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UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON
MSc Conservation
Please complete the following declaration and hand this form in with your MSc
Research Project.
I, Claire Thorpe
hereby declare :
(a) that this MSc Project is my own original work and that all source material
used is acknowledged therein;
(b) that it has been prepared specially for the MSc in Conservation of
University College London;
(c) that it does not contain any material previously submitted to the Examiners
of this or any other University, or any material previously submitted for any
other examination.
Signed : cthorpe
Date : 2/9/15
A Governance Analysis of Bluefields
Bay Special Fisheries Conservation
Area, Jamaica
Claire Thorpe
11,987 words
Thesis submitted for the degree of MSc Conservation, Dept of
Geography,
UCL (University College London)
Supervised by Dr Peter Jones
September 2015
1
Abstract
Marine Protected Areas are becoming an increasingly important tool in marine
conservation, as both natural and anthropogenic threats rise. If these newly created MPAs
are to achieve conservation, social and developmental goals their governance methods
must be examined for effectiveness. Discussions about the best frameworks for governance
are long-standing with early arguments over top-down or bottom-up approaches giving rise
to the popularity of more balanced and flexible co-management styles. In this study of
Bluefields Bay Special Fisheries Conservation Area in Westmoreland, southwest Jamaica,
Jones’ MPA Governance Framework was used to assess the governance approach,
effectiveness of meeting conservation goals and aspects to be improved or incorporated in
future. Jamaica is often used as an example of over-fishing at its worst. Within the
Caribbean region pressure on fish stocks has been highest here, resulting in depleted
biodiversity and degraded marine ecosystems. 2.1 million tourists annually are an additional
environmental stressor; leading to a real need for effective marine conservation on the
island. BBSFCA is Jamaica’s largest sanctuary and is entirely no-take. It is unusual in that the
local community themselves pushed the government for protection and wardens patrol on a
part voluntary basis to give 24 hour coverage.
Initial document analysis was combined with semi-structured interviews, group discussions
and participant observation to fully assess the governance of BBSFCA in line with the MPAGF
structure. The governance approach for BBSFCA is community-led with co-management
between the government and BBFFS wardens. The results from the governance analysis
showed that while there are significant conflicts to the achievement of the MPA objectives
the majority of these are being addressed. Driving factors of conflicts are poverty, lack of
long-term education and the Jamaican legacy of disregard for laws all of which are beyond
the control of BBFFS but efforts are being made to combat these where possible. An
effectiveness score of three is given to the MPA. In future there must be a continued focus
on biodiversity conservation while further improving quality of life for local people. By
implementing the business management plan currently being formulated BBFFS will become
financially self-sufficient thus allowing benefits to spread to the wider community and
increasing participation and compliance. This improvement in governance will benefit not
only the people of Bluefields but nature conservation throughout Jamaica.
This document contains 11,987 words
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3
Abbreviations
AOSIS - Alliance of Small Island States
BBFFS - Bluefields Bay Fishermen Friendly Society
BBSFCA - Bluefields Bay Special Fisheries Conservation Area
C-FISH Caribbean Fish Sanctuary Partnership Initiative
CBD - Convention on Biological Diversity
CBO - Community Based Organisation
CCI - Caribbean Challenge Initiative
ENGO- Environmental Non-Governmental Organisation
IOCARIBE - Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission for the Caribbean and Adjacent
Regions
IUCN – International Union for the Conservation of Nature
MOAF - Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries
MPA - Marine Protected Area
MPAG - Marine Protected Area Governance
NEPA - National Environment Protection Agency
SFCA - Special Fisheries Conservation Area
SWFFA - South West Fishermen Friendly Alliance
UNESCO - United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
4
Table of Contents
1 Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………………………………p6-9
1.1 Objectives p9
2 Literature Review…………………………………………………………………………………………………p10-18
2.1 Governance p10
2.2 Top-down Governance p11
2.3 Bottom-up Governance p12
2.4 Market-led Governance p14
2.5 Co-management p14
2.6 Governance in the Caribbean p17
3 Methodology………………………………………………………………………………………………………..p19-24
3.1 Document Analysis p19
3.2 Interview Techniques p19
3.3 Interviewee Selection p22
3.4 Participant Observation p22
3.5 Issues and Challenges p22
3.6 Data Analysis p23
4 Results and Discussion………………………………………………………………………………………….p25-44
4.1 Context p25
4.2 Objectives p27
4.3 Drivers and Conflicts p28
4.4 Governance Approach p33
4.5 Effectiveness p36
4.6 Incentives p38
4.7 Cross-cutting Themes p43
5 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………………………………p45-46
Autocritique………………………………………………………………………………………………………………p47
References……………………………………………………………………………………………………………..p48-56
5
Figures, Boxes and Tables
List of Tables
Table 1: Coded Interviewees Removed
Table 2: List of Incentives p24
Table 3: Incentives Used, Improved or Needed p43
List of Figures
Figure 1: Map of Jamaica’s SFCAs p9
Figure 2: Top-down Governance p12
Figure 3: Bottom-up Polycentric Governance p14
Figure 4: Co-evolutionary Hierarchical Governance p16
Figure 5: BBSFCA Map p27
Figure 6: Stakeholder Links at BBSFCA p35
Figure 7: Graph of Total Animals Caught Inside and Outside BBSFCA 2013-2014 p37
Figure 8: Socioeconomic Map of Bluefields p39
List of Boxes
Box 1: Interview Semi-structure p21
Box 2: Context of MPA p25
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1 Introduction
The Earth’s surface is 65% ocean, and these oceans contain 50-80% of all life on this planet
(UNESCO, 2012). The ocean provides humans with a carbon dioxide sink, temperature
regulation, transport, food, recreation and a plethora of other services. Three billion people
depend on fish, predominantly marine fish, for 20% of their animal protein and this figure
often rises in developing countries (FAO, 2014). Despite their importance we are not
protecting our oceans for future generations. It is estimated that 70% of fish stocks are
unsustainably exploited, we pump pollutants into the sea, destroy marine habitats and man-
made climate change is irreversibly changing the global systems that regulate the ocean
(IPSO, 2013). Assessments of fish stocks in particular have led to dire predictions for marine
ecosystems (Worm et al, 2006; Hutchings, 2000) and highlight the urgent need for better
management of our oceans.
Anthropogenic threats to marine biodiversity were internationally noted for the first time at
the UN Conference on the Human Environment, 1972, resulting in many resolutions on
conservation including commitments to protect marine life (Jones, 2014). Marine protected
areas (MPAs) are one of the solutions commonly suggested as a way to help combat the
effects humans have had on the ocean (Aburto-Oropeza et al, 2011; Kelaher et al, 2014;
Moland et al, 2013). MPAs are defined by the UN as:
“An area of land and/or sea especially dedicated to the protection of
biological diversity, and of natural and associated cultural resources,
and managed through legal or other effective means” (IUCN, 1994).
The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) in 1992 was one of the first to put forward
ambitious targets for MPAs; aiming for 10% of the ocean protected by 2020. This has led to
increased public interest in the protection of our oceans, however progress has been much
slower than terrestrial PAs and protected marine area must rise by 2.2million km2 to meet
CBD targets (UNEP, 2014). The aim of MPAs is to reverse or mitigate negative anthropogenic
impacts which have led to the declining state of our oceans.
However studies have shown that only 24% of MPAs assessed at a global level are soundly
managed, with no-take reserves being the most successful (UNEP, 2014). In order to
7
ameliorate the situation countries are beginning to act to increase effectiveness and
improve management of existing MPAs by altering or implementing governance
approaches. This has led to numerous papers detailing methods for effective management
of MPAs and best governance methods (Gjerde et al, 2013; Mora et al, 2009) and
consequently tools for analysis of MPA governance (MPAG) (Chape et al, 2005; Ostrom,
2009). In this study the MPAG framework for analysis devised by Jones (2014) is used to
assess the chosen MPA in Jamaica.
In the Caribbean over 50% of the population live within 1.5km of the coast and many people
depend on subsistence fishing for protein (UNCSD, 2012). Unfortunately the majority of
countries here have a history of poor management and over-exploitation of fisheries (Salas
et al, 2007). IOCARIBE was set up in 1968 to increase cooperation within the region and
increase links between marine specialists and politicians to improve the Caribbean marine
ecosystem and promote sustainable development (Montero, 2010). Now IOCARIBE and
UNESCO jointly find funding for projects in the region leading to improvements in
management and biodiversity. The recent Caribbean Challenge Initiative (CCI), set up by
Caribbean governments impatient for change, aims to link governments and corporations in
order to provide a sustainable plan for protecting the Caribbean marine ecosystem. The
main target is for 20% of Caribbean marine and coastal environment to be effectively
protected by 2020 (CCI, 2013). As of 2010 6.42% of the Caribbean marine area is protected,
higher than the global average of 5.55% (IUCN, 2010); but achieving the 20% target by 2020
will be extremely challenging.
