UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION … · A. Dugandzic, DRP C. Roettgen, DRP B. Bollinger, DRP J. Kulp, DRP, SRI Amar Patel, DRP, RI J. DeVries, DRP, AA A. Bowers,

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I

2100 RENAISSANCE BOULEVARD, SUITE 100 KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406-2713

August 6, 2014

Mr. Michael J. Pacilio, Senior Vice President Exelon Generation Company, LLC President and Chief Nuclear Officer, Exelon Nuclear 4300 Winfield Road Warrenville, IL 60555 SUBJECT: OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION - NRC INTEGRATED

INSPECTION REPORT 05000219/2014003 and NRC INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION REPORT 07200015/2014001

Dear Mr. Pacilio: On June 30, 2014, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on July 24, 2014, with Mr. G. Stathes, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission’s rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. This report documents one violation of NRC requirements, which was of very low safety significance (Green). However, because of the very low safety significance, and because it was entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating this finding as a non-cited violation (NCV), consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you contest the NCV in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN.: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station. In addition, if you disagree with the cross-cutting aspect assigned to the finding, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region I, and the NRC Resident Inspector at Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station.

M. Pacilio 2

In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 2.390 of the NRC’s “Rules of Practice,” a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC’s Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of the NRC’s Agencywide Documents Access Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely, /RA/

Kevin A. Mangan, Chief (Acting) Reactor Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos.: 50-219, 72-15 License Nos.: DPR-16 Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000219/2014003 & 0700015/2014001 w/Attachment: Supplementary Information cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html

M. Pacilio 2

In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 2.390 of the NRC’s “Rules of Practice,” a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC’s Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of the NRC’s Agencywide Documents Access Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely, /RA/

Kevin A. Mangan, Chief (Acting) Reactor Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos.: 50-219, 72-15 License Nos.: DPR-16 Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000219/2014003 & 0700015/2014001 w/Attachment: Supplementary Information cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ Distribution w/encl: W. Dean, RA D. Lew, DRA H. Nieh, DRP M. Scott, DRP J. Trapp, DRS P. Krohn, DRS

S. Kennedy, DRP K. Mangan, DRP L. Cline, Acting, DRP A. Dugandzic, DRP C. Roettgen, DRP B. Bollinger, DRP J. Kulp, DRP, SRI

Amar Patel, DRP, RI J. DeVries, DRP, AA A. Bowers, RI OEDO RidsNrrPMOysterCreek Res RidsNrrDorlLpl1-2 Res ROPreports Res

DOC NAME: G\DRP\BRANCH6\Inspection\Baseline\2014\2nd Qtr Reports\OC Integrated Inspection Report 2Q14.docx ADAMS ACCESSION NUMBER: ML14217A183

SUNSI Review

Non-Sensitive

Sensitive

Publicly Available

Non-Publicly Available

OFFICE RI/DRP RI/DRP RI/DNMS RI/DRP

NAME APatel/ LC for LCline/ LC MFerdas/ MF KMangan/ KAM

DATE 07/31 /14 07/31/14 08/05/14 08/04/14

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html

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Enclosure

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Docket Nos.: 50-219 License Nos.: DPR-16 Report No.: 05000219/2014003 & 0700015/2014001 Exelon: Exelon Nuclear Facility: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Location: Forked River, New Jersey Dates: April 1, 2014 – June 30, 2014 Inspectors: J. Kulp, Senior Resident Inspector

A. Patel, Resident Inspector S. Hammann, Senior Health Physicist C. Lally, Operations Engineer J. Schoppy, Senior Reactor Inspector P. Kaufman, Senior Reactor Inspector S. Pindale, Senior Reactor Inspector J. M. D’Antonio, Senior Operations Engineer

Approved By: K. Mangan, Chief (Acting) Reactor Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ......................................................................................................... 3

REPORT DETAILS .................................................................................................................... 4

1. REACTOR SAFETY ........................................................................................................... 4

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection .................................................................................... 4 1R04 Equipment Alignment ............................................................................................... 5 1R05 Fire Protection .......................................................................................................... 5 1R06 Flood Protection Measures ...................................................................................... 6 1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program ............................................................ 6 1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness ...................................................................................... 8 1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control ................................. 8 1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments ..................................... 9 1R18 Plant Modifications ..................................................................................................11 1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing ......................................................................................12 1R22 Surveillance Testing ................................................................................................12 1EP6 Drill Evaluation ........................................................................................................13

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES ..........................................................................................................13

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification ...........................................................................13 4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution .....................................................................14 4OA3 Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion ...................................16 4OA5 Other Activities ........................................................................................................16 4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit ...........................................................................................17

ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION ...............................................................17

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION ....................................................................................... A-1

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT .................................................................................................. A-1

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, DISCUSSED, AND UPDATED .................................... A-1

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED ....................................................................................... A-2

LIST OF ACRONYMS ............................................................................................................. A-7

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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS IR 05000219/2014003 & 0700015/2014001; 04/01/2014 – 06/30/2014; Exelon Energy Company, LLC, Oyster Creek Generating Station; Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments This report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced inspections performed by regional inspectors. Inspectors identified one finding of very low safety significance (Green), which was a NCV. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, “Significance Determination Process” (SDP). The cross-cutting aspects for the finding was determined using IMC 0310, “Components Within Cross-Cutting Areas.” Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green, or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC’s program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, “Reactor Oversight Process,” Revision 5, dated February 2014. Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

