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University of Buckingham Humanities Graduate Centre. Advanced Studies Seminars 2013
Thursday 25 April 2013
How immigration is changing Britain and other European societies
David Coleman, University of [email protected]
http://www.spi.ox.ac.uk/oxpop
A nation of immigrants?
Yes – in the very long run!
Most genetic ancestry appears to be ancient
Uncertain magnitude and effects of Saxon invasions 5th – 7th centuries, Danes 8th – 9th.
Relatively small contributions from Romans, Normans and others.
Later arrivals episodic, more impact on culture and economy than on population.
Post-war immigration to Europe and the rise of ethnic minority populations.
Historically, Europe a region of emigration.Large-scale immigration in peacetime mostly from 1960s:
Guest-workers to some countriesEasy entry from former colonies – for a time.Subsequent entry of dependants and new spousesChain migration from non-European countries helped by ‘familist’ culture, large family size, revolutions in information, transport, rights.EU expansionRenewed recent interest in skilled migration, age structure.
Policy important but erratic; many now restrictive
Some facilitating factors for migration
Unequal pace of economic development and demographic transition in ‘North’ and ‘South’.
Geographical proximity (UK/Ireland, Sweden/Finland.)
Political / historical connections.Post-war ‘revolutions’ in transport, information and
rights.State policy in sending and receiving countries.Expansion of EU and its powers.International conventions / human rights.The ‘migration industry’ and trafficking.
Peculiar characteristics of migration to UKLabour migration not organised by state – no ‘guest worker’ scheme except in 1940s.
Foreign immigration controlled since 1905, immigration of ‘British subjects’ not until 1962 / 71.
Some persistent electoral privileges for Commonwealth
Low levels of immigration from EU15, high from A8.
No significant organised return migration or repatriation.
Prominence of ‘ethnic’ classifications, not ‘immigrant ‘ or ‘foreigner’, multicultural policies.
Consensus on relatively restrictive migration policy 1963 – 1997, new pro-migration policy since 1997 – 2010, PBS.
(Vague) numerical target for first time since 2010.
Weak data, no register, but only country with emigration data.
Turkey and Western Europe 1950-2050 – an illustration of demographic disparity
Population trends and projections, selected European countries and Turkey 1950-2050 (millions). Source: United Nations 2004-based estimates.
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
France
Germany
Italy
United Kingdom
Turkey
Migration flows to European Union and USA, 1960 – 2011 (nb EU data include movement from one EU country to another; about 40%)
-500
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
Net immigation to EU-15, EU27 countries, gross inflow to the USA, 1960 - 2011 and net inflow to USA 2001-2011 (thousands). Sources: Eurostat, US Dept of Homeland Security.
Net immigration to EU-15 countries
Persons accepted for permanent residence, USA (gross inflow)
Net immigration to EU27 countries
Gross migration flow to France 2005, by reason for admission (%).
France 2005. Immigration (gross inflow) according to reason for admission (percent).
PercentStudent Worker Family Other All by area
EEA 3 37 10 50 100 21Non-Europe 26 5 50 19 100 79
All 21 11 42 25 100 100Source: INED
Note: 'Other' includes inactive, retired, refugee. Percent by purpose excludes minors (about 8% of total).Switzerland and Turkey omitted. 12% of total; mostly Turkey, 39% for family reasons.
Long-term migration trends to the United Kingdom 1967 – 2011, UK and non-UK citizens.
-200
-100
0
100
200
300
400
1967
1969
1971
1973
1975
1977
1979
1981
1983
1985
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
UK net migration by citizenship 1967 - 2011 (thousands). Note: there are discontinuities in this series from 1991. Source: ONS International Migration Statistics Series
MN, ONS Statistical Bulletin, Migration Statistics 2019.
Foreign citizens
Foreign citizens (post 1991)
UK citizens
UK Citizens (post 1991)
Net migration to selected European countries 1997 – 2011
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Net migration, selected European countries 1997 - 2011, thousands. Source: Eurostat
Denmark
Germany
France
Netherlands
Sweden
United Kingdom
Switzerland
Net migration to Italy and Spain 1997 – 2011. Note: increase primarily due to illegal immigration and regularisation of illegal
residence through amnesties.
-100
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Net migration, Spain and Italy, 1997 - 2011 (thousands). Source: Eurostat.
Spain
Italy
Net migration can go down as well as up. Germany 1954 – 2011.
Migration to Germany 1954 - 2011, by citizenship. Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Wiesbaden. Up to 1990 German Federal Republic only.
- 300 000
- 200 000
- 100 000
-
+ 100 000
+ 200 000
+ 300 000
+ 400 000
+ 500 000
+ 600 000
+ 700 000
+ 800 000
1954
2)
1956
2)
1958
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
Net migrationGermans including aussiedlerForeignersGermans without aussiedler net flow
Net migration per thousand population,
selected European countries. Source: Eurostat
Net immigration per thousand population, selected European countries 1990 - 2009. Source: Eurostat.