Jamaica is home to some of the world’s most over-fished seas, with up to 80% reductions in
fish biomass in the north and an absence of top trophic predators (Roberts, 2007). 18% of
Jamaica’s land area is protected and 15% of its marine area (NEPA, 2012), nevertheless
Jamaican commitments that go further than simply meeting targets as part of the CCI and
intend to increase protection to 25% of marine area by 2020 (CCI, 2013). Jamaica
established its first MPA in 1979 at Bogue Island Lagoon, Montego Bay, which aimed to
repopulate fish stocks. In 2008 a J$36.92 million fund was allocated for the creation of 10
new marine sanctuaries across the island (NEPA, 2010), now known as Special Fishery
Conservation Areas (SFCA), these are cooperatively managed between the government and
8
CBOs or NGOs and are IUCN category IV protected areas (MOAF, 2011). The map in Figure 1
shows the location of all of Jamaica’s SFCAs.
This study focuses on the Bluefields Bay Special Fishery Conservation Area (BBSFCA) in
Westmoreland, southwest Jamaica; BBSFCA is underlined in Figure 1. The Southwest of
Jamaica is home to sporadically distributed reefs and large areas of seagrass beds and
mangroves (Hughes, 1994). It is the least populated and developed part of the island and
consequently bleaching events have been less severe and over-fishing more limited than the
heavily developed north coast (Goreau, 1992). The designation of SFCA is used in Jamaica
because non-native species, such as lionfish, can be removed and traps are put down bi-
annually for research purposes but existing definitions of a marine sanctuary do not allow
this activity. No fishing of any sort is permitted within the entirety of BBSFCA (CaMPAM,
2010). It is likely that the official terminology will return to marine sanctuary in the next year
as long-standing legislature is re-worded to allow the activities mentioned above. The term
MPA will be used interchangeably with SFCA within this study.
9
Figure 1: Map of Jamaica’s SFCAs and marine features with BBSFCA underlined in red as
Bluefields Bay. Created by S.Lee of CARIBSAVE, 2012.
1.1 Objectives
This study aims to analyse the governance of BBSFCA through the application of Jones’
MPAG framework. A list of 36 incentives formulated by Jones will be used to determine
which incentives are being used effectively, which could be strengthened and which are yet
to be applied. The conflicts caused by designation of the MPA and the drivers of these
conflicts will also be examined, along with the overall effectiveness and future challenges
for the SCFA. The three main research aims are:
1. An in-depth governance analysis of BBSFCA using the framework created by Jones
(2014)
2. Examine the effectiveness of governance methods and framework in relation to
drivers of conflict and incentives used to meet conservation objectives of the MPA
3. Future recommendations to benefit BBSFCA and therefore nature conservation in
Jamaica
10
2 Literature Review
2.1 Governance
Governance is a concept with a long history; the term originates from the Greek verb ‘to
steer’ (Jones, 2014:63) and use of the term has increased exponentially in the past two
centuries, despite being without a firm consensus on meaning (UN, 2006). The UN
commonly uses a general definition by Hirst (2000):
“the means by which an activity … is controlled or directed, such that it delivers an acceptable range of outcomes according to some established standard”
This study uses a more specific definition from Jones (2014:63):
“steering human behaviour through combinations of state, market and civil society approaches in order to achieve strategic objectives”
Governance styles can be used to enlarge the issues governments must focus on and
provide a framework for managing these issues (UN, 2006). Approaches to governance of
natural resources have evolved over time, with certain approaches more common at certain
periods, for example there has been a decline in top-down approaches with a rise of
community-based systems (Stoker, 1998; Dearden et al, 2005). Common pool resources,
such as oceans, require a complex adaptive system of governance to control their usage to
prevent a ‘tragedy of the commons’ and empower stakeholders (Ostrom, 1999). There are
three main sources of steer which affect the governance approach adopted; these are the
state, civil society and markets which respectively give rise to top-down, bottom-up and
market-led governance (Jones, 2014:64). Recently there has been greater focus on
promoting linkages between these institutions in order to integrate their knowledge such as
in polycentric or co-managed approaches (Kooiman et al., 2005:165).
11
2.2 Top-down Governance
Historically governance has come from higher government levels; regulating what local
users do in a top-down style, see Figure 2. Top-down governance has been used in colonial
and post-colonial countries, occasionally with disastrous effects due to corruption and
mismanagement (Nielson et al, 2004). One such example of this is the Chagos Island reserve
which became entangled in development issues as the reserve (which banned fishing) was
proposed at the same time native people were permitted to return to the islands (De Santo
et al, 2011). This MPA was devised by the UK government, who ostensibly support bottom-
up approaches, but this was solely top-down and had the undesired effect of causing local
people to look negatively upon conservation efforts. This is a common issue with top-down
governance, which can cause stakeholders to reject regulations they see as forced upon
them, leading to the destruction of the resource (Christie & White, 2007). There is also
potential for a value-action gap in top-down governance when objectives for MPAs are
unclear and funding inadequate, leading to governments receiving positive press for their
conservation policies when in fact they have created paper parks (Develliers et al, 2014).
However, top-down governance also has examples of MPA success stories, although they
are predominantly in developed countries (De Santo et al, 2011). Countries such as Australia
and the UK have had success with top-down control as they have comparatively better
infrastructure for training and education, more resources and stronger and more effective
governance systems (Berkes & Shaw, 1986). Top-down control theoretically removes
complications around stakeholder involvement, reducing related costs and only involving
those essential to MPA effectiveness (Pomeroy & Douvere, 2008). The Great Barrier Reef
MPA is an example of successful top-down control; fisheries have been tightly regulated so
that total annual production is well below sustainable levels and species resilience to
perturbation has shown to be improved (Emslie et al, 2015). Similarly for Scottish fishers in
the North Sea, despite initial resistance to tight government quotas for cod, there has been
a change in attitude and behaviour leading to spawning stocks more than tripling since 2006
(Clover, 2015).
12
Figure 2: Top-down governance approaches -each hierarchical level exerts control over the one below, from Jones, (2014).
2.3 Bottom-up Governance
Bottom-up governance has grown in popularity since the rise of neo-institutional theory and
is particularly useful when the central government is weak or decentralised, paving the way
for community action and control (Christie & White, 2007), Figure 3. Bottom-up governance
approaches are also often ‘place-based’ or polycentric (Jones, 2014:65) with local users
contributing their knowledge and experience to conservation efforts, thus engendering a
sense of pride and ownership within the community. Such approaches can be cost effective
and participatory, especially when polycentric bottom-up governance gives communities
the freedom to self-regulate (Aswani & Lauer, 2006).One of the most famous examples of
successful bottom-up governance is the Cabo Pulmo reserve in Mexico. Created by local
groups in the 1990s in response to declining catch and degraded ecosystems, the reserve
has now seen fish biomass increase by 463% and top predator numbers are more than ten
times higher than before the sanctuary. Local groups continue to be involved in
conservation, primarily through ecotourism ventures (Aburto-Oropeza et al, 2011; Havard et
al, 2015).
In areas with top down control local people can become marginalised, worsening
development issues; there is a fine balance to be struck between the exclusion of locals and
careless bottom-up governance that simply redistributes power structures and inequality
rather than eliminating them (Lane & Corbett, 2005). In Spain Paloma et al (2015) showed
13
that when fishers considered themselves outside the governance system and their
knowledge ignored, conservation efforts were less effective. Future directions for bottom-
up governance include improving design by incorporating traditional knowledge with new
technologies such as GIS (Aswani & Lauer, 2006).
There are however criticisms of bottom-up governance. One such criticism is that bottom-
up governance does not eliminate the large scale inequality suffered by local people but
simply redistributes it while inequalities continue on smaller and smaller scales
(Brockington, 2004). Understanding the winners and losers in MPA design is vital to good
governance of all types, particularly given the unpredictability of environmental systems.
Walters (2004) claims that in some countries local knowledge is given too much value, with
an unsustainable amount of control ceded to decentralised MPAs. In the Philippines local
people were replanting mangroves long before conservation efforts began. However this
alters the forest structure and the community is likely to cut-down replanted forest; social
factors take priority so these replanted mangroves may not be as valuable to
conservationists as they originally seemed. Bottom-up styles of governance commonly
achieve either conservation objectives or development objectives, seldom both. To improve
this more monitoring of progress and effectiveness is required and education must be an
ongoing process to combat the challenges of marine resource governance (Shackleton et al,
2010).
14
Figure 3: Bottom-up polycentric governance, from Jones (2014). Local areas are given a certain degree of autonomy often regulated by national or international regulation.