Green. The NRC inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, “Corrective Action,” because Exelon did not promptly identify and correct

a condition adverse to quality. Specifically, Exelon did not identify and correct a high oil level condition caused by water intrusion in the ‘D’ emergency service water pump upper motor bearing resulting in an inoperable ‘D’ emergency service water pump. Following identification of the high level by the inspections, Exelon entered this issue into their corrective action program as issue report 1645010. Exelon’s corrective action included sealing joints on top of the motor that are susceptible to water intrusion. The inspectors determined that inadequate identification and resolution of the condition adverse to quality into the corrective action program is a performance deficiency that was within Exelon’s ability to foresee and correct. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the configuration control of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the performance deficiency affected the reliability of an emergency service water pump to perform its safety function. This issue was also similar to Example 3j of NRC IMC 0612, Appendix E, “Examples of Minor Issues,” because the condition resulted in reasonable doubt of the operability of emergency service water system. The inspectors determined that this finding was a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating structure, system, or component (SSC), where the SSC maintained its operability or functionality. Therefore, inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green). The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution, Corrective Action Program, because Exelon did not identify the issue associated with the high oil level in the emergency service water pump upper motor bearing oil in a timely manner in February and April 2014 [P.1]. (Section 1R15)

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REPORT DETAILS Summary of Plant Status Oyster Creek began the inspection period at 100 percent power and operated at full power throughout the inspection period, except for the following dates. Oyster Creek reduced power on April 4, 2014, to approximately 60 percent power to repair a condenser tube. On May 18 and June 27, 2014, Oyster Creek reduced power to approximately 70 percent power for a rod pattern adjustment. 1. REACTOR SAFETY Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity 1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01 – 2 samples) .1 Readiness for Seasonal Extreme Weather Conditions

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a review of Exelon’s readiness for the onset of seasonal high temperatures. The review focused on the ‘B’ station emergency battery and the emergency diesel generators. The inspectors reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), technical specifications, control room logs, and the corrective action program to determine what temperatures or other seasonal weather could challenge these systems, and to ensure Exelon personnel had adequately prepared for these challenges. The inspectors reviewed station procedures, including Exelon’s seasonal weather preparation procedure and applicable operating procedures. The inspectors performed walkdowns of the selected systems to ensure station personnel identified issues that could challenge the operability of the systems during hot weather conditions. Documents reviewed for each section of this inspection report are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Summer Readiness of Offsite and Alternate Alternating Current (AC) Power Systems

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a review of plant features and procedures for the operation and continued availability of the offsite and alternate AC power system to evaluate readiness of the systems prior to seasonal high grid loading. The inspectors reviewed Exelon’s procedures affecting these areas and the communications protocols between the transmission system operator and Exelon. This review focused on changes to the established program and material condition of the offsite and alternate AC power equipment. The inspectors assessed whether Exelon established and implemented appropriate procedures and protocols to monitor and maintain availability and reliability of both the offsite AC power system and the onsite alternate AC power system. The inspectors evaluated the material condition of the associated equipment by interviewing

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the responsible system manager, reviewing condition reports and open work orders, and walking down portions of the offsite and AC power systems.

b. Findings


1R04 Equipment Alignment .1 Partial System Walkdowns (71111.04Q – 3 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following systems:

‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’ emergency service water pumps while ‘D’ emergency service water pump out of service on April 9, 2014

Containment spray system I while containment spray system II out of service on April 21, 2014

Core spray system I while core spray system II out of service on May 20, 2014

The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk-significance relative to the reactor safety cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures, system diagrams, the UFSAR, technical specifications, work orders, condition reports, and the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant trains of equipment in order to identify conditions that could have impacted system performance of their intended safety functions. The inspectors also performed field walkdowns of accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and were operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no deficiencies. The inspectors also reviewed whether Exelon staff had properly identified equipment issues and entered them into the corrective action program for resolution with the appropriate significance characterization.

b. Findings


1R05 Fire Protection .1 Resident Inspector Quarterly Walkdowns (71111.05Q – 9 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted tours of the areas listed below to assess the material condition and operational status of fire protection features. The inspectors verified that Exelon controlled combustible materials and ignition sources in accordance with administrative procedures. The inspectors verified that fire protection and suppression equipment was available for use as specified in the area pre-fire plan, and passive fire barriers were maintained in good material condition. The inspectors also verified that

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station personnel implemented compensatory measures for out of service, degraded, or inoperable fire protection equipment, as applicable, in accordance with procedures.

480 volt switchgear room ‘A’ on April 22, 2014

480 volt switchgear room ‘B’ on April 22, 2014

Lower cable spreading room on April 22, 2014

Reactor building isolation condenser area on April 22, 2014

Reactor building refueling elevation on April 22, 2014

Emergency diesel generator fuel storage area on May 8, 2014

Main transformer area on May 8, 2014

Reactor building traversing in-core probe drive area on May 8, 2014

Mechanical vacuum pump room and demineralizer area on May 8, 2014

b. Findings


1R06 Flood Protection Measures (71111.06 – 1 sample)

.1 Internal Flooding Review

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the UFSAR, the site flooding analysis, and plant procedures to assess susceptibilities involving internal flooding. The inspectors also reviewed the corrective action program to determine if Exelon identified and corrected flooding problems and whether operator actions for coping with flooding were adequate. The inspectors also focused on the new cable spreading room area to verify the adequacy of equipment seals located below the flood line, floor and water penetration seals, watertight door seals, common drain lines and sumps, sump pumps, level alarms, control circuits, and temporary or removable flood barriers.

b. Findings


1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11A – 1 Sample, 71111.11Q – 2 Samples) .1 Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Requalification Testing and Training

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors observed licensed operator simulator training on April, 2, 2014, which included a main steam isolation valve closure with an anticipated transient without a scram and the failure of select components to automatically start as required. The inspectors evaluated operator performance during the simulated event and verified completion of risk significant operator actions, and the appropriate use of abnormal and emergency operating procedures. The inspectors assessed the clarity of communications, implementation of actions in response to alarms and degrading plant

