Unrwa at 60 by Nitza Nachmias

8/14/2019 Unrwa at 60 by Nitza Nachmias

1/22

UNRWA at 60: Are There Better Alternatives?

by Prof. Nitza Nachmias October 12, 2009

http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives

Abstract

The United Nations Relief and Work Agency for the Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA)

was established in 1948 as a temporary relief agency. In spite of its failure to solve

the refugee problem, it has been renewed and expanded for 60 years, with support

from the entire United Nations community, including the United States and Israel.

UNRWA's annual budget now exceeds half a billion dollars , and it has come to be

treated as a permanent protector and advocate of what are depicted as millions of

Palestinian "refugees" who, UNRWA claims. lack a homeland, citizenship, and

governments to serve their needs. Its mandate has been renewed repeatedly by the

UN General Assembly albeit with restrained criticism demanding more transparency

and additional budget controls.

The purpose of this paper is to explore three questions: (1) Are most of the

Palestinians in the Middle East in fact "refugees", and does treating them as

"refugees" contribute to solutions or prevent them? (2) Is UNRWA the agency best

suited to address the issues facing these populations most effectively, or does it

create more problems than it solves? (3) If UNRWA is a problem, is it the least bad of

the alternatives, or are there, in the balance of costs and benefits, other solutions with

a better probability to bring the issue to a just and rightful resolution?

The paper concludes that UNRWA is not merely an "imperfect" agency, but one that is

profoundly inimical both to the higher interests of its own Palestinian clients, and to thesearch for a political settlement of the conflicts in the region. It describes alternative

solutions that could more effectively deliver services to these Palestinian populations

while strengthening rather than undermining moderate elements and governments in

the various host countries, including the Palestinian Authority. Strengthening the PA

would help to advance the peace process. The paper proposes more effective ways to

1


2/22

channel the enormous sums misappropriated to UNRWA, to achieve vital objectives of

the donors that perpetuation of UNRWA will continue to subvert.

Introduction

Sixty years ago UNRWA was created as a temporary emergency relief agency. Its

main duties were constructing temporary shelters and providing essential food to the

Palestinian families that left their homes during the 1948 Israeli-Arab war. Sixty years

and billions of dollars later, UNRWA has become an entrenched permanent,

overstaffed, affluent bureaucracy. Hardly any traces of the original mandate can be

found in its current operations. In a surprising and unprecedented move for any

emergency aid organization, UNRWA launched in September 2008 a two-year global

celebration entitled: "UNRWA at 60". The celebrations are taking place at the UN

headquarters (NY), Vienna, Geneva, Brussels, the Gulf States, and in the donor

countries, among others. In the 60th celebration announcements UNRWA expresses

the hope that its operations will grow and flourish for many more years to come.[1]

The lavish events put an additional financial burden on the donors that astonishingly

did not stop to ask: is UNRW's 60th anniversary a cause for celebration, or is it a

testimony of failure? We will show that "UNRWA at 60" is indeed a testimony of

failure.

While the United Nations Relief and Work Agency for the Palestinian Refugees

(UNRWA) was established in 1948 as a temporary relief agency, it has for 60 years

enjoyed broad support from the entire United Nations community, including even

Israel and the United States. UNRWA is treated as the protector and advocate of what

are known as millions of Palestinian refugees who claim that for four generations they

have lacked a homeland, citizenship, and a government to serve their needs.[2]

UNRWA's mandate has been renewed repeatedly by the UN General Assembly albeit

with restrained criticism demanding more transparency and additional budget controls.

[3] The purpose of this paper is to explore three questions: (1) Are most of the

Palestinians in the Middle East in fact "refugees", and does treating them as

"refugees" contribute to solutions or prevent them? (2) Is UNRWA, on balance, the

2
http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftn1%23_ftn1http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftn2%23_ftn2http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftn3%23_ftn3http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftn1%23_ftn1http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftn2%23_ftn2http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftn3%23_ftn3


3/22

agency that is the most able to address the issues facing these populations most

effectively, or does it create more problems than it solves? (3) If UNRWA is a problem,

is it the least bad of the alternatives, or are there, on the balance of costs and benefits,

other solutions with a better probability to bring the issue to a just and rightful

resolution?

UNRWA claims that about five million Palestinians are refugees. We will show that

most are not. Most Palestinians living in the West Bank, Gaza and Jordan have been

integrated in the local communities, and many in Jordan have acquired Jordanian

citizenship. In the West Bank and Gaza the residents carry PA official documents.

