United States v. Carpenter, 1st Cir. (2015)

7/26/2019 United States v. Carpenter, 1st Cir. (2015)

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United States Court of AppealsFor the First Circuit

No. 14- 1286

UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA,

Appel l ee,

v.

DANI EL E. CARPENTER,

Def endant , Appel l ant .

APPEAL FROM THE UNI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURTFOR THE DI STRI CT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[ Hon. Geor ge A. O' Tool e, J r . , U. S. Di st r i ct J udge]

Bef or e

Tor r uel l a, Howar d, and Kayat t a,Ci r cui t J udges.

Mar t i n G. Wei nber g, wi t h whom Ki mber l y Homan was onbr i ef , f or appel l ant .

Chr i st opher J . Smi t h, At t or ney, Appel l at e Sect i on,Cr i mi nal Di vi si on, wi t h whom Car men M. Or t i z, Uni t ed St at esAt t or ney, Di st r i ct of Massachuset t s, Lesl ey R. Cal dwel l , Assi st antAt t or ney Gener al , Cr i mi nal Di vi si on, Kel l y Begg Lawr ence, Assi st ant

Uni t ed St at es At t or ney, Di st r i ct of Massachuset t s, and Sung- HeeSuh, Deput y Assi st ant At t or ney Gener al , Cr i mi nal Di vi si on, wer e onbr i ef , f or appel l ee.

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KAYATTA, Circuit Judge. We opi ne f or t he t hi r d t i me on

t he Uni t ed St at es' pr osecut i on of Dani el Car pent er f or mai l and

wi r e f r aud i n connect i on wi t h hi s mi shandl i ng of cl i ent escr ow

f unds. I n 2007, we af f i r med a di st r i ct cour t or der set t i ng asi de

a j ur y ver di ct of gui l t y i n f avor of a new t r i al . Uni t ed St at es v.

Car pent er , 494 F. 3d 13 ( 1st Ci r . 2007) . I n 2013, af t er a second

j ury al so f ound Car penter gui l t y, we r eversed a di st r i ct cour t

or der set t i ng asi de t hat ver di ct , and r emanded f or sent enci ng.

Uni t ed St at es v. Car pent er , 736 F. 3d 619 ( 1st Ci r . 2013) . Now,

post - sent enci ng, we consi der Car pent er ' s di r ect appeal i n whi ch he

ar gues, among ot her t hi ngs, t hat t he l engt hy dur at i on of t hi s

cr i mi nal pr oceedi ng vi ol at ed hi s const i t ut i onal and st at ut or y

speedy t r i al r i ght s. For t he f ol l owi ng r easons, we af f i r m t he

j udgment of t he di st r i ct cour t on al l grounds.

I. Background

Our 2013 opi ni on det ai l s t he act s f or whi ch Car pent er

st ands convi ct ed. I n a nut shel l , he t ol d cl i ent s he woul d hol d

t hei r money i n escr ow account s f or whi ch the cl i ent woul d pay a

f i xed f ee and whi ch woul d caut i ousl y gener at e ret ur ns of ei t her

t hr ee or si x per cent ; t hen ( unbeknownst t o hi s cl i ent s) he i nvest ed

t he money i n hi gh- r i sk, hi gh- r et ur n st ock opt i ons, hopi ng t o

gener at e excess r et ur ns t o keep f or hi msel f . Hi s opt i on t r adi ng

f ar ed poor l y, and he l ost ni ne mi l l i on dol l ar s i n cl i ent f unds. At

t r i al , he ar gued unsuccessf ul l y t hat he never pr omi sed t hat t he

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cl i ent f unds woul d be saf e, and t hat he di d not i nt end t o def r aud

hi s cl i ent s when he f ai l ed t o di scl ose hi s r eal st r at egy of usi ng

t hei r money t o make r i sky i nvest ment s t o see i f he coul d hi t a home

r un f or hi msel f .

Cent r al t o t hi s appeal ar e t he det ai l s of how t hi s

cr i mi nal pr oceedi ng has l ast ed so l ong.

A. The Indictment, First Trial, and Appeal (September 2004 July

2007)

The Uni t ed Stat es i ndi ct ed Car penter i n September 2004.

I n J ul y 2005, Car pent er ' s f i r st t r i al ended wi t h a convi ct i on. He

moved, among other t hi ngs, f or a new t r i al . I n December 2005, t he

di st r i ct cour t gr ant ed t hat mot i on f or a new t r i al on t he gr ounds

t hat t he government ' s r epeat ed use of gambl i ng metaphors had

unf ai r l y i nf l amed t he j ur y' s passi ons. Uni t ed St at es v. Car pent er ,

405 F. Supp. 2d 85, 103 ( D. Mass. 2005) . The government appeal ed,

but our cour t af f i r med t he or der i n J ul y 2007, r emandi ng f or a newt r i al . Car pent er , 494 F. 3d at 13. 1

B. The Second Trial, Appeal, and Sentencing (August 2007 - March2014)

Fol l owi ng remand, Car pent er ' s second t r i al ended wi t h

anot her convi ct i on i n J une 2008. The di st r i ct cour t i ni t i al l y

schedul ed a sent enci ng hear i ng f or Sept ember 23, 2008. The

1 Car pent er t hen pet i t i oned f or cer t i or ar i f r om t he deni al ofhi s cross- appeal of t he di st r i ct cour t ' s deni al of hi s mot i on f oracqui t t al . The Supr eme Cour t deni ed t hat pet i t i on i n Febr uar y2008. Uni t ed St at es v. Car pent er , 552 U. S. 1230 ( 2008) .

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di st r i ct cour t di d not sent ence Car pent er , t hough, unt i l al most si x

year s l at er , i n Mar ch 2014. Thi s l engt hy i nt er val pr ovi des t he

pr i mary basi s f or Carpent er ' s Si xt h Amendment argument .

1. Carpenter's Motions for Mistrial, Acquittal, andNew Trial (June November 2008)

On J une 17, 2008, j ust bef ore t he end of t he second

t r i al , Car pent er moved f or a mi st r i al and par t i al acqui t t al . On

J ul y 3, i mmedi at el y af t er hi s second convi ct i on, Car pent er f i l ed a

si xt y- seven- page mot i on f or acqui t t al or new t r i al . 2 Usi ng a

di f f er ent l egal t eam, he al so f i l ed t wo "suppl ement al " mot i ons f or

acqui t t al and new t r i al , r ai si ng a number of addi t i onal ar gument s.

Dur i ng J ul y and August 2008, t he government and Carpent er f i l ed

el even more mot i ons addi ng t o the argument s f or acqui t t al ,

mi st r i al , and new t r i al , and seeki ng var i ous r ul i ngs on page l i mi t s

and deadl i nes. By August 2008, t he government compl ai ned t hat

Car pent er ' s br i ef i ng t ot al ed over one hundr ed pages of openi ngbr i ef s, and near l y ei ght y pages of r epl y br i ef s.

I n Sept ember , Car pent er f i l ed a second mot i on f or a new

t r i al based on newl y di scover ed evi dence. I n November , he f i l ed

2 The gr ounds i n t hi s mot i on were ( a) t hat t he gover nmentpr esent ed i nsuf f i ci ent evi dence t o convi ct under 18 U. S. C. 1341

and 1343, ( b) t hat t he gover nment had agai n unf ai r l y pr ej udi ced t hedef endant , and ( c) er r oneous and pr ej udi ci al r ul i ngs on t heevi dence. However , t he di st r i ct cour t di d not act ual l y deci debased on any of t hese ar gument s, but i nst ead f ocused on var i ousways t hat t he government overst ated t he evi dence and f ocusedexcessi vel y on Car pent er ' s gr eed. Uni t ed St at es v. Car pent er , 808F. Supp. 2d 366, 380 ( D. Mass. 2011) .

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yet a t hi r d mot i on f or a new t r i al based on di f f er ent newl y

di scover ed evi dence. ( Nei t her mot i on concer ns t he newl y di scover ed

evi dence at i ssue i n t hi s appeal . )

2. The District Court Hearing on the Post-TrialMotions (December 2008)

On December 3, 2008, t he di st r i ct cour t hel d a hear i ng

f ocusi ng on t he J une 17 mi st r i al mot i on, whi ch was based on t he

ar gument t hat t he gover nment had knowi ngl y sol i ci t ed f al se

t est i mony f r om a wi t ness i n vi ol at i on of Napue v. I l l i noi s, 360

U. S. 264 ( 1959) . The cour t al so ent er t ai ned ar gument on t he J ul y

3 mot i ons f or acqui t t al or new t r i al . The cour t i ndi cat ed t hat i t

woul d deci de t he ot her pendi ng mot i ons based on t he wr i t t en

submi ss i ons.

3. Motions Related to the Merrill Lynch Civil

Litigation (March June 2009)

Bef or e the di st r i ct cour t r ul ed on t he numer ous, of t en-

l engt hy mot i ons bef or e i t , Car pent er began maki ng addi t i onal

f i l i ngs. Under st andi ng t hese new f i l i ngs r equi r es a bi t of

cont ext .

Car pent er t r aded hi s cl i ent s' f unds, i n par t , t hr ough an

i nvest ment account wi t h Mer r i l l Lynch. At Car pent er ' s t r i al , t he

gover nment sol i ci t ed t est i mony f r om t hr ee Mer r i l l Lynch empl oyees

about t he r i ski ness of Car pent er ' s t r adi ng st r at egy. These

empl oyees, i ncl udi ng one to whomwe ref er as "GL, " deni ed t hey knew

Car pent er was t r adi ng t hi r d- par t y f unds. However , GL' s t est i mony

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was i mpeached when a l awyer f or one of Carpent er ' s cl i ent s

t est i f i ed t hat Car pent er had ar r anged a phone cal l bet ween t hat

l awyer and GL. Phone and f ax r ecor ds cor r oborated t he l awyer ' s

ver si on of event s. 3 Even when conf r ont ed wi t h t he phone r ecor ds,

however , GL cont i nued t o deny t he conver sat i on t ook pl ace.

Car pent er ' s pr i mar y def ense t o t he f r aud char ges was hi s

good f ai t h: i . e. , t hat he l acked t he speci f i c i nt ent t o def r aud

because he genui nel y t hought he had i nvest ment di scr et i on over t he

f unds hi s company hel d. 4 I n hi s vi ew, evi dence showi ng he was open

wi t h Mer r i l l Lynch about t he sour ce of t he f unds he was t r adi ng

suppor t ed hi s good- f ai t h def ense on t he l ogi c t hat he woul d not

have been open wi t h Merr i l l Lynch i f he knew he was doi ng somethi ng

wr ong. The gover nment l ar gel y demur r ed, cal l i ng Mer r i l l Lynch

wi t nesses pr i mar i l y t o demonst r at e the r i ski ness of Car pent er ' s

appr oach, and devot i ng l i t t l e at t ent i on t o whet her anyone at

Mer r i l l Lynch knew t he sour ce of t he f unds. As t he pr osecut i on

t ol d t he j ur y, i t s posi t i on was t hat what ever Mer r i l l Lynch

3 Thi s exchange was t he basi s f or Carpent er ' s J une 2008 mot i onf or mi st r i al on t he gr ounds t hat t he government had knowi ngl yof f er ed per j ur ed t est i mony i n vi ol at i on of Napue, 360 U. S. at 269.The di st r i ct cour t deni ed t he mot i on and i n 2013 we af f i r med on t hegr ounds t hat al t hough t he empl oyee seems t o have t est i f i ed f al sel y,

t he government made al l necessar y di scl osures and the def ense wasabl e t o vi gor ousl y cr oss- exami ne t he empl oyee. Car pent er , 736 F. 3dat 630- 31.

4 Af t er hi s f i r st t r i al , f or exampl e, Car pent er moved f oracqui t t al on t he gr ounds t hat t he gover nment had f ai l ed t o di sprovehi s good f ai t h. Car pent er , 405 F. Supp. 2d at 93- 94.

