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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA Economics 134 DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS Spring 2018
Professor David Romer
LECTURE 10
THE ZERO LOWER BOUND IN THE IS-MP-IA FRAMEWORK FEBRUARY 21, 2018
I. INTRODUCTION II. THE IS-MP-IA MODEL EXTENDED A. Assumptions 1. The nominal interest rate can’t be negative 2. Expected inflation depends on actual inflation 3. Discussion B. The AD Curve 1. Where we are headed 2. The IS-MP diagram 3. Deriving the AD curve C. A Little Bit about the Case of Money Targeting III. EXAMPLES A. A Large, Long-Lasting Fall in Planned Expenditure 1. The initial situation 2. The shock 3. Aside: Why doesn’t the AD curve shift left by the same amount at
each inflation rate? 4. The dynamics of the economy 5. What happens when there is a rebound in planned expenditure 6. How seriously should we take this? B. The Case of “Anchored” Expectations 1. Overview 2. A model of anchored expectations 3. The effects of a large, long-lasting fall in planned expenditure 4. A concern: how long can this last?
LECTURE 10 The Zero Lower Bound in the IS-MP-
IA Framework
February 21, 2018
Economics 134 David Romer Spring 2018
Announcements
• Problem Set 2 is being distributed. • It is due at the beginning of lecture a
week from today (Feb. 28). • Optional problem set work session:
Monday, Feb. 26, 6:45–8:15, in 597 Evans Hall.
• A packet of “sample exam questions” is also being distributed.
Announcements (cont.)
• For next time, you do not need to read the paper by Temin and Wigmore.
• My upcoming office hours: • This week: Usual time: Thursday (2/22),
4–5:30. • Next week and the week after: Monday
(2/26 and 3/5), 3:30–5:00.
Bad Idea: Inflation Responds Little to Slack
Y
π
IA0
AD
π0
Y Y0
IA will shift down only very slowly in response to Y < Y.
IA1 π1
Y
π
AD0
π0
Y�,Y1 Y0 No reason to have Y < Y�. Result: Inflation doesn’t fall.
AD1
What Policies Are Likely to Be Followed If Policymakers Believe Inflation Responds Little to Slack?
IA0
Y
π
AD1
π0
No reason to have Y < Y� believed. Result: Inflation rises. Y�actual Y�believed
What If Policymakers Believe Inflation Responds Little to Slack and Have an Overly Optimistic Estimate of Y�?
IA0
IA1 π1
Y
r
MP1
Fed shifts MP down to get Y = Y� believed. Y�actual Y�believed
If It Is Monetary Policymakers Who Have These Ideas, What Will Be Going on in IS-MP?
IS0
MP0
How Were Ideas Reflected in Monetary Policy Choices in the Early and Late 1970s?
• No reason to for contractionary policy because they thought it wouldn’t curb inflation.
• Unrealistic estimates of the natural rate led to expansionary policy.
• Fed officials pushed for other policies to control inflation, such as price controls.
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Perc
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Figure 2 Inflation Rate
Eccles Martin Burns Volcker Greenspan
What Does Romer and Romer’s Analysis Suggest about a Question We Discussed Early in the Course?
• Why did the rise of stabilization policy not cause the economy to quickly become much more stable?
• Romer and Romer’s analysis provides support for the “the tools were used badly” hypothesis.
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The CPI Inflation Rate after “Romer & Romer Dates”
Interpreting Regression Results – Example: Taylor’s Estimates of the Pre-Volcker
Monetary Policy Rule
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics (coefficient estimate divided by the standard error).
Interpreting Regression Results – Example (cont.)
• For the 1960–1979 sample, Taylor finds a coefficient on inflation = 0.813, with t-statistic = 12.9.
• Since the t-statistic is >> 2, we can reject the hypothesis that the coefficient is 0.
• But what is the 2-standard error confidence interval? Can we reject the hypothesis that the coefficient is 1?
Interpreting Regression Results – Example (cont.) • Coefficient on inflation = 0.813, t-statistic = 12.9.
• t-statistic ≡ coefficient/standard error, so standard error = coefficient/t-statistic.
• So: standard error = 0.813/12.9 = 0.063.
• The two-standard error confidence interval is from 2 standard errors below point estimate to 2 standard errors above.
• So: 2-standard error confidence interval = (0.687,0.939).