Others have immigrated to the US and Europe where they are either legal residents or

citizens. For most Palestinians, the transition from refugee camps to urban dwellingsoccurred decades ago. As early as 1950, the majority of the original 1948 refugees

and their families began to move out of the camps and resettle in neighboring states

and regions. Simultaneously, non-refugees began to move into the camps for

economic advantages, especially to receive UNRWA's free services.[4] UNRWA's

bureaucracy soon adapted to the situation and moved away from its original relief

mandate to providing non emergency, civil services. [5] Yet UNRWA has been

perpetuating the myth of "millions of 1948 Palestinian refugees"; a myth that provides

the raison d'etre for UNRWA's oversized bureaucracy[6]. Moreover, UNRWA has

succumbed to major bureaucratic pathologies. It has become an ineffective self-

serving, work-creating agency suffused with favoritism and patronage. UNRWA is

definitely not a typical international humanitarian aid organization. The UN agency is

the largest non government employer in the region, employing over 29,000

Palestinians with a superstructure of 120 international advisors. Because UNRWA's

international staff is very small, the operations are planned, executed and controlled

by tens of thousands of Palestinian employees. Consequently, UNRWA's operations

follow its own institutional imperatives rather than its international mandate. [7]

In the particular case of the West Bank and Gaza, UNRWA has created unique

political and administrative dilemmas. UNRWA has become a non-territorial

administration, taking on national-governmental responsibilities, though the

3
http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftn4%23_ftn4http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftn5%23_ftn5http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftn6%23_ftn6http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftn7%23_ftn7http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftn4%23_ftn4http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftn5%23_ftn5http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftn6%23_ftn6http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftn7%23_ftn7


4/22


5/22

livelihoods as a result of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. UNRWA itself reports that its

original registration figures are based on information voluntarily supplied by applicants

primarily for the purpose of obtaining access to Agency's services and hence can't be

considered statistically reliable "demographic data."[10] A simple declaration by the

applicant was accepted as sufficient. UNRWA later granted benefits eligibility to the

descendants of these self-declared 1948 refugees. As a result of these financial

incentives, the number of putative "refugees" swelled from an estimated 914,000 in

1950 to over 5 million in 2009. UNRWA itself admits that the agency's "registration

records do not necessarily reflect the actual refugee population owing to the factors

such as: unreported deaths; false registration; and undetected absence from area of

UNRWA operation".[11] Thus, for six decades, UNRWA's vast budget is based on

enormously inflated numbers of clients that have never been refugees. It is important

to acknowledge the fact that for decades, UNRWA has been evading the donors

numerous requests to replace the 60-year old refugee ID cards with a new picture ID

cards. Such a process would have required UNRWA to execute a census, a process

that UNRWA never conducted. The census and the demand for the refugees to come

to UNRWA's offices, be photographed and get a bone fide UNRWA ID card would

have resulted in a big embarrassment for the agency. Most probably the majority of

the "registered refugees" will turn up to be none existent or settled.

A review of UNRWA's history reveals the unacceptable fact that for decades, UNRWA

has thwarted all efforts to settle the issue and terminate its operations. UNRWA was

created to provide short-term, emergency, humanitarian aid to Palestinian refugees,

just as the newly formed United Nations sought to assist millions of refugee

populations in other parts of the world created by the upheavals of World War II and

its aftermath. The UNRWA operation was expected to be completed within two or

three years, once the emergency conditions were resolved and the refugees resettled.

The Palestinian refugees were at the time but a small percentage of the tens of

millions of refugees worldwide receiving various forms of United Nations assistance.

Dag Hammeskjold, the second UN Secretary General (1953-1961), initiated a plan for

the reintegration of the Palestinian refugees in their host countries. Under his

5
http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftn10%23_ftn10http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftn11%23_ftn11http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftn10%23_ftn10http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftn11%23_ftn11


6/22

leadership, the UN General Assembly specifically instructed UNRWA to work to

reintegrate the refugees in the places of their refuge.[12] At the time, the refugee

camps in the West Bank were under Jordanian authority and the refugee camps in

Gaza were under Egyptian authority. The premise was that these two states would

absorb the refugees through a process of reintegration financed by the international

community.[13] With the exception of Jordan, the Arab host countries' rejected the

resettlement and reintegration proposals, and UNRWA instead, became a permanent,

self-perpetuating bureaucracy.

By the early 1950s, UNRWA's original 1948 emergency humanitarian mission was

completed. However, due to the agency's autonomous status, UNRWA was able to

shift its operational agenda and began providing non-emergency, regular, daily socialbenefits to anyone registered with the Agency who it decided to give assistance,

whether refugee or not.[14] UNRWA and other reliable sources data show that the

majority of the descendents of the original 1948 families ceased to be in need of relief

assistance many decades ago. A 1987 General Assembly report found that, only 10%

of UNRWA budget was dedicated to emergency relief, while the bulk was devoted "to

educating children and furnishing advanced training, maintaining effective public

healthcare services and providing basic welfare services to a largely industrious and

self supporting [so-called] refugee population." [15] Already 30 years ago, it was

reported that 95 percent of registered Palestinian refugees were self-supporting. A

2003 GAO report found that less than a third of the registered "refugees" live in

designated so-called "refugee camps," some only because they prefer to build their

homes in territory exempt from local taxes. Two thirds are integrated in the cities and

states in the Middle East and beyond. Over two million are resettled in Jordan, most of

whom are Jordanian citizens paying taxes and eligible to receive social services from

the Jordanian government.[16] All the same, these millions of people are,

inappropriately, holders of UNRWA refugee cards and enjoy all of UNRWA's giveaway

programs.