2.4 Market-led Governance
Market-led governance, having previously been rejected as a conservation approach, is
currently experiencing a rise in popularity together with related concepts such as ecosystem
services (Stavins, 2003). Finding sustainable sources of funding is a key aim for many MPAs
(McConney & Pena, 2012), as lack of funds will prevent MPAs from meeting objectives and
reduce their effectiveness while reliable income can help set specific targets for MPAs
(Hilborn, 2007). Market-led approaches often rely on creating a sense of ownership of the
resource through property rights, allowing stakeholders to ‘buy-in’ to conservation efforts
(Mansfield, 2006). This can also reduce conflicts between stakeholders and build trust
between institutions (Pomeroy & Douvere, 2008). In some cases this approach is
coordinated with top-down governance as taxes or entrance fees are used to raise money.
The linkage between economic rationality and environmental goals has been claimed to be
the most effective form of governance (Stavins, 2003; Hilborn, 2007).
2.5 Co-management
Clearly there are flaws in all of the above governance methods and there are fierce debates
over which is best. As a solution the approach of co-managed resources developed with the
aim of increasing flexibility in management, which is so crucial to dealing with the natural
stochasticity of fisheries (Kooiman et al, 2005:89). This combination of approaches prevents
one agency from controlling all aspects of governance and aims to place equal degrees of
15
importance on all stakeholders and emphasise the role of communities (Agrawal & Gibson,
1999). Jones et al (2013) noted that MPA resilience to socio-ecological perturbation is
increased when incentives for conservation were diverse with a wide range of participatory
stakeholders and institutions highlighting the need for co-management. Resilience creates a
positive feedback loop as co-management strengthens communities, just as community
participation strengthens governance effectiveness (Jentoft, 2000). For example, in the
Philippines, Apo Island MPA was seen as an instance of highly effective bottom-up
governance which was in time centralised leading to conservation failures. A co-managed
approach, restoring participation and trust within the local community, will be essential to
revive the former success of the reserve (White et al, 2002).
Future directions for co-management include strengthening vertical and horizontal linkages
between all levels with the aim of a truly equal partnership between state and community
(thus tackling development issues). Fishermen in Spain pioneered a co-management
approach after facing declining catch weights. After initial surveys, additional stakeholders
were brought in in the form of scientists and environmentalists, promoting improved
understanding of the MPA benefits, high effectiveness and an increased number of linkages
in the governance approach (Perez-de-Oliveira, 2013). Working to improve intra-MPA
networks to increase the flow of information and share techniques to improve effectiveness
will increase conservation success across regions and even whole countries (Berkes, 2007).
Compared to other approaches adaptive co-management has even greater flexibility to
respond to oceanic change, and adapt to ongoing assessment of MPA effectiveness while
increasing participation and living standards (Brown, 2010). A study in Honduras showed
that co-management failed to fulfil MPA objectives whereas adaptive co-management had
more success. Finding the best governance style for an MPA can depend a lot on the
location, which is why regions often adopt similar approaches, such as emerging co-
management seen across the Caribbean (Brown & Pomeroy, 1999).
Finally, the theory of ‘co-evolutionary hierarchical governance’ formulated by Jones
(2014:72) considers the multidirectional linkages between state, market and society, see
Figure 4. It differs from co-management in that each stakeholder has a different role, still
maintaining aspects of flexibility but keeping conservation objectives as the primary focus.
16
The state regulates and steers governance of the MPA while societal actors manage and
monitor (Jones, 2014). The MPAG framework used in this research was created from this
theory. The framework examines effectiveness by analysing conflict, and the drivers of it
and appropriateness of objectives (Jones, 2014:100). A list of 36 incentives was drawn up,
and each case study examines which are being used effectively, which could be
strengthened and which are lacking. Incentives are based around five categories each
contributing to different types of governance steer (page 1oflitrev); economic, knowledge,
interpretative, legal and participative. From case studies five types of governance approach
were identified; government-led, community-led, private, decentralised and ineffective
(Jones, 2014:174). These are flexible frameworks which could possibly be used by new or
developing MPAs to improve their effectiveness.
Figure 4: Co-evolutionary hierarchical governance, from Jones, 2014
17
2.6 Governance in the Caribbean
The Caribbean has a history of MPA mismanagement; in particular many became entangled
in unregulated credit loans to the community so lost the trust of local people (Espeut, 1992).
This places great importance on future governance being transparent and accountable if
stakeholders are to participate. The cost for not protecting Caribbean marine resources is
high; creating an urgent need for better governance linkage between countries as
country-level mismanagement has knock-on effects elsewhere (Chakalall etal, 2007). Top-
down governance is seen in overseas territories such as Guadeloupe, while others have
opted for a more bottom-up or co-managed approach (Geoghegan &Renard, 2002). So far
participation of local groups and organised action by fishers has been limited; where it has
occurred they were quite successful but there has been conflict over non-universal inclusion
and unequal division of benefits (Geoghegan &Renan, 2002). One example of successful
local participation is St Lucia, where negotiations and consensus before co-management
began led to high compliance and therefore effectiveness (Brown & Pomeroy, 1999).
Many Caribbean countries are signatories of international and regional treaties such as the
CBD and the CCI, however the national level is less organised, with many countries relying
on NGOs for funding and management (Chakalall et al, 2007). Governance models aiming
for economic self-reliance of the MPA have had initial success but this has often plateaued
after reaching an ecological limit where further tourist activity, such as diving, would
degrade the resource (Dixon et al, 1995). Finding a balance between ecological recovery and
economic growth will be one of the biggest challenges to overcome in Caribbean marine
conservation.
Jamaica’s fish are the most heavily exploited in the Caribbean and management lags behind
other countries; with 90% fewer predatory fish than the least-exploited island of Bonaire
(Figueroa, 2005; Roberts, 2007:234). The current system of co-managed MPAs and strong
commitments to increasing fish stocks show that Jamaica aims high, however not enough
support is given to the NGOs and groups running the sanctuaries. In particular education is
needed as fishers are frequently illiterate so lack the skills and knowledge to manage
accounts and monitor MPAs (Espeut, 1992). Often countries with failing governance have a
weak government, leading to paper parks; Jamaica’s corruption is high (ranked 85th out of
18
175 countries on Transparency International) so local control must be part of marine
conservation if it to be successful (Hilborn, 2007). Social factors can derail this though, as
there is a legacy in Jamaica of disregard for laws and disempowerment through authority
leading to a lack of consensus and consequently reduced efficacy of MPAs (Figueroa, 2005).
Creation or alteration of policy in Jamaica is highly politicised and centralised, especially
with regards to development (Figueroa, 2005). The funding and legislation for MPAs in
Jamaica was created under the previous Labour government and the current minister has
less personal interest in fisheries leading to apprehension over the future of MPAs here
(pers comms). However the current debate on amendments to the 1976 fishing bill which
would lead to over 500 times greater fines for fishing in a sanctuary provides hope for the
future of effective conservation in Jamaica (The Gleaner, 2015).
19
3 Methodology
This study took place in Bluefields Bay, Westmoreland, southwest Jamaica. It was chosen
because it is the largest SFCA in Jamaica and one that is often used as an example of a well-
performing MPA (Kubin, 2015). There are plans to incorporate BBSFCA into a network of
MPAs (the South West Fishermen’s Friendly Alliance, SWFFA) indicating that the governance
methods used here are replicable. Early research showed that although the area of
Bluefields is well studied (due to links with a number of American universities) a governance
analysis had never been performed. Jones (2014) MPAG framework for analysis together
with the initial document analysis were used to plan interviews and research and give a
basic structure to the study. Data was gathered using document analysis, semi-structured
interviews and observation of participants.
3.1 Document Analysis
BBSFCA was chosen after web-based analysis of newspaper articles, maps, web pages and
policy reports, giving an idea of the scope for study at Bluefields. This initial document
analysis was done in the UK so that possible interviewees could be contacted beforehand
and a timeframe could be drawn up. Some of the reports also gave an idea of challenges
faced by Jamaican MPAs which gave a basis for questioning. Once in Jamaica further
documents such as social and ecological maps, species data and management plans were
obtained with the help of BBSFCA, University of Missouri, Sandals Foundation and NEPA.
3.2 Interview Techniques
Interviews were conducted in a semi-structured style so were informal but had a clear
purpose and organisation (Adams, 2010). The semi-structure allowed for representation of
all stakeholder groups and gave an opportunity for them to share knowledge, skills and
understanding (Mason, 2002) while emphasising the value of individual views and
experiences (Hewitt-Taylor, 2001). It is important that interviews were conducted at a place
the interviewee felt comfortable, therefore they chose the location. All were conducted
around Bluefields/Belmont in order to retain context for the interviewer (Marshall &
Rossman, 2006). From there the fluid nature of the semi-structure allowed each interview
to be tailored to each participant to get the most from them, with a guiding structure to
return the conversation to key topics if needed (Hewitt-Taylor, 2001; Denscombe, 2003).