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empl oyees knew was i r r el evant because what mat t er ed were t he

r epr esent at i ons Car pent er made t o hi s cl i ent s.

The di st r i ct cour t , t oo, quest i oned t he probat i ve f or ce

of Car pent er ' s argument t hat Mer r i l l Lynch knew t he sour ce of t he

f unds. I t r ej ected a mot i on t o acqui t f or i nsuf f i ci ent evi dence

based on a ver si on of t hi s ar gument af t er bot h t r i al s. Car pent er ,

405 F. Supp. 2d at 93- 94; Uni t ed St at es v. Car pent er , 808 F. Supp.

2d 366, 378 ( D. Mass. 2011) . Never t hel ess , Car pent er cont i nued

( and cont i nues i n t hi s appeal ) t o ar gue t hat any evi dence showi ng

t hat Mer r i l l Lynch was awar e of t he sour ce of t he f unds was hi ghl y

r el evant t o hi s cl ai ms.

Wi t h t hi s backgr ound i n mi nd, we now r etur n t o t he

pr ocedur al chr onol ogy. I n ear l y 2009, shor t l y af t er t he hear i ng on

Car pent er ' s var i ous mot i ons f or mi st r i al , acqui t t al , and new t r i al ,

new document s began t o emerge as part of a ci vi l l awsui t agai nst

Mer r i l l Lynch. Those document s f ur t her t ended t o show t hat Mer r i l l

Lynch empl oyees were aware of t he sour ce of t he f unds Car penter was

t r adi ng.

Car pent er t out ed thi s unf ol di ng i nf or mat i on as bear i ng

on hi s pendi ng mot i ons. See ECF No. 349 at 1, J une 10, 2009

( not i ng t hat t he new i nf or mat i on has " a di r ect bear i ng on

Car pent er ' s pendi ng post - t r i al mot i ons" ) . On Mar ch 19, 2009,

Carpent er f i l ed an emergency mot i on seeki ng, among other t hi ngs, t o

compel t he government t o acqui r e and revi ew t hose new document s.

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Bet ween Mar ch and J ul y, Car pent er f i l ed f i ve r epor t s updat i ng t he

di st r i ct cour t on t he devel opment s i n t he ci vi l l awsui t agai nst

Mer r i l l Lynch, r espondi ng t o the gover nment ' s ar gument s, and

r ei t er at i ng hi s ar gument t hat t he gover nment shoul d be or der ed t o

seek out and r evi ew t he new document s. Thi s i ncl uded a j oi nt

r epor t submi t t ed by t he gover nment and Car pent er , i ndi cat i ng that

t he government had agr eed t o r evi ew t he new i nf ormat i on and repor t

"whet her t he gover nment agr ees t hat a new t r i al or di smi ssal of t he

char ges i s appr opr i at e i n l i ght of t he new evi dence. " ECF No. 352

at 2, J une 26, 2009.

4. Carpenter's Motion for Expedited Hearing (October2009)

On Oct ober 28, 2009, Carpent er moved f or expedi t ed r evi ew

of hi s pendi ng mot i ons, al bei t by f i l i ng a t hi r t y- t hr ee- page mot i on

support ed by over t hr ee hundr ed pages of exhi bi t s. ECF No. 355,

Oct ober 28, 2009. Al t hough t he gover nment had not yet r epor t ed

back on t he new Mer r i l l Lynch i nf or mat i on pur suant t o t he J une 26

agr eement , Car penter ar gued t hat t her e was now mor e than enough

i nf or mat i on avai l abl e f or a r ul i ng on hi s i ni t i al mot i ons f r omJ une

and J ul y 2008. I d. at 29. Car pent er st r essed t hat f i f t een mont hs

had el apsed si nce he f i l ed t hose i ni t i al post - t r i al mot i ons. I d.

at 1- 2, 26, 31- 32.

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5. Additional Delay and Additional Motions (October

2009 September 2011)

By J une 2010, t he di st r i ct cour t had yet t o r ul e,

not wi t hst andi ng Car pent er ' s r enewed expr essi on of concer n about t he

del ay. See ECF No. 360 at 3- 4, J anuar y 13, 2010. I n a J une 17

l et t er , Car pent er sent t he cour t conf l i ct i ng messages: he asked i t

t o deci de t he pendi ng mot i ons f or acqui t t al , mi st r i al , or new

t r i al , but he al so advi sed t he cour t t hat such act i on l i kel y woul d

not be necessary because Carpent er expect ed t he government t o

di smi ss t he i ndi ct ment agai nst hi m. ECF No. 370 at 1, J une 17,

2010 ( "[ I ] t i s our expectat i on t hat , i n l i ght of t hese new

devel opment s, t he Government wi l l move t o di smi ss t he i ndi ct ment

wi t h pr ej udi ce . . . t her eby obvi at i ng t he need f or t he Cour t t o

r esol ve t he mot i ons t hat have been pendi ng f or t wo year s. " ) .

Another hal f - year t hen passed wi t hout t he government

dr oppi ng t he case or t he di st r i ct cour t deci di ng t he mot i ons t hatCar pent er had t ol d t he cour t i t shoul d, but mi ght not need t o,

deci de. I n J anuar y, Febr uar y, and J ul y 2011, Car pent er submi t t ed

t hr ee mor e l et t er s pr ovi di ng suppl ement al aut hor i t y or new

i nf or mat i on, each of whi ch al so i ncl uded a r equest f or r ul i ngs on

t he mot i ons. The t hi r d updat e al so r equest ed a st at us conf er ence,

not i ng t hat i t had now been t hr ee year s si nce t he t r i al , "ever y day

of whi ch i s al one puni shment . " ECF No. 375 at 8, J ul y 14, 2011.

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C. Second Grant of New Trial and Appeal (September 1, 2011)

On Sept ember 1, 2011- - more t han t hree years af t er

Car pent er ' s i ni t i al mot i on f or a new t r i al af t er hi s second

convi ct i on i n J ul y 2008- - t he di st r i ct cour t gr ant ed Car pent er ' s

mot i on f or a new t r i al . Car pent er , 808 F. Supp. 2d at 386. The

cour t deni ed Car pent er ' s mot i on f or acqui t t al and ot her r el at ed

mot i ons. I d. The government appeal ed ( No. 11- 2131) , and Carpent er

f i l ed an appeal of hi s own ( No. 11- 2133) , whi ch he l at er moved t o

consol i dat e wi t h t he f i r st appeal .

I n Mar ch 2012, whi l e bot h t hese appeal s wer e st i l l

pendi ng, Car pent er f i l ed a mot i on i n di st r i ct cour t t o di smi ss hi s

i ndi ct ment f or vi ol at i ng hi s Si xth Amendment r i ght t o a speedy

t r i al . The di st r i ct cour t deni ed t he mot i on on j ur i sdi ct i onal

gr ounds, ci t i ng t he pendi ng appeal s. Car pent er t hen moved f or t hi s

cour t t o r emand t he pendi ng appeal s t o al l ow t he di st r i ct cour t t o

consi der hi s Si xt h Amendment speedy t r i al mot i on. On May 3, 2013,

t hi s cour t deni ed t he mot i on t o r emand, as wel l as t he mot i on t o

consol i dat e the appeal s, and a br i ef i ng schedul e was set .

On May 23, 2013, t he government moved f or a f or t y- f our -

day ext ensi on t o f i l e i t s br i ef on t he gr ounds t hat t he assi st ant

Uni t ed St ates at t orney who had f i l ed t he appeal i n November 2011

was no l onger i n charge of t he case, and the at t orney who had t aken

over needed t i me to revi ew t he ext ensi ve r ecor d whi l e al so managi ng

ot her cases wi t h May and J une deadl i nes. Thi s cour t gr ant ed t he

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or der t hat day. Al so on t hat day, Car pent er moved i n t hi s cour t t o

di smi ss t he i ndi ct ment , ar gui ng t hat t he gover nment had f ai l ed t o

"di l i gent l y pr osecut e[ ] " t he appeal , as r equi r ed by 18 U. S. C.

3731. The basi s f or t hi s cl ai m was t hat t he gover nment had not

moved t o expedi t e i t s appeal dur i ng t he ni neteen mont hs t hat

Car pent er ' s var i ous mot i ons wer e under advi sement , and that i t now

sought an extensi on. Thi s cour t deni ed t he mot i on i n J ul y. The

case pr oceeded through br i ef i ng and was ar gued on November 7, 2013.

On November 25, 2013, t hi s cour t r ever sed t he di st r i ct cour t ' s

gr ant of a t hi r d t r i al and r emanded f or sent enci ng. Car pent er , 736

F. 3d at 632. 5

D. Sentencing (February 2014)

Pr i or t o sent enci ng, Car pent er agai n moved to have the

di st r i ct cour t di smi ss hi s i ndi ctment f or vi ol at i ng t he Si xt h

Amendment ' s speedy t r i al cl ause. 6 The di st r i ct cour t deni ed t he

mot i on. Uni t ed St ates v. Carpent er , No. 04- 10029- GAO, 2014 WL

691659 ( D. Mass. Feb. 21, 2014) . On Febr uary 26, 2014, t he

5 On Sept ember 3, 2013, Car pent er al so f i l ed a cer t i or ar ipet i t i on seeki ng r evi ew of bot h t he di st r i ct cour t ' s deni al ofCar pent er ' s mot i on f or acqui t t al , and t hi s cour t ' s deci si ondi smi ssi ng Car pent er ' s appeal f or l ack of j ur i sdi ct i on. Thatpet i t i on was deni ed. Car pent er v. Uni t ed St at es, 134 S. Ct . 901( 2014) .

6 I n J anuar y, he al so moved f or di smi ssal f or vi ol at i on of t heSpeedy Tr i al Act , r enewi ng the same ar gument he made at t he cl oseof t he second t r i al i n 2008, whi ch t he di st r i ct cour t at t hat t i medeni ed. Uni t ed St at es v. Car pent er , 542 F. Supp. 2d 183 ( D. Mass.2008) . The di st r i ct cour t deni ed t he mot i on i n open cour t onJ anuar y 28, 2014.

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di st r i ct cour t sent enced Car pent er t o t hi r t y- si x mont hs'

i mpr i sonment , t hr ee year s' super vi sed r el ease, and penal t i es;

j udgment was ent er ed Mar ch 4. On May 23, t he di st r i ct cour t al so

gr ant ed t he gover nment ' s mot i on t o or der f or f ei t ur e of over

f our t een mi l l i on dol l ar s.

E. The Current Appeal

I n t hi s appeal , Car pent er ar gues t hat t he di st r i ct cour t

er r ed i n i t s Febr uar y 21, 2014, or der by f ai l i ng t o set asi de hi s

convi ct i on and di smi ss t he i ndi ct ment because t he dur at i on of t he

pr oceedi ngs vi ol at ed hi s Si xth Amendment r i ght t o a speedy t r i al .

He al so chal l enges: t he di st r i ct cour t ' s Apr i l 8, 2008, or der

denyi ng r el i ef under t he Speedy Tr i al Act , Uni t ed St at es v.

Car pent er , 542 F. Supp. 2d 183 ( D. Mass. 2008) ; t he di st r i ct

cour t ' s Sept ember 1, 2011, order denyi ng Car pent er ' s mot i on f or

acqui t t al on t he basi s of suf f i ci ency of t he evi dence, and

( i mpl i ci t l y) denyi ng a new t r i al on t he basi s of newl y di scover ed

Mer r i l l Lynch evi dence, Uni t ed St at es v. Car pent er , 808 F. Supp. 2d

366 ( D. Mass. 2011) ; and t he di st r i ct cour t ' s Mar ch 4, 2014,

sent enci ng or der . 7

7 Car pent er al so i ni t i al l y appeal ed t he May 23 f or f ei t ur eor der , but bot h par t i es now agr ee t hat t hi s or der wi l l be t hesubj ect of a separ at e appeal .