Once we realize that UNRWA is not actually in the refugee business at all, but is a

social welfare agency distributing benefits to a body of preferred clients whether they

6
http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftn12%23_ftn12http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftn13%23_ftn13http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftn14%23_ftn14http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftn15%23_ftn15http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftn16%23_ftn16http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftn12%23_ftn12http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftn13%23_ftn13http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftn14%23_ftn14http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftn15%23_ftn15http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftn16%23_ftn16


7/22

qualify as needy or not, the real issue becomes clear: If the world community wants to

provide economic and development assistance to Palestinians, is UNRWA the best

way to select the Palestinian beneficiaries and the best agency to channel the

assistance? A systematic review of UNRWA and other existing government and non-

government organizations shows that it is not.[17]

Alternatives for Better Education Opportunities

Education is UNRWA's single largest area of activity, accounting for half its budget

and two-thirds of its staff. UNRWA provides education to over 500,000 students in 684

schools, and this is often cited as one of its supreme achievements. Commissioner

General Ms. Abu-Zayd stated recently: "Education has been central to UNRWA's

human development agenda throughout its sixty-year history. Today, more than half of

our budget is devoted to the primary education of refugee children, with equal

opportunity given to boys and girls".[18] However, UNRWA's extensive and costly

educational activity is neither humanitarian nor consistent with UNRWA's mandate.

[19] The students of UNRWA's schools come from a largely undistinguished and

unidentified population, who could hardly be considered "refugees". Moreover, recent

scholastic achievement reports show that the same students could be better served by

educating them through the hosts' national school systems. If the international

community wishes to assist Palestinian children by subsidies to their education, this

could be accomplished more effectively and with fewer collateral problems by

providing the same assistance to the state educational systems where they reside

rather than through an over-sized international bureaucracy that perpetuates the

political myth that the Palestinians are refugees and should be allowed to return to

their former homes.

As mentioned earlier, UNRWA's claim to fame in education proves misleading. Its

schools are not scholastically superior, in fact they are often inferior, to the local-

national schools, and Jordan is a case in point. James Lindsay's thorough report

shows that while UNRWA's services are free, students still prefer the national school

systems. "UNRWA schools are losing students to Jordanian government schools

7
http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftn17%23_ftn17http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftn18%23_ftn18http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftn18%23_ftn18http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftn19%23_ftn19http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftn17%23_ftn17http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftn18%23_ftn18http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftn19%23_ftn19


8/22

(most Palestinian refugees in Jordan are citizens so they are able to choose which

schools their children attend)." The loss of students is in contradiction to the rise in

refugee rolls. "The number of registered refugees in Jordan increased by 32.4% from

December 1997 to December 2007, while the number of students in UNRWA schools

declined by 13%".[20] To avoid negative ramification of its deteriorating educational

reputation UNRWA decided to launch an elaborate public relations campaign.[21] It is

hard to believe that these tactic will dispel the criticism.

As we have shown, the answer to UNRWA's educational problems is clear: turn over

UNRWA's costly and inferior educational system to the local governments. While the

transfer will require a major structural change the process will be facilitated by the fact

that the majority of the students are bone fide citizens of Middle Eastern states, all theteachers are local Palestinians, and the curriculum is adopted from the host countries

and the PA texts. The transfer of the educational operation is necessary and timely.

Money will be saved and overstuffed, inefficient bureaucracy will be terminated. The

big winner will, of course, be the students!

Palestinian Self-Reliance Requires an End to UNRWA's Operations

During its six decades of operation, UNRWA has deepened and propagated thePalestinian dependence on its services. This has been detrimental to the development

of Palestinian economic and social self-reliance. It probably helped the rise of Hamas

which presents itself as a genuine, self-supporting economic and social Palestinian

institution. We argue that UNRWA's inflated bureaucracy and the unrestrained scope

of its non-emergency services hinder rather than induce Palestinian self-reliance.

UNRWA's operations have been particularly damaging to the fledgling PA that has to

accept the existence of a competing United Nations governing authority within its

boundaries . The World Bank recently reported that the PA is "developing strategies

that encourage productivity and growth in the industrial, agricultural, housing, and

tourism sectors and allow the Palestinian economy to develop a diversified export

portfolio"[22] UNRWA's operations have the reverse effect of nurturing and advancing

dependence. We will present feasible alternatives to UNRWA's operations that have

8
http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftn20%23_ftn20http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftn21%23_ftn21http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftn22%23_ftn22http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftn20%23_ftn20http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftn21%23_ftn21http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftn22%23_ftn22


9/22

been developed by Palestinian scholars who see that UNRWA undermines their road

to self-reliance

While UNRWA has no legal governing authority, it issues building permits, authorizes

commercial activities and acts as a "private banking system" distributing millions in

cash and loans to those it favors. Not surprisingly, thousands of residents of the West

Bank and Gaza, and millions in Jordan know only one governing authority: UNRWA.