20
A total of 25 interviews were conducted, 18 in person and seven on the phone or via
Skype/email. Each interview was 30-90 minutes and the coded details of interviewees are
provided in Table 1. Some stakeholders could be coded into two categories (for example
some wardens are also fishermen), the primary focus of their interview was used to decide
the category they were assigned. The research aimed to find as diverse a range of
perspectives as possible, thus participants from all levels and sectors were interviewed. As
highlighted in Jones (2008) nobody was dismissed, a wide range of views are likely to be
found even within groups of similar stakeholders. The semi-structure used for the interviews
can be found in Box 1, and while all key topics were covered more time was given to the
interviewees area of expertise and interest (Valentine, 2005).
Table 1: Removed to preserve anonymity
21
Box *:Semi structure for interviews
The ‘story’ of the MPA from the interviewee’s perspective: where it started, how it came
to be designated, how it is proceeding, any key events/issues and the prospects
Objectives of the MPA – how they were agreed, their legitimacy, validity, etc
Any opportunities and conflicts that the objectives raise (which sectors affected most)
Driving forces behind any conflicts between conservation and use and whether these are
being effectively addressed
Views on the governance structures and processes by which decisions are taken.
Trends in the status of key conservation features, e.g. coral cover, fish population levels,
bleaching events, etc.
Is there effective regulation of certain uses and their impacts on habitats/species that
are recognised as vulnerable conservation features, in order to effectively address
conflicts and achieve the MPAs objectives?
Whether the MPA is effective in addressing wider-scale impacts, e.g. terrestrial run-off,
coastal developments, etc
Strengths and weaknesses for participation of local users – decisions/influences
Strengths and weakness of the legal basis of the MPAs and the role of laws and
regulations
Strengths and weakness of the approaches for ensuring wide knowledge base drawn
on/integrated e.g. aboriginal, local and scientific knowledge
Strengths and weakness of approaches for raising awareness of the MPA and promoting
awareness of the conservation importance of the MPA and the regulations/restrictions
in place.
Box 1: Semi-structure for interviews, key themes for questions underlined
The ‘story’ of the MPA from the interviewee’s perspective: where it started, how it
came to be designated, how it is proceeding, any key events/issues and the
prospects
Objectives of the MPA – how they were agreed, their legitimacy, validity, etc
Any opportunities and conflicts that the objectives raise (which sectors affected
most)
Driving forces behind any conflicts between conservation and use and whether these
are being effectively addressed
Views on the governance structures and processes by which decisions are taken.
Trends in the status of key conservation features, e.g. coral cover, fish population
levels, bleaching events, etc.
Is there effective regulation of certain uses and their impacts on habitats/species in
order to effectively address conflicts and achieve the MPAs objectives?
Whether the MPA is effective in addressing wider-scale impacts, e.g. terrestrial run-
off, coastal developments, etc
Strengths and weaknesses for participation of local users – decisions/influences
Strengths and weakness of the legal basis of the MPAs and the role of laws and
regulations
Strengths and weakness of the approaches for ensuring wide knowledge base drawn
on/integrated e.g. aboriginal, local and scientific knowledge
Strengths and weakness of approaches for raising awareness of the MPA and
promoting awareness of the conservation importance of the MPA and the
regulations/restrictions in place.
Strengths and weakness of approaches for gaining economic benefits from the
conservation of the MPA and promoting compatible economic development
opportunities.
Whether the costs and benefits associated with the MPA are fairly distributed
The role of particular people who take a leadership role, including the role of political
will.
The role of non-governmental organisations, including conservation groups and local
community groups
22
3.3 Interviewee Selection
Interviewees were selected to cover a representative sample of stakeholders by the method
of ‘snowball sampling’. Initial contacts identified during the document analysis and
Bluefields community members then recommended others and often provided contact
details for them (Valentine, 2005). One problem with snowball sampling is debate
surrounding whether the knowledge gained can be generalised or only applied to one
specific sample (Biernacki et al, 1981). To overcome this, interviewees from national
organisations worked at other SFCAs so they could compare and contrast governance
methods and effectiveness, thus allowing for findings to be relevant at least to national
level. Participant observation was used to identify other possible interviewees such as
fishermen and community members.
3.4 Participant Observation
Ethnographic observations were made throughout the time at Bluefields to facilitate data
collection and add to knowledge gained in interviews (Angrosino, 2007). One set of
interviews was conducted with multiple stakeholders present as it seemed more would be
gained from observation of the natural social group than would be from one-on-one; in
particular the process of reaching a consensus was important here (Arksey & Knight, 1999).
Notes were taken on informal conversations to supplement the interviews and to keep
details as rich as possible (Hewitt-Taylor, 2001).
3.5 Issues and Challenges
To prevent problems interviewees were informed from the outset on how the data would
be used and the purpose of study and assured of their anonymity. Interviewees were given
the option to decline being recorded, which many in this study chose to do (only six were
recorded). Post-interview participants were emailed to determine if they had any further
comments or amendments they wished to make.
Some interviewees pointed out that in such a small community it would be very obvious
who had said what if direct quotes were used; however this conflicts with the need to use
extracts verbatim to get the best out of the interview (Denscombe, 2003). In this case
interviewees are coded to help preserve anonymity.
23
Finally there was also the challenge of possible compromise of data due to the interviewer’s
personal identity causing interviewees to alter their answers to something they believe the
interviewer wants to hear or which they believe shows them in a better light. While aspects
of the interviewers self, such as age, ethnicity and gender cannot be changed the best
attempt to be polite and neutral was made (Denscombe, 2003; Adams, 2010). In some cases
it was deemed more useful to conduct interviews with multiple participants as this would
reveal more about group dynamics rather than focus on the interviewer (Arkesey & Knight,
1999).
3.6 Data Analysis
The data collection and analysis proceeded together as they are so interwoven, and
immediate analysis prevents important details being forgotten (Mackenzie, 1994). This
involved transcribing interviews into reports based on the themes found in the MPAG
framework and removal of material unrelated to the study. Methods of transcription and
coding are adapted from Jones (2008). Data was not coded using computer packages as in
some cases the value attached to certain aspects can be lost during this process
(Denscombe, 2003). Two examples of transcribed reports can be found in Appendix 2. The
data from participant observation was not formally used but is incorporated into the
analysis and discussion and used to validate interview information.
The MPAG framework used to analyse how effective governance approaches at BBSFCA are
at meeting conservation objectives can be found in Section 4; and a list of 36 possible
incentives used to meet MPA objectives in Table 2, both from Jones (2014). Results were
used to assess which incentives are used to meet MPA objectives and which could be
adopted to strengthen governance approaches, resolve conflicts and improve effectiveness
in meeting MPA targets.
24
Table 2: List of possible incentives in their categories, codes used throughout the text included. From Jones, 2014.
Incentive Code Incentive Category Incentives
E1 Economic (10) Payments for ecosystem services
E2 Assigning property rights
E3 Reducing the leakage of benefits
E4 Promoting profitable and sustainable fisheries
E5 Promoting green marketing
E6 Promoting alternative livelihoods
E7 Providing compensation
E8 Reinvesting MPA income in local communities
E9 Ensuring sufficient state funding
E10 Provision of NGO and private sector funding
I1 Interpretative (3) Raising awareness
I2 Promoting recognition of benefits
I3 Promoting recognition of regulations and restrictions
K1 Knowledge (3) Promoting collective learning
K2 Agreeing approaches for addressing uncertainty
K3 Independent advice and arbitration
L1 Legal (10) Hierarchical obligations
L2 Capacity for enforcement
L3 Penalties for deterrence
L4 Protection from incoming users
L5 Attaching conditions to property rights
L6 Cross-jurisdictional coordination
L7 Clear and consistent legal definitions
L8 Clarity concerning jurisdictional limitations
L9 Legal adjudication platforms
L10 Transparency and fairness
P1 Participatory (10) Rules for participation
P2 Establishing collaborative platforms
P3 Neutral facilitation
P4 Independent arbitration panels
P5 Decentralising responsibilities
P6 Peer enforcement
P7 Building social capital
P8 Bracing linkages
P9 Building on local customs
P10 Potential to influence higher institutional levels
25
4 Results and Discussion
4.1 Context
Box 2: Context of MPA from MPAG framework, Jones, 2014. From CIA.gov unless otherwise stated
Jamaica is the third largest Caribbean island and the native Taino were colonised by the
Spanish in the 15th century. The island was then taken by the English in 1655, who ruled
until it was granted independence in 1962. The economy suffered in the 1970s oil crisis
when bauxite mining and exports decreased sharply leading to the country becoming
crippled by debts, with up to 20% of annual government revenue going to repayment
(Dearden, 2013). Added to this is the financial burden resulting from numerous tropical
hurricanes which have destroyed infrastructure and decreased food supplies across the
island. Lasting challenges from this downturn include high crime, corruption and
unemployment (CIA, 2015). These factors can be detrimental to conservation aims,
especially when combined with legacies of disregard for laws (Figueroa, 2005). Jamaica has
very low control of corruption a factor also tied to its colonial past (World Bank, 2014).