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conditions, and the oversight and direction provided by the control room supervisor. The inspectors verified the accuracy and timeliness of the emergency classification made by the shift manager and the technical specification action statements entered by the shift technical advisor. Additionally, the inspectors assessed the ability of the crew and training staff to identify and document crew performance problems.

b. Findings

No findings were identified. .2 Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Performance in the Main Control Room

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed licensed operator performance during a scheduled downpower evolution to set plant conditions for maintenance and a control rod sequence exchange on April 4 and April 5, 2014. The inspectors ensured that infrequently performed test or evolution briefings were performed and met the requirements of Exelon procedure HU-AA-1211, “Pre-Job Briefings,” Revision 9. Additionally, the inspectors observed control room operator performance to verify that procedure use, crew communications, and coordination of activities between work groups similarly met established expectations and standards.

b. Findings


.3 Licensed Operator Requalification (71111.11A – 1 sample)

a. Inspection Scope

On June 30, 2014, one NRC region-based inspector conducted an in-office review of results of licensee-administered annual operating tests for 2014 for Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station operators. The inspection assessed whether pass rates were consistent with the guidance of NRC IMC 0609, Appendix I, and “Operator Requalification Human Performance Significance Determination Process”. The review verified that the failure rate (individual or crew) did not exceed 20%.

0 out of 45 operators failed at least one section of the annual exam. The overall individual failure rate was 0 percent.

0 out of 7 crews failed the simulator test. The crew failure rate was 0 percent.

b. Findings No findings were identified.

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1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12 – 2 samples)

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the samples listed below to assess the effectiveness of maintenance activities on structure, system, and component performance and reliability. The inspectors reviewed system health reports, corrective action program documents, maintenance work orders, and maintenance rule basis documents to ensure that Exelon was identifying and properly evaluating performance problems within the scope of the Maintenance Rule. For each sample selected, the inspectors verified that the structure, system or component was properly scoped into the maintenance rule in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65 and verified that the (a)(2) performance criteria established by Exelon staff was reasonable. As applicable, for a structure, system or component classified as (a)(1), the inspectors assessed the adequacy of goals and corrective actions to return the structure, system, or component to (a)(2). Additionally, the inspectors ensured that Exelon staff was identifying and addressing common cause failures that occurred within and across maintenance rule system boundaries.

Isolation condenser system level transmitter issues on May 21, 2014

Control rod drive pumps bearing oil level issues on June 19, 2014

b. Findings


1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13 – 7 samples)

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed station evaluation and management of plant risk for the maintenance and emergent work activities listed below to verify that Exelon performed the appropriate risk assessments prior to removing equipment for work. The inspectors selected these activities based on potential risk significance relative to the reactor safety cornerstones. As applicable for each activity, the inspectors verified that Exelon personnel performed risk assessments as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and that the assessments were accurate and complete. When Exelon performed emergent work, the inspectors verified that operations personnel promptly assessed and managed plant risk. The inspectors reviewed the scope of maintenance work and discussed the results of the assessment with Exelon’s risk analyst to verify plant conditions were consistent with the risk assessment. The inspectors also reviewed the technical specification requirements and inspected portions of redundant safety systems, when applicable, to verify risk analysis assumptions were valid and applicable requirements were met.

‘A’ isolation condenser out of service for planned maintenance on April 3, 2014

‘D’ emergency service water pump and A fuel pool cooling out of service for planned maintenance on April 9, 2014

‘C’ and ‘D’ emergency service water pumps and containment spray system II out of service for planned maintenance on April 21, 2014

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Emergency diesel generator 1 out of service for planned maintenance on May 12, 2014

Core spray system II out of service for planned maintenance on May 20, 2014

Emergency diesel generator 1 out of service for corrective maintenance on June 16, 2014

‘A’ isolation condenser and ‘D’ emergency service water pump out of service for planned maintenance on June 23, 2014

b. Findings


1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments (71111.15 – 5 samples)

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed operability determinations for the following degraded or non-conforming conditions:

‘D’ emergency service water pump motor due to water intrusion in the upper motor bearing oil reservoir on April 9, 2014

Core spray booster pump NZ03C due to mechanical seal leakage on June 2, 2014

Core spray main pump NZ01C due to low bearing oil level on June 9, 2014

Emergency diesel generator 1 loading with A fuel pool cooling pump breaker not open on June 10, 2014

Emergency diesel generator 2 due to overspeed trip on June 16, 2014

The inspectors selected these issues based on the risk significance of the associated components and systems. The inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of the operability determinations to assess whether technical specification operability was properly justified and the subject component or system remained available such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred. The inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in the appropriate sections of the technical specifications and UFSAR to Exelon’s evaluations to determine whether the components or systems were operable. Where compensatory measures were required to maintain operability, the inspectors determined whether the measures in place would function as intended and were properly controlled by Exelon. The inspectors determined, where appropriate, compliance with bounding limitations associated with the evaluations.

b. Findings

Introduction. The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, “Corrective Action,” because Exelon did not promptly identify or correct a condition adverse to quality. Specifically, Exelon did not identify and correct a high oil level condition caused by water intrusion in the ‘D’ emergency service water pump upper motor bearing resulting in an inoperable ‘D’ emergency service water pump.