In its "UNRWA at 60" document the agency reports that in FY 2009, it has outstanding

169 million USD in loans, granted to 157,000 people! "The agency has been providing

loans worth USD 30 million each year". UNRWA boasts that "it is the largest micro-

finance service provider in the occupied Palestinian territories and the second largest

micro-finance institution in Syria". [23] UNRWA does not include details concerningthis unusual financial activity in its annual reports, and we wonder: how can a skeleton

body of 120 international advisors properly control and manage this high volume

financial activity? One must also ask the donors: if the international community wishes

to distribute millions of dollars (cash loans and grants) to Palestinian people, shouldn't

it be done in the proper manner, through national banking institutions that exercise

control, accountability and transparency mechanisms, and not through the shady

bureaucracy of UNRWA? .

Ending this detrimental anomaly requires the termination of UNRWA's non-emergency

operations and the transfer to the proper local authorities the responsibility and

authority to plan and execute public policy, namely, educating the Palestinian children

and running health clinics. The termination of UNRWA's status as a "non-territorial

government" in the West Bank and Gaza will establish the PA as the only legal,

governing authority. The PA leadership will gain the respect and trust of the people

that is needed to counter Hamas influence in Gaza. Indeed, in the West Bank, where

UNRWA's presence is weaker, the PA's position and authority is secure and growing.

The trade off is clear: a strong and "fat" UNRWA means a "lean" and weak PA. In

Gaza, Hamas leadership grew stronger under the protection of UNRWA, and

undermined the PA efforts to gain control of Gaza. Many Palestinians openly criticize

this role of UNRWA and express the hope that "UNRWA is not forever." [24]

9


10/22

The following are a few working plans suggested by Palestinian scholars that show a

Palestinian desire and appeal for self reliance. "One possible way of easing the

transition (from UNRWA to the PA and other host governments) would be to create a

flexible transitional funding mechanism, which would allow donors to transfer

resources for a variety of purposes with some assurance of accountability and

transparency. Such a facility would work as a flexible multi-country, multi-purpose

mechanism for channeling donor assistance."[25] The possibility of UNRWA being in

charge of a transitional fund was not accepted because "donors would be concerned

whether the Agency could maintain the appropriate degree of objectivity if it were

asked to manage the financial aspects of the transfer of services."[26] Another

alternative suggested that "UNRWA might be gradually wound down over 2-5 year

period. During this period, its previous functions would be gradually assumed by host

governments. UNRWA might also take on new tasks, whether to assist host

governments in upgrading the quality of their own service delivery, or in assisting the

implementation of various aspects of a permanent status agreement. Or, UNRWA

would face an indeterminate transition period between initial agreement on a

framework for resolving the refugee issue and agreement on specific modalities. This

would then be followed by a subsequent wind down period of 2-5 years." [27]

Another alternative suggested: "A first step would need to be reaching of agreement

among key donor countries that the time had arrived for UNRWA and the PA, and

where possible, UNRWA and the host governments, to enter into firm arrangements

for the transfer, over a specific period, of UNRWA's functions to the PA and to those

regional governmentEstablishment of a cooperation agreement between UNRWA

and the PA, and the PA encompassing secondment of staff from the PA to UNRWA

schools and clinics, with the PA to be given additional financial assistance from the

donors for the purpose (to cover salary and allowance differentials). Increase

outsourcing to the PA of refugee education and health services. Refugee children

should be able to go to school wherever there is capacity in PA schools to absorb

them as currently happens to some extent in the West Bank." [28] "While the

government of Syria could absorb current UNRWA expenditures in Syria relatively

10
http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftn25%23_ftn25http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftn26%23_ftn26http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftn27%23_ftn27http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftn28%23_ftn28http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftn25%23_ftn25http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftn26%23_ftn26http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftn27%23_ftn27http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftn28%23_ftn28


11/22

easily, the task is more difficult in LebanonJordan faces substantially greater relative

costs than do either Syria or Lebanon. Additional resources should be given to the PA

since in the Palestinian territories; there is no prospect that the Palestinian budget

could suddenly absorb the costs of providing under UNRWA health, education and

other social services in the immediate future."[29]

In summary, UNRWA's clients, the Palestinian people, are highly critical of the

"patron" that was imposed upon them. We agree with them that the termination of

UNRWA's operations is not only feasible but is imperative. Donors to UNRWA actually

harm the Palestinian community by perpetuating UNRWA's superfluous existence.

