UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN ...media.syracuse.com/news/other/2015/04/08/Proposed Amended...2015/04/08 · Kristina Parzych, Jonathan and Margaret Patch, Timothy

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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Robert and Colleen Bartlett, William and Michelle Barrington III, Kim Calverase, David Corrente, Gary Corrente, Lucy Corrente, Daniel and Veruska Dantuono, David and Juliette Dedo, Timothy and Sally DeLany, Brian and Tracy Dellow, Thomas and Kimberly Gdula, Ron Gryziec and Brenda Carpenter, Douglas and Charlene Hart, Thomas and Kimberly Kshyna, Michael and Alpha Kshyna, Matthew and Tracy Licameli, John and Kathleen Marinelli, Sarah Martinelli, William and Stephanie Mathewson, Peter and Jenafer Medina, Bryan Mignone and Elaine Everitt, Brian and Kimberly Murphy, Scott and Jill Musumeci, Jerry and Kristina Parzych, Jonathan and Margaret Patch, Timothy and Sharon Pieper, Frederick and Heather Puchta, Lynore and Mark de la Rosa, Deborah Ross, individually and as the representative of the Estate of Edward Wilbur, Robert and Lori Smith, Joey St. Louis, Robert and Megan Vertucci, Michael and Lynda Wade, and Mckenzie Yost,

Plaintiffs, -against-

HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC.,

[Proposed] Amended Complaint

Civil Action No. 513-CV-365

Defendant.

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The above-captioned individual Plaintiffs, through their attorneys, McCallion &

Associates LLP, hereby allege for their Amended Complaint as follows:

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

This is an action brought by residents of the Town of Camillus, New York,

as a result of Defendant Honeywell's negligent dumping of toxic waste dredged from

Onondaga Lake to a sediment consolidation site known as Wastebed 13, immediately

adjacent to Plaintiffs' homes and property, thereby endangering the health and safety of

Plaintiffs and their family members, and causing damage to their properties.

2. Plaintiffs seek monetary damages against Honeywell for the personal

injuries and property damages that they have suffered, and for the interference with their

right to the quiet enjoyment of their homes and property as a result of the toxic fumes and

odors emanating from Defendant's waste dump immediately adjacent to their homes.

Plaintiffs

3. Plaintiffs Robert G. and Colleen Bartlett reside at 153 Goldenrod Lane,

Warners, New York 13164 with their three children. The Bartletts purchased their newly

constructed home and property in 2006. It was not until 2009 or 2010 that Mr. and Mrs.

Bartlett learned of the plan to pump contaminated waste dredged from Onondaga Lake to

the Wastebed 13 site near their home. They were exposed to toxic chemicals, including but

not limited to hexachloro benzene, PCBs, hydrogen sulfide, naphthalene, benzene and

mercury, among other toxic chemicals, as a result of the toxic waste dumping at Wastebed

13. In the fall of 2012, Mr. and Mrs. Bartlett noticed foul odors and chemical-like smells

and a naphthalene-like odor coming from the direction of the waste dump, particularly in

the afternoon and early evening. Mr. and Mrs. Bartlett were very concerned about the

chemical exposure that their three children experienced during the dredging operations

from 2012 through 2014 at Wastebed fl because they were very active and liked to play

outside. Throughout the active dredging operations, Mr. and Mrs. Bartlett were concerned

as to whether they should allow their children to play in the backyard and use their pool

due to the noxious odors and air borne chemicals coming from Wastebed 13. In an attempt

to avoid the noxious odors emanating from Wastebed 13, the Bartlett family kept their air

conditioning running with the windows closed on a regular basis. Mr. and Mrs. Bartlett

were forced to remain indoors during the dredging season and thus lost use and enjoyment

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of the outdoor space on their property due to the odors and chemicals that they were

exposed to when venturing outside. Upon information and belief, the airborne chemicals

entered, landed on and damaged the Bartlett's property. Mr. and Mrs. Bartlett have

experienced anxiety and stress about the potential health effects of the chemical exposure.

4. Plaintiffs William D. and Michelle Barrington III reside at 147 Goldenrod

Lane, Warners, New York 13164 with their two children. At the time they purchased their

home in October 2005, they were unaware of any plan to pump contaminated dredged

waste from the Lake to a location close to their property. The Barringtons previously had

lived in the Fairmount area of Camillus and wanted to remain in the area for the quality of

the school system. If they had known that Wastebed 13 would be reactivated as a dump for

this toxic contaminated waste, they would have never moved into the Golden Meadows

community. Mr. and Mrs. Barrington were exposed to toxic chemicals, including but not

limited to hexachlorobenzene, PCBs, hydrogen sulfide, naphthalene, benzene and mercury,

as a result of the dredging operations at Wastebed 13. When the dredging of the Lake and

dumping at Wastebed 13 started in the summer of 2012, the family detected foul odors and

chemical smells emanating from Wastebed 13. The odors sometimes smelled like

naphthalene, or mothballs, and at other times it either had a "sweet chemical smell," a

"strong chemical smell," or a "body odor type smell." Mr. and Mrs. Barrington called the

hotline on numerous occasions to report the odors.

5. Due to this ongoing nuisance, Mr. and Mrs. Barrington spent a considerable

amount of time and thousands of dollars of their time and expertise helping to create a

website (www.odorreport.org) so that they and their neighbors could document the dates,

times and nature of the odors that they were detecting. The Barrington family home has a

nice fenced in backyard with a deck, patio and hot tub that they are not able to enjoy

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because of the odors emanating from Wastebed 13 and the health hazards that the chemical

exposure can cause. Mr. and Mrs. Barrington have lost all use of their backyard and

outdoor area during the dredging season when the odor is present. Upon information and

belief, the airborne chemicals particles entered, landed on and damaged the Barrington

property. Mr. and Mrs. Barrington have experienced severe stress because of the odors

emanating from Wastebed 13 and fear of what effect such chemical exposure will have on

the health and well-being of their children, as well as themselves.

6. Plaintiff Kim Calverase and her son reside at 145 Goldenrod Lane,

Warners, New York. She purchased her new house in August 2005, moving from

Fairmount (Town of Camillus) since she wanted her child to grow up in a good

neighborhood and new development that was more rural and had less traffic then her old

neighborhood. She thought that a neighborhood with less traffic and noise would be a

healthier environment for her child to grow up in. It was not until after she moved into her

new home that she first learned of the plan to pump the contaminated waste from the local

news. During the dredging/dumping "seasons" from 2012 through 2014, Ms. Calverase

smelled strong chemical, mothball-like odors. Upon information and belief, Ms. Calverase

was exposed to toxic chemicals, including but not limited to hexachlorobenzene, PCBs,

hydrogen sulfide, naphthalene, benzene and mercury, as a result of the toxic waste

dumping operations at Wastebed 13. The airborne chemicals entering and landing on Ms.

Calverase's property in the form of dust and particles caused her to develop headaches and

forced her to stay in her home with all of the windows and door closed in order to try to

avoid exposure to the odors and airborne contaminants. Ms. Calverase would not allow her

son to play outside because she did not want him exposed to whatever was in the air that

was causing the odors. Prior to the dredging/dumping, Ms. Calverase and her son spent a

lot of time outside enjoying cookouts on the deck and swims in their pool. She had a large

outdoor play set for her son, who enjoyed swinging, climbing and jumping. They also

played outdoor games in their yard, including baseball, kickball, hockey, lacrosse and

"hide and seek." However, as a result of the odors emanating from Wastebed 13, she

experienced anxiety and depression, since she is very concerned about the health and well-

being of herself and her son, and no longer has the "happy, healthy and safe home" for

herself and her son that motivated her to move there in the first place. Ms. Calverase is also

worried that her son will be left with "nothing but sad memories of a childhood spent

indoors."

7. Plaintiff David Corrente resides as 3647 Armstrong Road throughout the

entire relevant period. He had previously been an athletic and healthy man for his entire

life. However, beginning in or about August 2012 through November/December 2012, Mr.

Corrente began smelling a noxious pungent chemical-like smell in and around his house

that made it difficult to breathe. Upon information and belief, Mr. Corrente was exposed to

toxic chemicals, including but not limited to hexachloro benzene, PCBs, hydrogen sulfide,

naphthalene, benzene and mercury as a result of the toxic waste dumping operations at

Wastebed 13. During inactive dewatering operations from December 2012 through April

2013, the odors briefly subsided. During the months of June through November 2013, the

chemical odors returned and Mr. Corrente's difficulty breathing gradually intensified until

sometime in November, when he was admitted to the hospital in acute respiratory distress.

8. In November 2013, Mr. Corrente underwent surgery to relieve a build-up of

fluids around his lungs, and almost died during surgery. During the break in dumping and

dewatering operations, from approximately December 2013 through May of 2014, Mr.

Corrente incrementally regained some of his strength, but during active operations from

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June 2014 through November 2014, he again experienced the noxious odors and fatigue

associated with his respiratory ailments associated with the breathing of toxic

chemicals. To this day, Mr. Corrente has not fully recovered, and he continues to

experience severe chronic fatigue, breathing difficulties, headaches, and sore throat and

nasal passages. Mr. Corrente has also reported seeing a spray/vapor rising above the tree-

line of Wastebed 13 on numerous occasions that is consistent with the video taken by

Plaintiff Thomas Gdula (see below). Upon information and belief, the airborne chemicals

entered Mr. Corrente's property in the form of dust and particles. As a result of the odors

and airborne chemicals emanating from Wastebed 13, Mr. Corrente lost all use and

enjoyment of his property.

9. Plaintiffs Gary Corrente and his mother, Lucy Corrente, reside at 3838

Armstrong Road where they have resided for approximately sixty years. Beginning in or

about July/August 2012, Gary and Lucy Corrente began smelling an intense rotten egg,

chemical-like smell around their home that caused them to experience nausea, sore throats,

and severe and increasingly frequent headaches. Mr. and Mrs. Corrente were exposed to



Wastebed 13. The airborne chemicals entered and landed on the Corrente property. To

avoid the intense odor and headaches Gary and Lucy Corrente spent most of their time

inside their house with the windows closed. In early 203, MRI results for a back injury

Mr. Corrente was being treated for revealed that he had developed a cancerous tumor on

his bladder between 2012 and the spring of 203. As a result, Gary Corrente had surgery

to remove his bladder in 2013.

10. In early 2014, Gary Corrente sought further medical treatment for his

ongoing headaches, which had increased in intensity and frequency throughout the relevant

period. Further medical scans revealed for the first time that Gary Corrente developed a

lesion on his cerebellum between 2013 and 2014. Medical test are still ongoing to

determine whether Gary Corrente has developed a second lesion on his cerebellum and

whether or not the lesions(s) are malignant.

11. During the period of active operations at Wastebed 13, both Gary and

Lucy Corrente observed a vapor mist hugging the ground in the back of their house during

the early mornings on several occasions during which time the odors around his home were

also particularly pungent. During the same period, Lucy Corrente has experienced fatigue

and a difficulty eating which has resulted in a significant weight loss.

12. Plaintiffs Daniel R. and Veruska 0. Dantuono reside at 154 Goldenrod

Lane, Warners, New York with their three children. They purchased their new home in

July 2010, hoping to provide a healthy and safe environment for themselves and their

children. They first started noticing the odors in August 2012 when the dredging and

dumping of the contaminated waste was underway. It smelled like mothballs or

naphthalene. Mr. and Mrs. Dantuono were exposed to toxic chemicals, including but not

limited to hexachlorobenzene, PCBs, hydrogen sulfide, naphthalene, benzene and mercury

as a result of the toxic waste dumping operations at Wastebed 13. Upon information and

belief, the airborne chemicals emanating from Wastebed 13 entered and landed on the

Dantuono's property. In order to avoid the odors and air contamination, the Mr. and Mrs.

Dantuono closed their windows and were forced to remain inside or leave their home to

spend time off their property. When Mr. and Mrs. Dantuono smelled the odor emanating

from Wastebed 13, they did not let their children go outside. During the dredging season,

when they detected odor emanating from Wastebed 13, the Dantuonos could no longer

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barbeque or enjoy the other outdoor activities they previously enjoyed.

13. As a result of the odors and airborne chemicals emanating from Wastebed

13, Mr. and Mrs. Dantuono lost all use and enjoyment of their property. Mr. and Mrs.

Dantuono were embarrassed to host any outdoor activities on their property due to the

odors, and they have considered moving out of the neighborhood in order to avoid

continuing to live in a "toxic cloud." After the dredging began and the airborne chemicals

began to enter their property, Mrs. Dantuono starting getting nosebleeds for the first time in

her life. Mr. Dantuono was forced to spend a great deal of his time away from his job,

which is in the sales field, since much of the time that he previously spent planning his

work week or making sales calls became occupied with communicating with his neighbors

and others about the problem and worrying about his own health and that of his family. As

a result, he found it increasingly difficult to perform his job effectively.

14. Plaintiffs David and Juliette Dedo reside at 132 Goldenrod Lane,

Warners, New York 13164. They purchased their home in April of 2012, moving from

downtown Syracuse. They were attracted by the quiet neighborhood and good schools, and

thought that it was the perfect place to raise a family. Mr. and Mrs. Dedo first learned

about the plan to pump contaminated waste about one month later, in May 2012. In the

summer of 2012, Mr. and Mrs. Dedo began to notice an unusual chemical-like odor. Upon

information and belief, Mr. and Mrs. Dedo were exposed to toxic chemicals, including but

not limited to hexachloro benzene, PCBs, hydrogen sulfide, naphthalene, benzene and

mercury as a result of the toxic waste dumping operations at Wastebed 13. Upon

information and belief, the airborne chemicals emanating from Wastebed 13 entered and

landed on the Dedo's property. After the dredging began in 2012, Mrs. Dedo experienced

multiple nosebleeds as a result of the airborne chemicals emanating from Wastebed 13

entering and landing on her person and property. The entire Remediation experience made

Mr. and Mrs. Dedo highly anxious and stressed-out. This has severely affected their quality

of life and use and enjoyment of their property, since they have had to restrict their outdoor

activities, such as exercising, yard work, gardening and outdoor barbecues.

15. Plaintiffs Sally and Timothy (Tim) DeLany reside at 120 Goldenrod Lane,

Warners, New York with their two sons. They purchased their home on August U, 2008,

moving from another house in Camillus because they wanted a newer and larger home.

They would have never purchased the home if they had known that there were plans to

dump contaminated waste near their property. During the summer of 2012, Mr. and Mrs.

DeLany started noticing strong chemical odor, which irritated their nasal passages and

caused them both to have headaches. Upon information and belief, Mr. and Mrs. DeLany

were exposed to toxic chemicals, including but not limited to hexachlorobenzene, PCBs,

hydrogen sulfide, naphthalene, benzene and mercury as a result of the toxic waste dumping

operations at Wastebed 13.

16. As a result of the airborne chemicals entering and landing on the DeLany

property in the form of particles and dust, Mr. and Mrs. DeLany had to keep the windows

closed. This was very upsetting, especially during beautiful summer days. The odors got so

bad at times that their boys complained about not being able to go outside because of the

smells. The time that they spent outside on their deck was severely restricted, and the use

and enjoyment of their property was seriously impacted. As a result, Mr. and Mrs. Delany

became very upset and concerned about the possible adverse health effects, especially

since Mrs. DeLany works in the oncology nursing field and is very aware of the fact that

exposure to chemicals can have adverse health consequences even long after the exposure.

17. Plaintiffs Brian and Tracy Dellow reside at 187 Goldenrod Lane, Warners,

New York 13164 with their two children. They purchased their home in 2006, and were

attracted by the country setting and the safe, family friendly neighborhood. They did not

know of any plans to dump contaminated waste nearby until it hit the news several years

later. They never would have moved there if they had known. Mr. and Mrs. Dellow started

noticing chemical smells during the summer of 2012 and throughout the dredging seasons.

Upon information and belief, Mr. and Mrs. Dellow were exposed to toxic chemicals,

including but not limited to hexachlorobenzene, PCBs, hydrogen sulfide, naphthalene,

benzene and mercury as a result of the toxic waste dumping operations at Wastebed 13

The airborne chemicals entering and landing on the Dellow property in the form of

particles and dust burned their nasal passages. The noxious odor emanating from Wastebed

13 were most potent early in the morning and at night, and it either was a "gross chemical

smell, or the worst case of body odor you can imagine." Mr. and Mrs. Dellow couldn't

leave their windows open, and at times they felt forced to actually leave their home and

drive to a park in another town to seek some relief from the noxious odors.

