and recovery, it is essential to assess thequantity and quality of tangible outputs upon project completion, in order to assess the overallperformance of the fund.

5.6.c: If employment creation is a cross-cutting theme throughout the life span of a fund, it is important todefine standard measures for employment creation that can be consistently used during planning andimplementation, and in assessing the output of projects.

Recommendation:

5.6.1: Clear criteria to measure employment creation should be designed and standardized for all projects.

5.6.2: Clear criteria to measure the tangible outputs and results of each project should be defined at thedesign stage and measured throughout the project implementation.

5.6.3: Independent evaluations of all UNDG ITF projects should be undertaken before the closure of the fund.Measures should be in place to ensure quality and consistency of the evaluations.

5.6.4: Independent post-implementation evaluations should be planned for each project and budgeted forprior to approval.

5.6.5: Impact assessment studies should be planned and undertaken for the UNDG ITF, ideally by sector, inorder to assess the long-term effects of the interventions.

5.7. Sustainability

OECD-DAC criteria define sustainability as “the continuation of benefits from a development intervention aftermajor development assistance has been completed. The probability of continued long-term benefits. Theresilience to risk of the net benefit flows over time.” 120

Sustainability is arguably the most important parameter of the development-effectiveness review and hasreceived most attention from the interviewed representatives of the GoI and donors. By definition,




sustainability addresses the longer-term continuation of benefits from a project or programme. In order tomeasure sustainability, the LLE team looked into a number of elements.

Based on the fact that any project would be composed of tangible and intangible results and outputs,consideration of sustainability was based on the following dimensions. For each project, the LLE team sought toassess the extent of sustainability plans included during the project design. For tangible outputs, the LLE teamsought to assess the condition and status of the tangible output at the time of the independent evaluation. Forintangible outputs, the focus was on measuring the extent of working with the GoI counterpart to develophuman and institutional capacity, and the extent to which local implementing partners were involved in orderto continue to support the intervention beneficiaries after project completion.

As the LLE was dependent on the evaluation reports as the primary sources of feedback from the projectbeneficiaries and key source about the resilience of project outputs over time, the LLE team faced majordifficulty in locating relevant and consistent information in the evaluation reports and the other projectdocuments that enable a quantitative assessment of the dimensions of sustainability. Therefore, no clear KPIswere possible to measure upon the completion of the data collection exercise. Therefore, this LLE analysisdepends on evidence provided for some projects, as available in the evaluation reports.

As the UN agencies worked with a direct execution modality, they implemented projects and handed the outputand results over to the GoI counterpart. As most projects were focused on rehabilitation and recovery, mostprojects had a tangible output created or revamped during implementation. Our interviews with GoIrepresentatives indicated that the incidents where the tangible outputs remain functional and operational afterproject completion are limited. The analysis of information relating to the 60 projects and programmes underreview provided a rationale for this perception.

The project data did not provide information if there was an allocation of funds for future maintenanceor procurement of supplies after project completion. UN agencies’ feedback indicated that afterhandover to the government, supplies and parts procurement was the responsibility of the GoI. If theproduced tangible asset was not included in the budget of the GoI counterpart, at local or national level,it is unlikely that funds would have been allocated for its maintenance.

The institutional capacity of the GoI counterpart in many cases was limited during and after projectcompletion, which hindered the ability to ensure the sustainability of outputs and results.

While almost all projects included a training component, and in many cases training was technical innature, this did not ensure the sustainability of outcomes for two main reasons. High turnover on theGoI side across institutions and sectors was documented for many projects. This turnover resulted inmany cases of the trained individuals leaving their original posts, or the institution altogether, hencereducing the sustainability of the benefit of the training. The other reason, as confirmed by GoIinterviewees, is that in many cases the individuals receiving the training were nominated by the GoI onsubjective rather than objective and rigorous selection criteria, or on the basis of a training needsassessment. The latter reason is of particular importance as it links to the fact that most GoIinstitutions lack a functioning HR directorate that identifies the human capital requirements for publicsector staff and plans their development in a structured manner.

Handover to GoI counterparts of many project outputs was delayed due to long processing time at thecounterpart. This delayed the project completion from the UN side.

The GoI counterpart lacked either the capacity or the plan to maintain assets after completion. For some projects, the sustainability of results was high and evidenced by the continuation of benefits

of the project after completion, or the continued support of the UN agencies.

To support these arguments, a number of examples can be quoted:

Enhancing the Iraqi Institutions’ Capacity in Monitoring and Targeting the most Food Insecure andVulnerable Segments of Iraq Population (A6-03): “The fact that COSIT is currently capable inproducing regular food monitoring reports as a result of the capacity development activities and otheractivities supported under this project, is in itself a strong indicator that the project results wereeffective is supporting GoI in addressing food insecure and vulnerable segments of Iraq population.”And, “As a result of the training conducted by WFP and technical assistance in supporting the FoodSecurity Units, the government now has established a Post-Food Distribution Monitoring System in



each of Iraq’s 18 governorates. This relates directly to the output of enhancing the government’scapacity to monitor and target food assistance to vulnerable segments of the population.”

Restoration and Development of Essential Livestock Services in Iraq (A5-10): “Sustainability is mainlyin the hand of the MoA, since the infrastructure were provided to them. However, programmes such asanimal breeding and artificial insemination are of long-term nature and need close and continuoussupervision from FAO if they are to deliver the benefits expected of them.”

Support for the Donor Assistance Database II (C9-12): “The database, however , will probably not elicitthe support it needs from donors to be viable, at least not unless the UNDP is able to convince thedonors to record their contributions more regularly and this is not likely to happen.”

Support for the Board of Supreme Audit (BSA) (C9-18): “The Training programme which the UNDPhelped kick-start is now in full swing independent of UNDP funding with a largely self-sufficienttraining department.” In addition, the evaluation report comments that, “strong leadership within theBoard of Supreme Audit assures it will continue to upgrade the capacity of its employee auditors andcontinue to develop as an institution.”

Institutional Development—Organizational and HR Capacity Building for the Independent ElectoralCommission of Iraq/Independent High Electoral Commission (G11-14b): “Sustainability of thisproject's activities can be gauged by the fact that the IHEC was able to successfully organize andmanage a number of electoral events in 2008, 2009, 2010. In general, the electoral events that followedthis project were deemed to be credible, with acceptance of results by both Iraqis and the internationalcommunity. However, it is only possible to know if the achievements made under this and other IHECcapacity building projects are sustainable in years to come, as external assistance to the IHECdecreases, and it eventually becomes self operational.”

Establishment of a National Mine Action NGO in Basra (A7-04): “The planned project sustainability ispartially achieved as the management and operational staff is all Iraqi people, who are trained toaddress the contamination problem in Southern Iraq. However, they still need more technical support.Land is being freed from ERW contamination and released for the use of the local people, and this is asustainable impact of the mine action project for the community as the people will be able to use thereleased land for agriculture and grazing which constitute two long-term income sources.”

School Rehabilitation and Capacity Development for Enhanced Access and Retention in PrimaryEducation (B1-29b): “The lack of housekeeping and regular maintenance is shortening the life of therehabilitated buildings, and eventually will result in further rehabilitation needs in a few years whichwill ultimately lead to losing the investment made.” Therefore, UN-HABITAT organized a workshop inErbil in October 2009 (after project handover), to highlight the maintenance problems in schools andprovide training on maintenance-related issues.

Programme for the Protection of Iraqi Cultural Heritage (B1-07): “There is no evidence that there wasfollow-on activities that Museum staff are using the correct methods for preserving objects, orprogrammes for the Child Museum are being planned, or surveillance plans are being developed for thearchaeological sites for which equipment was procured.”

Capacity Building of Water Institutions of Iraq (A5-12): “The desired capacity building took place, but itis not known to what degree integrated water resources management has been understood and newknowledge applied in the workplace. However, the project has strengthened the project partners (i.e.main designers, implementers, funders, and beneficiaries). In addition the project has also allowed fornew partnerships to be established.”

Strengthening Good Governance through Support for Independent, Pluralistic, Sustainable andProfessional Media (C9-21b): “There is now an effective and positive Code of Conduct for journaliststhat has been produced by a domestic Iraqi determined process and which is available for widespreaduse. (self regulation) However, not sustainable unless the Iraq Media Support Group (IMSG) who tookthe responsibility of promoting the Code of Conduct, becomes functional or the work of ongoingpromotion is delegated to another group.”

Restoration of Veterinary Services in Iraq (A5-08): “Senior veterinary counterpart staff members haveleft their jobs and/or country during the life of the project. And most sadly, the project's primecounterpart interlocutor, the Director General of the Veterinary Department/Iraq Chief VeterinaryOfficer, was kidnapped together with his bodyguards in 2007.” In addition for this project theevaluation report comments that “maintenance (responsibility) is on the Ministry of Agriculturehowever survey findings indicate that lack of biological standards and chemical reagents preventedfrom operating at full capacity.”



School Rehabilitation and Capacity Building for School Maintenance (B1-22b): “special maintenancemanual was developed by UN-HABITAT for asset management and DoE121 staff, on schoolmaintenance.”

Rehabilitation/ Extension of storm Water and Sewage Networks in Select Locations in Kirkuk City (E3-13d): “Knowledge was transferred to the sewerage directorate by closely involving them in theassessment of the requirements and including the day-to-day supervision of work implementation.” Inaddition, government employees were trained in operations and maintenance and the water andsewage authorities in Kirkuk are now responsible for the operation and maintenance of the water andsewer networks that have been rehabilitated through this project. The Ministry of Municipalities andPublic Works have oversight responsibility for ensuring that the facilities remain functional.

Re-Establishing the Food Safety and Food Processing Industry Capacity in Iraq (D2-17c): “Variousunits of the MoH are specialized in the surveillance, inspection and insurance of citizens’ health andfood safety, and the prevention of the spread of diseases by food, water, and agricultural material andproducts. These units have the responsibility for monitoring, implementing, sustaining and developingrelated policies, plans and systems established through the implemented project activities.” Moreover,the evaluation report indicated that, “most equipment procured under the project is in place andoperational, a number of concerns were voiced around the technical capacity to make optimal use of theequipment, as well as the capacity (technical and financial) to sufficiently maintain it. There is a needfor ongoing GoI commitment, and likely, for continued donor support, in order to ensure that themaximum benefit is reaped from project investments.”

Rehabilitation of Pumping Stations (A5-02): “Most of the pumping stations and schemes supportedcould not be completed during the projects period and depend on the MoWR for finalization andinstallation. FAO therefore should not only put pressure on the MoWR to complete the projects but alsohelp make adequate provision for sustainable operation and maintenance of the projects. FAO shouldhelp MoWR with any support it needs especially regarding the “software” areas.” The evaluation reportcontinues to comment that, “The principal challenge after the rehabilitation of the pumping stationsand irrigation schemes will be their sustainability. From the evaluation results, this is an area forconcern. The lack of predictable power supply and of a well-oiled system for pump monitoring andmaintenance augur poorly for the sustainability of the rehabilitated pumping stations.”

Promotion of Cottage Industries in Rural and Urban Areas project (A5-06): “In a situation of high staffturnover attention has to be paid that a critical mass of trained trainers is maintained at the centers.”

Education/Integrated Community Based Social Service (B1-19): “Some factors limiting sustainabilityinclude low salaries, high turnover of staff and understaffing.”

Rehabilitation of Community Facilities and Infrastructure (E4-14): “It appears that the maintenance ofthese facilities, and therefore the sustainability of the investment, is currently in question. Four out ofthe 12 evaluated residential complexes visited by the evaluation team were not in good repair, owing toa lack of regular preventive maintenance. However, beneficiaries indicated that they had been verymuch satisfied with the project results immediately after handover. It is clear, therefore, that thefacilities in question have not been properly maintained. As a result, all other sites visited by theevaluation team, including hospitals, WTP, and orphanage, are still in good condition and are beingmaintained regularly.”

Therefore, based on the above evidence, while many projects have produced sustainable results, there are aconsiderable number of projects which risk unsustainable outputs and outcomes for either tangible orintangible results. This is a major area of concern, particularly to the GoI and donors who expect theinvestments made to be sustainable and provide increased benefits to the recipient country. A GoI intervieweefurther commented that, “There is a problem with quick disbursements of projects. Quick disbursement doesn'tmean good performance. UN is always in a hurry to get the project started and to show results. Quick resultsdon't mean good results and often are not sustainable. Iraq is a special case, where things take longer time toget accomplished.”

Overall, while tangible outputs prevailed in most projects, plans for the sustainability of outputs and the longer-term benefits were not in place. Projects were handed over to GoI counterparts who did not necessarily have theinstitutional or technical capacity to maintain and manage them long after project completion. The weakinstitutional capacity at the GoI counterpart had an impact on the longer-term sustainability of outputs, bothtangible and intangible.

121 Directorates of Education.



Lessons Learned

5.7.a: Plans for long-term sustainability, including financial and human resource allocations, are important todesign and manage throughout the project duration in order to maximize the potential of sustainability.

5.7.b: During project implementation, it is important to assess and develop the institutional capacity of thegovernment counterparts, not only the individual capacity, in order to improve the chances of long-term sustainability.

5.7.c: When capacity development activities are a key component of most projects and mostly depend onindividual capacity development, it is essential to address the participant-selection criteria andretention plans as part of the project design in order to maximize sustainability.

Recommendations

5.7.1: During project planning, measures for sustaining tangible outputs after project completion both innumber and quality should be in place.

5.7.2: During implementation, emphasis should be placed on the capacity of the receiving counterpart, at aninstitutional rather than individual level, to maintain and continue the use of the outputs well afterproject completion.



6. Summary of Lessons Learnedand Recommendations

6.1. Lessons Learned and Recommendations by Parameter

Lessons Learned RecommendationsOperational Effectiveness

4.2 Fund Design and Governance Structure

4.2.aThere was limited joint programming between the UNand World Bank under IRFFI due to differences inapproach and inability to set up a common Secretariatdue to security restrictions. The full potential of thedesign of two-window model of IRFFI could havebeen better realized for Iraq had the World Bank andUN worked more closely together in jointprogramming and coordinating their activities.

4.2.bCautious and realistic expectations regarding securitydevelopment in a post-conflict country are key whendesigning a multi-year trust fund. The designers ofIRFFI could have set up more effective structures forremote cooperation between the World Bank and theUN have they had more realistic expectations of Iraq'ssecurity situation development in 2003.

4.2.cThe placing of the GoI at the helm of the IRFFIgovernance structure gave the Iraq Strategic ReviewBoard a certain level of credibility as an Iraqiinstitution responsible for the coordination ofinternational assistance. All UNDG ITF and WB ITFprojects were channeled for approval through ISRB.The fact that in the original design, the ISRB andMoPDC were positioned as the key decision makerswith the Ministry of Finance ensured the alignment ofprojects with national budgets.

4.2.dThe main tangible benefit of the two-window modelMDTF has been the creation of a common DonorCommittee for the IRFFI, which reduced the cost andtime spent on donor coordination. Annual or semi-annual meetings of the Donor Committee are a usefulvenue for donors, government and fundadministrators to discuss the country priorities andprogress of interventions.

4.2.1Appropriate structures and processes should beestablished for the fund from the start, before projectsare approved and funds are disbursed. This processshould also include an early assessment of agencies’capacity to deliver on projects.

4.2.2Donors should be encouraged to consider expandingthe duration of the MDTF and reducing the pressurefor quick results at the start of the MDTF lifecycle inorder to provide time for operations to be properlyestablished and to allow for greater involvement of thegovernment, even at the price of slowerimplementation.

4.2.3It is recommended that a two-window model not be setup for future MDTF activity unless it provides agenuine choice of donor channels and implementationcapabilities and also can be supported by an effectivejoint governing body and support mechanism.

4.2.4The involvement of donor representatives in theproject approval process should be ensured from thestart. Such involvement is beneficial as it ensurestransparency, enhances coordination and preventsconflict of interests within the UN system.

4.2.5A future trust fund could consider creating anindependent body to monitor ongoing projects andprovide an oversight. This would address the issue oflack of accountability and leadership for the overallresults of a trust fund given that no single UN body hasa mandate to oversee and monitor other agencies.Models could be drawn from the World BankAdministrative Agent or Global Fund Local FundAgent.




4.2 Fund Design and Governance Structure

4.2.eThe rapid approval of projects between 2004-2007,with limited review from the GoI and donors,negatively impacted project results in the early yearsas many projects were designed to last for a shortperiod yet experienced significant challenges andwere delayed. More extensive review in the earlystages could have prevented such delays.

4.2.fThe quick approval and implementation of projectsuntil 2008 without consultation, where possible, withGoI line ministries compromised the involvement ofthe GoI in the design of projects, and an opportunitywas thus missed for developing capacity withingovernment to design and lead implementation ofsuch projects.

4.2.gThe active involvement of donors in the process ofproject review and approval proved important toensuring transparency and preventing conflicts ofinterest.

4.2.hIncluding the GoI on the Steering Committee of theUNDG ITF could have enabled greater capacitydevelopment for the GoI in the areas of projectdesign, stakeholder engagement, implementation andoverall greater accountability by the GoI.

4.2.iThe lack of a central body responsible for oversightand evaluation of results of all projects under theTrust Fund raised a number of issues. Due to thedecentralized nature of the UN system and based onthe Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signedbetween UNDG ITF and UN agencies, each agencywas indeed responsible for monitoring and evaluatingits own projects and the SC did not have a mandate tooversee or monitor ongoing projects funded by theUNDG ITF.

4.2.6A future trust fund may wish to consider including thegovernment on the Steering Committee as co-chair ofthe fund. As part of the SC, the UN and the GoI wouldjointly develop strategy and oversee the results ofprojects. All programmes and projects should beperiodically assessed by the joint SC.




4.3 Alignment4.3.aThe UNDG ITF process for approving projects wasdesigned to facilitate alignment with nationalstrategies and seek input and approval from nationalinstitutions. In practice, however, the process faced anumber of challenges as a result of weak governmentcapacity, high turnover of GoI officials and the UN'sdeciding to operate through remote management. Bymoving the process largely out of Baghdad forsecurity reasons, opportunities for governmentcapacity development and institution strengtheningwere understandably not optimized.

4.3.bWhile earmarking by donors did not significantlyimpact alignment with national priorities in the earlyyears given the vast needs in Iraq, it prevented the UNfrom quickly addressing humanitarian needs in thecountry as only small portion of funds was un-earmarked and thus able to be allocated to emergencyneeds.

4.3.cA number of donors remain unclear about how theirfunds were used by the UNDG ITF. Morecomprehensive communication is needed betweendonors and the MDTF Office regarding the desiredand actual reporting. While there is an agreement inplace between MDTF Office and donors regarding thetype and frequency of reports MDTF Office canprovide, donors continue to ask for more detailedreports which would help them to understand whichprojects were funded from their contributions. Thispoints to a need for MDTF Office to set up andfrequently clarify expectations regarding reporting.

4.3.1As the security situation has improved in recent years,the UN may consider relocating more staff in Iraq toengage more directly with government officials duringthe design stage of projects in order to ensure greateralignment with national priorities and processes and toprovide more opportunities for capacity developmentthrough interactions with UN teams.

4.3.2The MDTF Office should consider establishing moreeffective ways of communicating with donorsthroughout the life span of the Trust Fund and ofmanaging expectations regarding the level of visibilityand details donors can expect to obtain. This wouldhelp prevent or reduce some of the frustrationexpressed by donors due to the lack of detailedinformation on how their funds were spent.

4.3.3The UNDG ITF donors should, through theirrespective HQ encourage engagement with the UNDGto address some of their concerns regarding the legalinstruments and operations of MDTFs to addressissues of visibility and tracking donor earmarking atthe project level. The MDTF Office, as AA, operatesfollowing the legal instruments and AA protocol andthus cannot take such decisions on its own.

4.3.4Going forward, and as the government is now able toarticulate its priorities more clearly, donors should beencouraged to avoid earmarking their funds in order toensure greater alignment and flexibility ofinterventions. Donors should also be reminded of theircommitments to the principles of the Paris Declarationand be encouraged to reconsider their earmarking andvisibility requirements from MDTFs.




4.4 Harmonization4.4.aThe UNDG ITF as a pool funding mechanismcontributed to the harmonization of donor aid in Iraqby establishing processes for planning, funding,disbursement, monitoring and reporting on activitiesand aid flows. This harmonization allowed donors,especially smaller ones, to achieve significant savingsby not establishing their own operations in Iraq, andinstead engaging with one UN entity and channelingfunds through a trust fund.

4.4.bOn a large scale, considering the US$69 billion of aidgiven to Iraq by the international community, theUNDG ITF was a small example of aid harmonizationin the country. Given the donors' current preferenceto channel their aid bilaterally, the UN and the WorldBank could have done more to encourage donors tofurther harmonize their aid spending in Iraq througha trust fund in the most recent years.

4.4.cGiven the lack of overall government capacity andleadership in the early years, the IRFFI providedmuch needed coordination among donors, the GoIand implementing agencies through the IRFFI DonorCommittee and other coordination mechanisms.While this coordination was useful for stakeholders inIraq, greater capacity for GoI to coordinateinternational aid could have been developed if aparallel UN structure for project design outside thecontrol of the GoI had not been established.

4.4.1As committed in the Paris Declaration, donors shouldbe encouraged, especially where circumstances arechallenging such as in a conflict zone like Iraq, tocontinue harmonizing their aid and their in-countrymissions and activities either through a trust fund orthrough other mechanisms.

4.4.2For a future MDTF with an exclusive or a high level ofimplementation capability being entrusted to UNagencies, more emphasis needs to be put on providingdonors up-front with confidence in a credible, unifiedmonitoring, evaluation and reporting mechanism topromote greater levels of donor trust in the fundsaccountability and ability to deliver effective results.

4.4.3Instead of creating a parallel mechanism for projectapproval process and sector strategies, the UN shouldfocus more on building government capacity tocoordinate international aid and design sectorstrategies.

4.4.4The GoI needs to strengthen its internal coordinationmechanisms to provide clear direction for donorsabout national priorities.




4.5 National Ownership

4.5.aAn effective decentralization and modernization ofthe public sector has not yet been achieved in Iraqdespite billions of dollars committed by the GoI andinternational community since 2003 to enable thetransition towards a democratic, representative,decentralized and service-delivery-oriented state. Theshort-term focus of the UNDG ITF on recovery andreconstruction and delivering quick results meantthat important priorities such as the modernization ofthe public sector and decentralization only started tobe addressed towards the end of UNDG ITF's lifespan.

4.5.bDespite the mandate of ISRB to provide policyguidance and prioritize needs, the board faced manychallenges in the process of comprehensivelycoordinating international aid and providing strategicguidance because many donors did not consult withthe board in the process of approving their projects. Amandatory consultation with ISRB by all donors priorto designing any projects would have facilitated morecomprehensive coordination of aid and ensuredalignment with national priorities and nationalownership.

4.5.cInternational organizations and donors can andshould strive to enhance national ownership byrespecting established government processes for aidcoordination and project approvals such as the ISRB.In doing so, the UN set a good precedent for otherdonors to follow.

4.5.dThe UNDP with support from the UNDG ITFcontributed to developing the GoI’s capacity tocoordinate international aid by supporting thecreation of the Development Assistance Database. Asa result, the GoI is better positioned to coordinate aidand optimize the use of resources to meet Iraq'sprioritized needs. Creation of such a database,however, needs to be accompanied with a strategy onhow to keep it current and mandatory requirementsfor donors and implementing organizations to updateit regularly.

4.5.1For the GoI to achieve leadership in developing andimplementing national development strategies throughbroad consultative processes, further efforts need to bemade to ensure decentralization and develop regionalcapacities to plan, prioritize, budget needs andcommunicate them to central government.

4.5.2A longer life-span of an MDTF could reduce thepressure on producing quick results and allow the UNto involve the GoI to a greater extent in design andimplementation of projects and programmes.Engagement of GoI in project implementation mayslow down project time-lines but will have the benefitof building capacity and increasing Governmentownership. Donors and the UN system should considersetting up MDTF for longer than four years in post-conflict situations.

4.5.3Donors should consider setting up a trust fund with alonger lifespan and to focus at an earlier stage oneffectively supporting public sector modernization.

4.5.4All donors should submit their projects andprogrammes to the IRSB for review and approval inorder to inform the GoI of planned programmes and tobuild the GoI's capacity in coordinating developmentaid.

4.5.5The UN should continue to provide technical assistanceto the MoPDC to ensure that the data entered into theIraq Development Management System is accurate andtimely and that donors and line ministries have properincentives to keep the information updated.

4.5.6Donors need to consider complying with the GoIrequest to enter timely and accurate information into

IDMS and in doing so fulfill their commitment underthe Paris Declaration to respect partner countryleadership and help strengthen their capacity toexercise it. Having a reliable and credible source ofinformation on overall donor contributions to Iraq willallow the government and donors to make betterdecisions and further harmonize their aid and align itwith national priorities. The GoI should considermandating the use of IDMS for all donors.

4.5.7Line ministries should make greater use of IDMS toreport on the projects they implement to ensurecompleteness of data.




4.5 National Ownership

4.5.eThe focus on rapid implementation and a desire toshow quick results meant that the UN chose in manycases to implement projects directly, with minimalinitial government involvement. The short time frameof the MDTF impacted on the way money was spent,mostly during the initial years. Given that the fundwas set up for supporting reconstruction and recoveryover an intended initial duration of only four years,UN agencies often chose to implement projects fastand directly rather than working through thegovernment.

4.5.fRemote management, as well as the high turnover ofGoI officials, made it difficult for UN officials tointeract in person with GoI staff, engage in ameaningful long-term dialogue and buildrelationships, in order to ensure that UNinterventions were in line with national priorities andthat government was in agreement with the UNapproach.

4.5.gGovernment representation in a MDTF SteeringCommittee is key for improved national ownership,alignment with emerging priorities especially in post-conflict environments, and overall transparency ofTrust Fund management.

4.5.hWhile there are many indications of an active GoIinvolvement in project implementation, theindependent evaluations of UNDG ITF-fundedprojects do not provide sufficient informationregarding the GoI's leadership or ownership ofprojects. Based on interviews with stakeholders,leadership of GoI in UN projects was limited due tohigh staff turnover, weak capacity and security issueswhich prevented the UN and GoI from working moreclosely together.

4.5.iGovernment co-financing helps ensure that theprogramme is government owned and led, and that itstargets are mapped across to the budget process. TheUN was able to secure only limited GoI co-financingfor its programmes. Securing such co-financing waseasier in sectors where the UN has established strongand long-term relationships with line ministries.Long-term planning is necessary to increase co-financing as the GoI needs to approve a co-financingin its annual budget in order to provide it.

4.5.jStructuring a MDTF in a way that encourages GoI toprovide funding for UN projects is key for ensuringgreater national ownership and mutualaccountability.

4.5.8Donors and the UN should work with the GoI todevelop effective ways of co-financing and encouragethe GoI to contribute financially and in-kind todevelopment projects.




4.6 Development of National Capacity4.6.aEarly focus on capacity development is key in post-conflict interventions. The UNDG ITF shifted itsfocus on capacity development in 2008, but thisshift could have been made earlier.

4.6.bA weakness of capacity development efforts in Iraqhas been the absence of a capacity-developmentneeds assessment at the beginning of theinternational engagement. A well-defined strategyfor capacity development at the start ofdevelopment intervention is key to ensurecomprehensive approach as well as a baseline formeasuring achieved results.

4.6.cThe focus on supporting elections and investmentof more than US$200 million in election supportprojects resulted in strengthening of capacity forindependent election monitors and media monitorsand contributed to successful democratic elections.

4.6.dThe GoI has learned that that the preferredapproach for institutional capacity development isplacing an international technical expert inside aministry to provide day-to-day advice and on-the-job coaching, as practiced by the World Bank andUSAID.

4.6.eExamples of successful approaches to capacitydevelopment involved the use of localimplementers, partners and contractors, whoreceived hands-on experience, took ownership andaccountability of projects and contributed to theirsustainability.

4.6.fThe selection of training participants represented asignificant challenge for the UN. Proper screeningand selecting of participants by the government aswell as careful verification of candidates byimplementing agencies is key to successful andsustainable individual capacity developmentactivities such as training.

4.6.gDue in part to the high staff turnover ofgovernment bodies, the full potential of the UN’scapacity development work could not be realized,and the interviewed stakeholders insisted thatcapacity development activities should focus less onindividual training and more on train-the-trainerexercises, institutional capacity development andtechnical assistance.

4.6.1Capacity development should be seen as a mutual effortby government and donors, and a demand-supply type ofrelationship should be established between governmentbodies and implementing agencies or donors. Ministriesshould lead the capacity development efforts andestablish a human resources directorate tasked withdefining and implementing a capacity developmentstrategy for its staff.

4.6.2Clear roles and terms of reference should be establishedwithin the GoI in order to facilitate the recruitment andcapacity development of staff.

4.6.3Civil service laws should be reformed to ensure greaterjob security for government staff, so that officials who aretrained do not then lose their job each time a governmentchanges.

4.6.4The UN should continue to develop the capacity ofgovernment counterparts and other partners to enablethem to design, procure, implement and monitorprojects.




4.7 Management for Development Results4.7.aOne of the most often noted achievements of theUNDG ITF has been the level of coordination it hastriggered among UN agencies. Many intervieweesfrom UN agencies, donors and the GoI noted thatwithout a trust fund in place, UN agencies would tendto compete for funds and rarely or insufficientlycoordinated their activities. Due partially to theincentive of funds available from the UNDG ITF, 16UN agencies present in Iraq were able to efficientlywork together and coordinate their activities.

4.7.bWhile the UNDG ITF as a whole reduced transactioncosts to the government and donors by establishingone point of contact (the Administrative Agent) and asingle reporting source, there is little data available toassess if there were any further cost savings forparticipating UN agencies and the trust fund fromjoint programmes.

4.7.cThe UNDG ITF encouraged UN agencies toincorporate cross-cutting themes into programmingactivities including gender, employment creation,environment and human rights. 75 percent of the 60evaluated projects reviewed addressed one or morecross-cutting themes. Gender was the most commontheme noted as being addressed, representing 63percent of the reviewed projects.

4.7.dThe Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unitestablished in 2008 has been a useful instrument forsharing information and collaboration amongagencies on collecting data, conducting analysis andmaintaining a central online data repository. While itaddresses the issue of duplication of work among UNagencies and some NGOs, however, it does notaddress the problem of duplication of mandates withwider stakeholders in Iraq including the GoI, WorldBank, USAID and other donors.

4.7.1Going forward, UN Country Teams need to ensure thecontinuation of effective coordination among UNagencies as well as with the government. This is alreadybeing set in place with the establishment of the PriorityWorking Groups (PWG) for the implementation of theUNDAF 2011-2014, which engages nationalcounterparts, civil society and donors to a greaterextent than the SOTs.

4.7.2UN agencies should be encouraged to work together todesign a solid and streamlined division of labor basedon their capacity, comparative advantages andmandates. This may require senior management to pullout of certain sectors, reduce field presence andencourage greater involvement and ownership fromGoI and civil society organizations. Instead, the UNshould focus on those sectors and activities where itcan make a lasting difference.

4.7.3Develop formal collaboration between IAU and otherrelevant stakeholders like the GoI, WB, USAID andother donor agencies to prevent duplication of effort.




4.8 Accountability for Development and Operational Effectiveness4.8.aWithin the UN system, each participating UN agencyis accountable for project results and undertakesM&E as per their own guidelines, meaning that therewas no central accountability at UNDG ITF level. Thismay also have undermined donor confidence andboosted earmarking.

4.8.bDonors and the GoI suggested that the SteeringCommittee be given a mandate to monitor the work ofUN agencies implementing projects under the UNDGITF to ensure central accountability for results withconsistent quality and format standards for reportingresults.

4.8.cStrong and well-resourced SCSO is key to effectivemanagement results for an MDTF. With the presenceof the M&E capacity since 2008, the quality of projectdocumentation has improved and included consistentResults Based Management frameworks and budgetplans.

4.8.dUnder a very difficult security situation, the UN teamshave been able to continue delivering support to Iraqand its people thanks to a remote managementapproach and the use of various communicationmechanisms such as video, tele-conference andinternet as well as use of national consultants.

4.8.eIn setting up future trust funds, such M&Eframeworks would need to be designed from the startin order to ensure quality and consistency ofmonitoring and reporting.

4.8.1Future MDTFs will need to consider establishing acommon shared standard of effective, independent andtransparent M&E and also reporting channels toprovide information to their stakeholders.

4.8.2A third-party assessment of projects should besubmitted for UNDG ITF approval, one that isindependent of the donors or the beneficiaries. Inaddition, provision should be made within the UNDGITF for monitoring projects reliably, obliging theimplementers to submit regular progress reports to bereviewed by independent assessors as well as sectormanagers within the implementing organization.

4.8.3The MDTF Office should set appropriate expectationswith donors regarding the level of information the trustfund can provide. As an MDTF does not allowearmarking at project level, donors need to be clearlyinformed that they cannot receive tailored reports onthe projects their funds contribute to. At the sametime, donors should, through, their respective HQencourage engagement with the UNDG to addresssome of their concerns regarding the legal instrumentsand operations of MDTFs to address issues of visibilityand tracking donor earmarking at the project level.4.8.4The UNCTs need to engage the GoI in monitoringprojects and also build national capacity andstrengthen the GoI M&E system.

4.8.5Further promotion of the MDTF Office Gatewaywebsite and awareness of the information includedthere may be useful as some stakeholders among UNagencies, donors and the GoI are not familiar with theonline database.

4.8.6UN agencies should advocate the UN Security Councilto re-examine the security measures within Iraq inlight of the current risk situation and needs.