UNRWA is Neither an Exclusive Nor the Best Aid Provider

For sixty years, more than thirty international organizations, hundreds of NGOs, and

all members of the OECD have been transferring billions of dollars and in kind aid to

the Palestinian community. However, hardly any cost and benefit analysis is carried

out to compare the value and consequences of the generous, annual contributions to

UNRWA with the efficacy of aid given through other institutions. Notwithstanding the

lack of evidence that UNRWA's operation serves the cause of the Palestinian

community, in March 2009, at an international donor's conference in Sharm el-Sheikh,Egypt, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced the administration's pledge of

$900 million aid package that includes hundreds of million to UNRWA. [30]

UNRWA is only one of many aid providers and indeed, the Palestinian environment

resembles an "aid bazaar" with international organizations and donor states

competing with each other over "who is the biggest aid provider". Donors come from

all creeds, faith, agenda, ideology, size, affiliation and intentions. The Big Four are the

USAID, the European Commission, the World Bank, and the United Nations

Development Program. Others include FAFO (The Norwegian Peace Building Center),

the Finnish government, the British Council, the Italian and Japanese governments,

and many international NGO, including Catholic relief, Care, Save the Children,

OXFEM, UNICEF, to name a few. All the aid providers work simultaneously, at the

11


12/22

same locations, and provide aid to the same population. In this diffused system,

UNRWA is seeking to preserve its dominance position even after its original task has

long been achieved.

We argue that UNRWA's operations are redundant and irrelevant vis--vis the vast

assistance campaigns executed by the international community. The US in particular

needs to stop transferring vast amounts of resources to UNRWA while the USAID is

simultaneously carrying out independent development projects to the same

population. . "Most aid to the Palestinians is provided by USAID to U.S.-based NGOs

operating in the West Bank and Gaza. Funds are allocated for humanitarian

assistance, economic development, democratic reform, improving water access and

other infrastructure, health care, education, and vocational training."[31] If the USAIDautonomously carries out all these development projects why provide UNRWA's

inefficient organization with billions of dollars for the same activities? Indeed, between

2002 and 2009 the US increased its contributions to the Palestinians by more than

200%-- from $ 72 million in 2002 to $ 150 million in 2006 and to $ 414 million in 2008!

The picture repeats itself with aid provided by the European Commission. In 2008 the

EC announced a contribution of $ 461 million Euros to be spent on humanitarian,

food, and non humanitarian projects.[32] The World Bank is carrying out

independently, a variety of community development projects in the west Bank and

Gaza, supporting a pioneering new community driven development project, the Village

and Neighborhood Development Project" (VNDP).[33] The UNDP (United Nations

Development Program) is also heavily involved in Palestinian community and

economic development projects.[34] UNDP autonomous operations include:

democratic governance, crisis prevention and recovery, environment, poverty

reduction, gender and HIV/AIDS. UNDP reports that its 2008 budget for economic aid

for Gaza was only $ 80 million, but this lean yet efficient project has already generated

over 50,000 jobs for Palestinian workers.[35] In addition since 2005, the Finish

government has also been assisting the education sector in the West Bank and Gaza.

12
http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftn31%23_ftn31http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftn32%23_ftn32http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftn33%23_ftn33http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftn34%23_ftn34http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftn35%23_ftn35http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftn35%23_ftn35http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftn31%23_ftn31http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftn32%23_ftn32http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftn33%23_ftn33http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftn34%23_ftn34http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftn35%23_ftn35


13/22

Clearly, UNRWA's expensive existence is not indispensable! Terminating UNRWA's

ineffective operations and shutting down its oversized bureaucracy will not result in

lack of assistance for the Palestinian people.

UNRWA Inhibits the Peace Process

For decades UNRWA has used scare tactics to claim that its existence is essential to

the peace process. The scare tactics seem to work because UNRWA's budget has

grown exponentially. UNRWA strongest argument is that the Palestinian "refugees"

need a patron to take care of them until a legitimate Palestinian government is

established and takes over UNRWA's operations. In early 1995, when the donors

proposed to begin a gradual transfer of UNRWA's operations to the newly created PA

and the other host governments, UNRWA raised strong objections to the plan insisting

that it should continue operating "for practical as well as political reasons"[36] We

argue that nothing is further from the truth.

UNRWA's original mandate was neither clear nor specific on the question of

"assist[ing] the refugees until their status was politically resolved". Our discussion

clearly shows that the status of West Bank and Gaza Palestinians has been resolved,

and UNRWA's services are redundant and superfluous. Jordan and Syria are tworecognized, functioning states that could and should take over UNRWA's operations

and provide all the necessary services equally, to all the Palestinians who have

resided for four generations amidst them.[37] The only place where emergency aid

may be needed is Lebanon. Here too, the international community is actively and

intensely involved in providing aid to the camps. UNRWA is only one of many well

funded non governmental and governmental aid organizations that provide assistance

to the camp residents (mostly non refugees)in Lebanon. In the case of Gaza and the

West Bank, UNRWA functions as a "non territorial government" competing with the PA

as it provides civil services to PA citizens. Since 1995, the PA has been the legitimate

Palestinian governing authority. It should run schools, operate health clinics, issue

building permits, and collect taxes. UNRWA's existence denies the aspiring

13
http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftn36%23_ftn36http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftn37%23_ftn37http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftn37%23_ftn37http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftn36%23_ftn36http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftn37%23_ftn37


14/22

Palestinian people the right to self-government and self-reliance. The rise of Hamas

may be linked partly to the PA's weakend authority

As we have shown, a major component in UNRWA's survival strategy is the nurturing

of a mutual dependence syndrome, so that the Palestinian community thinks it cannot

function without UNRWA's inflated bureaucracy. UNRWA needs the myth of "five

million refugees" and in exchange, provides the Palestinians free services. The truth is

that UNRWA's tactics actually hinder the peace process and any realistic resolution of

the refugee issue. UNRWA's baseless and inflated registration numbers feed the

impossible demand for a "right of return".

