Unproven Screening Devices Threaten the Lives of Police and Military

Dale W. Murray Sandia National Laboratories

P.O. Box 5800 Albuquerque NM 87185

ABSTRACT

In a world plagued with improvised explosive devices, drugs and dangerous people, the desire to field technology to protect our police and military is providing a fertile market for the proliferation of protection technologies that range from the unproven to the disproven. The market place is currently being flooded with detection equipment making inflated and inaccurate marketing claims of high reliably, high detection probabilities, and ease of operation—all while offering detection capabilities at safe distances. The manufacturers of these devices have found a willing global marketplace, which includes some of the most dangerous places in the world. Despite a wealth of contradictory performance and testing data available on the Internet, sales of these devices remain brisk and profitable. Rather than enhancing the security of police and military personnel, the reliance on these unproven and disproven devices is creating a sense of false security that is actually lowering the safety of front-line forces in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. This paper addresses the development and distribution history of some of these devices and describes the testing performed by Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, and other reputable testing agencies that illustrate the real danger in using this kind of unproven technology.

INTRODUCTION

In early October 1995, Albuquerque Public Schools (APS)

security personnel contacted Sandia National Laboratories saying that they had seen a demonstration of a contraband detection device that they were considering purchasing for detecting drugs at area-wide schools. The detector in question was manufactured by Quadro, a small company based in Harleyville, South Carolina. The company’s brochures, sent to Sandia by APS for review, suggested that this device—the Quadro Tracker—could detect and indicate the location of drugs, explosives, and nearly any material that it was programmed to detect—and it could detect these materials at a considerable distance. The brochure described the detection process as relying on the human body’s electromagnetic (EM) field to illicit an interaction between the device and the target material and would direct a swinging antenna that would point in the direction of the material being sought. APS was considering the purchase of 200 of these devices at a cost of approximately $1,000 each. The department manager of the Contraband Detection Department at Sandia agreed to send several members of the department to make an assessment of the usefulness of the device.

The Quadro Tracker was the first contact Sandia had with this type of ‘detection’ device and was followed by a series of similar such devices. At first it seemed like it would be a

simple matter to provide potential government buyers with the information they needed to avoid wasting their money and staff’s time. In the end, it took years of performance testing to explicitly prove to the public the nature of these types of devices and try to prevent these devices from—at best—just wasting the taxpayer’s money, and at—worst—costing the lives of military forces personnel, emergency responders, and civilians. Sandia’s involvement, which began with simple observations, progressed to performing thorough technical inspections, and finally to having to perform rigorous double blind performance evaluations on these devices.

In 1998, Sandia was alerted to the next similar type of screening device—the DKL Laboratories LLC Lifeguard™. This device, however, was not a contraband detector, but instead was advertized as being capable of detecting living persons who were hidden or obscured. It was obvious from its intended purpose that the Lifeguard™ Models 2 and 3 were clearly putting lives at risk. In this case, the new device was marketed as a ‘life rescue device’ that could be used to scan collapsed buildings in search for survivors, a false positive could cause a responder to needlessly risk their life entering a dangerous area searching for someone who was not there. Conversely, a false negative could mean someone trapped inside a structure would potentially not be rescued if the search was called off based on the results of a negative scan. Another application advertised by the manufacturer of the Lifeguard was for use by police in searching for fugitives. In this case, a false negative could result in a police officer unguardedly entering an area where an armed fugitive was hiding based on the device falsely indicating that there was no one in the area. Sandia eventually performed two evaluations of this product; the first was a double-blind performance evaluation, and the second was an engineering physical examination and destructive analysis of one of the devices.

A third similar product emerged in 2002. This device, manufactured in the United Kingdom, was marketed as the MOLE by Global Technical Ltd. Interestingly, it was identical in appearance to the Quadro Tracker—even its injected molded plastic handle appeared to be from the very same mold. For the testing conducted on the MOLE, Sandia assisted the Denver branch of the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center (NLECTC) in performing a double-blind performance evaluation of the device. While the report of the test results, which was published by NLECTC on their website, largely put an end to the sales of the MOLE, it did not stop follow-on comparable devices that were developed by other companies associated with both the MOLE and Quadro Tracker—devices that would eventually be blamed for numerous deaths in Iraq and Thailand as well as a number of alleged false arrests in Thailand. While one of these devices was discredited by tests that were performed by government-sponsored agencies in

Thailand, this device still remains in use in a number of other countries, including Mexico.

In 2007, several government agencies contacted Sandia to inquire about yet another device similar to the MOLE and the Quadro Tracker, which also had an antenna swinging from a handle, called the SniffEx®. The device’s inventor, who is from Bulgaria, originally marketed the device in that country under the name Arsenal®; later it was marketed by a firm in Texas under the new name SniffEx®. This device did not need to be examined or tested by Sandia, since very soon after Sandia was contacted about testing the device, it was tested by others in well designed double blind tests. Testing showed the SniffEx® to be completely ineffective.