• 1 is outside this confidence interval, so we can reject (“at the 5% level”) the hypothesis that the coefficient is 1.
Key Assumptions: 1 The nominal interest rate cannot be negative • The central bank would like to set r = r(Y,π). • Since the real interest rate, r, equals i – πe,
this means that r cannot be less than 0 – πe. • Thus:
−
≥+=
otherwise π00ππ),Y(r if )π,Y(r
re
e
Key Assumptions: 2
• Expected inflation is an increasing function of actual inflation.
• That is, πe = πe(π), where πe(π) is an increasing function.
One Comment Before We Proceed
• We will continue to use the usual IS-MP-IA model (that is, the model without the zero lower bound) in cases where it is appropriate.
Y
π Y
r Deriving the AD Curve
0 – πe(π0)
MP(π0)
IS0
π0
MP(π1)
π1
0 – πe(π1)
MP(π2)
0 – πe(π2)
π2
Y0 Y1 Y2
π0 > π1 > π2
Y
π Y
r Deriving the AD Curve (continued)
IS0
MP(π3)
π2
Y2
π2 > π3
MP(π2)
Y3
π3
0 – πe(π2) 0 – πe(π3)
A Little Bit about the Case of Money Targeting • Continue to assume that expected inflation is
lower when actual inflation is lower. • Suppose that at some inflation rate, π0, the
nominal interest rate is zero. Thus the real interest rate is 0 – πe(π0).
• Now consider lower inflation, π1 (so π0 > π1). • The lowest possible real interest rate is 0 –
πe(π1), which is higher than the real interest rate at π0, 0 – πe(π0). Thus, r must be higher.
• That is, it is still true that when the economy is at the zero lower bound, lower inflation raises r.
Y
π Y
r
IS1
MP(π0)
π0, π1
IS0
IA0, IA1
Y0 (= Y) Y1
Y1 Y0 (= Y)
AD0 AD1
Example: A Large, Long-Lasting Fall in Planned Expenditure
0 – πe(π0)
Y
π AD if r = r(Y,π)
AD if r = 0 – πe(π)
Why Doesn’t the AD Curve Shift Left by the Same Amount at Each Inflation Rate?
Y
r
IS0 IS1
Y1 Y0 Y
r
IS0
0 – πe(π)
IS1
Y1 Y0
r = r(Y,π)
Why Doesn’t the AD Curve Shift Left by the Same Amount at Each Inflation Rate? (continued)
A given shift of the IS curve causes a bigger fall in Y (at a given π) if r = 0 – πe(π) than if r = r(Y,π).
Y
π AD if r = r(Y,π)
AD if r = 0 – πe(π)
Why Doesn’t the AD Curve Shift Left by the Same Amount at Each Inflation Rate? (continued)
Y
π AD0 AD1
Why Doesn’t the AD Curve Shift Left by the Same Amount at Each Inflation Rate? (concluded)
Y
π Y
r
IS1
MP(π1)
0 – πe(π1)
π1
IA1
Y2
AD1
MP(π2)
Y1
IA2 π2
Y
A Large, Long-Lasting Fall in Planned Expenditure (cont.)
0 – πe(π2) Note: Because inflation does not respond immediately to shocks, π1 = π0 (and so IA1 is the same as IA0).
Y
π Y
r
IS1
Y2
AD1
MP(π2) 0 – πe( π2)
IA2 π2
Y
The Effects of a Large Rebound in Planned Expenditure
IS3
Y4
AD3
How Seriously Should We Take This? The main message, which we should take very seriously: When the economy is at the zero lower bound, a key force keeping the economy stable is inoperative.
Inflation fell less in the Great Recession and the (subsequent period of continued high unemployment) than in previous recessions.
Example 2: Anchored Expectations
Two influences on inflation:
• As usual, below-normal output acts to make firms raise price and wages by less than before. This works to push inflation down.
• Firms’ expectations of inflation act to move inflation toward π*. When actual inflation is below π*, this works to push inflation up.
A Model of Anchored Expectations
Y
π Y
r Revisiting a Large, Long-Lasting Fall in Planned Expenditure
MP(π*)
0 – πe(π*)
π*
IS0
IA0
Y0 (= Y)
Y0 (= Y)
AD0
Y
π Y
r
IS1
MP(π*)
π*
IA1
AD1
Y1 Y
A Large, Long-Lasting Fall in Planned Expenditure (cont.)
0 – πe(π*)