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II. Standard of Review

Our cour t has r epeat edl y r evi ewed di st r i ct cour t r ul i ngs

on Si xth Amendment speedy t r i al mot i ons f or abuse of di scr et i on.

See Uni t ed St at es v. Sal i monu, 182 F. 3d 63, 69 ( 1st Ci r . 1999) ;

Uni t ed St at es v. Sant i ago- Becer r i l , 130 F. 3d 11, 21 ( 1st Ci r .

1997) ; Uni t ed St at es v. Col ombo, 852 F. 2d 19, 21 ( 1st Ci r . 1988) .

Thi s f or mul at i on of t he st andar d var i es f r om t hat used i n most

ot her ci r cui t s, whi ch r evi ew such cl ai ms de novo, al bei t whi l e

appl yi ng cl ear er r or r evi ew t o t he di st r i ct cour t ' s f actual

f i ndi ngs. See, e. g. , Uni t ed St at es v. Lopesi er r a- Gut i er r ez, 708

F. 3d 193, 202 ( D. C. Ci r . 2013) ; Uni t ed St at es v. Vel azquez, 749

F. 3d 161, 174 ( 3d Ci r . 2014) ; Uni t ed St at es v. Bi shop, 629 F. 3d

462, 466 ( 5t h Ci r . 2010) ; Uni t ed St at es v. J ackson, 473 F. 3d 660,

664 ( 6t h Ci r . 2007) ; Uni t ed St at es v. Hi l l s, 618 F. 3d 619, 629 ( 7t h

Ci r . 2010) ; Uni t ed St ates v. Summage, 575 F. 3d 864, 875 ( 8t h Ci r .

2009) ; Uni t ed St at es v. Cor ona- Ver ber a, 509 F. 3d 1105, 1114 ( 9t h

Ci r . 2007) ; Uni t ed St at es v. Lar son, 627 F. 3d 1198, 1207 ( 10t h Ci r .

2010) ; Uni t ed St at es v. Vi l l ar r eal , 613 F. 3d 1344, 1349 ( 11t h Ci r .

2010) . Our f or mul at i on of t he st andar d al so seems i n t ensi on wi t h

both our st andard f or r evi ewi ng mot i ons t o di smi ss under t he Speedy

Tr i al Act i t sel f , see Uni t ed Stat es v. Val di vi a, 680 F. 3d 33, 38

( 1st Ci r . 2012) ( r evi ewi ng deni al of a Speedy Tr i al Act mot i on "de

novo as t o l egal r ul i ngs and f or cl ear er r or as t o f act ual

f i ndi ngs" ) , and mor e si gni f i cant l y, wi t h our r ecent en banc r ul i ng

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t hat t he ul t i mat e quest i on of whet her pr i son of f i ci al s have

vi ol ated t he Ei ght h Amendment i s revi ewed de novo. Kosi l ek v.

Spencer , 774 F. 3d 63, 84 ( 1st Ci r . 2014) ( en banc) . 8 Be t hat as i t

may, t hi s case pr esent s no need t o r esol ve any f i ne quest i ons

r egardi ng the st andard of r evi ew because, even under de novo

r evi ew, our concl usi on woul d r emai n t he same.

We revi ew t he deni al of a Rul e 29 mot i on f or j udgment of

acqui t t al de novo, exami ni ng t he evi dence i n t he l i ght most

f avor abl e t o t he ver di ct . Uni t ed St at es v. Howar d, 687 F. 3d 13, 19

( 1st Ci r . 2012) . We r evi ew t he deni al of a mot i on f or a new t r i al

based on newl y di scovered evi dence f or mani f est abuse of

di scr et i on. Uni t ed St at es v. Wr i ght , 625 F. 2d 1017, 1019 ( 1st Ci r .

1980) . Fi nal l y, we r evi ew sent enci ng deci si ons f or abuse of

di scr et i on, exami ni ng t he di st r i ct cour t ' s f i ndi ngs of f act f or

cl ear er r or and i t s i nt er pr et at i ons of t he sent enci ng gui del i nes de

novo. Uni t ed St at es v. Fl or es- Machi cot e, 706 F. 3d 16, 20 ( 1st Ci r .

2013) .

8 Of cour se, any tensi on i s mi t i gat ed i n par t by the f act t hateven under r evi ew f or abuse of di scr et i on, an er r or i n i dent i f yi ngt he cor r ect l egal st andar d i s by i t s nat ur e an abuse of di scret i on.See Hi ghmar k I nc. v. Al l car e Heal t h Mgmt . Sys. , I nc. , 134 S. Ct .

1744, 1748 n. 2 ( 2014) ( "The abuse- of - di scr et i on st andar d does notpr ecl ude an appel l at e cour t ' s cor r ect i on of a di st r i ct cour t ' sl egal or f actual er r or : ' A di st r i ct cour t woul d necessar i l y abusei t s di scret i on i f i t based i t s r ul i ng on an er r oneous vi ew of t hel aw or on a cl ear l y er r oneous assessment of t he evi dence. ' " )( quot i ng Cooter & Gel l v. Har t mar x Cor p. , 496 U. S. 384, 405( 1990) ) .

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III. Analysis

A. Sixth Amendment Right to a Speedy Trial

I n Barker v. Wi ngo, 407 U. S. 514, 530 (1972) , t he Supr eme

Cour t adopt ed a bal anci ng t est f or assessi ng cl ai ms of a vi ol at i on

of t he Si xth Amendment r i ght t o a speedy t r i al . The t est wei ghs

f our f act or s: t he l engt h of t he del ay, t he r eason f or t he del ay,

t he def endant ' s asser t i on of t he r i ght t o a speedy t r i al , and

whether t he def endant has been pr ej udi ced by t he del ay. I d. The

Cour t expr essl y r ej ected a br i ght - l i ne r ul e i n f avor of a

"f unct i onal anal ysi s of t he r i ght i n t he par t i cul ar cont ext of t he

case. " I d. at 522. I t di d so because t he r emedy- - di smi ssal of t he

i ndi ctment - - was "unsat i sf actor i l y sever e. " I d. ( "The r i ght of a

speedy t r i al i s necessar i l y r el at i ve. I t i s consi st ent wi t h del ays

and depends upon ci r cumst ances. I t secur es r i ght s t o a def endant .

I t does not pr ecl ude t he r i ght s of publ i c j ust i ce. ") ( quot i ng

Beaver s v. Hauber t , 198 U. S. 77, 87 ( 1905) ) .

We begi n our anal ysi s by det er mi ni ng t he l engt h of del ay

at i ssue. I n under t aki ng t hat det er mi nat i on, we consi der and

r ej ect t he government ' s argument t hat t he Si xt h Amendment pl aces no

l i mi t on t he l engt h of post - convi ct i on pr oceedi ngs. We next

cl osel y exami ne the reasons f or t he del ay, t he extent t o whi ch

Car pent er sought gr eat er speed, and t he nat ur e of any pr ej udi ce

caused t o Carpent er by t he del ay.

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1. Length of the Challenged Delay9

The f i r st f act or , l ength of del ay, i s bot h a t r i gger i ng

mechani sm f or t he r est of t he anal ysi s, and a f act or i n t hat

anal ysi s. Uni t ed St at es v. Souza, 749 F. 3d 74, 81 ( 1st Ci r . 2014) .

Whi l e Car pent er ' s br i ef of t en ci t es t he t en year s t hat passed f r om

i ndi ct ment t o sent enci ng, he does not cl ai m t hat t he pace of t he

pr oceedi ngs was undue at al l t i mes. For exampl e, he has no bone t o

pi ck wi t h t he speed wi t h whi ch the case moved f or war d f r om t he

i ndi ct ment i n Sept ember 2004 t o t he end of hi s f i r st t r i al i n J ul y

2005. Nor does he suggest any del ay i n t he di st r i ct cour t t aki ng

f i ve mont hs t o hear and deci de t he mot i ons Car pent er f i l ed i n t he

wake of t hat f i r st t r i al . Cer t ai nl y t he pr oceedi ngs moved apace up

t o December 2005, when t he di st r i ct cour t ent ered orders denyi ng

Car pent er ' s mot i on f or acqui t t al and gr ant i ng hi m a new t r i al .

Car pent er ' s compl ai nt about t he pace of pr oceedi ngs f i nds

i t s f i r st t oehol d wi t h t he gover nment ' s deci si on i n J anuar y 2006 t o

appeal t he di st r i ct cour t ' s gr ant i ng of a new t r i al . That appeal

si det r acked t he case f or j ust over t went y mont hs unt i l t he mandat e

denyi ng t he appeal i ssued i n Sept ember 2007. Second, Carpent er

compl ai ns about t he pace of pr oceedi ngs between t he end of t he

9 We use t he unqual i f i ed wor d "del ay" i n t hi s opi ni on t o r ef ert o t he ent i r e per i od of t i me bet ween t wo event s, r ecogni zi ng t hatonl y unj ust i f i ed del ay t hat f ai l s t he Bar ker bal anci ng t estvi ol ates t he Si xt h Amendment . See Barker , 407 U. S. at 533( anal yzi ng whet her " t he l engt h of del ay bet ween ar r est and t r i al "vi ol ates t he Si xt h Amendment ) .

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second t r i al i n J une 2008 and t he ent r y, i n Sept ember 2011, of t he

di st r i ct cour t ' s or der set t i ng asi de t he second j ur y' s ver di ct and

or der i ng a t hi r d t r i al . Fi nal l y, Car pent er compl ai ns about t he

t went y- si x mont hs consumed by t he government ' s successf ul appeal of

t he or der set t i ng asi de t he second j ur y ver di ct .

The gover nment concedes t he f or egoi ng cal cul at i ons of

del ay. I t ar gues, however , t hat t he l at t er t wo t i me per i ods shoul d

pl ay no rol e i n our Si xt h Amendment anal ysi s because t hey post -

dat ed t he J une 2008 gui l t y ver di ct t hat our cour t ul t i mat el y

sust ai ned. Descr i bi ng t hi s passage of t i me as, at wor st , a del ay

i n sent enci ng, t he gover nment ur ges t hi s cour t t o f ol l ow t he Second

Ci r cui t i n Uni t ed St at es v. Ray, 578 F. 3d 184, 198- 99 ( 2d Ci r .

2009) . I n t hat case, t he cour t opi ned t hat " t he har ms ar i si ng f r om

del ayed sent enci ng . . . ar e qui t e di f f er ent f r om t hose ani mat i ng

t he Speedy Tr i al Cl ause. " I d. at 198. The cour t concl uded t hat

t he Const i t ut i on pr ot ect s def endant s f r omsent enci ng del ay t hr ough

t he Fi f t h Amendment , not t he Si xth. I d. at 199.

We decl i ne t o adopt t hat concl usi on. Al t hough nei t her

t he Supr eme Cour t nor t hi s ci r cui t has hel d t hat t he Si xth

Amendment appl i es t o post - convi ct i on del ay, bot h have assumed so

ar guendo. See Pol l ar d v. Uni t ed St at es, 352 U. S. 354, 361 ( 1957) ;

Uni t ed St at es v. Nel son- Rodr guez, 319 F. 3d 12, 60 ( 1st Ci r . 2003)

( not i ng t hat most ci r cui t s t hat had consi der ed t he i ssue had ei t her

hel d or assumed t he same) . I t i s no doubt t r ue t hat t he concer ns

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ar i si ng f r ompr e- t r i al del ay- - when a per son pr esumed t o be i nnocent

st ands under t he shadow of accusat i on- - ar e not i dent i cal t o t hose

ar i si ng f r ompost - convi ct i on del ay. The di f f er ence, t hough, i s not

qui t e as gr eat as i t may seem, gi ven t hat a gui l t y ver di ct i s not

yet f i nal unt i l appeal s ar e exhaust ed. Mor eover , our Si xt h

Amendment anal ysi s i t sel f r ecogni zes t he di f f er ence i n t he pr e- and

post - ver di ct t i me f r ames, i n t hat t he r equi r ed bal anci ng of

i nt er est s i ncl udes an assessment of t he extent t o whi ch del ay

causes pr ej udi ce. Thus, we see no r eason t o depar t f r om t he

maj or i t y vi ew t hat assumes t hat t he Si xt h Amendment al so pr otect s

agai nst post - t r i al del ay.

