Philip Stevens

Dr. Potter

29 April 2011

INT 498-01

United States Aid to Afghanistan: How Can We Do Better?

The events of the past decade in the Middle East have represented a shift in the policy of

the United States. Gone are the days of containment and isolation. President George W. Bush

initiated a new era of US international policy based on preemption. In invading Iraq, the U.S.

legitimized the use of force against its enemies before they attack. However, in the aftermath of

the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq the United States is now in a situation that was not

anticipated. Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated the policy for both

Afghanistan and Iraq would not be one in which the US participated in state-building and yet this

is exactly what happened (Rashid). In Afghanistan, the U.S. faced the Taliban and afterwards

was left with a crippled and fragmented nation. However, ten years after the attacks of 9/11,

only 3% of Americans believe the greatest terrorist threat to the West comes from Afghanistan

(Foreign Policy Survey). Americans are starting to understand Afghanistan and are showing

sympathy for a nation that has been wrapped in war for decades. How does The United States

help to build Afghanistan’s people and economy? How can the U.S. avoid its past mistakes and

position the American people’s money where it can be best used?

This paper shows that the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)

aid monies should be delivered directly to the benefit of the Afghani people, by utilizing regional

experts and local resident skill. Monetary aid and resources that are delivered directly instead of

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being channeled through various contractors or through the Kabul government will promote

economic growth and governmental legitimacy.

This paper addresses failures in current policies and while comparing other cases of aid

delivery, suggests that direct aid will be most efficient in Afghanistan. First the USAID

background and the problems that affect it will be discussed. The second section draws the

connections between direct-delivery aid and economic growth with government legitimacy. A

variety of research and evidence is used to substantiate this argument. In the third section, the

issues of delivering aid through Kabul and the specific problems which make this a poor bilateral

option are discussed. In the fourth section, the contractors and the tendency of USAID to hire

US-based contractors are explored. Contracting is needed in Afghanistan, but it should be

carefully deliberated before giving aid money to a company. The fifth section discusses how

USAID has helped to develop specific sectors, within other nations such as Iraq, Pakistan and

Tajikistan. In the sixth section, aid delivered through USAID and that of Non-Government

Organizations (NGOs) is compared and contrasted. Lastly, this paper concludes with an outlook

for the future of USAID in Afghanistan and the possibilities for the nation, if it makes productive

changes.

I. Background

USAID has been the distributer of substantial aid to Afghanistan, only since 2002. Aid is

defined as the voluntary transfer of any funds or resources. USAID was sent in response to the

attacks of September 11th, 2001, to help smooth the military’s transition into Afghanistan and

help the Afghani people. Its main operations include the allocation and utilization of US aid

dollars in Afghanistan. The agency supported and helped to develop the Afghani education and

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health systems, and also promoted economic growth and clean governance (USAID). Success in

these areas however, has varied in the past decade.

USAID has not been efficient in its distribution of funding. The agency has made a

practice of contracting to US-based companies, who often will subcontract, meaning hire other

contractors, to complete their job. Even the subcontracted company will sometimes subcontract

again. Chemonics is a company that subcontracted to another American company which itself

subcontracted to an Afghan firm, creating a three-company chain of delegation (Erlich). As a

result projects which are meant to assist the local people are poorly executed. An example of

such a project is a bridge built near the city of Jalalabad (see Figure 3) that washed away due to a

swelled river (Arnoldy). However, such subpar designs are the norm. The projects either are

poorly built, unnecessary to begin with, or fail to address the problem they were built to

alleviate. These contracts are elaborated on in the fourth section.

Ahmed Rashid (see glossary) described USAID in its earlier post 9/11 days as a

“glorified bureaucracy” that simply hired contractors and wrote checks. The unfortunate

situation is that these practices are still continuing. As little as 10-20% of USAID funds reach

the people (Erlich). The rest ended up in the pockets of contractors and invested back in the US

economy. These were signs of a flawed system. USAID should in the future deliver assistance

in the form of direct aid, money or resources that is not funneled through another channel, but is

immediately given to the citizens personally or promptly used to fund a project. Direct aid

reduces delegation and involves as few parties as possible in the process. This paper diagnoses

the direct aid situation, draws comparisons to other nations that USAID has succeed, and

explores the areas in which it can learn from NGO’s.

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II. Aid Helping the Economy & Government

The implementation of American aid is fruitless unless it is proven to be effective. This

section discusses how numerous studies link foreign aid to both economic growth and a more

transparent, less corrupt government.

Foreign Aid = Economic Growth?