Even today, the onslaught of similar unproven detection devices continues to be introduced to the security marketplace. In nearly all cases, the products are advertised as being capable of detecting nearly anything—when programmed properly—with the directions that they simply have to be operated in the hands of a human. Mostly, these devices do not even require batteries. Not surprisingly, none of these devices are ever accompanied by formal test reports indicating successful double-blind testing conducted by a reputable agency. They are, however, often accompanied by reports of demonstrations of the device that are reported as ‘rigorous tests’ or the literature makes claims that future tests are pending and will be performed by the government or a reputable testing laboratory. More often, the product literature presents testimonials of satisfied customers and anecdotal evidence of their efficacy.

The actual double blind tests of the Quadro Tracker, DKL Lifeguard, and the MOLE, which were conducted by Sandia National Laboratories, are described in the following sections.

EVALUATION OF THE QUADRO TRACKER QRS 250G

On the morning of October 16th, 1995, four members of the

Sandia Contraband Detection Department (including the author) visited a local vendor of the Quadro Tracker device located in Albuquerque, NM. The Quadro Tracker QRS 250G consists of a single piece of equipment approximately five inches tall. The straight plastic handle has a telescoping chrome-plated antenna that can be swung up from its storage groove in the front of the handle and be extended to approximately two feet out in front of the handle. The antenna is attached by a pin forming a hinge that allows the antennae to swing freely from side to side as shown in Figure 1. Programming the device to search for a specific material was accomplished by inserting a small contact-less plastic box called a programming chip into a slot in the handle.

Device Procedure

The detection procedure begins by the operator first holding the device in one hand to the side of his or her body with the antenna pointing down at the ground for about ten seconds. The company representative stated that this procedure ‘discharged’ the device and prepared it for detection. Next, the operator raises the device until the antenna is oriented nearly horizontal to the ground but with a slight down angle and is pointing forward relative to the operator’s position. The operator then walks forward while watching the antenna until it swings 90 degrees across the operator’s body. The operator

notes the direction of the antenna; it is supposed to be pointing in the direction of the target material. In order to ‘pin-point’ the location of the material the operator chooses a path roughly perpendicular to the first path then performs a second detection. According to the company, the point where the two lines of detection cross is the area where the target is located.

Figure 1: Quadro Tracker illustration.

Observations and Analysis

After the demonstration, the Sandia personnel made notes and observations and asked the representative some more question about the device. One of the more important statements made about the device was that there was a lack of any power source other than static electricity generated by the operator walking—the device contains no power source (e.g., batteries) or motors. According to the manufacturer’s specification sheet, the force that moves the antenna is derived from an electromagnetic field that exists between the operator’s body, the device, and the contraband material. It was observed by Sandia personnel during this demonstration that the force required to rotate the antenna’s mass 90 degrees could not possibly come from such a weak electric field even if such a field did exist. Without any other explanation the probable sources of the rotational forces are: • Gravity when the pin pivot is tilted away from vertical as

the operator walks. • The torque applied when the operator propels the device

forward by pushing on only the handle end of the antenna while it is not perfectly aligned with the forward motion.

• Wind. Another important observation was that there were no

electrical contacts between the programming chip and the device.

The conclusion of the Sandia observers was that the advertized mechanics of the Quadro Tracker device appeared to not be based on any known laws of physics. Chip Component Analysis

These findings were shared with the would-be purchaser, APS, and with the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) who was involved with Sandia’s program to assist various schools around the country with security problems like weapons screening. When NIJ discovered Sandia’s involvement with the Quadro Tracker, they asked if Sandia would examine a Quadro Tracker that the company had sent to them in an attempt to get a NIJ endorsement to recommend its use by

police agencies. Within a couple of days the NIJ’s unit arrived in Albuquerque for examination.

The first test performed on the Quadro Tracker was to x-ray the sealed handle. Despite the fact that the advertizing literature stated that the device employed inductors, conductors, and oscillators, the x-ray showed that none of these components were present.

The local Quadro Tracker vendor had shown how the device could also be used without programming chips (although this mode of operation was not mentioned anywhere in the product literature) by holding a sample of the material against the handle. This was demonstrated by the vendor wrapping a hair from the head of one of the Sandia members around the handle and using the device to find her. While she was sitting in plain view in the room, he demonstrated how the antenna pointed at her when he walked by. Based on this purported rationale, the Sandia evaluators decided to open the gunpowder programming chip to see if it contained some sample of gunpowder. The plastic case was securely glued shut so the only means to open the component was through destructive analysis with the use of a small hand saw. After the case was opened, the only thing found inside was a slip of black paper. The paper was subjected to analysis by an ion mobility spectrometer to see if the paper was contaminated with gunpowder; the test was negative. Eventually, after the FBI raided the corporate headquarters of the Quadro Corp, the mystery of the black paper was solved. The inventor, Wade Quattlebaum, showed how the programming chip was made; he used a Polaroid camera to take a photograph of the target material (for instance a sample of marijuana or gun powder), then used an enlarging copier to print an enlarged image of the material on black paper. The paper was cut into small rectangles and placed inside the chip.