Havi ng thus r ej ect ed the gover nment ' s at t empt t o exci se

f r om our Si xth Amendment anal ysi s t he f i ve year s t hat passed

bet ween t he second j ur y ver di ct and t he deci si on of t hi s cour t

sust ai ni ng t hat ver di ct , we t ur n our at t ent i on t o aski ng,

i ni t i al l y, whet her any or al l of t he del ays t hat Car pent er

chal l enges ar e suf f i ci ent l y or di nar y so as t o t er mi nat e our Si xt h

Amendment anal ysi s. "Unt i l t her e i s some del ay whi ch i s

pr esumpt i vel y pr ej udi ci al , t her e i s no necessi t y f or i nqui r y i nt o

t he ot her f act or s . . . . " Bar ker , 407 U. S. at 530. I n so doi ng,

we accept Car pent er ' s posi t i on t hat " [ e] ach of t hese per i ods shoul d

be assessed separ atel y. " At t he same t i me, we al so consi der any

act ual del ay cumul at i vel y.

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We need not t ar r y i n maki ng t hi s i ni t i al i nqui r y. Del ay

of ar ound one year i s consi der ed pr esumpt i vel y pr ej udi ci al , and t he

pr esumpt i on t hat del ay pr ej udi ces t he def endant " i nt ensi f i es over

t i me. " Dogget t v. Uni t ed St at es, 505 U. S. 647, 652 and n. 1

( 1992) . Gi ven t hat t he per i ods of t i me her e each wel l exceed one

year , and cumul at i vel y exceed si x year s, we t hi nk i t pr act i cal t o

pr oceed t o exami ni ng t he reasons f or t hat del ay.

2. Reason for Delay

The second Bar ker prong, t he r eason f or del ay, i s "of t en

consi der ed t he f ocal i nqui r y. " Uni t ed St at es v. Tr ueber , 238 F. 3d

79, 88 ( 1st Ci r . 2001) . As di scussed above, Car pent er chal l enges

t hr ee per i ods of del ay: ( 1) t he t went y mont hs occupi ed by t he

gover nment ' s f ai l ed appeal af t er t he f i r st gr ant of a new t r i al i n

December 2005; ( 2) t hi r t y- f our mont hs of t he r oughl y thr ee year s i t

t ook the di st r i ct cour t t o r ul e on Car pent er ' s mot i on f or acqui t t al

or new t r i al af t er hi s second convi ct i on i n J une 2008, and ( 3) t he

t went y- si x mont hs consumed by t he government ' s second, successf ul

appeal of t he di st r i ct cour t ' s gr ant of a new t r i al i n Sept ember

2011. We now consi der each i n t urn.

a. The Government's First Appeal

Car pent er f i r st ar gues t hat t he t i me consumed by t he

f i r st appeal const i t ut es unwar r ant ed del ay because t he gover nment ' s

posi t i on on appeal was weak. I n general , del ay caused by

i nt er l ocut or y r evi ew does not cut agai nst t he gover nment . Uni t ed

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St ates v. Loud Hawk, 474 U. S. 302, 312- 15 ( 1986) ( "Gi ven t he

i mpor t ant publ i c i nt er est s i n appel l at e r evi ew . . . i t har dl y need

be sai d t hat an i nt er l ocut or y appeal by t he Gover nment or di nar i l y

i s a val i d r eason t hat j ust i f i es del ay. ") ( i nt er nal ci t at i on

omi t t ed) . The Loud Hawk cour t noted, however , t hat a " t angent i al

or f r i vol ous" appeal woul d wei gh heavi l y agai nst t he gover nment , so

cour t s shoul d consi der t he st r engt h of t he gover nment ' s posi t i on on

t he appeal ed i ssue, t he i mpor t ance of t he i ssue t o t he case, and

( i n some cases) t he ser i ousness of t he cr i me t o determi ne whether

an appeal shoul d cut agai nst t he gover nment . I d. at 315.

These f act or s al l cut st r ongl y agai nst concl udi ng t hat

t he t i me consumed by the f i r st appeal const i t ut ed unj ust i f i ed

del ay. The government ' s cl osi ng comment s t hat l ed t o t he gr ant of

a new t r i al di d not even el i ci t a cont empor aneous obj ect i on f r om

def ense counsel or rebuf f f r om t he cour t i t sel f . Whi l e t he

di st r i ct cour t i n i t s di scr et i on concl uded t hat t he comment s wer e

suf f i ci ent l y pr ej udi ci al as t o r equi r e a new t r i al , t hat same

cour t , i n i t s Febr uar y 2014 or der r ej ect i ng Car pent er ' s speedy

t r i al mot i on, descr i bed t he gover nment ' s appeal of t hat gr ant of a

new t r i al t o be " l egi t i mat e and j ust i f i abl e. " Car pent er , 2014 WL

691659 at *2. Most notabl y, t he panel hear i ng t he appeal was

spl i t , wi t h one j udge f i ndi ng persuasi ve t he gover nment ' s argument

t hat t he di st r i ct cour t er r ed i n appl yi ng t oo st r i ct a st andar d i n

assessi ng t he i mpact of cl osi ng comment s t hat f ai l ed t o dr aw a

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cont empor aneous obj ect i on. Uni t ed St ates v. Car pent er , 494 F. 3d

13, 29 ( 1st Ci r . 2007) ( Campbel l , J . , di ssent i ng) . However one

def i nes t he cat egor y of r easonabl y st r ong appeal s, i t l i kel y

i ncl udes an appeal t hat gar ner ed an act ual vot e by a ci r cui t cour t

j udge i n f avor of t he appeal .

The appeal ed or der had set asi de a j ury ver di ct

convi ct i ng Car pent er of ver y ser i ous char ges. A successf ul appeal

woul d have ended ( i . e. , al so shor t ened) t he case. Focusi ng hi s

argument on t he f act t hat t he government chose t o appeal at al l ,

Car pent er ot her wi se rai ses no obj ect i on t o t he dur at i on of t he

appeal . We t her ef or e r ej ect hi s cont ent i on t hat t he t i me consumed

by the appeal const i t ut ed unj ust i f i ed del ay of any t ype r el evant t o

our anal ysi s.

b. The Government's Second Appeal

As f or t he gover nment ' s appeal of t he second gr ant of a

new t r i al i n Sept ember 2011, Carpent er cannot argue t hat t he

gover nment ' s posi t i on, whi ch act ual l y pr evai l ed, was weak. He

ar gues i nst ead t hat t he appeal t ook t oo l ong- - t went y- si x mont hs i n

t ot al - - because t he gover nment f ai l ed t o di l i gent l y pr osecut e t he

appeal . Ni neteen mont hs el apsed between t he government ' s f i l i ng of

a second not i ce of appeal i n Sept ember 2011 and when a br i ef i ng

schedul e was set i n May 2013. Car pent er al so poi nt s t o t he

gover nment ' s successf ul mot i on, af t er t he br i ef i ng schedul e was

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set , f or a f or t y- f our - day ext ensi on t o al l ow new counsel t o

f ami l i ar i ze her sel f wi t h t he r ecor d.

The unusual passage of ni net een mont hs bet ween t he f i l i ng

of t he appeal and t he set t i ng of a br i ef i ng schedul e was not ,

however , due t o any f aul t of t he gover nment . Rat her , i t was

Carpent er ' s own cr oss- appeal and r el ated mot i ons t hat sl owed down

t he government ' s appeal . As di scussed above, af t er t he government

f i l ed i t s not i ce of appeal on Sept ember 27, 2011, Car pent er on

Sept ember 29 f i l ed hi s own not i ce of appeal , whi ch chal l enged t he

deni al of hi s mot i ons f or acqui t t al and mi st r i al . On November 7,

2011, he moved t o consol i date t hat appeal wi t h t he government ' s

appeal . I n Mar ch 2012, he al so moved i n t he di st r i ct cour t t o

di smi ss the i ndi ct ment on Si xt h Amendment grounds. When t he

di st r i ct cour t i n May 2012 deni ed t hat mot i on, ci t i ng t he pendi ng

appeal s, Carpent er moved f or t hi s cour t t o r emand t he case t o t he

di st r i ct cour t t o r ul e on t he Si xth Amendment speedy t r i al mot i on.

We deni ed t hi s mot i on i n May 2013, and al so di smi ssed Carpent er ' s

cross- appeal f or l ack of j ur i sdi cti on. 10 At t hat poi nt , wi t h

Car pent er ' s own pr edi cat e mot i ons r esol ved i n due cour se, a

br i ef i ng schedul e f or t he gover nment ' s appeal was set .

10 The cour t det er mi ned t hat t he order s f r om whi ch Car pent erappeal ed wer e not appeal abl e col l at er al or der s. As ment i onedabove, Car pent er ' s pet i t i on f or cer t i or ar i chal l engi ng t hi sdet er mi nat i on was deni ed. Carpent er , 134 S. Ct . at 901.

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Car pent er i s corr ect t hat t he gover nment ' s r equest f or an

extensi on t hen sl owed t hi ngs down by f or t y- f our days, but t he f act

t hat t hi s extensi on was war r ant ed i s evi denced by t hi s cour t ' s

gr ant i ng t he government ' s mot i on f or an ext ensi on and denyi ng

Car pent er ' s mot i on t o di smi ss f or l ack of di l i gent pr osecut i on.

Wi t h t hat f i nal mot i on r esol ved, t he case pr oceeded apace t o

argument on November 7, 2013, and a deci si on r eversi ng t he di st r i ct

cour t ' s gr ant of a new t r i al on November 25, 2013. Car pent er , 736

F. 3d at 632.

Car pent er ci t es no aut hor i t y t o suggest t hat t he

gover nment shoul d have sought expedi t ed br i ef i ng, much l ess t hat i t

shoul d have done so whi l e Carpenter ' s own mot i on t o r emand was

pendi ng. Yet anot her mot i on i n a mot i on- l aden case coul d har dl y

have hel ped t he goal of swi f t r esol ut i on. We t her ef or e agr ee wi t h

t he gover nment t hat t he di st r i ct cour t di d not abuse i t s di scr et i on

i n determi ni ng that t he second appeal occasi oned no unwarr ant ed

del ay i n t he concl usi on of t he case.

c. The Time Between the Second Verdict and the

Second New Trial Order

As t he di st r i ct cour t i t sel f r ecogni zed, see Car pent er ,

2014 WL 691659 at *2, Carpent er ' s ar gument acqui r es some t r act i on

when we tur n t o the roughl y t hi r t y- ei ght mont hs t hat passed between

t he end of t he second t r i al i n J une 2008 and t he di st r i ct cour t ' s

gr ant i ng Car pent er ' s mot i on f or a second new t r i al i n Sept ember

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2011. 11 A por t i on of t hat t i me passed i n what can f ai r l y be

descr i bed as nor mal cour se. The par t i es agr eed t o a schedul e f or

post - t r i al br i ef s, a hear i ng was set f or Oct ober and t hen post poned

t o December 3, 2008, based on r equest s by both par t i es and wi t hout

obj ect i on. Had not hi ng el se been at i ssue, nor anythi ng el se

f i l ed, one woul d nor mal l y have expect ed a deci si on on t he

admi t t edl y ext ensi ve and heavi l y br i ef ed mot i ons f or acqui t t al or

new t r i al by t he J une 2009 anni ver sar y of t he t r i al . I nst ead, no

r ul i ng i ssued unt i l Sept ember 2011.