18. Mr. and Mrs. Dellow had installed a pool in their yard at a cost of $25,000,

but after the dredging started, they had to stop using it most of the time, especially when

the wind was blowing in the direction of their house from Wastebed 13. As a result of the

airborne chemicals emanating from Wastebed 13, Tracy would get headaches, her nose and

eyes would burn and her asthma would become worse. Some nights the odors emanating

from Wastebed 13 would enter her home and wake her up in the middle of the night. Mrs.

Dellow would be unable to go back to sleep because she sensed that the chemical odors

were now "trapped" in their bedroom. Mr. and Mrs. Dellow were unable to use any fans

during the dredging seasons because the fans would pull the odors into their house.

19. Mr. and Mrs. Dellow were forced to stop growing vegetables in their garden

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for fear of the airborne chemical contaminants that they believed were falling on the

ground and garden. Mr. and Mrs. Dellow experienced considerable stress for their own

health and that of their children. At a meeting, a Honeywell representative assured them

that the cancer risk "inside three years" was "low," but they continued to worry.

20. Plaintiffs Thomas and Kimberly Gdula and their two children reside at

145 Golden Meadows Way, Warners, NY 13164. They have lived there since December

2005. Beginning in or about July/August 2012 through the fall of 2014, when active

sediment dewatering and handling operations were going on at Wastebed 13, Mr. and Mrs.

Gdula smelled intense, chemical-like odors in and around their home which made it

difficult to breathe. Upon information and belief, Mr. and Mrs. Gdula were exposed to



Wastebed 13. The odors and airborne chemicals emanating from Wastebed 13, gave them

headaches, burnt their nasal passages and throats and, on some occasion, caused them

bloody noses.

21. During this period, Mr. and Mrs. Gdula were forced to stay inside their

home with the windows closed in order to avoid smelling the intense odors and the severe

effects of breathing the emissions that were clearly emanating from Wastebed 13. Upon

information and belief, the airborne chemicals emanating from Wastebed 13 entered and

landed on the Gdula property in the form of particles and dust. Since active dredging and

sediment dewatering operations ceased in or about November 2014, chemical odors have

continued to envelope their house on at least two occasions in December 2014 and January

2015, which they believe related to toxic airborne emissions still emanating from the

dredged waste within the porous geotubes dumped at Wastebed 13. Mr. and Mrs. Gdula

fear that this exposure to hazardous emissions will have negative long term health impacts

far more severe than the short term health impacts they have already suffered. Mr. and

Mrs. Gdula also fear that the sediment present in the geotubes at Wastebed 13 will continue

to emit hazardous emissions notwithstanding Honeywell's plans to cap the geotubes unless

a proper venting and gas flaring system is incorporated into the final design.

22. On numerous occasions during the sediment consolidationldewatering

operations at Wastebed 13 conducted by Honeywell, Mr. Gdula witnessed a vapor/spray

rising above the tree line surrounding Wastebed 13, during which time the chemical-like

smell entering his property had a particularly strong and pungent odor.

23. On one of those occasions, specifically on June 25, 2014, Mr. Gdula filmed

this vapor/spray phenomenon with his phone. Still-frames photos taken by Mr. Gdula are

attached hereto as Exhibit A.1

24. On numerous other occasions during the sediment consolidationldewatering

operations, he witnessed a thick vapor/mist cloud that hugged Armstrong Road and Nine

Mile Creek while he was driving, during which time the chemical-like odors enveloping

his car and house were also particularly strong and pungent. On September 14, 2014 and

again on November 8, 2014, Mr. Gdula took photographs of Wastebed 13 from a vantage

point overlooking the site. These photographs are attached hereto as Exhibit B (September

14, 2014) and Exhibit C (November 8, 2014).

25. Plaintiffs Ron Gryziec and Brenda J. Carpenter reside at 380 Armstrong

Road, Syracuse, New York 13209. They moved into their home in 2003, which is owned

by Ron's father, Richard Gryziec, who lives next door at 3817 Armstrong Road. Ron's

'In conformity with the Court's ECF filing rules, photographs and videos referred to herein as attached exhibits are being filed separately from this proposed amended complaint and are being served on defendant's counsel, and provided to the Court, by mail.

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aunt and uncle, Dorothy and Fred Storms, also live next door at 3775 Armstrong Road. Mr.

Gryziec and Ms. Carpenter first started noticing the mothball, or naphthalene-like, odors in

September 2012, which were especially heavy in the early morning hours. Mr. Gryziec and

Ms. Carpenter were exposed to toxic chemicals, including but not limited to

hexachlorobenzene, PCBs, hydrogen sulfide, naphthalene, benzene and mercury as a result

of the toxic waste dumping operations at Wastebed 13.

26. The dumping of contaminated waste at Wastebed 13 was extremely stressful

and caused them great anxiety, especially since they did not know what adverse health

effects could be caused by the airborne contamination that was causing the odors. Mr.

Gryziec and Ms. Carpenter shut their windows and stayed inside when the odors were

present. Mr. Gryziec and Ms. Carpenter were concerned about the airborne chemicals

entering and landing on their property and their large vegetable garden. They were

concerned about the possible effect that the produce from their large vegetable garden,

which had been contaminated by the airborne chemical particles, would have on them and

others who ate their vegetables. Mr. Gryziec and Ms. Carpenter were also concerned

because the large garden that they had normally required them to be outside for long

periods of time. In short, Defendant's operations at Wastebed 13 had a sharp and negative

impact on their quality of life, and the use and enjoyment of their property.

27. Plaintiffs Charlene and Douglas Hart resided at 153 Golden Meadows

Way, Warners, New York 13164 with their daughter from March 2008 until September

2014. The Harts purchased their house to move back to the area where Charlene had grown

up and where her sister Kim Kshyna, and brother-in-law, Torn Kshyna, lived. When the

2012 dredging/dumping season began, Mrs. Hart started noticing a burning, mothball, or

naphthalene-like, smell that burned her throat. Mr. and Mrs. Hart were exposed toxic

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chemicals, including but not limited to hexa chloro benzene, PCBs, hydrogen sulfide,


Wastebed 13. Charlene called the DEC hotline several times during the 202 dredging

season. Charlene had several conversations with Craig Milborne, the Honeywell Public

Relations representative, about the odor emanating from Wastebed 13. The Harts were told

that a "response team" was investigating the smell and that they would let them know what

happened but they never heard back.

28. As a result of the airborne toxic chemicals entering and landing on the Harts

property, Mrs. Hart had many sinus headaches and had to stop wearing her contact lenses

since they made her eyes sore. When the dredging stopped in November 2012, her

headaches subsided and she was able to wear her contacts again without irritation. Mrs.

Hart's symptoms of chemical exposure began again when the dredging started up again in

the fall of 2013.

29. The Harts' daughter Mikayla experienced sore throats when the

dredging/dumping was ongoing, and she would be constantly clearing her throat during the

dredging seasons. She would not play outside when the odors were present since she was

afraid to do so. Charlene had to drive her to school on the mornings that the odors were

present, especially when they were strong, which was often during the dredging season.

30. When the dredging began, Doug started to experience shortness of breath,

dizziness and headaches when exposed to the airborne chemicals that were emanating from

Wastebed 13 and landing on the Hart's persons and property.

31. The Harts family life changed dramatically during the Wastebed 13

dumping operations because they were unable to go outside when the odor was present.

Mrs. Hart was forced to stop running outside because of the odor and health effects she

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experienced when exposed to the airborne chemicals. Mr. and Mrs. Hart were forced to

keep their windows and doors closed at night, and they also stopped taking bike rides in the

evening because the smells became so terrifying. They also stopped sitting outside, even

when the weather was good. They felt that their liberty and their freedom were being taken

away from them.

32. The Hart family was unable to use and enjoy their property because of the

airborne chemicals and noxious odor that were present during the dredging seasons. Mr.

and Mrs. Hart feared the chemical exposure that they experienced when being outdoors in

their backyard especially when they noticed that the wildflowers they planted in their

backyard never grew. Mr. and Mrs. Hart had plans for a vegetable garden, a tree house, a

swing set and a landscaped fire pit, all of which were not possible due to the odors and the

unknown dangers of the contaminants that were producing the odors. Mr. and Mrs. Hart

have experienced extreme stress and anxiety due to the chemical odors and the unknown

health effects that the chemical exposure has had, and will continue to have, on the family.

33. In January 2014, the Harts moved back to the New Jersey/Philadelphia area

since they were very uncomfortable living in the area and having to be exposed to noxious

odors and worrying about the long term health consequences of such exposure. They had

difficulty selling their house since all of the prospective buyers already knew about the

odors emanating from Wastebed 13 during the dredging seasons.

34. Plaintiffs Thomas and Kimberly C. Kshyna reside at 128 Goldenrod

Lane, Warners, New York 13164 with their two children. The Kshyna family purchased

their house November 30, 2004. Their prior residence was about 2'/2 miles away, and they

wanted to live in a larger house in a new neighborhood that was further out in the country.

Starting with the 2012 dredging season, starting during the summer, they noticed a strong,

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chemical odor that smelled like mothballs or naphthalene. Mr. and Mrs. Kshyna were

exposed to toxic chemicals, including but not limited to hexachlorobenzene, PCBs,


operations at Wastebed 13

35. The odor from the airborne chemicals emanating from Wastebed 13 and

landing on the Kshyna property was so bad at times that they had to keep the windows

closed in the house and keep the A/C running both day and night. The Kshynas called an

800 hotline number at least U to 15 times during the 2012 dredging season. On many

occasions the DEC would come out to the Kshyna house and would agree that there was a

distinct odor that seemed to be coming from the direction of Wastebed 13.

36. The odors continued during the 2013 and 204 dredging seasons. Mr.

Kshyna experienced very severe headaches and body aches when the dredging and

dumping was ongoing, and his eyes felt as if they were being "squeezed." He tried to avoid

taking a deep breath of air, because when he did that, it became even harder for him to

breathe. His airways tended to tighten up. After the dredging began and after the airborne

chemicals began entering and landing on the Kshyna property, Mrs. Kshyna also had

headaches that would last for a few days to a full week. She was taking Advil every day.

These symptoms tended to stop once the dredging/dumping stopped for a couple of weeks

in late September 2012, but they returned once again when the dredging re-started in 2013.

The same cycle continued during the 204 dredging season.

37. Mr. and Mrs. Kshyna both experienced severe stress and anxiety because of

the ongoing nuisance and health hazard, and they lived in fear for the well-being of their

children as well as themselves. Mr. and Mrs. Kshyna closed their windows and stayed

inside when the dredging/dumping was ongoing and when they noticed the odors, but they

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knew that these precautions were no guarantee that they were not being exposed to

dangerous airborne chemicals anyway.

38. Plaintiffs Michael W. and Alpha M. Kshyna reside at 103 Meadowlane

Drive, Camillus, New York 13164. They have lived in their home since 1965. The Kshynas

first learned about the dumping plans at a public meeting, and were assured by DEC and

Honeywell that "there would be no problems." During the 2012 dredging season, starting

during that summer, they noticed a pungent, heavy sulfurous odor, particularly in the early

morning and late evening when there was no wind. As a result of the toxic waste dumping

operations at Wastebed 13, Mr. and Mrs. Kshyna were exposed to toxic chemicals,


benzene and mercury. The odor from the airborne chemicals emanating from Wastebed 13

returned during the 2013 and 2014 dredging season. Upon information and belief, the

airborne chemicals emanating from Wastebed 13 entered and landed on the Kshyna's

property. Mr. and Mrs. Kshyna were forced kept their windows closed in an attempt to

keep the odors from Wastebed fl out of the house, and they were forced to remain indoors.

They lost the use and enjoyment of their property as a result of the odors. Both Mr. and

Mrs. Kshyna have experienced extreme stress and anxiety because of the odor nuisance

and the fear of the health effects that the airborne chemicals from Wastebed 13.

39. Mr. and Mrs. Kshyna, retirees with grandchildren living in the Golden

Meadows neighborhood, have experienced a severe loss of their personal freedoms because

their activities have been restricted, upon information and belief, by the Defendant's

conduct.

40. Plaintiffs Matthew C. and Tracy A. Licameli reside at 198 Goldenrod

Lane, Warners, New York 13164 with their two daughters. The Licameli family purchased

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their home on September 9, 2007, moving from Albany to be closer to their parents and

other family members as they were starting a new family themselves. During the 2012

dredging season, starting during the summer, Mr. and Mrs. Licameli noticed a strong,

chemical smell that created a burning sensation in their noses. As a result of the toxic waste

dumping operations at Wastebed 13, Mr. and Mrs. Licameli were exposed to toxic

chemicals, including but not limited to hexachloro benzene, PCBs, hydrogen sulfide,

naphthalene, benzene and mercury.

41. The smell of the airborne chemicals emanating from Wastebed 13 and

landing on the Licameli property was so bad that they got the sense that if they had lit a

match, the whole place would explode. They had to stay inside even on beautiful summer

days. Mr. and Mrs. Licameli could no longer use their backyard or their deck.

42. The patio furniture developed a bad smell when red dust from Wastebed 13

settled on it. Mr. and Mrs. Licameli were afraid to use that patio furniture even after they

tried washing the red dust off it. They could no longer even think about barbecuing in their

backyard or consider having friends over, since they never knew when the odors would

become unbearable. Mr. and Mrs. Licameli could no longer grow vegetables in their yard,

and no longer buy corn and other products from the farmer in the neighborhood because of

the toxic chemicals both lingering in the air and landing on the property. Mr. and Mrs.

Licameli could no longer leave their windows open when they went out, since they would

never know when they returned home whether or not the whole house would smell like

chemicals. They often sent their children to their grandparents' house located outside the

immediate neighborhood so that they could play outdoors, and then have them return home

at night to sleep. Mr. and Mrs. Licameli ran their A/C on a constant basis throughout the

summer and fall. They also had the same experience during the subsequent dredging

FI

seasons. Mr. Licameli developed an irritation of his eyes and had a sore throat that

wouldn't go away. Their daughter developed allergies and started taking allergy medicines.

The Remediation was very stressful for them, especially since they felt that their children

were in harm's way and that they did not know what the long-term effects would be on

them of being forced to breathe the toxins in the air.

43. During the relevant time frame, Plaintiffs John C. and Kathleen A.

Marinelli resided at 136 Goldenrod Lane, Warners, New York 13164 with their daughter,

Plaintiff Sarah Marinelli (22 years old). Sarah moved out of the house in December 204,

and now resides at 403 Tompkins Street, Syracuse, New York. They closed on their house

in November 2004, and did not learn of the plans to dump waste in the area until years

later. During the 2012 dredging season, they noticed a strong, chemical-type smell. Mr. and

Mrs. Marinelli were exposed to toxic chemicals, including but not limited to


of the toxic waste dumping operations at Wastebed 13. Mr. and Mrs. Marinelli were forced

to keep the windows closed and run the A/C most of the time when the dredging was

active. Mr. and Mrs. Marinelli have lost the use of their backyard. Mr. and Mrs. Marinelli

have a pool but they were unable to utilize it during the active dredging season. In previous

years, Mr. and Mrs. Marinelli used to plant vegetable garden, but they were forced to

forego gardening due to the health concerns of ingesting the vegetables that were exposed

to the airborne chemicals emanating from Wastebed 13 and landing on the Marinelli' s

property. Mr. and Mrs. Marinelli have experienced extreme stress and anxiety because of

the chemical exposure and they continue to fear for the well-being of their family.

44. Plaintiffs William and Stephanie Mathewson resided at 181 Goldenrod

Lane, Warners, New York 13164 with their two children from April, 2006, when they

19

purchased their home, until July 15, 203, when they were forced to sell their house. They

had previously lived nearby in the Fairmount area, which is in the West Genesee School

District, and they wanted to stay in the area due to the good reputation of the school

district. Since the dredging and dumping started in the summer of 2012, Mr. and Mrs.

Mathewson feel like they were forced to live in a nightmare, and felt like they have been

literally run out of their neighborhood by Honeywell and the airborne toxins that have

contaminated the air they breathe and landed on their property. Mr. and Mrs. Mathewson

have exposed to toxic chemicals, including but not limited to hexachlorobenzene, PCBs,


operations at Wastebed 13.