To the scientists and engineers at Sandia, the idea that a simple piece of black paper on which an image of some contraband material was printed could be diced up and used to locate contraband material at any distance—even small distances—seemed so obviously misguided that no one would ever take this type of device seriously again. This proved not to be the case.

EVALUATIONS OF THE DKL LifeGuard™

In late 1997, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office

of Safeguards and Security (NN-51) contacted Sandia to request that Sandia perform a performance test on a device they thought could be of great benefit to DOE security forces while protecting critical DOE facilities. The device was the Dielectrokenetic Laboratories, LLC. (DKL) LifeGuard™. This device was purported to be capable of detecting a living human at long distances even obscured behind barriers.

Manufacturer Claims

The following list of features and claims were extracted

from the manufacturer’s website at the time of the request [1]. • The Dielectrokenetic Laboratories (DKL), LLC

LifeGuard™ series of devices is designed to locate and track living human individuals, even when hidden from the operator, based on the device’s response to the beating human heart. The human heart has such a

unique signal that the device can distinguish between humans and great apes. This discrimination is achieved by employing a patented electronic polarization filter that prevents the device from responding to all other signals.

• These devices have an accuracy of ±5° at 500 meters for the Model 1, ±5° at 20 meters for the Model 2, and ±5° at 500 meters for the Model 3. Barriers reduce range in proportion to the thickness and density of the barrier. For the Model 2, an external wall in the average house will reduce the detection range by a foot.

• “The devices indicate detection and tracking by the point of an antenna protruding from the front of each device when the antenna swings and points in the direction of the nearest beating human heart. The swing-and-point operation of the antenna is driven by the effect of dielectrophoresis (DEP).

• LifeGuard™ is composed of two parts: a passive dielectrophoretic (DEP) part and a set of powered parts.

• DKL LifeGuard™’s patent-approved electronic circuitry filters out everything but ultra-low frequency signals, and DKL’s unique electric polarization filter responds only to the unique non-uniform electromagnetic field generated by the beating human heart. LifeGuard™’s patent-pending filtering circuits allow only signals from a human field to flow to a piece of special dielectric material in the upper part of the LifeGuard™ (Model 2’s) case. This special dielectric material is capable of becoming highly polarized. When the LifeGuard™ is moved through a human field this dielectric material polarizes, positive and negative charges separate and collect on opposite ends of the instrument. Dielectrophoresis causes the LifeGuard™ to swivel and point at the beating heart, the center of the human electric field. This effect is entirely passive and does not require power.

• The LifeGuard™ is dependent on the operator for four key activities:

1. The operator must move the instrument through the human’s non-uniform electric field in order to detect a target.

2. The operator must recognize the torque that signals detection.

3. The operator serves as part of the LifeGuard™’s dielectric array. This is why the LifeGuard™ does not detect the operator.

4. The operator provides a link to ground for the LifeGuard™.

• DKL uses newly available polarizable materials and fabricates them into a size and shape that maximizes the dielectrophoresis force. The LifeGuard™ uses state of the art materials.

Double-Blind Test Configuration and Procedure

Sandia contacted the company and requested that they participate in a double-blind test of their product. After several false starts, the tests were finally scheduled for March 20, 1998. The test site was a remote location on Kirtland Air Force Base where no people other than those involved in the testing would be present for at least one mile. Five plastic shipping crates that were large enough to hide a person while

seated were placed in an open field. There was an instrument trailer present at this location that served as a location to sequester the teams. Short stakes driven into the ground served to mark a line of closest approach for the device operator. DKL proposed to test its Model 2 unit, which had an advertised detection range of 20 m. The closest approach allowed to each crate was to be 50 feet (15 meters), which was at 75% of the Model 2’s purported range. The crates were placed 30 feet apart along a straight line, which was 50 ft. away from the line of closest approach. This configuration provided over 30 degrees of angular separation between crates (more than six times the minimum of five degrees angular accuracy claim for the device.) The reason for this spacing was to ensure that there was sufficient angular separation between the crates so there should be no confusion over which crate contained the target subject.

The test procedure was relatively simple. There were three test phases as described below. Phase 1, Test A – Baseline

Phase 1 consisted of 10 trials; in each trial, a single test subject was randomly placed in one of the five crates based on a random number generator. The baseline placement took place in full view of everyone present including the Lifeguard™ operator. The purpose of this test was to ensure that the test parameters were acceptable to everyone and that the device was operating to the satisfaction of the DKL Lifeguard™ operator. The results of this phase were that the operator correctly located the target subject all 10 times; the operator stated that the device was operating correctly.