Lessons Learned RecommendationsDevelopment Effectiveness

5.2 Overall Results5.2.aQuick disbursement of funds during the first years ofa trust fund emphasizes a short-term focus andreduces due attention to the longer-term needs of acountry, especially those devastated by conflict andsanctions. While this speed of disbursement may besuitable for the donors’ political agenda, quickdisbursement does not help in qualifying real needsand selecting the most relevant projects to befinanced through the trust fund.

5.2.bOver-spending at the initial years of a fund, especiallywhen recipient capacity is lowest, misses theopportunity of maximizing the value of the moneyspent on fund projects, as it reduces the amountsavailable at later years, when more realistic andrelevant projects are envisioned, in closer cooperationwith the recipient government.

5.2.cIn a post-conflict setting where historical practices ofcentralized governance have resulted in imbalanceddistribution of national wealth, political and economicdecentralization of the governing system contributesto accelerating development results for thehistorically deprived population groups.

5.2.dDevelopment organizations can use pooled funding todesign projects that aim to recreate a balance amongthe different population groups and geographic areasin a country where historical disparity hassignificantly impacted development results.

5.2.1Disbursements under a reconstruction anddevelopment MDTF should maintain a better balancebetween the short-term immediate needs for recovery,rehabilitation or humanitarian assistance, and thelong-term developmental aspects identified by thecountry and the development agencies.

5.2.2Donor expectations for quick disbursement need to bemodified and re-aligned at the start of a trust fund,especially regarding how to optimize the benefit oftheir contribution, given the natural low recipientcapacity in a post-conflict situation.

5.2.3A development MDTF should strategically maintainbalance in funding development interventions acrossthe various regional and geographic areas of anycountry in order to overcome traditional imbalances indevelopment assistance and/or government focus.

5.2.4The design of project activities should be directlyrelated to the situation of the population of the targetareas and their needs. In addition, the capacity andabilities of the local government authorities andorganizations should be assessed and managed throughproject implementation to ensure sustainability ofresults.




5.3 Relevance5.3.aSpecific project- or sector-needs assessment duringproject planning stage enhances the relevance ofprojects and ensures that beneficiaries’ needs areaddressed.

5.3.bRemote management reduces direct and regularinteraction with recipient authorities and targetbeneficiaries, and accordingly reduces the maximumbenefit that can be achieved from developmentinterventions.

5.3.1Project design should, with much greater frequency,refer to specific and relevant need(s) for the direct andindirect target beneficiaries prior to the approval offunding.

5.3.2Project monitoring activities and quarterly progressupdates should include measures to confirm that theplanned project activities and outputs remain relevantto beneficiaries’ circumstances, especially if the projectimplementation is significantly delayed.

5.3.3The duration anticipated during project planningshould identify a tolerance range for the percentage ofdelay acceptable during implementation. This shouldbe designed based on a realistic and completeunderstanding of implementation challenges in thefield. During implementation, unjustified delays, orthose that fall within the control of the agency, shouldbe somehow penalized in order to ensure efficiency andeffectiveness of development interventions.

5.4 Effectiveness5.4.aWorking more closely with the governmentcounterparts during project planning andimplementation provides a better chance of projectsuccess and sustainability.

5.4.bDeveloping the institutional capacity of thegovernment counterpart during projectimplementation and the transfer of knowledge andtechnical know-how on the job builds the foundationfor transfer of ownership after project completion andimproves the chances of sustainability of projectoutcomes in the longer term.

5.4.1To improve the chances of success and moreimportantly the sustainability of project achievements,the government should be involved more closely duringthe planning and implementation of the project.

5.4.2Developing the institutional capacity of governmentcounterparts should be incorporated during projectdesign and implementation.

5.4.3Project titles should be more carefully worded toexpress the scope of work more accurately.




5.5 Efficiency5.5.aAttributing delays in project implementation mostlyor solely to security conditions in post-conflictcountries obscures other important factors such aslack of human, technical, or institutional capability byimplementing partners, including the UN agenciesthemselves—one example is delays in recruiting aproject manager.

5.5.bThe budget breakdown for projects is important formeasuring cost efficiency in sufficient depth,especially for projects in which financial closure andaudit is not yet achieved. Therefore it is importantthat the budget sheet be designed and filled with thebest-available details and linked to results andmilestones, in order to allow a measure of costefficiency for the independent reviewer.

5.5.1Planning for project durations should consider therealistic capabilities of implementation partners,ideally to be assessed during the detailed design of theproject proposal, and should accordingly be reflectedon the planned duration.

5.5.2For MDTF and other pooled funding modalities wherecontributions cannot be directly traced to certainprojects, a detailed breakdown of and distinctionbetween programmatic costs and non-programmaticcosts at the project level should be designed in order toenable the assessment of efficiency afterimplementation.

5.6 Results5.6.aIndependent evaluations provide specific and detailedinsights about project implementation andchallenges, and identify areas for improvement forfuture activities.

5.6.bWhen a trust fund is primarily focused onreconstruction and recovery, it is essential to assessthe quantity and quality of tangible outputs uponproject completion, in order to assess the overallperformance of the fund.

5.6.cIf employment creation is a cross-cutting themethroughout the life span of a fund, it is important todefine standard measures for employment creationthat can be used consistently during planning andimplementation and in assessing the output ofprojects.

5.6.1Clear criteria to measure employment creation shouldbe designed and standardized for all projects.

5.6.2Clear criteria to measure the tangible outputs andresults of each project should be defined at the designstage and measured throughout the projectimplementation.

5.6.3Independent evaluations of all UNDG ITF projectsshould be undertaken before the closure of the fund.Measures should be in place to ensure quality andconsistency of the evaluations.

5.6.4Independent post-implementation evaluations shouldbe planned for each project and budgeted for prior toapproval.

5.6.5Impact assessment studies should be planned andundertaken for the UNDG ITF, ideally by sector, inorder to assess the long-term effects of theinterventions.




5.7 Sustainability5.7.aPlans for long-term sustainability, including financialand human resource allocations, are important todesign and manage throughout the project durationin order to maximize the potential for sustainability.

5.7.bDuring project implementation it is important toassess and develop the institutional capacity of thegovernment counterparts, not only the individualcapacity, in order to improve the chances of long-termsustainability.

5.7.cWhen capacity development activities are a keycomponent of most projects and mostly depend onindividual capacity development, it is essential toaddress the participant selection criteria andretention plans as part of the project design in orderto maximize sustainability.

5.7.1During project planning, measures for sustainingtangible outputs after project completion both innumber and quality should be in place.

5.7.2During implementation, emphasis should be placed onthe capacity of the receiving counterpart, at aninstitutional rather than individual level, to maintainand continue the use the outputs well after projectcompletion.



6.2. Recommendations by Stakeholder

UN System

Operational effectiveness

4.2.1 Appropriate structures and processes should be established for the fund from the start, before projectsare approved and funds are disbursed. This process should also include an early assessment of agencies’capacity to deliver on projects.

4.2.3 It is recommended that future MDTF activity not be set up a two-window model unless it provides agenuine choice of donor channels and implementation capabilities and also can be supported by aneffective joint governing body and support mechanism.

4.2.5 A future trust fund could consider creating an independent body to monitor ongoing projects andprovide oversight. This would address the issue of lack of accountability and leadership for the overallresults of a trust fund given that no single UN body has a mandate to oversee and monitor otheragencies. Models could be drawn from the World Bank Administrative Agent or Global Fund LocalFund Agent.

4.3.1 As the security situation has improved in recent years, the UN may consider relocating more staff inIraq to engage more directly with government officials during the design stage of projects in order toensure greater alignment with national priorities and processes and to provide more opportunities forcapacity development through interactions with UN teams.

4.3.2 The MDTF Office should consider establishing more effective ways of communicating with donorsthroughout the life span of the Trust Fund and of managing expectations regarding the level of visibilityand details donors can expect to obtain. This would help prevent or reduce some of the frustrationexpressed by donors due to the lack of detailed information on how their funds were spent.

4.4.2 For a future MDTF with an exclusive or a high level of implementation capability being entrusted to UNagencies, more emphasis needs to be put on providing donors up-front with confidence in a credible,unified monitoring, evaluation and reporting mechanism to promote greater levels of donor trust in thefunds accountability and ability to deliver effective results.

4.4.3 Instead of creating a parallel mechanism for project approval process and sector strategies, the UNshould focus more on building government capacity to coordinate international aid and design sectorstrategies.

4.5.5 The UN should continue to provide technical assistance to the MoPDC to ensure that the data enteredinto the Iraq Development Management System is accurate and timely and that donors and lineministries have proper incentives to keep the information updated.

4.6.4 The UN should continue to develop the capacity of government counterparts and other partners toenable them to design, procure, implement and monitor projects.

4.7.1 Going forward, UN Country Teams need to ensure the continuation of effective coordination among UNagencies as well as with the government. This is already being set in place with the establishment of thePriority Working Groups (PWG) for the implementation of the UNDAF 2011-2014, which engagesnational counterparts, civil society and donors to a greater extent than the SOTs.

4.7.2 UN agencies should be encouraged to work together to design a solid and streamlined division of laborbased on their capacity, comparative advantages and mandates. This may require senior managementto pull out of certain sectors, reduce field presence and encourage greater involvement and ownershipfrom GoI and civil society organizations. Instead, the UN should focus on those sectors and activities inwhich and through which it can make a lasting difference.



4.7.3 Develop formal collaboration between IAU and other relevant stakeholders like the GoI, WB, USAIDand other donor agencies to prevent duplication of effort.

4.8.1 Future MDTFs will need to consider establishing a common shared standard of effective, independentand transparent M&E and also reporting channels to provide information to stakeholders.

4.8.2 A third-party assessment of projects should be submitted for UNDG ITF approval, one that isindependent of the donors or the beneficiaries. In addition, provision should be made within the UNDGITF for monitoring projects, reliably obliging the implementers to submit regular progress reports to bereviewed by independent assessors as well as sector managers within the implementing organization.

4.8.3 The MDTF Office should set appropriate expectations with donors regarding the level of informationthe trust fund can provide. As an MDTF does not allow earmarking at project level, donors need to beclearly informed that they cannot receive tailored reports on the projects their funds contribute to. Atthe same time, donors should, through, their respective HQ encourage engagement with the UNDG toaddress some of their concerns regarding the legal instruments and operations of MDTFs to addressissues of visibility and tracking donor earmarking at the project level.

4.8.4 The UNCT need to engage the GoI in monitoring projects and also in building national capacity andstrengthening the GoI M&E system.

4.8.5 Further promotion of the MDTF Office Gateway website and awareness of the information includedthere may be useful as some stakeholders among UN agencies, donors and the GoI are not familiar withthe online database.

4.8.6 UN agencies should advocate the UN Security Council to re-examine the security measures within Iraqin light of the current risk situation and needs.

Development effectiveness

5.2.1 Disbursements under a reconstruction and development MDTF should maintain a better balancebetween the short-term immediate needs for recovery, rehabilitation or humanitarian assistance, andthe long-term developmental aspects identified by the country and the development agencies.

5.2.3 A development MDTF should strategically maintain a balance in funding development interventionsacross the various regional and geographic areas of any country in order to overcome traditionalimbalances in development assistance and/or government focus.

5.2.4 The design of project activities should be directly related to the situation of the population of the targetareas and their needs. In addition, the capacity and abilities of the local government authorities andorganizations should be assessed and managed throughout project implementation to ensuresustainability of results.

5.3.1 Project design should, with much greater frequency, refer to specific and relevant need(s) for the directand indirect target beneficiaries prior to the approval of funding.

5.3.2 Project monitoring activities and quarterly progress updates should include measures to confirm thatthe planned project activities and outputs remain relevant to circumstances of the beneficiaries,especially if the project implementation is significantly delayed.

5.3.3 The duration anticipated during project planning should identify a tolerance range for the percentage ofdelay acceptable during implementation. This should be designed based on a realistic and completeunderstanding of implementation challenges in the field. During implementation, unjustified delays, orthose that fall within the control of the agency, should be somehow penalized in order to ensureefficiency and effectiveness of development interventions.



5.4.2 Developing the institutional capacity of government counterparts should be incorporated during projectdesign and implementation.

5.4.3 Project titles should be more carefully worded to express the scope of work more accurately.

5.5.1 Planning for project durations should consider the realistic capabilities of implementation partners,ideally to be assessed during the detailed design of the project proposal, and should accordingly bereflected on the planned duration.

5.5.2 For MDTFs and other pooled-funding modalities where contributions cannot be directly traced tocertain projects, a detailed breakdown of and distinction between programmatic costs and non-programmatic costs at the project level should be designed in order to enable the assessment ofefficiency after implementation.

5.6.1 Clear criteria to measure employment creation should be designed and standardized and for allprojects.

5.6.2 Clear criteria to measure the tangible outputs and results of each project should be defined at the designstage and measured throughout the project implementation.

5.6.3 Independent evaluations of all UNDG ITF projects should be undertaken before the closure of the fund.Measures should be in place to ensure quality and consistency of the evaluations.

5.6.4 Independent post-implementation evaluations should be planned and budgeted for each project priorto approval.

5.6.5 Impact assessment studies should be planned and undertaken for the UNDG ITF, ideally by sector, inorder to assess the long-term effects of the interventions.

5.7.1 During project planning, measures for sustaining tangible outputs after project completion, both innumber and quality, should be in place.

5.7.2 During implementation, emphasis should be placed on the capacity of the receiving counterpart, at aninstitutional rather than individual level, to maintain and continue the utilization of the outputs wellafter project completion.

Donors


4.2.2 Donors should be encouraged to consider expanding the duration of the MDTF and reducing thepressure for quick results at the start of the MDTF lifecycle in order to provide time for operations to beproperly established and to allow for greater involvement of the government, even at the price of slowerimplementation.

4.2.4 The involvement of donor representatives in the project approval process should be ensured from thestart. Such involvement is beneficial as it ensures transparency, enhances coordination and preventsconflict of interests within the UN system.

4.3.3 The UNDG ITF donors should, through, their respective HQ, encourage engagement with the UNDG toaddress some of their concerns regarding the legal instruments and operations of MDTFs to addressissues of visibility and tracking donor earmarking at the project level. The MDTF Office, as AA, operatesfollowing the legal instruments and AA protocol and thus cannot take such decisions on its own.

4.3.4 Going forward, and as the government is now able to articulate its priorities more clearly, donorsshould be encouraged to avoid earmarking their funds in order to ensure greater alignment and



flexibility of interventions. Donors should also be reminded of their commitments to the principles ofthe Paris Declaration and be encouraged to reconsider their earmarking and visibility requirementsfrom MDTFs.

4.4.1 As committed in the Paris Declaration, donors should be encouraged, especially where circumstancesare challenging such as in a conflict zone like Iraq, to continue harmonizing their aid and their in-country missions and activities either through a trust fund or through other mechanisms.

4.5.2 A longer life-span of an MDTF could reduce the pressure on producing quick results and allow the UNto involve the GoI to a greater extent in design and implementation of projects and programmes.Engagement of GoI in project implementation may slow down the timeline of projects but will have thebenefit of building capacity and increasing government ownership. Donors and the UN system shouldconsider setting up MDTF for longer than four years in post-conflict situations.

4.5.3 Donors should consider setting up a trust fund with a longer life span and to focus at an earlier stage oneffectively supporting public sector modernization.

4.5.4 All donors should submit their projects and programmes to the IRSB for review and approval in orderto inform the GoI of planned programmes and to build the GoI's capacity in coordinating developmentaid.

4.5.6 Donors need to consider complying with the GoI request to enter timely and accurate information into

IDMS and in doing so fulfill their commitment under the Paris Declaration to respect partner country

leadership and help strengthen their capacity to exercise it. Having a reliable and credible source ofinformation on overall donor contributions to Iraq will allow the government and donors to makebetter decisions and further harmonize their aid and align it with national priorities. The GoI shouldconsider mandating the use of IDMS for all donors.

4.5.8 Donors and the UN should work with the GoI to develop effective ways of co-financing and encouragethe GoI to contribute financially and in-kind to development projects.


5.2.2 Donor expectations for quick disbursement need to be modified and re-aligned at the start of a trust-fund, especially in relation to optimizing the benefit of their contribution, given the natural lowrecipient capacity in a post-conflict situation.

Government


4.2.6 A future trust fund may wish to consider including the government on the Steering Committee as co-chair of the fund. As part of the SC, the UN and the GoI would jointly develop strategy and oversee theresults of projects. All programmes and projects should be periodically assessed by the joint SC.

4.4.4 The GoI needs to strengthen its internal coordination mechanisms to provide clear direction for donorsabout national priorities.

4.5.1 For the GoI to achieve leadership in developing and implementing national development strategiesthrough broad consultative processes, further efforts need to be made to ensure decentralization anddevelop regional capacities to plan, prioritize, budget needs and communicate them to centralgovernment.

4.5.7 Line ministries should make greater use of IDMS to report on the projects they implement to ensurecompleteness of data.



4.6.1 Capacity development should be seen as a mutual effort by government and donors, and a demand-supply type of relationship should be established between government bodies and implementingagencies or donors. Ministries should lead the capacity development efforts and establish a human-resources directorate tasked with defining and implementing a capacity-development strategy for itsstaff.

4.6.2 Clear roles and terms of reference should be established within the GoI to facilitate the recruitment andcapacity development of staff.

4.6.3 Civil service laws should be reformed to ensure greater job security for government staff, so thatofficials who are trained do not then lose their job each time a government changes.


5.4.1 To improve the chances of success and more importantly the sustainability of project achievements, thegovernment should be involved more closely during the planning and implementation of the project.



AnnexesAnnex 1: Case Studies

Case Study 1: Local Area Development Programme (LADP) (C10-09a)

Local Area Development Programme (LADP) was the first programme in the UNDG ITF to involve multiple UNagency collaboration on a large scale. Seven UN agencies participated in the LADP programme (UNDP, UN-HABITAT, ILO, WHO, UNOPS, UNESCO and UNIFEM), each bringing their own advantages to the pool ofskills and expertise. LADP was designed implemented under the Economic Reform and Diversification sectorwith three main objectives:

Strengthen the capabilities of local authorities in three selected areas in the north, center and south toplan and manage reconstruction and development activities through the formulation and implementationof Human Rights based, gender sensitive local area development plans.

Stimulate local economic development and generate short-term and sustainable long-term employment inthe three selected areas.

Improve social and physical infrastructure using labor-intensive approaches and the service deliverycapabilities of local governments in the three selected areas.

LADP's geographic scope covered six districts in five governorates (Sulaymaniyah, Babylon, Basrah, Thi Qarand Missan). LADPs budget totaled US$30,338,384 with funds distributed to the implementing agencies as perthe chart below. At the beginning of the programme funds were divided equally amongst all participatingagencies, however three months later they reallocated the funding based on needs and activities.

FIGURE 13: LADP BUDGET (IN US$)

UNIFEMUS$1,519,276

ILOUS$2,005,406

WHOUS$3,210,675

UNESCOUS$3,235,570

UN-HABITATUS$3,986,250UNOPS

US$4,220,894

UNDPUS$12,160,313



Each agency contributed its unique skills and expertise to the programme, thus increasing the overalleffectiveness of LADP’s activities. The following summarizes the contribution of each agency:

UNDP was responsible for leading the project and serving as the overall project manager. UNDP wasalso in charge of area coordination in the south as well as engaging in the implementation of fast-trackprojects in rural areas.

WHO was responsible for the health components of the LADP. Given WHO's long standing history inIraq, the organization was able to provide a depth of local knowledge. Its strong network of more than100 national staff located on the ground in Iraq facilitated the smooth running of the programme.

UNESCO contributed its experience in the education sector in establishing and running vocationaltraining centers, school labs and providing training-for-trainers.

UN-HABITAT had a dual role of being area coordinator of the central region as well as an implementerof various fast-track projects.

ILO and UNOPS collaborated through a joint execution agreement in which ILO assumed a leadtechnical role in providing expertise in the employment and economic recovery field and UNOPS wasresponsible for administrative and logistical matters.

UNIFEM provided experience in gender-related matters and tried to ensure female participation inworkshops and training activities.

Despite many challenges and delays in implementation, LADP is considered by many to be a good example of asuccessful joint programme within the UN system in Iraq. LADP provided an unprecedented opportunity forUN agencies to work closely together in Iraq, use each agency's expertise, avoid duplications and lowertransaction costs. The experience gained by agencies during LADP implementation contributed tounderstanding of ground realities in Iraq that also aided the UN Country Team in the development of UNDAF.

LADP had significant development results. The LADP Team had completed 132 fast-track projects includingwater and sanitation projects, electricity and health facilities, generating 1350,000 person days of employment.In addition, 2685 beneficiaries received technical training on business-development practices and 715entrepreneurs received loans, including 156 female-owned businesses. In total, 3,400 enterprises weresupported and 463 businesses were created. The table below lists the actual achievements of LADP against theplanned output:



TABLE 13: LADP OUTPUTS AND ACHIEVEMENTS BY AGENCY

Planned OutputResponsible

AgencyAchievements

Output 1.1 Comprehensive

human-rights-based, gender-

sensitive, local-area development

plans for three areas prepared and

adopted by local authorities and

stakeholders assisted by a team of

UN agencies based on joint

participatory needs assessments.

UNDP

ILO

UN-HABITAT

Six final draft plans have been developed and adopted bylocal authorities.

Six district profiles have been developed.

Output 1.2 Strengthened

coordination and communication

mechanisms between central

government and local authorities

in the three areas.

UNDP

ILO

UN-HABITAT

Regular Local Steering Committees meetings. Three national Steering Committee meetings in 2009,

including a Lessons Learned review workshop.

UNDP Management Information System (MIS) has been

developed and presented to Government of Iraqstakeholders.

UNDP Media coverage has increased significantly for all sectors.

Output 2.1: Improved local

business environment for small

businesses in three areas.

ILO

Three local economic-action plans were produced andendorsed during the seven of workshops taking placeduring November and December 2008.

Awareness campaign to promote entrepreneurship amongthe local population is being implemented to target thethree areas of LADP.

Sulaymaniyah Business Information Center (BIC) officiallyand effectively started functioning in February 2009, Basrain January 2010, and Hillah will officially function in BICpremises in April 2010.

‘Standard Operating Procedures (SOP)’ manual wasdeveloped.

Three BIC sustainability plans adopted by Chambers ofCommerce's boards.

15 value-chain analysis studies. Three Small and Medium Scale Enterprise (SME) surveys

implemented. 10 investment studies. Two trade fairs organized. 505 beneficiaries received Business Management Training

(BMT). 600 trained on women in enterprise. 26 business counseling support staff. 20 trainers in Hillah and 34 in Sulaymaniyah of local

NGOs trained on business start-up and management. 24 managers of local NGOs received Train-the-Trainer

training on women’s economic empowerment. 10 grants provided through Women’s Entrepreneurship

Development and Gender Equality (WED), 690 peoplehave benefited.

22 beneficiaries joined three study tours in Italy and inJordan to study business incubator/development servicesand investment boards.




AgencyAchievements

Output 2.2: At least 80 new small

enterprises and cooperatives

established in three areas.

ILO

113 new and 603 existing businesses received loans, with100 percent repayment rate after one year; loans providedto 156 female-owned businesses.

1,241 jobs created directly through the Ministry of Financescheme, including 974 for men and 299 for women.

A locally owned and operated microfinance facilityestablished in the three areas of implementation. Start-upentrepreneurs trained in business management skills.

860 beneficiaries trained on GET Ahead (Gender &Entrepreneurship Together).

42 direct beneficiary trainees (from Business InformationCenters (BIC) and from Business Management Training(BMT)/Gender & Entrepreneurship Together (GET) Aheadcomponents).

22 BICs staff trained in management and key counselingtechniques.

Output 2.3: Enhanced

employment skills for at least 1500

residents in three areas.

UNDP

Various capacity-building activities and projectsimplemented.

400 short-term employment opportunities in agriculture. 350 short-term opportunities employment in electricity. 200 short-term employment opportunities in water and

sanitation.

UNESCO Three Vocational Training Centers (VTCs) established and

operational. 12 VTC trainers trained in life skills.

WHO 25 capacity-building programmes conducted for healthcare workers, teachers, and community members.

Output 3.1: 30 Water and

sanitation facilities and services

improved in three areas.

UNDP 28 water and sanitation projects implemented and servicesimproved in the three areas.

Output 3.2: Nine primary

educational facilities and

programme activities improved in

three areas.

UNESCO 8 school laboratories and education facilitatesrehabilitated.

UNDP 1 primary school rehabilitation.

UN-HABITAT 7 school and youth center rehabilitations.

Output 3.3: 12 Health services

centers and services improved in

three areas.

WHO 6 centers fully built or rehabilitated, which includes adoctors’ residence (cost-shared, four apartments houses).

WHO 25 capacity building programmes conducted for healthcareworkers, teachers and community members.

Output 3.4: Communal upgrading

in poor housing areas through

improvements to access roads and

surface drainage and 12

community facilities improved in

three areas.*

UN-HABITAT

Three paved access roads. Three primary schools. One school hall. Two secondary schools. Two youth centers. Four local parks. Construction of two workshops for Crafting School. Construction of one multi-purpose playing yard and two

green areas.

Output 3.5: Improved conditions

for agriculture development and

the promotion of environment

awareness including 60 small

infrastructure projects in three

areas.

UNDP 13 projects implemented and services improved in thethree areas.

WHO Three environmental-awareness capacity-building

programmes have been implemented, and communityaware about the environment and sanitation has increased.

UNDP 60 local planners trained in Jordan on Natural ResourcesManagement and Environment.




AgencyAchievements

Output 3.6: 30 community

electricity facilities improved in

three areas.

UNDP 35 projects implemented and services improved in thethree areas.

Output 3.7: Restoration and

construction of buildings and sites

reflecting culture and tradition.**

UNDP 14 projects implemented.

Source: UNDG ITF 2009 Annual Report

*In assessing the scope of work for this output, construction of individual housing units was consideredproblematic due to difficulties in selecting beneficiaries and insufficient budget allocation. It was decided toinvest in communal upgrades to poor housing areas through improvements to access roads and surfacedrainage thus benefiting a larger number of people in low income housing areas.

**In assessing the scope of work for this output, the rehabilitation of religious sites (UNDP) was consideredoverly sensitive in terms of perceived impartiality and equity by various religious groups and would havepossibly required particular care for cultural heritage preservation. This would have likely resulted in slowimplementation and costly interventions, which was not adequate for fast-track projects. Instead, it was decidedto invest in initiatives promoting culture and tradition that have been identified and prioritized by localcommunities themselves.

Note: The above table and notes are quoted from the latest available annual report: The ‘LADP 2009 UNDG ITFAnnual Report.’

Multiple agency collaboration

A joint programme involving seven UN agencies was challenging and difficult to manage. Having that manyagencies working together, difficulties were faced at the beginning as it took a while to agree on a commonvision and organize a system of effective collaboration. Project Managers made sure to avoid conflict andensured that there was not any overshadowing of other agencies.

To facilitate multiple agency collaboration and communication with stakeholders, LADP's geographic scope wasdivided into three areas, having a focal point and area coordinators assigned to each.

Northern Iraq—ILO acted as area coordinator. Central Iraq—UN-HABITAT acted as area coordinator . Southern Iraq—UNDP took responsibility for area coordination.

Having designated area coordinators has had an immense effect on cutting costs and avoiding duplication ofeffort. LADP succeeded in appointing three area coordinators rather than having an individual appointed fromeach agency in the three locations. Area coordinators took the lead on logistical, administrative and substantiveinputs relating to the execution of the various activities of the programme.

According to the evaluation report, Iraqi stakeholders praised the UN for appearing so unified but there wereconcerns regarding coordination among agencies in the field. There was little communication and the areacoordinators were not always on top of what was going on with each agency. The evaluation report alsomentions that in aspects such as information sharing and the design of training activities, the agencies appearto have worked independently from each other and missed opportunities for synergy among the agencies.

Based on meetings with stakeholders, stakeholder perceptions of the benefits and challenges of having multipleagencies working together to achieve one goal are summarized below:



Benefits of multiple agency collaboration

Combined expertise—having seven agencies involved allowed for availability of greater technicalexpertise.

The UN system appeared to be unified with seven agencies working together on one programme, inthree different areas across the country.

Coordinated approach to cross-cutting issues, where cross-cutting issues can be tackled at more thanone level.

Ability to address wider geographic areas. Holistic and multi-sectoral approach to development planning based on local-community participation. Collaborative participation based on competence of each agency, so that each agency stood out and

performed at its best, rather than competition among the participating agencies. Reduced cost of operations through the following:

– Shared positions for the entire programme such as LADP Programme Manager (from UNDP),IT Manager, Media Officer, Monitoring and Reporting officer,

– Joint capacity building plan (local authorities, CSOs, etc.),– Joint evaluation and auditing.

Challenges of multiple agency collaboration

Coordination among agencies—communication, coordination and decision making among sevenagencies was a logistical challenge.

Lack of clarity as to who was accountable for the overall project results. Personality differences and clashes may occur when working with many individuals in positions of

authority. Some agencies floating on other agencies’ achievements, resulting in the lack of achievements going

unnoticed. Slow reaction and/or response to issues and problems, such as recruiting and retaining a suitable

project manager. Overcoming the priorities of each agency and adhering to the overall programme objectives and

common planning approach. Overshadowing of other agencies, where an agency dominates and takes credit for other agencies’ work.

At the time of LADP implementation, which commenced in 2007, there was a growing insurgency in Iraq, adeteriorating security situation, weak government and overall poor infrastructure throughout the country.There were numerous issues faced by UN agencies and other stakeholders with travel and communication. Aidworkers and those associated with international organizations were often targeted by insurgents. Specific otherchallenges faced by the LADP Team included:

Lack of qualified staff in Iraq. During the first year of the programme implementation, UNDP wasunsuccessful in appointing a programme manager. This significantly hindered the mobilization of theentire programme.

At the beginning, coordination among UN agencies was very difficult and in the words of UNrespondents at that time "dysfunctional," as it was a new experience for so many agencies to worktogether.

During the first year of the programme, implementation was slow due to a lack of vision at the start ofthe programme, and the time taken to establish coordination and communication mechanisms and torecruit a suitable programme manager.

Also there was confusion at the outset regarding roles and responsibilities which negatively affected theeffectiveness of the project. For example, it was not clear who should be responsible for monitoring andreporting on the programme's progress, and there was confusion in the field amongst Iraqistakeholders about the roles of the different UN organizations. This was later resolved through bettercommunication and regular stakeholder meetings.

Lengthy procurement process and government sign-off on procured items. Remote Management posed challenges. It also yielded surprising advantages. It greatly increased local

ownership and the responsibility taken by the local coordinators for this particular programme, whosephilosophy was based on participatory planning and implementation of project activities with localcommunities’ through local steering committees (LSCs) and a national SC.



Slow delivery at the beginning due to the delay in filling the important position of programme managerand establishing a coordination mechanism. This attracted criticism from stakeholders, as indicated inthe evaluation report.

Relevance

The LADP was designed to contribute to the following Millennium Development Goals, particularly:

Eradicating extreme hunger and poverty Promoting gender equality and empowering women Ensuring environmental sustainability Developing a global partnership for development

The programme was also aligned with the National Development Strategy and supported improvements in thequality of life of people in Iraq through the rehabilitation of basic social infrastructure besides pro-activelysupporting economic growth through the development of private sector and SME.

Although the LADP has supported the overall needs of Iraq and carried out activities relevant to nationalpriorities, in some instances the programme was not relevant in meeting the exact needs of some populations.For example, vocational training-centers equipment purchased in Sulaymaniya, Babyel and the Marshlandsproved to be too advanced for the beneficiaries and there was no sufficient demand for it in rural areas. Thus itwas noted that one of the lessons learned from the implementation of LADP was the need to ensure that aproper needs assessment, feasibility studies and planning are undertaken prior to implementation.

National ownership and government involvement

UN agencies participating in the LADP worked with various ministries and government departmentsthroughout the lifespan of the programme to ensure alignment with national priorities, effectiveimplementation and government involvement and ownership. The following government counterparts wereinvolved in LADP: Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation, Ministry of Education, Ministry ofEnvironment, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Municipalities and Public Works, Ministry of WaterResources, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MoLSA) and selected Chambers ofCommerce and Industry of Iraq in the targeted Governorates.

To ensure national ownership and government involvement, LADP set up Local Steering Committees (LSCs)comprised of government representatives, civil society representatives, NGOs, workers unions and chaired bythe governor of the selected area. LADP has also established the National Steering Committee (NSC) to provideguidance to the central government from a pan-Iraqi perspective.

NSC Responsibilities LSC Responsibilities

Provide strategic advice on LADP design andimplementation.

Support the LSCs and facilitate the involvementof ministries in preparing and implementinglocal area development plans.

Prepare a Local Area Development Plan. Identify fast-track social and economic

development and physical rehabilitationprojects.

Encourage cooperation, coordination andpartnership with governorate, local governmentofficials and other stakeholders.

Monitor implementation of programmeactivities.

Local and central government involvement varied through the stages of the programme. During the design andimplementation of LADP, there was significant government involvement in identifying priorities and approvingplans and activities. Government officials also contributed to making decisions regarding how certain activitieswere implemented. However, government involvement in monitoring and evaluation was rather limited. Thesustainability of the LADP is contingent on overcoming the challenge of rotation of local council officials, whoare elected every four years; new councils may have their own ideas and approaches to local area development



activities. In addition, the continuity of the LSC concept needs to be further supported by the local governmentto institutionalize this approach and link closely with local government structure during implementation.