The di st r i ct cour t admi t t ed t hat i t bor e at l east some

r esponsi bi l i t y f or t hi s "r egr et t abl e" del ay, but al so ci t ed

Car pent er ' s many mot i ons as t he mai n cul pr i t . I d. at *2- 3. I t i s

wel l - est abl i shed t hat i t cut s heavi l y agai nst a def endant ' s speedy

t r i al cl ai ms when hi s own mot i ons cont r i but e t o t he del ay. Loud

Hawk, 474 U. S. at 316- 17 ( "Havi ng sought t he ai d of t he j udi ci al

pr ocess and r eal i zi ng t he del i ber at eness t hat a cour t empl oys i n

r eachi ng a deci si on, t he def endant s ar e not now abl e t o cr i t i ci ze

t he ver y pr ocess whi ch t hey so f r equent l y cal l ed upon. " ) ( i nt er nal

quot at i on mar ks omi t t ed) ; Uni t ed St at es v. Wor t hy, 772 F. 3d 42, 49

( 1st Ci r . 2014) ; Uni t ed St at es v. Muoz- Franco, 487 F. 3d 25, 60- 61

( 1st Ci r . 2007) ; Nel son- Rodr guez, 319 F. 3d at 61; Uni t ed St at es v.

11 Car pent er made the new t r i al mot i on i n J ul y 2008, t hi r t y-ei ght mont hs bef ore Sept ember 2011. However , he asks t he cour t t of ocus on onl y t he t hi r t y- f our mont hs bet ween t he hear i ng on t he newt r i al mot i on on December 3, 2008, and t he gr ant i ng of t hat mot i onon September 1, 2011.

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Muoz- Amado, 182 F. 3d 57, 62 ( 1st Ci r . 1999) ; Uni t ed St ates v.

Gi bson, 353 F. 3d 21, 22- 23 ( D. C. Ci r . 2003) .

I n t hi s case, i n addi t i on t o t he numer ous mot i ons t hat

were pendi ng at t he end of t he second t r i al , Carpent er made twent y

f i l i ngs between t he J une 2008 j ur y ver di ct and the December 2008

hear i ng on hi s mot i ons. As descr i bed i n t he f act s sect i on of t hi s

opi ni on, t hese f i l i ngs i ncl uded t wo separ at e set s of mot i ons f or

acqui t t al or new t r i al f i l ed by t wo separ at e l egal t eams and whi ch

advanced numer ous, di st i nct t heor i es of er r or ; t wo addi t i onal

mot i ons f or a new t r i al based on newl y di scover ed evi dence; and

l engt hy r esponses t o t he government ' s responses. Many were ver y

subst ant i al . 12 Pr esumabl y he want ed t he di st r i ct cour t t o r evi ew

t hem al l , and of cour se t he cour t had t o revi ew t he gover nment ' s

r esponses.

Car pent er def ends hi s aval anche of f i l i ngs as j ust i f i ed.

But t hat i s besi de t he poi nt . The f i l i ngs cut agai nst Car pent er i n

our Si xt h Amendment anal ysi s not because t hey were weak or

ot her wi se not j ust i f i ed. Rat her , t hey cut i n t hi s manner because

t hey suppor t t he di st r i ct cour t ' s st at ement t hat t he need t o

consi der t he f i l i ngs r easonabl y consumed t i me.

12 Some of t he mor e l engt hy f i l i ngs i ncl ude t he i ni t i al si xt y-seven- page mot i on f or acqui t t al or new t r i al ; a r esponse t o t hegover nment ' s opposi t i on t o that mot i on, t ot al i ng f or t y- ei ght pageswi t h exhi bi t s; and a r epl y memor andum i n suppor t of hi s mi st r i almot i on t ot al i ng sevent y- si x pages wi t h exhi bi t s.

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Car pent er t hen poi nt s out t hat t he di st r i ct cour t di d not

r el y on t he post - hear i ng f i l i ngs r egar di ng Mer r i l l Lynch when i t

f i nal l y gr ant ed Car pent er a new t r i al i n Sept ember 2011. That i s,

i f t he di st r i ct cour t gr ant ed Car pent er ' s 2008 mot i on wi t hout

r egard t o any of t he ar gument s r ai sed i n subsequent mot i ons, why

di d i t not do so cl oser t o 2008?13 The pr obl emwi t h t hi s argument

i s t hat i t suggest s t he di st r i ct cour t woul d have known at t he

out set t he gr ounds on whi ch i t s deci si on woul d r est . Thi s expect s

t oo much of t he di st r i ct cour t . Car pent er ' s Mer r i l l Lynch mot i ons

began i n March 2009, t hr ee mont hs af t er t he mot i on hear i ng. As he

cont i nued updat i ng t he cour t , he expl i ci t l y st at ed t hat t hi s new

i nf or mat i on had "a di r ect bear i ng" on hi s pendi ng mot i ons. ECF No.

349 at 1, J une 10, 2009. Hi s r egul ar updat es suggest ed a f ast -

changi ng si t uat i on t hat coul d l i kel y l ead t o mor e mot i ons. At

l east i ni t i al l y, t he di str i ct cour t cannot be f aul t ed f or hol di ng

of f on maki ng a r ul i ng whi l e t he i nf or mat i on was st i l l evol vi ng and

Car pent er was i nsi st i ng i t was r el evant .

13 Car pent er al so ar gues i n hi s r epl y br i ef t hat t he di st r i ctcour t coul d not have consi der ed the new evi dence i n pr epar at i on f ort he Sept ember 2011 or der because the di st r i ct cour t st at ed i n t he

December 2008 hear i ng t hat t he government ' s behavi or wi t h r egard t ot hi s evi dence di d not vi ol at e i t s obl i gat i ons under Br ady v.Maryl and, 373 U. S. 83 ( 1963) . However , Carpent er at no t i mesuggest ed t hat he was pr esent i ng t he Mer r i l l Lynch evi dence sol el yas a Br ady cl ai m, and i n f act expl i ci t l y st at ed mul t i pl e t i mes i nhi s 2009 submi ssi ons t hat t hi s i nf or mat i on was r el evant t o hi spendi ng mot i ons f or r et r i al and acqui t t al .

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Thi s ar gument l oses some f or ce over t i me, however ,

par t i cul ar l y af t er t he ci vi l t r i al agai nst Mer r i l l Lynch concl uded

i n J ul y 2009. Al t hough Car pent er cont i nued t o pr ovi de updat es

based on newl y deci ded cases and t he damages phase of t he ci vi l

t r i al , af t er Oct ober 2009 t hey became l ess f r equent , and Car pent er

began pr essi ng t he di st r i ct cour t t o r ul e on hi s mot i ons. See ECF

No. 355 at 1, Oct ober 28, 2009. Gr ant ed, t he unusual l y l arge

number of mot i ons, as wel l as t hei r l engt h, makes i t unsur pr i si ng

t hat t he di st r i ct cour t woul d st i l l need an unusual l y l ong t i me t o

gi ve t hem f ul l consi der at i on. By t he t i me of Car pent er ' s Oct ober

2009 mot i on, however , si xt een mont hs had passed si nce t he end of

t r i al , and Car pent er had f or mal l y moved t he di st r i ct cour t t o make

a deci si on on t he mot i ons t hat had been ar gued i n December 2008.

Once t he anni ver sary of t hat hear i ng had passed, t he reason f or any

cont i nui ng del ay can no l onger be at t r i but ed pr i mar i l y t o

Carpent er .

We theref ore concl ude that t here was an unwarr ant ed del ay

of some t went y- one mont hs i n t he pr ogr ess of t hi s case, f r om

r oughl y December 2009 t o September 1, 2011. 14 Never t hel ess, t he

pr osecut i on pl ayed no r ol e i n t hi s unwar r ant ed del ay. Nor was t he

di st r i ct cour t usi ng del ay i n any host i l e manner . When del ay i s

t he r esul t of negl i gence and not bad f ai t h, i t wei ghs l ess heavi l y

14 Put t i ng a f i ner poi nt on t hi s est i mat e woul d r equi r ecompar at i ve empi r i cal evi dence not r eadi l y avai l abl e and woul d, i nany event , be i r r el evant t o our concl usi ons.

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i n t he bal anci ng cal l ed f or by Bar ker . Bar ker , 407 U. S. at 531 ( "A

del i ber at e at t empt t o del ay t he t r i al i n or der t o hamper t he

def ense shoul d be wei ght ed heavi l y agai nst t he government . A more

neut r al r eason such as negl i gence or overcr owded cour t s shoul d be

wei ght ed l ess heavi l y but never t hel ess shoul d be

consi der ed . . . . ") ; see Sant i ago- Becer r i l , 130 F. 3d at 22.

3. Assertion of the Right

The t hi r d prong i s t he asser t i on of t he speedy t r i al

r i ght , i n par t i cul ar t he "f r equency and f or ce" wi t h whi ch t he

def endant obj ect ed t o del ay. Bar ker , 407 U. S. at 529. Cour t s l ook

wi t h some skept i ci sm at asser t i ons of speedy t r i al r i ght s made by

def endant s who cont r i but e t o t he del ay, and ar e par t i cul ar l y

skept i cal of t hose who r ai se t he i ssue f or t he f i r st t i me i n a

mot i on t o di smi ss. See, e. g. , i d. at 534- 35 ( "Bar ker di d not want

a speedy t r i al . . . . Whi l e he hoped t o t ake advant age of t he del ay

i n whi ch he had acqui esced, and t her eby obt ai n a di smi ssal of t he

char ges, he def i ni t el y di d not want t o be t r i ed. ") ; Sant i ago-

Becer r i l , 130 F. 3d at 22. And l i ke t he ot her f act or s, asser t i on of

t he r i ght i s not i n i t sel f deci si ve. See Muoz- Franco, 487 F. 3d at

60- 61 ( f i ndi ng no vi ol at i on despi t e t he f act t hat t he appel l ant s

t hr ee t i mes r ai sed speedy t r i al obj ect i ons) .

Carpent er ' s f i r st mot i on t o di smi ss on Si xt h Amendment

speedy t r i al gr ounds came i n March 2012, af t er t he government had

appeal ed hi s second gr ant of a new t r i al . However , he began

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pr essi ng f or act i on on hi s pendi ng mot i ons f or acqui t t al or new

t r i al much ear l i er , when he moved f or expedi t ed hear i ng i n Oct ober

2009, and he cont i nued t o st r ess t he del ay i n subsequent f i l i ngs.

Thus, i n our vi ew, t he di st r i ct cour t ' s concl usi on t hat Car penter ' s

asser t i on of t he r i ght had been "spot t y at best , " Car pent er , 2014

WL 691659 at *4, i s not qui t e accur at e, at l east i n t he t i me per i od

f r om l ate 2009 to 2011, when hi s undeci ded mot i on was pendi ng.

Of cour se, on J une 17, 2010, Carpent er i nf ormed t he cour t

t hat t he whol e case mi ght go away, and t hat t he cour t mi ght not

need t o deci de t he post - t r i al mot i ons. I t i s reasonabl e t o t hi nk

t hat a busy t r i al j udge, so i nf or med, mi ght at t end t o ot her mat t er s

r at her t han r e- engagi ng wi t h a vol umi nous set of mot i ons.

Never t hel ess, t hi s does not si gni f i cant l y det r act f r om t he f act

t hat dur i ng t he per i od of unwar r ant ed del ay, Car pent er ot her wi se

st eadi l y pr essed t he di st r i ct cour t f or act i on.