Phase 2, Test B – Single Test Subject, Double Blind

Phase 2 consisted of 25 trials. In the double-blind

configuration, there was no one person that was allowed to witness the entire test. During this phase, one test subject was located in one of the five crates for each trial. The test participants were divided into two groups. One group was to act as the placement team, while the second group acted as the search team, which naturally included the Lifeguard™ operator. While the search team was sequestered inside the instrument trailer, the placement team placed the test subject in one of the five crates, each time using the random number selection method. Following the placement of the test subject, the two teams swapped locations; no talking or other form of communication was allowed while trading places. With the placement team sequestered, the Lifeguard™ operator performed the search to locate the test subject while the rest of the search team stood well behind the range line to witness the search procedure. Once the operator was satisfied that he had located the correct crate containing the test subject, the location he selected (container 1-5) was recorded by the search team and the teams swapped places again. In this way, neither team knew both of the critical pieces of information—the search team did not know which crate held the test subject and the placement team did not know which crate was selected by the operator. Therefore, no one knew how successful the operator was until the testing was over and the two pieces of information were finally put together. Figure 2 shows the DKL operator during this phase of the testing.

Phase 3, Multiple Test Subjects, Double-Blind

Phase 3 consisted of five trials. The purpose of Phase 3 was to provide an additional type of double blind test for the process. During this phase for each trial from zero to five test subjects were placed in the five crates based on a predetermined random selection process. The operator was then asked to scan all of the crates and indicate which crates were occupied and which were empty (a 0.5 probability of correctly guessing the content of each crate). For this testing there were only three trials (a total of15 crates were scanned).

Figure 2: DKL operator indicating the test subject is in

crate 5 shown in the background.

Results and Analysis

As pointed out previously, the baseline test (Test A) configuration for the placement of persons in each box was not concealed to any of the test participants. The DKL operator correctly located all persons in the container in all trials—the operator got 10 out of 10 correct.

In Phase 2 (Test B), which began the double blind testing, the DKL operator results were six correct selections out of 25 trials. With five possible locations for the target there is a 0.2 probability of correctly selecting the target location using random guessing—therefore, one would expect that a random guessing process during 25 trials would, on average, be correct five times. For a random guessing process, test results would lie between two and eight correct guesses approximately 93% of the time, therefore, only a result of nine or greater (or less than two) correct guesses in this test would have been inconsistent with random guessing and would indicate that perhaps something other than a random process might have been occurring. The actual result was consistent with a random guessing process and far below the claimed success rate of over 90%.

In Phase 3 (Test C), which began the multiple test subject double-blind testing, the DKL operator results were six correct selections out of 15 trials. With a 0.5 probability of correctly selecting the target location using random guessing alone, one would expect, on average, to be correct 7.5 times. Again, with only six correct guesses, the results are consistent with a random guessing process.

DKL began a campaign of distorting the analysis of the 1997 test data and indicated multiple problems they had with the test setup. With the success in the baseline phase of the testing (subject location in container known by all participants), it is difficult to see how either the data analysis

or the test setup could be the reason for the device’s failure. The DKL operator and all other test participants were in concurrence regarding the test set up and the procedures before proceeding on to Tests B and C. Nothing changed in the test protocol except switching from non-blind to double-blind procedures. Despite the clear legitimacy of the conduct of the test and the impartiality of the design configuration, DKL continues to dispute the accuracy of the test results. This company is still in business and continues to sell their LifeGuard™ device mostly outside of the United States. The full SNL test report can be accessed online [2].

Following the performance test, NIJ asked Sandia to disassemble a LifeGuard™ Model 3 (500-meter detection range), which they had in their possession. The analysis of the physical examination determined that the dielectrophoretic force could not provide anywhere enough force—even at short distances—to swing the antenna a full 90 degrees in a short period of time let alone overcome any friction or gravitational or wind caused forces. In short, the device could not possibly operate on the principles as stated by the company.

Another discovery that resulted from the disassembly of the device was the exact nature of the “patent-approved electronic circuitry filter.” Specifically, it was composed of human hair sandwiched between two pieces of polystyrene plastic. Two wires were inserted into this assembly and this fabricated component was soldered into a circuit inside the device. Apparently, this is the means the company had devised to prevent the device from responding to other mammals. Figure 3 shows the disassembled hair filter showing wires and human hair sandwiched between polystyrene. The full report on the physical examination can be accessed online [3].

Figure 3: Discrimination filter made of human hair.

EVALUATION OF THE MOLE

The next questionable screening device that was brought to the attention of Sandia was the MOLE. The NIJ National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center (NLECTC) office in Denver, Colorado asked Sandia to assist in conducting a double-blind performance evaluation of a device that was being manufactured in the UK by Global Technical Ltd of Kent, England. This device was supposed to detect a number of contraband substances including drugs and explosives. Global Technical Ltd asserted that the device could be programmed to locate nearly anything. Similar to the Quadro Tracker device, the description of the MOLE’s detection method involved an antenna that pivoted and

pointed to the substance being sought. Upon inspection of the device on the day of the testing, it was found that its operational description not only sounded like the Quadro Tracker, but its physical appearance was also identical to the Quadro Tracker.