Jamaica has a total population of 2.71million; 144,817 of whom live in Westmoreland parish
where BBSFCA is located (SIJ, 2012). Westmoreland has 2250 registered fishers and 525
registered vessels (though registration has not been particularly high in Westmoreland)
(MOAF, 2008). In Jamaica fishing is practised not only to supply food and income but is also
Context:
Name of MPA: Bluefields Bay Special Fisheries Conservation Area
Area of MPA: 3,054 acres (c-fish.org)
MPA coastline length: 6.5 miles (c-fish.org)
Per capita GDP: $8,600
GDP growth rate: 0.5%
Main economic sectors (%GDP): services (72%), industry (21.1%), agriculture
(6.9%)
Unemployment rate: 15.3%
State capacity: 0.02 (World Bank, 2014)
Human development index: 96 -high (UNDP.org)
Population below poverty line: 16.5%
26
a traditional way of life. In 2007 11,838 tonnes of fish were caught in Jamaican waters with
roughly 20% going to domestic supply (MOAF, 2008). The highest landings of valuable
snapper and reef fish are in Westmoreland, however the majority of reefs are affected by
bleaching and warming so this intense fishing activity will further degrade Jamaica’s marine
environment (CARICOM, 2000).
BBSFCA, at 3,054 acres, is the largest SFCA in Jamaica and is entirely no take, Figure 5. It was
declared in 2009 and is currently policed 24 hours a day by six wardens, paid by the
government. The surrounding area has a population of 3,671 and is primarily rural with
little tourism thus it is relatively poorer than the Jamaican average (MOA, 2008). There is a
significant area of mangrove forest fringing BBSFCA and numerous seagrass beds inside the
sanctuary. In 2011 an artificial reef was placed in the sanctuary and in 2015 coral trees for
repopulation of external reefs were built (c-fish, 2015).
27
Figure 5: Map of BBSFCA showing SFCA limits and key surrounding features and habitats. From McIntyre, 2015
4.2 Objectives
The objectives for BBSFCA are:
Conserve marine biodiversity, particularly corals, mangroves and sea grass
Increase fish stocks and spill-over
These objectives compliment national commitments such as the CBD to protect 10% of the
world’s oceans by 2020 and the CCI to protect 25% of marine area by 2020. Jamaica has also
agreed to the more general aims of the FAO to conserve and promote sustainable use of the
ocean and its resources by keeping fish stocks within sustainable limits. The Alliance of Small
28
Island States (AOSIS) pledge to promote sustainable management at sea, strengthen
fisheries management, surveillance and monitoring and control impacts which could be
harmful to corals. The Jamaican governmental department in charge of meeting these
targets is the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MOAF) and the government funded
NEPA. Together they create legislation and regulations on sustainable use of marine
resources and make decisions on new MPAs. NEPA has some universal objectives for MPAs:
Conserve healthy marine ecosystems and resources as the primary aim
Promote research and monitoring to guide effective management
Increase compliance with MPA regulations
Educate and endorse MPA benefits to the local community to engender a sense of
ownership and support
Improve sustainable livelihoods in areas adjacent to MPAs
Facilitate sustainable recreation
Efficiently manage MPAs to support their sustainability
Develop and implement financial plans to ensure conservation is possible
4.3 Drivers and Conflicts
There are numerous factors causing conflict at BBSFCA, some more apparent than others.
The conflict between a sanctuary preventing fishing and a population heavily reliant on fish
is clear at Bluefields. Additionally untreated waste water can make its way to the sea in this
area, affecting corals in particular. Less obvious are the organisational politics that affects
everyday decisions and smooth running or BBFFS. The drivers behind these conflicts include
economic poverty, lack of long-term education and a pressure to develop in order to bring
in tourists.
Poaching
The main threat to conservation at BBSFCA is poaching inside the sanctuary and over-fishing
outside. Despite claims of 95% compliance with no-take regulations (IND2) during the short
period of this research there were numerous instances of traps found within the sanctuary
or fishers within the sanctuary (Appendix 3). In particular it is young spear-fishers who do
not own boats who are the perpetrators of poaching (COM2; FSH1-3; FSH5; PRV3; WRD1-3).
Fishers claim that the fact that BBSFCA is entirely no-take makes it hard for them to earn a
living as they must fish closer to the shore, reducing their fishing grounds, while pot or line
29
fishers (often older with money to buy a boat) who can get out beyond the sanctuary are
less affected (FSH5). Poaching by outsiders from Savannah-la-Mar has also been a problem.
Non-local poachers are aware of the sanctuary, and even gave their support for its creation
(SC1); the higher densities of fish and valuable lobster and conch are a big temptation with
BBSFCA described by one fisher as ‘like a nature film inside’ (PRV1). However, the close-knit
community of Bluefields would be highly likely to report external poachers, while they
would not mention if they had seen someone they knew fishing in BBSFCA (COM2; FSH5;
GOV3). Also, 24 hour patrols by wardens (who volunteer time in order to provide constant
protection) reduce opportunities for poaching.
The area of Bluefields was heavily over-fished before the establishment of the sanctuary
(IND1; IND2; WRD1-3) but due to recent improvements in fish numbers the younger fishers
do not always remember the ‘bad old days’ (SC2) so the imposition of a sanctuary feels like
an injustice to them. This also hints at the predisposition to defy authority in Jamaica which
can be detrimental to conservation (Figueroa, 2005). Legislation on wire-mesh sizes aimed
to reduce the numbers of juvenile fish caught and there are proposals to ban capture of
parrot fish, which help maintain healthy reefs (McClanahan & Kaunda-Arara, 1996). Yet
compliance on existing regulations is low, as is uptake for fishing and boat licences so any
new laws are unlikely to be met with a great change in behaviour. Wire exchanges organised
by CARIBSAVE and BBFFS have been popular but in some cases the new wire is then sold on
as fishers continue to use their small mesh (WRD2).
The main drivers behind poaching and over-fishing are poverty and lack of long-term
education both in the Bluefields area and throughout Jamaica (FSH1-3; FSH5; NGO1; PRV4;
SC1; SC2). ‘Passing laws does not make something truly bring about change’ (IND2) and
there is not enough ongoing education to bring about the change in attitude needed to
eliminate poaching. There is a need for conservation goals to be incorporated into everyday
life in an area that relies so heavily on natural resources (IND1; IND2) and young people
specifically must be won-over by conservation efforts if the BBSFCA is to succeed (COM1).
Sandals hotel in Whitehouse runs regular education programmes and BEPA, a hotel-based
ENGO, sponsors schools in the area. BBFFS must work together with these organisations to
deliver education on marine conservation and its importance (PRV2; PRV4; WRD3).
30
Furthermore, the lack of economic alternatives for fishers (none were created when the
sanctuary was brought in) means that it is currently worth the risk, for some, to fish inside
the sanctuary. However if the proposed increase in fines comes into play this may change
particularly as prosecution in Bluefields has been frequent due to the supportive local judge
and nearby marine police (which was petitioned by BBFFS) (GOV3; SC2). It remains to be
seen whether there is sufficient political will to push these fine increases through.
CARIBSAVE together with NEPA are in the process of creating a financial plan for BBSFCA so
that they can attract tourists to the area and start to turn a profit (GOV1; GOV2; NGO1).
Currently fishers make on average J$300, or roughly £16 per day, although this fluctuates a
lot (FSH2). A high proportion of fishers in Westmoreland are illiterate (SC1) so their role
would be taking tourists out in their boats to dive or sightsee, with some acting as guides
(IND1; WRD1). This increase in jobs in the area would theoretically reduce poaching.
Organisational Politics
The politics of CBOs in Jamaica is described locally as ‘crabs in a bucket’ (SC2) whereby
people who are seen to get above themselves must be knocked back down even if it is to
the detriment of the whole society or community. Unfortunately this is something Bluefields
knows all too well, as internal politics caused the collapse of the BPCA (Bluefields’ Peoples
Community Association) in the 1990s. This organisation has now returned but BBFFS cannot
afford to let internal politics come before conservation goals (NGO1; SC2). In small
communities like Bluefields disagreements within organisations can cause rifts as people
begin to take sides and get involved in disagreements; thus undermining the conservation
goals of BBFFS.