Description. During a system walk down on April 8, 2014, NRC inspectors identified a high oil level condition on the ‘D’ emergency service water pump upper motor bearing. The NRC inspectors informed the unit supervisor regarding the oil level in the sight

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glass; however, no issue report (IR) was written. On April 9, 2014, the NRC inspectors determined high oil level is not recommended by the motor vendor manual. Subsequently, Exelon lowered the oil level to the normal band and performed an analysis on the oil that was removed. The oil appeared cloudy and there was visible water in the oil. Per Exelon procedure, MA-AA-716-230-1001, Oil Analysis Interpretation Guidance, visible water signifies greater than 10,000 ppm of water in oil (water content > 1000 ppm constitutes an Alert level; water content > 2000 ppm constitutes a Fault level). Exelon defines Alert level in MA-AA-716-230-1001, Data Interpretation, “Alert: Adverse trend or deviation from normal operating conditions. However, there is a low probability of damage or failure of equipment. Additional monitoring or analysis may be required.” Exelon defines Fault level in MA-AA-716-230-1001, Data Interpretation, “Fault: Serious deviation from normal operating condition has been detected. Damage or equipment failure may occur.” Subsequently, as a result of the oil level reaching the fault level, Exelon declared the ‘D’ emergency service water pump inoperable and drained the oil and refilled the oil reservoir (IR 1645010).

Exelon conducted an apparent cause evaluation and determined an IR was not written for this degraded condition although it had been identified by equipment operators. Specifically on February 17, 2014, an equipment operator noticed the high oil level on the emergency service water pump upper bearing. The equipment operator communicated to the field supervisor who informally investigated the issue. The field supervisor annotated it on the Operations Senior Reactor Operator turnover sheet, but an IR was not submitted in their corrective action program. Exelon’s PI-AA-120, IR’s are defined as a common process through which personnel at Exelon Nuclear Facilities can identify and gain assignment for resolution of identified issues. Exelon’s human performance apparent cause evaluation for this issue noted that IR’s are required as the first step in identifying, analyzing and resolving problems. Exelon procedure PI-AA-120, “Issue Identification and Screening Process” requires, in part, that issues be entered into the corrective action program via computer or a handwritten issue reporting form. Exelon determined that the apparent cause for the water intrusion into the upper motor bearing is that the preventive maintenance work order, procedure or instruction lacks the procedural guidance to inspect the upper motor gaskets and did not address sealing the joints on the motor. Exelon’s corrective action included sealing joints on top of the motor that are susceptible to water intrusion. The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions to restore the motor and determined them to be reasonable.

Analysis. The inspectors determined that inadequate identification and resolution of a condition adverse to quality was a performance deficiency that was within Exelon’s ability to foresee and correct. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it is associated with the configuration control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the performance deficiency affected the reliability of an emergency service water pump to perform its safety function due to the upper motor bearing oil containing water. This issue was also similar to Example 3j of NRC IMC 0612, Appendix E, “Examples of Minor Issues,” because the condition resulted in reasonable doubt of the operability of emergency service water system II and additional analysis was necessary to verify operability.

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The inspectors evaluated the finding using exhibit 2, “Mitigating System Screening Questions” in Appendix A to IMC 0609, “Significance Determination Process.” The inspectors determined that this finding was a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating SSC, where the SSC maintained its operability or functionality. Therefore, inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green). The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution, Corrective Action Program, because Exelon did not identify the issue associated with the high oil level in the emergency service water pump upper motor bearing oil in a timely manner in February and April 2014 [P.1].

Enforcement. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, “Corrective Action," requires, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as, deficiencies, deviations, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected. Exelon procedure PI-AA-120, “Issue identification and screening process” requires, in part, that issues be entered into the corrective action program via computer or a handwritten issue reporting form. Contrary to the above, Exelon did not identify and correct a condition adverse to quality. Specifically, between February 17 and April 19, 2014, Exelon operations personnel noted a high oil level in the ‘D’ emergency service water pump upper motor bearing oil; however, the adverse condition was not entered into the corrective action program. As a result, the condition adverse to quality, unacceptable water content in the upper motor bearing oil, was not promptly corrected. Because this issue is of very low safety significance (Green) and Exelon entered this issue into their corrective action program as IR 1645010, this finding is being treated as an NCV consistent with the NRC Enforcement Policy. (NCV 05000219/2014003-01, Failure to Identify and Correct High Oil Level in D Emergency Service Water Pump Upper Motor Bearing)

1R18 Plant Modifications (71111.18 – 1 sample) .1 Temporary Modifications

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the temporary modifications listed below to determine whether the modifications adversely affected the safety functions of systems that are important to safety. The inspectors reviewed 10 CFR 50.59 documentation and post-modification testing results, and conducted field walkdowns of the modifications to verify that the temporary modifications did not degrade the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of the affected systems.

TCC-1405-736, Temporary power to 24V battery charger per R2150504 on May 19, 2014

b. Findings


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1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19 – 8 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the post-maintenance tests for the maintenance activities listed below to verify that procedures and test activities ensured system operability and functional capability. The inspectors reviewed the test procedure to verify that the procedure adequately tested the safety functions that may have been affected by the maintenance activity, that the acceptance criteria in the procedure was consistent with the information in the applicable licensing basis and/or design basis documents, and that the procedure had been properly reviewed and approved. The inspectors also witnessed the test or reviewed test data to verify that the test results adequately demonstrated restoration of the affected safety functions.