In discussing foreign aid’s effect on economic growth, the evidence is stronger in support

of such funds promoting growth of the host nation’s GNP. However, there are studies that show

a negative relationship between aid and economic growth. The research of Griffen and Enos

(1970) demonstrates this. They state that the relationship between foreign aid and economic

growth is negative linear one, where aid causes a decrease in economic growth. However, there

are two problems with this model. The relationship between the two factors is restricted to a

linear one, meaning the two variables are directly linked. There is no room in the model for any

extraneous factors such as the methods of aid implementation or the individual strengths of the

economy. The second issue is the restriction of the types of aid and growth (Easterly).

Aggregate aid and growth are the only types measured and aid given in other ways is discounted.

Other aid non-monetary aid is discounted. Also the way which the aid is implemented into the

host-country is also not taken into account. These are two major limitations that highly decrease

the scope and application of the Griffen-Enos model.

More recent models are in support of the argument of this paper, and showed that most of

the time aid either causes a strong positive relationship or accompanies growth1. But, in these

research projects, it is economic aid that is the only type of aid that is taken into consideration.

1 Rajan and Subramanian (2005), Durbarry, Gemmell and Greenway (1998), Lensink and White (2001),

Dalgaard,Hansen and Tarp (2001) (Easterly)

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Other types of direct aid may involve training or teaching, but these are not part of such models.

For example, a regional expert funded by USAID may be cheap to hire, but his impact on a

larger project may be higher than his economic value accounts for. His ideas can be

implemented, and have the effect of a larger aid sum. When some researchers actually relaxed

the economic aid factor to include other types of aid, a firm positive relationship between the two

variables was found.2 This means that with some certainty it can be concluded that aid is

followed by economic growth (Easterly).

However, there are numerous variables that could change the degree of that positive

relationship. One of these factors is excessive bureaucracy aid organization. The USAID was

plagued by such bureaucracy early in the 2000s, due primarily to the complicated contracting

practices of the early post-2001 years (Rashid). Since then, the agency has become more

efficient but is still working at avoiding a dependence on excessive contracting. A second

variable which could positively affect aid effectiveness is the proper ownership and participation

of the nation’s issues by the host population. Several NGOs work at a grassroots level to

empower and assist people to participate actively in the issues which affect Afghanistan. This

type of aid will help to promote the Afghani people to take a more active role in the future of

their country. The third and last variable is the effectiveness of bilateral or multilateral aid.

USAID must take advantage of other organizations, particularly NGOs who already understand

the Afghani people. Since the agency is inexperienced, it should take advantage of other

organizations’ experience and expertise. If these three issues are addressed there are numerous

models that support the idea that aid, when properly distributed can show a strong positive

relation to economic growth in the host nation.

2 Owens and Hoddinott (1999), Marvrotas (2002), Mavrotas (2003) (Easterly)

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Foreign Aid = Legitimate Government?

Research of the relationship between foreign aid and decreased government corruption is

scarce. This particular relationship exists in the specific case of Afghanistan due to the issue of

opium and its plague on the governance. However, research conducted by Nicholas Charron

from the Gothenburg University in Sweden, of countries from all regions shows a positive

relationship between multilateral aid and lower government corruption after the 1990’s3. His

research says that economic aid in fact does correlate with a drop in government corruption.

There are of course other studies which show similar conclusions4. Therefore, there exists

certain evidence that supports the idea that unbiased aid can accompany and help to create

legitimate government. This does not however, confirm that all types of aid causes lower

corruption. He found that bilateral aid had a negative effect on government corruption (Sharron).

Bilateral aid involves aid given directly from one country to another. This is often

accompanied by certain goals by the donating country. In the case of the United States, the

accompanying goal would be a military presence in the country and the eradication of the

Taliban and al-Qaeda. This was the case for the U.S. for the better half of a decade following

2001. It only makes sense that the corruption in the newly-formed Afghani government

increased drastically. Bilateral aid became a preferred policy, and USAID was pushed aside.

Kabul became more of a contractor of aid money and thus the funds were not properly used.

Although the US government never fully trusted the new regime, it gave a good deal of money

and free reign to the new government (Rashid). If the U.S. can distribute its assistance through a

more open and multilateral approach, the Kabul regime will have less blind support from

3 Charron attributes the 1990’s as the time of the “Anti-Corruption Movement”. Both Multilateral and Bilateral Aid

before this ACM were ineffective (Charron). 4 Goldsmith (2001), Tavares (2003), Dunning (2004), Ear (2007) (Charron)

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Washington and more pressure to reform its inefficiencies before more money is given. Aid

should work to benefit the people not the government. Such large amounts of money should not

be placed in the laps of junior government officials. It should be delegated by USAID, but the

Afghani government should be trained in its handling, so the federal government can become

more self-sustaining. Also in Afghanistan, opium is the major source of corruption. If the aid

can be used to properly combat opium production in conjunction with security forces, then it’s

very likely a drop in corruption will accompany. Fortunately, it has been the policy of

Washington, to avoid giving aid to Kabul. USAID will play this critical role of allocating the aid

to combat opium.