The main driver behind this intra-organisational politics is a culture of suspicion relating to
high levels of corruption within all levels of government (Figueroa, 2005; FSH5; PRV4). Any
person with influence, or who has links to higher organisations or is perceived to have
become successful through a CBO could draw suspicion. This makes it difficult for key
individuals to persevere with conservation activities. Still, this doubt is not always
unfounded as there are many cases where such suspicions have proved to be true (SC2). In
its infancy BBFFS were giving out loans to community members with little accounting taking
place; however this was stopped and now any loans are documented and BBFFS has been
31
praised for its record and account keeping (GOV1; IND1; NGO1; NGO3; PRV3). Interestingly
the fact that BBSFCA is in a very Christian area has been blamed for environmental
degradation (IND2; SC1) as this belief leads to complacency over the environment as ‘God
will come one day and burn up the land so what is the point’ (SC1). In the future BBFFS must
look into ways to incorporate neutral panels when making decisions although this will be is
difficult given the location in a community where everyone is personally linked.
Wetland Removal
Much of BBSFCA is fringed by mangroves and its waters are rich in sea grass. Both provide
essential ecosystem services with one acre of sea grass supporting 40, 000 fish and essential
breeding grounds for many fish species located within mangroves (NEPA, 1997).
Modification of wetlands requires a permit but economic developments are often permitted
even in sensitive sites, conflicting with conservation aims. Residents claim that corruption
was behind government support for nearby Sandals Whitehouse Hotel, the construction of
which destroyed acres of protected wetland (FSH5; NGO2; PRV4; SC2). The area previously
supported protected crocodile species but these are now restricted to Black River 30km
away (pers comms).
The driver behind this kind if development is pressure to increase tourism and boost
Jamaica’s ailing economy. As this area is currently the least developed in Jamaica (Goreau,
1992) it is important that as Bluefields increases the amount of tourists it receives proactive
measures must be put in place to ensure development is sustainable and based around eco-
tourism (GOV1; WRD3). Protection of wetlands should be a high priority for future plans at
BBSFCA (IND2).
Pollution and Waste
Resurfacing roads adjacent to BBBSFCA has caused run-off covering sea grass beds as have
attempts to channel the river under the road (SC2, pers comms). There are also issues with
sanitation in Westmoreland as pit latrines often leak into rivers, leading to sewage being
released into the sea around BBSFCA (IND2; NGO3). There was previously a recycling centre
for plastic in Kingston with a collection point at Bluefields but this closed down, leading to a
build-up of bottles around BBFFS offices (IND1). Use of plastic bags and disposable
packaging is high in the area leading to large amounts of household waste which is not
32
always disposed of correctly. BEPA provide bins along the public beach and Sandals and
BBFFS regularly clean beaches and rivers. Again the diver of this conflict is a lack of
education in conservation and environmentalism. Rather than focusing on cleaning up there
should be targets to change behaviour permanently (IND2).
Natural Systems
Jamaica is not only home to a high number of anthropogenic stressors for marine life but is
also in an area frequently affected by hurricanes, bleaching and other effects of climate
change. Coral bleaching was first noted in Jamaica in the 1990s, with no bleaching before
1987. Jamaica suffered an extreme bleaching event in 1991 when coral cover throughout
Jamaica dropped to just 5% down from 50%; this damage was not as severe in
Westmoreland due to the lack of anthropogenic stressors at the time (Goreau, 1992; Jones
et al, 2008). The wipe-out through disease of herbivorous Diadema antillarum urchins that
previously grazed corals also contributed to coral and therefore fish declines at this time
(Goreau, 1992; GOV1). Another mass bleaching occurred in 2005 due to the highest sea
temperatures in over 150 years (James & Crabbe, 2010). Reefs are recovering now due to
better management and the introduction of MPAs to the island (FSH4; GOV1). Climate
change is expected to increase the severity and occurrence of hurricanes and bleaching, and
rising sea levels will threaten the way of life for coastal populations (Hughes et al, 2003;
Jones et al, 2008). In combination these natural stressors undermine conservation attempts
such as MPAs and fishing restrictions. Hurricane Ivan in 2004 was particularly destructive
and the final catalyst, after the impacts of overfishing, to really bring about the idea of an
MPA at Bluefields (IND1; IND2; SC1; WRD1).
These natural factors are all beyond human control, but Bruno et al (2009) showed that the
likelihood of coral takeover by microalgae (which was thought to occur after disturbance) is
actually quite a low threat and the main priority for restoration should be the protection
and return of hard corals and species diversity. This is a measure BBSFCA is already taking
with the provision of coral trees and an artificial reef to support resilience and recovery
(WRD1; WRD2; IND1; NGO1).
33
Lionfish
Lionfish have become widespread in the Caribbean and the first lionfish was seen in Jamaica
in 2004 (Schofield, 2009). These predatory invasive fish add stress to reefs that are already
facing the problems discussed above and their voracious appetite contributes to species
decline. In many Caribbean countries introducing the lionfish as an edible catch has been
unsuccessful due to scepticism about their poisonous spines. However, in Jamaica this
method (combined with a nationwide programme of culls) has been more effective. In
Bluefields, while they may have contributed to decline in fish numbers in the past, lionfish
have successfully been fished down to only small juveniles (FSH1-3).
4.4 Governance Approach
BBSFCA is an example of an MPA ‘governed primarily by local communities under collective
management arrangements’ or community-led governance as defined by Jones (2014:107).
Figure 6 shows the current stakeholders in BBSFCA governance and how they are linked.
Declining fish stocks due to over-fishing and damage from hurricanes led to the Bluefields
community realising they had to do something to protect their marine life. In 2004 a survey
of the community was undertaken, including a question asking if they would support an
MPA (IND1; IND2; SC1; WRD1-2). When key community leaders involved in this drive for
protection heard of government plans to create SFCAs throughout the island they pushed
for the inclusion of Bluefields on the shortlist of 20 sites (SC1). The positive results from the
Bluefields survey, and another carried out in Savannah-la-Mar, convinced the Minister for
Fisheries to choose Bluefields as one of nine sanctuaries. Bluefields was the biggest to be
designated and an agreement with the government made BBFFS responsible for SFCA
management.
Six wardens were trained by NEPA and have the power to arrest poachers and must report
wider environmental damage (UNEP, 2004), they are paid J$50,000/month to patrol, they
volunteer hours to ensure there is 24 hour coverage (payments are often months late)
(GOV1; WRD1-3). Initially wardens received death threats and compliance was low but now
the situation is much better, with up to 95% compliance (IND2; SC2). The initial struggle led
to BBFFS petitioning for a new marine police station near them which was eventually
granted (GOV3). BEPA was one of their first partners, providing fuel for the warden’s patrol
34
boat (PRV3; PRV4). Sandals Whitehouse and the Sandals Foundation have given funding for
divers to complete monitoring and like BEPA they participate in beach and river clean-ups
(PRV1; PRV2; PRV4). Sandals introduced BBFFS to CARIBSAVE who bought the new patrol
boat and provide funding for the coral trees, monitoring and other projects (PRV1).
CARIBSAVE are also in the process of creating a management plan for BBSFCA as it is yet to
make any money (NGO1; NGO2). MOAF must provide educational training and help
facilitate legislation (GOV1). There has been ongoing community education to attempt to
change the behaviour of fishers and prevent the use of fine nets, juvenile capture and coral
damage (FSH3-5; GOV2; IND2; WRD3). Decisions are community-based and involve
meetings between stakeholders and a board of community leaders (COM1; IND2; SC1). The
main aim now is to become financially independent and to rely less on grants; this would
put money back into the community and relieve poverty caused by reduced income from
fishing after the sanctuary was designated.
35
[Type a quote from the document
or the summary of an interesting
point. You can position the text
box anywhere in the document.
Use the Drawing Tools tab to
change the formatting of the pull
quote text box.]
[Type a quote from the document
or the summary of an interesting
point. You can position the text
box anywhere in the document.
Use the Drawing Tools tab to
change the formatting of the pull
quote text box.]
Figure 6: linkages between organisations at Bluefields. Green represents environmental organisations in the area that are no closely linked to BBFFS. Links may be one or two-way.
36
4.5 Effectiveness
As mentioned in 4.3 many of the conflicts at BBSFCA are at least partially addressed.
Conservation objectives are being met, but specific numerical targets must now be the focus
of BBSFCA. 24 hour patrols are a very important factor in reducing poaching and mean
incidents such as a large night poaching event by outsiders at Oracabessa SFCA which
reduced fish stocks almost to pre-designation levels, can be avoided (GOV1; NGO1). The
legal framework at BBSFCA is very strong, with a high rate of prosecution and fines for illegal
activity (GOV3). If fines are increased as proposed this will further deter poachers.
The community-led governance model means that local people have a say in the running of
the sanctuary and how it impacts them, although currently not enough is being done to
improve participation in the sanctuary (NGO1; SC2). As funds increase with increasing
tourism and business delivered through BBSFCA local people should begin to see more
benefits. There is a constant process of grant application by the BBFFS secretary and while
they receive help from Peace Corps and community members with expertise, there must be
more done to train staff in administration and accounting to successfully manage BBFFS as it
expands.