LADP provided a platform for Iraqi professionals to take part in the design of the methodology and use theirknowledge of local areas and needs. Involving Iraqi professionals as subcontractors and other stakeholders inall aspects of the project design, implementation and monitoring and evaluation proved to be successful as theyprovided quick, realistic and relevant contributions to the programme. Moreover, the staff retention of Iraqisubcontractors was often higher than that of international staff from UN agencies. GoI respondents noted thatone lesson learned from LADP is that the UN should continue to encourage engagement of nationalcounterparts for greater ownership, adapt their way of working to the government and support Iraqi officials inaddressing the needs and priorities of Iraq.

Capacity development

A significant component of LADP focused on capacity development, where beneficiaries had the opportunity toundergo various forms of training. Beneficiaries from training included: government personnel, healthcareprofessionals, consultants, private contractors, organizations, managers and the general public. Capacitydevelopment activities ranged from on the job training, training of trainers, workshops, seminars and studytours. Capacity development in its various forms provided practical skills as well as exposure to new conceptsand ideas.

Training topics included: district and spatial analysis, district planning, monitoring and evaluation,environmental awareness, and business development practices among others.

LADP stands out from other UN projects in Iraq for providing opportunities for people at district levels andfrom remote areas to receive training and visit other countries. Many informants noted that despite the hours oftraining provided, most beneficiaries found it difficult to replicate activities without UN agencies' involvement.According to an independent evaluation report of LADP, training modules were predetermined rather thancustom made and did not always reflect the real needs of the particular beneficiaries. Also, training tended to betoo general and short to be significantly useful.

Sustainability

LADP was more recovery oriented than development oriented and therefore sustainability was not the mainfocus. The approach of LADP to sustainability included: training, involving government officials in overseeingthe implementation of fast track projects, creating business information centers and devising economicdevelopment plans for chambers of commerce. It is difficult to determine, however, whether these activitieswere sustainable as they were not replicated without UN involvement in the project. Another area of concernwas the sustainability of the fast-track infrastructure projects given that there were limited resources allocatedfor the maintenance of infrastructure. While fast track projects provided a total of more than 135,000 personemployment days to the local population as of 31 December 2009, that employment was temporary in natureand ceased after the end of the project.

The activities of LADP will be sustained through an extension of the project for five more years (LADP Phase II)as well as the 12-month bridging phase that was funded by UNDG ITF. LADP Phase II (C10-13) is a 12-monthbridging phase that will enable the core Regional Technical Teams to consolidate Phase I accomplishments andlay robust foundations for LADP Phase II, and undertake necessary preparatory work to pave the way for a swiftprogramme expansion in 2011. It is structured around three pillars: (i) Inclusive local participatory planningand improved service delivery, (ii) Local citizen empowerment and civic engagement, and (iii) Nationalframework and institutional structure for devolved local planning and improved service delivery. LADP PhaseII will build on Phase I achievements and expand on the knowledge and experience gained. LADP Phase II willcontinue to work towards sustainable poverty reduction and improvement of living conditions in Iraq. Theoriginal LADP provided UN agencies and other stakeholders with important experience and exposure to thesituation on the ground in Iraq. LADP Phase II promises to focus more on sustainability by providing localpeople and government officials with systems, policies and procedures to carry out activities on their own.LADP II is expected to receive co-financing from the GoI. UN staff is expected to provide only supervision andguidance for LADP II, while most of the implementation will be done by local partners.



ISRB approved the extension of Phase II in June 2010 with the following comments:

"The board emphasized the need of the second phase, taking into consideration the lessons learned from thefirst phase, namely, aspects related to sustainable approach of technical assistance to local authorities, whichrequires stronger collaboration with Ministry of Planning, work with governorates councils instead of districtsand sub-districts, planning directorates, at governorates and also MoPDC planning units. It is also important togive more ownership to the government through monitoring of the project activities and work planimplementation by the National Steering Committee. The selection criteria of local steering committee shouldbe revised as well as ToR of the National Steering Committee. Finally, the project outcomes and outputs shouldalso be revised, reflecting the weaknesses of governance at local level."

Managing joint programmes is a complex and rather new experience for the UN system. Given all thechallenges that were faced in bringing seven agencies together, the programme was deemed successful.According to the LADP project manager from UNDP, an indication of this success is that the programme wasreferred to as a brand and people would think of it as an independent organization rather than a programmecomposed of seven agencies.

In conclusion, LADP was a successful programme despite some areas of improvement that have been identifiedby the various stakeholders. The participatory approach to local area development and involvement of the Iraqicommunity in the target areas in the planning, implementation and monitoring of project activities was ofparticular importance to the situation in Iraq as it enhanced the relevance of programme activities andincreased ownership of outputs. The programme was a first phase and follow-up phases are recommended, as itcontributed to the development of Iraq and provided a learning opportunity to its various stakeholdersincluding government officials, entrepreneurs, NGOs, UN agencies and the general public. The LADP hasprovided a model of a successful joint programme and collaboration between the UN and the Iraqi communityon one hand, and the UN agencies on the other hand.

References

UNDP C10-09 Evaluation Report LADP 2009 Annual Report Agency Progress and Quarterly Reports Tawasul Material

Meetings with:

Name Position AgencySoroush Javadi CTA and Iraq Team Leader ILODr Aqila NooriMs. Lamia Rantissi

Medical OfficerTechnical Officer WHO

Fiona McCluney Senior Programme Officer UN-HABITATNahida El Saies TVET Project Manager UNESCOMahmoud Uthman KRG SRB GovernmentLionel Laurens Programme Manager UNDP



Case Study 2: Disease Eradication, Elimination and IntroducingNew Vaccines Project (D2-19)

Following the 2003 Iraq war, Iraq’s immunization figures dropped from more than 80 percent of infants tobelow 60 percent. Those alarming figures prompted WHO & UNICEF to team up to revitalize the vaccinationprogramme, to prevent any further decline in immunization. The mutual developmental goal was to contributeto the reduction of infant and child morbidity and mortality through protecting more children against diseases.With support and funding from the MoH for the largest share, a total amount of US$25 million, with WHO andUNICEF allotting US$52,254 and US$1,400,000 respectively and through additional financing from UNDGITF of US$12 million (all provided by the Japanese government), the intervention managed to improve thecoverage of infants by essential vaccines from below 60 percent in 2003 to above 80 percent in 2005. Theproject activities targeted children of less than five years of age from the 18 governorates of Iraq, although someinterventions were focused on selected districts. The project was implemented through close cooperation withthe Iraqi Ministry of Health.

The original project duration was February 2007 to March 2008. Due to unavoidable delays in implementation,however, the project was extended to June 2009 and the target dates for achieving the desired outcomes werealso deferred. Delays were attributed to ambitious target dates for completion of project activities duringproject design on one hand, and the prevailing state of violence in many areas of Iraq on the other hand,especially given the national coverage of the project activities.

Officials from the Expanded Program Immunization (EPI) unit, and especially Dr. Mutaaz Abbas, EPI'sDirector, were heavily involved during project planning and design and were responsible for presenting the casefor the vaccination programme in front of the Iraqi Strategic Review Board (ISRB) and on several occasions toDr. Barham Saleh, the Prime Minister of Iraqi Kurdistan. The early involvement of EPI officials wasconstructive in securing government ownership of the project activities and accountability for results. This wasevident in the commitment from MoH as well as the effectiveness of the feedback mechanisms deployed byMoH to report scientifically analyzed data in a transparent manner to all concerned parties, which is essentialin addressing future vaccine and coverage requirements.

According to a government informant, government co-financing for this project was secured mainly because ofthe importance of the underlying issue to the Iraqi administration and the need to take precautionary measuresto control any epidemics or disease outbreaks, especially among infants and children. This awareness andculture goes back to WHO & UNICEF’s strong and continuous advocacy among policy makers (MoH and otherministries) since 1979, which created a strong political and financial commitment for vaccination.

Awareness of the consequences of a poor vaccination programme and lessons drawn from countries facingdisease outbreaks convinced the MoH to ensure it was in the driving seat and to dedicate its resources to dealwith the challenge, from disease identification to disease elimination.

Government ownership was visible during project planning through the involvement of MoH personnel inproject design and case demonstrations reviewed by the ISRB. During project implementation, EPI personnelwere heavily involved in almost all activities undertaken by the project such as house-to-house nationalcampaigns, periodic assessments to depict trends in the incidence of vaccine preventable diseases, and thecreation and maintenance of an effective health information system to ensure that surveillance of EPI diseasesmet the WHO criteria of acceptability, proper disposal of syringes, needles and empty vaccine vials. Later in2009, the Iraqi government pledged money to support the MoH in conducting various activities with the minorsupport of UN agencies, including carrying out periodic assessments, surveillance of EPI diseases, supervisionand reporting, procurement, testing and storage of vaccines, service delivery and carrying out campaigns toreach every district.

Coordination Mechanisms

This project was a good example of effective joint programming among UN agencies operating under the UNDGITF. WHO and UNICEF have a long history of collaboration at a global scale, which made it easy for those twoagencies to establish efficiently a set of working standards and norms and to create a joint practice that ensured



clarity of roles and proper division of labor. As for coordination mechanisms among WHO, UNICEF and theMoH, informants from the three entities indicated that there was a good level of ongoing, almost dailycommunication from the start of the project. Various methods of communication were used, from phone andvideo conferencing to in-person interactions at station points established at the MoH premises. National stafffrom WHO and UNICEF were based in the MoH station point to facilitate swift decision-making and technicaladvice. The administration, finance and procurement departments were also established at MoH to support anddrive the on-the-ground operations. Such forms of coordination left little room for break-downs even duringdifficult security conditions.

Further collaboration among WHO, UNICEF and MoH was facilitated through the Health Sector WorkingGroups biweekly meetings. These meeting were led by the MoH with participation from WHO, UNICEF andother international organizations and donors. During these meetings different policies were discussed andproposals were endorsed. This collaboration facilitated capacity development for MoH and other participatinggovernment authorities.

In addition to the longstanding cooperation between the MoH, WHO and UNICEF, the project was able tocreate new partnerships with international and national NGOs and donors such as USAID and IRCS, as well aswith medical schools and community leaders, who assisted in advocacy, social mobilization and conductingstudies to assess the burden of the Haemophilus influenza type-b (Hib) and rotavirus diseases.

Since it is the MoH which looks after the health and well being of the Iraqi people, MoH, in collaboration withWHO, worked closely with ministries of Education and Higher Education, Municipalities and Public Works,Agriculture, Interior, Finance and Planning to ensure the successful implementation of new vaccinationprogrammes. In addition, project implementation depended on forging new partnerships with communityleaders, religious leaders and the community at large to facilitate the completion of project activities at anational level. WHO and UNICEF international staff were based in Amman, and provided guidance to nationalstaff in Iraq, whose movement was restricted by UN standards. In addition, the project was implemented by theactive participation of the MoH staff, as with all WHO projects in Iraq. The multi-level collaboration led tofurther capacity development of MoH and other participating government authorities, and this, in turn,enhanced the national ownership of the programme—a prerequisite for the future sustainability of EPIactivities.

Achievements and results

Despite the volatile security situation and setting ambitious target dates for completion of the plannedactivities, the project has been successful in achieving high immunization coverage rates in all governoratesincluding hard-to-reach districts through house-to-house campaigns, mobile vaccination teams and employingthe Reach Every District approach. Outlined in the table below are the project planned objectives, results andrelevant analysis based on the project documents and recent evaluation conducted in April 2010 byindependent consultants from Stars Orbit.



TABLE 14: D2-19 PLANNED OBJECTIVES AND ACTUAL RESULTS

Planned Objectives Actual Results Analysis

Achieve by the end of2007 coverage of at least80 percent for allessential vaccines amonginfants in every district.

Supply of urgently needed vaccines,syringes and measles-laboratory equipmentand supplies:

This was 90 percent achieved, as verified byfield visits of WHO and UNICEF staff aswell as by reviewing reports from vaccinewarehouses. The MoH is now procuring allnecessary vaccines, syringes, and cold chainequipment. WHO and UNICEF are bridginggaps and providing special reagents.

As at 31 December 2008, only 60 percent ofdistricts reported 80 percent coverage.

Maintain poliovirus-freestatus through 2007 andeliminate measles fromIraq by the end of 2007.

The non-polio AFP rate increased from 1.6in 1999 to 2.8 in 2005 and 3.0 in 2006.Stool adequacy rate has also increased from79.7 percent in 1992 to 94 percent in 2005and 92 percent in 2006. Except in high riskareas such as Anbar, all Governoratesachieved the non-polio rate of 2/100,000.

Access to immunization servicesimproved for all under five yearsthrough two rounds of house-to-house Oral Polio Vaccine (OPV)vaccination campaigns in 2007and 2008:

The two rounds were conductedin September/October 2007 andOctober/November 2008 andreached more than 90 percentcoverage of children under fiveexcept in Baghdad/Karkh andDiyala. The relevantadministrative reports wereverified by WHO and UNICEFstaff, which affirms that poliofree status was maintained in2007 and 2008, (consistenteight-year polio-free status wasmaintained in the country since2000).



Planned Objectives Actual Results Analysis

Provide evidence for theintroduction of rotavirusand Hib vaccines into theEPI programme by theend of 2007.

Replaced measles aggregate-basedreporting with measles case-basedreporting, and introduced laboratory-basedclassification of measles instead of clinical-based classification. As at 31 December2008, measles case-based surveillance andmeasles laboratory-based diagnosis waswell established.

Reports from warehouses and the reviewand scrutiny of administrative data andreports revealed that 92 percent of childrenwere reached during the April/May 2008MMR vaccination campaign, with a rangefrom 15 percent in Najaf DOH to 61 percentin Baghdad, Karkh. The lower rates were indistricts which saw high rates of violence,mainly Baghdad/Karkh, Sulymania, Dyala,Anbar, and Salah-Din.

The 100 percent coverage is dueto the movement of refugees tosafe havens, whereas the lowcoverage may explain the onsetof measles outbreaks, whichlater spread from central areasto the north and south.

Decentralization ofvaccine storage andmanagement by the endof 2007.

Three regional vaccine warehouses storingand distributing vaccines in Erbil, Babil andBasra were constructed and are functioning.UNICEF and WHO field reports confirmthe functioning of the regional vaccinewarehouses.

The above results were achieved throughthe vigorous efforts exerted by WHO andUNICEF in close coordination with MoHstaff. Intensive training was undertaken tostrengthen the capacity development ofstaff

The activities undertaken hadcontributed to the realization ofthe underlying project objectivesespecially with regard to therevitalization of theimmunization programme andreversing the downward trend ofcoverage of infants and childrenby essential vaccines. Theproject was able to achieve thestipulated results, with a fewexceptions of inadequatevaccination coverage in certainsub-districts, incompletereporting from some districts,non-completion of the bacterialmeningitis surveillance and thedeferral of a decision onintroducing new vaccines in thenational EPI pending furtherassessment of needs and costs.

Project activities were impacted by delays caused by the security situation. Informants indicated that the mainchallenges faced during the project implementation were: 1) delays in government formation, 2) high turnoverof government officials and MoH staff in particular, as well as 3) the length of time and complicated protocolsinvolved in drafting and processing official government letters.

Efficiency and effectiveness

The project underwent several revisions to reallocate funds within budget lines in order to implement theproject activities in a cost-effective manner. This exemplified flexibility in responding to unforeseendevelopments and/or newly emerging needs and priorities, such as the sudden surges in violence in certaindistricts, the onset of disease outbreaks and additional demands arising during implementation. Examples ofsuch situations include the beginning of the cholera outbreak in Sulymania in January 2007 and measles



outbreaks in March/April 2008 in Anbar, Ninewa, Baghdad, Salah Al-Din and Kirkuk provinces, whichwitnessed high violence.

The project provided access to and coverage of immunization services for children under age five in Iraq as awhole and without discrimination by gender, religious or ethnic group, on a national basis as well as in the highpriority districts through the house-to-house vaccination campaigns, Supplementary Immunization Activities(SIA) and mopping-up campaigns.

In addition, vaccine safety was improved through the creation of vaccine storage and distribution facilities,provision of the urgently needed cold chain equipment and supplies as well as adopting safe methods for thedisposal of used syringes, needles and empty vaccine vials.

Alignment with priorities

The project was aligned with the following MDGs:

Goal 3: Promote gender equality by providing equal access of infants and children to immunization serviceswithout gender discrimination.

Goal 4: Reduce child mortality by protecting children against vaccine preventable diseases.

Goal 6: Combat diseases by reducing infant and child morbidity from vaccine-preventable diseases.

In addition, the project was aligned with the National Development Strategy 2005- 2007, which calls forstrengthening integrated health services with emphasis on Primary Health Care quality improvement andhuman resources. Urgent priorities identified in the national plans for health sector reforms were alsoaddressed through this project.


Capacity development during the project lifecycle took various forms, starting with the daily interaction amongMoH, WHO and UNICEF around mutual planning and implementing of activities as well as holding trainingsessions and workshops. Gradually, the MoH was able to hold the same planning and implementation cycle onits own with minor support and consultation from WHO & UNICEF.

Successful capacity-development activities resulted in MoH’s ability to procure eight of the ten million doses ofOral Polio Vaccine which was financed by MoH. In addition, MoH developed an ability to use the balance offunds for supporting social mobilization activities, printing 12,000 registry books and supporting vaccinationteams in carrying out the October/November 2008 Polio National Immunization Days, which reached morethan 5 million children across Iraq as well as provided transportation services to nearly 5,000 mobile teams forthe two rounds of 2008 Polio National Immunization Days and measles mopping-up campaigns, which reachednearly 580,000 children.

Government informants indicated that ongoing capacity-development activities such as training sessions,seminars, train-the-trainer workshops and on-the-job training were much more effective and efficient whendelivered inside Iraq as opposed to outside Iraq. The reason behind that is that such activities when deliveredinside Iraq allow for a wider coverage of MoH staff for longer periods of time, which in turn instills the learningand ensures knowledge transfer to MoH personnel.

Sustainability

According to a government interviewee, MoH assumed full responsibility of the EPI programme after the end ofthe project. However, there is still a need for further capacity building activities targeted at the MoH’s staff.

Key activities would include the establishment of train-the-trainer in each Governorate and district toadequately transfer knowledge to MoH staff at the management and service delivery level.



Conclusion

The assistance of specialized UN agencies was indispensable in the last decade under heightened securityconditions and the pressing needs in Iraq. Going forward, however, the MoH should develop its own capacity toassume full leadership and national ownership of the EPI.

Given that house-to-house national campaigns remain the most effective strategy for addressing the decline inimmunization coverage under emergency situations, MoH is best positioned to lead such a campaign.

Despite the unstable security situation in Iraq during the project implementation period and the remote natureof managing, implementing and monitoring the project activities inside Iraq, the EPI representatives noted thatthe project met its objectives and goals.



Case Study 3: Remote Management

Introduction

The post-conflict situation in Iraq during which UNDG ITF funded projects were implemented was unique in itslack of stability and security. No other development environment has been comparable with that of Iraq from2003 to 2010, where ongoing violence, insurgencies and attacks on aid workers were a constant threat to theUN staff and other international organizations and those in any way affiliated with them. Following the August2003 bombing of the UN headquarters in Baghdad, UN agencies relocated all their operations out of Iraq toneighboring countries, mainly Jordan. From there, they continued to plan, implement and monitor projectsremotely. This mode of operation is commonly referred to as remote management, where organizations manageprojects from outside of the conflict zone using technologies such as phone, video conference or internet tocommunicate as well as engaging nationals of the country to travel to project sites and organizing meetingsoutside of the conflict zone. Many other international organizations employed similar mode of remotemanagement in Iraq.

Remote management was chosen as one of the case studies under the UNDG ITF LLE because of theuniqueness of this operational model in development. This case study is based on a sample of 11 UNDG ITFprojects representing all eight sectors and implemented by various UN agencies. The 11 projects were selectedfrom the 60 closed projects which also underwent independent evaluations. Desk review included projectdocuments, evaluation reports, quarterly reports (known as fiches) and UNDG ITF annual reports. Six UNproject managers were interviewed specifically for this case study. In addition, all interviews with donors, GoIofficials, UN agencies and other stakeholders included questions about remote management. There were anumber of challenges in conducting this case study as there is limited information available about expensesassociated with remote management. This made it difficult to analyze the cost effectiveness of this approach.Also no data was available regarding the number of UN staff present in or travelling to Iraq throughout theseven years of UNDG ITF operations.

Remote management was one of the unique aspects of UNDG ITF. Given security concerns, the UN had verylimited presence in Iraq in the International Zone (IZ) in Baghdad as well as in Erbil. Selected UN staff wouldoccasionally travel to Iraq under protection of US military or other security guards. The mode of implementingUN projects in Iraq was semi-remote. In fact none of the 11 reviewed projects had a fully remote managementteam. Each UN agency maintained its engagement with local partners through its locally based staff as well asthe international staff who travelled to Iraq whenever required subject to the security situation. Each UNagency approached the issue of security by applying different methods, some employing more remotemanagement from Amman and others placing more national staff in Iraq. Over time, UN agencies slowlyincreased their presence in Iraq as the security situation improved. For example, UN-HABITAT has local staffunder a contract as UN-HABITAT staff in the field who are permanently based in Iraq. UNICEF and UNHCRrelocated many of their staff inside the IZ in Baghdad.

Analysis

1. Development effectiveness

Relevance

The lack of consistent presence of UN staff in Iraq created a major challenge to developing projects that wereclosely relevant to the population’s needs in the field. Government informers expressed concerns that theUNDG ITF funded projects did not always reflect what the people of Iraq needed because UN staff were notalways on the ground to witness the situation or observe day-to-day life in order to recognize the softcomponents the people needed to continue and to improve their lives, or the physical facilities they lacked toperform their daily activities.

However in many cases the projects were not remotely managed per se, as for example in the SchoolRehabilitation and Capacity Building Phase 1 project, the assessment of the schools that needed rehabilitationwas done by an official from UN-HABITAT with a local contractor and a government official to assess the



situation. Reports were then sent to the headquarters in Jordan in order to develop plans according to thefeedback from the field, in addition to a schools survey that helped give a clearer picture.

The water quality control and surveillance project, on the other hand, reflects a negative side of remotemanagement. One of the lessons learned in the evaluation report was that “the urgent needs and prioritiesshould be clearly defined and agreed upon between partners [before the] start [of] the projects.” When the casestudy team discussed this further with WHO officials, they explained that there was no relevance between thechemicals obtained and the equipment in use. This resulted in a case where the equipment was of no usewithout the right chemicals. This could have been avoided if there had been more interaction between technicaladvisors and the local counterpart.

Effectiveness and efficiency

Most of the 11 reviewed projects have achieved their stipulated project deliverables, but with significant delaysbeyond the planned end date. The major cause for this delay was the unstable and dangerous security situationas well as challenges in communicating with government officials. In number of instances customs clearancescaused significant delays to project implementation as products were held at the border and communicationwith customs officials was often challenging.

The lack of more experienced international technical consultants in the field is one of the compromises UNagencies had to make because of remote management. Some UN agencies, for example WHO, addressed thisobstacle by placing its national staff at the Ministry of Health. This allowed for direct contact between the WHOheadquarters in Jordan and the staff in Iraq through video teleconferencing. Even though in some cases UNagencies' staff was based in Baghdad, it was still very complicated and costly to move in and out of the IZ. Also,meetings with Iraqi counterparts and representatives of CSO in the IZ are difficult as those without an IZ badgehave to go through hours of security check at the checkpoints. Interviewed UN staff noted that it is easier andless costly to hold those meetings in Amman than Baghdad. In fact GoI officials occasionally come to Amman,where many meetings with the UN are held. While the security situation in Erbil is better, the UN staff hassimilar security constraints as in Baghdad.

It is very difficult to gather any solid data to analyze the cost effectiveness of remote management. There is alsono clear consensus among interviewees as to how cost effective remote management is. On one hand some UNofficials viewed remote management as the most cost-effective choice compared with having on the groundpresence in Iraq given the unsafe and risky situation in Iraq. For example, it costs around $50,000-$60,000 amonth to rent a villa in the IZ. The estimated cost of travelling to the airport from IZ in Baghdad with privatesecurity can be as high as US$5,000 per trip. All this cost of security can be put to better use which moredirectly serves the beneficiaries. International staff has limited accessibility and movement in Iraq, and thus itis easier to handle issues from a less expensive and more secure location. On the other hand, many GoIcounterparts have stated that remote management is not cost effective, and that this approach made UNagencies more expensive to work with. GoI representatives noted that UN agencies have high fees, as there is asmuch as 15 percent to 20 percent added cost for security.

Sustainability

There was no evidence to suggest that the sustainability of the projects was affected by remote management,and many interviewees suggested that although this is not the ideal way of working, this operating method doesnot directly affect the sustainability of projects.

2. Operational Effectiveness

National ownership

The fact that many UN agency staff was based outside of Iraq and maintained remote communication with itsIraqi counterparts presented a number of challenges related to strengthening national ownership by the GoI.Remote management did not, however, prevent national ownership. For example, in the InstitutionalDevelopment - Operational and HR Capacity Building for the IECI/IHEC project, the independent electoralcommissions were able to take significant ownership and leadership of monitoring the March 2010 elections. Inthis election, UN officials only supported the procedure, while in the previous elections UN staff were



responsible for the whole process. Also in most projects the assessment and planning was carried out incollaboration with counterparts, which allowed them to be fully integrated in and take ownership of theprocess.


The initial focus of UNDG ITF was on reconstruction and recovery, while later that focus shifted to capacitydevelopment. This soft yet crucial component of projects was affected by the nature of the remote operatingmodel, as the UN staff had fewer interactions with beneficiaries. There are, however, some positive examples.In the case of the health sector, MoH and WHO were working together on a day-to-day basis as WHO wasoperating from inside the MoH in Baghdad, and was able to provide ongoing training and on-the job coaching.

Also, in the case of the IHEC project, UNAMI was present in Iraq working daily with the commission, andprovided on-the-job training when it was crucial for staff to stay in Baghdad to prepare for the elections(between six and nine months prior to the elections). UN staff also helped in the selection of the people going totraining so as to make sure they were investing in the right people. UN agencies contracted local NGOs staffedwith nationals of Iraq who had access and the ability to move within the country more freely than UN staff. Thiscreated an opportunity to build capacity for the locals and take greater ownership of electoral process.

Management for results, alignment and harmonization, accountability

Another important aspect of the UNDG ITF is the joint efforts between the UN agencies. Remote managementincreased the synergies and harmonization between the UN agencies as they came together to share facilitiesand solved challenges they faced, especially in joint programmes. Monitoring is an important part of the successof implementing remotely designed plans in the field. For example in the Rehabilitation of CommunityFacilities and Infrastructure projects, the provision of well-grounded information and reporting from fieldengineers enabled UN-HABITAT to make informed and reasonable decisions on field matters. Most of themonitoring was done by UN staff monitors and government officials from the relevant ministry, Clear feedbackfrom the field is a key part of remote management, allowing for a better planning and adaptation according tothe changing needs of the people.

Most of the implemented projects faced delays, for which the remote management aspect was partlyresponsible, although this in turn was often due to the unstable security conditions.

Lessons learned

Applying the remote-management model to a country with such unique issues as Iraq delivered lessons aboutthe operating model, including:

– Under a very difficult security situation, the UN teams have been able to deliver support to Iraq and itspeople thanks to remote-management approach and use of various communication mechanisms, such asvideo, tele-conference and the internet, as well as through the effective engagement and management ofnational consultants.

– Some level of risk must be tolerated by agencies operating in post-conflict and high security areas.Development cannot work when its actors are quarantined. The remote-management approach, whileallowing the UN to be engaged in Iraq without significant presence on the ground, also caused challengesin working with the GoI counterparts and reduced the effectiveness of delivering results and developingcapacity. As the security situation improves in Iraq, UN should consider relocating more staff to Iraq.

– Many observers noted that remote management, despite all the challenges that it may cause, was still asuccessful operating model. The UN engaged national staff to conduct implementation and monitoring ofprojects and was able to overcome many of the challenges faced due to security issues. Going forward,however, it is important for UN teams to be present in Iraq to see what the needs are and to have morecollaboration and coordination with GoI counterparts.



References

Evaluation reports on the following 11 projects.

# SOT Project No. Project Title Agency

1 AFF A5-06 Promotion of Cottage Industries UNIDO

2 PRO A7-04 Strengthening of National Mine Action Organization In Southern Iraq UNDP

3 EDU B1-08 Literacy and Life Skills Development UNESCO

4 GOV G11-07 Support for Fair, Safe and Professional Media Coverage UNESCO

5 ERD C10-04 Smart Community Project for Iraq ESCWA

6 HN D2-05 Non-Communicable Diseases and Mental Health WHO

7 WAT E3-11a Water Quality Control and Surveillance in Iraq Phase II WHO

8 WAT E3-11b Water Quality Control and Surveillance in Iraq Phase II UNICEF

9 HS E4-14 Rehabilitation of Community Facilities and Infrastructure UN-HABITAT

10 GOV G11-14bInstitutional Development- Organizational and HR Capacity Building

for the IECI/IHECUNOPS

11 EDU B1-22b School Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Phase 1 UN-HABITAT

Notes from interviews for the LLE SOT final reports Interviews with stakeholders

Organization Name Title Meeting Location

WHO

Dr. Eltayeb Mansour Medical Officer Amman

Dr. Faris Bunni Medical Officer/ NCD Amman

Eng Mohammad HamashaEnvironmental Health Program

OfficerAmman

UN-HABITAT Wael Al Ashhab (OIC) Project Manager – Infrastructure Amman

UNOPS Andrew Reese Programme Manager Amman (Tel)

UNDP Niels Guenther Programme Coordinator Amman (Tel)



Annex 2 – Interview Questionnaire

Inception Questionnaire

I. Introductions1. Introduce the team.2. Describe the context and objective of the Lessons Learned Exercise for UNDG ITF as well as the

objectives of this inception interview.3. Note the time duration for this interview.4. Understand the role and involvement of the person being interviewed in the UNDG ITF.

II. Inception Phase questions1. In your view, what should the LLE exercise achieve?2. Who do you think are the key persons to interview for the LLE? Why? Please cover as many

stakeholders as possible: UN, GoI, WB, donors, civil society, media or beneficiaries.3. If you have reviewed any of the independent evaluation reports completed for closed projects of the

ITF, what is your comment on the adequacy of these reports in assessing the development impact of theITF?

4. If we were to undertake a sample of case studies for the development effectiveness review, which levelof analysis do you suggest as most suitable:

a. Implementing Agency?b. Project?c. Sector?

5. Given answer to the above, which entity(s)/projects/sector would you recommend for a case study?Why?

6. Given the evaluation exercises that had been undertaken for the ITF before (namely the Scan Team andPwC reviews), in your view how many of the findings and recommendations have already beenaddressed?

7. How were they addressed? Or why weren’t they addressed?8. What biases should we be mindful of when conducting this exercise?9. What are your concerns about the LLE and what do you perceive are potential challenges in this

exercise?10. Are there any documents or reports that we may not have access to on the MDTF Gateway that you

would recommend we look at?11. Any thing else you'd like to share with us at this point to help us best prepare for this work?



Inception Questionnaire for Donors

I. Introductions1. Introduce the team.2. Describe the context and objective of the Lessons Learned Exercise for UNDG ITF as well as the

objectives of this inception interview.3. Note the time duration for this interview.4. Understand the role and involvement of the person being interviewed in the UNDG ITF.

II. Inception Phase questions

1. In your view, what are you overall perceptions of the ITF? What should the LLE exercise achieve?

2. How has the ITF helped them to:

Show support and care for Iraq and programmes in Iraq

Provide adequate strategic guidance and oversight

Show their voters their contributions (tax payer money) was valuable and achieved the desiredimpact

Serve their political agenda

3. Have they contributed to other MDTFs in post-conflict areas? If so, which ones? How much of thefunding was earmarked?

4. To what extend the Government of Iraq was aware of how much the donor contributed to Iraq thruthe ITF? In other words, did the donor get sufficient visibility with the GoI thru the ITF?

5. What did the donor think about the reports from MDTF? Have they provided adequate informationabout the progress of projects?

6. What are your thoughts on the governance of ITF? How efficient was the project approvalprocess?

7. If you were part of the Peer Review or Steering Committee, what were your impressions of thosebodies?

8. Did you feel that the Iraq Strategic Review Board (ISRB) function provided sufficient role for thegovernment to be involved in ITF?

9. How much has your country contributed to Iraq bilaterally? Who was the implementingorganization?

10. Are they planning to contribute to the future trust fund for Iraq?

11. Please discuss collaboration with the World Bank and USAID.

12. Please suggest any case study themes.

13. Any additional people you would suggest we meet with?



Main Questionnaire for Government of Iraq Officials

OPPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS

1. Could you please describe your role within the government? What has been your involvementwith the UNDG ITF or IRFFI and since when?

2. Overall, what are your impressions of the UNDG ITF?3. In your view, what lessons have been learned from the UNDG ITF?4. To what extent were UN contributions aligned with national priorities and development

objectives?5. How did the government ensure that there was alignment throughout the lifespan of the fund?6. What are your overall perceptions of the UN? Is the UN system coherent and coordinated in their

responses or does it operate as independent Agencies? In other words, what signs are there that the UNreform of delivering as one is being implemented on the ground?

7. What coordination mechanisms are there in place for the Government of Iraq to coordinate aidfrom donors to support aid harmonization and alignment with national priorities?

8. To what extent were you able to guide or influence the selection and approval of programmesand projects under the UNDG ITF? How has that evolved over time?

9. What were the strengths and weaknesses of the ISRB mechanism? How could the function beimproved in the future, if at all?

10. Why did the government not contribute more financially to UNDG ITF and its projects?11. To what extent did the government participate in the implementation of projects? How has this

evolved over time?12. Were there any obstacles in government involvement in planning, implementation and oversight of

UNDG ITF programmes and projects? How could any obstacles be avoided in the future to ensuregreater government participation and leadership?