III. Problems with Aid through Kabul

Hamid Karzai’s Government in Kabul has been very much influenced by Western powers

the United Nations, and in large credit the United States (Rasanayagam). Although significant

strides have been made since the Taliban’s rule over the nation ended in 2001, Afghanistan is

still riddled with corruption, drug and crime connections, inefficient policies, political splintering

and scandals. Even Karzai’s brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai has been accused of connections to the

opium trade, straining relations between Karzai and Washington (New York Times). This makes

difficult aid delivery through Kabul. However, in addition to discussing this issue, the following

section also talks about how the U.S. should educate and slowly integrate the Afghani

government into the aid system. The government needs experience handling money, especially

aid.

Centralized Government

In the past, the government in Afghanistan has been centralized and concentrated in the

capital of Kabul. In the late 19th Century the “Iron Amir” Abdur Rahman Khan ruled from the

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capital with strength. He attempted to modernize the country and impose taxes and a new state-

system. However, the qawms or tribes & clans saw the state as intrusive and foreign. Rahman

was followed by a series of kings (1919-1970s) who also attempted to modernize the country and

reign in the tribal countryside. However, their reigns were plagued with wars and conflict.

Mohammad Daoud Khan seized power in 1973 as a nationalist head of state, replacing the

monarchy. His short reign was replaced by the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan, seen

as a Soviet “lackey” by the Afghani people. The PDPA, in 1974 was well funded, but besides

taxes, tariffs and the new government enterprises their reach into the countryside was shallow

(Barfield). It never reached the people on a social level, affecting health, rights, and education.

The PDPA was resisted by the Mujahedeen, “the heroes of Afghanistan” and the Kabul

government during that time was seen as a foreign entity. The Mujahedeen government followed

by the Taliban in the early 1990s is perhaps the closest the nation came to unification. These

entities were tribal in nature, and their rise to power represented dissatisfaction with central

power from Kabul. The tribal culture, like those of other adjacent nations permeates the

everyday. Cooperation exists between modern-day Kabul and tribes in the surrounding

countryside, but a broad legitimacy of the central government is lacking. No government in

recent history was able to claim both international and domestic tribal acceptance. The Kings

and PDPA were well supported by foreign powers, but the Taliban was a domestic power.

Karzai’s government is similar to the internationally-supported regimes of the first 90 years of

the 20th century. His government is following the pattern of most of the other Afghani

governments. It is centralized within Kabul and lacks real power in the rural areas.

Lack of Afghani Identity

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A lack of identity as an Afghani people is another issue. Patriotism for one’s country is

part of the American identity. However, if one was to ask an Afghani, he would claim loyalties

to his family and tribe rather than his country. Then he would identify himself as a Pashto, Tajik

or maybe an Uzbek. Within the country, there are a large variety of ethnic groups and at least

four distinct languages (see Figure 2). These groups are distinct and separate, and yet they make

up one nation. People do not have a motivation to serve the authority in Kabul. This is a very

deep rooted issue; there is disconnect between the government and the Afghani people that is set

deep in the culture. The people’s daily lives have not been affected, for better or worse, by the

Kabul government, outside of taxation and war.

Additionally, government is not known well enough by its own people to be a legitimate

distributer of aid. Since, the regime is only centralized in Kabul; it is a poor candidate for aid

allocation. It won’t understand how to properly use the funds. Aid is a precious income source,

and a corrupt government may never spread the money outside of the city’s walls. Aid needs to

be distributed throughout the whole country including to the tribes in the South and the

agricultural regions in the North. Without an explicit knowledge of the regions and its needs, the

job of mass aid distribution is better left to another organization.

Corruption, Drugs & Crime

The vast majority of the world’s opium population today comes from Afghanistan. It

sale brought $2.8 billion to the economy in 20045. Production has increased since the 2001 US

invasion. Farmers were forced to grow the high-selling plant as a last-resort due to the terrible

economic conditions and the low selling price of wheat and other crops. The growth and the

sustainability of the highly illegal industry have seeped into every rung of society, from low-

5 See Figure 1

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class farmers to rich and powerful warlord. The government is no exception to this trend.