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Net
imm
igra
tion
per
tho
usan
d po
pula
tion
Switzerland
United Kingdom
Netherlands
Germany
Czech Republic
Relative importance of migration and natural change in population growth and decline, Europe 2011.
Crude rate of natural change and crude rate of net migation plus statistical adjustment, selected European countries 2011.
Source: Eurostat.
Ukraine
Russia
Moldova
Georgia
BelarusSerbia
Switzerland
Norway
Iceland
Mac.
Croatia
UKSweden
Finland
Slovak.
Slovenia
Romania
Portugal
Poland
Austria
Netherlands
Malta
Hungary
Italy
France
SpainGreece
Ireland
Estonia
Germany
DenmarkCzech Rep.
Bulgaria
Belgium
-8.0
-6.0
-4.0
-2.0
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
10.0
12.0
-6.0 -4.0 -2.0 0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 10.0 12.0
Rate of natural increase per 1000
Rat
e of
net
mig
rati
on p
er 1
000
European comparisons – effect of projected migration levels on projected population size, 2010 compared with 2060. Western and Southern
Europe. Source: Eurostat.
Effect of migration on projected population growth 2010-2060, percent, selected Western and Southern European countries, by descending order of growth without migration.
Source: data from Eurostat 2008 convergence scenario
14.7
35.6
27.3
3.0
24.1
13.7
7.7
-18.8
8.97.2
2.8
-5.2 -5.3
-18.3
-25.3
-28.9
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
France Norway UK Netherlands Belgium Spain Italy Germany
percent population change to 2060 withmigration
percent population change to 2060without migration
European comparisons – effect of projected migration levels on projected
population size, 2010 compared with 2060. Eastern Europe. Source: Eurostat.
Projected percent population change 2010-2060, selected Eastern European countries, with and without migration, sorted by descending order of projected
population size without migration. Source: data from Eurostat 2010 projection.
-17.3
-19.3-20.0
-22.3
-24.7-26.0
-26.7
-30
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
Poland CzechRepublic
Slovenia Romania Bulgaria Hungary Latvia
percent projected population change2010-2060 with migration
percent projected population change2010-2060 without migration
Demographic consequences to the UK of projected levels of migration, 2011 - 2061
UK population 2011 - 2061. 2010-based Principal projection and high and low migration variants
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
2011 2016 2021 2026 2031 2036 2041 2046 2051 2056 2061
OXPOP TFR=1.95, net migration = 240k
ONS High Migration 260k
ONS Principal Projection, TFR = 1.84, migration = 200k
ONS Low migration 140k
ONS natural change only
Age-structure at different levels of net migration, UK 2011 -2086, with constant TFR = 1.84 and falling mortality. Source:
ONS and OXPOP
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
2011
2016
2021
2026
2031
2036
2041
2046
2051
2056
2061
2066
2071
2076
2081
2086A
ged
Pot
enti
al S
up
por
t R
atio
183 thousand
90 thousand
40 thousand
25 thousand
zero migration
Retirement age and the PSR, UK 2011 - 2086
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
5.5
6.0
2011
2016
2021
2026
2031
2036
2041
2046
2051
2056
2061
2066
2071
2076
2081
2086A
ged
Pot
enti
al S
up
por
t R
atio
APSR 20-75 (graduated)
APSR 20-69
APSR 15-64
Ethnic change
Continued migration from one population, into another with sub-replacement fertility, must eventually replace one with the other.
If incoming populations have higher fertility, the process will be accelerated.
Migration, not differential fertility, is usually the dominant factor.
Selected European populations, percent of residents born abroad, 2010. Source: Eurostat
16.315.315.2
14.314.013.9
12.712.4
12.011.3
11.111.111.111.0
10.89.0
8.07.5
6.54.44.3
3.81.2
0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0
EstoniaLatvia
AustriaSweden
SpainBelgium
IrelandSlovenia
GermanyUnited Kingdom
FranceGreece
NetherlandsIcelandNorway
DenmarkItaly
PortugalLithuaniaHungary
FinlandCzech Republic
Poland
Series1
Estimates of foreign origin and immigrant
population, selected European countries. Sources: national statistical offices
Numbers of foreign citizens, and immigrants, enumerated in selected European countries, around 2009
Foreign‘Foreign ‘Foreign ImmigrantsImmigrants citizens as
Population Origin’ Origin’ as percent ofpercent ofMillions (millions) (percent) (millions) total pop. immigrants
Austria 2011 8.4 n.a. n.a 1.00 11.9 92.4Belgium 2007 10.6 n.a n.a 1.38 13.0 70.4Denmark 2011 5.6 0.57 10.2 0.43 7.7 80.7Finland 2010 5.4 n.a n.a 0.25 4.6 67.7France 2008 64.0 n.a n.a 5.34 8.4 69.5Germany 2009 81.9 16.04 19.6 10.60 12.9 67.3N'lands 2011 16.7 3.43 20.6 1.78 10.7 42.7Portugal 2007 10.6 n.a n.a 0.65 6.1 68.9Spain 2007 44.9 n.a n.a 6.00 13.4 72.4Sweden 2009 8.0 1.73 21.7 1.34 16.7 45.1UK 2010 61.4 10.24 16.7 7.14 11.6 62.5
TFR trends of UK ethnic minority populations 1965 – 2006data from Labour Force Survey by own-child method, 7-year moving averages
TFR ethnic minorities, UK 1965 - 2006 from LFS by own-child method; seven-year moving averages
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
19
65
19
67
19
69
19
71
19
73
19
75
19
77
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
White
Black-Caribbean
Black-African
Indian
Pakistani
Bangladeshi
Chinese
Convergence in fertility: total fertility of Pakistani
women in the UK by birthplace. Source: Coleman and Dubuc 2010.