4. Prejudice

The prej udi ce prong seeks t o prot ect t hree i nter est s:

avoi dance of oppr essi ve pr et r i al i ncar cer at i on, mi ni mi zi ng anxi et y

and concer n, and l i mi t i ng t he possi bi l i t y t hat t he def ense wi l l be

i mpai r ed. Dogget t , 505 U. S. at 654 ( quot i ng Bar ker , 407 U. S. at

532) .

A def endant must st r uggl e to sat i sf y t he pr ej udi ce pr ong

af t er convi ct i on, when t wo of t he t hr ee f act or s r el evant t o t he

pr ej udi ce anal ysi s- - excessi ve pr e- t r i al i ncar cer at i on and

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i mpai r ment of an ef f ect i ve def ense- - ar e of l i t t l e or no r el evance.

See Pr ez v. Sul l i van, 793 F. 2d 249, 256 ( 10t h Ci r . 1986) . Thus,

Car pent er cannot ar gue that t hi s del ay extended any pr et r i al

detent i on because t here was none: Carpent er was r el eased on

per sonal r ecogni zance on Febr uar y 24, 2004, t he day of hi s

ar r ai gnment . Car pent er l i kewi se can of f er no evi dence t hat any

del ay pr ej udi ced hi s def ense. I ndeed, a qui cker pace may have

depr i ved hi m of t he basi s f or hi s f or ays concer ni ng t he Mer r i l l

Lynch documents.

Carpent er ' s argument i nst ead f ocuses on t he anxi ety he

suf f er ed t hr oughout t he pr oceedi ngs. Hi s br i ef , suppor t ed by

r ecor d mat er i al s, descri bes a "l i vi ng hel l " of l ost busi ness

oppor t uni t i es, f i nanci al st r ess, sl eepl essness, pani c at t acks, and

t he l i ke. He poi nt s, however , t o no oppor t uni t i es that woul d not

have been l ost as wel l i n t he wake of a speedi er convi ct i on. And

whi l e anxi ety about t he out come of post - convi ct i on mot i ons and

appeal s i s no doubt r eal , anxi et y i s a nor mal par t of t he pendency

of cr i mi nal char ges. I t t her ef or e becomes a si gn of pr ej udi ce onl y

when "undue pr essures" exi st . Muoz- Fr anco, 487 F. 3d at 61

( quot i ng Sant i ago- Becer r i l , 130 F. 3d at 22- 23) .

Whi l e Car pent er ar gues convi nci ngl y t hat he has suf f er ed

gr eat st r ess t hr oughout t he pr oceedi ngs, he does not demonst r at e

why hi s anxi ety was gr eat er t han t hat suf f ered by many ot her

def endant s, ot her t han t hat i t cont i nued l onger . See Uni t ed St at es

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v. Col ombo, 852 F. 2d 19, 26 ( 1st Ci r . 1988) ( not i ng t hat " [ t ] he

passage of t i me al one . . . i s not concl usi ve evi dence of

pr ej udi ce") . Whi l e i t may be possi bl e t hat post - convi ct i on del ay

coul d r esul t i n pr ej udi ce by shi f t i ng t he t i me per i od i n whi ch a

def endant serves hi s sent ence, Carpenter makes no such argument

here. I n sum, whi l e t he l engt h of del ay causes us t o pr esume some

pr ej udi ce, we f i nd not hi ng i n t hi s r ecor d t o est abl i sh t hat

Car pent er suf f er ed a t ype of pr ej udi ce t hat woul d t ake on added

wei ght i n our assessment of t he const i t ut i onal i t y of t hat del ay.

5. Weighing the Factors

Whi l e t he t r avel of t he case as a whol e was r emarkabl e,

i t s l engt h ar ose al most ent i r el y because t he di st r i ct cour t

exer ci sed ( and exceeded i n one i nst ance) i t s di scr et i on i n gr ant i ng

Car pent er r el i ef f r omver di ct s agai nst hi m. I n t he end, we have an

unj ust i f i ed del ay of r oughl y t went y- one mont hs, whi ch occur r ed

af t er a gui l t y ver di ct was r et ur ned and wi t hout any meani ngf ul

f aul t of t he gover nment . Whi l e t he del ay was unf or t unat e, i t di d

not i mpai r t he def ense, cr eat e any undue pr essure, or r esul t i n any

per i od of i ncar cer at i on.

Car pent er poi nt s t o no pr ecedent f or set t i ng asi de a

gui l t y ver di ct i n such ci r cumst ances, nor ar e we awar e of any.

Rat her , pr ecedent poi nt s ot her wi se. I n Kat z v. Ki ng, 627 F. 2d 568

( 1st Ci r . 1980) , we r ej ect ed a cl ai m t hat a f our - mont h del ay

bet ween t he compl et i on of t r i al and t he ent r y of t he ver di ct

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vi ol at ed t he def endant ' s r i ght t o a speedy t r i al . I n so doi ng, we

not ed t hat ot her cour t s have " f ound del ays i n sent enci ng of up t o

t went y- ni ne mont hs not t o be excessi ve. " I d. at 576 ( ci t i ng Uni t ed

St at es v. Campi si , 583 F. 2d 692, 694 n. 5 ( 3d Ci r . 1978) . We al so

r ej ect ed a chal l enge t o a f our t een- mont h del ay between convi ct i on

and sent enci ng, r el yi ng "most i mpor t ant l y" on t he di mi ni shed

possi bi l i t y of pr ej udi ce i n t he post - convi ct i on t i me f r ame.

Nel son- Rodr guez, 319 F. 3d at 61 ( " [ T]he cour t s have gr eat

r el uct ance t o f i nd a speedy t r i al depr i vat i on wher e t her e i s no

subst ant i al and demonst r abl e pr ej udi ce. " ) ; cf . Wor t hy, 772 F. 3d at

49- 50 ( af f i r mi ng t he di st r i ct cour t ' s r ej ecti on of a Si xt h

Amendment cl ai m based on a twent y- t hr ee- mont h pr e- t r i al del ay i n

l i ght of t he "compl exi t y of t he case, [ t he def endant ' s] own

r esponsi bi l i t y f or and acqui escence i n t he del ay, and t he absence

of any cogni zabl e pr ej udi ce") .

Whi l e each case must be eval uat ed i n the cont ext of i t s

own ci r cumst ances, see Barker , 407 U. S. at 533, t he compl et e l ack

of any pr ecedent f or t hr owi ng out a gui l t y ver di ct when t he

def endant has not demonst r ated pr ej udi ce (beyond t he consi derabl e

anxi et y f el t by many cr i mi nal def endant s post - convi ct i on) st r ongl y

suppor t s our own concl usi on t hat , under Bar ker , Car pent er ' s Si xth

Amendment r i ght s have not been vi ol at ed. We do not r ej ect t he

not i on t hat post - convi ct i on del ay mi ght gi ve r i se to a r emedy,

per haps on mandamus r evi ew ( whi ch Carpenter never sought ) . Cf .

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Dol an v. Uni t ed St at es, 560 U. S. 605, 616- 17 ( 2010) ( i ndi cat i ng

t hat mandamus coul d be used t o compel a di st r i ct cour t t o hast en a

r ul i ng under cer t ai n r ar e ci r cumst ances) . However , t he r el i ef

Car pent er seeks- - di smi ssal of t he i ndi ct ment f or whi ch he has t wi ce

been f ound gui l t y- - i s unwar r ant ed her e.

B. Speedy Trial Act

Car pent er next makes a mor e t echni cal , st at ut ory ver si on

of a speedy t r i al cl ai m. He ar gues that t he di st r i ct cour t er r ed

i n i t s Apr i l 8, 2008, or der by not di smi ssi ng t he i ndi ct ment f or

pur por t edl y vi ol at i ng t he Speedy Tr i al Act , 18 U. S. C. 3161- 3174,

dur i ng t he per i od of t i me bet ween t he di st r i ct cour t ' s f i r st gr ant

of a new t r i al on December 15, 2005, and set t i ng t he dat e f or t hat

t r i al on November 26, 2007. Uni t ed St at es v. Car pent er , 542 F.

Supp. 2d 183, 183- 85 ( D. Mass. 2008) . Thi s ci r cui t r evi ews a

deni al of a st at ut or y speedy t r i al cl ai m de novo as t o l egal

r ul i ngs, and f or cl ear err or as t o f act ual f i ndi ngs. Uni t ed St at es

v. Val di vi a, 680 F. 3d 33, 38 ( 1st Ci r . 2012) .

The Speedy Tr i al Act i mposes a sevent y- day deadl i ne on

br i ngi ng a def endant t o t r i al , whi ch nor mal l y runs f r om t he l at er

of t he f i l i ng of t he i nf or mat i on or i ndi ctment , or t he f i r st

appear ance of t he def endant . See 18 U. S. C. 3161( c) ( 1) . However ,

a speci f i c pr ovi si on cover s r et r i al s: sect i on 3161( e) pr ovi des

t hat i f t he def endant i s t o be t r i ed agai n " f ol l owi ng a decl ar at i on

by t he t r i al j udge of a mi st r i al or f ol l owi ng an or der of such

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j udge f or a new t r i al , " or " f ol l owi ng an appeal or a col l at er al

at t ack, " t hat new t r i al must commence wi t hi n sevent y days " f r omt he

dat e t he act i on occasi oni ng t he r et r i al becomes f i nal . " I d.

3161( e) . I n addi t i on, sect i on 3161( h) pr ovi des a l i st of ei ght

ki nds of del ay that "shal l be excl uded . . . i n comput i ng t he t i me

wi t hi n whi ch t he t r i al of any such of f ense must commence. " Thi s

l i st i ncl udes "del ay r esul t i ng f r omany i nt er l ocut or y appeal . " I d.

3161( h) ( 1) ( C) .

I n Car pent er ' s case, t he di st r i ct cour t or der ed a new

t r i al on December 15, 2005. The government appeal ed t hi r t een days

l at er on J anuar y 9, 2006. Af t er t hi s cour t af f i r med t he new t r i al

or der , f i f t y- ei ght mor e days el apsed bef or e the st at us conf er ence

i n whi ch t he di st r i ct cour t set a new t r i al dat e and gr ant ed a so-

cal l ed "ends- of - j ust i ce" cont i nuance unt i l t hat dat e, as i s al l owed

by 18 U. S. C. 3161( h) ( 7) ( A) . Fromt hi s t i mel i ne, Car pent er makes

t wo ar gument s f or why t he government vi ol ated t he Speedy Tr i al Act .

1. When the "Action Occasioning Retrial" Becomes Final

The part i es' f i r st di sagr eement concer ns when, under

sect i on 3161( e) , t he "act i on occasi oni ng r et r i al becomes f i nal " and

t he sevent y- day cl ock begi ns t o r un i n a case wher e t he di st r i ct

cour t set asi de a ver di ct and or der ed a new t r i al , t he pr osecut i on

appeal ed t hat or der , and t he appel l at e cour t conf i r med t he or der .

Car pent er ar gues t hat t he cl ock began t o r un upon t he di st r i ct

cour t ' s new t r i al or der ; t he gover nment count s f r om t he dat e on

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whi ch t he cour t of appeal s' mandat e i ssued. Under Car pent er ' s

vi ew, t he t hi r t een pr e- appeal days added t o t he f i f t y- ei ght post -

appeal days exceed by one day t he sevent y- day l i mi t .

Nei t her t he Supr eme Cour t nor our ci r cui t has i nt er pr et ed

t he phr ase "t he dat e t he act i on occasi oni ng t he ret r i al becomes

f i nal " as appl i ed t o a di st r i ct cour t ' s ret r i al or der t hat i s

af f i r med on appeal . Her e, t hough, we r equi r e no pr ecedent t o

answer t he quest i on posed. Rat her , we l ook t o t he st at ut or y

l anguage, whi ch we read as pl ai nl y pr ovi di ng t hat t he sevent y days

st ar t s when t he appel l at e mandat e af f i r mi ng t he di st r i ct cour t

or der i ssues, 15 t her eby r ender i ng t hat or der f i nal . We r ead t he

l anguage i n t hi s manner pr i mar i l y because t her e i s no r eason t o

have used t he t er m "becomes f i nal " i f t he dr af t er s act ual l y meant

t he date t he chal l enged order was ent ered.