Opium has caused corruption and inefficiency to plague the post Taliban federal system. It is

difficult for the United States to clean the opium production as it would mean undermining the

former members of the Mujahedeen; the national heroes of the Soviet-Afghan war. It is these

men who make small fortunes. Also, power hungry tribal leaders and police ensure the

prolonged sustainability of the plant through shady deals, and bribery prevents laws and reforms.

Corruption is the most important reason to not place aid in the hands of the government

in Kabul. Besides inefficiencies at delivering money properly to the people outside of the

capital, there is no legitimacy with corruption. After 2001, in exchange for cooperation and the

American military presence, Kabul was given a relatively free reign. The aid was meant to be

used on a variety of programs, and USAID was too ineffective to deal with it either. Many of the

programs the aid targeted involved diversifying the economy and untying the country from its

opium reliance. This aid was seen to work against the opium industry and against the interests of

many politicians, and warlords and government officials were bribed to shuttle the aid away

from its goals. The money was wasted.

IV. What’s wrong with Contractors?

Contractors in Afghanistan are used not for distribution of aid, and but for the

implementation of integral projects. This section is meant to show how in many cases,

contractors do not effectively use aid monies. The most common culprits are foreign and

American contractors. In hiring these companies, it estimated that up to 40% of aid money will

be deposited back into the US, not into the Afghani economy (Barfield). These mistakes occur

when Afhani and NGO’s are not given preference, and American contractors are hired instead.

Lack of Efficiency

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There are several problems that effect foreign contractors and their implementation of

aid. The most notable of these is the inability of said companies to properly implement projects

efficiently. Often, contractors hired by USAID will subcontract their project to other even

smaller contractors in Afghanistan. This is inefficient, as with every transaction money is lost.

In transition from taxpayers to the U.S. Government, to USAID, then to the contractor and

finally to the subcontractors; small amounts of the intended aid are lost when paying for

employees, staff, equipment and other small items6. It is estimated that only $10-20 of each

$100 donated makes it to its proper recipient (Erlich). Thus, the aid loses the intended impact

and millions are spent on other secondary matters. Furthermore, the subcontractors are often

native Afghani companies and institutions who are consequently underpaid. The aid process

should contain less delegation of aid money so it reaches its intended destination more

efficiently.

An example of in a 2004 project to build storage centers in the Nangarhar province (see

Figure 2) for farmers to store crops shows how aid money is not put to good use. These centers

were poorly constructed and contained design flaws which rendered them unusable. In addition,

there were several centers which contained the same problems. What was even worse was that

some of these facilities were not even needed to begin with. Such inefficiencies are not

uncommon. The issues in this project did not stem from a lack of knowledge or materials. The

problems came from the incompetence of the subcontractors. The Afghani laborers which built

the Nangarhar storage centers were unmotivated and most likely poorly paid. They had little

encouragement from the donor source and were not briefed on the impact their work has.

Because of this subcontracting, a very small percentage of the original aid money actually

6 In addition USAID employees often are given hazard/hardship pay, and receive payments for travel & living

expenses as well (Erlich).

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reached the people it was meant to impact most (Erlich). American contractors, such as the one

who built the storage centers are preferred by the US government. NGOs are not given an

opportunity to use the aid money, despite the fact that these organizations could even complete

the job better. Because of this, the aid continues to be placed in the care of wasteful western-

contractors (Arnoldy).

Safety & Inexperience

Further, a much stronger push is put on the military and the ousting of the Taliban and al-

Qaeda. The U.S. Government is not as concerned about efficiency of humanitarian aid delivery.

To motivate the government to state build and protect its aid workers is difficult, especially when

the government had not planned on doing so when it invaded a decade ago (Rashid). Therefore

the death toll of private contractor employees rises. As of the summer of June 2010, over 500

contracted works have been killed in the country (ABC). The American contractors are foreign

to Afghanistan. They are based in the U.S., particularly in Washington7 and know very little

about the country and its danger. They understand the briefs presented to them by the

government, outlining their job and basic knowledge and stories from the news. Otherwise,

contractors are often insensitive to the everyday issues which affect the Afghani people and do

not understand the everyday hazard they will be placed in. They are disconnected from the

rebuilding process. The state building is business and not a humanitarian need. Contractors

indeed serve a purpose, but ultimately place an unneeded burden on the foreign aid distribution

process.

7 Certain contractors have been known as “Beltway bandits” for their sly practices and their headquarter locations in

the Beltway of Washington D.C. (Rashid).