45. During the 2012 dredging season, Mr. and Mrs. Mathewson noticed a foul

chemical odor on many occasions throughout the three month dredging season. It smelled

like mothballs, or naphthalene, and at other times, like body odor. After Honeywell put in a

misting system to try and mask the smell, Mr. and Mrs. Mathewson often smelled an

unnatural floral scent that mimicked air freshener. Mr. and Mrs. Mathewson couldn't leave

their windows open, and they had to keep their A/C running. They could no longer use

their backyard the way that they had used to, and they felt like they could no longer let

their children outside. Mr. and Mrs. Mathewson stopped growing vegetables since they no

longer felt comfortable eating any vegetables grown in this toxic environment. They had

only limited visits from friends and family, since they never knew when the odor would

drive them indoors.

46. The airborne chemicals emanating from Wastebed 13 that landed on the

Mathewson's persons and property made Mrs. Mathewson's eyes water and irritated her

nasal passages. These symptoms tended to dissipate when she was indoors or when the

20

windows were shut. Mrs. Mathewson also started suffering from panic attacks, acid reflux,

GI issues, heart palpitations, as well as numbness and tingling in her extremities. Her face

would get flushed and she would physically start to shake, which her doctor explained was

a high stress reaction.

47. Mr. and Mrs. Mathewson experienced both severe stress and anxiety

because of this ongoing nuisance and health hazard, and they feared for the well-being of

their entire family. Mr. Mathewson had bouts of insomnia and increased stress, as he tried

to find a way to extricate himself and his family from the nightmare in a way that would

protect his children's health. The Remediation took a severe toll on both of them, both

physically and mentally.

48. Plaintiffs Peter G. and Jenafer Medina reside at 200 Goldenrod Lane,

Warners, New York 13164 with their two children. The Medinas purchased their house on

July 25, 2007. They first learned about the dumping plans in approximately the spring of

2010 from a neighbor. Starting in about August 2012, when the dredging and dumping was

underway, they started to notice an obnoxious odor, like a mix of body odor and mothballs,

or naphthalene. For a period of several months, the odor emanating from Wastebed fl

continued on a constant basis, varying in degree from mild to overwhelming. The Medinas

called the DEC hotline several times and made reports to the odor reporting website

created by the Camillus Community Air Coalition. Mr. and Mrs. Medina were exposed to

toxic chemicals, including but not limited to hexachlorobenzene, PCBs, hydrogen sulfide,


Wastebed 13.

49. When exposed to the airborne chemicals that landed not only on his

property but also his person, Mr. Medina suffered nearly constantly from increased anxiety

2

and insomnia, and he was under the treatment of a medical doctor for both of those

conditions. He went outside every night to check for odors since he was worried that the

odors would infiltrate the house while his family slept. Mrs. Medina began to experience

extreme stress from both the odors and her concerns for the health hazards that the

chemical exposure from Wastebed fl may have posed to herself and her family. Mr. and

Mrs. Medina were forced to keep their windows closed when they noticed the odor, and

they purchased a charcoal filter to try to clean the air. They also ran their AC/furnace

regularly to circulate and filter the air. Mr. and Mrs. Medina did not let their children go

outside unless one of them went out first to see how strong the odor was. Due to the odors

from Wastebed 13 and fear of what the chemical exposure would do to their health, the

Medina family was unable to have camp fires, tent camps and evenings in the backyard

with family and friends as they had done prior to the dredging. The Medina family stopped

their organic gardening and cancelled their traditional Labor Day BBQ in 2012 and 2013

50. To provide their children with a safe outdoor area to play in on the

weekends, the Medinas purchased a camper and rented a full seasonal spot in Weedsport,

New York. They typically only spent 4 days per week in their home from June through

October during the dredging seasons. During the extra bad weeks, they took their children

out to the camp for 5-6 days at a time. The Medinas were forced to make this investment

because their backyard was unusable during the dredging due to the odors. The Medinas

had homeschooled their children for 6 years. In September 2013, due to the odors in the air

and safety concerns, the Medinas enrolled their children in school. The Medinas felt that

their home was no longer safe and the children were no longer able to be outside and enjoy

the homeschooling environment due to the odors in the air.

51. Plaintiffs Bryan M. Mignone and Elaine M. Everitt reside at 196

22

Goldenrod Lane, Warners, New York 13164 with their two young children. They

purchased their home in 2007, having previously lived in an apartment in Manhattan, and

briefly in a rented apartment in Baldwinsville. They wanted to raise a family in an area

where their children would have a yard and an outdoor area to play. They also did not want

their children to be exposed to air pollution, which, they had believed, was more common

in metropolitan areas. Starting with the 2012 dredging season, they noticed a strong,

chemical smell that created a burning sensation in their nasal passages. Mr. Mignone and

Ms. Everitt were exposed to toxic chemicals, including but not limited to


of the toxic waste dumping operations at Wastebed 13.

52. The odor from the airborne chemicals emanating from Wastebed 13 and

landing on the Mignone/Everitt persons and property smelled so strong at times that they

took their children in the car to a park that was far enough away so that they could no

longer detect the odor. Ms. Everitt experienced severe headaches when she was outside, as

well as a burning sensation in her nasal passages, nausea and severe malaise. She sought

medical treatment for these symptoms at the Upstate Occupational Health Clinic. Her

symptoms tended to resolve when she stayed inside her home with the windows closed or

drove out of the area. Mr. Mignone and Ms. Everitt lose the use and enjoyment of their

property as a result of the airborne chemicals emanating from Wastebed 13. They were

forced to close their windows and stay inside when the dredging/dumping was ongoing,

and their children were not allowed outside even during beautiful summer days. Even when

Mr. Mignone and Ms. Everitt did consider letting their children outside to play, they were

forced to check the wind direction and smell the air first. They ran the A/C on a constant

basis through the summer and into the fall. They even had to run the A/C when it was 46

23

degrees outside because of the health effects that Ms. Everitt was experiencing. Mr.

Mignone and Ms. Everitt both experienced severe stress and anxiety because of this

ongoing nuisance and health hazard and because of their fears for the well-being of their

children, as well as themselves. They even had extreme feelings of being overwhelmed and

helpless.

53. Plaintiffs Brian T. and Kimberly C. Murphy reside at 193 Goldenrod

Lane, Warners, New York 13164 with their two young children. The Murphys purchased

their home on October 20, 2006, moving from an apartment in Baldwinsville because they

wanted to live in a new housing development with other young couples with children.

When the dredging began in August 202, the Murphy family began to notice a foul

chemical odor on numerous occasions. The odor typically smelled like mothballs, or

naphthalene, or body odor. The toxic chemicals that Mr. and Mrs. Murphy were exposed to

included hexachloro benzene, PCBs, hydrogen sulfide, naphthalene, benzene and mercury

as a result of the toxic waste dumping operations at Wastebed 13. Upon information and

belief, the airborne chemicals emanating from Wastebed 13 entered and landed on the

Murphy's property. Their children complained of sore noses and throats, even during the

summer months, and Mr. Murphy noticed a marked increase in his asthma symptoms, and

greater reliance on his corrective inhaler during the summer months.

54. Mr. and Mrs. Murphy can no longer use their backyard and their children

are not allowed to play outside due to the odors and airborne chemicals emanating from

Wastebed 13. Mr. and Mrs. Murphy were forced to keep their windows closed, and they

kept the A/C running. They severely limited their invitations to friends and neighbors since

they never knew when the odor might drive them indoors. Mr. and Mrs. Murphy have

experienced extreme psychological and emotional distress as a result of the toxic waste

24

dumping operations at Wastebed 13 and the ever-present airborne chemicals emanating

from Wastebed 13 onto their property. Mr. and Mrs. Murphy have experienced extreme

stress and anxiety because of the ongoing odor nuisance emanating from Wastebed fl and

they continue to fear what the chemical exposure is doing to the well-being of their family.

As a result of their stress and anxiety, Brian and Kimberly developed insomnia.

55. Plaintiffs Jill and Scott Musumeci reside at flO Goldenrod Lane,

Warners, New York 13164 with their two children. The Musumeci family purchased their

home on February 28, 2005. Both Jill and Scott grew up in the area and wanted to raise

their children in Camillus. They were unaware that there were plans to open an active

waste dump near their property. During the 2012 dredging season, they first noticed a

strong, chemical smell, like burning plastic or chemicals. Mr. and Mrs. Musumeci were



operations at Wastebed 13. The odors from the airborne chemicals began again during the

2013 dredging season.

56. When the odors were emanating from Wastebed 13, Mr. and Mrs.

Musumeci were forced to stay inside with the windows closed in an attempt to avoid the

exposure. The airborne chemicals emanating from Wastebed 13 were entering and landing

on their persons and property in the form of particulates and dust. Mr. and Mrs. Musumeci

would not let their children go outside when the odor was present due to the health effects

of the chemical exposure. Mr. and Mrs. Musumeci have experienced extreme stress and

anxiety due to the odors and the fear of the health effects the airborne chemicals from

Wastebed 13 have had and will have on their family.

57. Plaintiffs Jerry and Kristina M. Parzych reside at 194 Goldenrod Lane,

25

Warners, New York 13164 with their two children. The Parzychs bought their home on

March 1, 2007. They wanted a new and bigger house for their family. They did not learn

about the dredging/dumping plans until much later. During the 202 dredging season, they

noticed a strong, chemical smell, which was unbearable. The airborne toxic chemicals that

Mr. and Mrs. Parzych were exposed to included hexachloro benzene, PCBs, hydrogen

sulfide, naphthalene, benzene and mercury that were emanating from Wastebed 13 and

landing on the Parzych property. Upon information and belief, the airborne chemicals

emanating from Wastebed 13 entered and landed on the Parzych's property. The odor from

the airborne chemicals was especially bad when Mr. Parzych came home at night from

work around midnight.

58. A few times, when the chemical smell was strong, Jerry noticed that he

became short of breath by the time he reached his doorstep. On one particular occasion, the

odor was so strong that he was unable to get air into his lungs. He went inside and called

911 and informed them that there was a flammable or caustic odor coming from Wastebed

13. Jerry also called the DEC hotline. After the call, at around 1:00 am that evening, a DEC

representative came to his home. The DEC representative confirmed that the odor was

coming from Wastebed 13. This scenario was repeated every day or every other day for a

few weeks straight. Each time that the DEC and Honeywell representatives came to the

house, they both confirmed that the odor was coming from the dump site.

59. Mr. and Mrs. Parzych experienced the same odors from the airborne

chemicals emanating from Wastebed 13 during subsequent dredging/dumping seasons. Mr.

and Mrs. Parzych were forced to keep their windows closed and were forced to either stay

in their home or go away from the weekends to avoid the odor emanating from Wastebed

13. Mr. and Mrs. Parzych were unable to enjoy their home and property due to the odors

26

and chemical exposure resulting from the toxic waste dumping at Wastebed 13. Mr. and

Mrs. Parzych were unable to enjoy their backyard including activities like barbeques,

playing catch, or letting their dogs run outside. Mr. Parzych was unable to wash and wax

his cars outside during the dredging seasons. Both Mr. and Mrs. Parzych have experienced

severe stress and anxiety because of the odor nuisance and the fear of what effects the

airborne chemicals coming from Wastebed fl will have the on the health of themselves

and their family.

60. Plaintiffs Jonathan B. (Jon) and Margaret K. (Peggy) Patch reside at 169

Goldenrod Lane, Warners, New York 13164 with their three children. The Patch family

purchased their home in April 2006, moving from Massachusetts in order to have a better

quality of life for their kids. They were completely unaware of any potential dredging that

was to be done. Once they realized that this plan was in the works, it seemed that their

quality of life took a sharp downward trajectory. They had a general feeling of panic that

they had just moved their small, healthy children into this potentially and remarkably

unhealthy situation, the effects of which may not be known for years, when everyone else

in the area had forgotten about the dredging. Also, they were concerned that they had

invested virtually all of their assets into this house and neighborhood, only to find out that

a toxic waste dump was being opened by Honeywell virtually in their backyard.

61. Since the dredging/dumping started in 2012, they experienced headaches,

nosebleeds or constant, never-ending allergy-type symptoms. They experienced increased

costs for medications and doctors' visits, concerned with the ongoing symptoms. Their

ability to enjoy their home, yard and air was overwhelmingly decreased because of the

fumes coming from Wastebed 13. They feared for their own health and that of their

children, and decided to not even try to subject any guests to the odors and toxic exposures.

27

They refrained from having friends over for fear of exposing them to harmful chemicals

and the sewer/chemical stench. The odors they detected were a foul chemical odor that

smelled like several different chemicals had been mixed together. It smelled like burning

chemicals at times. They couldn't leave their windows open, and they kept the A/C

running, which they weren't sure was a good idea either. They used to open the windows

on nice days, but quickly realized that they were just letting the chemicals in. The "fresh"

air wasn't "fresh" anymore. They did not open their windows with any consistency since

2012. They would do it briefly on a day that didn't seem bad, to try to change the air, and

then quickly close them again.

62. Upon information and belief, Mr. and Mrs. Patch were exposed to toxic

chemicals, including but not limited to hexachlorobenzene, PCBs, hydrogen sulfide,


Wastebed 13. Upon information and belief, the airborne chemicals emanating from

Wastebed 13 entered and landed on the Patch's property.

63. When she was driving in her car on Airport Road, Mrs. Patch experienced

"throat closings" on several occasions, which was a very scary experience.

64. During the dredging seasons, Mrs. Patch was forced to stop wearing

contacts for the most part since her eyes were constantly watering/burning. Several family

members also began experiencing severe migraine-type headaches, which they had never

had a problem with before. Their sons, who had no previous medical issues, also exhibited

random nose bleeds, headaches, itchy throats, etc., which made both parents extremely

concerned as to what the lasting health effects would be on their children. As a result, they

both experienced severe stress and anxiety because of their continuing concerns for their

own health and that of their children. In short, although they had thought they were moving

NM

into "God's country," it ended up being something else entirely.

65. The whole issue caused them countless hours of lost sleep, and considerable

distress. They felt trapped. They no longer used their backyard in the way that they had,

and they stopped letting their children outside when the dumping was ongoing. They

stopped eating berries and vegetables from the strawberry/vegetable garden in the backyard

for fear that it was covered in chemicals, and eliminated that garden, and many of their

trees would die between spring and summer. When pregnant with their last child, Peggy

had to stop going to community meetings about Honeywell's dumping of the toxic sludge

nearby because it made her so upset, being extremely worried about the health of their

unborn baby. Their children are now 13, 10'/2 and 4'/2, and to this day, they are deeply

worried about any possible adverse health effects on them.

66. Plaintiffs Timothy J. and Sharon Pieper reside at 127 Golden Meadows

Way, Warners, New York 13164 with their two children. The Pieper family purchased

their house in December 2004, and first heard about the dredging/dumping in about

December 2009 from neighbors and newspaper reports. During the 2012 dredging season,

starting in late August/early September, they noticed an odor that smelled like mothballs or

naphthalene. They noticed the odor again during the 2013 dredging season, with the

additional smell of strong chemical burning, which was so strong that it was occasionally

unbearable for them to be outside. Mr. and Mrs. Pieper were exposed to toxic chemicals,


benzene and mercury both in the air and on their property as a result of the toxic waste

dumping operations at Wastebed 13.

67. Mr. and Mrs. Pieper experienced respiratory issues during the entire 203

dredging season. Mr. and Mrs. Pieper made numerous calls to the hotline to report their

29

concerns which have been documented by the DEC. Mr. and Mrs. Pieper have

experienced extreme stress, anxiety and insomnia since the dredging began because they

are concerned about the short-term and continuing long-term health risks exposure to

harmful toxins emitted from Wastebed 13 onto their persons and property.

68. Plaintiffs Frederick (Marty) and Heather Puchta reside at 115 Raspberry

Lane, Camillus, New York 13031 with their three children. Until May 18, 2013, they

resided at 167 Goldenrod Lane in the Golden Meadows community. They purchased that

home in November 2004 and moved in May 2005. They previously lived in Marcellus, but

wanted a larger home in a rural setting that was in the West Genesee School District. They

were exposed to toxic chemicals, including but not limited to hexachlorobenzene, PCBs,


operations at Wastebed 13. Upon information and belief, the airborne chemicals emanating

from Wastebed 13 entered and landed on the Puchta's property. The Puchta family noticed

the foul odors and chemical smells from the airborne chemicals emanating from Wastebed

13 on a regular basis during the dredging.