Car pent er ' s argument t o t he cont r ar y t ur ns on sect i on

3161( h) ( 1) ( C) , whi ch pr ovi des t hat t he t i me f or "any" i nt er l ocut or y

appeal i s "excl uded" f r omSpeedy Tr i al Act cal cul at i ons. Car pent er

ar gues t hat because thi s l at t er pr ovi si on cover s " any"

i nt er l ocut or y appeal , Congr ess i nt ended t o account f or an appeal

af t er a new t r i al or der by "excl udi ng" t he t i me of t he appeal f r om

t he sevent y days t hat began t o r un on t he dat e of t he di st r i ct

15 An appeal ends f or Speedy Tr i al Act pur poses when t hemandat e i ssues. Uni t ed St at es v. Rush, 738 F. 2d 497, 509 ( 1st Ci r .1984) .

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cour t or der , and not by post poni ng t he begi nni ng of t he sevent y- day

per i od unt i l t he cour t of appeal s af f i r ms t he or der .

Car pent er ' s ar gument f aces an uphi l l bat t l e, gi ven t hat

t he t ext of sect i on 3161( h) ( 1) ( C) does not addr ess t he quest i on of

when t he sevent y- day cl ock begi ns t o r un. The st r ongest argument

i n suppor t of Car pent er ' s posi t i on ( al bei t one t hat Car pent er

di dn' t make) i s t hat sect i on 3161( e) cont ai ns a pr ovi si on t hat

" [ t ] he per i ods of del ay enumer at ed i n sect i on 3161( h) ar e excl uded

i n comput i ng t he t i me l i mi t at i ons speci f i ed i n t hi s sect i on. " I f

t he sevent y- day cl ock doesn' t even st ar t r unni ng unt i l t he

concl usi on of t he appeal , why i ncor por at e t he excl usi on f or

i nt er l ocut or y appeal s under sect i on 3161( h) ( 1) ( C) ?

The answer i s t hat our r eadi ng of sect i on 3161( e) does

not r ender ent i r el y unnecessar y t he need t o have a t ol l i ng per i od

f or i nt er l ocut or y appeal s i n cases wher e new t r i al or der s ar e

af f i r med on appeal . I t i s ent i r el y possi bl e f or an appeal s cour t

t o af f i r ma new t r i al or der , t r i gger i ng t he sevent y- day cl ock under

sect i on 3161( e) , and f or a par t y t o f i l e a di f f er ent i nt er l ocut or y

appeal bef or e t he sevent y days expi r es. I n t hat case, t he sevent y

days woul d st ar t when t he r et r i al or der became f i nal - - ei t her when

i t was ent ered f or cases t hat ar e not appeal ed, or when t he

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appel l at e cour t ' s mandat e i ssued f or cases t hat ar e- - and woul d be

t ol l ed f or t he dur at i on of any subsequent appeal . 16

Thi s pl ai n r eadi ng of sect i on 3161( e) i s suppor t ed by

Congr ess' use of i dent i cal l anguage i n sect i on 3161( d) ( 2) . That

sect i on addr esses t he scenar i o i n whi ch a di st r i ct cour t di smi sses

an i ndi ct ment , but an appeal s cour t causes i t t o be r ei nst at ed. I n

such a case, t he onl y possi bl e candi dat e f or t he "act i on

occasi oni ng r et r i al " i s t he act i on of t he appeal s cour t . Yet

sect i on 3161( d) ( 2) al so i ncl udes a st at ement t hat " t he per i ods of

del ay enumer at ed i n sect i on 3161( h) ar e excl uded. " Cl ear l y, t hat

i ncor por at i on of sect i on 3161( h) i n sect i on 3161( d) ( 2) cannot mean

t hat t he sevent y- day cl ock begi ns t o r un bef or e t he appeal i s

concl uded. The whol esal e i ncor por at i on of sect i on 3161( h) i nt o

sect i on 3161( d) , t hen, si mpl y cover s t he possi bi l i t y t hat some

other i nt er l ocut or y appeal mi ght cause some need t o t ol l t he

16 For exampl e, t he pr osecut i on mi ght appeal f r omt he gr ant i ngof a mot i on t o excl ude bef ore the new t r i al commences, or adef endant mi ght appeal t he deni al of a doubl e j eopardy mot i onbef or e the second t r i al , as t he def endant di d i n Uni t ed St at es v.Pi t ner , 307 F. 3d 1178, 1182- 83 ( 9t h Ci r . 2002) .

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r unni ng of t he sevent y days. 17 We r ead i t t o do t he same i n sect i on

3161( e) .

Our i nt er pr et at i on i s al so consi st ent wi t h t he Gui del i nes

t o t he Admi ni st r at i on of t he Speedy Tr i al Act , As Amended, i ssued

by a Uni t ed St at es J udi ci al Conf er ence commi t t ee. 106 F. R. D. 271,

282 ( 1984) ( "[ I ] f an appeal or pet i t i on f or cer t i or ar i i s f i l ed,

t he act i on occasi oni ng t he r et r i al shoul d not be consi der ed f i nal

unt i l t he appeal or pet i t i on has been di sposed of . " ) The

gover nment al so poi nt s t o l egi sl at i ve hi st or y t endi ng t o suggest

t hat t he "becomes f i nal " l anguage was added t o cl ar i f y t hat t he

sevent y days wer e t r i gger ed by the concl usi on of any appeal s. See

Ant hony Par t r i dge, Legi sl at i ve Hi st or y of Ti t l e I of t he Speedy

Tr i al Act of 1974 80- 82 ( Fed. J udi ci al Cent er 1980) .

The ci r cui t cour t opi ni ons Car penter ci t es as suppor t f or

hi s r eadi ng ar e not t o t he cont r ar y, despi t e l anguage seemi ng t o

suggest ot her wi se. See Uni t ed St at es v. Pi t ner , 307 F. 3d 1178,

1182- 83 ( 9t h Ci r . 2002) ( "i nt er l ocut or y appeal s i nt er r upt t he

sevent y day per i od; t hey do not st ar t i t r unni ng") ( i nt er nal

quot at i on mar ks omi t t ed) ; Uni t ed St at es v. Ri ver a, 844 F. 2d 916,

17 Gr ant ed, an appeal cover ed by sect i on 3161( d) i s a di r ectappeal , and t hus sect i on 3161( h) ( 1) ( C) does not pose pr eci sel y t he

same quest i on of apparent r edundancy as an i nt er l ocut ory appeal ofa new t r i al or der under sect i on 3161( e) . Never t hel ess, i t st i l ldemonst r ates how sect i on 3161( h) ( 1) ( C) pl ays an i mpor t ant r ol e i nt he st at ut or y f r amewor k unr el at ed t o the quest i on of when t he cl ockbegi ns t o r un, whi ch suggest s Congr ess di d not i nt end i t t oobl i quel y def i ne t he st ar t i ng poi nt of t he sevent y- day cl ock i n ar et r i al case under sect i on 3161( e) .

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919 ( 2d Ci r . 1988) . 18 ( "[ T] he 70- day per i od . . . st ar t ed . . .

when t he mi st r i al was decl ar ed, and t he speedy t r i al cl ock r esumed

on t he dat e t he excl usi on al l owed f or an i nt er l ocut or y appeal . . .

ended. " ) I n bot h cases, t he act ual i ssue concer ned an

i nt er l ocut or y appeal of an or der ot her t han t he mi st r i al or der s

t hat made a new t r i al necessary. I n Ri ver a, t her e was act ual l y no

di sput e- - or mat er i al i ssue- - concer ni ng when t he sevent y- day cl ock

st ar t ed t o r un. Ri ver a, 844 F. 2d at 919- 22. I n Pi t ner , t her e was

such a di sput e, but we woul d have r eached the same r esul t under our

r eadi ng of sect i on 3161( e) . Ther e, t he di st r i ct cour t decl ar ed a

mi st r i al because the j ur y was deadl ocked, and t he pr osecut i on di d

not ( and l i kel y coul d not ) appeal . Pi t ner , 307 F. 3d at 1180. The

"act i on occasi oni ng t he r et r i al " was t hus t he mi st r i al or der , t he

f i nal i t y of whi ch was never del ayed or suspended. Mont hs l at er ,

t he def endant appeal ed f r om t he deni al of a mot i on t o di smi ss on

doubl e j eopar dy gr ounds. J ust as we woul d, t he Ni nt h Ci r cui t hel d

t hat t he t i me taken by t hat i nt er l ocut or y appeal was s i mpl y t o be

excl uded i n cal cul at i ng t he sevent y days t hat began r unni ng when

t he mi st r i al was decl ar ed. I d. at 1182. To t he ext ent t he cour t

18 Car pent er al so ci t es t o Uni t ed St at es v. Gi nyar d, 572 F.Supp. 2d 30, 36 ( D. D. C. 2008) , f or t he sent ence "an i nt er l ocut or yappeal i nt er r upt s, but does not r est ar t t he runni ng of t he cl ock. "The i ssue i n Gi nyar d- - was whet her an ext ensi on provi si on i n sect i on3161( e) appl i es r et r oact i vel y- - i s even f ur t her r emoved f r om t hequest i on her e.

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expl ai ned t hat hol di ng i n t er ms t hat went beyond t he f act s

pr esent ed, we di sagr ee f or t he reasons st at ed above.

For t hese reasons, we have l i t t l e t r oubl e concl udi ng t hat

when a par t y appeal s a di st r i ct cour t or der gr ant i ng a new t r i al ,

t he act i on occasi oni ng t he ret r i al becomes f i nal when t he mandat e

of t he appel l at e cour t i ssues. Her e, t hat happened when t hi s

ci r cui t uphel d t he gr ant of a new t r i al f i f t y- ei ght days bef or e t he

di st r i ct cour t set a new t r i al dat e and gr ant ed an ends- of - j ust i ce

cont i nuance f or t he t i me bef or e t r i al .

2. The Sufficiency of the Ends-of-Justice Findings

Car pent er next ar gues t hat t he di st r i ct cour t ' s November

28, 2007, ends- of - j ust i ce cont i nuance, whi ch excl uded f r om Speedy

Tr i al Act cal cul at i ons al l t i me bet ween t he st at us conf er ence

set t i ng t he t r i al dat e and t he commencement of t r i al , was i nval i d

because the di st r i ct cour t di d not at t he t i me make speci f i c

f i ndi ngs i n t he recor d as t o why i t was grant i ng t he cont i nuance,

as requi r ed by 18 U. S. C. 3161( h) ( 7) ( A) . Thi s pr ovi si on al l ows

t he di st r i ct cour t t o gr ant a cont i nuance on t he basi s of f i ndi ngs

t hat " t he ends of j ust i ce served by t aki ng such act i on out wei gh t he

best i nt er est of t he publ i c and t he def endant i n a speedy t r i al . "

I d. I t f ur t her pr ovi des t hat del ay r esul t i ng i n t he cont i nuance i s

not excl udabl e "unl ess t he cour t set s f or t h, i n t he r ecor d of t he

case, ei t her or al l y or i n wr i t i ng, i t s r easons f or f i ndi ng t hat t he

ends of j ust i ce" ar e ser ved i n l i ght of st at ut or y f actor s def i ned

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i n sect i on 3161( h) ( 7) ( B) . 19 I d. 3161( h) ( 7) ( A) . One of t he

f act or s i s whet her f ai l ur e to gr ant a cont i nuance woul d

unr easonabl y deny the def endant t he abi l i t y to obt ai n counsel or

cont i nui t y of counsel , or woul d deny counsel f or ei t her par t y t i me

t o pr epar e. I d. 3161( h) ( 7) ( B) ( i v) .