Double-Blind Test Configuration and Procedure

The tests were scheduled to take place at the Denver office of NLECTC on January 27, 2002. After some discussions with Mr. Robert Balais (the representative of the company and operator during testing), the personnel involved in the testing moved to the second floor of the building where the actual testing was to occur. The advantage here was that the second floor had a rectangular hallway going around the entire floor with offices on both sides of the hall. This allowed an office belonging to the NLECTC representative to be used as an area where the two teams could be sequestered while the other performed their respective functions. Four empty cardboard boxes were provided by NLECTC personnel for this test and one box was located in each corner of the hallway. NLECTC had also provided the target material—20 grams of C4 explosive—which was carefully wrapped in plastic wrap and then placed inside a clean plastic 35 mm film canister. The location where the test target would be placed for each trial was selected by the order of two coin tosses. • Heads-heads corresponded to box 1, • Heads-tails corresponded to box 2, • Tail-heads corresponded to box 3, and • Tails-tails corresponded to box 4.

Baseline

First, a baseline test was performed that included five trials.

The target was hidden in the randomly selected box in full view of all participants including the operator. In all five trials the operator indicated he had detected the target in the box that held the target. Double-Blind Testing

There were a total of 20 trials in the double-blind testing.

When the double-blind phase started the personnel separated into two teams and a procedure similar to the one used to test the DKL device was used. While the placement team tossed the coin and placed the target in one of the four boxes, the search team was sequestered in an office on the same floor. In order to avoid leaving behind any clues that would disclose the location of the target, the placement team visited and disturbed every box. In this way the placement process took the same amount of time for each trial and every box was disturbed to the same degree.

Results and Analysis

Following the conclusion of the testing everyone met in a second floor conference room to score the test. Since there were only four boxes for this test the probability of correctly guessing the correct location of the target was 0.25. For 20 trials it would be expected that a random guessing process would on average produce five correct guesses. The actual number of correct selections during the MOLE test was six.

This result is entirely consistent with a random guessing process. The success rate of 33.3% is far below the advertised success rate that was stated by the operator of greater than 95% accuracy.

As was the case with the DKL testing, the poor performance results for the MOLE were disputed by the company. The company and its advocates presented numerous post hoc explanations as to why the test procedure was not suited for testing this particular device. Not only did these protests come from Mr. Balais (the device operator) but also from Mr. Gary Bolton, the president of Global Technical Ltd in the UK. While acknowledging their disappointment, it is difficult to take these protests seriously since the operator claimed 100% success in the baseline test and stated beforehand his confidence that the test setup was fair and he was confident that the MOLE device would pass with flying colors. Soon after the Sandia report was published, the operator sent an email to Sandia complaining that he had lost his franchise to sell the product based on the failed test results. The complete SNL report can be accessed online [4].

EMERGENCE OF THE GT200 AND THE ADE 651

Not long after the failed test of the MOLE, Global Technical

Ltd stopped selling the MOLE and introduced a new model—the GT200. Figure 4 shows a GT200 and its related programming cards.

Figure 4: GT200 detector and related hardware.

This device was again very similar to the Quadro Tracker and the MOLE in its operation—it also had a swinging antenna that pivoted and pointed to the substance being sought and was still unpowered but now the device but no longer looked identical to the previous models. About that time a company-provided report describing a test of the MOLE [5] had been modified to state that it was the GT 200 that was tested instead. The original report claimed successful testing of the MOLE as conducted by the UK Royal Engineers. While that testing may have occurred, it certainly was not double-blinded and was not proof of the efficacy of the MOLE device. Interestingly, after the editing, the date of the GT200 report [6] stayed the same as the original report (November 10, 1999), a full two years before the GT 200 came onto the market. Additionally, the picture on the cover still showed someone operating the MOLE, although the title now stated “Trial of GT200 System Detector.”

Another development that occurred since the 2002 SNL/NLECTC test that failed the MOLE, was that Mr. Balais began working with a different UK company—ATSC UK Ltd headed by president Jim McCormick. The company at first started marketing a device identical in appearance to the Quadro Tracker called the ADE 100 (Advanced Detection Equipment 100). This product quickly disappeared from the market but was soon followed by a series of ADE products that differed in appearance from the Quadro Tracker. The last model in that line is the ADE 651.

The story for the ADE 651 and the GT200 becomes tragic when these two products started to become very popular with the militaries of Iraq and Thailand. A New York Times article by Rod Norland (November 3, 2009) [7] first broke the story that the ADE 651 was not only in use in Iraq by the Iraqi military but that conservatively, at least several hundred units had been purchased for a total of up to $80 million. The NY Times article referenced the Sandia testing conducted in 2002 and quoted U.S. military personnel stating that the U.S. military had no confidence in the device. While there was an enormous sum of money that was clearly wasted, more disturbing was the possibility that the device had been contributing to the death toll of military personnel and civilians. The Iraqi military was using this device in lieu of proven search techniques like manual searches and bomb sniffing dogs. As a testimony to how convinced some of the ADE 651 and GT200 users of the devices can be, the NY Times article noted that when asked about previous evaluations of similar devices, Maj. Gen. Jehad al-Jabiri, the head of the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior’s General Directorate for Combating Explosives, boasted, “I don’t care about Sandia or the Department of Justice or any of them… I know more about this issue than the Americans do. In fact, I know more about bombs than anyone in the world.”