V-14-30, ‘A’ isolation condenser steam inlet valve after valve motor preventive maintenance on April 1, 2014

‘B’ isolation condenser after isolation condenser condensate return valve preventive maintenance on April 7, 2014

‘D’ emergency service water pump after drain and refill of the upper motor bearing oil on April 11, 2014

Containment spray system II after preventive maintenance on April 22, 2014

Emergency diesel generator 1 after preventive maintenance on May 19, 2014

Core spray system II after preventive maintenance on May 21, 2014

Emergency diesel generator 2 after overspeed trip limit switch replacement on June 17, 2014

‘D’ emergency service water pump after motor replacement on June 25, 2014

b. Findings


1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22 – 5 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed performance of surveillance tests and/or reviewed test data of selected risk-significant SSCs to assess whether test results satisfied technical specifications, the UFSAR, and Exelon procedure requirements. The inspectors verified that test acceptance criteria were clear, tests demonstrated operational readiness and were consistent with design documentation, test instrumentation had current calibrations and the range and accuracy for the application, tests were performed as written, and applicable test prerequisites were satisfied. Upon test completion, the inspectors considered whether the test results supported that equipment was capable of performing the required safety functions. The inspectors reviewed the following surveillance tests:

‘A’ isolation condenser isolation test and calibration on April 2, 2014

Containment spray and emergency service water system I pump operability and quarterly in-service test on April 16, 2014

Standby gas treatment system 10-hour run – system II on May 25, 2014

Torus to drywell vacuum breaker operability test on June 19, 2014

Unidentified leak rate verification on May 29, 2014

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b. Findings

No findings were identified. Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

1EP6 Drill Evaluation (71114.06 – 1 samples) .1 Training Observations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed a simulator training evolution for licensed operators on April 2, 2014, which required emergency plan implementation by an operations crew. Exelon planned for this evolution to be evaluated and included in performance indicator data regarding drill and exercise performance. The inspectors observed event classification and notification activities performed by the crew. The inspectors also attended the post-evolution critique for the scenario. The focus of the inspectors’ activities was to note any weaknesses and deficiencies in the crew’s performance and ensure that Exelon evaluators identified the same issues and entered them into the corrective action program.

b. Findings

No findings were identified. 4. OTHER ACTIVITIES 4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)

.1 Unplanned Scrams with Complications (1 sample)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed Exelon’s submittal for the Unplanned Scrams with Complications performance indicator for the period April 1, 2013 through March 31, 2014. To determine the accuracy of the performance indicator data reported during those periods, the inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Document 99-02, “Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline,” Revision 7. The inspectors reviewed control room logs, NRC integrated inspection reports and plant process computer data, and compared that information to the data reported by Exelon to validate the accuracy of the submittal.

b. Findings


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.2 Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours (1 sample)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed Exelon’s submittal for the Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours performance indicator for the period April 1, 2013 through March 31, 2014. To determine the accuracy of the performance indicator data reported during those periods, the inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in NEI Document 99-02, “Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline,” Revision 7. The inspectors reviewed control room logs, NRC integrated inspection reports and plant process computer data, and compared that information to the data reported by Exelon to validate the accuracy of the submittal.

b. Findings


.3 Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours (1 sample)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed Exelon’s submittal for the Unplanned Power Changes performance indicator for the period April 1, 2013 through March 31, 2014. To determine the accuracy of the performance indicator data reported during those periods, the inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in NEI Document 99-02, “Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline,” Revision 7. The inspectors reviewed control room logs, NRC integrated inspection reports and plant process computer data, and compared that information to the data reported by Exelon to validate the accuracy of the submittal.

b. Findings


4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution (71152 – 1 sample) .1 Routine Review of Problem Identification and Resolution Activities

a. Inspection Scope

As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, “Problem Identification and Resolution,” the inspectors routinely reviewed issues during baseline inspection activities and plant status reviews to verify that Exelon entered issues into the corrective action program at an appropriate threshold, gave adequate attention to timely corrective actions, and identified and addressed adverse trends. In order to assist with the identification of repetitive equipment failures and specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the corrective action program and periodically attended condition report screening meetings.

15

Enclosure

b. Findings


.2 Annual Sample: Operator Actions during a Reactor Scram on December 14, 2013 and

Subsequent Startup Reactor Scram Signal

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed Exelon’s evaluation and corrective actions associated with the operator performance aspects of a reactor scram on December 14, 2013, (IR 1597041) and the subsequent startup reactor scram signal (IR 1598442). The inspector reviewed the root cause evaluations, associated issue reports, and interviewed personnel related to these issues to ensure appropriate corrective actions have been identified and appear effective.

b. Findings and Observations


In regard to IR 1597041, the inspector evaluated the specific issues of reactor vessel level control following the reactor scram on December 13, 2013, and a fourteen hour delay in resetting the scram. The inspectors noted that emergency operating procedure (EOP) EMG-3200.01A, “RPV Control – No ATWS,” directs operators to control level between 138” to 175”. Review of the post event level plots show that the isolation condensers, used for pressure control, were initiated three times in the first hour following the scram with reactor vessel level at approximately 138”-140”. Per water physics, this creates a level swell of up to 20 inches. This resulted in a cooldown such that when the isolation condensers were secured, level dropped below 138” due to shrink, by approximately 10-15 inches. The inspector interviewed the shift manager for this event concerning why level was not maintained above 138”. The crew was concerned on not exceeding the upper level limit due to the potential 20” swell when initiating the isolation condensers. This upper limit is based on potential flooding of the isolation condenser steam lines which could cause a water hammer. Due to this concern, the crew kept level at the low end of the EOP band and considered compliant with the EOP criteria because level was trending up whenever the isolation condensers were secured. Review of the EOP basis documents shows that the only basis for the 138” low level is that this is a scram setpoint, so the scram cannot be reset until level is stable above that value. The inspector determined that excessive concern over the potential for water hammer and failure to anticipate the effect of cooldown from the isolation condensers is a knowledge and training issue, rather than a failure to comply with the EOP. Exelon captured this issue as IR 1599446 and IR 161771.

The delay in resetting the scram resulted initially from the fact that level was repeatedly dropping below the 138” scram setpoint. The inspector reviewed Exelon procedure, ABN-1, “Reactor Scram,” and noted that there is no specified time frame or urgency

16

Enclosure

about resetting the scram. There is one valve which must be closed if the scram will not be reset for an extended period of time; the crew took that action.