The Supreme Cour t has emphasi zed t he i mport ance of on-

t he- r ecor d f i ndi ngs, al bei t i n t he cont ext of a case wher e t he

def endant , at t he di st r i ct cour t ' s ur gi ng, wai ved f or al l t i me hi s

speedy t r i al r i ght s, and t he gover nment ar gued t hat t he pr osecut i on

coul d be sal vaged by gr ant i ng a r et r oact i ve ends- of - j ust i ce

cont i nuance. Uni t ed St at es v. Zedner , 547 U. S. 489, 507- 08 ( 2006) .

Zedner hel d t hat f i ndi ngs must be made " i f onl y i n t he [ t r i al ]

j udge' s mi nd" by t he t i me t he cont i nuance i s granted, and must be

ent er ed i n t he r ecor d by t he t i me t he di st r i ct cour t deni es t he

mot i on t o di smi ss on STA gr ounds. I d. at 506- 07. Because t he

di st r i ct cour t "ent er ed" i t s r easons f or gr ant i ng a cont i nuance

i nt o the r ecor d t hr ough t he or der denyi ng t he mot i on t o di smi ss,

Car pent er , 542 F. Supp. 2d at 183- 84, as wel l as i n t he hear i ng on

19 The f act or s ar e ( i ) whet her f ai l ur e t o gr ant t he cont i nuance

woul d make t he cont i nuat i on of t he pr oceedi ng i mpossi bl e or r esul ti n a mi scar r i age of j ust i ce, ( i i ) whet her t he case i s par t i cul ar l yunusual or compl ex, ( i i i ) whet her a gr and j ur y pr oceedi ng i sunusual or compl ex, or ( i v) i n a case t hat i s not par t i cul ar l yunusual or compl ex, whet her f ai l ur e t o gr ant t he cont i nuance woul dunr easonabl y deny t he abi l i t y t o obt ai n counsel , or t he cont i nui t yor pr epar at i on of t hat counsel . 18 U. S. C. 3161( h) ( 7) ( B) .

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t hat mot i on, Car pent er f ocuses hi s argument on whet her t he di st r i ct

cour t "made" t he f i ndi ngs at t he t i me i t gr ant ed t he mot i on.

Thi s ar gument f ai l s. The t r anscr i pt of t he J anuar y 24,

2008, hear i ng i n whi ch t he di st r i ct cour t gr ant ed t he cont i nuance

demonst r ates t he cour t caref ul l y consi dered why and f or how l ong

t he government and Carpent er ' s counsel woul d be unavai l abl e i n

l i ght of count er vai l i ng consi der at i ons such as t he avai l abi l i t y of

wi t nesses. I t r ej ect ed Car pent er ' s request t o put of f schedul i ng

a t r i al unt i l a st at us conf er ence i n Mar ch, and i t ul t i mat el y set

a t r i al dat e ear l i er t han t he one Car pent er ' s counsel r equest ed.

The r ecor d i s cl ear t hat t he di st r i ct cour t bal anced counsel s'

schedul es wi t h t he publ i c' s i nt er est i n a speedy t r i al , and t hus

i t s deci si on r epr esent s a det er mi nat i on t hat gr ant i ng a cont i nuance

ser ved t he ends of j ust i ce.

C. Sufficiency of the Evidence and Jury Instructions

Car pent er next ar gues t hat t he di st r i ct cour t er r ed when

i t deni ed Car pent er ' s mot i on f or acqui t t al i n whi ch he ar gued t hat

t he government di d not pr ove t hat he had an af f i r mat i ve dut y t o

di scl ose anythi ng t o t he i nvest or s, whi ch i s a necessary el ement of

a t heor y of f r aud by omi ssi ons. Thi s ar gument f ai l s because t he

gover nment di d not pr osecut e a t heor y of f r aud by omi ss i on: i t s

t heor y was t hat t he market i ng mater i al s and agr eement s cont ai ned

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mi sl eadi ng af f i r mat i ve st at ement s. 20 As t he di st r i ct cour t not ed,

" [ a] r gui ng t hat t he def endant omi t t ed mat er i al i nf or mat i on

necessar y t o make the af f i r mat i ve st at ement s not mi sl eadi ng di d not

t r ansf or mt he case f r omone of af f i r mat i ve mi sr epr esent at i ons t o a

case of mi sr epr esent at i on sol el y by r eason of omi ssi on. "

Car pent er , 2014 WL 691659 at *5. I n i t s 2013 deci si on, t hi s cour t

shar ed t he di st r i ct cour t ' s vi ew of t he pr osecut i on' s theor y. See

Car pent er , 736 F. 3d at 623- 24 ( not i ng t hat t he gover nment ' s t heor y

was t hat t he mar ket i ng mat er i al s " ef f ect i vel y pr omi sed" t he

exchangors' f unds woul d be kept saf e) . Under t he t heor y of

mi sl eadi ng af f i r mat i ve st at ement s, t her e was no need t o pr ove t he

el ement s of a pur e f ai l ur e- t o- di scl ose case.

D. Motion for New Trial Because of Newly Discovered Evidence

Car pent er next chal l enges t he di st r i ct cour t ' s deni al of

hi s mot i on f or a new t r i al based on t he Mer r i l l Lynch document s

t hat appear ed af t er hi s second t r i al . As descr i bed above, t hose

document s i ndi cated t hat Merr i l l Lynch knew t hat Carpent er was

20Car pent er f i r st r ai sed t he i ssue of whet her t he gover nment ' st heor y was mi sr epr esent at i on or omi ssi on as one of t hr ee i ssues i na J ul y 2008 suppl ement al mot i on f or acqui t t al . Thi s mot i on wassummari l y deni ed i n t he Sept ember 1, 2011, order gr ant i ng Carpent era new t r i al . Car pent er , 808 F. Supp. 2d at 386. The or der di d notspeci f i cal l y di scuss whet her t he gover nment had, i n f act , of f er ed

a t heor y of f r aud by omi ssi on at t r i al . However , i n a separ at emot i on f or a new t r i al , he r ecast t he same basi c argument as achal l enge t o t he i ndi ct ment , ar gui ng that t he gover nment char gedhi m wi t h af f i r mat i ve mi sr epr esent at i on, but at t r i al ar gued f r audby omi ssi on. I t i s i n t hi s cont ext t hat t he di st r i ct cour tdet er mi ned t hat t he t heor y was one of af f i r mat i vemi sr epr esent at i on.

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i nvest i ng ot her peopl e' s money, and t hus suppor t ed Car pent er ' s

cl ai m t hat he di d not hi de t hat f act f r om Mer r i l l Lynch. Al l of

t hi s, he cl ai ms, woul d have tur ned t he t i de on hi s good f ai t h

def ense. I n i t s 2011 or der , t he di st r i ct cour t di d not buy t hi s

ar gument . 21 Carpent er , 808 F. Supp. 2d at 379- 86. We now r evi ew

t hat deci si on. 22

21 I n t he Sept ember 1, 2011, or der , t he di st r i ct cour t

expl i ci t l y r ej ect ed t he ar gument t hat t he Mer r i l l Lynch evi denceconst i t ut ed gr ounds f or a j udgment of acqui t t al , and al so di d notl i st i t as one of t he gr ounds on whi ch i t gr ant ed a new t r i al .Car pent er , 808 F. Supp. 2d at 378- 79.

22 The di st r i ct cour t di d not expr essl y consi der t hese cl ai msas a mot i on f or a new t r i al based on newl y di scover ed evi dence, butdi d st at e i n a Febr uar y 10, 2014, st at us conf er ence t hat i t sSept ember 1, 2011, or der was an i mpl i ci t deni al on t hose gr ounds.The r eason f or t hi s approach i s as f ol l ows: Car pent er begani nt r oduci ng emer gi ng evi dence f r omt he Mer r i l l Lynch t r i al i n Mar ch2009. He pr esent ed t hi s i nf or mat i on as rel evant t o hi s pendi ng

mot i ons, not as t he basi s f or a new mot i on. I n f act , when t hegovernment argued t hat Carpent er was, i n essence, maki ng anargument f or a new t r i al based on newl y di scover ed evi dence,Car pent er expr essl y deni ed that he was.

When t he di st r i ct cour t gr ant ed Car pent er ' s mot i on f or a newt r i al on Sept ember 1, 2011, i t summar i l y deni ed al l ot her pendi ngmot i ons. Carpent er, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 386. Af t er we r ever sed t hesecond gr ant of a new t r i al , Carpent er ar gued i n a Febr uar y 10,2014, st at us conf er ence t hat one of hi s submi ssi ons r egar di ngMer r i l l Lynch- - t he Oct ober 28, 2009, "Memor andumi n Suppor t " of hi spendi ng mot i ons ( ECF No. 355) - - was an undeci ded mot i on f or a new

t r i al . The di st r i ct cour t i nst ead hel d Car pent er t o hi s pr i orposi t i on t hat t he new i nf or mat i on was par t of hi s previ ous mot i onsand not a di st i nct mot i on, and t r eat ed t he ar gument as havi ng beeni mpl i ci t l y deci ded agai nst Car pent er i n the Sept ember 1, 2011mot i on. I t di d so over t he gover nment ' s cont ent i on t hat Car pent erhad wai ved any argument f or a new t r i al based on newl y di scoveredevi dence.

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"Or di nar i l y we wi l l af f i r mt he t r i al cour t ' s deni al of a

new t r i al " based on cl ai ms of newl y di scover ed evi dence "unl ess t he

cour t has mani f est l y abused i t s di scr et i on. " Uni t ed St at es v.

Wr i ght , 625 F. 2d 1017, 1019 ( 1st Ci r . 1980) . Thi s r emai ns t he case

even when t he di st r i ct cour t di d not cl ear l y ar t i cul at e i t s r easons

f or denyi ng t he mot i on, whi ch, because of t he compl exi t i es

i nt r oduced by t he vol umi nous f i l i ngs i n t hi s case, i s t he si t uat i on

pr esent ed her e. I d. ; Uni t ed St at es v. Connol l y, 504 F. 3d 206, 212

( 1st Ci r . 2007) . Al t hough t he st andard i s somewhat hei ght ened when

t he gover nment knowi ngl y pr esent s f al se t est i mony, t he di st r i ct

cour t r ej ect ed t he cl ai mt hat t he gover nment di d so i n any way that

af f ect ed t he i nt egr i t y of t he t r i al , and we agr eed. 23 See

Car pent er , 731 F. 3d at 630- 31. Thus, we r ej ect Car pent er ' s

ar gument t hat a hei ght ened st andar d i s cal l ed f or i n t hi s case.

A di st r i ct cour t may gr ant a mot i on f or a new t r i al based

on newl y di scovered evi dence i f ( 1) t he evi dence was unknown or

unavai l abl e t o t he def endant at t he t i me of t r i al ; ( 2) f ai l ur e t o

l ear n of i t was not because of l ack of due di l i gence; ( 3) t he

evi dence i s mat er i al , and not mer el y cumul at i ve or i mpeachi ng; and

( 4) i t wi l l pr obabl y r esul t i n acqui t t al upon r et r i al . Wr i ght , 625

23 We decl i ne Car pent er ' s i nvi t at i on t o r evi si t t hi sdetermi nat i on, whi ch he ar gues i s warr ant ed because t he newevi dence even more st r ongl y suggest s t hat GL' s t est i mony was not t obe bel i eved. The f act r emai ns t hat t he government pr esent edevi dence f r om whi ch a j ur y coul d concl ude t hat t he quest i onabl epor t i on of hi s t est i mony was not t o be bel i eved.

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Documents

United States v. Carpenter, 1st Cir. (2015)