Acting on the lead established by the NY Times article, Newsnight, an in-depth investigative news program broadcast by BBC, began running a series of programs on the “so-called bomb detectors” in a campaign to expose the manufacturer, Jim McCormick, who was exporting these devices from the UK to warzones in countries where British and U.S. troops were in harm’s way. Sidney Alford, a leading explosives expert who advises all branches of the military, told Newsnight the sale of the ADE 651 was "absolutely immoral.”

On January 22, 2010, Newsnight reported (by Caroline Hawley and Meirion Jones) [8] that “An attack in December (2009) killed over 120 people, prompting Iraqis to ask how the bombs could have got through the city's security.” The news report noted that the ADE 651 bomb detector device was widely in use at most Iraqi checkpoints, and reported, “Iraq has bought thousands of the detectors for a total of $85M.” The news report went on to say, “The British Foreign Office has told the BBC that they will now be urgently warning all governments who may have bought devices, such as the ADE 651 and the GT200, that they are "wholly ineffective" at detecting bombs and explosives. Although the main focus of the report was the ATSC ADE 651 another manufacturer and product was mentioned. Global Technical and their GT200 scanner were now also receiving attention.

A similar situation to the one in Iraq had been taking place in Thailand, but rather than the ADE 651 it was the GT200 being used extensively by the Thai military to detect explosives. They began using the devices in 2004 to combat

the Islamic separatist uprising in southern Thailand. The GT200 was being used to establish checkpoints searching for bombs that were being used by the insurgents.

An article from the Bangkok Post [9] (dated February 22, 2010) reported, “Two soldiers of Pattani Task Force 24 were injured in an explosion at a market in Pattani's Khok Pho district on Monday morning after a GT200 detector was used to scan the area but found no explosives”. The coverage from the BBC and the Bangkok Post combined with statements from the UK government prompted the Thai Government to sponsor double-blind tests of the GT200. A CNN article by Dan Rivers (dated February 16, 2010) reported that the GT200 failed in the double blind tests [10]. Thai Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva told CNN, ”We've done a double-blind test where the equipment was only successful in discovering in 20 percent of the cases, when just a random choice would give you 25 percent—so there's no statistical significance to having the equipment."

Soon after the BBC coverage, the UK government banned the export of the ADE651 (ATSC UK Ltd) and the GT200 (Global Technical). In a later development in January of 2010, the president of ATSC, Jim McCormick, was arrested by British police for suspicion of fraud. Both the ADE 651 and the GT200 have been disassembled to reveal that the handles and card holders were completely empty. Despite this fact the manufacturers still insist the devices work.

THE SniffEx®, SniffEx Plus, HEDD 1

SniffEx® and SniffEx Plus

Sometime in 2005, Sandia started getting requests for information about a product called the SniffEx®. This device had been invented in Bulgaria and was being marketed by a company called SniffEx® Inc from Texas. The description of the operation of the device was very familiar. There is no other power source than human generated static electricity, it had to be held by a human in order to operate, and the detection was indicated when a swinging antenna pointed toward the material being sought. Sandia had to respond with the fact that it had not been tested at Sandia, but based on its description Sandia warned that anyone interested in this product should use caution and insist on a double-blind test prior to use or purchase to establish its efficacy. The company had been generating significant interest in the product since following the introduction of the product the company had been flooding the Internet with news releases and was waging a serious email campaign to sell stocks in the company. SniffEx® was selling company stock through Pink Sheets, an exchange selling “penny stocks”.

Sandia never had to test this device because other tests of the device occurred that were more than adequate to establish the random chance performance of the device. One test was performed by an anonymous individual in a double-blind test of the SniffEx® at the Seventh Annual California Safety and Security Conference in Anaheim, CA. He managed to talk the president and vice president of the company into testing the device in the hall outside of where the conference was being held. The results of the test are well presented at the review website [11]. This test clearly

shows that a rigorous double-blind test need not be complicated and the results are seldom in doubt.

In July 2008, SniffEx Inc was shut down by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The SEC charged the company with operating what is called a pump-and-dump scam. In this scam, a company offers a very low cost stock and then uses news releases and other techniques in an attempt to artificially drive up the price of the stock after which the company officers dump the stock at a higher price and reap the profits. Unfortunately, there are still those individuals who have been convinced that the device is effective and continue to use it in other countries where it is still being sold.

Following the collapse of the Texas-based company, the manufacture and sales of the SniffEx® moved to Germany. The new company (Unival Group of Bonn, Germany) soon changed the device’s name to SniffEx Plus and indicated that it possessed enhanced performance. The SniffEx® or SniffEx Plus is currently in use in Pakistan.

HEDD 1

Recently the company introduced the HEDD 1. This device

looks somewhat different from the SniffEx but retains the same swinging antenna in its design that is supposed to point to the material being sought. As specified in its product literature, it also has to be carried by a human, although this time the company states that it requires a battery. In addition to the battery, there is a pair of permanent magnets and a small metallic chamber with undisclosed contents. The HEDD 1 device still contains no electronics or motors. Since, Sandia has not tested the device and is not aware of any rigorous double-blind tests that have been performed by others on this device, Sandia cannot state that its effectiveness has been established one way or the other, however, it would be in the best interest of anyone who may be interested in using or purchasing this device to insist on a rigorous double-blind test before purchase.