69. On September 17, 2012 and October 27, 202, Mrs. Puchta called the DEC

hotline and reported strong odors. The DEC hotline informed her that they had received a

lot of calls that evening. Most times the odors were so bad that they were forced inside.

The odors typically smelled like moth-balls, or naphthalene, chemicals and things the

Puchta family has never smelled before. Sometimes the smells were so strong that Mr. and

Mrs. Puchta noticed the odor in their noses when they arrived at work, and it remained

there throughout the day.

70. Mr. and Mrs. Puchta experienced a variety of medical and physical

problems since the dredging started in 202. On one particular Saturday in the fall of 2012,

30

Mr. Puchta went outside to get the paper and the garage door was open. The fumes were so

bad that he felt dizzy, nauseous and thought he was going to faint. Mr. Puchta called the

DEC and asked them to stop the dredging. He spoke with Mary Jane Peachy and made it

very clear that the dredging was affecting his health. Later that evening, when he still felt

dizzy and sick, he called his sister to take him to the hospital Emergency Room since he

could not drive himself and Mrs. Puchta had to stay home with the kids.

71. Mr. Puchta received medical attention on October 23, 2012, November 14,

2012, November 15, 2012, November 20, 202, December 6, 202, December 2, 202,

and January 17, 2013, from his doctor Joseph A. Pinkes. On October 24, 202 and

November 14, 2012, Mr. Puchta required trips to Upstate University Hospital emergency

room. Mr. Puchta's doctor, Dylan Rodner, made diagnosis of acute allergic rhinitis,

vertigo, anxiety and expressed concern that his symptoms were consistent with hydro-

carbon poisoning. Mr. Puchta was treated by a psychologist, Dr. Rene Wilett, for his

anxiety. Dr. Wilett informed Mr. Puchta that his symptoms were consistent with post-

traumatic stress syndrome as a result of the dredging and exposure to the airborne

chemicals. After his emergency room visits, Mr. Puchta spoke with Ken Lynch at the DEC

and informed him of what he was told by the doctors.

72. Due to the symptoms that Mr. Puchta exhibited when exposed to the odors,

he had to miss many days of work. Specifically, he had to miss a week of work after

visiting the emergency room because he was weak and tired, and had to stay in bed for

several days. On one occasion in the fall of 2012, Mrs. Puchta was driving with her

windows down in the community and she immediately got a headache, and her throat

started to swell and hurt from the odor. She had to return home immediately to take

medicine. The rest of the family also suffered from headaches much more than they

31

normally did, even though they kept their house sealed tight during the entire dredging

season. In 2011, the Puchta family had an in-ground pool installed and the family was

unable to use it in 2012 after the dredging began. The Puchta children were not allowed to

enjoy the backyard, swim, play basketball, play on their play set, play nerf guns and burn

the energy that children need to do. All outdoor activity was restricted for the entire Puchta

family.

73. Mr. and Mrs. Puchta felt an indescribable amount of stress and emotional

distress since dredging began. Specifically, Mr. Puchta suffered from acute anxiety which

has led directly to his medical conditions. He has also felt sad, angry, alone, paranoia,

insomnia, fearful of the health and safety of his family and extremely worried about the

financial impact the dredging will have on the value of their home. Mr. Puchta's doctor has

recommended a therapist to help deal with his anxiety. Mrs. Puchta also experienced

severe stress since the dredging began. She has experienced hair loss by the fistful on a

daily basis. She has experienced insomnia and has had to take medicine to help her sleep.

Mrs. Puchta has also experienced sores inside her mouth from the stress of the dredging.

She has been overwhelmed by the anxiety and stressed about her families' health and being

forced to leave the neighborhood due to the health problems the exposure to the odors was

causing her family. Mr. Puchta's condition continued to deteriorate until approximately

mid to late May, 2013, when he could no longer continue to live in the house. He was

experiencing constant headaches and dizziness, and could no longer function in anything

close to a normal manner. He actually moved out of the house and rented an apartment a

few miles from their home, but sufficiently distant from Wastebed 13 so that the air quality

relieved his symptoms and he could function normally. The Puchta family was finally

reunited in May 2013 when they closed on their new home at 115 Raspberry Lane in

32

Camillus.

74. Plaintiff Lynore and Mark de la Rosa reside at 109 Victory Lane,

Warners, New York with their two children. They purchased their home on November 10,

2008, moving from Baldwinsville in order to be closer to family. As soon as the dredging

started, the de la Rosa family noticed a foul, mothball-type, or naphthalene, odor. The de la

Rosa's were exposed to airborne toxic chemicals, including but not limited to

hexachlorobenzene, PCBs, hydrogen sulfide, naphthalene, benzene and mercury emanating

from Wastebed 13. Mrs. de la Rosa experienced mild to severe headaches from the end of

summer through the fall of 2012 due to the exposure to the airborne chemicals and odors

emanating from Wastebed 13 onto the de la Rosa persons and property. Mrs. de la Rosa

was unable to enjoy outdoor activities and rollerblading with her dog because of the health

effects she experienced from being exposed to the contaminated air.

75. The de la Rosa family never opened their windows or door during dredging

season unless absolutely necessary. Mr. and Mrs. de la Rosa were unable to spend any

length of time outside when the dredging was occurring because the odors and airborne

chemicals would negatively affect them. The de la Rosa family could not cook or eat

outside on their deck because the odor was so nauseating it would ruin their appetite. Mr.

and Mrs. de la Rosa would not let their children play or ride their bikes outside when a

strong smell was evident. Mr. and Mrs. de la Rosa have experienced extreme stress,

anxiety and insomnia since the dredging began because they are concerned about the short-

term and continuing long-term health risks exposure to harmful toxins emitted from

Wastebed 13.

76. Plaintiff Deborah Ross, individually and as the representative of the Estate

of Edward Wilbur, her late father, resided at 6212 Airport Road, Syracuse, NY 13209

33

during active toxic waste dumping operations at Wastebed 13. Mr. Wilbur moved in with

his daughter in or about June 2012, just before the commencement of active operations at

Wastebed 13. From the beginning through completion of the Lake dredging and dumping

operations at Wastebed 13, Ms. Ross and her father smelled intense sour chemical-like

smells that caused Ms. Ross to suffer headaches and bloody noses on numerous occasions,

as well as severe sinus pressure and bronchitis. Ms. Ross and her father were exposed to



Wastebed 13. The odors coming from the airborne chemicals that were landing on their

persons and property exacerbated Mr. Wilbur's emphysema, causing him to be hospitalized

on numerous occasions for respiratory conditions, including pneumonia. During 203, he

was also prescribed an oxygen tank to aid his breathing. Mr. Wilbur's condition continued

to deteriorate until he was ultimately diagnosed with lung cancer in 2014, during which

time he had to remain indoors in order avoid the intense odors and aggravating symptoms

from chemical exposure. He ultimately committed suicide on October 2, 204, after his

suffering become unbearable.

77. Plaintiffs Robert and Lori Smith reside at 163 Goldenrod Lane, Warners,

New York 13164 with their two children. The Smiths purchased their home in September

of 2005 and were never notified of the plan to pump toxic waste into their backyard until

January 2010. Had they known about the plan in advance, they would have never bought a

house in Golden Meadows. Mr. and Mrs. Smith were exposed to toxic chemicals, including

but not limited to hexachloro benzene, PCBs, hydrogen sulfide, naphthalene, benzene and

mercury as a result of the toxic waste dumping operations at Wastebed 13. Mr. and Mrs.

Smith lost all use and enjoyment of their property during the dredging seasons as a result of

34

the noxious odors and airborne chemicals emanating from Wastebed fl onto their persons

and property. They noticed the chemical smells on almost a daily basis, often early in the

morning and later at night. It smelled like a combination of tar, mothballs and various

chemicals. They could almost taste it, like it was a residue in the air. They often felt like

they couldn't breathe because the smell was so toxic that it burned their noses and throats.

Sometimes it felt like they were suffocating. They limited their time outside and kept their

doors and windows closed. Mr. and Mrs. Smith experienced extreme stress, anxiety and

insomnia since the dredging began because they are concerned about the short-term and

continuing long-term health risks to themselves and their children as a result of the

exposure to harmful toxins emitted from Wastebed 13. Their anxiety greatly increased

when their son experienced bloody noses with increased frequency and duration. There

were several time he had 3-4 nose bleeds in a day. They received calls from his school

because he was having them with such frequency, He also had severe headaches and

underwent a CAT scan because they were so severe and happening daily. When the

dredging stopped for the season, his headaches and nose bleeds abated. When the dredging

resumed, his headaches and nose bleeds returned as well. They were also very concerned

about the impact that the chemical exposures were having on their daughter, who also

suffered from headaches during this time, and which she had never experienced before.

She often took Aleve on a daily basis to combat the headaches. Lori also began having

extremely severe cluster migraines when the dredging started, and which would often take

days to break. She lost several days of work because of these migraines. She saw a

neurologist for her migraines because they were so bad. In addition she started

experiencing tremors, most often in her hands and arms, but sometimes throughout her

entire body. After they moved out of the house to 210 Crestwood Drive in Camillus, the

35

tremors stopped. She was treated by a neurologist for her tremors, and she also had a lot of

problems with eye pain before they moved. She has not had any tremors since they moved.

78. Plaintiffs Joey St. Louis, Sharon St. Louis and their 21 year old son Justin

St. Louis reside at 123 Golden Meadows Way, Warners, New York 13164. The St. Louis

family purchased the house on September 28, 2004, moving from Liverpool, N.Y. to get

away from the noise and traffic, and to live in a more rural area. It was not until about

November 2009 that they learned through a newspaper article about the plan to dump

contaminated waste near their home. Once they starting noticing the strong, chemical-type

smells coming from Wastebed fl during the 2012 dredging season, they stopped leaving

their windows open and kept the A/C running. The St. Louis family was exposed to toxic

chemicals, including but not limited to hexachloro benzene, PCBs, hydrogen sulfide,


Wastebed 13. Upon information and belief, the airborne chemicals emanating from

Wastebed 13 entered and landed on the St. Louis property.

79. Joey St. Louis used to be outside a lot during the summers, but starting with

the 2012 dredging season, he had to stay indoors most of the time because he started to

experience symptoms related to the odors and chemicals that caused them. For the first

time in his life, he started to experience a sore/burning throat, headaches and watery eyes.

He also began to have very itchy skin, and he started to take large quantities of cold and

sinus medicines in order to alleviate the symptoms. The St. Louis family has been unable

to utilize a beautiful in-ground pool in the backyard of their property on certain days

because of the odors. Because the St. Louis family was fearful that very unpleasant odors

would be present, they were afraid to invite friends and family over to their home. Also,

the St. Louis family was forced to refrain from inviting over some families whose children

36

have asthma because the odors would trigger an asthma attack. The St. Louis family

experienced increased stress, anxiety and loss of sleep due to the fear and uncertainties of

the short and long term impacts on their health.

80. Plaintiffs Robert L. and Megan M. Vertucci reside at 178 Goldenrod

Lane, Warners, New York 13164 with their two children. The Vertucci family purchased

their home on February 22, 2006. They did not know of the plan to dump toxic waste in the

area until January of 20 10, and they started experiencing the foul odors from the beginning

of the dredging and dumping process. The odors ranged from a volatile, almost gasoline

smell, to an odor like body odor or mothballs, or naphthalene. Mr. and Mrs. Vertucci were



operations at Wastebed 13. Upon information and belief, the airborne chemicals

emanating from Wastebed 13 entered and landed on the Vertucci's property. On many

occasions, the odors of the airborne chemicals lingered early in the morning, especially as

they put up their garage door to leave for work or get the paper from the mailbox. After

calling the DEC hotline, Megan would usually hear back from Craig Milburn, the

Honeywell Public Relations representative, Mary Jane Peachy, a DEC representative, or

other DEC and Honeywell representatives that were in the neighborhood. Each time she

spoke with any of the representatives, they assured her that they also smelled the odors.

81. When the odors from Wastebed 13 were particularly strong, the Vertucci

family experienced a burning sensation in the nostrils, itchy skin and a sore throat.

Specifically, Mrs. Vertucci experienced extremely itchy skin from August 2012 through

late November 2012 (the dredging season) that would wake her up at night and often times

would bleed from the skin becoming raw. She visited an allergist, a gynecologist, and a

37

dermatologist who ruled out pre-menopausal symptoms, thyroid deficiencies, and skin

rashes. She was treated with different allergy medications and creams which had little to no

effect on her itchy skin. Each doctor agreed that the symptoms she was experiencing were

caused by stress. The Vertucci family was forced to keep the house and car windows

closed. On top of the odors, Mr. and Mrs. Vertucci used to hear the activity from the

Wastebed 13 operations including a humming noise and the beeping of trucks late at night.

82. Mr. and Mrs. Vertucci were unable to live in their residence and enjoy their

outdoor property without being interrupted by odors and various levels of toxins coming

from Wastebed 13. Specifically, Mr. and Mrs. Vertucci did not use their pool, go on bike

rides, engage in backyard activities or entertain friends and relatives at their home because

they were afraid of the odors. The Vertucci children reported smelling the odors while

outside and have chosen to come inside as the odor was unbearable. Both Mr. and Mrs.

Vertucci have experienced insomnia, anxiety, and severe stress from the odors and the fear

that the chemical exposure from Wastebed fl will continue to affect the health of their

family.

83. Plaintiffs Michael J. and Lynda K. Wade reside at 192 Goldenrod Lane,

Warners, New York 13164 with their three children. The Wades purchased their home on

July 5, 2011, moving from Liverpool, N.Y. They wanted a larger house, a more rural

setting in a safe community and a better school district for their children's education. When

the dredging started in 2012, the Wades started noticing a strong mothball, or naphthalene,

or body odor smell. Sometimes it smelled like a soapy or heavy fragrant smell. Mr. and

Mrs. Wade were exposed to toxic chemicals, including but not limited to


of the toxic waste dumping operations at Wastebed 13. Upon information and belief, the

in

airborne chemicals emanating from Wastebed 13 entered and landed on the Wade's

property. Mr. and Mrs. Wade couldn't stay outside when the odor from the airborne

chemicals was present. Mr. and Mrs. Wade were forced to stay indoors with their windows

closed. They didn't want to risk trapping the bad air inside. The smell was most prevalent

in the early morning, mid-afternoon or late evening. They also heard slamming and

banging noises at night relating to pumping and toxic waste dumping at the Wastebed 13

site. Between the noise and the odor, they sometimes had to stay up most of the night.

84. They would not let their children play outside with they noticed the smells.

Sometimes the airborne chemicals entered the house even though they had the windows

closed. The Remediation caused them great anxiety and stress. Mr. and Mrs. Wade can't

plan any outside parties, birthdays or barbeques because of the frequency of the chemical-

like odors. When they learned that some of the airborne chemicals, such as benzene, have a

high odor threshold, this made them even more anxious, since they could be inhaling toxic

chemicals without even detecting an odor.

85. Mrs. Wade experienced ongoing prolonged headaches during the dredging

seasons. Her symptoms included headaches and nausea. In particular, exposure to the

body-like odor immediately caused her to be overwhelmed with nausea. When the odor

was a naphthalene smell (more moth ball like odor), it gave her a burning/cooling

sensation, resulting in a quick onset of headache, accompanied by extreme anxiety. She

started feeling depressed and nervous, with severe bouts of shaking; she also cried a lot and

could feel that her heart was pounding. Her numerous meetings with representatives from

Honeywell, Parsons and the DEC were always stressful, and many of these meeting took

place on their front lawn. She also had to take much of her time away from her job to help

organize the Camillus Clean Air Coalition ("CCAC"), the community based organization

39

formed by the Plaintiffs and others in the community. It took over her life for an extended

period of time, and was an exhausting and emotionally crushing experience. She had to

stop her exercise routine of walking outside, and at times, their children had to run to the

school bus with their noses and mouths covered in an attempt to avoid the noxious odors

and to avoid exposure to the chemicals that caused them. All three of their boys

experienced headaches during the dredging/dumping seasons, and one of them seemed to

be constantly clearing his throat. These headaches and throat problems tended to clear up at

the end of each dredging season.