13. What, if any, was the role of the government and national partners towards being accountable forresults? How did that role change over time?

14. To what extent did UNDG ITF reduce your transaction costs?15. How has the UNDG ITF modality helped reduce duplication of projects and created synergy among

development interventions?16. How has the UNDG ITF contributed to capacity development in Iraq throughout the past 7 years?17. What is your definition of capacity development? What particular aspects of capacity

development worked? Which ones could be improved?

DEVELOPMENT EFFECTIVENESS

18. How relevant, effective, efficient and sustainable have these capacity development interventionsbeen? Please give examples of certain projects or programmes you are aware of. Which developmentareas do you believe the UNDG ITF had been most effective in the past 7 years? Why?

19. In which sectors/ clusters do you believe the UNDG ITF achieved the most success? Why?20. What were the strengths and weaknesses of remote management in the implementation of UNDG ITF

programmes and projects?21. To what extent are the results of the UNDG ITF projects and programmes sustainable? Why?22. How would you comment on the relevance of the UNDG ITF projects and programmes to the

development needs of Iraq over time?23. Were the results achieved to date at a reasonable cost compared with alternative approaches to

accomplishing the same development objectives/results?24. To what extent have the programmes and project and their components have addressed the underlying

issues?25. How did the programmes and projects engaged with stakeholders and beneficiaries during project

planning and implementation?26. If a new Trust Fund was to be set up for Iraq, what would you recommend:

a. What aspects of the current UNDG ITF should be continued as they are or modified?b. What aspects should be stopped and which one to be added?c. How much co-financing and in-kind contribution should be included?

27. Is there anything else you would like to discuss with us regarding UNDG ITF that we have not yet covered?



Main Questionnaire for Donors

OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS

1. Could you please describe your role within your organization? What has been your involvement withthe UNDG ITF and since when?

2. Overall, what in your view has been the contribution of ITF to Iraq's reconstruction and recovery overthe past seven years?

3. How has the UNDG ITF helped your country achieve your objectives related to supportingdevelopment in Iraq?

4. How has your country been involved in Iraq outside the UNDG ITF? Why?5. MDTF MODALITY:

a. As a donor, how do you see the UNDG ITF modality comparable to other modalities fordonor contribution? What other modalities do you feel stronger about and why?

b. Compared to your work with the UN system in other countries, what advantages does theUNDG ITF offer? What disadvantages does it have?

c. To what extent did ITF reduce your transaction costs?d. How has the ITF modality helped reduce duplication of projects and created synergy among

development interventions?6. What are your overall perceptions of the UN? Is the UN system coherent and coordinated in their

responses or are they operate as independent Agencies? In other words, what signs are there that theUN reform of delivering as one are implemented on the ground?

7. To what extent did the UNDG ITF fulfilled on the Paris Declaration principles of aid harmonization,alignment with national priorities, capacity development, national ownership?

8. How effective were the accountability mechanisms under UNDG ITF? How was the governmentinvolved in the accountability for the programmes? What processes worked well and which ones neededimprovement? Please provide examples.

9. The UNDG ITF has evolved over its lifespan in terms of operations, governance, and implementationcapabilities. As a donor, what are your views of this evolution? Was it:

a. Timely?b. Responsive to the needs of Iraq?c. Responsive to donor requirements?

10. Please explain the extent of your involvement in the UNDG ITF with relation to:a. Project selection and approvalb. Implementationc. Monitoring and evaluation

11. What are your views on the fund design and governance structure of UNDG ITF? Whatimprovements, if any, would you recommend?

12. With regards to the selection and approval process of programmes and projects under UNDG IT, doyou believe the process was efficient? Why or why not?

13. Regarding monitoring and evaluations of programmes and projects under UNDG ITF, do youbelieve the M&E mechanism was sufficient, effective and effective?

14. How would you comment on the quality and timeliness reporting on UNDG ITFprogrammes/projects under the UNDG ITF as a donor?

15. GOVERNMENT: How would you rate relevance and effectiveness of government's involvementand leadership as it relates to selecting, approving, monitoring, implementing and in-kind orfinancial contribution of UNDG ITF programmes and projects?

16. CAPACITY: To what extent the UNDG ITF projects and programmes have contributed to the capacitydevelopment of the GoI? What was the contribution on an institutional level (strategy, policy,prioritization of projects) as well as on an implementation level?

17. What is your definition of capacity development? What particular aspects of capacitydevelopment worked and which ones could have been improved? How relevant, effective, efficient andsustainable have these interventions been? How were capacity development needs assessed on at anational and local level? Please give examples.



DEVELOPMENT EFFECTIVENESS:

18. Which development areas do you believe the UNDG ITF had been most effective in the past sevenyears? Why?In which sectors/clusters do you believe the UNDG ITF achieved the most success? Why?

19. To what extent are the results of the UNDG ITF projects and programmes sustainable? Why?20. How would you comment on the relevance of the UNDG ITF projects and programmes to the

development needs of Iraq over time?21. Were the results achieved to date at a reasonable cost compared with alternative approaches to

accomplishing the same development objectives/results?22. To what extent the programme/project and its components have addressed the underlying issues?23. How programme/project results contribute to improved access and utilization of services?24. How did the programme/project engage with stakeholders and beneficiaries in during project planning

and implementation?25. If a new trust fund was to be set up for Iraq, what would you recommend:

a. What aspects of the current UNDG ITF should be continued as they are or modified?b. What aspects should be stopped and which one to be added?c. How much co-financing and in-kind contribution should be included?

26. Is there anything else you would like to discuss with us regarding UNDG ITF that we have not yetcovered?



Main Questionnaire for UN Agencies

1. Could you please describe your role within your organization? What has been your involvementwith the UNDG ITF and since when?

2. How do you see the UNDG ITF modality comparable to other modalities for development? What othermodalities do you feel stronger about and why?

3. Compared to your work with the UN system in other countries, what advantages does the UNDG ITFoffer? What disadvantages does it have?

4. The UNDG ITF has evolved over its lifespan in terms of operations, governance, and implementationcapabilities. What are your views of this evolution? Was it:

a. Timely?b. Responsive to the needs of Iraq?c. Responsive to donor requirements?d. Responsive to feedback from beneficiaries?e. Participatory?

5. What are your views on the fund design and governance structure of UNDG ITF? Whatimprovements, if any, would you recommend? Depending on your role and involvement, please discussthe strengths and weaknesses of particular governance structure (SOT, SC, SCSO, PR, ISRB).

6. With regards to the selection and approval process of programmes and projects under UNDG ITF,do you believe the process was efficient, effective and transparent? Why or why not?

7. How has the UNDG ITF facilitated the UN organizations to deliver as one UN in a coordinated,coherent and effective manner?

8. What were the strengths and weaknesses of joint programmes under UNDG ITF? Did yourorganization participate in any joint programme? If so, would you be involved in this type of work if itwere not for the joint programmes? Please provide specific examples of what worked well and whatcould be improved in joint programmes.

9. Regarding monitoring and evaluations of joint programmes under UNDG ITF, do you believe theM&E mechanism was sufficient, effective and efficient?

10. How would you comment on the reporting on UNDG ITF programmes/projects under UNDG ITF?Was it relevant, timely and sufficient?

11. How would you rate the relevance and effectiveness of government's involvement and leadershipas it relates to selecting, approving, monitoring, implementing and in-kind or financial contributions ofUNDG ITF programmes and projects?

12. Were there any obstacles to government involvement? How could any obstacles be avoided in thefuture to ensure greater government participation and leadership?

13. How would you describe your Agency’s relationship with donors contributing to UNDG ITF? Wereyou receiving bilateral funding from any donors?

14. Which development areas do you believe the UNDG ITF had been most effective in? Why?15. In which sectors/clusters do you believe the UNDG ITF achieved the most success? Why?16. Do you believe that UNDG ITF has contributed to development results and are those results

sustainable?17. Do you believe the UNDG ITF projects/programmes have managed to develop the capacity of the

GoI throughout the implementation of projects?18. What in your Agency's view is the definition of capacity development? What particular aspects of

capacity development worked and which ones could have been improved? How relevant, effective,efficient and sustainable have these interventions been? How were capacity development needsassessed and intervention monitored? Please give examples.

19. How would you comment on the relevance of the UNDG ITF projects and programmes to thedevelopment needs of Iraq over time?

20. If a new Trust Fund was to be set up for Iraq, what would you recommend:a. What aspects of the current UNDG ITF should be continued as they are or modified?b. What aspects should be stopped and which one to be added?c. How much co-financing and in-kind contribution should be included?


2. Reviewing the funds managed by the MDTF Office (based on Gateway), we find that some funds have a

direct cost allocations, others don’t. What are direct costs composed of, and why do some funds have itand others don’t (ITF direct costs US$4.61 million)?

3. All other MDTFs had administrative fee of 1%, ITF of 0.8% (based on Gateway). Why were other fundscharged higher AA fees?



4. ITF has a balance of funds remaining with the AA. We also understand from meetings in Amman thatthe ITF will be operational until 2014 (some recently approved projects have planned duration until2013), does this mean new projects can still be approved and funded by the ITF?

5. Also based on some discussions, we learned that the Lebanon Recovery Fund has a different structure,as for example the Steering Committee is chaired by two ministers. How is the structure of any of theMDTFs decided? Who is usually involved in the process?

6. Would the involved costs or charges for any fund vary by the nature of the fund (e.g. humanitarianfund, One UN fund, etc.)

7. Why are the funds set up for a duration of a maximum of four years (some have one or two years’planned duration only), especially since scholars discuss that trust funds are by nature long-term inperspective?

8. Is there a mechanism to invest undisbursed funds other than being deposited in a bank account andaccruing interest? How else does UNDP usually invest unused funds?

9. In other MDTFs, is there a link between an Agency’s speed of project implementation and their abilityto apply for new projects? There was an unwritten rule in the ITF in 2005 about that but it was laterdiscarded.

10. We understand that some funds can be accessed by international NGOs directly (such as theEmergency/Humanitarian Response Fund (ERF). On what basis is it decided if a fund is applicableonly to UN Agencies or other development partners as well?

11. When an UNDAF fund is set up in Iraq, will it also be managed by the MDTF Office?12. Why aren’t there many thematic funds managed by the MDTF (For example climate change, global

compacts and corporate responsibility, etc.)?13. Who usually initiates the request for a trust fund to be established under the UN, and managed by the

MDTF Office?14. Looking at the project budgets for some of the funds, specifically the Albania One UN Coherence Fund

and the CAR Common Humanitarian Fund, the amounts are significantly smaller than the projectbudgets under ITF, although judging by the titles, some have comparable project descriptions.Assuming activities and objectives are the same for a project, does this mean the cost of projects in Iraqis significantly higher?, or that Agencies have to take into consideration when they propose a project theoverall small fund size (in the smaller funds) to enable more projects?

15. Taking a donor’s perspective, what would be the benefits of contributing to a trust fund, versuscontributing to the Agency directly?



Main Questionnaire for MDTF Office

1. Reviewing the funds managed by the MDTF Office (based on Gateway), we find that some funds have a

direct cost allocations, others don’t. What are direct costs composed of, and why do some funds have itand others don’t (ITF direct costs $ 4.61 million)?

2. All other MDTFs had administrative fees of 1%, ITF of 0.8% (based on Gateway). Why were other fundscharged higher AA fees?

3. ITF has a balance of funds remaining with the AA. We also understand from meetings in Amman thatthe ITF will be operational until 2014 (some recently approved projects have planned duration until2013), does this mean new projects can still be approved and funded by the ITF?

4. Also based on some discussions, we learned that the Lebanon Recovery Fund has a different structure,as for example the Steering Committee is chaired by two ministers. How is the structure of any of theMDTFs decided? Who is usually involved in the process?

5. Would the involved costs or charges for any fund vary by the nature of the fund (e.g. humanitarianfund, One UN fund, etc.)

6. Why are the funds set up for a duration of a maximum of four years (some have one or two years’planned duration only), especially since scholars discuss that trust funds are by nature long-term inperspective?

7. Is there a mechanism to invest undisbursed funds other than being deposited in a bank account andaccruing interest? How else does UNDP usually invest unused funds?

8. In other MDTFs, is there a link between an Agency’s speed of project implementation and their abilityto apply for new projects? There was an unwritten rule in the ITF in 2005 about that but it was laterdiscarded.

9. We understand that some funds can be accessed by international NGOs directly (such as theEmergency/Humanitarian Response Fund (ERF). On what basis is it decided if a fund is applicableonly to UN Agencies or other development partners as well?

10. When an UNDAF fund is set up in Iraq, will it also be managed by the MDTF Office?

11. Why aren’t there many thematic funds managed by the MDTF (For example climate change, globalcompacts and corporate responsibility, etc.)?

12. Who usually initiates the request for a trust fund to be established under the UN, and managed by theMDTF Office?

13. Looking at the project budgets for some of the funds, specifically the Albania One UN Coherence Fundand the CAR Common Humanitarian Fund, the amounts are significantly smaller than the projectbudgets under ITF, although judging by the titles, some have comparable project descriptions.Assuming activities and objectives are the same for a project, does this mean the cost of projects in Iraqis significantly higher? or that Agencies have to take into consideration when they propose a project theoverall small fund size (in the smaller funds) to enable more projects?

14. Taking a donor’s perspective, what would be the benefits of contributing to a trust fund, versuscontributing to the Agency directly?



Main Questionnaire for Non-Government Organizations

1. Could you please describe your role? What has been your involvement with the UNDG ITF and sincewhen? What is your overall perception of the UNDG ITF?

2. How has the UNDG ITF helped Iraq achieve national priorities and development objectives?Please discuss how this has evolved since 2004?

3. Please comment on the involvement of the government, CSOs, NGOs or other national partners inimplementation? How has their involvement changed over the past seven years?

4. To what extent were you involved in the monitoring and evaluation process? In your view howsufficient and effective was the monitoring of projects?

5. How have the UNDG ITF and its programmes and projects helped the CSO/NGO/National Partnersreceive or provide support in Iraq where it is most needed and create sustainable results? How hasthis changed over time?

6. How would you rate government's involvement and leadership in UNDG ITF programmes andprojects?

7. How has the UNDG ITF contributed to capacity development in Iraq throughout the past sevenyears overall and specifically for the NGO sector and civil society.

8. What particular aspects of capacity development worked and which ones could have beenimproved?

9. Were the results achieved to date at a reasonable cost compared with alternative approaches toaccomplishing the same development objectives/results?

10. To what extent have the programme/project and its components addressed the underlying issues?11. How have programme/project results contributed to improved access to and utilization of services?12. How did the programme/project engage with stakeholders and beneficiaries in during project planning

and implementation?13. How would you rate the sustainability of results of the UNDG ITF projects after 2010? Why?14. In your view, were the UNDG ITF projects relevant to the needs of the Iraqi people? Why or why not?15. Which sectors/clusters do you believe the UNDG ITF was most successful? Why?16. Were you engaged in any programme where more than one UN Organization participated? If yes, what

were the strengths and weaknesses of joint programmes under UNDG ITF? Please provide specificexamples of what worked well and what could be improved in joint programmes.




Annex 3 - List of People Interviewed

Category Organization Name TitleMeeting

Location122

UN Agencies

FAO

1. Akshay Sinha Programme Officer Amman

2. Fadel El Zubi Head, FAO – Iraq

Senior Programme Coordinator

Amman

3. Dr. Hilal Mohammed CTA – Project manager and OICDeputy for Project

Amman

ILO

4. Jean Francois Klein Chief, Regional ProgrammingServices

Amman (Tel)

5. Luka Fedi SOT member and project manager Amman

6. Soroush Javadi CTA and Iraq program TeamLeader

Amman

UNESCO7. Michael Croft Executive Officer Amman

8. Salah Zaki Khaled Liaison and Administrative Officer Amman

OHCHR9. Tahar Boumedra Special Advisor to the Special

representative Secretary GeneralAmman (Tel)

UNFPA10. George Makram Georgi Representative Amman

11. Hilal Fawzi Assistant Representative Amman

UN-HABITAT

12. Doudou Mbye Head of Mission and ProgrammeManager

Amman

13. Wael Al Ashhab (OIC) Project Manager – Infrastructure Amman

14. Nihal F. Kana’an M & E, Donor Relations Specialist Amman

15. Fiona McCluney Senior Program Officer Amman

122 "(Tel)" indicates that the interview was carried over the phone.



16. Dyfed Aubrey Land and Housing expert Amman

UNICEF

17. Sikandar Khan Representative Amman

18.Mette Nordstrand Chief of Education Amman

19.Charlie Hrachya Sargsyan Water and Sanitation Sector Leader Amman

20. Subhash Misra Chief Planning M & E Amman

21.Iman Saleh Abdulla Education Officer USA –Tel

UNOPS

22. Jim Pansegrouw Operation Center Director andRepresentative for Iraq and Jordan

Amman

23. Andrew Reese Programme Manager Amman

24. Raad Yousef Gilyana Head of Support Services Amman

WFP

25.Edward Kaloon Representative & Country Directorfor Iraq

Amman

26. Yaver Sayyed Regional Programme Officer Baghdad

UNIDO 27.Renato Fornocaldo Special Representative to Iraq Amman

WHO

28. Ezechiel Bisalinkumi Technical Officer, Essential HealthTechnologies and Pharmaceuticals(EHTP)

Amman

29. Dr. Eltayeb Mansour Medical Officer Amman

30. Dr. Faris Bunni Medical Officer/ NCD Amman

31.Eng Mohammad Hamasha Environmental Health ProgramOfficer

Amman

32. Omar Ahmad Mekki Officer in Charge Amman

33. Dr. Aqila Noori Medical Officer Amman

UNDP

34. Mohamed El Ghannam Senior Programme Advisor Rule ofLaw and Judicial Reform

Amman

35.Richard Cox Media Amman

36. Maha Noimi National Program Officer Amman



37. Sudipto Mukerjee Head, economic recovery andpoverty alleviation pillar

Amman

38. Tamara Al Zayyat Programme Officer Amman

39. Lionel Laurens Programme Manager Amman

40. Issam Amarin Programme Assistant

Poverty Reduction & HumanDevelopment Unit

Amman

41. Seifeldin AbbaroFirst Head of the SteeringCommittee Support Office

Amman (Tel)

42. Thair Shraideh Program Specialist (ERF) Amman

43. Niels Guenther Programme Coordinator Baghdad

UNAMI

44. Moin Karim Head UNDG Iraq Trust FundSteering Committee Support Office

Amman

45. Pamela F. Husain Planning, Monitoring, andevaluation Unit

Office of Resident Coordinator –Iraq

Amman

46. Usman Akram Planning, Monitoring andEvaluation Unit, office of theResident Coordinator

Amman

47.Bana Kaloti Monitoring and evaluationspecialist

Amman

48. Christine McNab DSRSG/HC UNAMI, ResidentRepresentative UNDP Iraq

Amman

49. Bashar Al Ali Programme Specialist- ITF SCSO Amman

50. Simon Strachan Senior Program Officer

Office of Development andHumanitarian Support (ODHS)

Baghdad

51. Prosper Nyandagazi Humanitarian Affairs Officer RCO Amman



52.Hakam Shahwan Operations Coordinator – AmmanElectoral Support Office (UNAMI)

Amman

53.Jerzy Skuratowicz Deputy Special Representative ofSecurity General (DSRSG) -General Political

Baghdad

IAU

54. Francine Pickup Head, Inter-Agency Informationand Analyst Unit StrategicPlanning Advisor

Amman

UNIFEM55.Dina Zorba Gender Advisor / Iraq Baghdad

UNHCR56. Naomi Kawahara Senior Program Officer Baghdad & Amman

(Tel)

IOM

57.Rafiq Tschannen Senior Advisor Amman

58. Mio Sato Donor Reporting Officer Amman

MDTF Office

59. Dawn Del Rio Senior Portfolio Manager MDTFOffice.

Amman

60. Bisrat Aklilu Executive Coordinator USA - Tel

World BankWorld Bank

61.Joe Saba World Bank Director for the MiddleEast

USA

Donors

USA

62. Patricia M. Haslech Ambassador/ Deputy Coordinatorfor Diplomacy/ Office of the GlobalHunger and Food SecurityInitiative

USA

Canada 63. Isabelle Valois Head of Cooperation – CIDA Iraq Amman

Australia 64. Erica Ferguson First Secretary Development Amman (Tel)

EU 65. Jobst Von Kirchmann First Counselor Amman

Belgium 66. Fiel Vanthemsche Embassy Attaché Amman

Netherlands67.Lars Tummers Charge D’affaires Baghdad (Tel) &

email



Sweden

68. Elisabet Hellsten Counselor – Deputy head ofmission

Baghdad

69. Christina Dahlman Counselor –Development andCooperation

Baghdad

Denmark70. Gert Meinecke Ambassador Baghdad

71. Mikael Winther Former Danish Ambassador (Tel)

Italy

72. Nicola Bazzani First Secretary Baghdad

73. Francesco Fedele Second Secretary Baghdad

74. Silvia Izzo Cooperation and DevelopmentExpert

Baghdad

Korea

75. Chang-Hyun Yoon Counselor, Embassy of theRepublic of Korea

Baghdad

76. Seo Dong Sung Assistant Chief Representative ofKOICA

Baghdad

UK 77. Lucia Wilde Head of Office - DFID Baghdad

Switzerland

78. Mohammed Barakat Programme Manager – SwissAgency for Development andCooperation

Amman

Japan79. Takema Sakamoto Counselor, Economic Affairs Baghdad

80. Akira Endo Minister Counselor Baghdad

Government

Ministry of Planning

81. H.E. Ali Baban Minister of Planning Baghdad

82. Huda Malik Director General, InternationalCooperation Directorate –Executive Secretary of ISRB

Baghdad

83. Dr. Mehdi Al Alak Deputy Minister of Planning /Head of central StatisticalOrganization

Baghdad

Ministry of Planning – KRG84. Zagros Siwaily Director General of Development

Cooperation UnitErbil



Independent HigherElectoral Commission

85.Faraj Al-Haider IHEC Chairman Amman

86.Saad Al Rawi IHEC Deputy Amman

87. Raof Qadir Tawfeeq (LADP) Senior Advisor Amman (Tel)

88.Mahmoud Ahmad Uthman Regional Representative of KRG inSRB

Amman

Ministry of Finance89.Dr. Salaheldien Al Hudaithi Deputy to the Head of Debt

Management OfficeBaghdad

National Institute ofHuman Rights

90.Dr. Saad Fatallah Director Baghdad

Prime Minister’s AdvisoryBoard

91. Dr. Hamed Ahmad PM Advisor for Education andHigher Education

Baghdad

Prime Minister’s AdvisoryCouncil

92.Dr. Thamer Al Ghadban Chairman of the Prime Minister’sadvisory council

Baghdad

Ministry of Electricity

93.Eng. Adel Hamed Director General Advisor to theminister

Baghdad

94.Kosay Abdul Sattar Director General Planning Baghdad

Ministry of Agriculture

95. Kamel Mukhlif Al Dulayme Director General of the GeneralBoard for Date Palm

Baghdad

96.Faisal Rasheed Nasir Advisor of the Minister Baghdad

General Federation of IraqiTrade Unions

97. Adnan Rashed Executive Board Member Baghdad

Ministry of Health

98.Mutaaz Abbas National Expanded ProgramImmunization Manager

Baghdad

99.Alaa Shalan Director of Nutrition researchinstitute

Baghdad

100.Hameed Jaber Senior Research Analyst JuvenileCare Department

Baghdad

Ministry of Labour andSocial Affairs

101. Naseer Naji Hamdan Manager of Planning Baghdad

102. Raed Jabbar Baheidh Coordination Manager Baghdad

103. Riyadh Hassan Director General of Labour and Baghdad



Vocational training

Ministry of HigherEducation & ScientificResearch

104. Salah Al Nuaaimy Advisor for Minister Baghdad

Ministry of HigherEducation – KRG

105. Beriwan Al-Khailany Advisor for Minister Erbil

Ministry of Constructionand Housing

106. Istabraq Al-Shouk Senior Deputy Minister Baghdad

National InvestmentCommission

107. Sami Al Araji Chairman Baghdad

Ministry of Industry andMinerals

108.Sinan Al Saidi Director General Amman

109. Nidhal Hamzah Manager of EnterpriseDevelopment

Amman

Kurdistan Parliament110. Dana Sofi Head of the civil society committee Erbil

Iraq Kurdistan Mine ActionAuthority

111. Siraj Barzani Head of IKMAA Erbil

NGOs ACTED 112. Alexandre Morel Regional Director / Middle East Amman

Danish Refugee Council –DRC

113. Yves-Kim Creac’h Country Director Amman

HARIKAR 114. Salah Yaseen Director Amman (Tel)

International RescueCommittee – IRC

115. Aidon Goldsmith Head of Mission – Iraq Amman (Tel)

Intersos

116. Stefano Cordella Regional Director Amman

117. LaChalle Amos Acting Head of Mission, Iraq /Programme Manager

Amman

Mercy Hands

118. Alice Massari Representative Coordinator Amman

119. Eng. Ahmad Sameer Director General Baghdad

120. Dr. Hamad Shahab Senior Advisor Baghdad



NGO CoordinationCommittee for Iraq – NCCI

121. Fyras Mawazini Executive Coordinator Amman



Annex 4 – List of Documents Reviewed

1. Barakat, Sultan, "The failed promise of Multi-Donor Trust Funds: aid financing as an impediment toeffective state building in post-conflict contexts" in Policy Studies, Volume 30, Issue 2, April 2009,pages 107 – 126

2. Brown, G. and Stewart, F, "Fragile States", CRISE, University of Oxford, January 20093. Brunner, B., and Beth Rowen, "Iraq Timeline", http://www.infoplease.com/spot/iraqtimeline1.html4. Council on Foreign Relations, "IRAQ: Madrid Donor Conference", October 30, 2003,

http://www.cfr.org/publication/7682/iraq.html

5. Ernst & Young, "Country-Led Evaluation of Delivering as One United Nations in Cape Verde",September 2010.

6. European Union, "Joint Strategy Paper for Iraq 2011-2013 and National Indicative Programme",November 2010 http://eeas.europa.eu/iraq/docs/index_en.htm

7. Freedman, Jim et al. , "Outcome Evaluation of UNDP Governance, Crisis, Prevention and Recovery,and Poverty Reduction Initiatives in Iraq", prepared for UNDP, June 2009

8. GoI, National Development Plan ( 2010-2014 )9. GoI, National Development Strategy (2005-2007)10. GoI, National Development Strategy (2007-2010)11. Guidance Note on Budget Revision for UNDG Iraq Trust Fund Financed Projects (April 2009)12. ICVA, "Strengths in Numbers: A Review of NGO Coordination in the Field. Case Study: Iraq 2003-

2010"13. International Committee of the Red Cross, "Iraq sanctions create their own disaster”, World Disasters

Report, 199814. International Republican Institute, "Survey of Iraqi Public Opinion (June 3 –July 3, 2010)"15. Iraq Public Sector Modernization (I-PSM) Programme Document16. IRFFI Donor Committee Minutes of Meeting17. IRFFI Revised Terms of Reference, 200718. IRFFI Terms of Reference, 200319. ISRB Minutes of Meeting20. Kabell Konsulting, "Evaluation of the Implementation of the Paris Declaration, Phase One, Synthesis

Report", July 200821. Malik, Huda A., "Position paper on aid management in Iraq", MoPDC, 200922. MDTF Guidance Note

23. MDTF Office, "UN Multi-Donor Trust Funds & Delivering as One Funds: A lessons learned non-paper",July 2009

24. MoPDC, "Presentation on Development Assistance Database", www.mop.gov.iq25. National Investment Commission and the UK Trade and Investment Department “The New Iraq: 2011

Discovering Business”, 201126. Norad, "Mid-Term Evaluation of the Joint Donor Team in Juba, Sudan", 200927. OECD, "The Challenge of Capacity Development: Working toward good practice", 200628. OECD, "The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action"29. OECD-DAC, "Evaluation and Aid Effectiveness: Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based

Management"30. Oxford Policy Management and the IDL Group, "The applicability of the Paris Declaration in fragile and

conflict-affected situations", August 200831. PwC, "Governance & Organizational Review of the UNDG ITF", January 200732. Scanteam, " Flexibility in the Face of Fragility: Programmatic Multi-Donor Trust Funds in Fragile and

Conflict-Affected Situations, July 201033. Scanteam, "Review of Post-Crisis Multi-Donor Trust Funds", February 200734. Scanteam, "Stocktaking Review of the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq", January

200935. The International Compact with Iraq36. The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), "Quarterly Report to the United States

Congress", October 201037. UN / World Bank Joint Iraq Needs Assessment (Oct 03)38. UN Assistance Strategy for Iraq 2008-201039. UN Common Country Assessment for Iraq, 2009



40. UN Development Assistance Framework for Iraq (2011 – 2014)41. UN Reform: Delivering as One: Reforms in Development: A Perspective from the Field42. UN Security Council Resolution 1546 (2004)43. UN Security Council Resolution 1770 (2007)44. UN Security Council, Second report of the Secretary General pursuant to paragraph 3 of resolution

1905 (2009), July 201045. UNDG ITF Approved and Funded Projects by Participating UN Organization (PUNO) & Quarterly

Project Progress Updates (as of 30 June 2010)46. UNDG ITF Approved and Funded Projects by Sector Outcome Team & Quarterly Project Progress

Updates (as of 30 June 2010)47. UNDG ITF Breakdown of Earmarked and Un-earmarked Donor Deposits (as of 30 June 2010)48. UNDG ITF Budget Revision Guidance Note (2009) and (2010)49. UNDG ITF Gross Donor Commitments and Deposits (As of 30 June 2010)50. UNDG ITF UNDG ITF Letter of Agreement between donors and UNDP51. UNDG ITF Memorandum of Understanding between MDTF Office and participating UN Organizations52. UNDG ITF Peer Review Minutes of Meeting53. UNDG ITF Quarterly Newsletters54. UNDG ITF Reporting Guidelines and Templates55. UNDG ITF SC ToR & Rules of Procedure (04-07) and (09)56. UNDG ITF Six Monthly Progress Reports:57. UNDG ITF Summary Progress Report, September 200458. UNDG ITF First Progress Report, July- Dec 200459. UNDG ITF Second Progress Report, Jan-June 200560. UNDG ITF Third Progress Report, July-Dec 200561. UNDG ITF Fourth Progress Report, Jan-June 200662. UNDG ITF Fifth Progress Report, July-Dec. 200663. UNDG ITF Sixth Progress Report, Jan-June 200764. UNDG ITF Seventh Progress Report, July-Dec 200765. UNDG ITF Eighth Progress Report Jan-June 200866. UNDG ITF Ninth Progress Report 200867. UNDG ITF Tenth Progress Report 200968. UNDG ITF Steering Committee Fast Track Process for Programmes/Projects Financed through the

Trust Fund - Guidance Note69. UNDG ITF Steering Committee Minutes of Meeting70. UNDG ITF Steering Committee Terms of Reference & Rules of Procedure71. UNDG, "Capacity Assessment Methodology: User guide for national capacity development", 200872. UNDG, "Guidance Note on Establishing, Managing and Closing Multi-Donor Trust Funds", June 201073. UNDG, "Guidance Note on Joint Programming", December 200374. UNDG, "Guidance Note on MDTF", March 200775. UNDG, "Harmonized Financial Reporting to Donors in Joint Programmes: Explanatory Note",

September 200676. UNDG, "Lessons Learned Paper on the Delivering as One UN Pilot Countries", April 200977. UNDG, "MDTF Oversight Framework", September 200778. UNDG, "Pooled funding for transition at the country level. Prepared for the UNDG/ECHA task team on

financing for transition", November, 200979. UNDG, "Technical Brief on UNDG Programming Principles: Capacity Development", 200980. UNDG, "Uruguay One UN Coherence Fund Annual Report", December, 200881. UNDP and Iraqi MoPDC, "Unsatisfied Basic Needs Mapping and Livings Standards in Iraq", 200682. UNDP Evaluation Office, "Achieving Results: Evaluation of Results Based Management at UNDP",

December 200783. UNDP Evaluation Office, "Human Security: Evaluation of UNDP Support to Conflict-Affected

Countries", 200684. UNDP Evaluation Office, "The Joint Evaluation of the UNDG Contribution to the Paris Declaration on

Aid Effectiveness", 200885. UNDP MDTF Office, "Annual Narrative and Financial Progress Reports Guidance and Templates",

February 2010



86. UNDP MDTF Office, "Memorandum of Understanding between Participating UN Organizations andthe UNDP regarding the Iraq UNDAF Fund", January 2011

87. UNDP MDTF Office, "Protocol on the Administrative Agent for MDTFs and Joint Programmes, andOne UN Funds," Approved by the UNDG ASG Group, September 2008

88. UNDP MDTF Office, "UNDP's accountability when acting as Administrative Agent in MDTFs, One UNFunds and/or UN joint programmes using the pass-through fund management modality", July 2010

89. UNDP, "Capacity Development in Post-Conflict Countries", Global Event Working Paper, 2010.90. UNDP, Capacity Development: A UNDP Primer. 2009. www.undp.org/capacity91. World Bank, "Data sheet on Operations in Iraq", May 201092. World Bank, "The Capacity Development Results Framework: A strategic and results-oriented

approach to learning for capacity development", June 2009



Annex 5 – List of Projects and Programmes Reviewed

# Project NameProjectNumber

Education

1 Literacy and Life Skills Development B1-08

2 Education/Integrated Community Based Social Service B1-19

3 Support to Emergency Obstetric Care in Iraq D2-02

4 Iraqi Networking Academies Project B1-10

5 Iraqi Networking Academies Project B1-17

6School Rehabilitation and Capacity Development for Enhanced Access and Retention inPrimary Education

B1-29b

7 Revitalization of Technical and Vocational Educationand Training (Phase 2) B1-14

8 Education Management Information System B1-13

9 Strengthening Secondary Education in Iraq Phase I B1-15

10 Revitalization of Technical and Vocational Education and Training in Iraq (Phase I) B1-01

11 Textbooks Quality Improvement Programme B1-18

12 Training of trainers in teacher education B1-23

13 School Rehabilitation and Capacity Building for School Maintenance B1-22b

14In-Service Training of secondary school teachers of science, mathematics and Englishlanguage

B1-05

15 Programme for the protection of Iraqi Cultural Heritage B1-07

16 Skills Development to Support Employment Generation in Iraq B1-27a

17 Skills Development to Support Employment Generation in Iraq B1-27b


18 Rehabilitation of Water Distribution Systems in Sidakan and Rawanduz E3-12a

19 Rehabilitation of Takia Water Distribution System E3-12b

20 Water Quality Control and Surveillance in Iraq E3-11a

21 Water Quality Control and Surveillance in Iraq E3-11b

22Emergency Water Supply to unserved/underserved/vulnerable Areas in Baghdad and theIDPs

E3-09

23 Rehabilitation of Sewage Facilities In Select Facilities in Basra City E3-13a

24 Rehabilitation of Water Supply Systems in select locations in Wassit Governorate E3-13b

25 Extension of Storm Water and Sewer Network in Select Locations in Kerbala Governorate E3-13c

26Rehabilitation/Extension of storm Water and Sewerage Networks In Select Locations inKirkuk City

E3-13d



Agriculture, Food and Security

27 Capacity Building of Water Institutions of Iraq A5-12

28 Promotion of Cottage Industries in Rural and Urban Areas project A5-06

29Assessment and rehabilitation of community irrigation schemes and restorations ofirrigation water in rural areas

A5-01

30Improvements of water supply and drainage provision through the rehabilitation ofpumping stations

A5-02

31Assessment, emergency needs maintenance and rehabilitation of the communityirrigation scheme & restoration of water supply in rural areas

A5-04

32Enhancing the Iraqi Institutions' Capacity in Monitoring and Targeting the most FoodInsecure and Vulnerable Segments of Iraq Population

A6-03

33 Restoration of Veterinary Services in Iraq A5-08

34 Pilot Project for The Rehabilitation of the Diary Sector in Iraq A5-13

35Community Livelihoods and Micro-Industry Support Project in Rural and Urban Areas ofNorthern Iraq

A5-17

36 Restoration and Development of Essential Livestock Services in Iraq A5-10

Economic Reform and Diversification

37 Smart Community Project for Iraq C10-04

38 Iraqis Rebuilding Iraq C10-03


39 Disease Eradication, Elimination and Introducing new Vaccines D2-19a

40 Disease Eradication, Elimination and Introducing new Vaccines D2-19b

41 Strengthening Primary Healthcare System in Iraq D2-03

42 Re-Establishing the Food Safety and Food Processing Industry Capacity in Iraq D2-17a

43 Re-Establishing the Food Safety and Food Processing Industry Capacity in Iraq D2-17b

44 Re-Establishing the Food Safety and Food Processing Industry Capacity in Iraq D2-17c

45Emergency Public Health Assistance; Strengthening Non-communicable diseases andmental health control and prevention programme

D2-05

Housing and Shelter

46 Rehabilitation of Community Facilities And Infrastructure E4-14

Protection

47 Support to the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency A7-03

48Protection & assistance to persons of concern in Southern Iraq and support to LocalAuthorities and Civil Society Organizations in Addressing Displacement Needs & Gaps

F8-05

49 Establishment of a National Mine Action NGO in Basra A7-04



Governance

50Support for fair, safe & professional media election coverage: Election reporting guide andadvocacy campaigns

G11-07

51 Facilitating reconciliation in Iraq through Constitutional review and national dialougue C9-20

52Strengthening Good Governance Through Support for Independent, Pluralistic,Sustainable and Professional Media

C9-21b

53 Local Area Development Programme C10-09a

54 Support to National Electoral Observer Groups for the Electoral Events of Iraq G11-21

55Institutional Development and Capacity Building for the Independent High ElectoralCommission

G11-14a

56Institutional Development - Organizational and HR Capacity Building for theIndependent Electoral Commission of Iraq / Independent High Electoral Commission"IHEC"

G11-14b

57Evaluation of UNDP Governance Projects Funded by the Iraq Trust Fund Support for theBoard of Supreme Audit

C9-18

58 Support for the Donor Assistance Database II C9-12

59 Support of the Constitutional Drafting Process C9-10a

60 Contract Constitutional Development for Iraq C9-10c



Annex 6 – List of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs)

KPIs Across 60 Evaluated Projects/ Programmes

Fund design and Governance

1. Non - programmatic security and admin costs

Alignment and harmonization

2. Needs Assessments on Project Level3. Needs Assessments on Sector Level4. Needs Assessments on Strategy Level5. Projects with no needs assessment6. Nationwide vs. central project locations7. Total number of projects implemented in (or had influence) in each governorates.