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Suggestions

USAID has in the past used American contractors which are inefficient, inexperienced in

the region and tend to subcontract, thus losing the aid’s potential impact. The US government

should empower the Afghani national companies to acquire the USAID contracts. In addition,

the agency should take advantage of the local and international NGOs such as the Atlanta-based

CARE organization, which has been working in the region since 1961 (CARE). If USAID can

rely less on US based companies, then aid will be delivered and implemented better. This point

is elaborated on further in section six.

V. Handling of Aid in Other Nations

This section discusses the role that USAID has taken in other nations. In each nation

USAID has, with success, delivered aid in a particular area. In these countries, the agency has

proven it can efficiently give aid directly to the affected people. Such strategies are models of

sucess which USAID Afghanistan should follow.

Iraq & Business Stimulation

The aid landscape in Iraq and Afghanistan is similar, but there exists some key

differences. The countries’ physical landscapes are quite different. Iraq has the major resource

of oil, and is surrounded by stable and economically-strong neighbors, while Afghanistan is not.

Another difference is the advantage of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. Iraq’s agricultural

production has more potential as a result and it doesn’t have the problem of mass-opium farming.

In an aid perspective, this shows that Iraq is more ready to move forward with development in its

agricultural sector, whereas Afghanis have yet to reach this goal. One last major difference is

Afghanistan has been under the rule of the Taliban, a strong Islamic institution, while Saddam

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Hussein was a strong secularist. This means that Iraq may be more willing to accept non-Islamic

assistance, such as that from USAID or NGOs.

Something that USAID Afghanistan can take from USAID Iraq is the new economic

policies. USAID in Iraq emphasizes economic growth and connecting the economy to the world.

Iraq’s more educated population, with a literacy rate over 84%, contributes to an economy which

is more easily adapted to pushes for a larger and more efficient private sector (CIA). USAID has

helped the Iraqi Ministry of Finance develop a “Competiveness Study” to help strengthen this

sector. Afghanistan faces a similar problem of a lack of motivation to compete in the private

sector. A comparable program would help to alleviate this. The Iraqi Investment Promotion

Agency was also given assistance which helps to bring the economy into the world market.

Lastly, USAID has helped to revitalize the Iraqi agricultural sector. It has helped to set-up

orchards & vineyards, a strategy that could be well implemented in the fertile Northern region of

Afghanistan (PR Newswire).

Aid in Afghanistan can emulate these strategies. Already USAID is emphasizing

privatization if Afghanistan. However, the country’s unique situation calls for dealing with the

opium problem. The U.S. Government should allocate funds that will impact the economy on a

ground level. Too much aid is spent on the military and as a result economic efforts fail.

Targeted aid which deemphasizes opium growth and promote legal crops will help to stimulate

growth of a wider variety of agricultural products. Similar to Iraq, aid is most efficient if it is

sent to areas such as the right agricultural regions of the north, and used to empower Afghani

businesses and encourage growth. The Afghani people need to see that their country is being

advance and developed. If Afghanis are witnessing that electricity is working, fresh water is

available and that roads are improving, they will be more motivated to work as well. If aid can

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be delivered to directly promote Afghani businesses and agriculture, economic growth will

follow.

Pakistan & Local Governance

Because Pakistan is Afghanistan’s neighbor to the south (see Figure 3). It shares the

issues of a strong Taliban presence and a border that is controlled by tribal cultures. Pakistan is

almost an exclusive Islamic nation. It faces the similar issue of government corruption and party

violence. The Taliban plays a large role in the politics of the country. As USAID is a western

and non-Islamic organization it is very difficult for the local populace to see it as legitimate force

for progress.

In order to solve this problem USAID has given over $700 million dollars into the tribal

regions of Pakistan. Similar to Afghanistan these regions are not under strict control of the

Pakistani federal government. However, USAID has used this money to empower the local

recognized tribal governors. The money is used to empower the local governments and provide

them with certain legitimacy. Ultimately this strategy helps to win the “hearts and minds” of the

people (Perlez). They rely less on al-Qaeda and the Taliban and see their local government as

the authority. USAID has strengthened the existing civil society. Instead of starting with the

federal system and solving corruption and inefficiency down to the local level, it has helped the

local systems demand accountability from the regime in the capital.

This strategy should be translated to Afghanistan. It is imperative that the local systems

change. If provincial and tribal councils can enact clean policies which benefit the everyday

people then perhaps they will hold their federal government accountable as well. The strategy

takes into account the highly tribal culture of the people in the region. They naturally do not

claim allegiance to a government or an overarching nation, thus they may not see benefits in

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legitimized federal government. However, the people in Afghanistan do want a dependable and

trustworthy direct tribal or state system. The aid program works to point out points of corruption

and scandal. Naturally people will feel more motivated to improve this immediate governance.