The facility wrote IR 1599446 to address RPV level control, and IR 161771 to evaluate an expanded level band for isolation condenser operation in EOPs and other issues. In regards to IR 1598442, the inspector determined that the evaluation and corrective actions for the error that resulted in a scram signal while shutdown was thorough and appropriate. The inspector also evaluated the issue of whether fitness for duty and/or fatigue testing should have been performed. Exelon procedure SY-AA-102-202, “Testing for Cause,” lists conditions requiring either “for cause” testing. The only aspect of this event that potentially required “for cause” testing was an event that resulted in a station event free clock reset. OP-AA-101-113-001, “Station Event Free Clock Program,” Attachment 1, “Station Clock Reset Criteria,” item 5.c includes regulatory reporting per 10 CFR 50.72 and 10 CFR 50.73 as a reason for a clock reset. This event was reported per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B). Exelon determined this was not an item requiring a reset because the reset is discretionary. The inspector interviewed the Human Performance Improvement Manager, and determined the event would have been a station clock reset if the event had happened with the plant online. As result, for the event that did not occur online, no “for cause” fitness for duty test was discretionarily not required.

4OA3 Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion (71153 – 1 sample) .1 Plant Events

a. Inspection Scope

For the plant events listed below, the inspectors reviewed and/or observed plant parameters, reviewed personnel performance, and evaluated performance of mitigating systems. The inspectors communicated the plant events to appropriate regional personnel, and compared the event details with criteria contained in IMC 0309, “Reactive Inspection Decision Basis for Reactors,” for consideration of potential reactive inspection activities. As applicable, the inspectors verified that Exelon made appropriate emergency classification assessments and properly reported the event in accordance with 10 CFR Parts 50.72 and 50.73. The inspectors reviewed Exelon’s follow-up actions related to the events to assure that Exelon implemented appropriate corrective actions commensurate with their safety significance.

Unusual Event due to release of chlorinated water on May 28, 2014

b. Findings

No findings were identified. 4OA5 Other Activities .1 Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) at Operating Plants

(IP 60855.1)

a. Inspection Scope

17

Enclosure

The inspectors evaluated Exelon’s activities related to long-term operation and monitoring of their ISFSI, and verified that activities were being performed in accordance with the Certificate of Compliance (CoC), technical specifications (TS), regulations, and site procedures.

The inspectors performed tours of the ISFSI pad to assess the material condition of the pad and the loaded horizontal storage modules (HSMs). The inspectors also verified that transient combustibles were not being stored on the ISFSI pad or in the vicinity of the HSMs. The inspectors confirmed vehicle entry onto the ISFSI pad was controlled in accordance with the site procedures and verified that Exelon was performing daily HSM surveillances in accordance with TS requirements.

The inspectors interviewed reactor engineering personnel and reviewed Exelon’s program associated with fuel characterization and selection for storage from the last ISFSI loading campaign in April/May 2012. The inspectors verified that the criteria meets the conditions for cask and canister use as specified in the CoC. The inspectors also confirmed that physical inventories were conducted annually and were maintained as required by the regulations.

The inspectors reviewed radiological records from the last ISFSI loading campaign to confirm that radiation and contamination levels measured on the casks were within limits specified by the TS and consistent with values specified in the final safety analysis report (FSAR). The inspectors reviewed radiation protection procedures and radiation work permits associated with ISFSI operations. The inspectors also reviewed annual environmental reports to verify that areas around the ISFSI pad and the ISFSI site boundary were within limits specified in 10 CFR Part 20 and 10 CFR Part 72.104.

The inspectors reviewed corrective action program condition reports, and the associated follow-up actions associated with ISFSI operations to ensure that issues were entered into the corrective action program, prioritized, and evaluated commensurate with their safety significance.

b. Findings No findings were identified. 4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

On July 24, 2014, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. G. Stathes, Site Vice President and other members of the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station staff. The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained by the inspectors or documented in this report.

ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

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Attachment

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Exelon Personnel G. Stathes, Site Vice-President R. Peak, Plant Manager M. Ford, Director, Operations G. Malone, Director, Engineering J. Dostal, Director, Maintenance C. Symonds, Director, Training M. Rossi, Operations Training Lead B. Egan, Shift Manager D. DiCello, Director, Work Management M. McKenna, Manager, Regulatory Assurance D. Moore, Licensing M. Caldeira, HPIP Manager T. Farenga, Radiation Protection Manager J. Renda, Manager, Environmental/Chemistry T. Keenan, Manager, Site Security P. Bloss, Senior Manager, Plant Engineering H. Ray, Senior Manager, Design Engineering E. Swain, Shift Operations Superintendent J. Chrisley, Regulatory Assurance Specialist D. Moore, Regulatory Assurance Specialist K. Paez, Regulatory Assurance Specialist C. Carlon, ISFSI Program Engineer J. Dougherty, Exelon Corporate ISFSI Program Engineer C. Holtzapple, SNM Coordinator K. Zadroga, Radiation Protection Supervisor

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, DISCUSSED, AND UPDATED Opened/Closed 05000219/2014003-01 NCV Failure to Identify and Correct High Oil Level in D

Emergency Service Water Pump Upper Motor Bearing (Section 1R15)