National Ownership

8. Number of projects with financial cost-sharing from the GoI9. Total Monetary government contribution10. Number of projects with in-kind contribution from the GoI11. Total value of non-monetary government contribution

Accountability

12. Number of projects that have performed interim evaluation as a percentage of all projects

Capacity development approaches

13. Total number of NGOs involved in projects14. Percentage of projects with NGO involvement15. Number of government organizations involved16. Number of projects where government staff were involved in implementation17. Number of government staff who benefited from capacity development tasks/activities of the

project/program18. Percentage of projects that had government staff capacity building aspect19. Percentage of projects that had capacity building aspect

Management for development results

20. Number of evaluated projects addressing cross cutting issues as a percentage21. Percentage of projects covering gender22. Percentage of projects covering employment creation23. Percentage of projects covering environment24. Percentage of projects covering human rights25. Percentage of projects that have contributed to improving security (as an issue and not a cross cutting

issue)

Realization of development results

26. Percentage of projects/programmes that involve:

a. Physical asset creation and/or rehabilitationb. Capacity development (one of the main objectives of the project)c. Service Delivery (e.g. distribution of goods, vaccines)



d. Government/Policy assistance (mostly governance projects)

27. Percentage of projects/programmes and funds that were humanitarian in nature (quick impact,emergency), development focused (long-term and sustainable) or recovery focused.

a. Humanitarianb. Developmentc. Recovery

Efficiency and Effectiveness

28. Percentage of projects/programmes completed on time versus delayed for:

a. Not Delayedb. 1-6 monthsc. 7-12 monthsd. 13-18 monthse. 19-24 monthsf. Over 24 monthsg. Not included (on going projects or exceptions)

29. Average revisions per project30. Reasons for revisions (during implementation):

a. Change to scope of workb. Movements of Fundsc. Time extensiond. Increase in project budget

31. The percentage of time extensions granted due to:

a. Security conditionsb. Lack of delivery capability by UNc. Lack of delivery capability by partnersd. Delay from the GoI side in approval or implementation of major tasks or processes needed to

proceed with the projecte. Change of scope of workf. Six month extension within the authority of the Agencyg. Otherh. No justification

32. Number of programmes/projects that were revised for:

a. Change in scopeb. Time extensions due to delaysc. Time extensions to conduct additional activitiesd. Budget revisionse. Two or all of the above

Relevance

33. Percentage of programmes/ projects where scope was changed to address changing/ emerging priorities

SustainabilityNot measured in quantitative KPIs, however this was reflected in a narrative manner.



Other KPIs

34. Total number of projects in each sector

a. Educationb. Water and Sanitationc. Health & Nutritiond. Housing and Sheltere. Agriculture & Food Securityf. Protectiong. Governanceh. Economic Reform & Diversification

35. Average delay across all projects36. Average approval time (either from line ministry approval to SC approval or from cluster review date to

SC approval)37. Variance between original budget and actual budget38. Percentage of evaluated projects under joint programs39. Average number of UN Agencies participating in joint programmes40. Average number of participating UN Agencies across all projects41. Percentage of budgets spent on value adding activities42. Percentage of budgets spent on programmatic management activities43. Total number of capacity development activities

KPIs Across All Completed Projects/ Programmes

44. Project Budgets at Approval45. Project Cost at Completion46. Difference (Budget - Cost)47. Percentage of projects per organization48. Number of Projects in Joint Programmes49. Average number of participating UN Organizations in Joint Programmes50. Average Original Duration51. Average Actual Duration52. Average Delay53. Average number of time extensions54. Distribution of Projects per governorate



Annex 7 – List of Projects/Programmes Analyzed for theRemote Management Case Study

# Project No. Project Title

1 A5-06 Promotion of Cottage Industries

2 A7-04 Strengthening of National Mine Action Organization In Southern Iraq

3 B1-08 Literacy and life Skills Development

4 G11-07 Support for fair, safe and professional media coverage

5 C10-04 Smart Community Project for Iraq

6 D2-05 Non-Communicable Diseases and Mental Health

7 E3-11a Water Quality Control and Surveillance in Iraq Phase II

8 E3-11b Water Quality Control and Surveillance in Iraq Phase II

9 E4-14 Rehabilitation of Community Facilities and Infrastructure

10 G11-14bInstitutional Development- Organizational and HR Capacity Building for theIECI/IHEC

11 B1-22b School Rehabilitation and Capacity Building Phase 1



Annex 8 – List of Projects/Programmes that UnderwentGap Analysis

# Project No. Project Title

1 A5-08 Restoration of Veterinary Services in Iraq

2 A7-04 Strengthening of National Mine Action Organization In Southern Iraq

3 B1-07 Protecting Iraqi Cultural Heritage

4 D2-03 Strengthening Primary HN Care System

5 A6-03Enhancing Iraqi Institutions Capacity in monitoring and targeting the mostfood insecure and vulnerable segments

6 B1-14 Revitalization of Technical and Vocational Education (Phase 2)

7 C10-03 Iraqis Rebuilding Iraq Phase II

8D2-19a Disease Eradication; Elimination and Introducing New Vaccines

D2-19b Disease Eradication; Elimination and Introducing New Vaccines

9 E3-09Emergency Water Supply in Unserved/Underserved/Vulnerable Areas inBaghdad and IDPs

10 C9-12Support to Government of Iraq in International Assistance Coordination andCapacity Building DAD

11 E4-14 Rehabilitation of Community Facilities and Infrastructure



Annex 9 – Online Survey

English

Dear representative of the Government of Iraq,

The United Nations in Iraq in collaboration with the International Reconstruction FundFacility for Iraq (IRFFI) Steering Committee has commissioned PricewaterhouseCoopers(PwC) to undertake an independent Lessons Learned Exercise for the United NationsDevelopment Group Iraq Trust Fund (UNDG ITF). The UNDG ITF is a Multi-Donor TrustFund (MDTF) which provided approximately US$1.4 billion for recovery and reconstructionof Iraq since 2004. The UNDG ITF is one of the two funding windows of the IRFFI.

This is a critical exercise to distill lessons on development and the operational effectivenessof the UNDG ITF, and will include a review of independent evaluations of 58 ITF fundedprojects. The learning from the exercise will not only add value to the UN’s ongoingprogrammatic work in Iraq but will also contribute to the design of future coordination, jointprogramming and funding arrangements.

We understand that you have worked or partnered with one or more UN Agencies in the pastseven years to implement one or more UN programme or project funded under the UNDGITF in Iraq. We, therefore, invite you to participate in the following survey as part of theLessons Learned exercise. Your views about those projects and your collaboration with UNAgencies are important as they will provide valuable lessons and recommendations forimprovement of UN interventions in Iraq in coming years.

Please be assured that your name and responses will be kept confidential. Onlya summary of all survey answers will be shared as part of the final lessonslearned report in such a way as to keep respondent identities anonymous.

Instructions:

To the extent possible, we would be grateful that you respond to all questions to thebest of your knowledge and firsthand experience.

For multiple choice questions please pick only one answer unless otherwiseindicated.

Your Name Please provide your full name here

Your OrganizationGovernment Entity /Ministry you work for

Please enter the name of your organizationhere

Your Job Title Please enter your job title / designation here

1. Please indicate how you were involved with the UNDG ITF (you can select more thanone choice for this question)

a) Design and approval of project

b) Implementation of project



c) Monitoring and/or Evaluation of project

d) Others (please specify)

2. How long have you been involved with UNDG ITF projects

a) 1-6 months

b) 7-12 months

c) 1-2 years

d) 3-4 years

e) 5 years or more

3. How many UNDG ITF projects have you participated in?

a) 1

b) 2-4

c) 5 or more

4. Did the UNDG ITF projects you were involved in address national and/or local needs andpriorities?

a) Yes

b) No

c) Somewhat

Please comment further and/or provide examples where applicable:

5. How do you see the engagement of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and CivilSociety Organizations (CSOs) in project implementation of UNDG ITF projects thatyou have been involved in?

a) Very good engagement

b) Good engagement

c) Fair engagement

d) Poor engagement

Please comment further and/or provide examples where applicable:

6. What methods of capacity development did you find most effective in the UNprojects that you were involved in? (you can select more than one choice forthis question)

a) Classroom setup training



b) On-the-job training

c) Consultation (e.g. coaching, facilitating, expert advice, etc.)

d)Access to information (e.g. databases, library, global best practice,publications, etc.)

e) Other (please specify)

7. What areas of capacity development did you find most effective in the UN projects thatyou were involved in? Would you please provide examples of those (you can selectmore than one choice for this question)

Individual Development

a) Technical skills

b) Other (please specify)

Institutional Development

c) Management structure

d) Systems and procedures

e) Legal and regulatory

f) Other (please specify)

8. How were Capacity Needs identified and addressed in the projects you were involvedin? (you can select more than one choice for this question)

a) No capacity needs assessment was undertaken

b) A capacity needs assessment was undertaken before starting the project

c) A capacity needs assessment was undertaken during the project

d) A capacity needs assessment was undertaken at end of the project

e)Capacity gaps from the capacity needs assessment were taken intoconsideration and addressed as the project proceeded

9. If a Capacity Needs Assessment was NOT conducted, then what were the challengesyou came across? (you can select more than one choice for this question)

a) Identifying problems

b) Effective planning

c) Project design

d) Project implementation

e) Project monitoring and/or evaluation

f) No challenges were faced



10. Do you feel that after having worked with UN Agencies, your ability to implementsimilar projects in the future has improved?

a) Yes

b) No

c) Do not Know

11. If you were involved in any joint programme (involving more than one UN Agency), inyour view did such programmes add more value towards achievement of developmentresults than project(s) implemented by a single UN Agency?

a) Yes

b) No

c) Do not Know

Please comment further and provide examples

12. What were the major strengths of implementing joint programmes (involving more than one

UN Agency)? (you can select more than one choice for this question)

a) Lack of duplication

b)Exposure to different Agencies at the same time provides a rich learningenvironment

c) Higher efficiency

d) Higher effectiveness


13. In case you faced any challenges to effectively implement joint programmes (involving morethan one UN Agency), please select one or more of the following choices.

a) Coordination

b) Communication

c) Accountability

d) Efficiency

e) Effectiveness


14. Based on the project(s) that you were involved in, what was the level of governmentownership in these projects?

a) Very good

b) Good



c) Fair

c) Poor

15. For the project(s) that you were involved in, how did the project promote nationalownership? (you can select more than one choice for this question)

a) Government engagement in planning

b) Government engagement in implementation

c) Government engagement in monitoring and/or evaluation

d) Government engagement in coordination

e) Government engagement in decision making


16. If you faced any challenges regarding the ownership of project(s), please select one ormore of the following choices

a) Lack of government capacity

b) Government took no initiative in ownership

c) Lack of coordination between UN Agencies and the government

d) Lack of engagement of the government by UN Agencies


17. What were the key strengths of the project monitoring and/or evaluation mechanism? (you canselect more than one choice for this question)

a) Kept project(s) on track in terms of scope, quality, time and budget

b) Contributed to informed decision making

c) Enhanced accountability

d) Involved government officials


18. What were the key challenges of the project monitoring and/or evaluation mechanism? (youcan select more than one choice for this question)

a) Lack of clarity on roles and responsibility

b) Lack of systems

c) Lack of follow up on monitoring reports



d) No challenges were faced


19. Due to security issues, most UN staff was based outside of Iraq and they utilized aremote management approach. What, in your opinion, were the challenges faced inusing that approach? (you can select more than one choice for this question)

a) Limited day-to-day interaction and coordination with government counterparts

b) Delays in project implementation

c) Limited UN visibility on the ground

d) No challenges were faced


Please comment further and provide examples

20. What, in your opinion, are the key lessons learned from projects implementation?

a)

b)

c)

21. Are there any specific recommendations that you would like to share with us to beconsidered when designing similar projects in the future?

a)

b)

c)



Arabic

عزيزي ممثل الحكومة العراقية،

Steering)فوضت الأمم المتحدة في العراق، بالتعاون مع اللجنة التوجيهية Committee) لمرفق

كجهة (PwC)، شركة برايس ووترهاوس كوبرز (IRFFI)الصندوق الدولي لإعادة إعمار العراق

من الصندوق الإئتماني للعراق التابع لمجموعة (LLE)مستقلة للقيام بدراسة حول الدروس المستفادة

UNDG)الأمم المتحدة الإنمائية ITF) والذي هو عبارة عن صندوق إئتماني متعدد المانحين(MDTF) ل حواليوهو 2004بليون دولار أميركي لإنعاش وإعادة إعمار العراق منذ العام 1,4مو

.نافذة من إثنتين لتمويل مرفق الصندوق الدولي لإعادة إعمار العراق

إن هذه الدراسة مهمة جداً لاستقصاء الدروس حول فعالية التطوير والتشغيل للصندوق الإئتماني للعراق مشروعاً والذي 58لأمم المتحدة الإنمائية وستتضمن مراجعة التقييم المستقل الخاص بـالتابع لمجموعة ا

ما سنتعلمه من هذه الدراسة سيضيف قيمة لمشاريع الأمم . تم تمويله من قبل الصندوق الإئتماني للعراقدبير التمويل المتحدة المستمرة في العراق وسيساهم في تصميم التعاون المستقبلي والمشاريع المشتركة وت

.اللازم

نحن ندرك أنك عملت أو شاركت مع واحدة أو أكثر من مؤسسات الأمم المتحدة في السنوات السبع

الماضية لتنفيذ مشروع أو أكثر من تلك الممولة من قبل الصندوق الإئتماني للعراق التابع لمجموعة الأمم اركة في هذا الإستبيان كجزء من تمرين الدروس بناء عليه، ندعوكم للمش. المتحدة الإنمائية في العراق

إن وجهات نظركم حول هذه المشاريع وتعاونكم مع مؤسسات الأمم المتحدة مهم جداً حيث . المستفادة

سيمنحنا دروساً مستفادة وتوصيات ذات قيمة للتحسين من عمل الأمم المتحدة في العراق في السنوات .القادمة

اتك ستبقى سرية وسيتم تلخيص إجابات جميع المشاركين كجزء من التقرير كن مطمئناً أن إسمك وإجاب .النهائي لتمرين الدروس المستفادة بطريقة تبقي على هوية المشاركين مجهولة

تعليمات

على معرفتك وخبرتك بقدر المستطاع، يرجى الإجابة عن جميع الأسئلة بناء واحدة فقط إلا إذا تمت الإشارة لغير ذلك للأسئلة متعددة الإجابات، يرجى إختيار إجابة

يرجى ذكر إسمك الكامل هنا الإسم

الوزارة التي تعمل بها هنا/يرجى ذكر إسم المؤسسة / المؤسسة الوزارة

يرجى ذكر المسمى الوظيفي الخاص بك هنا المسمى الوظيفي



ما طبيعة مشاركتك في مشاريع الصندوق الإئتماني للعراق التابع لمجموعة الأمم المتحدة الإنمائية

)بإمكانك إختيار أكثر من إجابة واحدة(

1.

تصميم المشروع والموافقة عليه )أ

تنفيذ المشروع )ب

أو تقييم المشروع/رصد و )ج

)لطفاً حدد(أخرى )د

شاركت بها في مشاريع الصندوق الإئتماني للعراق التابع لمجموعة الأمم المتحدة ما المدة التي الإنمائية

2.

أشهر 6–1 )أ

أشهر 12–7 )ب

سنة 2–1 )ج

سنوات 4–3 )د

سنوات أو أكثر 5 )هـ

لمجموعة الأمم ما عدد المشاريع التي شاركت بها في مشاريع الصندوق الإئتماني للعراق التابع المتحدة الإنمائية

3.

1 )أ

2–4 )ب

أو أكثر 5 )ج

هل تعرضت المشاريع التي شاركت بها للإحتياجات والأولويات الوطنية والمحلية 4.

نعم )أ

لا )ب

تقريباً )ج

يرجى التعليق أو تزويدنا بالأمثلة إن أمكن

من خلال المشاريع التي شاركت بها، كيف ترى مشاركة المؤسسات غير الحكومية ومؤسسات

المجتمع المدني في تنفيذ مشاريع الصندوق الإئتماني للعراق التابع لمجموعة الأمم المتحدة الإنمائية 5.

مشاركة جيدة جداً )أ



مشاركة جيدة )ب

مشاركة معتدلة )ج

مشاركة ضعيفة )د


من خلال المشاريع التي شاركت بها، ما هي أساليب تطوير القدرات التي وجدتها أكثر فعالية في

)بإمكانك إختيار أكثر من إجابة واحدة(مشاريع الأمم المتحدة 6.

تدريب على شكل فصل صفي )أ

تدريب أثناء أداء العمل )ب

) مثل تمرين، تيسير، نصيحة خبير، الخ(إستشارات )ج

)مثل قاعدة بيانات، مكتبة، أفضل الممارسات الدولية، منشورات، الخ(مدخل للمعلومات )د

)لطفاً حدد(أخرى )هـ

من خلال المشاريع التي شاركت بها، ما هي مجالات تطوير القدرات التي وجدتها أكثر فعالية في . مشاريع الأمم المتحدة

)بإمكانك إختيار أكثر من إجابة واحدة(يرجى إعطاء أمثلة على هذه المجالات 7.

تطوير فردي

مهارات تقنية )أ

)لطفاً حدد(أخرى )ب

تطوير مؤسسي

الهيكل الإداري )ج

الأنظمة والإجراءات )د

التشريعات والقوانين )هـ

)لطفاً حدد(أخرى )و

من خلال المشاريع التي شاركت بها، كيف تم التعرف والتعامل مع إحتياجاتكم في مجال القدرات

)بإمكانك إختيار أكثر من إجابة واحدة(في مشاريع الأمم المتحدة 8.

أي تقييم للإحتياجات في مجال القدراتلم يتم عمل )أ

تم عمل تقييم للإحتياجات في مجال القدرات قبل البدء بالمشروع )ب

تم عمل تقييم للإحتياجات في مجال القدرات خلال المشروع )ج

تم عمل تقييم للإحتياجات في مجال القدرات عند الإنتهاء من المشروع )د

الفجوة في القدرات والمأخوذة من تقييم الإحتياجات في مجال القدرات أخذت بعين )هـ



الإعتبار وتم التعامل معها مع سير المشروع

في مجال القدرات، فماذا كانت التحديات التي واجهتها بناء إذا لم يتم عمل أي تقييم للإحتياجات

)واحدةبإمكانك إختيار أكثر من إجابة (عليه؟ 9.

التعرف على المشاكل )أ

التخطيط الفعال )ب

تصميم المشروع )ج

تنفيذ المشروع )د

أو تقييم المشروع/رصد و )هـ

لا تحديات )و

هل تشعر بأنه وبعد عملك مع مؤسسات الأمم المتحدة قد تحسنت قدرتك على تنفيذ مشاريع مماثلة في المستقبل؟

10.

نعم )أ

لا )ب

لا أعرف )ج

مشاريع تضمنت أكثر من مؤسسة واحدة من مؤسسات (إذا كنت قد شاركت في البرامج المشتركة ، فمن وجهة نظرك، هل أضافت هذه البرامج أية قيمة من حيث الإنجاز في مجال )الأمم المتحدة

المتحدة؟التطوير مقارنةً مع مشاريع تم تنفيذها من قبل مؤسسة واحدة من مؤسسات الأمم 11.

نعم )أ

لا )ب

لا أعرف )ج


مشاريع تضمنت أكثر من مؤسسة واحدة (ماذا كانت برأيك أوجه القوة في تنفيذ البرامج المشتركة )بإمكانك إختيار أكثر من إجابة واحدة(). من مؤسسات الأمم المتحدة

12.

عدم تكرار المشاريع )أ

التعرض لمؤسسات مختلفة في الأمم المتحدة في نفس الوقت مما يوفر بيئة تعليمية غنية )ب

كفاءة أعلى )ج

فعالية أعلى )د




مشاريع تضمنت أكثر من مؤسسة واحدة (ما هي التحديات التي واجهتها في تنفيذ البرامج المشتركة )بإمكانك إختيار أكثر من إجابة واحدة(. بفعالية) من مؤسسات الأمم المتحدة

13.

التنسيق )أ

التواصل )ب

المسؤولية )ج

الكفاءة )د

الفعالية )هـ

شاركت بها، ماذا كان مستوى الملكية الحكومية لهذه المشاريع؟من خلال المشاريع التي )بإمكانك إختيار أكثر من إجابة واحدة(

14.

مستوى جيد جداً )أ

مستوى جيد )ب

مستوى معتدل )ج

مستوى ضعيف )د

من خلال المشاريع التي شاركت بها، كيف تم الترويج للملكية الوطنية؟

)من إجابة واحدة بإمكانك إختيار أكثر(15.

مشاركة الحكومة في التخطيط للمشروع )أ

مشاركة الحكومة في تنفيذ المشروع )ب

أو تقييم المشروع/مشاركة الحكومة في رصد و )ج

مشاركة الحكومة في التنسيق )د

مشاركة الحكومة في إتخاذ القرارات )هـ

)لطفاً حدد(أخرى )و

من خلال المشاريع التي شاركت بها، ماذا كانت التحديات التي واجهتها في مجال ملكية الحكومة

)بإمكانك إختيار أكثر من إجابة واحدة(للمشاريع 16.

إفتقاد الحكومة للقدرات )أ

لم تبادر الحكومة في أخذ الملكية )ب

إفتقاد التنسيق بين مؤسسات الأمم المتحدة والحكومة )ج

إفتقاد خرط مؤسسات الأمم المتحدة للحكومة )د




أو تقييم المشاريع؟ /برأيك، ماذا كانت أوجه القوة الأساسية في آلية رصد و)بإمكانك إختيار أكثر من إجابة واحدة(

17.

أبقت المشروع في مساره من حيث النطاق، الجودة، الوقت والميزانية )أ

في إتخاذ القرارات المبنية على المعرفةساهمت )ب

حسنت من المسؤولية )ج

)لطفاً حدد(أخرى )د

أو تقييم المشاريع؟ /ماذا كانت التحديات الأساسية في آلية رصد و)بإمكانك إختيار أكثر من إجابة واحدة(

18.

إفتقاد الوضوح حول ماهية الدور والمسؤولية )أ

إفتقاد الأنظمة )ب

إفتقاد متابعة تقارير التقييم )ج

لا تحديات )د


بسبب مسألة الأمن، فإن معظم موظفي الأمم المتحدة تواجدوا خارج العراق واستخدموا أسلوب

ماذا برأيك كانت التحديات التي تمت مواجهتها بسبب إستخدام هذا الأسلوب في ". الإدارة عن بعد"

)بإمكانك إختيار أكثر من إجابة واحدة(الإدارة؟ 19.

بين موظف الأمم المتحدة ونظيره من الحكومةحد من التفاعل والتنسيق اليومي ما )أ

تأخر في تنفيذ المشروع )ب

حد من وضوح الرؤية على أرض الواقع )ج

لا تحديات )د



تنفيذها من خلال الصندوق الإئتماني ما هي برأيك أهم الدروس المستفادة من المشاريع التي تم للعراق التابع لمجموعة الأمم المتحدة الإنمائية؟

20.

)أ

)ب

)ج

هل لديك أية مقترحات تود مشاركتنا بها لأخذها بعين الإعتبار عند تصميم مشاريع مشابهة في المستقبل؟

21.



)أ

)ب

)ج



Kurdish

حكومةتى عیَراق،بةرِیَز نویَنةرى

لةرِیَطةى كؤمؤسیؤنى ثرایز ) IRFFI(نةتةوة یةكطرتوةكان بةیارمةتى سندوقى نیَودةولَةتى بؤ ئاوةدانكردنةوةى عیَراقھةلَدةستىَ ثیَشكةش كردنى ضةند وانةیةكى فیَركارى سةربةخؤ سةبارةت بةطةشةثیَدانى )PwC(ؤتةر ھاوس كوثةرس

UNDG(یةكطرتوةكان طروثى تایبةت بةنةتةوة ITF .( طروثى طةشثیَدانى نةتةوة یةكطرتووةكان سندوقى دلَنیایى لةUNDG(عیَراق ITE ( بلیؤن دؤلارى تةرخان 1.4ةوة نزیكةى 2004بریتیة لة سندوقى خیَرخوازى كة لة سالَى

ةكان سندوقى دلَنیایى لة عیَراقطروثى طةشثیَدانى نةتةوة یةكطرتوو. كردووة بؤ طةشةثیَدان وئاوةدانكردنةوةى عیَراقUNDG ITFیةكیَكة لةثیَكھاتةكانى سندوقى نیَودةولَةتى بؤ ئاوةدانكردنةوةى عیَراق)IRFFI.(

ئةم ضةند لاثةرِةیةى لة بةردةستان دایة بریتیة لة ضةند وانةیةكى رِةخنة ئامیَز بؤ طةشةثیَدان وضالاك كردنى UNDGى نةتةوة یةكطرتووةكان سندوقى دلَنیایى لة عیَراقھةماھةنطى تایبةت بة طروثى طةشثیَدان ITF، ھةروةھا

تیَطةشتن لةم ).ITF(ثرؤذةى جیَبةجىَ كراو لةلایةن سندوقى دلَنیابوونى عیَراقى 58ھةلَسةنطاندنیَكى سةربةخؤیة بؤ یاد ناكات بةلَكو ھاندةر دةبیَت لة بابةتة تةنھا بةھاى ثرؤطرامى دارِیَذراو و كارثیَكراوى نةتةوة یةكطرتوةكان لة عیَراق ز

.دارِشتنى ثلانى كاركردن لة داھاتوودا تایبةت بة ثرؤطرامى ھاوبةش و زیادكرنى سةرضاوة ئابوریةكان

تیَطةشتنیَكى تةواومان ھةیة دةربارةى كاركردنتان یاخود بةشداریكردنتان لةطةلَ یةكیَك یاخود زیاتر لة بریكارةكانى سالَى رِابردوودا بؤ جیَبةجیَكردنى ثرؤطرامةكانى رِیَكخراوى نةتةوةیةكطرتوةكان 7ةكطرتوةكان لة رِیَكخراوى نةتةوةی

UNDGیاخود ثرؤذة جیَبةجیَكراوةكانى ITF ھةربةو ھؤیةوة جةنابتان بانطیَشت كراون بؤ بةشداریكردن لةم .لة عیَراقتان دةربارةى ئةو ثرؤذانة و ھاوكاري كردنتان لةطةلَ بیرورِا.رِووثیَوة وةك بةشیَك لةوانةى سوودبةخش بة شارةزایى

رِیَكخراوى نةتةوة یةكطرتوةكان كاریَكى طرنطة ضونكة ضةند وانةیةكى سوودبةخش و ئامؤذطاریةكى بةثیَزن بؤ .باشتر كردنى كارةكانى رِیَكخراوى نةتةوة یةكطرتوةكان لةعیَراق لةسالاَنى داھاتوودا

تةنھا ثوختةیةك لة وةلاَمةكانتان دةبنة بةشیَك لة رِاثؤرت و .ناو و وةلاَمةكانتان بةشیَوةیةطى نھیَنى دةثاریزریَندلَنیاتان دةكةینةوة كة . وانةى كؤتایى،بةو شیَوةیة ناسنامةى كةسانى بةشداربوو بة نةناسراوى دةمیَننةوة

:رِیَنمایي طشت ثرسیارةكانمان بدةیتةوة بةثیَى زانیاري تا ئةوثةرِى توانا،سوثاس طوزار دةبین ئةطةر بتوانى وةلاَمى

.وشارةزایىتكایة تةنھا یةك وةلاَم ھةلَبذیَرة بؤ ھةر ثرسیاریَك جطة لةو ثرسیارانةى كة بةشیَوةیةكى تر وةلاَم دةدریَنةوة .