BBFFS and other local environment-centric organisations such as BEPA and the Sandals
Foundation educate the community through school outreach programmes and training
events. More must be done to begin to change the mind-sets of the community in order to
change behaviour, especially of the young (COM1; SC1). Progress has been made in terms of
conservation awareness; before BBSFCA many fishers did not know coral was alive and
destroyed fish eggs and other damaging habits (such as eating turtle eggs or crocodile) were
widespread (IND1-2). These behaviours are now almost universally seen as wrong and have
all but disappeared (WRD1-2).
Monitoring is carried out bi-annually and divers are paid to clean the coral trees, showing a
focus on scientific assessment. Data collected by BBSFFS and CARIBSAVE show that
biodiversity inside and outside BBSFCA is increasing over time revealing successful
governance of biological resources (see Figure 7). The short dataset means seasonal
variation affects results but seasonal comparisons also show an increase. The Coral Reef
Health Index (CRHI) at Bluefields is 2.5, so ‘poor’ but ‘fair’ cover starts at 2.6; Bluefields’
37
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
Oct-12 May-13 Nov-13 Jun-14 Dec-14
Nu
mb
ero
fA
nim
als
Cau
ght
Sample Period
Total Number of Individual Animals Caught
Inside Sanctuary
Outside Sanctuary
CRHI is the second best found on the island. Levels for microalgae cover are ranked as ‘fair’
(NEPA, 2013). It is probable that the next report would give BBSFCA a ‘fair’ CRHI as coral reef
health has been a focus in the past 2 years with introduction of coral trees in addition to the
artificial reef (WRD1-2).
Figure 7: Graph of total individuals caught inside and outside BBSFCA during bi-annual
sampling. This included lobster and conch as well as fish. Data from CARIBSAVE and BBFFS.
An effectiveness score of three1 is given to BBSFCA, and with implementation of the planned
management plan this could become a four in the foreseeable future. Good coral cover and
increasing catches inside and outside the sanctuary indicate conservation objective are
being met and enforcement is effective. A lack of will to control development in the area
and inability to become financially independent due to lack of expertise or specialist
knowledge may be problematic in the future but there are safeguards against the latter.
This is an ‘exciting but critical’ (SC2) time for BBSFCA and their ability to launch financially
will depend on their relative success thus far and may be the deciding factor in the
continued viability of an MPA at Bluefields.
1A score of three signifies ‘Some impacts completely addressed, some are partly addressed’
Jones (2014:104)
38
4.6 Incentives
This sections discusses incentives used, needed and to be improved at BBSFCA. Codes from
Table 1 are utilised; see Table 3 for full list.
Economic
BBSFCA does not yet generate its own income which shows that at present there is a lack of
economic incentives. E2 should come into force as tourism increases so fishers will be paid
for the use of their boats as sightseeing vessels. Figure 8 shows there is little tourism
infrastructure currently in Bluefields and how much local people would benefit from an
increase in eco-tourism. The SWFFA network could assign rights to fish only from one fishing
beach to prevent outsiders and increase tourism in all three MPAs by creating a tourist trail.
E5 is already used by the farmers group so once the old marketplace is running again fishers
can also sell locally caught produce. This ties well with E6 which is used at a small-scale;
local crafts people are encouraged to sell their products from the BPCA buildings where
there is currently a sewing shop making artisanal products for Sandals. New tourist
accommodation opened in August with plans for a craft shop to open in 2016 providing a
location for local-made goods, such as weaving, to be sold.
Currently there is leakage of benefits to non-local vessels as fishers from Savannah-La-Mar
often travel to Bluefields for higher catch. There are no reports of fishers from other
countries ever fishing in BBSFCA waters. As all of BBSFCA is no-take there is strong use of E4,
and wire distribution to stop juvenile catch coupled with targeted education campaigns
means sustainable fishing is encouraged and practised by a majority. Fishers reported an
increase in catch implying increasingly profitable fisheries; however NGO3 reported no
change in benefit seen by their sponsored fishermen. The lack of any great benefit to fishers
so far indicates a need for E7 to improve in order for equality issues worsened by the
establishment of BBSFCA to recover.
BBFFS is good at securing funding for all sectors. Government funding is often late but is
written into legislation and many NGO partnerships are long-term. Recently the person
responsible for many of the grant applications left BBFFS so more training must be given to
the BBFFS secretary to keep funding coming in. The wardens are skilled at report and
account writing through this history of funding partnerships.
39
Figure 8: Socioeonomic map of Bluefields. Created by Smith & Wedenoja, 2013
Interpretative
Although their budget is not large, BBFFS do work with the community to raise awareness of
the work of the MPA and more general marine conservation issues. Wardens promote
training days where they inform fishers on regulations and have provided wire for pots so
juvenile fish cannot be caught. It was BBFFS that petitioned for the marine police station
40
minutes from BBSFCA and its presence means I2 is very well enforced. The community
seems to understand the consequences for trespassing or poaching and knowledge of the
benefits BBSFCA was beginning to provide to their fishing grounds was widespread.
Awareness of marine conservation is much higher than in neighbouring Whitehouse, with
many fishers demonstrating knowledge of spill-over benefits and the penalties for defying
regulations. Partners also work to promote awareness of the MPA. BEPA contribute to I1 as
they inform their guests on conservation issues by taking them of tours of BBSFCA.
CARIBSAVE produce videos about the MPAs they work with which raises awareness in the
wider area and even internationally. As BBSFCA begins to generate income this widespread
understanding of benefits and environmental awareness should translate into a greater
sense of ownership within the community and further promote compliance and awareness.
Knowledge
K1 has been well used at BBSFCA where fishers have contributed to discussions involving
the boundaries of the MPA and their knowledge and expertise have been used to develop
new projects. Visiting scientists often use fishers to help them find the best locations for
research and they will play a key role in increasing tourism at Bluefields. Half of the wardens
are also fishers thereby providing an obvious link to the fishing community and allowing
patrols to focus on areas poachers are likely to frequent. In the early days education about
marine ecology was provided by BCPA but the general consensus between all stakeholders
is that local knowledge is much better now. Sandals Foundation has its own education
programme and they regularly go into schools to raise awareness of local conservation and
get children involved.
The sea beyond the boundaries of BBSFCA is unmanaged but inside is strictly no-take,
zonation to integrate these distinctly different areas could help achieve conservation
objectives and incorporate the precautionary principle into management. The plans for the
SWFFA network to link the three MPAs and promote sustainable use beyond their
boundaries are based on the latest science showing networks increase resilience (NGO1).
CLIF data is collected biannually to inform future decisions on usage and management with
collective decisions used to avoid disputes. It is difficult to find a truly neutral discussion
panel in such a small area and more needs to be done to address this. However scientists
41
involved give advice without bias and, especially those from outside, are willing to challenge
leadership figures within BBFFS. BBFFS receive help from independent researchers, the
Jamaican Environmental Trust and Peace Corps but none of these yet take on the role of an
arbitrator.
Legal
Close ties with the marine police and a high level of support for BBSFCA from the local judge
mean legal incentives within BBFFS’ control are used well. Police patrol daily in addition to
24 hour warden patrols, and political will to increase the deterrents wardens impose is
increasing as the fishing bill comes to parliament. Legal definitions and jurisdictions are
widely understood by the community due to a leaflet campaign in the early years of BBSFCA
explaining the boundaries, restrictions and penalties (diagrams were also provided for
illiterate fishers).
All partners of BBFFS require accounts detailing where money has been spent and reports
on progress towards conservation goals. This has made BBFFS a transparent organisation
with much practice in report writing. Wardens are available for discussion if a community
member believes something unjust has occurred. The legacy of mistrust for authority in
Jamaica often means that if an organisation is unfair or corrupt it will not last long. As BBFFS
was created in 2009 by fishermen from Bluefields they have a much higher level of trust
than if government had imposed the MPA on the community.
Current linkage between BBSFCA stakeholders is poor. CARIBSAVE and BEPA only met for
the first time this year despite both having been involved and influential since shortly after
the MPA creation. Coordination between government departments and BBFFS is better than
between NGOs, although within government, decisions to improve tourism in Jamaica
would come before conservation goals. This again highlights the need for better
adjudication platforms and facilitators to bring stakeholders together. This enhancement
would also aid in situations where intra-organisational politics hinders decision making and
conservation.
42
Participative
P1 is clearly set out in the rule book for BBFFS, along with objectives for BBSFCA. It makes
clear that the MPA must not restrict one group of fishers more than any other and this
contributed to the placement and size of BBSFCA. Currently there are monthly meetings
between various subsets of stakeholders, allowing grievances to be discussed and action
taken when possible or necessary. There was a consensus among interviewees that they
knew where to bring problems which would be listened to if they did so. The trust built up in
the community is predominantly caused by the decentralised governance operated at
BBSFCA. In future decentralisation must go further and place responsibility on locals, and
especially fishers, particularly if they begin to benefit financially from increasing tourism at
Bluefields.