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Attachment

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED Section 1R01: Adverse Weather Protection Procedures ABN-60, Grid Emergency, Revision 14 341, Emergency Diesel Generator Operation, Revision 107 WC-AA-107, Seasonal Readiness, Revision 14 OP-OC-108-109-1001, Severe Weather Preparation T&RM for Oyster Creek, Revision 28 Condition Reports 1668338 1668327 1665932 1644693 1619853 1659324 Section 1R04: Equipment Alignment Procedures 322, Service Water System, Revision 84 310, Containment Spray System, Revision 109 308, Emergency Core Cooling System Operation, Revision 93 Miscellaneous 2014 Certification of Oyster Creek Generation Station Summer Readiness Section 1R05: Fire Protection Procedures CC-AA-211, Fire Protection Program, Revision 5 101.2, Oyster Creek Site Fire Protection Program, Revision 71 OP-OC-201-008-1022, 480 Volt Switchgear Room ‘A’, Revision 2 OP-OC-201-008-1023, 480 Volt Switchgear Room ‘B’, Revision 2 OP-OC-201-008-1019, Lower Cable Spreading Room, Revision 1 OP-OC-201-008-1002, Reactor Building, Revision 1 OP-OC-201-008-1001, Reactor Building, Revision 1 OP-OC-201-008-1037, Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Storage Area, Revision 1 OP-OC-201-008-1033, Main Transformer Area, Revision 2 OP-OC-201-008-1007, Reactor Building TIP Drive Area, Revision 0 OP-OC-201-008-1026, High/Low Conductivity Room, SJAE Room, Vacuum Pump Room,

Demineralizer Area, Revision 1 Section 1R06: Flood Protection Measures Procedures RAP-N1a, Fire Pump 1 Trouble, Revision 3 RAP-N2a, Fire Pump 1 Running, Revision 2 OP-OC-201-008-1019, Pre-Fire Plan: New Cable Spreading Room (NCSR), Revision 1 OP-OC-201-008-1018, Pre-Fire Plan: Control Room, Revision 1 Condition Reports 1672258 813797

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Attachment

Miscellaneous Internal Flood Evaluation Summary and Notebook: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station,

dated April 17, 2008 OC-2010-S-099, 50.59 Screening: RAP-N2a and RAP-N2b, Revision 0 Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Section 9.3.3,

Equipment and Floor Drainage Systems, Revision 16 13432.30.105, Calculation: New CSR Floor Drain Line Sizing, dated December 29, 1981 Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification Program Procedures 202.1, Power Operation, Revision 138 HU-AA-1211, Pre-Job Briefings, Revision 9 2612.CREW.10-02.05, Exelon Nuclear Licensed Operator Requal Training Simulator Exercise

Guide, Revision 1 Condition Reports 1643399 1643526 1647596 Section 1R12: Maintenance Effectiveness Procedures ER-AA-310, Implementation of the Maintenance Rule, Revision 9 Condition Reports 1627825 1617094 1667783 1615170 1615588 Section 1R13: Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control Procedures ER-AA-600-1042, On-line Risk Management, Revision 8 OP-AA-108-117, Protected Equipment Program, Revision 3 WC-OC-101-1001, On-line Risk Management and Assessment, Revision 17 322, Service Water System, Revision 84 311, Fuel Pool Cooling System, Revision 115 310, Containment Spray System, Revision 109 341, Emergency Diesel Generator Operation, Revision 107 308, Emergency Core Cooling System Operation, Revision 93 Section 1R15: Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments Procedures OP-AA-108-115, Operability Determinations, Revision 13 125.3, Leak Reduction Program Administration, Revision 9 610.4.021, Core Spray System I Pump Operability and Quarterly IST, Revision 28 636.4.001, Diesel Generator No. 1 Automatic Actuation Test, Revision 14 MA-AA-716-230-1001, Oil Analysis Interpretation Guideline, Revision 17 Condition Reports 1665760 1669426 1669421 1667783 1671539 1627040 1441513 1662392 1645572 1645010 1659092 0467636

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Attachment

Maintenance Orders/Work Orders R2173173 M2352864 Section 1R18: Plant Modifications Procedures 340.2, 24Vdc Distribution System, Revision 18 Maintenance Orders/Work Orders R2150504 R2193655 Miscellaneous TCC-1405-736, Temporary Power to 24 VDC A-1 Charger per R2150504, dated May 19, 2014 Section 1R19: Post-Maintenance Testing Procedures 607.4.005, Containment Spray and Emergency Service Water Pump System 2 Operability Test,

Revision 78 607.4.016, Containment Spray and Emergency Service Water Pump System 1 Operability Test,

Revision 38 665.4.010, Containment Spray Leak Reduction Procedure, Revision 26 636.4.003, Diesel Generator #1 Load Test, Revision 99 610.4.022, Core Spray System 2 Pump Operability and Quarterly In-Service Test, Revision 29 RAP-B7b, ESW Pump D Trouble, Revision 1 MA-AA-716-012, Post Maintenance Testing, Revision 19 Condition Reports 1649757 1649880 1649944 1649952 1649962 1650310 1650927 1650942 1651034 1659101 1658897 1660543 1660115 1659616 1659406 1661298 1673853 1674025 1674695 1674684 Maintenance Orders/Work Orders A2331897 A2331893 A2331892 R2235209 R2136646 A2352864 M2352864 R2201972 R2169951 R2236850 R2204220 R2204221 R2092377 R2124011 R2201972 R2238482 R2238500 C2032432 Section 1R22: Surveillance Testing Procedures 609.3.022, A Isolation Condenser Isolation Test and Calibration – A1 Sensors First, Revision 3 607.4.016, Containment Spray and Emergency Service Water System I Pump Operability and

Quarterly Inservice Test, Revision 38 651.4.003, Standby Gas Treatment System 10-Hour Run – System 2, Revision 11 330, Standby Gas Treatment System, Revision 56 ER-AB-331-1006, BWR Reactor Coolant System Leakage Monitoring and Action Plan,

Revision 2 312.9, Primary Containment Control, Revision 58 604.4.016, Torus to Drywell Vacuum Breaker Operability and In-Service Test, Revision 37

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Attachment

Drawings BR 3029, Elementary Emergency Condenser Isolation Control, Sheet 2, Revision 26 GE 148F262, Emergency Condenser Flow Diagram, Revision 50 Condition Reports 1642163 1647678 1642261 1665874 1666686 Work Orders R2224627 R2230850 Miscellaneous Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Technical Specification Table 3.1.1, Protective