OTHER DEVICES – Alpha 6, PSD-22, Al-6D, AND H3Tec

There are companies still selling devices that are identical

in appearance to the Quadro Tracker/MOLE but under different names. One such company is Scandec Inc., a company in Belize with offices in the UK and the Middle East. Scandec sells a device called the Alpha 6; the Alpha 6 is also sold by ComsTrack of the UK and several other companies located in the Middle East and South Africa. The MOLE can still be found for sale on the Internet from a company in China.

There are at least three additional devices that have similar operational procedures using a swinging antenna and based on unsubstantiated ‘physical science’ phenomena that supposedly points to the target material being sought. The manufacturer of these devices also claim that the detection range is from tens of meters to several kilometers. These devices are the PSD-22, the DiodeBell model AL-6D and the H3Tec.

There is little information on the PSD-22 other than it was offered for sale by a company in the UK named Intelligence Counter Security & Surveillance Ltd. Their Web site [12] continues to list the PSD-22 as a product but the link to the information page no longer works, nonetheless, the company continues to market the Alpha 6.

The DiodeBell model AL-6D, which is manufactured by the DiodeBell Company of Greece, is similar to the previous detection devices reviewed, however, in this device the antenna is fixed to the casing/body, which pivots freely on its handle. Advertized detection range is said to be several kilometers depending on the amount of explosives present.

The H3Tec device is also similar in operation to the GT200 and the ADE 651 and has a swinging antenna, which is contained in a semicircular metal housing with a window on top so that the antenna can be viewed by the operator. The device is also advertized to be able to detect a variety of materials and comes with a computer to download element information that will ‘tune’ the device to hone in on specific elements. This manufacturer is H3Tec of Utah (http://www.h3tec.com). The company’s website does not list a maximum detection range, but, on the ‘Utah Pulse’ website [13], there is a statement that the device, “can detect any element or compound up to two miles away.” The advertized operational principle for this device is “nano-ionic resonance,” although this “principle” is not clearly defined but sounds very similar to the molecular resonance often found in product material on the swing rod type of devices. The explosive detection version of this device is said to be designed to detect improvised explosives devices (IEDs) and vehicle born improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) and is in use by the U.S. Army (this could not be verified by Sanida). Analysis

Since Sandia has not tested any of these three devices (Alpha-6, H3Tec, Al-6D, and PSD-22) and is not aware of any proper double blind testing that has been conducted, Sandia cannot state that the performance of these devices has been established one way or the other. Until there is a properly designed double-blind performance test performed by a reputable testing agency, anyone considering using or purchasing one of these devices should insist on a double-blind test as a condition for purchase.

IDEOMOTOR EFFECT

If these devices are not actually working, then what is

happening to convince people witnessing the demonstrations or even operating the device themselves that detection is occurring? The most likely explanation for the perceived operation is the ideomotor effect. Nineteenth century zoologist William B. Carpenter first coined the phrase in 1852 to describe an effect that explained the motion of dowsing rods and pendulums in the hands of diviners [14]. Another more modern casual name is the Ouija Board effect. The best way to explain the effect is that when a human is in control of any nearly unstable system (like a swinging rod) the human will subconsciously manipulate the device by small muscle movements to achieve an expected outcome. Often the operator is simply responding to a suggestion and is not aware he is even controlling the device. If the operator expects a swinging rod to point to explosives then he will manipulate the rod subconsciously to point to where he thinks explosives are located. The muscle movements for achieving this manipulation are so small that observers and even the operator cannot detect them.

PRODUCT CAUTIONS

The emergence of devices whose manufacturers claim they detect explosives (and other materials) at distances of tens of meters or longer prompted Sandia National Laboratories to conduct double blind testing on a number of these devices. The results of these tests show the devices are completely ineffective in that their performance cannot be distinguished from random guessing. The test results coupled with the fact that other similar dubious detection devices continued to emerge on the market, led Sandia to write a warning to prospective buyers in the law enforcement community. As described in NIJ’s Guide for the Selection of Commercial Explosives Detection Systems for Law Enforcement Applications [15], there are a number of product claims and device features, which should cause concern to any potential buyers, such as: • Words like molecular frequency discrimination, harmonic

induction discrimination. • Claims of detecting small objects at large distances. • Devices that require no power to operate (most real

technology requires power). • Any device that uses a swinging rod that is held nearly

level, pivots freely and “indicates” the material being sought by pointing at it.

• Advertisements that feature several testimonials by “satisfied users,” and statements about pending tests by scientific and regulatory agencies (but have just not happened yet) may be indications that the device has not been proven to work.

• Statements that the device must be held by a human to operate.