86. Plaintiff Mckenzie Yost resides at 3609 Dunn Road, Warners. New York

13164 with her mother. She has lived there for approximately ten years. During the period

beginning in the summer of 2012, Ms. Yost began to smell a chemical-like smell that she

described at different times as smelling at different times as sour, like mothballs and like

tar. Ms. Yost was exposed to toxic chemicals, including but not limited to


of the toxic waste dumping operations at Wastebed 13. Upon information and belief, the

airborne chemicals emanating from Wastebed 13 entered and landed on the Yost property.

Beginning in the fall of 2012 through completion of the remediation, Ms. Yost experienced

difficulty breathing, nausea, fatigue, bloody nose, blisters on her tongue, throat and

lips. On one occasion during the fall of 2012, Ms. Yost's throat swelled to the point where

she could not breathe, and she sought treatment at the hospital. During the fall of 2012, Ms.

Yost also suffered a miscarriage during operations at the SCA. During the relevant period,

during early morning hours in particular, Ms. Yost frequently observed a fog-like mist

hovering low to the ground in and about her property that appeared to pool in lower lying

areas, during which time the chemical odors were particularly strong.

EN

Defendant

87. Defendant Honeywell International, Inc. ("Honeywell") is a Fortune 100

company that produces a variety of commercial and consumer products, and engineering

services. It has a workforce of approximately 130,000, of which approximately 58,000 are

employed in the United States. Honeywell is headquartered in Morristown, New Jersey,

and is the product of the 1999 acquisition of it by the much larger Allied Signal Company.

However, it was decided that the combined company would operate under the name

"Honeywell" due to its superior brand recognition. Honeywell reported sales of $33.7

billion in 2012. According to the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), no

corporation has been linked to a greater number of Superfund toxic waste sites that has

Honeywell. Honeywell ranks 44th in a list of U.S. corporations most responsible for air

pollution, releasing more than 425 million kg (9.4 million pounds) of toxins per year into

the air.

RELEVANT FACTS

Honeywell's Pollution of Onondaga Lake

88. For decades, Honeywell and its predecessor companies dumped toxic

chemicals into Onondaga Lake, which comprises about 4.6 square miles and is located

immediately northwest of the City of Syracuse, New York. The massive quantities of waste

were byproducts of Honeywell's manufacturing operations. As a result there is now

extensive contamination of Lake sediments by chemicals known to be extremely hazardous

to human health and the environment, including chlorinated benzene, BTEX (benzene,

toluene, ethyl benzene and xylenes), light and heavy PAHs (polycyclic aromatic

hydrocarbons), and chlorinated dioxins/furans.

89. On June 27, 1989, the State of New York filed a lawsuit against Allied-

4

Signal Inc., pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and

Liability Act ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et.seg., and state law, to compel a cleanup of

Onondaga Lake, its tributaries and related upland areas. The lawsuit alleged that there were

releases and a continuing threat of releases of hazardous substances, as defined by section

101(14) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §960(14), and other waste substances from Honeywell's

industrial facilities which have contaminated the sediments and surface water of Onondaga

Lake.

90. Honeywell is the successor to Allied-Signal Inc.

91. On September 30, 1993, the N. Y. S. Department of Environmental Control

("DEC") and the EPA entered into a cooperation agreement pursuant to section 04(d) of

CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9604(d), which provides that the DEC will be the lead agency with

respect to the Onondaga Lake site and will prepare draft RODs for subsites, subject to EPA

approval, and take the lead in all enforcement actions to ensure that responsible parties

commit to undertake necessary work to investigate and remediate subsites.

92. A Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study ("RI/FS") for the Lake

Bottom was conducted in 2004. A copy of the RI/FS is attached hereto as Exhibit P.

93. During the RI/FS, more than 6,000 sediment samples were collected and

analyzed for contaminants. These included metals, VOCs, and semi-volatile organic

compounds ("SV005"), as well as numerous contaminants identified as Compounds of

Interest ("COIs"), including high levels of elemental and organic mercury,

hexachlorobenzene, polychlorinated byphenyls (PCBs), benzene, and naphthalene. Id.

94. On July 1, 2005, the DEC and the EPA jointly issued a Record of Decision

("ROD") which described the selected remedy (the "Remedy") for the Lake Bottom. A

copy of the ROD is attached hereto as Exhibit E.

42

95. On October 11, 2006, the DEC and Honeywell reached a settlement

agreement known as a consent decree (the "Consent Decree"). A copy of the Consent

Decree is attached hereto as Exhibit F.

96. On January 4, 2007, the United States District Court for the Northern

District of New York approved the Consent Decree.

97. The Consent Decree specifically stated that it resolved only the State's

claims against Honeywell for the "Matters Addressed" which include all response actions

within the meaning of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 960 1(25), taken by Honeywell to implement

this Consent Decree including the investigation, design, implementation, and post-

implementation of the Remedial Program for the Lake Bottom subsite and all response

costs within the meaning of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).

98. The Onondaga Lake Superfund Site consists of twelve "operable units"

considered to contribute to the contamination of Onondaga Lake.

99. The Consent Decree required design, operation, maintenance, and

monitoring of an inactive hazardous waste disposal site and remedial program in

accordance with the ROD, CERCLA, the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution

Contingency Plan ("NCP") and N.Y. Environmental Conservation Law ("NY-ECL"). Id.

at p. 6.

100. The Consent Decree further required Honeywell to prepare and submit a

Remedial Design Work Plan (the "RDWP" or the "Work Plan") for the implementation of

the Remedy. Id.

101. The Work Plan detailed: (i) activities preceding the Remedial Design

("RD"), including sampling and pilot-testing in accordance with relevant EPA and DEC

guidance documents; and (ii) a site-specific description of RD activities, with a schedule

43

for performance and a summary of all activities performed. Id. at p. 7.

102. The Work Plan required preparation of a quality assurance project plan (the

"QAPP") describing quality assurance and control protocols to achieve the data quality

objectives and field sampling plan consistent with EPA's Compendium of Superfund Field

Operations Method. Id.

103. Upon information and belief, Honeywell engaged the services of

engineering firms Parsons Corporation ("Parsons") and O'Brien & Gere ("O&G") to

perform various phases of the RDWP, Remedial Design ("RD"), design, development,

construction, implementation, operation, maintenance, and monitoring of the Remediation.

104. The Work Plan was required to include several elements, including a health

and safety plan ("HASP") to protect persons at and in the vicinity of the Site during the

RD, during implementation of the RDWP, and during and after completion of remedial

construction. The HASP was required to be prepared in accordance with 29 C.F.R. § 1910

by a certified health and safety professional. Honeywell was required to supplement the

HASP as necessary to ensure the health and safety of all persons in the vicinity of the Site.

Honeywell's Community Health and Safety Plan ("CHASP")

105. In May 2012, Honeywell published the Lake Onondaga Community Health

and Safety Plan ("CHASP"). See Exhibit G attached hereto.

106. In its CHASP, Honeywell repeatedly described the Remedy selection and

design as reducing or eliminating health hazards, including, but not limited to, use of a

closed system, double containment, and geotextile tubes. Id., at p. 4. However, as discussed

herein, the disposal of the dredged toxic waste at Wastebed 13 was never a "closed

system."

EM

107. Honeywell also negligently and/or falsely represented in its CHASP that

"[t]he sediment management process is a closed system, so sediments are never exposed to

the atmosphere during dredging, transport or dewatering [at Wastebed 3]. Id. at p. 15 and

at p. 5 ("[S]ediments will never be exposed to the atmosphere during dredging, transport or

dewatering")(emphasis added).

108. Honeywell's CHASP further represented: "Specific examples of protective

components incorporated into the design include containment of dredged sediments at the

SCA using geotextile tubes and locating the SCA in a location that maximizes the buffer

between the SCA and local residents." Id. at p. 7 (emphasis added). However, as discussed

herein, the geotubes were specifically designed with a porous fabric in order to facilitate

the passage of contaminated water (and therefore airborne chemicals) through them.

Honeywell also knew, or was negligent in not knowing, that its plan to pump the

contaminated waste into the geotubes at high pressure would increase the emission of

contaminated water and airborne chemicals through the geotube fabric into the outside

atmosphere, and that the forcing of pressurized contaminants into the geotubes would

greatly increase the probability that at least some of the geotubes would rupture and

thereby expose the contaminants directly into the atmosphere.

109. In its CHASP, Honeywell further negligently and/or misleadingly

represented: "Pumping the dredged sediments into geotextile tubes will serve to minimize

the amount of contaminants that are exposed to the atmosphere by eliminating the direct

exposure of the sediments themselves." Id. at p. fl (emphasis provided). However, upon

information and belief, said representation was grossly misleading since Honeywell knew,

or should have known, that while the pumping of the toxic contaminants into the geotubes

would reduce their direct exposure to the atmosphere, the porous geotube fabric was

45

specifically designed to indirectly allow the contaminated water (and therefore airborne

toxic chemicals) to be released from inside the geotubes into the outside environment.

110. The dredging of the Lake bottom (the "Lake Bottom") began on or about

July 31, 2012, and Honeywell announced that it was completed in or about November

2014

111. The remediation process ("Remediation") involved the dredging of

approximately 2 million cubic yards of highly contaminated Lake Bottom sediments,

which were transported as a 90-percent water/sediment slurry through a 3.9-mile pipeline,

up-gradient via four pump stations, to the sediment consolidation area (the "SCA") in

Camillus, New York. This SCA, also referred to as Wastebed 13, is in the immediate

vicinity of the residential community where the Plaintiffs lived.

112. When the highly contaminated slurry reached Wastebed 13, it was pumped

and dewatered into and through porous geotextile tubes (or "geotubes"). The removed

water was treated, and the geotubes were placed in onsite impoundments while they

"cured," sequestering the contaminants (in theory) until such time the geotubes were dry

enough for the impoundment to be capped.

113. From the beginning of the Remediation, Camillus residents, including

Plaintiffs, complained of noxious odors and severe physical respiratory symptoms,

consistent with inhalation exposure to the myriad highly toxic and carcinogenic chemical

compounds dredged from the Lake Bottom and transported to Wastebed 13.

Honeywell's Failure to Perform an Air Pathway Analysis

114. Under CERCLA and the NCP, an Air Pathway Analysis ("APA") must be

performed with respect to the remediation of any Superfund site. See NCP, Part 300.430,

"remedial investigation / feasibility study and selection of remedy."

115. An APA is, in essence, a systematic evaluation of the potential or actual

effects on air quality of an emissions source such as a Superfund site.

116. The main components of an APA during a Superfund remediation are: (i)

characterization of the source of contaminant emissions; (ii) determination of the effects of

atmospheric processes such as transport and dilution (dispersion) on the contaminant

"plume;" and (iii) evaluation of the exposure potential at receptors of interest (i.e. the local

community).

117. Honeywell initially developed the essential elements of a bona fide APA

for the dewatering and sediment consolidation components of the Remedy in their

November 2005 Phase I Emissions and Odor Work Plan (the "Phase I Emissions Work

Plan") and May 2008 Air Dispersion Modeling Protocol (the "Modeling Protocol")

pursuant to this obligation under the Consent Decree. Copies of the Phase I Emissions

Work Plan and the Modeling Protocol are attached hereto as Exhibit H and Exhibit I,

respectively.

118. However, as described in detail below, Honeywell ultimately failed to

conduct and/or supervise a complete and proper air pathway analysis ("APA") to quantify

potential emissions of COTs from the sediment dewatering system component of the

Remediation, as required under the Consent Decree and Defendants' own work plans.

The Phase I Emissions Work Plan and Modeling Protocol

119. The Phase I Emissions Work Plan (Exhibit H) described the required

(DEC-approved) methods to be implemented for assessing potential emission rates and loss

factors for those COTs which might be emitted during consolidation and placement of

slurry in the SCA at Wastebed 13, including, but not limited to, bench-scale wind-tunnel

testing, mass-balance tests, and air dispersion modeling. See Section D2.2 of Phase I

47

Emissions Work Plan at pp. D2-1 through D2-9.

120. The Phase I Emissions Work Plan (Exhibit H) required collection of

explicit information about the mass emission rates of the various compounds (e.g., grams

per second per square meter) for a given source or source area (e.g., per operable unit of

the SCA) in order to perform a dispersion modeling analysis of potential impacts and

prediction of hazardous concentrations of COTs. See Section D2. 1.1 of Phase I Work Plan

at pp. D2-1.

121. The Phase I Emissions Work Plan (Exhibit H) required that once emission

rates were estimated, they would be input to an air dispersion model to estimate potential

impacts in surrounding areas and to develop a successful mitigation strategy, if necessary.

Id.

122. The Modeling Protocol (Exhibit I) provided the basic method for

predicting the potential air impacts generated by the remediation, including slurry piping

and sediment treatment at the SCA.

Phase I Bench-Scale Testing

123. Pursuant to the Phase I Emissions Work Plan (Exhibit H), bench-scale

testing was performed for twenty-two COIs to evaluate the open-basin sediment

dewatering method at the SCA during 2005 and 2006. The bench-scale testing consisted

of: (i) wind-tunnel testing, in which the air was sampled and analyzed in order to develop

emission rates for use in subsequent dispersion modeling; and (ii) mass-balance testing, in

which the "before" and "after" contaminant concentrations in the sediment were compared

in order to assign depletion (loss) factors as a confirmatory "check" for the wind-tunnel

testing.

124. Results of Phase I bench-scale testing were submitted to the DEC in a

March 2006 report entitled "Wind Tunnel Testing Report" (not available in Honeywell's

electronic file repository); this report was subsequently revised and resubmitted in June of

2008. See Wind Tunnel Testing Report (2008) attached hereto as Exhibit J.

125. Sediment samples having the highest concentrations of the three primary

COT groups were targeted: (i) benzene-containing compounds (including chlorobenzene,

dichlorobenzene, and hexachlorobenzene); (ii) naphthalene; and (iii) total mercury (both

elemental and organic). See Exhibit H. at p. D2-2.

126. Mercury was acknowledged to be of particular interest due to its extreme

toxicity; the potential release of benzene and naphthalene, because of their carcinogenic

status, was also an important factor in project decision-making. Id.

127. Accordingly, sediment samples were collected from locations identified as

most likely to have the highest levels of contamination and most likely to produce

emissions to avoid false "non-detects" in measuring emissions during wind tunnel tests.

Id.

Honeywell Discontinues the Study of Hexachlorobenzene, Mercury and PCBs in Further Bench-Scale Testing

128. Upon completion of the Phase I bench-scale testing, ten of the twenty-one

COTs tested, including hexachloro benzene, mercury (elemental and organic), and PCBs,

were eliminated from further testing, despite the facts that: (i) large quantities of those

contaminants were to be dredged and handled at the SCA; and (ii) mass-balance tests,

performed for five of these eliminated COTs, indicated high depletion (loss) factors. See

Wind Tunnel Testing Report (Exhibit J), Tables 9 through 14.

129. Hexachloro benzene. Although hexachloro benzene was not detected in the

air during wind-tunnel testing, it was detected in the mass-balance testing; the calculated

EZ

depletion (loss) factor was 58.4 percent. This meant that 58.4 percent of the

hexachlorobenzene mass in the sediment was lost (volatilized into the air). Despite this

fact, hexachlorobenzene was dropped from further bench-scale work, without any

discussion or explanation whatsoever in the Wind Tunnel Testing Report (Exhibit J). Id.

130. Mercury. Like hexachlorobenzene, mercury was not detected in the air

during wind-tunnel testing, but was detected in the mass-balance testing, with an extremely

high loss factor of 96.1 percent - the second-highest of all COTs measured. Because

mercury was not detected during wind-tunnel testing, however, Honeywell explicitly

recommended that mercury not be considered for further bench-scale work. Id. at p. 21.

131. PCBs. Like hexachlorobenzene and mercury, Honeywell recommended

explicitly that PCBs not be considered for further bench-scale work; however, this time,

the recommendation was made despite the fact that a loss factor could not even be

calculated: PCBs "were not [in fact] analyzed for in sediment samples collected for the

wind tunnel tests due to sampling error." See Question and Answer No. 12 in August

2010 Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ5) Human Health Risk Assessment (the "HHRA

FAQs"), attached hereto as Exhibit K (emphasis added).

132. Hexachloro benzene, mercury, and PCBs were clearly important

contaminants (perhaps the most important contaminants, as shown below); nevertheless, all

three were eliminated from further bench-scale studies without any reasonable explanation.