Thus, it is not surprising that UNRWA has consistently resisted any effort by Israeli

governments to resettle the "refugees". Immediately after the administration of the

West Bank and Gaza shifted from Egypt and Jordan to Israel as a result of the war of

1967, the Israeli Military Administration initiated a major camps reconstruction policy.

The plan involved moving the refugees to permanent housing, as well as widening

camps roads and improving Gaza infrastructure and living conditions, and demolition

of temporary shelters. In a complete violation of UNRWA's mandate, these positive

measures were vigorously protested by UNRWA, including protests before the UN

General Assembly, calling upon Israel to abandon its plans and refrain from any action

that might lead to resettlement of Palestinian refugees. Later, during the 1990s,

UNRWA rejected plans initiated by local Palestinian municipal authorities to annex the

residents of UNRWA's areas of control to the Palestinian areas of responsibility. Even

the request to strengthen the ties between UNRWA's clients and the local Palestinian

municipal authorities was rejected.[38]

In 2000, Palestinian leaders publicly expressed disappointment at UNRWA's

resistance to relinquish its responsibilities. "While the Oslo Process of 1993 renewed

the debate about the future of UNRWA, and for the first time since UNRWA was

established it is possible to see on the horizon the end of the Agency's mission and

UNRWA's ultimate dissolutionfive years later, however, the future of the Agency

remains unclear."[39] To date, UNRWA continues to deny the well known fact: most

14


15/22

refugees are long settled. Only an acknowledgment of this fact will move the peace

process forward.

UNRWA Violates Antiterrorist Laws and Conventions

UNRWA is a United Nations agency, and is expected to adhere to antiterrorism laws

and Security Council resolution. But UNRWA facilities, including schools, health clinics

and even hospitals, are used as training grounds and safe haven for guerrilla armies

and terrorists. The autonomous status of UNRWA has enabled the agency to ignore

these conventions with impunity. UNRWA, by its own admission, contravenes US law.

UNRWA's former Commissioner-General Peter Hansen admitted in 2004 that he was

sure that there are Hamas members on UNRWA's payroll and he did not see that as a

crime.[40] The donors, in particular the largest donor, the US, also ignore UNRWA's

disregard for international anti-terrorism laws. The US Congress has been

continuously approving generous contributions to UNRWA in spite of UNRWA's

violation of US laws. Section 301 of the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act (PL 87-195) as

later amended by Congress to says: "No contributions by the United States shall be

made to UNRWA except on the condition that UNRWA takes all the possible

measures to assure that no part of the United States contribution shall be used to

furnish assistance to any refugee who is receiving military training as a member of the

so called PLO or any other guerrilla type organization or who has engaged in any act

of terrorism." While the USAID is taking major steps to ensure that US resources,

including its aid to the West Bank and Gaza, do not go to Hamas and Hezbollah

members, UNRWA does not.

Matthew Levitt of the Washington Institute argues that "UNRWA does not have ready

access to information on refugees who are receiving military training from guerrillas.

As recently as December 2002, USAID 'cleared' several charity commitments to

receive funding despite information publicly tying them to Hamas."[41] As early as

2003, a GAO inquiry determined that UNRWA is in violation of US law. "UNRWA's

implementation of procedures to address section 301(c) is constrained by several

factors. First, it relies on host governments to review local jobs applicants. Also it can't

15


16/22

determine if its beneficiaries meet section 301( c) criteria owing to concerns for its

staff's safety and its inability to verify beneficiary responses."[42]

Another recent inquiry reached even harsher conclusions. "UNRWA makes no attempt

to weed out individuals who support extremist positions and some staff members

undoubtedly support violence to achieve these goals ".[43] UNRWA is using disturbing

tactics to permit keeping Hamas and Hezbollah members on its payroll. By denying

that these two organizations are "terrorism supporting organizations", as they are

identified in US law, UNRWA is able to keep their members on the payroll. Thus, when

vetting employees, questions about membership or support of Hamas and

Hezbollahare not asked nor is this information recorded.

In contrast to UNRWA's tolerance of Hamas and Hezballah activities, the PA and the

Jordanian governments denounce Hamas terrorist activities and systematically carry

out counter terrorism operations against them. A transfer of UNRWA's operations to

the PA and the host governments, e.g. giving the PA control of UNRWA's schools and

health care facilities in Gaza and the West Bank, would help weed out Hamas

members and prevent terrorists from using schools and health clinics as shelters.