CONCLUSION

Any security related screening device that requires a

human to make a determination if a detection has occurred or not should be tested using randomized double-blind testing. However, many of the manufacturers of these devices will not willingly subject their products to double-blind testing. In fact several representatives of these types of devices state that double-blind testing is not appropriate for their products. This position may be because they either are not familiar with double-blind test protocols or they are aware that their device will fail and they do not want the results made public. However, double blind testing, while requiring more careful design, is the fairest all-around method for testing human operated detection devices because neither the persons conducting the test nor the device operators can intentionally skew the outcome of the test.

A well designed test will provide both an appropriate number of trials (a large number of data points) and a test configuration that ensures that random guessing alone will result in a low number of correct selections. Although more is better, it is recommended that a minimum of 15 trials be performed with at least four possible locations where the target can be located (probability of a correct selection by random guessing of no more than 0.25). It is also recommended that there be baseline tests performed both before and after the double-blind phase of testing. In this way, a rigorous double-blind test will ensure that the results of

the test are unambiguous—that is, the test will provide a clear indication as to whether the tested device works or not.

Security and military personnel who risk their lives on a daily basis need dependable security techniques to provide effective contraband screening. The use of any unproven screening device in the field not only threatens the lives of military and security personnel but also emergency responders and at risk civilians. No human operated screening device should ever be employed in life and death situations until it has passed a rigorous randomized double blind evaluation conducted by a reputable testing agency.

REFERENCES

[1] Dielectrokenetic Laboratories, LLC. (DKL), LifeGuard™

website (date circa 1997). Current DKL website is: http://www.dklabs.com/

[2] Murray, Dale W., Floyd W. Spencer, and Debra D. Spencer. Double-Blind Evaluation of the DKL LifeGuard Model 2, SAND98-0977. Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, May 1998. Available online: http://infoserve.sandia.gov/sand_doc/1998/980977.pdf

[3] Murray, Dale W. Physical Examination of the DKL LifeGuard™ Model 3. Sandia National Laboratories investigation sponsored by the National Institute of Justice, October 1998. Report is accessible at: http://www.justnet.org/Lists/JUSTNET%20Resources/Attachments/440/moleeval_apr02.pdf

[4] Murray, Dale W. Double-Blind Field Evaluation of the MOLE Programmable Detection System. Rocky Mountain Office of the National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center (NLECTC), February 2002. Available online: www.justnet.org/Lists/JUSTNET%20Resources/.../moleeval_apr02.pdf

[5] Global Technical Ltd. Trial of MOLE Programmable System Detector. Global Technical Ltd, November 10, 1999. Available online: http://explosivedetectorfrauds.blogspot.com/

[6] Global Technical Ltd. Trial of GT200 Programmable System Detector, Published online by Global Technical Ltd, November 10,1999. This report is not in print and is no longer available online.

[7] Norland, Rod. “Iraq Swears by Bomb Detector U.S. Sees as Useless.” New York Times, November 3, 2009. Available online: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/04/world/middleeast/04sensors.html

[8] Hawley, Caroline and Meirion Jones. “UK Bans Exports of ‘Bomb Detecting’ Dowsing Rods.” Newsnight, BBC broadcast, January 22, 2010. Report is accessible on YouTube at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rQMwXo1SSVo

[9] Online Reporters. “GT200 fails to detect bomb that injures soldiers.” Bangkok Post, February 22, 2010.

Available online: http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/local/169294/gt200-uselessness-proven-again

[10] Rivers, Dan. “Thailand's Bomb Detection Problem.” CNN, Connect the World, Blog, February 16, 2010. Accessible at: http://connecttheworld.blogs.cnn.com/tag/dan-rivers/

[11] Anonymous, “Sniffex Explosive Detector Test and Review Anaheim, California.” This test was conducted at the Seventh Annual California Safety and Security Conference, April 26-27, 2006. Blog published May 13, 2007. Accessible at: http://sniffextest.blogspot.com/

[12] Intelligence Counter Security & Surveillance Ltd. London. http://icssuk.com/index.php. Select Products to view 1) PSD-22 Programmable Substance Detector and 2) Alpha 6 Detection System. (Current.)

[13] Utah Governor’s Office of Economic Development, “Utah Procurement Spotlights: H3 TEC”, Utah Pulse.com, January 6, 2009. Accessible at: http://utahpulse.com/featured_article/utah-procurement-spotlights-h3-tec

[14] Carpenter, William B. "On the Influence of Suggestion in Modifying and Directing Muscular Movement, Independently of Volition." Proceedings of the Royal Institution of Great Britain. (1852): no.1:147-153.

[15] Rhykerd, Charles L., David W. Hannum, Dale W. Murray, and John E. Parmeter, Guide for the Selection of Commercial Explosives Detection Systems for Law Enforcement Applications. Sponsored and published by National Institute of Justice, Law Enforcement and Corrections Standards and Testing, interagency agreement with Sandia National Laboratories, NIJ Guide 100-99, NCJ 178913, September 1999.

VITA

Dale Murray graduated from the University of New Mexico with a BSEE degree. He is currently a Senior Member of Technical Staff with Sandia National Laboratories. He has been at Sandia since 1981 and is the author of two previous ICCST papers.