133. The EPA, in its supplemental Human Health Risk Assessment ("HHRA")

(Exhibit L, Appendix F), calculated the staggering total mass of these three contaminants

for treatment at the SCA as follows: for hexachlorobenzene, 17.9 tons; and for mercury,

42.0 tons; and for PCBs, 3.6 tons.

134. Given the depletion (loss into the atmosphere) factors as measured in the

50

Phase I bench-scale testing, this would imply, upon information and belief, the following

mass was lost to the air (and, ultimately, available for inhalation by Plaintiffs and others):

for hexachlorobenzene, 10.45 tons (or 20,900 pounds); and for mercury, 40.36 tons (or

80,720 pounds). From any perspective, and based on any metric, these represent

extraordinarily huge hazardous air emissions over the Remediation period.

135. Of the twenty-one COTs originally tested, the most toxic five via inhalation,

according to the Annual Guideline Concentrations (AGC5) provided by the DEC, are: (#1)

certain PCBs, with an AGC of 0.002 micrograms per cubic meter (ug/m); (#2)

hexachlorobenzene, with an AGC of 0.0022 ug/m3; (tied for #3 and #4) phenanthrene and

pyrene with AGCs of 0.02 ug/m3; and (#5) organic mercury (in the form of

methylmercury), with an AGC of 0.024 ug/m3. It should further be noted that, upon

information and belief, an AGC for the more toxic form of organic mercury,

dimethylmercury, does not even exist, as no amount of this compound is ever considered to

be safe. See NYSDEC DAR-, AGC/SGC tables, dated February 2, 2014.

136. At the very least, additional bench-scale testing should have been performed

to: (i) reconcile the contradictory results for hexachlorobenzene and mercury; and (ii)

address the PCB "sampling error," never even discussed in the Wind Tunnel Testing

Report (Exhibit J).

137. Alarmingly, because the Perimeter Air Monitoring ("PAM") System

eventually put in place was neither designed nor able to detect emissions of

hexachlorobenzene, mercury, or PCBs, no method or system was ever implemented to

predict or measure emissions of these extremely hazardous chemicals during actual

dewatering operations at the SCA, despite repeated assurances by Honeywell to the

contrary.

51

The 2008 Revised Emissions Work Plan

138. In 2008, the Phase I Emissions Work Plan was revised (the "Revised

Emissions Work Plan") to include additional (Phase III) bench-scale wind-tunnel testing

to: (i) verify and confirm the results of the Phase I bench-scale testing; (ii) address

emissions associated with long-term drying of exposed sediments in the SCA, and (iii)

consider use of geotextile technology as an alternative to the open-basin dewatering

process. A copy of the Revised Emissions Work Plan is attached hereto as Exhibit M

(emphasis added).

139. However, upon information and belief, all bench-scale testing was

discontinued once Honeywell decided to eliminate the open basin in lieu of the geotubes;

thus, no further testing was ever performed to determine emissions from those COTs

recommended in the Wind Tunnel Testing Report (Exhibit J), including

hexachlorobenzene, mercury, or PCBs, at any point prior to or during geotube dewatering

operations.

140. Further, upon information and belief, no bench-scale wind-tunnel testing

was ever performed to address emissions associated with long-term drying of exposed

sediments in the SCA, despite drying sediments having been repeatedly identified as a

likely source of emissions.

Honeywell Shifts the Focus From Quantifying and Controllin! Hazardous Emissions to Mitigating Odor

141. Instead of conducting the additional bench-scale/wind tunnel studies

outlined in the Revised Emissions Work Plan, Defendants proceeded to conduct: (i) a 2008

Phase Il/Ill Odorant Characterization Study designed to identify which chemical

compounds had the greatest impact on odor, and developed correlations between chemical

52

concentrations and various odor parameters; (ii) a 2009 Phase III wind tunnel evaluation

which evaluated different odor/air mitigation techniques.

142. Honeywell abandoned any plans to conduct further analysis of

mercury/mercury compounds and PCB emissions, which had had already been

discontinued after Phase I testing, because neither compound has a detectable odor

threshold. Therefore, neither mercury nor PCBs were included in the Phase Il/Ill or Phase

III testing.

143. Moreover, because the highly toxic hexachlorobenzene does not have an

odor, it was, predictably, not detected during the Phase Il/Ill odor characterization, and it

was not even analyzed during the 2009 Phase III wind tunnel evaluation.

144. Thus, between the Phase I Bench Scale Tests through the Phase 11/111 and

Phase III evaluations, Honeywell shifted the narrative and focus of its analysis from

quantifying and controlling hazardous emissions to controlling/mitigating 'odors' from

only those compounds that reached detectable odor thresholds.

145. As a result, the potential release into the air of dangerous chemical

compounds known to be present in the Lake sediment to be dredged, such as mercury and

hexachlorobenzene, was not even tested.

The February 2009 SCA Dewatering Evaluation

146. In February 2009, Honeywell and its agent, engineering company Parsons,

compared the open-basin and geotube dewatering methods, concluding that the water and

the consolidating (drying) sediments would be potential sources of emissions under both

methods. A copy of the February 2009 SCA Dewatering Evaluation (the "Dewatering

Evaluation") is attached hereto as Exhibit N; see Section 5.2

147. In the Dewatering Evaluation, Honeywell and Parsons claimed that "based

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upon conceptual design, it was determined that either method of dewatering could be

utilized without offsite health impacts from emissions [and that] odor mitigation strategies

for both methods were evaluated based on their effectiveness at meeting this important

objective and their potential operational impacts." Id. (emphasis added).

148. Honeywell and Parsons further asserted that that "based on case studies,

geotextile tubes have been shown to effectively control odors when used to dewater

sludges (e.g., sludges from water treatment plants) [and that] minimizing the volume and

movement of filtrate, minimizing the active dewatering area, and covering the tubes (if

necessary) were considered to be effective and implementable odor mitigation strategies

during tube operations." Id. (emphasis added).

149. Because, upon information and belief, Honeywell and Parsons concluded

that mitigation measures were less difficult and expensive to implement for geotextile

dewatering method than for the open-basin method, the geotube dewatering method was

adopted. Id.

Once Honeywell Decides to Use Geotubes it Discontinues All Bench-Scale Testing to Quantify Hazardous Emissions

150. Once Honeywell decided to use geotubes, the Phase III bench-scale wind

tunnel testing was abruptly discontinued, despite the fact that such wind tunnel testing had

drying sediment over longer periods of time and to evaluate the use of geotubes as an

alternative to the open-basin, among other reasons. See Question and Answer No. M to

HHRA FAQ (Exhibit K).

151. The decision to use geotubes was allegedly based on "experience" at other

sites, "conceptual design," and the "expectation" that emissions and odors from the porous

geotubes would be significantly less than from the open-basin method. Id.

152. Results obtained from the previous Phase I/IT bench scale tests were not

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used to quantify COT emission rates or depletion (loss) factors from the geotextile

dewatering method; instead, these wind-tunnel results were used solely to identify potential

COTs which might be emitted from geotextile tubes. Id.

153. Unlike for the open-basin sediment dewatering system previously under

consideration, bench-scale testing was never performed to quantify potential COT emission

rates and depletion (atmospheric loss) factors from the geotubes, as required under the

Phase T Emissions Work Plan (Exhibit H), the Revised Emissions Work Plan (Exhibit M),

and the Modeling Protocol (Exhibit I).

154. Consequently, Defendant Honeywell failed to conduct and/or supervise a

complete and proper APA to quantify potential emissions of COTs from the sediment

dewatering system component of the Remediation process.

155. The decision to forego new bench-scale testing notwithstanding,

Defendant's decision to switch to geotubes was based on the erroneous assumption and/or

misrepresentation that: (i) Honeywell and its agents allegedly had "years of experience"

with geotubes; the porous geotubes (specifically designed to emit vapors and gases through

its geomembrane fabric) were somehow "closed," thereby supposedly controlling and

protecting the public from hazardous emissions; and (ii) mitigation control measures would

be less expensive and less difficult to implement for the geotubes than for the open basin.

156. In an ill-conceived and failed effort to prove that its geotube dewatering

method was safe, Honeywell, in May 2010, proposed a risk assessment method (the "Risk

Assessment Method") which, instead of relying on actual measured data, improperly

assumed the existence of contaminant "safe levels" at the SCA perimeter (assigned

previously by the EPA and DEC), and then assumed that these safe-level concentrations

were then diluted as the airborne contaminants were carried to the nearby residential

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community where the Plaintiffs lived.

157. Among other things, Honeywell was then able to ignore actual emissions of

numerous hazardous COTs from at least two significant SCA emission sources: (i) drying

sediments inside the geotubes that were volatilizing and being released through the porous

geotube fabric into the air over a period of time; and (ii) highly contaminated spray/vapor

observed to reach heights above the height of the PAM monitors on the ground and,

indeed, above the tree-line and, therefore, undetected by the fixed PAM monitors.

158. Alarmingly, upon information and belief, to the extent that any bench-scale

testing was, in fact, performed, such testing was not properly performed, as: (i) mercury

(both elemental and organic) and hexachloro benzene, were eliminated from further study,

despite mass-balance test results which confirmed extremely high depletion rates into the

atmosphere (i.e., volatilization rates); and (ii) PCBs were eliminated from further study,

despite the occurrence of a sampling error which precluded the ability to even calculate a

depletion (loss) rate.

159. In short, once the decision was made to abandon the open-basin dewatering

system in favor of the geotube system, Honeywell abandoned the APA process altogether.

Defects In the Perimeter Air Monitoring System

160. Honeywell's reliance on the PAM System to detect toxic emissions from the

geotubes was completely unfounded because it was incapable of detecting hazardous

emissions from Wastebed 13, for the numerous reasons alleged hereunder.

161. Upon information and belief, hazardous concentrations at the SCA

perimeter were never detected by the PAM System because of these defects.

162. Thus, Honeywell improperly relied on a PAM System to: (i) confirm that

these perimeter "safe levels" were not exceeded; and (ii) detect COTs in time to shut down

56

SCA operations and take corrective measures in the event that perimeter "safe levels"

were, in fact, exceeded (i.e., in the event their hypothetical Risk Assessment Method

assumption proved false).

Honeywell Temporarily Shuts Down Its Dredging/Dumpin! Operations, But Fails to Disclose to Plaintiffs and Others That Extremely Hi2h Levels of Toxic

Chemicals Were Being Emitted From Wastebed 13

163. Despite the glaring deficiencies in the fixed PAM System, Honeywell was,

in fact, aware that extremely high levels of toxic chemicals were being emitted from the

SCA into the air.

164. Upon information and belief, as far back as September 202, real-time,

hand-held instruments used by Honeywell's SCA workers during routine OSHA-

mandated health and safety (H&S) monitoring did, in fact, detect extremely hazardous

levels of total mercury, total volatile organic compounds (total VOCs), and hydrogen

sulfide (H2S) in the air above and around the geotubes during SCA operations.

165. As a result, and upon information and belief, the DEC ordered (or strongly

suggested to Honeywell) that the SCA be shut down on September 20, 2012 based upon:

(a) urgent health and safety complaints by onsite workers, and (b) detection by onsite,

hand-held and OSHA-required H&S monitors of dangerously high levels of H2S, mercury

and total VOCs.

166. Upon information and belief, Honeywell was required to shut down its

operations at Wastebed 13 since the H&S data was showing that the limits for total VOCs,

mercury and hydrogen sulfide were being reached and/or exceeded under its own

guidelines set forth in the CHASP. See Exhibit G, Table at p. 17.

167. Upon information and belief, Honeywell: (i) concealed from Plaintiffs and

other community residents that in fact such dangers to toxic chemical exposures existed;

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(ii) falsely represented to the Plaintiff and other members of the public that the shutdown

was "voluntary;" (iii) developed an Odor Mitigation Plan to mask the hazardous

chemicals and their odors from detection with perfume-like fragrances and other odor

suppression methods; and (iv) virtually removed the term "emissions" from their

vocabulary and replacing it with the more innocuous term "odors."

Honeywell's H&S Data Showing Dangerously High Levels of Toxic Chemicals Being Released at Wastebed 13 is Discovered in 2013

168. In and about March 2013, the consulting firm, Minnich and Scotto, Inc.

("MSI"), was retained by the Town of Camillus to prepare an air contaminant exposure

report regarding operations at Wastebed 13. MSI was also doing some consulting work

for Plaintiffs' attorneys on the same issues. On or about March 8, 2013, in order to

support the MSI investigation, MSI requested that the Town Engineer, Paul Czerwinski of

Barton and Loguidice ("B&L") provide all available onsite Health and Safety (H&S)

monitoring data that had been sent to the DEC. Although such data was not received by

MSI in time for inclusion in the MSI Report prepared for the Town on April 8, 2013, the

data was released by the DEC and received on or about April 26, 2013.

169. The data received by MSI on or about April 26, 2013 covered only the first

31 of the 92 days of operation of the transport and dumping of the contaminated waste in

Wastebed 13, which was the time frame before the temporary shutdown during which

DEC and Honeywell attempted to mitigate the offsite impacts. The DEC informed MSI

(via e-mail to B&L) that this partial set of data was all they had in their possession, and

that "[T]his data collection is not part of DEC's project requirements, but rather worker

safety data that Honeywell keeps as part of their work safety requirements." A copy of the

partial H&S monitoring data, including the two relevant e-mails, is attached hereto as

Exhibit 0 (the "H&S Monitoring Data").

170. In or about March 2013, in order to support the MSI report, B&L also

provided MSI with a copy of a May 18, 2010 PowerPoint presentation that Honeywell

presented to the DEC and EPA. See Exhibit P attached hereto ("Geotube Emissions

Presentation"). Upon information and belief, the PowerPoint presentation proposed a Risk

Assessment Method based entirely upon faulty hypothetical assumptions, rather than upon

objective results obtained through actual bench-scale studies.

171. At this same time, B&L also provided MSI with three technical

memoranda (dated June 3, 2010, June 29, 2010, and October 28, 2010), all from

Honeywell's agent, Parsons, to the DEC, which described desk-top emission calculations

for various sediment handling and processing activities at the SCA. See Exhibit Q

attached hereto ("Emissions Memoranda").

172. The onsite Health and Safety (H&S) monitoring data (Exhibit 0) showed

airborne contamination levels at the SCA that were "off the charts" and far in excess of all

acceptable levels. For example, the "snapshot" TVOC concentration of 44.9 parts per

million (ppm) measured sometime during the day on September 10, 2012 in the breathing

zone atop the geotubes (presumably during filling and dewatering) was entirely consistent

with the dangerously high peak hourly VOC concentrations that MSI had predicted for

that same location (12.7 ppm for benzene, 16.4 ppm for 1, 4-dichlorobenzene, and 47.0

for naphthalene).

173. Among other things, the onsite H&S monitoring data (see Exhibit 0)

showed that on August 10, 2012, H25 was measured at a lethal concentration (264 ppm)

from the "doghouse" atop the geotubes. The IDLH for H25 (Immediately Dangerous to

Life and Health concentration) is 100 ppm.

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174. Upon information and belief, the facility emissions from the SCA clearly

exceeded the "major source" threshold for HAP under Section 112 of the 1990

Amendments to the Clean Air Act (CAAA). Therefore, pursuant to requirements under

CERCLA, the facility should have been subject to the substantive technical requirements

for any Title V major source.

175. The H&S data (Exhibit 0) also found extraordinarily high levels of

mercury. For example, on August 23, 2012, the concentration of total mercury from the

"doghouse" above the geotubes was measured at 0.370 milligrams per cubic meter

(mg/m3) and on September 12, 2012, the concentration of total mercury was measured at

0.150 mg/m3 in the breathing zone above the thickeners (the point in the pipeline where a

coagulant is added to the slurry).

176. To put this into perspective, the short-term ( -hour-averaged) ambient air

standard for mercury is 0.60 micrograms per cubic meter (ug/m), which is 0.0006 mg/m3.

This means the measured concentration of 0.370 mg/m3 from the "doghouse" was more

than 600 times the hourly standard and 250 times the hourly standard the breathing zone

above the thickeners. In addition, this does not even take into account the fact that the

organic forms of mercury are even more toxic than elemental mercury.