Finally, UNRWA's damaging policies and its violation of section 301 (c) of US law

should be taken into account regarding US contributions to UNRWA.

Conclusion: Alternatives to UNRWA

As we have shown, UNRWA's self proclaimed status, as the best available and most

preferred provider of aid to the "Palestinian refugees" is wrong and misleading. We

have also shown that UNRWA's operations are harmful and damaging to the self-

reliance and autonomous governing of the PA. The redundancy of UNRWA was clear

at the donor conference that took place in 2007 in Paris. The President of the PA,

Mahmoud Abbas requested and was promised $ 7.4 billion in economic assistance,

for three years (2008-2010). The representatives of the 90 donor nations agreed that

the future of the Palestinian people is dependent on a strong and stable PA. The US

Congressional Research Service observed that "Experts advised that the PA stability

16


17/22

hinges on improved security, economic development, Israeli cooperation, and the

continuation of high levels of foreign assistance." [44] The facts show that UNRWA's

existence stands in the way of achieving all these goals. Notwithstanding, UNRWA

continues to perpetuate the myth that it is the "best show in town."

The billions donated to UNRWA reduce the amount of money available for aid to the

PA, making the PA a weaker potential partner for peace. To secure its permanent

existence, UNRWA uses scare tactics warning of disastrous consequences to the

peace process if its operations are curtailed. Consequently, no donor dares to reduce

or cut UNRWA's burgeoning budget. UNRWA's theme of the imagined "five million

distressed refugees" feeds the impossible demand for a "right of return." Following

UNRWA's path, in a few years we could be facing a fantastical "10 million distressedrefugee population," demanding a "right of return. By perpetuating this myth, UNRWA

has become a major problem not a solution.

The US is the largest donor and it should expose UNRWA's misleading tactics. The

US Congress has demanded transparency and accountability, to no avail. It is time to

put a lid on donations to UNRWA,gradually phasing out of UNRWA's operations. A

sixty-year entrenched bureaucracy has to be eliminated, and almost 30,000 UNRWA's

employees could and should be integrated either in the relevant local governments or

in the various international agencies that will take over UNRWA's operation. The

process will encounter opposition. "Affected parties would ensure an active, vocal

resistance in some quarters. But carefully managed, those sensitivities should not

prevent a well-considered series of reforms from going forward."[45] Critics might

claim that a central role in the transition for UN and other international organizations

will bring with it potential problems of interagency rivalry and bureaucratization. Also,

there certainly exists no common vision among UNRWA, UNHCR, UNDP and others,

as to what their respective contributions to a transition process might be. Even after

decades of simultaneous operation, there is very little vision at all, about the ability of

UN agencies (and UNRWA in particular) to plan for a phase out and transfer of

responsibilities. UNRWA certainly will put up a fight to secure its bureaucratic survival.

As early as 1995, when donors first seriously considered a gradual transfer of

17


18/22

responsibilities, UNRWA vehemently objected to any change in its status. " A reduced

UNRWA could have potential political consequencesfor the Palestinian Authority,

the host countries and the peace process itself."[46]

However, resolving the refugee problem requires the termination of UNRWA's

operation, and the US and the other major donors should not be intimidated by the

political sensitivity surrounding most of the transition initiatives. The transition has to

be carefully planned and the annual contributions should be gradually transferred from

UNRWA to the regional, host governments. The roles and responsibilities of all the

donors that will participate in the transition process should be discussed with the

relevant local governments as well as with the US government. Proper bills will have

to be passed. Congress, the White House and the Department of State, (USAID) willhave to develop a coherent, coordinated plan of action.

We suggest that the execution of the transition be managed by an international

working group that includes representatives of US government agencies, various

relevant United Nations agencies, the World Bank, representatives of donor

governments, in particular, the EC, representatives of UNRWA's Advisory

Commission, and finally, representatives of Israel, the PA and the other host

governments. The working group should divide the work among the members based

on the expertise and the ability of each government and agency to contribute and take

part in the transition period. UNRWA (or an UNRWA-successor agency calling upon

some of the same staff and facilities) might play a temporary role, for example, in

resettlement, economic development initiatives, the administration of refugee

compensation, or other possible components of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement on

the final resettlement of the refugee issue.

Other elements of the UN system can also contribute whether in conjunction with, or

instead of, UNRWA. The process will require a substantial degree of interagency

cooperation and coordination to assure an optimal and smooth transition. This is a

complex process that should not be delayed or avoided. UNRWA has to be phased

out, and only bold actions will yield the necessary results.

18
http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftn46%23_ftn46http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftn46%23_ftn46


19/22

Nitza Nachmias is a Senior Research Fellow at The Jewish-Arab Center, University of

Haifa and a Visiting Professor at the Department of Political Science, Towson

University, Maryland.

[1] Webrelief document: "UNRWA at 60", A concept paper.