There is a strong tradition of BBFFS influencing government, from the conception of the
MPA by petitioning the government to the allocation of a marine police station at Bluefields.
While they did not believe they could stop a development from happening BBFFS members
claimed they would do their utmost to ensure it did as little damage as possible to the
ecology of BBSFCA and seemed confident they would not go unheard. The various
partnerships built up by BBFFS have built social capital while maintaining traditional ways of
decision making and discussion.
Participation must increase in the wider community, plus education to change behaviour
eventually leading to more environmental awareness locally and thus peer enforcement and
greater social capital. The introduction of new economic incentives to increase participation
will require the implementation of some new legal incentives too. For example if property
rights are assigned there must be regulations to ensure equal distribution of rights and the
SWFFA network must be closely monitored and policed to ensure there is protection from
outsiders. Equally this will require neutral, independent panels to set these regulations and
help from the MOAF, drawing from the knowledge of all stakeholders. This shows how
interlinked the incentives are, the addition of one will require greater implementation or
addition of others.
43
Table 3: Incentives sorted by whether they are used, must be improved or are needed at
BBSFCA. Codes from Table 1.
Incentives Used To be Improved Needed
E4 E3 E1
E8 E6 E2
E9 E7 E5
E10 I1 K3
I2 K2 L5
I3 L2 L6
K1 L3 P3
L1 L4 P4
L7 L8
L10 L9
P5 P1
P9 P2
P10 P6
P7
P8
4.7 Cross-cutting Themes
Leadership
The main leadership role at BBSFCA is the president of BBFFS but the wardens and BBFFS
committee also lead the community. The previous president of BBFFs had a huge galvanising
force and was very well-connected but they have moved on to other ventures now.
Decision making is slow in Jamaica and there is political resistance to change(Figueroa,
2005) so it remains to be seen if without the leadership of the ex-president, BBFFS will
receive as much funding as before and continue to steer political decisions. In order to
continue the process of continual grant writing and pressuring the government for change
the current secretary must receive training in grant applications at least. As a group the
wardens provide leadership in the community as many are fishers themselves so they lead
by example in terms of biodiversity conservation.
44
Role of NGOs
NGOs play an essential role in the management of BBSFCA as they are the main source of
funding for BBFFS and nationally galvanise political will for marine conservation. However,
while all of these organisations require accounting and progress reports (in particular
CARIBSAVE) there has been no training of BBFFS staff to do this. Currently over half of the
wardens are fishermen, some of whom were illiterate until recently. If the NGOs expect
extensive administration it should be their responsibility to ensure someone is appropriately
trained. It is unclear whether, during the implementation of the CARIBSAVE management
plan, someone from the community will be trained to run a tourism business or whether
someone would be brought in but there is currently not anyone skilled enough to take on
this responsibility (PRV3; SC2).
Communication between NGOs could also be improved as some long-term partners had not
interacted until this year. This has led to conflicts of interest, for example BEPA provide the
fuel for the patrol boat while CARIBSAVE bought the wardens the boat. There was no
discussion between the two and this lead to CARIBSAVE buying a hugely expensive boat
with excessive fuel consumption whose engines later broke down. Had there been better
communication such money leakage could have been avoided.
Equity Issues
As BBSFCA is entirely no-take there are some equity issues around the MPA. Local fishers to
date have not been compensated for loss of income but increasing income to BBSFCA
through tourism and craft markets is expected to be put back into the community in a
similar way Food for the Poor practises already. Traditional livelihoods have not been put at
risk as fishing beaches are still accessible and fishers can earn enough to sustain their ‘way-
of-life’ (FSH1-3). Figure 8 shows a socioeconomic map of the Bluefields area around BBSFCA
which shows that there are a lot of local businesses that could benefit from tourism,
improving equity in the area. As participation in BBFFS is open to all, poorer communities in
the area have the chance to build social capital by investing in the MPA, receiving a share of
the profits as they are made. NGOs could do more to stimulate social justice in the area; the
NGOs linked to hotels are very wealthy so could give more to the community and do more
to promote the long-term benefits of conservation.
45
5 Conclusion
MPAs play a vital role in marine conservation and are needed to protect biodiversity and
prevent further depletion of commercial fish stocks. Analysis of MPA governance is key to
determining their effectiveness at meeting conservation objectives. The best methods of
governance have long been debated but new consensus is being reached promoting
management styles that combine state, society and market based approaches. Methods for
analysing the governance of MPAs are therefore essential to current and future
conservation efforts. The basis for analysis used here is the framework devised by Jones
(2014) and this study adds to over twenty case studies already assessed in this way. The
governance at BBSFCA in Jamaica is community-led but with influence from the government
so it can be seen as an example of co-management, combining steer from both state and
civil society.
The BBSFCA case study provides an important example of how community driven MPAs can
be successful and the conflicts they face in achieving conservation objectives. BBSFCA was
awarded an effectiveness score of three indicating that the influence of both community
and state partners has been indispensable to the MPA’s success. BBSFCA is the only MPA in
Jamaica to have 24 hour patrols by wardens; this was devised by wardens who are fishers
and had noticed decreasing catch sizes prior to the MPA designation. Community
participation has led to high compliance and much increased knowledge of biodiversity and
conservation in the Bluefields area. It is hoped this engagement with conservation issues
will lead to peer enforcement and increased awareness of environmental degradation
generally. However, there are some equity issues associated with BBSFCA. The exclusion of
fishers from this area brought some initial conflict, and as BBSFCA does not currently
generate an income some fishers see the MPA solely as an imposition with no benefits.
BBFFS has strong partnerships with NGOs but has come to rely on them for funding and thus
lacks economic incentives. A management plan is being complied presently, aimed at
creating a source of income and distributing benefits throughout the community. NGO
funding added to new profits generated by the MPA will add a market dimension to
governance, increasing resilience to societal or environmental perturbation
46
In the future BBFFS must focus on becoming self-sufficient. Introduction of tourism and food
and craft markets must be done at an appropriate pace for the MPA so that conservation
objectives remain the main focus of BBSFCA governance. It is vital that additional coastal
development in the Bluefields Bay area is based around eco-tourism as historically tourism
in Jamaica has been built around making as much money as possible with no heed to the
degradation of the environment. The planned creation of an MPA network is a good
strategy as it will facilitate discussion and cooperation between management groups and
diversify governance. Poorly-performing MPAs will improve and those already well
established, such as BBSFCA, can contribute to collective learning and increase social capital.
Jamaica appears to be invested in a sustainable future and has signed to numerous
conservation targets. However, challenges affecting BBSFCA also affect the rest of Jamaica,
and a great deal of political will is needed to resolve the drivers of conflict. The outcome of
parliamentary discussion over new fishing laws will be the first stage at which politicians’
commitment to this will be tested. The success of BBSFCA can be used as a model for the
establishment of MPAs in future and for finding a co-management balance to meet
objectives. Long-term goals for conservation in Jamaica and throughout the Caribbean will
be met through increased stakeholder participation and a communal sense of stewardship
for their natural resources.
47
Autocritique
I knew early on that I was interested in conservation governance, in particular of protected
areas which is why I chose to do my study with Peter Jones. I particularly wanted to study an
MPA with a wetland component such as mangroves or seagrass; these are commonly
included in Jamaican MPAs which is why the project was done there (with the additional
benefit of being English speaking). The initial plan for my study was to look at 3 MPAs in the
South West of Jamaica, Galleon, Whitehouse and Bluefields, which have plans to be turned
into a network, the South West Fishermen’s Friendly Alliance (SWFFA). However, as a
second student decided late on to also do a study in Jamaica and after some research that
did not reveal much about the network my work was changed to a single study of Bluefields.
I feel this benefitted me in the end because when interviewees at Bluefields were asked
about SWFFA none could give me many details other than the fact that it was a plan for the
future. Only CARIBSAVE and Sandals seemed to know more than this. Some initial worries of
interview fatigue at Bluefields proved unfounded, the community were very welcoming and
pleased to have further studies in the area. As I was interviewing different groups it never
fell to one person to explain everything to me.
Spending the full five weeks in Bluefields allowed me the time to do an in-depth analysis
which would not have been possible had I rushed to do three MPAs in a similar time.
Bluefields has the good fortune of being relatively well-studied compared to many
Caribbean MPAs which was beneficial to me in that maps of the area etc. had been created.
However it would be of great value to Bluefields if there was the creation of an archive
there as past PhDs are not always possible to find and it would be good to know all the
studies that have been done there. There are plans to do this in the near future.
It would be interesting in future to look at SWFFA and the unstudied MPA at Whitehouse.
The wardens only started work there the week I arrived so it would not have been feasible
to include it in my study as it is so new, but it is very small so could maybe be included in
studies of the area or even a wetland PA analysis in St. Elizabeth.
Appendices removed
48
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