177. Upon information and belief, Defendant Honeywell failed to monitor for

mercury as part of the PAM system. According to the June 2012 Quality Assurance

Project Plan ("QAPP") (Exhibit R), mercury should have been monitored every six hours

at each of the eight monitoring stations using a portable analyzer, for a total of 32

measurements per day. However, there is no evidence in Honeywell's electronic

document repository that mercury was ever monitored (http://www.lakecleanup.com/).

Me

178. Based on the EPA's own data contained in its HHRA (see Exhibit L), the

mass of total mercury which went to the SCA for dewatering was conservatively

calculated to be 42.0 tons. Based on the bench-scale loss factor of 96.1 percent reported

for this compound (see Exhibit J), a total of 40.36 tons (or 80,700 pounds) of total

mercury was lost to the air. Based on EPA's estimate that as much as 1.4 percent of the

total mercury in the lake-bottom sediment could be ascribed to methylmercury (see

Exhibit L, p. 6), this would mean that a total of 0.565 tons (or 1,130 pounds) of this

supertoxic compound was lost to the air.

179. Hexachloro benzene. Hexachloro benzene is an organochloride and a

"probable human carcinogen." It is not detectable via a PID instrument, or via EPA

Method TO-is (Summa canister analysis). The DEC has assigned to this toxic compound

an Annual Guideline Concentration (AGC) of 0.0022 micrograms per cubic meter

(ug/m), which makes it the second-most toxic of all COTs identified. Based on the EPA's

own data contained in its HHRA (see Exhibit L), the mass of hexachloro benzene which

went to the SCA for dewatering was conservatively calculated to be 17.9 tons. Based on

the bench-scale loss factor of 58.4 percent reported for this compound (see Exhibit J), a

total of 10.45 tons (or 20,900 pounds) of hexachlorobenzene (a HAP) was lost to the air.

180. In addition, upon information and belief, Honeywell did not even consider

volatilized mercury compounds, hexachloro benzene, or PCBs, three of the most toxic of

all compounds in the lake-bottom sediment removed and sent to the SCA.

181. Mercury-contaminated waste is extremely toxic to human health, especially

through inhalation of airborne mercury. Organic mercury compounds, such as

dimethylmercury, are both soluble and highly volatile, and are so harmful to human health

that they have been classified as being "supertoxic." Dimethylmercury is also one of the

6

most potent neurotoxins known to man. Airborne mercury compounds are particularly

dangerous because mercury has no odor. Nevertheless, H&S monitoring data (Exhibit 0)

showed that there were extremely high quantities of airborne mercury being released from

Wastebed 13. This means that Plaintiffs, upon information and belief, were exposed to

airborne mercury compounds without Plaintiffs being able to detect the mercury through

their own sense of smell.

182. Benzene. Benzene is a "known human carcinogen." Based on the EPA's

own data contained in its HHRA (see Exhibit L), the mass of benzene which went to the

SCA for dewatering was conservatively calculated to be 13.2 tons. Based on the bench-

scale loss factor of 79.7 percent reported for this compound (see Exhibit J), a total of

10.52 tons (or 21,000 pounds) of benzene (also a HAP) was lost to the air.

183. One of the most dangerous factors relating to benzene is that it has a fairly

high odor threshold. This means that Plaintiffs and other individuals may be exposed to

level of airborne benzene at dangerously high levels, but without the odor of benzene

being readily apparent. With a mean odor threshold of 123 milligrams per cubic meter

(mg/m3), benzene has a short-term (1-hour) safe level of 0.0019 mg/m3, just one percent

of the odor threshold; worse, the long-term (annual) safe level of 0.0019 mg/m3 are nearly

6,500 times less than the odor threshold. This means that the decision by Honeywell to

eliminate mercury and other compounds from further wind tunnel testing based solely on

odor was grossly negligent, at best.

184. Naphthalene. Naphthalene is considered to be a "possible human

carcinogen." The June 2012 QAPP (see Exhibit R) mentions only the long-term

assessment of this compound (via Method TO-15), and Method TO-15 (Summa canisters)

is intended for monitoring VOCs only. Naphthalene is a semi-volatile compound, and not

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included in the list of compounds to be tested through this method. Based on the EPA's

own data contained in its HHRA (see Exhibit L), the mass of naphthalene which went to

the SCA for dewatering was conservatively calculated to be 364.0 tons. Based on the

bench-scale loss factor of 82.9 percent reported for this compound (see Exhibit J), a total

of 301.76 tons (or 603,500 pounds) of naphthalene (also a HAP) was lost to the air.

185. Onsite H&S data from the SCA also showed high levels of VOCs. For

example, on September 10, 202, the concentration of total VOCs was measured at 44.9

parts per million (ppm) in the breathing zone above the geotubes, and 3,259 ppm inside

the doghouse atop the geotubes. Also, on September 5, 2012, the concentration of total

VOCs was measured at 133 ppm in the breathing zone above the thickeners.

186. PCBs. PCBs are classified as a "probable human carcinogen." Based on the

EPA's own data contained in its HHRA (see Exhibit L), the mass of PCBs which went to

the SCA (Wastebed 3) for dewatering was conservatively calculated to be 3.6 tons.

Because the bench-scale loss factor was not derived due to a sampling error, the mass lost

to the air was never ascertained. Since airborne PCBs have no odor, Plaintiffs were, upon

information and belief, exposed to PCBs without being able to detect them with their

sense of smell.

187. Upon information and belief, the H&S data (Exhibit 0) was never publicly

disclosed, and Defendant Honeywell continued to rely on "safe levels" reported from its

fixed PAM System in order to assuage safety concerns by the Plaintiffs and other

members of the public and to facilitate the continuation of the sediment dewatering

operations through November 204.

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188. As a result, Plaintiffs and other residents of the area were needlessly and

negligently exposed to airborne contaminants from the SCA, and experienced severe

symptoms and illnesses consistent with inhalation of these hazardous contaminants.

Honeywell Misrepresents To Plaintiffs and Other Members of the Public That Geotubes Were "Safe" Because They Were Part of a "Closed System"

189. From 2005 through the end of the dredging and dumping of the

contaminated dredged waste in 2014, Plaintiffs and others raised concerns over the use of

Wastebed 13 as a hazardous waste processing facility. See copies of Community Letters

attached collectively hereto as Exhibit S.

190. From 2005 through 2010, local residents and elected officials attended

DEC and EPA-sponsored Community Meetings to discuss their concerns. See copies of

the January and February 2010 Community Meeting Transcripts ("the Meeting

Transcripts") attached collectively hereto as Exhibit T.

191. In response to community concerns, the Plaintiffs and others were assured

that there would be no risk of hazardous emissions to the community, because the Remedy

entailed a "closed system" for moving sediments from the lake bottom to the SCA. See

summary page of the April 2010 FAQs (the "SCA FAQs") attached hereto as Exhibit U.

192. The Plaintiffs and other members of the public were assured that: (i) the

sediments would be enclosed to prevent public exposure; (ii) potential exposure via

inhalation would be minimized by the "virtually closed" system; (iii) sediment processing

and treatment would be enclosed to prevent/minimize potential uncontrolled emissions;

and (iv) the primary means of preventing volatile emissions (and odors) [would] be by

enclosing all of the various processes to the extent practicable. Id. at FAQs 35-36.

193. Upon information and belief, CERCLA and the NCP do not permit air

emissions to be controlled merely "to the extent practical." Indeed, such ambiguous

language flies in the face of the Feasibility Study process, in which the burden lies clearly

with the Responsible Party (i.e., Honeywell) to conclusively demonstrate, in advance, that

the selected Remedy fully protects the local community from harmful exposure to

emissions via any migratory pathway.

194. The Plaintiffs and other members of the public was also assured by

Defendant Honeywell that geotubes: (i) were constructed from a high-strength, woven-

plastic fabric; (ii) have been used successfully for more than forty years in a variety of

applications, including the farm and food industries where they had proven successful for

dewatering wastes and controlling odors; and (iii) would cause the majority of the

contaminants to remain with the sediments within them.

195. The Plaintiffs and other members of the public were further falsely assured

by Defendant Honeywell that: (i) extensive testing had been performed in order to predict

potential emissions, including bench-scale testing, wind-tunnel testing, flux-chamber

testing, odor characterization, collection of site-specific meteorological data, and

dispersion modeling; (ii) air monitoring would be conducted during SCA operations to

ensure protection in the event any emissions levels were exceeded; and (iii) contingency

plans, such as covering the geotubes or reducing or ceasing dredging operations, would be

implemented to correct the problem, should it be found that the SCA (Wastebed 3) was

generating "nuisance" odors.

Honeywell Fails to Disclose that Geotubes are Desi2ned to Emit Vapors and Gases

196. In addition to allowing water to drain, the open pores of the high-strength,

woven-plastic geotube "fabric" also allows vapors and gases to escape during the

densification (i.e., drying) process. See TenCate's (the geotube manufacturer) "How It

65

Works," for a description of the use of geotubes to dewater sediment, attached hereto as

Exhibit V.

197. The maintenance of proper pressurization within the transported slurry is a

critical factor in preventing breaches in the geotube membrane. See the Geotube

Technical Documents attached collectively hereto as Exhibit W.

198. Moreover, upon information and belief, it is well-documented that passive

dewatering systems such as geotubes do not control hazardous emissions. Id.

199. Thus, Honeywell was either grossly negligent, reckless and/or intentionally

misrepresenting what the geotubes were capable of doing when it "assumed" and/or

represented that the geotubes could possibly have been part of a "closed" system, or

otherwise capable of controlling hazardous emissions.

Honeywell Makes False Representations at Geotube Emissions Presentation

200. In May 2010, Honeywell gave its Geotube Emissions Presentation

(Exhibit P) to the EPA and DEC proposing a "desk-top" method to derive geotube

emission source terms which would be modeled to assess exposure to the downwind

community.

201. In its Geotube Emissions Presentation, Honeywell proposed its Risk

Assessment Method based entirely upon faulty hypothetical assumptions, rather than upon

objective results obtained through actual bench-scale studies as required under the Phase I

Emissions Work Plan (Exhibit H) and the Revised Emissions Work Plan (Exhibit M).

202. In its Geotube Emissions Presentation, Honeywell also stated, for the first

time, that: (i) the water flowing out of holes in the fabric material would account for the

majority of geotube emissions; and, (ii) the bench-scale testing (and previous project

Me

experience "indicating" that the fabric material minimizes emissions) had shown the

drying geotubes themselves to not be a significant source of emissions.

203. However, these statements were grossly negligent and/or false when made,

since, upon information and belief, no bench-scale or wind-tunnel testing (or any other

analyses) were ever performed to quantify emissions from drying geotubes.

204. Indeed, upon information and belief, Honeywell discontinued bench-scale

testing when the decision to use geotubes was made, and that the prior bench-scale results

for open basins were not used to quantify estimated geotube emission rates. See Question

and Answer No. 14 to HHRA FAQ5 (Exhibit K).

Honeywell's Risk Assessment Method Was Based on Faulty Hypothetical Assumptions and Did Not Comply with the Modeling Protocol

205. Honeywell's Risk Assessment Method began by simply assuming, without

proving, that "Project AQ [Air Quality] Criteria (i.e.,'safe levels') for chemical

concentrations would not be exceeded at the SCA perimeter fence-line." See HHRA

(Exhibit L), p. 4-5.

206. A "dilution term" was then be applied to these already safe levels in order

to "scale" the concentrations to the nearest residences, arriving at the inescapable

conclusion that concentrations throughout the residential areas were, of course, also safe.

207. As a "fail-safe," this Risk Assessment Method further assumed,

erroneously, that a monitoring system could be implemented along the SCA perimeter

which would detect any hazardous emissions in time to mitigate or control them (i.e., the

PAM System).

The EPA Adopts Honeywell's Fatally Flawed Risk Assessment Method in Its HHRA

208. Weeks later, the EPA adopted Defendants' flawed Risk Assessment

Method in its analysis of "emissions scenarios," erroneously concluding, based upon

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Defendant's flawed assumptions, that geotextile dewatering operations at the SCA would

be safe. See HHRA (Exhibit L), p. 6.

209. However, Appendix C to the HHRA explicitly concedes that Honeywell's

Risk Assessment Method did not follow the Modeling Protocol.

210. Instead, the entire HHRA was founded upon the fundamental, underlying

(and inaccurate) assumption in Honeywell's Risk Assessment Method that all

contaminants were present at concentrations at or below their "safe level at all locations

along the SCA perimeter." Indeed, based upon this erroneous assumption, Defendant

Honeywell was able to either ignore or dispense with all of the APA work that had already

been performed, such as the preparation of air dispersion modeling protocols and the years

of expensive wind-tunnel simulations, as well as the subsequent desk-top analyses

(performed later in 2010).

Honeywell's Further Desk-Top Emissions Studies

211. Despite the fact that Honeywell's Risk Assessment Method (and, therefore,

the HHRA) had already hypothetically (and erroneously) "proven" that geotube

dewatering was "safe," Defendant Honeywell and its agent, Parsons, nonetheless

continued to conduct desk-top studies to estimate emissions from the geotubes and the

SCA which, at the request of the EPA and DEC, were memorialized in a series of three

emissions memorandum between June and October of 2010. See Exhibit Q.

212. The first emissions memorandum (the "June 3, 2010 Memo") stated that

sources of water draining from the geotubes and SCA were still in the process of being

studied, and that emissions from other sources, such as drying sediment in the geotubes

themselves, would be developed separately. Id.

Me

213. The third emissions memorandum (the "October 28, 2010 Memo"): (i)

detailed the methods for developing emissions estimates at the SCA; (ii) summarized

emissions estimates for the SCA; (iii) purportedly provided dispersion modeling results

based on the full suite of emissions from the SCA; and (iv) provided a comparison to the

anticipated air quality monitoring criteria yet to be established. Id.

214. Although the June 3, 2010 Memo specifically identified drying sediments

in the geotubes as a source of emissions would be quantified as part of a separate study,

no desk-top results for drying sediment emissions were included in the "full suite of

emissions from the SCA" provided in the October 28, 2010 Memo. Id.

The Gross Inadequacy of Honeywell's Perimeter Air Monitorin! System Becomes Further Evident in July 2012

215. The May 2012 CHASP (Exhibit G) and the July 202 QAPP (Exhibit R)

publicly revealed, for the first time, the process by which the perimeter monitoring was

developed and approved.

216. Notably, the CHASP conceded that there might be volatilization/emissions

from the geotubes during the dewatering process. See Exhibit G at pp. 15 through 18.

217. Moreover, despite recitation of the EPA's Data Quality Objectives (the

"DQO Process") in designing the PAM System, the QAPP (Exhibit R) did not justify

how the number and spacing of eight photoionization detectors (PIDs) and four Summa

canisters were determined to provide adequate coverage for the 72-acre SCA.

218. Indeed, upon information and belief, the number and spacing of monitors

comprising the PAM System were incapable of detecting contaminant "plumes" in excess

of the safe limits emitting from an area the size of the SCA.

219. The PAM System surrounded Wastebeds U, 13, and 14; these Wastebeds

comprise a total of 400 acres. See the CHASP (Exhibit G), p. 19. See also "Siting

Evaluation" (Exhibit X), p. 2.

220. Upon information and belief, the total linear distance that the PAM System

"covers" (i.e., the total perimeter path length) is 18,400 feet (3.5 miles). With eight PID

stations to ensure short-term (1-hour) safe-level compliance, there is, on average, one PID

station every 2,300 feet; with four Summa canister stations to ensure annual safe-level

compliance, there is, on average, one Summa canister station every 4,600 feet. Added to

this is the fact that the Summa canister samples were collected only every sixth day.

221. Consequently, upon information and belief, Honeywell's air monitoring

program had grossly inadequate "sampling densities," resulting in the following: (a) it had

very little chance of ever capturing the highest 1-hour-averaged concentrations; and (b) it

would require a duration far longer than the Remediation time-frame itself before enough

data could be collected to facilitate a reasonable assessment of annual exposure.

222. Critically, and upon information and belief, neither the PIDs nor EPA

Method TO-15 (Summa canister analysis) have the capability to detect

hexachlorobenzene, mercury (elemental or organic), or PCBs - under any conditions -

even in the highly unlikely event that the contaminant plume "centerline" directly

impacted any given monitoring station.

223. Thus, the early decision by Honeywell to eliminate hexachloro benzene,

mercury, and PCBs from further investigation after the Phase I bench-scale testing was

critical, given their abundance in the dredged sediment, their extremely high toxicity, and

(at least for hexachloro benzene and mercury) their extremely high depletion (loss) rates.