Instrumentation Requirements, Amendment 253 Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Section

6.3.1.1, Isolation Condenser System, Revision 18 SE-328312-003, Safety Evaluation: GL 89-10 Motor Operated Valve Modification, Revision 1 SE-315403-031, Safety Evaluation: Justification for Revised IC High Flow Trip Time Delay,

Revision 0 C-1302-153-5450-083, Evaluation of Iso Cond MOV Gear Mod Impact on RPV Response to a

HELB, Revision 0 C-1302-2111-5350-080, Timer Setpoint Uncertainty, Revision 1 Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Technical Specification Section 4.4, Emergency

Cooling, Amendment 263 Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 6.2.2,

Containment Heat Removal Systems, Revision 18 Regulatory Guide 1.52, Design, Inspection, and Testing Criteria for Air Filtration and Adsorption

Units of Post-Accident Engineered Safety Feature Atmosphere Cleanup System in Light Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 4

ASME AG-1-2003, Code On Nuclear Air and Gas Treatment, with 2004 Addenda Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Section 6.5.1,

Engineered Safety Feature Filter Systems, Revision 17 SDBD-OC-822, Design Basis Document for Standby Gas Treatment System/Secondary

Containment, Revision 2 Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Technical Specification 4.5.H, Standby Gas

Treatment System, Amendment 219 Adverse Condition Monitoring and Contingency Plan, Drywell Leakage Monitoring, Revision 8 Drywell Sump and Atmosphere Chemistry Monitoring 1-8 Sump Chemistry Analysis Results,

dated May 23, 2014 Section 1EP6: Drill Evaluation Procedures 2612.CREW.10-02.05, Exelon Nuclear Licensed Operator Requal Training Simulator Exercise

Guide, Revision 1 Section 4OA1: Performance Indicator Verification Miscellaneous NEI Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7 Operations Department Operator Logs from April 1, 2013 to March 31, 2014 Performance Indicator Summary Report, dated April 17, 2014

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Attachment

Section 4OA2: Problem Identification and Resolution Procedures: EMG-3200.01A, RPV Control – No ATWS, Revision 14 SY-AA-102-202, Testing for Cause, Revision 16 OP-AA-101-113-001, Station Event Free Clock Program, Revision 16 ABN-1, Reactor Scram, Revision 11 2000-BAS-3200.02, EOP User’s Guide, Revision 8 Condition Reports 1597041 1598442 1599446 161771 Section 4OA3: Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Procedures EP-AA-1010, Exelon Nuclear Radiological Emergency Plan Annex for Oyster Creek Station,

Revision 8 ABN-33, Toxic or Flammable Gas Release, Revision 9 Condition Reports 1665474 1665151 1665293 1665011 1664961 1665293 Section 4OA5: Other Activities Procedures 205.13, HSM Monitoring While Containing Fuel, Revision 8 NF-AA-60, Fuel Selection for Dry Cask Storage Process Description, Revision 1 NF-AA-330, Special Nuclear Material Physical Inventories, Revision 11 NF-AA-330-1001, Core Verification Guideline, Revision 9 NF-AA-621, Classification of Fuel Assemblies for Dry Storage, Revision 2 NF-AA-622, Fuel Selection and Documentation for Dry Cask Loading, Revision 0 NF-AA-623, Technical Review of Dry Cask Storage System Fabrication, Revision 0 OU-AA-630, Dry Cask Storage Program Implementation, Revision 4 OU-OC-630, ISFSI Pad and Component Annual Inspection, Revision 0 Condition Reports 0770801 1333511 1347055 1363007 1375967 1390331 1417341 1420295 1422288 1146521 1469805 1509007 1511308 1511675 1537330 1557432 1591424 1607735 1624372 1645290 1645890 Engineering Evaluations C-1302-915-E310-021, Fuel Selection Package for DSC OCG-61B-021-C, Revision 0 C-1302-915-E310-020, Fuel Selection Package for DSC OCG-61B-021-C, Revision 1 C-1302-915-E310-021, Fuel Selection Package for DSC OCG-61B-022C, Revision 0 Miscellaneous HSM Temperature Monitoring Log, January 1, 2014 to March 31, 2014 Technical Specification Log Sheet Number 681.4.004, Dry Fuel Storage, Revision 28

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Attachment

Radiation Protection Documents Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report, 2012 Oyster Creek ISFSI Fence Dosimeters, 1st QTR 2011 - 4th QTR 2013 RP-AA-401 Attachment 2, 2012 Dry Cask Storage Campaign ALARA Plan, dated March 19,

2012 RWP No. 12-1020, ISFSI Project (All RCA Areas) Ramp-Up/Ramp-Down & Support Activities, Revision 0 RWP No. 12-1021, ISFSI Project (All Areas), Revision 0 YFS-12-01945, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facility Radiological Survey, dated April 12,

2012 YFS-12-02506, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facility Radiological Survey, dated May 12,



2012 YFS-13-05531, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facility Radiological Survey, dated October 8,

2013 Work Orders A2011781 C2028792 C2029253 M2327283

LIST OF ACRONYMS AC Alternating Current ADAMS Agencywide Documents Access and Management System ATWS Anticipated Transient without Scram CFR Code of Federal Regulations CoC Certificate of Compliance EOP Emergency Operating Procedure ESW Emergency Service Water FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report HSM Horizontal Storage Module IR Issue Report ISFSI Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation IMC Inspection Manual Chapter NCV Non-Cited Violation NEI Nuclear Energy Institute NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission RPV Reactor Pressure Vessel SDP Significance Determination Process SSC Structure, System, or Component TS Technical Specifications UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report