This is an example of the way aid that assists on a direct level can work its way up to help

legitimize the federal government.

The Taliban is another commonality Afghanistan has with Pakistan. Due to the US

military offensive in Afghanistan though, the situations differ as the. However, the same reforms

to local councils and governments will help to make the Taliban have less of an impact. USAID

should be able to protect provincial governments and councils with the already-present U.S.

Military. Transparent councils should not be punished with Taliban retaliation. Cracking down

on opium production or bribery should be an admired act and not one that is seen as being a

“lackey”. USAID in addition to promoting clean local governance should reward this with

targeted protection from the American security forces.8

The Taliban must become a group that lacks the sympathies of the people. Because of its

remaining influence, opium production continues and its existence goes unchecked due to bribes

and back-door deals. If it has no backing from the Afghani people then its grip will be lost and

government legitimacy will improve.

Tajikistan & Health

Tajikistan shares an ethnic group with Afghanistan; the Tajiks, and shares a high poverty

rate with Afghanistan. Both countries are also landlocked. Healthcare deficiencies are a

common issue which USAID is addressing, but more efficiently in Tajikistan.

8 USAID has actually recently introduced “PRTs” or Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan which consist

of both civilians military that work towards these goals (USAID)

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USAID and the Tajik Ministry of Health have been collaborating since 1999 (US Fed

News). The agency has helped to build wells and even a number of dams taking advantage of

Tajikistan’s rich natural water supplies9 (Stern). Wells have been built by the community with

the assistance of USAID. They have empowered the community and strengthen local ties.

Currently USAID is working to alleviate polio, which still affects the region. As a result of the

USAID’s work in Tajikistan, there exists far better maternal health and reduced infant mortality

rates (CIA). Such close cooperation, and local empowerment make USAID in Tajikistan a

model for the Afghani branch.

The Tajikistan success story is another example of the benefits of direct aid to people. If

the aid was given to the federal government there is no guarantee that it would reach the people.

Maternal education is a new concept and it is more beneficial to teach it to individuals on a

communal level than to entrust a federal government that is unfamiliar with such information

anyway. Aid in this case has a long term effect of improving life expectancy of newborns.

However, healthy maternal practices will lead to lower infant and maternal mortality rates

immediately and will help to keep the population growing at a controllable level. These positive

indicators will help to legitimize the role of USAID, if implemented in Afghanistan and help to

cause a greater importance placed on education.

Also, water supply remains an issue and has been shown to have a positive correlation to

health of a people. USAID in Afghanistan should follow suit from the role it played in

Tajikistan. If it teaches communities and smaller tribes to create and maintain wells, this creates

a stronger local populace. Currently, water remains a scarce and decreasing resource. If the

Afghani people are able to find water for their families they will have a better ability and

9 Tajikistan contains over 40% of Central Asia’s water (Stern)

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capacity to turn their eyes to the larger issues which have been mentioned, such as corruption in

their governments and economic growth. Communities that cannot provide basic needs such as

water and proper care for their children cannot deal with high- level issues such as clean

governance. What does corruption in Kabul matter if your son or daughter is starving? Such

basic needs can only be met by a knowledgeable and capable aid organization that presents help

to the actual people.

Like the system in Tajikistan, USAID should work towards promoting health of the

Afghani people on a personal level, working with communities and meeting the needs of the

people before emphasizing the importance of clean federal government and economic growth. If

the people can meet their basic needs, they will be able to then focus on the central government

in Kabul and demand an improved system. If this happens the Afghani people will be able have

a stake in the future of their country and feel they can control its future.

VI. Aid through NGOs vs. USAID

The importance of non-government organizations in the rebuilding of Afghanistan cannot

be understated. Although this paper concentrates on the USAID and its impact, NGOs have a

definitive and needed impact. CARE, is an example a US-based NGO that has been working in

the country for over 50 years. Their goals are very similar to those of USAID. It has worked in

Afghanistan to grow sectors such as civil society, water supply, and the economy (CARE). This

organization understands the Afghani people and has the long-term knowledge that USAID does

not. Christ Patterson, the commissioner for external relations for the European Union believed

that “aid should be channeled through the NGOs in Afghanistan who have had the field

experience for many years, sometimes operating in the most difficult conditions during the

Taliban” (Rasanayagam 262).