تكایة ناوى تةواوت بنووسة: ناوتكایة ناوى رِیَكخراوةكةت بنوسةناوى ریَكخراو یان دامةزراوةى حكومي یان

:ئةو وةزارةتةى كة كارى لىَ دةكةیت بنووسة تكایة ناوى تةواوت : ناونیشانى كارةكةت

UNDG( تكایة ضؤنیةتى كاركردنت رِوون بكةرةوة لةطةلَ ITF(؟) دةتوانى زیاتر لة خالَیك ھةلَبذیَرى بؤ وةلاَم دانةوةى ئةم)ثرسیارة

1-

نةخشةكیَشان و رِةزامةندى لةسةر ثرؤذة )أ

جیَبةجیَكردنى ثرؤذة )ب

ضاودیَرى و ھةلَسةنطاندنى ثرؤذة )ج

)دیارى بكةتكایة (ھى تر )د

UNDG( ماوةى ضةند لة ثرؤذةكانى ITF (كارت كردووة؟ 2-

مانط 1-6 )أ



مانط 7-12 )ب

سالَ 1-2 )ج

سالَ 3-4 )د

سالَ یاخود زیاتر 5 )ھـ

UNDG(لةضةند ثرؤذةى ITF (بةشداریت كردووة؟ 3-

1 )أ

2-4 )ب

یاخود زیاتر 5 )ج

UNDG(ثرؤذةكانى ئایا ITF(یاخود طشتیةكان بوون؟/كةتیَیاندا بةشداربووى،بؤ ثرِكردنةوةى كةم وكورِییة تایبةتیةكان و 4-

بةلَىَ )أ

نةخیَر )ب

ھةندیَك جار )ج

لة كاتى ثیَویست نوونة ثیَش كةش بكة/تكایة رِوون كردنةوةى زیاتر بدة

رِیَكخراوة ناحكومیةكان و رِیَكخراوةكانى كؤمةلَطةى مةدةنى لةجیَبةجیَكردنى ئةو ثرؤذانةى ضؤن دةرِوانیتة بةشداریكردنى UNDG(كةلةلایةن ITF (جیَبةجىَ كراون و تیَیدا بةشداربویت؟

5-

بةشداربوونیَكى زؤر باش )أ

بةشداربوونیَكى باش )ب

بةشداربوونیَكى مام ناوةند )ج

بةشداربوونیَكى خراث )د

لة كاتى ثیَویست نوونة ثیَش كةش بكة/تكایة رِوون كردنةوةى زیاتر بدة

UNDG)كام لةو ھةنطاوانة بةكاریطةرتر دةزانیت بؤ بةرةوثیَش بردنى توانةكان لة ثرؤذةكانى ITF)دةتوانى (كةتیَیدا بةشداربوویت؟ )زیاتر لة خالَیك ھةلَبذیَرى بؤ وةلاَم دانةوةى ئةم ثرسیارة

6-

رِیَكخستنى خولى رِاھیَنان )أ

رِاھیَنان لة كاتى كاركردندا )ب

)بؤ نمونة رِاھیَنان،ئاسانكارى،رِاویَذكردن لةطةلَ رِاویذكاران وھى تر(رِاویَذكردن )ج

)،كتیَبخانة،بلاَوكراوةكان و ھى تر)قاعدة البیانات(بؤنمونة بنكةى زانیارییةكان(طةشتن بةزانیارییةكان )د

)تكایة دیارى بكة(ترھى )ھـ



كام لة بوارةكانى طةشةثیَدانى تواناكانت بةشیَوةیةكى كاریطةر تر دةبینى لة ثرؤذةكانى رِیَكخراوى نةتةوة یةكطرتووةكان كةتیَیدا )دةتوانى زیاتر لة خالَیك ھةلَبذیَرى بؤ وةلاَم دانةوةى ئةم ثرسیارة(بةشدار بوویت؟؟

7-

ثةرةثیَدانى تاك

كارامةیى ھونةریى )أ

)تكة دیارى بكة(ھى تر )ب

ثةرةثیَدانى دام ودةزطاكان

ھةیكةلى كارطیَرِى )ج

سیستةم ورِیَوشویَنةكان )د

طؤرِانكاریي لةیاساو رِیَساكان )ھـ

)تكایة دیارى بكة(ھى تر )و

كةلة تیَیدا بةشدار بوویت؟ضؤن ثیَداویستیة تواناییةكان دةستنیشان دةكران لةو ثرؤذانةى 8-

ثیَداویستیةكان دیارى نةدةكران )أ

ثیَداویستیةكان دیارى دةكران ثیَش دةست ثیًكردنى ثرؤذةكان )ب

ثیَداویستیةكان دیارى دةكران لةكاتى ثرؤذةكان )ج

ثیَداویستیةكان دیارى دةكران دواى تةواوبوونى ثرؤذةكان )د

ھةبوونى بؤشایى لة دیاریكردن و ضارةسةركردنى ثیَداویستة تواناییةكان بةدةست ثیَكردنى ثرؤذة؟ )ھـ

ئةطةر ثیَداویستیة تواناییةكان دةستنیشان نةكران،ئایا ضؤن دةتوانیت لةطرفتةكان دةرباز بى؟)دةتوانى زیاتر لة خالَیك ھةلَبذیَرى بؤ وةلاَم دانةوةى ئةم ثرسیارة(

9-

دیارى كردنى طرفتةكان )أ

ثلاندانى ضالاك )ب

نةخشةكیَشانى ثرؤذة )ج

ئةنجام دانى ثرؤذةكة )د

ھةلَسةنطاندن و ضاودیَریكردنى ثرؤذة )ھـ

ھیض طرفتیَك بةرةنطارمان نةبوةتةوة )و

تواناكانت بةرةو ثیََشضوون بؤئةنجام دانى ھةمان ثرؤذةكان دواى كاركردنت لةطةلأَ بریكارةكانى رِیَكخراوى نةتةوة یةكطرتووةكان ئایا لةداھاتوودا؟

10-

بةلَىَ )أ

نةخیَر )ب

نازانم )ج

،ئایا بة رِاى )ثیَكھاتوو لةزیاتر لةیةكیَك لة بریكارةكانى رِیَكخراوى نةتةوة یةكطرتووةكان(ئةطةر بةشداربوویت لة ثرؤذة ھاوبةشةكانتؤ ئةم جؤرة ثرؤطرامانة باشترن یاخود ئةو ثرؤذانةى كةلةلایةن تةنھا بریكاریَكى رِیَكخراوى نةتةوة یةكطرتوةكان جىَ بةجيَ

11-



دةكریَن؟

بةلَىَ )أ

نةخیَر )ب

نازانم )ج

تكایة رِوون كردنةوةى زیاتر بدة لةطةلَ نموونة

ثیَكھاتوو لةزیاتر لةیةكیَك لة بریكارةكانى رِیَكخراوى نةتةوة (طرنطترین خالاَكانى ھیَز ضین لة بةئةنجام طةیاندنى ثرؤذة ھاوبةشةكان )ھةلَبذیَرى بؤ وةلاَم دانةوةى ئةم ثرسیارةدةتوانى زیاتر لة خالَیك (؟ )یةكطرتووةكان

12-

نةبوونى تیَكھةلَضوون )أ

بوونى زیاتر لة بریكاریَك لةھةمان كات ذینطةیةكى فیَركارى دةولَةمةند ثیَش كةش دةكات )ب

تواناى زیاتر )ج

ضالاكى زیاتر )د

)تكایة دیارى بكة(ھى تر )ھـ

ثیَكھاتوو لةزیاتر لةیةكیَك لة بریكارةكانى (بووةتةوة لةكاتى جیَبةجیَكردنى ثرؤذة ھاوبةشةكان ض جؤرة طرفتیَك رِووبةرِووت)رِیَكخراوى نةتةوة یةكطرتووةكان

13-

ھةماھةنطى )أ

ثةیوةندى )ب

بةرثرسیاریَتى )ج

تواناسازى )د

ضالاكى )ھـ


-14 ثرؤذانةى كة تیَیدا بةشدار بووى رِیَذةى بةشدارى كردنى حكومةت ضةند بوو لةو ثرؤذانة؟بة ثشت بةستن بةو

زؤرباش )أ

باش )ب

مام ناوةند )ج

لاواز )د

-15 )دةتوانى زیاتر لة خالَیك ھةلَبذیَرى بؤ وةلاَم دانةوةى ئةم ثرسیارة(لةوثرؤذانةى كة تیَایدا بةشداربووى ضؤن؟

بةشدارى حكومةت لة ثلان دانان )أ

بةشدارى حكومةت لة لةجیَبةجیَكردندا )ب

بةشدارى حكومةت لة ضاودیَري كردن و ھةلَسةنطاندن )ج



بةشدارى حكومةت لة ھةمامةنطى كردندا )د

بةشدارى حكومةت لة لة دروست كردنى برِیار )ھـ


رِووبةرِووت بووةوة تكایة یةكیَك لةم ھةلَبذاردنانة ھةلَبذیَرة؟) كان(طرفتى مولَكداریَتى ثرؤذةئةطةر 16-

بىَ توانایى حكومةت )أ

نةبونى دةست ثیَشخةرى لةلایةن حكومةت لةمولَكداریَتیدا )ب

حكومةتنةبوونى ھةماھةنطى لة نیَوان بریكارةكانى رِیَكخراوى نةتةوة یةكطرتووةكان و )ج

بةشدارى ثیَنةكردنى حكومةت لة لایةن بریكارةكانى رِیَكخراوى نةتةوة یةكطرتووةكان )د


طرنطترین خالَةكانى ھیَز لة ضاودیَرى كردن و ومیكانیزمى ھةلَسانطاندنى ثرؤذةكاندا ضیة؟ 17-

ثاراستنى رِیرِةوى ثرؤذةكان دةربارةى كات،جؤر و بودجة )أ

بةشدارى كردن لة برِیار دان )ب

یارمةتیدان لة بةرثرسیاریَتى )ج

)تكایة دیارى بكة(ھى تر )د

دةتوانى زیاتر لة خالَیك (؟ئةو ئاستةنطانة ضین كةلة ضاودیَرى كردنى ومیكانیزمى ھةلَسانطاندندا ثرؤذةكان رِووبةرِووت دةبنةوة؟ )ھةلَبذیَرى بؤ وةلاَم دانةوةى ئةم ثرسیارة

18-

نارِوونى لة ھةلَسورِاندنى رِؤلَ و بةرثرسیاریَتى )أ

نةبوونى ثرؤطرام )ب

نةبوونى بةدواداضون و رِاثؤرتى ضاودیَرى )ج

ھیض طرفتیَك بةرةنطارمان نةبوةتةوة )د


بةھؤى نائارامى بارى ئاسایش زؤربةى كارمةندانى نةتةوة یةكطرتوةكان لة دةرةوةى عیَراق جیَطیرببون وةكارةكانیان لةدةرةوةى عیَراق بةرِیَوة دةبرد،بةرِاى تؤ ئةو طرفتانة ضین كةلةم شیَوة بةرِیَوبردنة رِووبةرِووت دةبیَتةوة؟

19-

ھةماھةنطیةك و سةرثةرشتیةكى رِؤذانةى دیاریكراو لةلایةن حكومةتةوة )أ

دواكةوتن لة جیَبةجیَكردنى ثرؤذةكان )ب

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Annex 10 – Focus Group Discussion Guide

I. Introduction (10 minutes)

Welcome participants and introduce yourself and co-facilitator Explain the general purpose of the discussion and why the participants were chosen. Discuss the purpose and process of focus groups. Explain the presence and purpose of recording equipment. Outline general ground rules and discussion guidelines such as the importance of everyone

― Speaking up [― Talking one at a time― Being prepared for the moderator to interrupt to assure that all the topics can be covered.

Review break of 10 minutes scheduled at the end of the first hour. Address the issue of confidentiality. Inform the group that information discussed is going to be analyzed as a whole and that participants'

names will not be used in any analysis of the discussion.

Discussion Guidelines:

We would like the discussion to be informal, so there’s no need to wait for us to call on you to respond. In fact,we encourage you to respond directly to the comments other people make. If you don’t understand astatement or question, please let us know. We are here to present statements and ask questions, listen andmake sure everyone has a chance to share.

If we seem to be stuck on a topic, we may interrupt you and if you aren’t saying much, we may call on youdirectly. If we do this, please don’t feel bad about it; it’s just our way of making sure we obtain everyone’sperspective and to ensure your opinion is included.

We do ask that we all keep each other’s identities, participation and remarks private. We hope you’ll feel freeto speak openly and honestly.

As discussed, we will be tape recording the discussion, because we don’t want to miss any of your comments.No one will have access to these tapes and they will be destroyed after our report is written.

Helping is my assistant NAME. He will be taking notes and be here to assist me if I need any help.

Let’s begin. Let’s find out some more about each other by going around the room one at a time. Tell us yourfirst name and the job you have. I’ll start.

II. Discussion Generation (90 minutes)

The focus group facilitator will explain:

This group is convened to validate some statements surrounding the operational and developmenteffectiveness of the UNDG ITF through an open discussion. The statements are based on previous interviewsthat you and other stakeholders may have taken part in. This will help us understand the strengths and areasof improvement of the fund and projects implemented in Iraq through the UNDG ITF leading to LessonsLearned that can be used in future funds. If there is some confusion during the discussion about how a topic isrelevant clarifying comments could be requested, but the conversation will quickly move on.

Let’s get started!

The initial question: After 7 years of working with the UN, we can conclude the UN has made a big difference in the

development of Iraq and the well being of its population (Use thumps up / thumps downapproach).

After the responses from this prompt have been exhausted, move on.



For an interactive process, you can then:

1. Take a topic that was just brought up and prompt the group for more information.

2. Alternatively, you can bring up a statement from our below list to prompt the group.

In this way, we will explore a series of statements to be followed by relevant prompts to clarify the item.This process is not pre-scripted but interactive in its nature. The goal is for the participants’ experience tolead the way, therefore eliciting the most authentic data possible.

Record the statement on a chart or white board for reference and give constant prompts to make certainevery potential angle is covered.

Statements

1. UN projects were closely related to the real and evolving needs of Iraq, at a strategic level and inthe field during implementation.

2. The UN Agencies involved the right levels from the GoI counterpart during the planning andimplementation of project.

3. The GoI demonstrated ownership of project / programmes. What were the major challenges facedby the government regarding its ownership of programmes / projects? What could have beendone better to ensure government ownership? Give examples of ownership.

4. The funding of the UN projects was efficient and expenditures were focused on value addingactivities, waste was minimized. If you were responsible for a project’s budget, would you havespent it differently? Why? How?

5. UN project outputs (tangible and intangible) are still functional and providing benefits to thepopulation groups they were intended to serve. Give examples.

6. The GoI contributed to the sustainability of the projects. When? How? Which ones? Why these?7. Certain UN projects were able to secure government co-financing while others were not. Why?

What lessons can be learned from that for UN Agencies for the future?8. UN’s level and method of communication with GoI was the same whether the GoI co-financed a

project or not. Give examples.9. UN worked remotely from Amman due to security reasons. Effective? Efficient? If not, what could

have been done differently to ensure greater efficiency without risking UN lives?10. UN encouraged GoI to be accountable for results of projects. How? Who was ultimately

accountable for how projects were implemented and what results were generated?11. Most effective and sustainable capacity development approaches used (individual and

institutional).12. Key areas where GoI needs most support from the UN going forward.13. Being an oil-rich country, Iraq does not need donor funding and can depend on national budget

for development moving forward.

III. Closing (10 minutes)

Closing remarks Thank the participants



Running focus groups

If appropriate, ask the participants to introduce themselves and/or wear name tags. Most importantly, all

questions you ask should be open and neutral. It is also important for the moderator to be aware of

participants' energy and concentration levels and provide short breaks if necessary. The moderator shouldencourage free-flowing discussion around the relevant issue(s).

Other tips for running focus groups include:

Start on an issue people have strong feelings about and are familiar with Phrase issues in terms people will be familiar with Let participants know their contributions are valuable (both through what you say and also your body

language)

It is also important that the moderator realizes that:

It may be necessary for them to step in and keep the session on-track Disagreements and debates are useful when they lead to new and interesting ideas, but have to be

managed carefully Issues of power and privacy need to be managed sensitively Focus groups should end with the moderator winding-up the session by stressing all that has achieved

and casting it in a positive light.

To facilitate useful, free-flowing discussion during the focus group, follow some of these tips:

1. If one participant tries to dominate the session, the moderator should invite each person to speak inturn.

2. Avoid personal confrontation - allow the group to police itself (e.g. "do others in the group agree?").3. Respect someone's right to be quiet, but do give them a chance to share their ideas 1-to-1 (e.g. during a

break).4. Use differences of opinion as a topic of discussion - the moderator should avoid taking sides.5. Carefully word each question before that question is addressed by the group. Allow the group a few

minutes for each member to carefully record their answers. Then, facilitate discussion around theanswers to each question, one at a time.

6. After each question is answered, carefully reflect back a summary of what you heard (the note takermay do this).

7. Ensure even participation. If one or two people are dominating the meeting, then call on others.8. Consider using a roundtable approach, including going in one direction around the table, giving each

person a minute to answer the question. If the domination persists, note it to the group and ask forideas about how the participation can be increased.

9. Verify if the tape recorder, if used, worked throughout the session.10. Questions on a given topic should be ordered from the more general to the more specific.11. Topics of greater importance should be placed early in the discussion.12. The moderator should encourage all participants to speak, without letting one member dominate. Ask

facilitating questions such as “Do the rest of you agree with X’s statement?” “How would you extendwhat X has said?” “Does anyone have a contrasting experience?” The moderator may suggest that allparticipants initially write down a few thoughts in response to a question before the group discusses ittogether.

13. While the tape recorder will provide a record of what was said, be sure to notice non-verbal interactionsand responses in your session, taking notes of body language, reluctance or eagerness to speak,dynamics between group members that either open up or shut down conversation.

14. It is inappropriate to report the results of focus groups by percentage (e.g. 56 percent of participantsmentioned …). Rather, look for emerging themes by question and then for the discussion overall.Compare the words used to answer specific questions, the emphasis or intensity of the respondents’comments, and the consistency of comments and the specificity of responses in follow up probes.



The role of the facilitator/moderator

The main purpose of the moderator is to facilitate the group discussion including:

1. Getting the discussion started.2. Managing expectations of the participants.3. Keeping people on the subject.4. Keeping the discussion moving.5. Bringing out the people who are not participating.6. Inhibiting people who are dominating the discussion.7. Moving people on to the next topic.

The other important role, and arguably their real skill, is to use the group dynamics and interaction, and whatpeople say on the day, to probe views effectively and in more depth. Essential skills include:

1. The use of direct, straightforward language that is appropriate for the specific group of participants.2. An ability to remain neutral and avoid expressing opinions, influencing the discussion or

favouring/being dismissive of certain views.3. Good listening skills with an ability to pick up on salient points and use them in the discussion.4. The ability to make links between what people say by summarizing or paraphrasing.5. The confidence to subtly challenge and probe views.6. Promoting debate, possibly by bringing your own experiences/knowledge to bear.7. Supporting group members to generate ideas or solutions and not just raise problems.



Annex 11 – Distribution of Urban and Rural Population byGovernorate

Governorate Rural Urban

Anbar 48% 52%

Babil 53% 47%

Baghdad 13% 87%

Basrah 21.8% 78.2%

Dahuk 27% 73%

Diyala 59% 41%

Erbil 24% 76%

Kerbala 35% 65%

Kirkuk 31% 69%

Missan 35% 65%

Muthana 56% 44%

Najaf 31.4% 68.4%

Ninewa 39% 61%

Qadissiya 48% 52%

Salah al-Din 54% 46%

Sulaymaniyah 30% 70%

Thi-Qar 42% 58%

Wassit 48% 52%



Annex 12 – List of 60 Projects/ Programmes Reviewed and Their Extensions

Project NamePlannedDuration

ActualDuration 1

Extensions (month) PercentageDelayExtension

1Extension

2Extension

3Extension

4Extension

5

Education

Literacy and Life Skills Development(B1-08)

12 40 4 15 3 6 233%

Education/Integrated CommunityBased Social Service (B1-19)

6 13 4 3 117%

Support to Emergency Obstetric Carein Iraq (D2-02)

30 63 6 12 6 8 110%

Iraqi Networking Academies Project(B1-10)

18 32 6 8 78%

Iraqi Networking Academies Project(B1-17)

18 32 6 8 78%

School Rehabilitation and CapacityDevelopment for Enhanced Accessand Retention in Primary Education(B1-29b)

12 27 15 125%

Revitalization of Technical andVocational Education and Training(Phase 2) B1-14

16 25 6 3 56%

Education Management InformationSystem (B1-13)

8 25 5 6 6 213%

Strengthening Secondary Educationin Iraq Phase I (B1-15)

16 28 6 6 75%



Revitalization of Technical andVocational Education and Training inIraq (Phase I) B1-01

18 30 9 3 67%

Textbooks Quality ImprovementProgramme (B1-18)

6 15 1 2 3 3 150%

Train-the-trainer in teacher education(B1-23)

18 53 6 6 6 17 194%

School Rehabilitation and CapacityBuilding for School Maintenance (B1-22b)

24 32 6 2 33%

In-Service Training of secondaryschool teachers of science,mathematics and English language(B1-05)

12 28 6 10 133%

Programme for the protection of IraqiCultural Heritage (B1-07)

12 18 N/A 50%

Skills Development to SupportEmployment Generation in Iraq (B1-27a)

18 42 12 12 133%

Skills Development to SupportEmployment Generation in Iraq (B1-27b)

18 52 12 22 189%


Rehabilitation of Water DistributionSystems in Sidakan and Rawanduz(E3-12a)

9 27 9 3 3 3 200%

Rehabilitation of Takia WaterDistribution System (E3-12b)

9 24 8 6 3 167%

Water Quality Control andSurveillance in Iraq (E3-11 Phase)

12 36 6 6 6 6 200%

Water Quality Control andSurveillance in Iraq (E3-11 b)

12 36 6 6 6 6 200%



Emergency Water Supply tounserved/underserved/VulnerableAreas in Baghdad and the IDPs (E3-09)

8 7 -13%

Rehabilitation of Sewerage FacilitiesIn Select Facilities in Basrah City (E3-13a)

12 30 6 6 6 150%

Rehabilitation of Water SupplySystems in select locations in WassitGovernorate (E3-13b)

12 18 6 50%

Extension of Storm Water and SewageNetwork in Select Locations inKerbala Governorate (E3-13c)

12 30 6 6 6 150%

Rehabilitation/ Extension of stormWater and Sewage Networks In SelectLocations in Kirkuk City (E3-13d)

14 20 6 43%

Agriculture food and Security

Capacity Building of WaterInstitutions of Iraq (A5-12)

17 26 N/A N/A 6 3 53%

Promotion of Cottage Industries inRural and Urban Areas Project(A5-06)

24 37 6 2 5 54%

Assessment and rehabilitation ofcommunity irrigation schemes andrestorations of irrigation water inrural areas (A5-01)

24 31 17 29%

Improvements of water supply anddrainage provision through therehabilitation of pumping stations(A5-02)

24 53 17 12 121%

Assessment, emergency needsmaintenance and rehabilitation of thecommunity irrigation scheme &restoration of water supply in ruralareas (A5-04)

24 36 6 6 50%



Enhancing the Iraqi Institutions'Capacity in Monitoring and Targetingthe most Food Insecure andVulnerable Segments of IraqPopulation (A6-03)

12 12 0%

Restoration of Veterinary Services inIraq (A5-08)

24 51 30 113%

Pilot Project for The Rehabilitation ofthe Dairy Sector in Iraq (A5-13)

16 54 6 7 12 4 2 238%

Community Livelihoods and Micro-Industry Support Project in Rural andUrban Areas of Northern Iraq (A5-17)

18 26 6 1 1 44%

Restoration and Development ofEssential Livestock Services in Iraq(A5-10)

24 37 13 54%

Economic Reform and Diversification

Smart Community Project for Iraq(C10-04)

18 42 3 6 6 5 8 133%

Iraqis Rebuilding Iraq (C10-03) 12 30 14 3 3 150%


Disease Eradication, Elimination andIntroducing new Vaccines (D2-19a)

13 25 6 6 92%

Disease Eradication, Elimination andIntroducing new Vaccines (D2-19b)

13 31 6 12 138%

Strengthening Primary HealthcareSystem in Iraq (D2-03 Phase I)

18 43 6 6 6 3 9 139%

Re-Establishing the Food Safety andFood Processing Industry Capacity inIraq (D2-17a)

17 32 10 5 3 6 6 88%



Re-Establishing the Food Safety andFood Processing Industry Capacity inIraq (D2-17b)

17 32 10 5 3 6 6 88%

Re-Establishing the Food Safety andFood Processing Industry Capacity inIraq (D2-17c)

17 32 10 5 3 6 6 88%

Emergency Public Health Assistance,Strengthening Non-communicableDiseases and Mental Health Controland Prevention Programme (D2-05)

15 51 2 4 6 12 6 240%

Housing and Shelter

Rehabilitation of CommunityFacilities And Infrastructure (E4-14)

13 48 5 21 3 3 2 269%

Protection

Support to the Iraqi Kurdistan MineAction Agency (A7-03)

12 29 12 4 1 142%

Protection & assistance to persons ofconcern in Southern Iraq and supportto Local Authorities and Civil SocietyOrganizations in AddressingDisplacement Needs & Gaps (F8-05)

18 17 -6%

Establishment of a National MineAction NGO in Basra (A7-04)

12 36 6 9 3 6 200%

Governance

Support for fair, safe & professionalmedia election coverage: Electionreporting guide and advocacycampaigns (G11-07)

3 4 1 33%

Facilitating Reconciliation in IraqThrough Constitutional Review andNational Dialougue (C9-20)

12 48 3 27 10 12 9 300%



Strengthening Good GovernanceThrough Support for Independent,Pluralistic, Sustainable andProfessional Media (UNESCO C9-21b)

12 21 6 3 75%

Local Area Development Programme(UNDP C10-09a)

12 39 12 8 7 225%

Support to National ElectoralObserver Groups for the ElectoralEvents of Iraq (G11-21)

9 9 0%

Institutional Development andCapacity Building for the IndependentHigh Electoral Commission (G11-14 a)

12 38 11 6 9 217%

Institutional Development -Organizational and HR CapacityBuilding for the IndependentElectoral Commission of IraqIndependent High ElectoralCommission (G11-14b)

12 31 14 3 2 158%

Evaluation of UNDP GovernanceProjects Funded by the Iraq TrustFund Support for the Board ofSupreme Audit (C9-18)

15 48 27 3 6 220%

Support for the Donor AssistanceDatabase II (C9-12)

22 48 7 7 6 6 118%

Support of the Constitutional DraftingProcess (C9-10A)

6 18 12 200%

Contract Constitutional Developmentfor Iraq (UNESCO C9-10c)

6 9 3 50%

UNDG Iraq Trust Fund Lessons Learned Exercise Final Draft Report


1 The actual duration does not equal the sum of the extensions and the planned duration, as in some cases theproject takes more/ less time than the filed extensions.



Annex 13 – List of Joint Programmes (JPs)

2004 - Only single Agency projects were approved (51 in total) and no joint programmes were approved.

2005 - 2 JPs and 27 projects were approved. JPs included:1. Institutional Support for the Constitutional Drafting Process with 4 implementing Agencies - UNDP,

UNOPS, UNIFEM and UNESCO2. Integrated Community Based Project to Deliver Quality Basis Social Services with two implementing

Agencies - UNICEF and WHOFew projects were implemented jointly with non-participating in UNDG ITF UN organizations. Forexample:

UNDP partnered with IOM for Iraqi rebuilding Iraq UNOPS partnered with UNAMI and UN Electoral Assistance Division (UNEAD) on election

support projects. In 2004 UNDP also partnered with UNEAD on electoral projects.

2006 - 6 JPs and 25 projects were approved including the following JPs: Strengthening Immunization Services in Iraq - Phase II - UNICEF and WHO School Rehabilitation and Capacity Building - Phase I - UNICEF and UN-HABITAT Rebuilding Food Safety and Food Processing Industry Capacity - WHO, FAO and UNIDO Avian and Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Control - WHO and UNICEF Restoration of Al Askari Shrine in Samara City and Rehabilitation of Other Damaged Religious Sites

Throughout Iraq - UNDP and UNESCO Water Quality Control and Surveillance in Iraq - Phase II - WHO and UNICEF

2007 - 12 JPs and 34 projects were approved in 2007 including the following JPs:1. Support to Iraq’s National, Regional and Local Authorities and Civil Society Organizations in

Developing a Draft National Policy and Addressing Displacement Needs and Gaps - UNHCR andUNOPS

2. Strengthening of the Constitutional Process and Good Governance – UNDP, UNESCO, UNICEF,UNIFEM AND UNOPS

3. Skills Development to Support Employment Generation in Iraq – UNOPS and ILO4. Disease Eradication; Elimination and Introducing New Vaccines – UNICEF and WHO5. Institutional Development-Organizational and HR Capacity Building for the IECI/IHEC – UNDP and

UNOPS6. Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) in Education for Iraq – ESCWA and UNESCO7. Area Based Development Programme – Local Area Development Plans – UNDP, UNOPS, UN-

HABITAT, UNESCO, WHO, ILO and UNIFEM8. Rehabilitation of the Date Palm Sector in Iraq – FAO and UNIDO9. School Rehabilitation and Capacity Development for Enhanced Access and Retention in Primary

Education – UNICEF and UN-HABITAT10. Solid Waste Management Project for Iraqi Ministry of Municipalities and Public Works and the

Governorate of Basra – UN-HABITAT and UNICEF11. Improving quality and relevance of Technical and Vocational Education and Training in Iraq –

UNESCO, ILO and UN-HABITAT12. Support for Job Creation and Self Employment Through Promotion of Micro-Industries in Ninewa

Governorate of Iraq – FAO and UNIDO

2008 – Six JPs and 26 projects were approved1. Cholera Outbreak, Early Detection and Mortality Reduction – WHO and UNICEF2. Supporting the Efforts of Government of Iraq in Developing the Capacity of the Iraqi Education Sector

through Enhancing the Learning Environment in Vulnerable Areas in Iraq for Meeting the EFA Goals– UNICEF, UN-HABITAT, UNESCO, WHO and UNIFEM

3. Emergency Water Supply and Sanitation for Abu Al-Khaseeb – UNICEF and WHO4. Strengthening of the Primary Health Care System in Iraq - Phase II – WHO and UNICEF5. Improving the Housing Delivery System in Erbil - UN-HABITAT and UNDP6. Private Sector Development Programme for Iraq – UNDP, ILO, UNOPS, UNIDO, FAO, UN-HABITAT

and UNIFEM



2009 – Five JPs and 11 projects were approved including the following JPs:1. Strengthening Protection and Justice for Children and Young People in Iraq – UNICEF and UNFPA2. Water and Sanitation Master Planning and Capacity Building Programme – UNDP, UNICEF, UN-

HABITAT and WHO3. Support for Enhanced Media Coverage and Monitoring of Electoral Processes – UNESCO and UNDP4. Combating Violence Against Women in Iraq – UNFPA, UNIFEM and WHO5. Promoting Civic Values and Life Skills for Adolescents (12 years to 19 years) Through Education –

ESCWA, UNFPA and UNESCO

2010 - 12 JPs and 28 projects were approved including the following JPs:1. Addressing Micronutrient Deficiencies in Iraq: Assessment and Responses – WHO and UNICEF2. Support to the Government of Iraq's National Measles and Polio Vaccination Campaign – WHO and

UNICEF3. Strengthening Capacity for Management of Unaccounted-for Water (UFW) – UNOPS and UNICEF4. Adolescents and Youth Friendly Health Services at Primary Health Care Level – UNFPA, WHO and

UNICEF5. Iraq Public Sector Modernization (I-PSM) Programme – UNDP, UNICEF, WHO, UNESCO and UN-

HABITAT6. Completion of a Comprehensive Assessment of Education Sector for Iraq - UNESCO and UNICEF7. Developing Iraqi Agricultural and Agro-Industrial Data, Information Systems and Analytical Capacities

- FAO and UNIDO8. Strengthening the Capacity of the Housing Sector in Iraq: Bridging for Phase III - UN-HABITAT and

UNDP9. Capacitating and Strengthening Protection Networks with the Government of Iraq - UNHCR and IOM10. Protection of Media Professionals, Human Rights Defenders and Members of the Academic

Community in Iraq - UNESCO and UNOPS11. Bridging for Local Area Development Programme Phase II – UNDP, ILO, UNOPS and UN-HABITAT12. Institutional Development Support to the Independent High Electoral Commission – UNDP and

UNOPS



Annex 14 – List of Iraq’s Needs Extracted from the Joint Needs Assessment (JNA)and the National Development Strategy (NDS)

JNACategory Sub-Category 2004 2005 2006 2007

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Ensure minimal quality standards of teaching and learning and system management through strengthening basic training andproviding an adequate supply of materials and equipment.Physical rehabilitation and reconstruction of primary and secondary schools, prioritizing replacement of schools that are nolonger serviceable.Initiate a systematic program of in-service training, particularly focusing on master trainers and instructor methods.Start the process for developing new curriculum, education priorities, and mechanisms for change. This would include aparticipatory and consultative process for educational policy within a national vision.For Technical and Vocational Education (TVE), rehabilitate key buildings and replace essential equipment as needed in theshort-term, and assess the TVE system before carrying out more extensive investment.Teachers’ professional development; teaching methodologies; links between vocational/technical education, higher education,and the labor market; and education governance and financing.Restore effective control and ensurestewardship over the health care system.Secure effective implementation of public healthprograms and interventions.Provide equitable access to effective health care,and with the full involvement of communitygroups.Increase focus on improving public health, withparticular attention to women, children, andother vulnerable groups.Address imbalances in the distribution and skill-mix of health professionals.Rehabilitate essential infrastructure and healthservices to render them more responsive topriority needs of the Iraqi population.Develop a national health plan based on the 10areas mentioned below.

Develop a master plan for the development of Iraq’s health sector.Change from a highly centralized management structure in the Ministry ofHealth to a more decentralized and empowered system. The Ministry of



Health will also establish frameworks for local, Governorate, and nationallevel partnerships to increase the involvement of key stakeholders in thedesign and implementation of health and health-related actions.Address the 10 areas in the health sector master plan identified throughongoing consultations between the Ministry of Health and the internationalcommunity: public health; health information systems, informationtechnology; legislation and regulation; human resources; education andtraining of health professionals; credentials and licensing of healthprofessionals; health care delivery system; pharmaceuticals; medicalsupplies and equipment; and financing of health care.