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Honeywell's Emissions Mitigation Report Concedes the Geotubes Had the Greatest Potential for Emissions and Was Not the Closed System as

Previously Represented

224. In October of 2012, Honeywell suspended all dredging and dewatering

activities for three weeks to identify additional mitigation measures, including additional

covers for the drying geotubes, water storage basin modifications, misting system

enhancements, thickener upgrades, and water treatment plant upgrades.

225. In April 2013, Honeywell issued its "Odor Mitigation Plan" which

identified the actively filling geotubes as having the greatest potential for emissions and

recommended supplemental control measures, including, but not limited, to a

comprehensive and integrated, non-permeable geotube covering system, wind screens,

reduced water flow to the SCA, an odor-control additive, large capacity fans, and an

expansion of the misting system. A copy of the Odor Mitigation Plan is attached hereto as

Exhibit Y.

226. Honeywell rejected the use of portable hoods for capturing geotube

emissions, concluding that this option was not feasible due to "cost and time constraints."

Id. at Appendix A, p. 1.

227. When the dredging and dumping of contaminated waste began again after

the autumn 2012 shutdown, Plaintiffs continued to experience the same noxious odors and

increasingly severe symptoms as they had before, indicating that, upon information and

belief, the mitigation measures implemented did little or nothing to reduce Plaintiffs'

exposure to airborne toxic chemicals and reduce the toxic chemical particulates from

entering and landing on Plaintiffs' persons and property.

228. Specifically, during September 2014, it was observed by Plaintiff Thomas

Gdula and others that the comprehensive and integrated geotube covering system had not

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been installed on the majority of the geotubes. During the Remediation in November

2014, Mr. Gdula and others also observed streams of high-pressure spray/vapor reaching

heights above the perimeter tree-line of the SCA during which times noxious odors were

particularly pungent. See Exhibit A.

229. Upon information and belief, this spray evaporated above the tree-line and

emitted a substantial amount of VOCs contained in the droplets of evaporated water into

the air pathway of the Camillus community and onto the Plaintiffs' property.

230. Upon information and belief, this contaminated spray was caused by

contaminated water being pushed through the open drainage pores of the geotubes under

the extremely high pressure which was needed to transport the slurry over a distance of

3.9 miles (up an elevation of MO feet) at the 5,500 gallon-per-minute rate to the SCA.

231. Upon information and belief, the possibility of contaminated spray

emanating from the open pores of the geotubes and the evaporation of that spray was

never examined during the APA process by Honeywell as a potential source of emissions

of COTs, despite ample knowledge that pressurization of geotextile tubes is a critical

factor to consider in their proper use.

232. Upon information and belief, no action was ever taken by Defendant

Honeywell to mitigate the spray emanating from the open pores of the geotubes and the

evaporation of that spray, despite direct observation and knowledge that this phenomenon

was occurring during active operations.

233. Upon information and belief, no action was ever taken to mitigate the

spray emanating from the open pores of the geotextile tubes and the evaporation of that

spray, despite Defendant's direct knowledge that this phenomenon was occurring during

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active operations, and some or all of the supplemental emissions mitigation measures

identified in the Odor Mitigation Plan (Exhibit Y) were never taken.

Two Major Sources of Emissions of Geotube Emissions Were Never Examined

234. Although hazardous emissions from the drying sediments were identified

as a major source in the Emissions Memoranda (Exhibit Q) and "an area that [would] be

included in a separate submittal," the emissions were never actually assessed.

235. The Emissions Memoranda (Exhibit Q) also failed to identify a second

major source of possible emissions, namely, streams of pressurized contaminated water.

This second source of airborne contamination has, upon information and belief,

contaminated the air in and about Plaintiffs' homes and property, as observed and

videotaped by Plaintiff Thomas Gdula, who observed streaming/spraying through the

drainage pores of actively filling geotubes to a height above the tree-line at the SCA

(Wastebed 13) where this pressurized stream/spray evaporated and released uncontrolled

VOCs and aerosolized hazardous contaminants. Upon information and belief, the streams

of pressurized contaminated water also entered and landed on the Plaintiffs' persons and

property. Indeed, upon information and belief, Defendant Honeywell has never even

tested or evaluated this toxic spray phenomenon which was observed rising above the

SCA tree-line. See Exhibit A.

Plaintiffs Suffered Injuries as a Result of Honeywell's Conduct

236. After the Remediation began, Plaintiffs experienced physical symptoms

from the exposure to hazardous levels of airborne chemicals, including naphthalene,

benzene, mercury, PCBs, and hexachloro benzene.

237. Upon information and belief, even a brief exposure to naphthalene can lead

to headaches, nausea, dizziness and/or vomiting. If a person breathes in enough

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naphthalene, he or she can develop hemolytic anemia. The International Agency for

Research on Cancer ("IARC") of the World Health Organization ("WHO") has concluded

that naphthalene is a possible carcinogenic to humans. EPA classifies naphthalene as a

"possible human carcinogen."

238. Similarly, short-term inhalation exposure to benzene may cause

drowsiness, dizziness, headaches, as well as eye, skin and respiratory tract irritation.

Chronic inhalation exposure to benzene has caused various disorders in the blood.

Reproductive effects have been reported for women exposed by inhalation to high levels

of benzene. The IRAC and the EPA have classified benzene as a "known human

carcinogen."

239. When mercury is inhaled as a vapor, symptoms include tremors, emotional

changes (e.g. mood swings, irritability, nervousness), insomnia, neuromuscular changes

(such as weakness, muscle atrophy, twitching), headaches, sensory disturbances, changes

in nerve responses, and, performance deficits on test of cognitive function. At high levels

of exposure, inhalation of mercury can cause kidney effects, respiratory failure and death.

240. Plaintiffs have experienced physical symptoms that are consistent with

exposure to the above contaminants including, but not limited to, severe headaches,

nausea, sinus and nasal burning and irritation, insomnia, nosebleeds, metallic-like taste in

his or her mouths, tingling sensations, severely dry and itchy skin, persistent coughing,

and severe asthma attacks.

241. Honeywell's failure to limit Plaintiffs exposure to the hazardous volatile

chemicals caused Plaintiffs to experience loss of sleep, extreme anxiety and continuing

fear for the short and long-term effects that the exposure will have on themselves and their

families.

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242. Plaintiffs experienced a loss of use and enjoyment of their property due to

the extreme odors and physical symptoms that they experienced when outside their

homes.

243. Plaintiffs' physical symptoms and emotional distress continued even after

Honeywell implemented the so-called mitigation measures.

Honeywell Was Negligent in Performing the Remediation

244. Honeywell knew or should have known that geotubes are neither "closed"

nor capable of controlling emissions of hazardous airborne chemicals.

245. Honeywell knew or should have known that the majority of the hazardous

volatile chemicals processed at Wastebed 13 did not remain with the sediments within the

geotextile tubes but instead volatized through the membrane pores of the geotubes into the

air pathway of the Camillus community, including onto the properties of the Plaintiffs.

246. Honeywell knew or should have known that a substantial amount of the

hazardous chemicals, including semi-volatile compounds, released through the membrane

pores of the geotubes in the form of an aerosolized spray/vapor that reached the height of

the tree-line surrounding the SCA and into the air pathway of Plaintiffs' homes and

properties.

247. As a result of Honeywell's failure to perform or complete an Air Pathway

Analysis and/or the Phase I Emissions Work Plan and/or the Revised Emissions Work

Plan, as required by the Consent Decree and RDWP, Honeywell failed to discover that the

geotubes were not capable of containing the emissions of the hazardous chemicals and

thus failed to implement mitigative measures and appropriate controls.

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248. As a result of Honeywell's failure to implement appropriate controls and

mitigative measures, the Camillus community, including Plaintiffs, were exposed to

hazardous levels of airborne chemicals, including, but not limited to, naphthalene,

benzene, mercury, PCBs, and hexachloro benzene during the Remediation period.

249. Plaintiffs seek compensatory and punitive damages for, among other

things, the interference with their right to the quiet and safe enjoyment of their homes and

properties, including the interference with their health and safety caused by the

uncontrolled release of airborne contaminants from Wastebed 13

Wastebed 13 Continues to Pose a Risk To Plaintiffs of Toxic Exposure

250. Despite the fact that sediment dewatering operations have now ceased at

the SCA (Wastebed 13), drying sediment at the SCA will continue to be a source of

hazardous emissions unless and until the SCA is properly closed.

251. Notwithstanding plans to impermeably cap the SCA, it is likely - and

indeed probable - that emissions will continue to breach the impermeable cap as certain

weather systems pass over the SCA; the effects will be even worse if the sediments

undergo a process of biodegradation that produces a build-up of methane gas, or if the

mercury in the geotubes continues to undergo a process of methylization.

252. Thus, the current plan to cap will be ineffective to prevent future hazardous

emissions for the foreseeable future unless further steps are taken to: (i) characterize the

COTs that remain within the sediments; and (ii) vent and capture/treat the build-up of

hazardous gases in the Wastebed 13 landfill.

253. Upon information and belief, unless these steps are taken to mitigate the

continued risk of emissions from what is now essentially an unlicensed hazardous waste

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landfill, the community will continue to suffer increasing and more cumulative exposure

to hazardous emissions long into the foreseeable future.

COUNT ONE (Negligence)

254. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege the allegations set forth in the foregoing

paragraphs of this Amended Complaint as though fully set forth herein.

255. Defendant Honeywell failed to employ reasonable care under the

circumstances by storing, transporting and disposing of dredged contaminated waste in

such a manner as to release into the air contaminants that pose a danger to the health and

safety of Plaintiffs and their families and otherwise interfere with their right to the use and

enjoyment of their homes and property free of such airborne contaminants.

256. Defendant Honeywell had a duty to transport and dump the contaminated

waste in such a manner as to eliminate the danger of exposure to Plaintiffs of airborne

contamination, and to implement safety procedures and air monitoring systems that would

give them reasonable and timely warning of the presence of airborne contaminants from

Defendant's transport and dumping operations in the vicinity of their homes and

properties.

257. Defendant Honeywell breached this duty to Plaintiffs and other area

residents, thus failing to exercise reasonable care, including the use of state-of-the-art

safety procedures and monitoring systems.

258. Honeywell knew or should have known that geotubes being used to

dispose of toxic dredged waste at Wastebed 13 were neither "closed" nor capable of

controlling emissions of hazardous volatile chemicals.

259. Honeywell knew or should have known that significant amounts of the

hazardous airborne chemicals processed at Wastebed 13 did not remain with the

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sediments within the geotextile tubes but instead were emitted through the membrane

pores of the geotubes into the air pathway of Plaintiffs' homes and properties.

260. Defendant Honeywell knew or should have known that a substantial

amount of the hazardous chemicals released through the membrane pores of the geotubes

in the form of a contaminated spray/vapor that reached the height of the tree-line

surrounding Wastebed 13 and into the air pathway of the Camillus community, including

onto the homes and properties of the Plaintiffs.

261. As a result of its failure to perform or complete an Air Pathway Analysis,

the Phase I Emissions Work Plan and/or the Revised Emissions Work Plan, as required by

the Consent Decree and RDWP, Honeywell negligently failed to design or implement any

plan with mitigative measures and appropriate controls that properly took into account the

fact that the geotubes were not capable of containing the emissions of volatile and

hazardous airborne chemicals.

262. Defendant Honeywell negligently failed to take any effective measures to

mitigate the toxic spray and volatile airborne chemicals emanating from the open pores of

the geotubes and the evaporation of the spray containing hazardous airborne toxic

chemicals into the atmosphere.

263. Defendant Honeywell negligently failed to properly recognize that the

toxic spray emanating from the geotubes under high pressure was rising to a height that

was equal or greater than the surrounding tree-line and was being blown towards

Plaintiffs' properties at a height that was not capable of being registered or recorded by

the ground-level perimeter air monitors place around the SCA.

264. Honeywell negligently failed to implement some or all of the supplemental

emissions mitigation measures identified in the Odor Mitigation Plan (Exhibit Y).

in

265. Specifically, and as observed by Plaintiff Tom Gdula and others in

September 2014, Defendant Honeywell failed to design and/or implement a

comprehensive, effective and integrated geotube covering system on a majority of the

geotubes.

266. As a result of Defendant Honeywell's failure to implement appropriate

controls and mitigation measures, Plaintiffs were exposed to hazardous levels of airborne

chemicals, including, but not limited to, naphthalene, benzene, mercury, PCBs, and

hexachlorobenzene during the Remediation.

267. Since Defendant Honeywell failed to implement an effective covering and

"closed" system for the geotubes containing toxic contaminated waste being stored at

Wastebed 13, Plaintiffs continue to be exposed to hazardous levels of volatile chemicals

from the drying toxic sediments, despite the fact that Defendant Honeywell has ceased

active remediation operations, including the dredging, pumping, dewatering and storing of

contaminated waste.

268. Plaintiffs seek compensatory and punitive damages for, among other

things, the interference with their right to the quiet and safe enjoyment of their homes and

properties, including the interference with their health and safety caused by the

uncontrolled release of airborne contaminants from Wastebed 13.

269. As a result, Plaintiffs have suffered damages proximately caused by

Defendant's negligence and breaches of duty, in an amount to be determined at trial.

COUNT TWO (Private Nuisance)

270. Plaintiffs repeat and allege the allegations set forth in the foregoing

paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein.

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271. Defendant Honeywell maintained and continued to maintain a dangerous

condition on their properties that constitutes an unlawful burden on Plaintiffs' properties.

Defendant Honeywell has also engaged in unreasonably hazardous activities, including

but not limited to the dumping of contaminated waste in close proximity to Plaintiffs'

homes and properties without first putting in place effective safeguards and techniques to

eliminate the risk of airborne contaminants being released into the atmosphere, and further

failing to put in place state-of-the-art safety procedures and monitoring systems.

272. As a result of such wrongful actions, Defendant Honeywell has

unnecessarily caused airborne contaminants to invade Plaintiffs' persons and properties,

causing the creation of noxious fumes and other nuisances, including the depositing of

toxic chemical dust on Plaintiffs' properties and contamination of their soil, resulting to

personal injury and property damages, including the interference with Plaintiffs'

enjoyment of their legal rights and quality of life.

273. Such conditions constitute an ongoing specific, particular and unique

burden on Plaintiffs' persons and their property, and such wrongful acts were and are the

foreseeable and proximate cause of injury, discomfort, annoyance, inconvenience, and/or

damage to Plaintiffs themselves and their properties.

274. Accordingly, Plaintiffs seek compensatory and punitive damages from

Defendant Honeywell in an amount to be determined at trial.

COUNT THREE (Trespass)

275. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege the allegations set forth in the foregoing

paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein.

276. Honeywell's negligent, willful and/or wanton actions and/or failures to act

caused toxic chemical particulates, both visible and invisible, to be released into the air in

the form of vapor and dust which then landed on Plaintiffs' real property and persons.

277. Such trespass by Defendant Honeywell was knowing and intentional, or

was in reckless disregard of the consequences.

278. As a result, Plaintiffs were damaged in their persons and property in an

amount to be determined at trial.

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

279. Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury on all issues so triable.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand judgment against Defendants as follows:

(a) An award of Compensatory Damages as set forth in Causes of Action One

through Three, in an amount to be determined at trial;

(b) An order granting temporary, preliminary, and permanent equitable and/or

injunctive relief as permitted by law, equity or applicable statutory provisions thereby

compelling Defendant Honeywell to provide a Court-supervised, Defendant-funded

medical monitoring regime, not less frequently than semi-annually, for Plaintiffs including,

but not limited to, blood analysis for heavy metals and target gaseous compounds of

concern to facilitate the early diagnosis and adequate treatment in the event a medical

disorder or disease stemming from the toxic chemical exposure is diagnosed; and

(c) An award of Punitive Damages for Defendant's reckless and wanton

conduct in an amount to be determined at trial, and in an amount that is likely to deter

Defendant Honeywell and others similarly situated from engaging in such further conduct.

01

Dated: April 6, 2015 McCALLION & ASSOCIATES LLP

/s/

By: Kenneth F. McCallion Kristian Karl Larsen 100 Park Avenue — 16th floor New York, New York 10017 (646) 366-0880 Attorneys for Plaintiffs

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