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Advantages of NGOs

Christ Patterson has a valid point in suggesting that NGO’s should handle aid. Those

organizations have a definitive advantage in the fact that they have been working in the country

for over 50 years. The members know the people and the terrain. They understand the

sensitivities and the needs of the people much better than any other USAID personnel. In

addition they understand and have become accustomed to the fatigue associated with working in

the country. Even more so, they experienced the oppression of the Taliban and have a personal

understanding of the Afghan question. Whereas USAID fluctuated and its officers were

dependent on the funding from Washington, NGOs have maintained a presence since the 1970’s,

before the Soviet invasion. An example of this can be seen in the British NGO, Afghan Aid.

This organization includes 98% Afghani staff and has been in the country for over 30 years

(Afghan Aid). Being residents of the region already they understand the country personally.

Afghan Aid has in particular helped many of the same issues that USAID is attempting to fix.

These include creating local legal councils and investing in agriculture and education.

The NGO’s have the sympathies and trust of the people. Afghan Aid includes mostly

residents and not visitors. The people in the organization have a stake in the future of the

country as much as the people they serve. The people naturally respect their work and

understand that their purpose is to help and not to exploit, unlike contractors.

Experience is a factor in which NGO’s have an advantage. This is valuable resource and

NGOS has been used by many other organizations such as the World Bank and the United

Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Supporting local governances first and working at a

grassroots level to influence nation-wide change are at the core of many of the already-present

NGOS. Instead of expecting change from Kabul to trickle down, USAID should adapt this

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strategy. This sort of knowledge can only be acquired by time and interaction with the people.

Unfortunately this is not something that USAID has had. It has only significantly increased its

presence after 2001.

Afghanistan has a history of foreign influence. In modern times the British, the Soviets

and more recently the United States have all been foreign powers which have had a major

presence in the region. While the United States may not be seen as the enemy or a colonizing

power by the people, it is seen as a foreign power and a stranger in the country. The military

presence places a burden on the people and it reminds of the Soviets, whose goal was to colonize

the country. Therefore the USAID officials, though sincere, are seen in a different light than

NGO workers. With a long-term presence, USAID may gain the respect and trust of the Afghani

people.

What USAID can Learn

In the early years after 2001, Robert Finn, a US Ambassador described USAID in the

following way:

“USAID is doing nothing itself now, it has become a contracting agency with layers of

bureaucracy that did not exist in the past and too much of the money comes back to the US through consultancies” (Rashid 174).

It is unfortunate that this was the case. Due to its lack of experience and manpower10 USAID

was forced to contract to US-based companies. This caused a sizeable portion of the aid money

that was meant to be deposited into Afghanistan, end up back in America. Some conservative

estimates have placed up to 40% of aid money ending back in the United States (Barfield). Also

the bureaucracy of the small agency slowed the process and doomed its efficiency. Many aid

programs contain the problem of excessive red tape and procedures and as a result important aid

10 In 2002 the Kabul USAID Office had 12 staff members (Rashid)

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money never reaches the anticipated beneficiary (Easterly 436). The structure of the USAID

project was flawed from the start and it also developed poor habits of contracting out projects to

American companies. Stories of such failures range from expensive trips of Afghani carpet

dealers to Germany, to the funding of superfluous art schools to the failed training of 180

Afghanis on poultry farming (Nasuti). Instead of using the already existing NGOs to properly

plan and understand the needs, USAID had charged ahead, unaware of its own ignorance.

Washington had a part in that, as certain USAID activity was restricted by the CIA as it would

jeopardized the more important interests of the Administration (Rashid). USAID was quickly

trampled over by the military efforts and the CIA-fueled agenda. In 2003 and the years

following, Afghanistan was for the most part, ignored and the country delved into chaos.

Despite the protests of experts, knowledgeable expatriates and even USAID, the issue of aid was

pushed aside.

Fortunately, in the more recent past, USAID has taken some advantage of the NGOs

presence in the region. They have cooperated with the non-government coordinating bodies and

have cooperated with the World Health Organization, the United Nations Development

Programme and the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund or UNICEF.

However there are many more organizations that are more Afghanistan-centered. USAID still

has yet to take advantage of some of the major NGOs in the region such as the Red Cross or

Afghanis 4 Tomorrow. This is the first major lesson that USAID and the U.S. Government can

take from NGOs; take advantage of the people and organizations that know the country. The

United States is fortunate to have a large diversity and in the years following 2001 hired many

regional experts such as Barnett Rubin and Ahmed Rashid. It is unfortunate that their

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suggestions were somewhat ignored when it came to action, and the US military took precedence

first.