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Provide quick, nationwide employmentopportunities for the unemployed andvulnerable groups through labor-intensivereconstruction and rehabilitation schemes andcommunity development projects.Provide related support to local councils andcivic organizations (training in management,monitoring, administration, accounting, andprocurement) in support of communitydevelopment programs.Establish programs that upgrade skills throughvocational training centers, scholarships, andapprenticeships, targeting vulnerablepopulations, including unemployed youth,displaced populations, and people withdisabilities.Facilitate community based reintegration ofrefugees/IDPs through employment generationand enhancement of access to social andeconomic services.Pilot microfinance schemes and develop astrategy for building the capacity of MFIs andestablishing an appropriate legal and regulatoryframework for microfinance.

For the medium and longer-term needs more sustainable employment willcome from policy choices in other sectors.

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Reconstruct institutions and upgrade staff skillsand capacityRaise drinking water access in urban areas by15% and in rural areas by 20%.



Reduce water losses by 10%.Raise sanitation coverage in urban areas by 10%and test and adopt a comprehensive strategy forsanitation in rural areas.Improve solid waste collection in both urbanand rural areas.Develop City Master Plans for the provision ofwater and sanitation services in 15 major cities.Build capacity and enhance (computerized)management systems.

Raise potable water access in urban areas by 15% and in rural areas to 25%.Raise sanitation coverage by 30% in urban areas and by 30% in rural areas.Reduce water loss by 20%.Further improve solid waste management in both urban and rural areas.Continue capacity building.

Highways, Roads, and BridgesRe-establish the physical and technical capacity, including reconstructing office facilities of the key sector ministry – theMinistry of Housing and Construction – as well as at the national road laboratories, and replacing lost equipment and supplies.Provide technical assistance, equipment and software to support a proper planning system to improve road inspections, trafficcounts, axle load surveys, and road user charge studies to develop and implement an effective Road and Bridge ManagementSystem.Convert the State Commission for Roads and Bridges into a Highway Authority that owns and manages the country’s mainroads.RailwaysRehabilitate key stations and refurbish rolling stock and maintenance equipment.Repair the Al Datha Bridge near Baiji and the Akashat Bridge near the Syrian border, two key structures that were damagedduring the conflict.Modernize the railway training center in order to maintain the skills of the railway staff.Prepare a sector strategy to assess the merits of restructuring to permit greater private sector participation in the delivery ofservices. Including: establishing appropriate signaling systems, rehabilitating and reconstructing stations in the system, andrestoring workshops to their original state to enable proper maintenance and repair of the rolling stock. Second priority itemsinclude completing the replacement of tracks for the Baghdad–Basra–Umm Qasr Line, rehabilitating the concrete sleeperfactory at Abugharib, and installing an optical fiber communication system on all railway lines. Third priority items includecompleting the replacement of tracks for the Baghdad–Mosul-Al Yaribiyeh (Syrian boarder) Line.Airports and Civil AviationEstablish a civil aviation authority to provide regulatory oversight of the sector.Form an integrated national air traffic management system that will enable the International Civil Aviation Organization(ICAO) recertification.Provide equipment and software, accompanied by a training program for Iraqi air traffic controllers.



Refurbish three airports (Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul), including control towers and related facilities, air traffic controlequipment and navigational aids, in addition to repairing runways, taxiways, and aprons, and restoring utility services,including power, water, sewerage, and telecommunications. Cargo and passenger handing services will also need to bereinstated, which will entail renovating storage areas, replacing electromechanical systems, and installing security systems thatare post 9/11 compliant.Refurbish the Iraqi Meteorological Organization, which is integral to both transport planning and better environmentalmanagement.Develop a sector strategy, coupled with a master plan, which should include an inventory of all assets, plans for rationalizingfacilities, and future institutional arrangements. In particular, over the medium-term, policies should be considered that wouldseparate regulatory functions from airport management, with the possible outsourcing of airport management to a privateoperator. A policy of “open skies” should be pursued.Ports and Inland WaterwaysContinue ongoing dredging activities in and around Umm Qasr Port.Rehabilitate Umm Qasr’s buildings and marine structures, grain silos, and warehousing facilities.Remove 282 wrecks in Shattal Arab and Umm Al Qasr port after conducting an environmental assessment of the current statusand removal options.Replace vital equipment at Umm Qasr Port, including vessels for piloting, tugs, and emergency response vehicles.Acquire cargo and container handling equipment.Develop a master plan to increase efficiency and optimize the institutional arrangements.Public TransportRefurbish key facilities and replacing buses lost to enable normal operations.Explore options to introduce emission standards, phase out old vehicles and introduce unleaded fuel.Provide technical assistance to design a strategy for concession management of the country’s 165 bus terminals, which arecurrently under the control of the Private Transport Company. Similarly, consideration should be given to increasing privatesector participation in the delivery of bus services.Explore the potential for developing a bus rapid transit system and dedicated bus lines.Freight and Commercial TransportReconstruct facilities that were damaged as a result of the recent conflict and subsequent lootingFormulate a strategy to liberalize the sector, allowing open access to markets, and increasing competition.

Te

lec

om

mu

nic

ati

on

Immediate Needs (2004) and Medium-Term Priorities (2005-2007)Rebuild and expand the existing switching and local access (copper cable or wireless in the local loop) and undertake civilworks, in order to reach, for fixed telephone services, the following reasonable benchmarks by 2007: a teledensity of 13percent, or about 3.3 million customers by 2007, up from the expected level of 1.3 million by the end of 2003.Establish a modern and integrated national long distance backbone network with international connectivity. The network willconsist mainly of fiber optic cables, digital microwave links, and international earth stations and links.

Establish a modern network operations system to ensure efficient integration and operational management of the nationalnetwork and a modern billing and customer care system to enable an efficient and customer-oriented operation at the ITPC.Reconstitute the postal system, including the rehabilitation of postal facilities and existing buildings, to bring Iraq in line withother countries with comparable GDPs, modernizing and expanding postal facilities and services (vehicles, scales, scooters,



information systems, etc).Provide consultancy services for institutional strengthening of the ITPC, including an evaluation of restructuring optionsaimed at establishing the ITPC as a commercial company, developing corporate governance guidelines and a strategic plan,implementing a comprehensive change program, conducting a financial audit, establishing a cost-based and benchmarkingtariff regime for ITPC services and training technical and managerial staff.Provide technical assistance to the government to support the establishment of an independent and competent regulatoryauthority. This package would include preparation of a sector strategy, developing the organizational structure, budget,staffing, and operational guidelines of the proposed regulatory authority, elaborating the regulatory framework, includinglicensing, interconnection, numbering, and technical standards. The regulatory authority should also be equipped with amodern spectrum management and monitoring system to enable the authority to carry out its spectrum management function.

Ele

ctr

icit

y

Immediate Needs (2004) and Medium-Term Priorities (2005-2007)Return the Iraqi power system to a reliable and efficiently run system similar to the pre-1991 level.Increase the generating capacity from 3,300MW to 4,775 MW in 2004 and commence the necessary works to realize a further3,985MW between 2005 and 2007 to provide about 8,760 MW in 2007.Technical assistance to prepare: (i) a least-cost master plan for the sector; (ii) an option analysis to review the adequacy of theexisting legal and regulatory framework and industry structure, with recommendations for reforms; (iii) a comprehensive tariffstudy that analyzes the impact of tariff changes on the population and the financial viability of the sector entities; and (iv) astudy to assess human resource development needs.Carry out maintenance in generation, transmission, and distributionContinue the implementation of projects under the OFF Program commence new augmentation and asset replacementprojects;Purchase spare parts and tools.Complete emergency rehabilitation of transmission lines and rebuild substations damaged by looting and vandalism.

Ho

us

ing

an

dm

an

ag

em

en

t

HousingRestore the institutional capacity tomanage the sector and implementreforms:Provide training, workshops, and study tours tothe senior staff at the Ministry of Housing andConstruction to increase exposure tointernational best practices in housing policies.Introduce office information andcommunications technology to better managesector data and information.Address the housing needs of vulnerablegroups:Initiate a ten-year program to provide housingto internally displaced persons and families.Initiate a two-year program for the



rehabilitation and reconstruction of war-damaged houses.Initiate a 15-year urban upgrading program thataddresses the needs of low income social groupsliving in substandard neighborhoods.Initiate a housing and land supplyprogram:Provide technical assistance for policy andregulatory reforms focused on housing and landsupply including property restitution,construction finance, building material,construction technology, and building codes andstandards.Initiate pilot public/private partnershipprograms in housing and land supply in keycities of Iraq.Ensure any demolition and disposal of war-damaged buildings is conducted with dueattention to asbestos.

Initiate a sector reform program with a focus on housingfinance:Provide technical assistance for policy and regulatory reforms to the RealEstate Bank and the deregulation of mortgage financing in Iraq. This willhave to be carried out in tandem with wider reforms in the financial sector.*Scale up public/private partnership programs in housing and land supply.Address the housing needs of vulnerable groups:Pursue the ten-year program for the provision of housing to internallydisplaced persons and families.Complete the two-year program for the rehabilitation and reconstruction ofwar-damaged houses.Pursue the ten-year urban upgrading program, addressing the needs of lowincome social groups living in substandard neighbourhoods

Land ManagementInitiate the debate on the legal basis for policyreforms and the introduction of a landmanagement system for Iraq that can addressland tenure issues and resolve land disputes.Elements of policy reforms should address landmanagement and administration, landallocation, land tenure rules, land use



regulations, including measures to arrest landdegradation, and land inventory andregistration.Assess and build consensus on the status ofproperty disputes nationwide, identifyingplausible mechanisms for property restitutionand linking this exercise intentionally to largerefforts for peace and reconciliation.

Initiate the gradual and transparent introduction of policy reforms andimplement the development of a land management information system.Integrate the development of land management systems and requisitepolicies and legislation with concurrent efforts in housing delivery andurban management.Introduce nationally acceptable institutional arrangements for propertyrestitution with due regard for enforcement and in ways that are consistentwith emerging systems of land management and land information.

Ur

ba

nM

an

ag

em

en

t

Restore institutional capacity to managethe sector and implement reforms:Provide training, workshops, and study tours forexposure to best international practice.Introduce office information andcommunications technology to better managesector data and information and the design of anUrban Observatory for Iraq.Initiate the debate on the sector reformprocess that focuses on moving the sectorprogressively towards decentralizationwith the aim of improving sectoreffectiveness and sustainability:Provide technical assistance for policy andregulatory reforms focused on improvingaccountability and financial sustainabilitythrough improved resource mobilization at thelocal level.Pilot public/private partnership programs inmunicipal service provision, building on theemerging experiences in Baghdad’s garbagecollection. The success of this relies on overallreform at the central level, including budgetingauthority and processes.



Conduct an assessment for new housing/urbanmanagement projects to introduce theenvironmental land use planning concerns ofsolid and sewage management, opportunitiesfor waste segregation and water conservation.Initiate a ten-year Municipal AssetsRehabilitation Program:Rehabilitate existing municipal buildings, roads,sidewalks, and public parks using labor-intensive techniques and small- and medium-sized contractors, for a transitional period offour years, taking care also to introduce specificequipment/technology where labor-intensiveproduction processes are inadequate and/orinappropriate.

Initiate the implementation of the Sector Reform Action Planthat focuses on moving towards decentralization with the aim ofimproving sector effectiveness and sustainability:Provide technical assistance for policy and regulatory reforms focused ondecentralization.Scale up public/private partnership programs in municipal serviceprovision.Introduce long-term policy measures supporting sustainable urbandevelopment.Initiate a ten-year City-wide Capital Investment Program aimedat improving living standards and integrating marginalizedareas:Expand city-wide municipal infrastructure.Initiate the gradual and transparent introduction of policyreforms and implement the development of a land managementinformation system.Integrate the development of land management systems and requisitepolicies and legislation with concurrent efforts in housing delivery andurban management.Introduce nationally acceptable institutional arrangements for propertyrestitution with due regard for enforcement and in ways that are consistentwith emerging systems of land management and land information.



C.

Ag

ric

ult

ur

e,

wa

ter

re

so

ur

ce

s,

an

dfo

od

se

cu

rit

yReconstruct degraded and damaged facilitiesand re-establish and improve the efficiency ofkey agricultural services.

Continue PFDS complemented bysupplementary feeding programs targetingvulnerable groups and children (e.g., thoughschool feeding).Maintain supplies of agricultural inputs toensure no further reduction in the level of farmactivities.Develop policy and carry out institutionalreform options that would provide the basis foran agriculture and food security sector strategyin the medium-term, including an increased rolefor the private sector, competitive production,phasing out subsidies, integrated water resourcemanagement, land management andconservation, and capacity development.Design and implement media strategies tosupport awareness raising and advocacycampaigns on the PDS universal-to-targetedtransitional issue.

Undertake pilot food security assessments withcommunity participation aimed at moving thesystem gradually away from universal foodsupport towards targeted support.Undertake a water sector assessment, includinglooking at water balances, water allocations,pricing, water quality, and trans-boundaryissues.Rehabilitate critical infrastructure, especiallythe irrigation and drainage system and foodproduction and food control facilities.Restore and improve essential agriculturalservices by rehabilitating facilities,strengthening capacity, and investing in newinfrastructure.Address the agriculture-related needs ofvulnerable groups.Move towards sustainable use and management



of natural resources by adopting an integratedland-water-biodiversity approach.

Provide agricultural services, focusing on decentralization, efficiency, costrecovery, adequate maintenance, and participatory approaches.Ensure water management efficiency and ecosystem integrity.Establish agricultural credit and rural and microfinance systems, includingschemes that target women.Establish programs on Water Basin Management, including ensuring watermanagement efficiency and addressing trans-boundary issues.Rebuild institutional capacity.Improve environmental conditions by developing a land conservation andmanagement plan, carry out environmental impact assessments ofirrigation and hydraulic schemes, promote integrated pest managementand strengthen pesticide regulation, and train agricultural extension staffin sustainable practices.Assist vulnerable groups and expand sustainable community basedactivities and stakeholder involvement (user associations; operations andmaintenance schemes; and participatory planning, decision making, andmanagement).

D.

Fin

an

ce

an

dP

riv

ate

Se

cto

rD

ev

elo

pm

en

t

Fin

an

cia

lS

ec

tor

Provide critical assistance (includingrefurbishing and reconstructing offices andbranches, updating technology, and providingtechnical assistance and training) to the twomain commercial banks, Rafidain and Rasheed,to enable them to resume banking operationsand thereby provide essential financial services.Undertake preparatory work on a centralbanking law.Create an effective operating structure forbanking supervision, which will require capacitybuilding, institutional restructuring, and reformthat will need to be implemented over themedium-term.Define and implement a program to upgradeand modernize the country’s non-cash paymentsystem, including clearing and settlement, anddevelop electronic settlement facilities.Review the accounting and auditing frameworkin the financial industry, and in the businesssector as a whole, to ensure congruence with



internationally applicable standards.Develop and deliver training programs aimed at building and upgradingbanking skills.Initiate regulatory work on the non-bank sector (insurance industry andcapital markets).Address the status of the specialized state-owned banks, and encourage theprocess of consolidation within the small and fragmented privatecommercial banking system.Introduce the concept of environmental due diligence in lending toinvestment projects.

Sta

te-O

wn

ed

En

ter

pr

ise

s

Maintain the status quo in the short-term: payworkers’ salaries and provide necessary workingcapital for SOEs, except those that have beendestroyedClose down destroyed SOEs and fund severancepackages, retraining of employees, etc.Undertake preparatory work on legal andregulatory institutions, separation of owingresponsibilities to manage SOEs duringtransition, and build a framework forprivatization.Initiate a clean up of environmental hotspots inthe SOEs causing imminent threat to publichealth.Take steps to improve the enabling environment(see subsection on The Investment Climateunder Section 3, Transition to a Modern MarketEconomy).Establish a trust fund for advisory services andothers transaction-related services to supporteventual privatization.Begin detailed investigations of the SOEs todistinguish degrees of viability.

Inv

es

tme

nt

Cli

ma

tea

nd

Tr

ad

e

InvestmentProvide support (technical assistance and investment) for the government to collect information on the trade and theinvestment climate, support the necessary public and private institutions, and resolve key bottlenecks.“Prime the pump”: establish a venture capital fund and SME-targeted credit facility to help stimulate and catalyze privatesector capital flows.Develop framework arrangements for indemnifying environmental liabilities during privatization.



TradeRehabilitate and modernize the Customs Administration, including the establishment of an operational Customs headquarters,a Customs office in the Ministry of Finance, operational points of entry, simplified Customs procedures, staffing etc.Diversify agricultural and manufacturing exports by enhancing quality consciousness of producers and wider adoption of goodpractices which impart safety, and quality, and conformity.

E.

Min

eA

cti

on

Reduce casualty rates and risk to localpopulationsFree land and infrastructure assets forproductive useBuild national capacities to plan, coordinate,and manage the mine action sector nationwideDevelop an operational capacity to remove EOand UXO caused by the recent conflictReorient mine action assets to provide aresponse in highly affected communities.Review the responsibilities and activitiescurrently carried out by a combination of themilitary, NGO, commercial company and CDOinterventions and develop a coordinatedresponse plan.Develop the capacity of NMAA and IMAC toplan and coordinate mine action.Establish three Regional Mine Action Centersthroughout Iraq to implement yearly work plansand coordinate mine action with humanitarianand reconstruction activities.Further develop northern NGOs, which willbecome the responsibility of the NMAA afterOFF Program transition.Develop Mine Risk Education capacity,clearance, survey, and training capacity in thesouth and center.Conduct a health, environmental and food chainimpact/risk assessment at Depleted Uranium(DU) targets and arm stockpiles and conductDU awareness.Carry out risk reduction and clean up of DUcontaminated sites and sites of controlled armstockpile explosions.



Integrate information systems into nationalhumanitarian databases.Improve mechanical and dog mine detectioncapacity to provide a national resource.

Develop capacity for the planning, implementation, coordination andmonitoring of the mine action activities, including training and capacitybuilding of the various institutions and entities responsible forimplementation.Develop a victim assistance capacity integrated into the national healthsystem.Develop national capacity to limit EO hazards by marking and cleaning upmunitions stocks.Implement a nationwide landmine impact survey.

F.

Go

ve

rn

me

nt

Ins

titu

tio

ns

,R

ule

of

La

w,

Civ

ilS

oc

iety

an

dM

ed

ia

Lo

ca

la

nd

na

tio

na

lin

sti

tuti

on

s

Provide the Interim Governing Council and itsConstitutional Drafting Committee withexposure to comparative experience gained indemocracies throughout the world.Provide assistance to the Governing Council tobuild its capacity for analysis and policy review.Strengthen capacities of local authorities andinstitutions to deliver social servicesReconstruct and rehabilitate central ministriesand local government buildings and provideoffice equipment and furniture to an operationallevel.Develop a framework and structure of a futurePublic Service Commission and define itsmission, functions, organizational structure, andstaffing. As a part of the preparation, undertakea review of civil service laws, salary scale, andbenefits in advance of the establishment of anelected government with a view to developingoptions for future decision making by an Iraqigovernment, and to make them compatible withthe requirements of an efficient and professionalservice and combat corruption.Strengthen the capacity of the Supreme AuditBoard to enable it to undertake managementand financial audits of public sector entities on aregular basis. Management audits conducted



would serve to inform any government reformsthat may take place under an elected Iraqigovernment.Establish financial information systems in localgovernment departments and central ministrieswith a view to reinforcing sound financialmanagement including expenditure controls.Establish a National Institute of PublicAdministration with three local branches insouthern, central and northern Iraq to train civilservants at all levels as well as members offuture elected legislative councils at thegovernorate level.Review procurement rules and regulations andpropose alternatives. Establish clearadministrative procedures in the civil service.

Define the mission and objectives of all ministries and clarify theirorganizational structure and staffing needs both at central and local levels.

Establish a monitoring and evaluation entity at Cabinet level to follow uppolicy implementation and review policy impact on the society.Establish the Public Service Commission.Institutionalize changes in procurement laws, rules, and regulations.

Ru

leo

fL

aw

an

dh

um

an

rig

hts

Review the laws and develop options that wouldmake them more suitable for an open societyand free market economy. Rebuild and equipthe courts.Provide support in the implementation oftransitional justice.Strengthen law enforcement capacity anddevelop the capacity of correctional institutionsDevelop training programs for putative judgesand prosecutors on international human rightsstandards, developments in internationalcriminal law, and modern approaches to basiclegal skills and civil rights.

Train public defenders.Develop the capacity of the forensics institute.Refurbish and equip the schools of law, theJudicial Institute, and support the reform oflegal education to ensure the quality of teaching



staff and students. Provide training for juristsand court staff.

Establish a Human Rights Commission and ensure its staffing andoperations.Establish a monitoring mechanism of the justice sector (courts, police, andprisons) to identify individual and systemic human rights violationsoccurring in the justice sector and report them to the authorities forcorrective action.

Civ

ilS

oc

iety

Or

ga

niz

ati

on

s

Review the laws, rules, and regulations affectingthe establishment and operation of civil societyorganizations.Provide training to the founders and staff of civilsociety organizations.

Support civil society organizations and ensure the legal framework for theiroperations.Facilitate the participation of civil society organizations in thereconstruction and development projects and allow them to act as externalmonitors of government operations.

Me

dia

an

dC

om

mu

nic

ati

on

Establish interim public policy on the mediathat complies with the relevant internationalstandards of freedom of expression until anIraqi constitution is in place.Train journalists and media staff through atwinning arrangement with well establishedinstitutions.

Provide the legal and licensing framework and enabling environment forthe operation of media organizations and ensure freedom of expressionunder the law.

G.

Cr

os

sC

utt

ing

Th

em

es

-H

um

an

Rig

hts

,G

en

de

r,

En

vir

on

me

nt H

um

an

Rig

hts

Restoration and consolidation of democracy with inclusion, transparency, and good governanceComprehensive policies enacting far-reaching institutional and legal reformsUtilize methods of the transition process that are inclusive, participatory, and command broad-based Iraqi support.Give particular attention to the principles of non-discrimination, reducing vulnerability, establishing accountability, enhancingempowerment, and securing the free, active, and meaningful participation of the Iraqi people.

Ge

nd

er

Convene a Women’s Forum to identify and clearly articulate the needs and priorities of Iraqi women, and identify resourcesand mechanisms for their participation in the transitional process.

Support the mobilization and organization of women and women's networks for their effective participation in the democraticprocesses, and to advocate for their rights in the new governance frameworks and institutions. It is also critical to link Iraqiwomen with regional women's groups and networks for rapid learning and capacity development.Design and implement media strategies to support awareness raising and advocacy campaigns on key transitional issues.



En

vir

on

me

nt

Strengthen the Ministry of EnvironmentStrengthen environmental governance at alllevelsBuild capacity for environmental impactassessmentsClean up environmental hotspotsBuild public awareness of environmental issues.

Establish a modern environmental infrastructure accompanied by laws,procedures, and information systemsBuild capacity for Iraq to access international environmental fundingopportunities



NDS (2005 - 2007)Category Sub-Category 2005 2006 2007

Ec

on

om

icG

ro

wth

Maintaining low inflation within the context of sound monetary policy, and expanded monetary policy toolsMaintaining fiscally sound budgets and transparent controls for budget formulation and execution Meeting fiscaltargets will be assisted by subsidy adjustments

Strengthening financial management and public expenditure tracking and controlDeveloping and implementing mechanisms to ensure transparent and full accountability of oil revenues within thenational budget processConcluding debt relief agreements with both Paris Club and non-Paris Club creditorsImplementing all macroeconomic and structural reforms under the IMF’s Emergency Post-Conflict Assistance(EPCA) agreement, including implementing a timely and accurate monetary survey and establishing a singletreasury accountImproving the quality, timeliness, and range of financial and economic data produced by government offices foreconomic planningImplementing fiscal decentralization and devolution of planning responsibilities to local and regional governmentsIncreasing domestic resource mobilization by creating conditions conducive to private savings, by strengthening thedeposit-taking commercial banking sector with a national payments system

Oil

an

dG

as

Improving the legal and regulatory framework in the oil sector to enable restructuring of the industryPromoting strategic partnerships between Iraqi and foreign oil and gas companies so as to tap an important sourceof capital for the expansion and rehabilitation of the industryEstablishing independent national oil and gas companies (both upstream and downstream)Reducing fuel subsidies that distort incentives and encourage wasteful consumption of this precious non-renewableresourceInvesting in technical and managerial training to bolster capacity

Ag

ric

ult

ur

e

Reform of the subsidy regime to eliminate price distortions in agricultural marketsRestoration of irrigation infrastructure (including a long-term desalinization program), as well as the grainmarketing infrastructure for handling, storing, and distributing agricultural inputs and outputsDevelopment of a viable agricultural research and extension service to develop and disseminate improved varietiesand successful production practices are needed to restore agricultural productivityIncreasing production and productivity through providing improved seeds, fertilizers and their scientificexploitationParticipating effectively in the national plan to revive marshes through the development of animal assets, especiallyraising buffalo and the development of fish fortune

To

ur

ism

Establishing active tourist promotion offices in key international capitalsStreamlining and simplifying visa and immigration proceduresEncouraging entry by the international hospitality industry (hotels, car rental Agencies, foreign exchange bureausetc.) into the Iraq marketDeveloping marshes and lakes to an appropriate tourism level to attract tourists and visitors



Developing the infrastructure of religious cities and maintaining the Holy shrinesDeveloping tourism education institutes, and developing tourism institutions, building the capacities of peopleworking in the tourism field through specialized training programs, and making use of the experiences of othercountries

Gr

ow

tha

nd

Jo

bC

re

ati

on

Ba

nk

ing

an

dF

ina

nc

e

Restructuring the State-owned banks, including updating technology and providing technical assistance, andcapacity buildingCreating an effective operating structure for the Central Bank to provide services and supervision of the bankingsystemUpgrading and modernizing the non-cash payments system, including inter-bank clearing and settlement servicesEstablishing up to date electronic settlement facilities at the Central Bank and its regional branchesAddressing the status of State-owned banks and insurance companies to encourage the process of consolidation andprivatization

Ele

ctr

icit

y

Reconstruct the electric power network to increase power generation to the levels that guarantee continuous supplyto satisfy consumer demand with minimum interruptionsUpdate the electric power distribution networks to meet the objective aboveDevelop a timetable on short- and long-term bases to qualify and train executives and supervisory staff for thesector to upgrade its efficiencyA combination of more rational pricing, significant investment, and improved efficiency should eliminate theexisting gap between electrical supply and demand. The private sector should be the main source of new investment

Te

lec

om

mu

nic

ati

on

Rebuilding and expanding the existing switching and local access networks and undertake civil works in order toreach fixed line telephone service teledensity of 3.3 million customers by 2007Establishing a modern and integrated national long distance backbone network with international connectivityReconstructing the postal system including rehabilitation of post facilities and the existing buildings to bring Iraq inline with other countries in the region

Tr

an

sp

or

t

Continue ongoing dredging activities in and around Umm Qasr PortRemove wrecks in Shatt-al-Arab and Umm Qasr Ports in the most environmentally sound manner possibleDevelop a master plan to increase efficiency and optimize the institutional arrangement for ports and inlandwaterwaysExplore the potential for developing a rapid bus transit system and dedicated bus linesRehabilitation of key railway stations and refurbishing rolling stock and maintenance equipmentModernize railway training centers in order to maintain the skills of railway staffPrepare a railways strategy to assess the merits of restructuring the present system to permit greater private sectorparticipation in the delivery of servicesDevelop airports and civil aviation strategy coupled with a master plan, which should include plans forrationalization of facilities and future institutional arrangements, with the possibility of outsourcing airportmanagement to private operatorsDevelop programs for the privatization of some activities in the sector, particularly in the field of communications,and land, sea, and air transportationRetrain supervisory and operational staff, particularly in the area of previously suspended activities such as aviation



and maritime

Pr

iva

tiz

ati

on

an

dr

es

tru

ctu

rin

go

fs

tate

-ow

ne

de

nte

rp

ris

es

Achieving a significant increase in the annual production of industrial enterprises in comparison with 2002Closing down SOEs whose physical plant has been damaged where there is no economic advantage from keepingthem in operation and facilitating the redistribution of assets to more productive uses elsewhereExpanding the activities of geological surveys in northern areas and starting metal exploration activitiesEstablishment of industrial zones and complexes for the purpose of industrial integration and the encouragement ofjoint venturesStrengthening standardization and quality assurance servicesEncouraging the establishment of Small and Medium Scale Enterprise projects and developing appropriatefinancing mechanism for such projectsEncouraging the establishment of technical resource networks for women entrepreneurs

Fo

re

ign

Dir

ec

tIn

ve

stm

en

ts

Continue to remove all kinds of restrictions on foreign investors and to encourage the flow of foreign directinvestment in a manner that ensures the flow of foreign capital, modern technology and management expertiseEncourage partnerships between foreign and Iraqi investorsSimplify procedures for foreign investors through a one-stop approach for all procedures related to foreigninvestors, that would draw together all Iraqi government officials concerned in one placeCreate a specialized authority to provide facilities to investors and offer investment opportunities in the countryConclude bilateral and multilateral foreign investment agreements, ratify investment guaranty agreements with theMultilateral Investment Guarantee Agency and effectively utilize the Overseas Private Investment Corporation tocatalyze foreign investmentPromote alternative dispute resolution mechanisms to resolve investment disputes

Imp

ro

vin

gth

eQ

ua

lity

of

life

Wa

ter

an

dS

an

ita

tio

n

Establishing a Leadership Code of Conduct and Ethics requiring, inter alia, declaration of wealth by public officials.Strengthening the Public Integrity Commission and decentralizing its activities to the regions to eradicatecorruption.Continuing strengthen the Board of Supreme Audit and decentralizing its activities to the regions to ensuretransparency in public financial management.Enhancing corporate ethics and transparency.Implementing the new public procurement regulations for ministries and public Agencies for the proper andeffective use of State funds.Establishing e-government to modernize governmental business processes.Supporting the Electoral Commission, including voter registration and voter education.Strengthening journalistic professionalism.Supporting civic education initiatives that promote dialogue between communities.Supporting objective public broadcasting (including an independent regulatory structure for license allocation).Increasing representation of women and minorities in both the legislative and executive branches.Training in respect for human rights for all security services, including the prisons.Enhancing the administration of justice by training judges, lawyers and prosecutors, and providing modernmanagement information systems and equipment



Ed

uc

ati

on

Physical rehabilitation and reconstruction of primary and secondary schools.Ensuring minimal quality standards of teaching and learning through strengthening basic teacher training.Providing adequate supplies of material, equipment and furniture to schools.Developing a new curriculum at all levels to prepare students for the 21st century.Strengthen links between vocational training, technical education and labor markets.Encourage life-long professional development of educational staff.

He

alt

h

Meeting Urgent Needsa. Addressing shortages in medicines andurgent supplies.b. Upgrading emergency services includingobstetric care.c. Increasing immunization coverage.d. Upgrading blood transfusion services.e. Establishing a more efficient informationsystem.f. Improving communications.g. Improving food safety measures.h. Re-organizing the pharmaceutical sector.i. Conducting an in-depth review ofprimary care.j. Strengthening disease surveillancesystem.k. Intensifying communicable diseasecontrol activities.l. Meeting most urgent rehabilitationneeds.m. Developing a plan for human resourcesdevelopment and attending to urgentorganizational and coordination issues.Strengthening Results BasedManagementa. Institutionalizing values such astransparency, accountability, openness,equal opportunity and participationb. Strengthening capacity for strategicplanning, management, procurement; andmodernizing budgeting and financefunctions.c. Building capacity for managing



decentralization and for leadershipdevelopment.d. Changing to evidence-based decisionmaking, performance appraisal, monitoringand evaluation.e. Eradicating corruption.Developing and implementing a fouryear plan for reconstructiona. Revisiting reconstruction requirementsand prioritizing.b. Developing standards for rehabilitationand new construction.c. Strengthening capacity in projectmanagement and implementation.d. Strengthening coordination withpartners.Training and capacity buildinga. Training and capacity building inmanagement.b. Strengthening capacity in public healthand related branches like health planning,economics, financing, and other areas.c. Training in clinical skills.d. Upgrading health professional education(basic, post-graduate, continuing).Mobilizing resourcesa. Raising commitment to the health sectorb. Improving information on current statusand needsc. Intensifying work with the mediad. Strengthening donor partnerships andcoordinatione. Encouraging partnerships with non-governmental organizations andcommunities.

The development of a strong, coherent and integrated public healthsystem.Health financingSupporting and strengthening public sector administration



Go

ve

rn

an

ce

an

dS

ec

ur

ity

Er

ad

ica

tin

gC

or

ru

pti

on

Establishing a Leadership Code of Conduct and Ethics requiring, inter alia, declaration of wealth by public officialsStrengthening the Public Integrity Commission and decentralize its activities to the regions to eradicate corruption.Continue strengthening the Board of Supreme Audit and decentralize its activities to the regions to ensuretransparency in public financial management.Enhancing corporate ethics and transparency.Implementing the new public procurement regulations for ministries and public Agencies for the proper andeffective use of State funds.Establishing e-government to increase transparency and modernize governmental business processes

La

wE

nfo

rc

em

en

tEmergency issuesa. Train, equip, and mentor ISF in technical skills and concepts of enforcementb. Build ISF capacity in Management, Fiscal Responsibility, Administration and Leadershipc. Foster a law enforcement culture of “Protect and Serve”d. Develop centralized administrative and finance management systemse. Bolster ISF Station Infrastructure and Operationsf. Establish policy, procedural and systemic integration and oversight with the corrections system and the judiciaryg. Develop investigative and forensic capability that respects the rights of those accusedh. Strengthen control of borders including immigration and customs enforcementi. Develop sufficient communication capabilities to engender and enhance provincial public order.Specific Immediate Requirementsa. Training and equipment for the ISF.b. Building senior Iraq law enforcement leadership and command capacities through technical assistance andmentoring in Iraq and internships.c. Development of mid-level and first-line supervisory skills through a combined program of Iraq-based training,technical assistance and mentoring.d. Implement personnel and payroll management system.e. Encourage close coordination between law enforcement and judicial investigatorsf. Build investigative and forensic capability through training and equipmentg. Automate case management system

Ju

dic

iar

y

Emergency Issuesa. Build infrastructure for Iraq’s court facilities.b. Increase court administrative capacity for case management.c. Improve security for members of the judiciary and court facilities.d. Establish policy, procedural and systemic integration and oversight with the corrections system and the judiciary.e. Strengthen the legal profession in support of the judicial process that includes substantive and proceduralknowledge, legal research, standards, licensing, higher legal education, and human rights training.