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
5.5
6.0
6.5
1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99
period
TFR
and
95%
con
fide
nce
inte
rval
Pakistani-born women in UK
All UK Pakistani women
UK-born Pakistani women
Ethnic change in the USA, projected 1999 - 2100
US population 1999 - 2100 Middle Series, ethnic group. Source; US Bureau of the Census 2000.
0.000
50.000
100.000
150.000
200.000
250.000
1999
2002
2005
2008
2011
2014
2017
2020
2023
2026
2029
2032
2035
2038
2041
2044
2047
2050
2053
2056
2059
2062
2065
2068
2071
2074
2077
2080
2083
2086
2089
2092
2095
2098
Hispanic White non-Hispanic Black NH American Indian NH Asian and Pacific NH
A projection of ethnic transformation in the UK 2006 – 2056. TFR = 1.84, net immigration = 180,000 / year. Source: Coleman 2010.
Very long-term ethnic change in the UK in relation to level of
net immigration (+180k, +81k, ‘balanced’ and natural change). Source:
Coleman 2010 Figure 6.
Comparison of results of European ‘foreign-origin’ projections
Projected growth of population of immigrant or foreign origin 2000-2050,
selected countries, as percent of total population.
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
per
cen
t
Germany medium variant
USA medium variant (excludes black population)
Netherlands base scenario
Denmark 2002- based medium variant
Sweden foreign background 2004 based
Austria 'Compensating' scenario, no naturalisation.
UK population projection 2051 by age, sex and origin Assumptions for total population as GAD Principal Projection 2006 (net migration 190K;
TFR 1.84)
UK population 2051 projection by age and origin (1000s).Assumptions for total population: migration, TFR as in GAD Principal Projection 2008.
3,000 2,500 2,000 1,500 1,000 500 0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000
0-4
5-9
10-14
15-19
20-24
25-29
30-34
35-39
40-44
45-49
50-54
55-59
60-64
65-69
70-74
75-79
80-84
85-89
90-94
95-99
100+
Males British origin Males foreign originFemales British origin Females foreign origin
The faces of the future?
ethnic groups of mixed origin, England and Wales 2001. Source: 2001 Census.
All born in born born in born % of % of
birth- UK overseas UK overseas total non-white
places (1000s) (1000s) (1000s) (1000s) pop. pop.
All Mixed groups 661.0 524.3 136.7 79.3 20.7 1.3 14.6W/ Black Caribbean 237.4 222.9 14.5 93.9 6.1 0.5 5.3W/ Black African 78.9 52.9 26.0 67.1 32.9 0.2 1.7W/Asian 189.0 144.5 44.6 76.4 23.6 0.4 4.2Other mixed 155.7 104.0 51.7 66.8 33.2 0.3 3.4
Current unions outside own group, Great Britain 1991-96, 1997-02 (percent).
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Black-Caribbean
Black-African Indian Pakistani Bangladeshi Chinese
perc
ent
Women 1991-1996 Women 1997-2002 Men 1991-1996 Men 1997-2002
UK 2006 – 2056. Projected continued growth of mixed ethnic groups without migration. Source: Coleman 2010.
An end to ‘ethnic’ categories? The rise of mixed populations.Probabilistic projections of the UK 2001- 2100, average outcome for major groups
(percent).
UK Version 2 probabilistic projection: mean of percent of each major ethnic group in the total population, 2001 - 2100.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
2001
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050
2055
2060
2065
2070
2075
2080
2085
2090
2095
2100
White
Black
Asian
Mixed
Concluding points
Migration from developing world may be over within a century (?); but effects on ancestry permanent.
Migration the key driver; in theory under policy controlSignificance for social and political change: religion, identity,
segregation, language, law, foreign policy? (depends on numbers, pace, origins, policy).
Integration / assimilation, or ‘community of communities’? And who adapts to whom?
Is ‘parity’ or ‘majority’ important? Inter-ethnic union may change relative group size, eventually
create completely new mixed populations of increasingly ill-defined ancestry.