A second lesson that USAID and the US Government can learn from NGOs is to make

changes that affect the people at the grassroots level. USAID has made a habit of hiring

American contractors who exploited the aid money instead of putting it to good use. Because of

this practice, money has been lost in the bureaucracy and extended procedures of the chaotic

system. The international humanitarian organization, Oxfam further describes USAID to be

“bound by structures and strategies that often constrain their ability to work effectively on the

ground” (USA Today). Both Afghan Aid and CARE are experienced and use the strategies of

investing in Afghanis at a ground level. By empowering national businesses and hiring A

instead of Americans, would bring USAID in line with the methodology used by Afghan Aid and

CARE. The agency needs to learn from the ways it impacted people in Iraq, Pakistan &

Tajikistan. It should follow the example set by senior organizations by empowering the existing

civil society, economy and people.

A final lesson is to maintain a presence and expertise in the region. NGOs had been in

the region for over 50 years when USAID entered the country in 2002. Even so, USAID

officials were ignored and even killed in the early years11. The idea of keeping an aid

organization strong and growing did not surface until the U.S. was caught in state building

almost a half-decade later.

VII. Conclusions & Implications

The USAID assistance process needs reform. Instead of allowing aid to be allocated by

the corrupt government in Kabul and the inexperienced and inefficient contractors, it should be

11 Between 2001 and 2006 over 100 Afghan USAID staff members were killed by the Taliban (Ras hid).

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delivered multilaterally by USAID, directly to the people. This method should use experts of the

region and the current skilled and knowledgeable people who already live there. Ultimately this

method helps to combat government corruption and grow the economy.

USAID is a useful and versatile organization. It potential to help the Afghani people,

repair the tarnished US reputation and bring stability to the region is paramount. As Afghanistan

is becoming less of a battleground and more of a humanitarian case 79% of American’s polled

think the greatest terrorist threat to the West now lies in Pakistan. 83% believe that Osama bin

Laden is in Pakistan; the same man with a $25 million reward for his capture (FBI). The

battlefield is moving on and President Barack Obama has already announced the beginnings of

troop withdrawals in July of 2011 (Jackson). Even now only 20% of Americans think it is

necessary to win the war in Afghanistan (Foreign Policy Survey). One cannot help think that the

country is being abandoned instead of transitioned.

However, in the decline of war in Afghanistan, there is an opportunity for USAID to help

move the country forward. In the past it has been the responsibility of non-government

organizations and other funds to help alleviate poverty and poor economic conditions in

Afghanistan. Government organizations were seen as bureaucratic and biased. However, by

utilizing NGOs and local Afghani organizations, USAID can play a key role as an unbiased

source of funds and resources. Also in representing a government, it has the potential to show

that even state institutions can work effectively and without unneeded bureaucracy.

There are three main goals that I believe USAID can achieve in Afghanistan. First, it can

make a lasting and positive impact in moving Afghanistan forward to a peaceful and efficient

democracy. Second, it can also initiate and help sustain the slow process of unclamping the

country from the opium-trade. Lastly, USAID will be able to build a stable growing nation that

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can stand against the Taliban and al-Qaeda and work to eradicate such terrorist groups from the

region. These are long term objectives, but the future is much brighter than most would think.

Afghanistan has stepped out of a dark past, and the United States is standing alongside as a

builder of nations.

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VIII. Glossary

Afghan Aid: A United Kingdom-based humanitarian and development organization that

specializes in alleviating poverty and developing community and economic opportunities

Ahmed Rashid: a best-selling Pakistani author, who is considered an expert on Afghanistan,

Pakistan and broader Central Asia

Al-Qaeda: Islamic extremist group led by Osama bin Laden

CARE: an Atlanta, Georgia-based humanitarian organization that works mainly to fight poverty

Hamid Karzai: the president of Afghanistan since December of 2001

Kabul: the capital city and largest city; located in the southeast region of the country near

Pakistan (see Figure 3)

Mujahedeen: this term means “the partakers of or the followers in jihad”. In 1979 when the

Soviet Union invaded, the most prominent native militant-group that fought against the Soviet

armies was this organization

NGO: “Non-Government Organization”

Pakistan: a country to the southeast of Afghanistan; it borders India’s northwest border (see

Figure 3)

Tajikistan: a small country to the northwest border of Afghanistan that was one time part of the

U.S.S.R. (see Figure 3)

Taliban: Pashto extremist group that ruled the country before 2001

USAID: “United States Agency for International Development”

UNDP: “United Nations Development Programme”

UNICEF: “United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund”

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IX. Index

Figure 1:

Opium Cultivation

in Afghanistan

(1994-2010)

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Figure 2:

Ethno-linguistic Groups

in Afghanistan (1997)

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Figure 3:

Afghanistan Political

Map (2008)

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