Specific Immediate requirementsa. Merit-based, transparent procedure for nominating and promoting candidates to fill judicial and prosecutorialpositions.



b. Transparent procedures for investigating allegations of misconduct and incompetence in the judiciary.c. Annual budgets based upon objectives and technical support.d. Mechanisms for interfacing with the executive and legislative branches to provide information on the role of theHJC in a reformed judiciary.e. Expanded training programs for judges, judicial investigators, and court staff.f. Support courthouse construction and renovation.g. Support and training for legislative drafting.h. Support for administrative judiciary training.i. Improved transparency and management of the office responsible for ensuring enforcement of judicial decisions.j. Improved security for members of the judiciary and court facilities.k. Modern computerized case management systems to schedule cases, coordinate attendance of prosecutors,complainants, witnesses, and police, and allow lay persons to view court schedules.l. New techniques and technologies in court administration, including docket management, case assignment,collection and analysis of statistics, and training judges and court administrators to use these new systems.m. Support for the Iraqi bar in training lawyers in court administration and case management.n. Support for an effective, transparent and equitable public defense system.o. Building and strengthening networks of defense attorneys and legal service providers to improve access to justicefor the citizenry, especially the traditionally disenfranchised and the poor.

Co

rr

ec

tio

ns

Emergency Issuesa. Build capacity of Ministry of Justice and management and administration of Prisons with adherence tointernational standardsb. Improve prison infrastructure and operationsc. Train and mentor correction system personnel in relevant international standards and human rights accordsd. Establish policy, procedural and systemic integration and oversight with law enforcement and the judiciarye. Strengthen system for oversight, accountability, and enforcement of prison personnel and operationsf. Implement rehabilitation programs to reform and train detaineesSpecific Immediate requirementsa. Training of Iraqi Correction System personnel including human rights and managerial subject matterb. Furnish and equip correctional facilitiesc. Training of MOJ personnel in administration and managementd. Rehabilitation programs to return detainees to society



NDS (2007 - 2010)Category Sub-Category 2008 2009 2010

Oil

an

dG

as

Establishing harmonized transparent and predictable hydrocarbon financial systemImproving monitor and control process including installing meters in all stages.Using precautions for environment protection including the best oil field use, reducing harmful gas and control it.Estimating the needs of the oil, gas and electricity ad-hoc sectors as interrelated power production components.Identifying national investment priorities according to-power sector experts' views.Developing effective plan to increase power sector efficiency.Identifying the required funding as well as identifying public and private resources including local and foreigninvestments.Developing supporting policies and legislations for managing power demand including power efficiency improvement.Increasing crude oil production to 3.5 million bpd at the end of 2011.Increasing fuel production to 700 thousand bpd at the end of 2011.Satisfying demand for fuel with international prices at the end of 2011.Developing natural gas to satisfy electricity demand.

Ag

ric

ult

ur

e

Supporting production and stop agricultural inputs subsidies in different periods according to their kinds and impact onthe development process.Encouraging private sector investment in the agriculture and agro-industry fields by creating a secure investmentenvironment.Reactivating the credit system through the Agriculture Development Fund by paying for the list of requirements insteadof paying the credit amount which was the mechanism in the past.Encouraging the establishment of specialized agricultural associations.Trying for a fair division of for water shares in terms of quality and quantity with concerned countries.Completing irrigation and drainage systems for irrigated projects using comprehensive reclamation system andrehabilitate existing ones as well as implementing main outfalls.Adding new lands especially those could be cultivated by establishing irrigation projects in rain fed zones such as Al-Jazeera, KRG and Kirkuk projects.Using supplementary irrigation in semi-rain zones.Using modern irrigation technologies including closed irrigation systems to reduce water wastewhich could resultcreating new lands.Reusing heavy and salinity water after treatment and planting corps resisting salts.Using renewable underground water in all agricultural and livestock breeding fields without being consumed throughdigging wells in promising areas.Completing large and small dam's projects systems achieving (water security); increasing water resources to addelectrical power to the network.Maintaining existing irrigation projects, pump stations, irrigation and drainage network, main rivers cleaning.Increase vegetal production (Including vegetal and orchards) through vertical expansion (production increase) andhorizontal expansion (adding new lands) according to irrigation project plan and water shares.



Derive and input high productivity species resisting dryness and salinity.Reviewing seeds legislations and regulations.Revitalizing and developing Iraqi Marches according to development comprehensive programs within provided waterresources.Develop appropriate agricultural courses for farmers in each region and using bean fodder.Looking after livestock breeding and artificial fertilization transferring genes according to development breedingprograms.Treating severe lack in fodder supply by planting them and developing green spots and forests, natural protectorate andreconstruct the damages.Investing water sites for fishing breeding, activate sea fishing and develop poultry sector.Develop guidance and veterinary services as well as supporting agricultural research in this field.Develop infrastructure and building capacity upon world practices.Providing guidance and educating the new generation and rural woman training her to participate in developing thissector.Expanding the use of comprehensive control (IPM), expanding natural fertilizers and move to Bio- agricultureproduction.Developing environment in all agricultural projects and staying a way from negative practices on it.Utilizing renewable natural power such as wind and sun energy and other in developing remote areas and agriculturallands.Completing the program of agro- environment dividing maps for guiding farmers.Enhancing agricultural trade by increasing production and quality improvement as well as creating competition to faceconsequence effects on current international economic changes.Review agriculture and environment legislations related to lands ownership and rent.Follow up Iraq accession to International and regional agreements related to agriculture, environment and waterresources.Rehabilitating irrigation, drainage and soil maintenance projects as a base for production increase in one hectare.Solve the problem of salinity and desert as well as looking after pasturages, forests and water sits to activate livestockproduction, fishing wealth and others.Establishing clear policy of guidance to direct farmers to use modern agriculture and concentrate on applied researchesespecially those related to developing seeds species with high productivity in addition to educating them on preventivemethods of diseases and efficient marketing.Organizing irrigation projects in a way securing agriculture requirements and achieving sound irrigation system.

To

ur

ism

Establishing active tourist promotion offices in key international capitalsStreamlining and simplifying visa and immigration proceduresEncouraging entry by the international hospitality industry (hotels, car rental Agencies, foreign exchange bureaus etc.)into the Iraq marketDeveloping marshes and lakes to an appropriate tourism level to attract tourists and visitorsDeveloping the infrastructure of religious cities and maintaining the Holy shrines



Developing tourism education institutes, and developing tourism institutions, building the capacities of people workingin the tourism field through specialized training programs, and making use of the experiences of other countries

Gr

ow

tha

nd

Jo

bC

re

ati

on

Ba

nk

ing

an

dF

ina

nc

e

Restructuring the State-owned banks, including updating technology and providing technical assistance, and capacitybuildingCreating an effective operating structure for the Central Bank to provide services and supervision of the banking systemUpgrading and modernizing the non-cash payments system, including inter-bank clearing and settlement servicesEstablishing up to date electronic settlement facilities at the Central Bank and its regional branchesAddressing the status of State-owned banks and insurance companies to encourage the process of consolidation andprivatizationProvide appropriate circumstances for financial system enhancement in Iraq and increase insurance servicesaccessibility by commercial companies and individualsProvide appropriate competitive environment for private sector business growth as well as restructuring, changing anddeveloping private banks role in banking industry in general.Facilitate private sector participation in presenting services for the government as employees and pensioners payroll.

Ele

ctr

icit

y

Reconstruct the electric power network to increase power generation to the levels that guarantee continuous supply tosatisfy consumer demand with minimum interruptionsUpdate the electric power distribution networks to meet the objective aboveDevelop a timetable on short- and long-term bases to qualify and train executives and supervisory staff for the sector toupgrade its efficiencyA combination of more rational pricing, significant investment, and improved efficiency should eliminate the existinggap between electrical supply and demand. The private sector should be the main source of new investment

Te

lec

om

mu

nic

ati

on

Rebuilding and expanding the existing switching and local access networks and undertake civil works in order to reachfixed line telephone service teledensity of 3.3 million customers by 2007Establishing a modern and integrated national long distance backbone network with international connectivityReconstructing the postal system including rehabilitation of post facilities and the existing buildings to bring Iraq in linewith other countries in the region

Tr

an

sp

or

t

Continue ongoing dredging activities in and around Umm Qasr PortRemove wrecks in Shatt-al-Arab and Umm Qasr Ports in the most environmentally sound manner possibleDevelop a master plan to increase efficiency and optimize the institutional arrangement for ports and inland waterwaysExplore the potential for developing a rapid bus transit system and dedicated bus linesRehabilitation of key railway stations and refurbishing rolling stock and maintenance equipmentModernize railway training centers in order to maintain the skills of railway staffPrepare a railways strategy to assess the merits of restructuring the present system to permit greater private sectorparticipation in the delivery of servicesDevelop airports and civil aviation strategy coupled with a master plan, which should include plans for rationalization offacilities and future institutional arrangements, with the possibility of outsourcing airport management to privateoperatorsDevelop programs for the privatization of some activities in the sector, particularly in the field of communications, andland, sea, and air transportation



Retrain supervisory and operational staff, particularly in the area of previously suspended activities such as aviation andmaritime

Pr

iva

tiz

ati

on

an

dr

es

tru

ctu

rin

go

fs

tate

-o

wn

ed

en

ter

pr

ise

s

Achieving a significant increase in the annual production of industrial enterprises in comparison with 2002Closing down SOEs whose physical plant has been damaged where there is no economic advantage from keeping themin operation and facilitating the redistribution of assets to more productive uses elsewhereExpanding the activities of geological surveys in northern areas and starting metal exploration activitiesEstablishment of industrial zones and complexes for the purpose of industrial integration and the encouragement ofjoint venturesStrengthening standardization and quality assurance servicesEncouraging the establishment of Small and Medium Scale Enterprise projects and developing appropriate financingmechanism for such projectsEncouraging the establishment of technical resource networks for women entrepreneursRestructuring companies with economically viable.

Fo

re

ign

Dir

ec

tIn

ve

stm

en

ts

Continue to remove all kinds of restrictions on foreign investors and to encourage the flow of foreign direct investment ina manner that ensures the flow of foreign capital, modern technology and management expertiseEncourage partnerships between foreign and Iraqi investorsSimplify procedures for foreign investors through a one-stop approach for all procedures related to foreign investors,that would draw together all Iraqi government officials concerned in one placeCreate a specialized authority to provide facilities to investors and offer investment opportunities in the countryConclude bilateral and multilateral foreign investment agreements, ratify investment guaranty agreements with theMultilateral Investment Guarantee Agency and effectively utilize the Overseas Private Investment Corporation tocatalyze foreign investmentPromote alternative dispute resolution mechanisms to resolve investment disputes

Em

er

ge

nc

yP

os

t-C

on

flic

tA

ss

ista

nc

eP

ro

gr

am

(Sta

nd

By

Ag

re

em

en

t)

Reducing fuel subsides and restructuring oil sector.Reforming Social Safety Net (SSN), improving PDS management according to certain mechanism targeting the poor inthe society.Developing open exchange and payment system as well as maintaining debt resettlement with Non- Paris Club countrieswith the same conditions of Paris Club Countries.Completing the Fiscal Reform System by applying Government Fiscal Classification (GFS)

WT

OA

cc

es

sio

n

Maintaining low protection policies to facilitate openness process on international markets.Removing all imports quantitative limitations and developing suitable custom tariff. This requires carrying outcomprehensive review for all customs laws especially Customs Law No. 23 / 1983 and other technical laws related totechnical specifications of imported commodities, general health, vegetal and animal health in accordance with item 20of the CAAT Agreement which allows countries to protect their general health without being under covered protection.Removing all import subsidies.Applying appropriate agricultural policy solving subsidies first and allowing agricultural stuff to enter local marketsorganizing how submitted to custom tariff second.Liberalizing services sector and open it to the world, the international organization insists on applying non-discrimination principle in this sector.



Issue and implement number of legislations in accordance with the minimum requirements for protecting intellectualrights according to Uruguay agreement.Complete preventative procedures Draft Law.Complete Anti Overloading Procedures Draft Law.Implementing macroeconomic reforms allowing to free capital and foreign investment movement etc.

Hu

ma

nD

ev

elo

pm

en

t

Monitoring and evaluation system to assess the economic and social impact of governmental policies for evidence- basedadjustment of supporting programsModern, transparent public expenditure management to promote development while covering basic sectoral fundingneedsFundamental management skills (supervision, team building, financial management, budgeting and costing, strategicplanning, etc.), as well as those needed to implement new policies.Institutionalization of systems: standard operating procedures within the various governmental institutionsData gathering and analysis systems: decentralized monitoring, evaluation and reporting systems, information sharingand management and coordination with other governmental and international institutionsPublic career development policy and associated training programs to boost performance in public institutions and toachieve overall improvement of governance

Er

ad

ica

teE

xtr

em

eP

ov

er

tya

nd

Un

de

rta

ke

Ar

ea

Ba

se

dD

ev

elo

pm

en

t

Monitor poverty and food insecurity and assess needs in order to adjust social safety nets to cover all the needypopulation and expand the active social protection tools to combat poverty and increase stability

Support the development of the employment generating private sector through fiscal incentives, limited bureaucracy,and transparent and fair competitionReorganize the vocational education system to respond to labor market needs for skills and to encourage employmentEstablish Regional Development Agencies under MoPDC to coordinate and implement nationally and internationally-funded reconstruction projects for geographic areas and allocate funding based on needs assessmentDevelop and implement area development strategies in certain areas such as the marshes in the South and other areas inthe Center and the north of the country.Develop security-strengthening social plans with the social partners, police, business people, donors and MNFIs to solvethe problems of illegal weapons, armed groups, security, and critical reconstructionEncourage local civil society participation in developing comprehensive plans to treat all issues rationally, as well asproviding job opportunitiesEstablish public- private partnerships between governmental entities and the private sector to provide services

Em

plo

ym

en

t

Institutionalization of the social dialogue with social partners (unions, employers’ organizations) for employmentpolicies adjusted to the labor market’s needs (Social Dialogue Committee set up under MOLSA coordination)Institutionalization of partnership with foreign investors in Iraq (through the Chamber of Commerce of Iraq) to identifytraining needs and to secure funding for skills development programsSmall and Medium Enterprises development program and an institution devoted to encouraging job creation and on thejob trainingMicro credit/grant pilot units to be operational in poor areas with the support and the participation of the civil societyLocal Councils’ participation in employment generating programs through public works at the local level across Iraq



Ta

rg

eti

ng

Vu

lne

ra

ble

Gr

ou

ps

.

Computerization of business processes, SSN Beneficiary Database development, making Management InformationSystem operational in MOLSA and its local offices to preserve integrity of the SSN system, check and reject duplications,manage payments and produce reports to document and support specific decisionsContinuous training programs to rehabilitate staff skills in using modern IT and new business processesRegular Beneficiaries assessment to monitor the impact of the SSN programInstitutionalize the Social Worker in Iraq, providing training and develop a network of social workers to assist poor andvulnerable groupsSet quality standards for social services and develop NGOs – MOLSA partnerships to expand social assistance for thebenefit of needy personsIssue monthly reports on SSN coverage, including basic information regarding access and eligibility conditions, toincrease public awareness

Inte

rn

all

yd

isp

lac

ed

pe

op

le,

re

fug

ee

sa

nd

re

tur

ne

es

Policy development: drafting and analytical capabilityGood legal/ analytical skills, particularly in comparative exercises that will ensure that the national policies and laws arein accordance with international laws and standardsInternal coordination structures as well as inter-ministerial coordinationTechnical capacity regarding emergency preparedness, coordination, and response capacity, including good needsassessment capacity and specialized ability to address the particular needs of each vulnerable groupInstitutionalization of systems: standard operating procedures within the MoDM and other partner governmentalinstitutionsStreamlining/ electronic maintenance of records and information systemsEnhancing field capacity/ establishment of branch offices at the governorate and district levels with an informationnetwork at the community/ linkages at Governorate level/ delineation of authority which enables local response andcoordination

Wa

ter

an

dS

an

ita

tio

n

Provide financial and technical support to water, sewage, and solid waste sectors to achieve pre – 2003 levels by the endof this year, including: increasing access to potable water by urban areas by 15% and that of rural areas by 20%; reducingwater losses by 10%; raising sanitation coverage by 10% in urban areas; developing city master plans for water andsanitation service in the major cities; building capacity and enhancing management systems.Rebuild Al- Rasafa Plant for potable water in Baghdad and provide safe potable water to the city of Basrah. Providesewage services to newly built areas in Baghdad and Basrah.Continue efforts to reconstruct and establish new sanitation plant in urban and rural areas to ensure full coverage of allregions of Iraq, and to reduce inequity between urban and rural areas.Improve water quality and upgrade the water distribution networks.Develop short- and long- term plans to train executives and supervisory staff for the water and sewerage projects, and toestablish high level training centers for this purpose.Provide adequate crude water resources for all regions of Iraq.Maintain and improve the efficiency of existing pumps stations and sewerages networks.Maintain and rehabilitate the existing potable water projects for the purpose of having environment standards forprocessed water prior to pumping to drainage points for protecting environment.Improve and protect environment by observing air, water and soil pollution rates. Building capacity, providing special



machines and staff for measuring the quality of air and water sewage, liquid and solid waste of individual andgovernment location and private sector and control processing before.

Ed

uc

ati

on

Physical rehabilitation and reconstruction of primary and secondary schools.Ensuring minimal quality standards of teaching and learning through strengthening basic teacher training.Providing adequate supplies of material, equipment and furniture to schools.Developing a new curriculum at all levels to prepare students for the 21st century.Strengthen links between vocational training, technical education and labor markets.Encourage life-long professional development of educational staff.H

ea

lth

Meeting Urgent Needsa. Addressing shortages in medicines andurgent supplies.b. Upgrading emergency services includingobstetric care.c. Increasing immunization coverage.d. Upgrading blood transfusion services.e. Establishing a more efficient informationsystem.f. Improving communications.

g. Improving food safety measures.h. Re-organizing the pharmaceutical sector.i. Conducting an in-depth review of primarycare.j. Strengthening disease surveillance system.k. Intensifying communicable disease controlactivities.l. Meeting most urgent rehabilitation needs.m. Developing a plan for human resourcesdevelopment and attending to urgentorganizational and coordination issues.Strengthening Results BasedManagementa. Institutionalizing values such astransparency, accountability, openness, equalopportunity and participationb. Strengthening capacity for strategic planning,management, procurement; and modernizingbudgeting and finance functions.c. Building capacity for managingdecentralization and for leadership



development.d. Changing to evidence-based decision making,performance appraisal, monitoring andevaluation.e. Eradicating corruption.Developing and implementing a 4 yearplan for reconstructiona. Revisiting reconstruction requirements andprioritizing.b. Developing standards for rehabilitation andnew construction.c. Strengthening capacity in projectmanagement and implementation.d. Strengthening coordination with partners.Training and capacity buildinga. Training and capacity building inmanagement.b. Strengthening capacity in public health andrelated branches like health planning,economics, financing, and other areas.c. Training in clinical skills.d. Upgrading health professional education(basic, post-graduate, continuing).

Mobilizing resourcesa. Raising commitment to the health sector

b. Improving information on current status andneedsc. Intensifying work with the mediad. Strengthening donor partnerships andcoordinatione. Encouraging partnerships with non-governmental organizations and communities.

The development of a strong, coherent and integrated public healthsystem.Health financingSupporting and strengthening public sector administration

Ho

us

ing

& Ur

ba

nD

ev

elo

pm

en

t

Reviewing existing land use patterns, zoning regulations, building codes and standards and formulate forward lookingland use and development policies for efficient and optimum utilization of land.Developing a new strategic Master Plan for Baghdad and all other municipalities utilizing modern technologies and



latest city profile data.Reviewing existing laws with a view to amending or repealing or promulgating new laws so as to strengthen thelegislative framework for housing and urban development.Establishing a transparent and fully automated property rights registration system.Creating an enabling environment for public and private housing finances institutions to take root.Enact a new Mortgage Law to enable all established banks, including the Real Estate Bank, to participate in financinghousing projects.Evolve appropriate fiscal incentives for resource mobilization and to encourage house lending.Initiate the process of establishing an appropriate regulatory framework to facilitate public and private partnership.Develop legal means for cheaper and more stable construction finance such as allowing partly constructed buildings tohave standing in law as assets so they may serve as collateral.

An

nu

al

All

oc

ati

on

sa

nd

Dis

trib

uti

on

so

ng

ov

er

no

ra

tes

Regions and governorate should prepare their development strategies within the general framework of the NDS to besent to MOPCD.Develop medium- term plans including:- Required quantity goals, living standards survey and human development indicators could be used in this concern.- Distributing funds according to identified priorities during plan years.- Identify basic implementation requirements to avoid obstacles might impact on implementation efficiency andschedules.- Identify project operational requirements after implementation, especially preparing specialized and qualified staffwith early coordination with the concerned sectoral ministries.Establishing institutional system deals with planning and development within governorate level as a base fordecentralizing development management, will be explained later, in addition to identifying tasks and responsibilities ineach organizational unit.Establishing Information database for the purpose of providing data and indicators feedback.Building and developing capacities.

Po

liti

ca

lN

ee

ds

Rejection and Confrontation of terrorismRenunciation of violence against the state and between sects, ethnic and social groups within IraqRespect for the rule of law, including civil liberties and human rightsEstablishment of a sovereign, unified, democratic and federal IraqInstitutionalization of democratic federalism through an agreed upon and consensus based processFair and equitable sharing of resourcesCooperation based on mutual benefit with its neighbors

Bu

ild

ing

up

for

ce

sa

nd

se

cu

rit

y

Emergency Issues:a- Train, equip, and mentor ISF in technical skills and concepts of enforcementb- Build ISF capacity in Management, Fiscal Responsibility, Administration and Leadership.c- Foster a law enforcement culture of “Protect and Serve”d- Develop centralized administrative and finance management systemse- Bolster ISF Station Infrastructure and Operationsf- Establish policy, procedural and systemic integration and oversight with the corrections system and the judiciary



g- Develop investigative and forensic capability that respects the rights of those accusedh- Strengthen control of borders including immigration and customs enforcementi- Develop sufficient communication capabilities to engender and enhance provincial public order.

Specific Immediate Requirements:a- Training and equipment for the ISF .b- Building senior Iraq law enforcement leadership and command capacities through technical assistance andmentoring in Iraq and internships.c- Development of mid-level and first-line supervisory skills through a combined program of Iraq-based training,technical assistance and mentoring.d- Implement personnel and payroll management system.e- Encourage necessity of close coordination between law enforcement and judicial investigatorsf- Build investigative and forensic capability through training and equipmentg- Automate case management system

Hu

ma

nR

igh

ts

Establish a comprehensive human rights regime nationwideEstablish and implement effective rule of law institutions and policiesEstablish effective transitional justice mechanisms

En

ga

gin

gw

ith

civ

ilS

oc

iety

Introduce a policy framework that stimulates the participation of civil society in the design, implementation andmonitoring of reform and reconstruction programmes. Adopt legislation enabling and protecting NGOs and other civilsociety structures including.Clarify mandates and responsibilities and ensuring engagement of all stakeholders in the context of economic and socialtransformations including economic liberalization and devolution.Develop a comprehensive approach to transparency including freedom of information legislation and policies on publicdisclosure mandatory for public officials and institutions. Guarantee and protect the rights of media, watchdogs andother information sharing institutions

Go

od

Go

ve

rn

an

ce

an

dC

or

ru

pti

on

Strengthen the rule of law and the capacities of law enforcement AgenciesDevelop anticorruption plans for institutions with substantial revenue and expenditure assignmentsFully implement the public income and asset disclosure lawLaunch a public education campaign on anticorruptionStrengthen capacity for internal audit and the Supreme Board of AuditReview the mandates and statutes of the Commission of Public Integrity and the Inspectors Generals to ensure theirworking as independent, professional, technical and non-political bodies.Develop a comprehensive system of internal and external controls within government, including conflict of interestpolicies, audit and evaluationDevelop comprehensive and consistent policies and legislation along with responsible institutions to improve access toinformation and public disclosure;Ratify the UN Convention Against CorruptionDevelop common, merit-based practices for employment in the public sectorEstablish a unit to recover assets that are the proceeds of corrupt dealingsIntroduce and implement legislation as necessary to authorize asset seizure and forfeiture.



Go

ve

rn

an

ce

an

dS

ec

ur

ity

Ju

dic

iar

y

Emergency Issuesa- Build infrastructure for Iraq’s court facilities.b- Increase court administrative capacity for case management.c- Improve security for members of the judiciary and court facilities.d- Establish policy, procedural and systemic integration and oversight with the corrections system and the judiciarye- Strengthen the legal profession in support of the judicial process that includes substantive and procedural knowledge,legal research, standards, licensing, higher legal education, and human rights training.Specific Immediate Requirementsa- Merit-based, transparent procedure for nominating and promoting candidates to fill judicial and prosecutorialpositions.b- Transparent procedures for investigating allegations of misconduct and incompetence in the judiciary.c- Annual budget based upon objectives and technical support.d- Mechanisms for interfacing with the executive and legislative branches to provide information on the role of the HJCin a reformed judiciary.e- Expanded training programs for judges, judicial investigators, and court staff.f- Support courthouse construction and renovation.g- Support and training for legislative drafting.h- Support for administrative judiciary training.i- Improved transparency and management of the office responsible for ensuring enforcement of judicial decisions.j- Improved security for members of the judiciary and court facilities.k- Modern computerized case management systems to schedule cases; coordinate attendance of prosecutors,complainants, witnesses, and police; and allow lay persons to view court schedules.l- New techniques and technologies in court administration, including docket management, case assignment, collectionand analysis of statistics, and training judges and court administrators to use these new systems.m- Support for the Iraqi bar in training lawyers in court administration and case management.n- Support for an effective, transparent and equitable public defense system.o- Building and strengthening networks of defense attorneys and legal service providers to improve access to justice forthe citizenry, especially the traditionally disenfranchised and the poor.

Co

rr

ec

tio

ns

Emergency Issuesa- Build capacity of MOJ and management and administration of with adherence to international standards Prisonsb- Improve prison infrastructure and operationsc- Train and mentor correction system personnel in relevant international standards and human rights accordsd- Establish policy, procedural and systemic integration and oversight with law enforcement and the judiciary includinge- Strengthen system for oversight, accountability, and enforcement of prison personnel and operationsf- Implement rehabilitation programs to reform and train detaineesSpecific Immediate Requirementsa- Training of Iraqi Correction System personnel including human rights and managerial subject matterb- Furnish and equip correctional facilities



c- Training of MOJ personnel in administration and managementd- Rehabilitation programs to return detainees to society



Annex 15 – Projects Focusing on Electoral Support

1. Technical Assistance to IECI2. Provision of Electoral Support to Observer Groups in Iraqi Elections3. Support for Fair, Safe and Professional Media Coverage4. Support to Electoral Process - Phase II5. Support to Elections - Phase III6. Logistics Support to IECI7. Provision of Electoral Support to Observer Groups - Phase II8. Logistics Support to IECI - Phase II9. Empowerment of Women and Youth in Iraqi Electoral Process10. Institutional Development-Organizational and HR Capacity Building for the IECI/IHEC11. Electoral Education Campaign Project12. Support to Electoral Observer Groups in Iraq - Phase III13. Provision of Communication Support and Technical Assistance to the IHEC at the HQ and Governorate

Electoral Office Levels14. Support to National Electoral Observer Groups for Provincial Council Elections in Iraq15. Institutional Development – Organizational and HR Capacity Building for the IHEC - Phase II16. Technical Assistance to IHEC – Phase II17. Support to National Electoral Observer Groups for the Electoral Events of Iraq 2009-201018. Support for Enhanced Media Coverage and Monitoring of Electoral Processes19. Institutional Development Support to the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC)



Annex 16 – Projects in the Governance Sector (excludingElections)

20. Support to Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation (MoPDC)21. Civil Society Forums22. Women’s Solidarity Towards Active Participation in Elections23. Capacity Building and Institutional Strengthening of Municipal Ministry of Public Works24. Institutional Support for the Constitutional Drafting Process25. Iraq National Constitution and Referendum Awareness Campaign (INCRAC)26. Media and Human Rights: Promotion of Freedom of Expression and Human Rights in Iraq27. Civil Society Constitutional Outreach Campaign28. Involving the Iraqi Media and Journalists in Covering the Constitutional Process29. Involving the Iraqi Media and Journalists in Organizing Public Debates on the New Iraqi Constitution and

Support for a "New Democracies TV Film Festival"30. Supreme Audit Board31. Support to Government of Iraq in International Assistance Coordination and Capacity Building32. Human Rights Project for Iraq 2006 - 2007 Phase I & Phase II33. Facilitating Reconciliation in Iraq through Constitutional Review and National Dialogue34. Strengthening of the Constitutional Process and Good Governance35. Assistance for the Establishment of the Secretariat for the International Compact with Iraq (Compact

Secretariat)36. Capacity Development in Census and Surveys37. Iraqi Civil Society Empowerment Project38. Support the Media in its Role of Fostering Peace and Democracy39. Support to the Development of Justice and the Rule of Law40. Support to Decentralisation and Local Governance for Service Delivery – Preparatory Phase41. Support to the GOI in Implementing the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness42. Assisting the GOI to Develop a National Tourism Strategy43. Iraq Public Sector Modernisation (I-PSM) Programme44. Capacity Strengthening of the MoPDC to Support the Process of a National Development Plan for Iraq45. Conducting Lessons Learned and Project Evaluations for the IRFFI46. Capacity Development to Establish a Socioeconomic Monitoring System in Iraq47. High Commission for Human Rights in Iraq: Capacity Building and Technical Support



Annex 17: Differences between UNDG ITF and DaO

Origins: The origins of the Delivering as One (DaO) initiative and the UNDG ITF are quite different. DaOpilots started in 2007 based on recommendations from the Secretary General's High Level Panel on UNSystem-wide Coherence, and were intended to increase coherence and effectiveness of UN field operations. Therationale for the establishment of the UNDG ITF was not the drive for UN coherence per se but the need for apooled funding mechanism to enable donors to contribute funding to the UN system as a whole, so as to speedup recovery and reconstruction efforts. The trust fund, however, also led all UN agencies in Iraq to collaboratein order to put the funding from the Trust Fund to the best possible use, thus contributing to UN coherence.Many interviewed stakeholders pointed out that there would probably have been little coherence among UNagencies in Iraq without the Trust Fund, as they had no other incentive to collaborate. Given the weakness ofgovernment ownership, there were no internal pressures on UN agencies to efficiently collaborate as may be thecase in countries where the government is capable of leading development efforts.

Scope: DaO pilots were established in stable countries, where national ownership and leadership is strong andpriorities are clearly established. The UN had a pre-existing UNDAF process in every DaO pilot country, whichfacilitated joint-programming efforts with the government. MDTFs, on the other hand, tend to operate in post-conflict countries with weak national ownership. In Iraq, the UNDAF process was not started until 2009, anduntil then the UN Assistance Strategies were the only common UN development framework. Governmentownership and capacity were severely weakened after the conflict, and thus the assistance was supply-drivenrather than demand-driven as in the DaO approach.

Size and duration: DaO pilots have typically been implemented in countries where the UN presence islimited. In comparison to the UNDG ITF, the ‘One Coherence’ funds are smaller and involve fewer agencies.The largest one, in Tanzania ($90 million) amounts to only 7 percent of the size of the UNDG ITF. MDTFsusually have a short-term focus (typically four years), while DaO approaches are focused on the longer-term.

Budgetary framework: Within the DaO framework, under ‘One Budget,’ the UN country teams presentcosted results in a single financial framework, showing each agency’s planned input together with the fundingsource. Each agency contributes both monetary and in-kind resources to the One Budget. Within the UNDGITF, agencies did not have to pool their resources together into one budget. Instead they applied for fundingfrom a common trust fund.

Programming: DaO pilots are usually set up with a solid UNDAF and tend to supports national budget gaps.Therefore their budgets are relatively small. UNDG ITF was intended for reconstruction and recovery in a post-conflict environment and its budget was significantly larger than any DaO fund. As previously noted, UNagencies in Iraq worked together to design a common UN Assistance Strategy and later the UNDAF to guide itsprogramming. Also the sector/cluster system promoted a ‘one programme’ approach in that agenciescollaborated to identify priorities within sectors and design joint programmes.

Leadership: Under the ‘One Leader’ concept of DaO, the Resident Coordinator is expected to provide strategicleadership throughout the development programming process, bringing together relevant analytical capacities,both national and international, developing synergies between various UN assets and linkages between the UNentities with their respective mandates and other partners. Under the UNDG ITF, the role of the leader wasequally consolidated in the hands of RC who was the chair of the Steering Committee.

Sharing resources: DaO promotes the harmonization of business processes, common services and, often, theuse of common premises for UN agencies in the country. In many ways, UN agencies in Iraq were forced toshare services and offices in Baghdad and Erbil due to space constraints and limited resources. In Amman,however, agencies are located throughout the city with little harmonization of processes or services.



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