[2] Paragraph 7 of UNGA Resolution 302 (IV) of December 8, 1949, established the

United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) to administer the distribution of

food, shelter, clothing, medical treatment, and education for the refugees. The U.N.

General Assembly has renewed the UNRWA mandate ever since.

[3] See James G. Lindsay, "Fixing UNRWA", Policy Focus #91, The Washington

Institute for Near East Policy, January 2009.

[4]. "The Jalazon data show that half of the camp's household arrived from 1950onward and since then the movement into camps continued at a steady annual rate

of about 1 percent. ..most of the families had never been in a camp and decided to

move in because of advantages to be gained." Yoram Ben Porat and Emanuel Marx,

"Some Sociological and economic aspects of refugees camps on the West Bank," A

Ford Foundation Report (Santa Monica, Rand Corporation, August 1971), 9

[5]there is no logical or humanitarian argument to justify a UN organization providing

services such as education, health,and welfare to citizens of a member state in a non-

emergency situation." in James G. Lindsay, "Fixing UNRWA", 53

[6] UNRWA has accumulated a billion dollars in a pension fund, the "Providence

Fund", controlled by the Commissioner General, and never mentioned in the Agency's

annual Report.

[7] UNRWA's has a problem of double loyalty. "UNRWA's inexactitude of the data is

due to double loyalty of the local UNRWA staff." Baerwald, Paul. Survey of the

Development and Structure of UNRWA 1948-1967: (Jerusalem, The Hebrew

University, 1968), p. 5

[8] For example, since the creation of the Palestinian Authority in 1993, UNRWA has

been competing for development contracts with the PA's Palestinian Economic

Council for Development and Reconstruction (PECDAR).

[9]. "Hamas is a social movement with thousands of activistsand it engages in

19
http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref1%23_ftnref1http://www.relief.int/rw.nsf/db900SIDhttp://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref2%23_ftnref2http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref3%23_ftnref3http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref4%23_ftnref4http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref5%23_ftnref5http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref6%23_ftnref6http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref7%23_ftnref7http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref8%23_ftnref8http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref1%23_ftnref1http://www.relief.int/rw.nsf/db900SIDhttp://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref2%23_ftnref2http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref3%23_ftnref3http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref4%23_ftnref4http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref5%23_ftnref5http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref6%23_ftnref6http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref7%23_ftnref7http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref8%23_ftnref8


20/22

extensive political and social activities." Glenn E. Robinson, "Hamas as Social

Movement", in Quintan Wiktorowicz,(ed.): Islamic Activism,(Bloomington: Indiana

University Press, 2004), 112

[10] 1998 Report of the Commissioner General (July 1997-30 June 1998). Quoted in

Barry Rubin at al. "UNRWA: Refugee of Rejectionism", A report from the Global

Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center, May 8, 2008, p. 4.

[11] Efrat, Moshe. The Palestinian Refugees Social and Economic Survey: 1949-

1974, (Tel Aviv University, unpublished Master's thesis, 1976), p. 13

[12]. "Urges the governments of the countries in the area to assist, with due regard to

their constitutional processes, in the carrying out of this program (The program

allocated $200 million) for reintegration over and above such contributions as may be

made by local governments, to be carried out over a period of approximately three

years starting as of 1 July, 1951." General assembly resolution #413. , 26 January,

1952

[13] The British government also considered Iraq as one of the countries that would

absorb the refugees. Jacob Tovy, On Its Own Threshold, (Jerusalem: Ben Gurion

Research Institute, 2008), p. 5

[14] UNRWA acknowledges that it provides aid to anyone in need. UNRWA's official

cite, front page.

[15] United Nation Yearbook, 1987, p.325

[16] A GAO report of November 17, 2003

[17] UNRWA's response to these claims was less than satisfactory. See Andrew

Whitley response to James G. Lindsay review of UNRWA's operations. Policy Watch

# 1471: Special Policy Forum Report .

[18] Commissioner-General statement, Amman Jordan, 7 April 2009

[19] "This week thousands of children in Gaza will make an attempt to break the world

record for the number of kites flying in the same place at the same time". UNRWA

press release, 30 July, 2009.

[20] James G. Lindsay, Repairing the UN's Troubled System of Aid to Palestinian

Refugee, Washington DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy

Focus #91 | January 2009 p.27

20
http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref10%23_ftnref10http://www.gloriacenter.org/submenus/articles/2008/rubin/5_8.asphttp://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref11%23_ftnref11http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref12%23_ftnref12http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref13%23_ftnref13http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref14%23_ftnref14http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref15%23_ftnref15http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref16%23_ftnref16http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref17%23_ftnref17http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref18%23_ftnref18http://www.un.org/UNRWA/newshttp://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref19%23_ftnref19http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref20%23_ftnref20http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref10%23_ftnref10http://www.gloriacenter.org/submenus/articles/2008/rubin/5_8.asphttp://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref11%23_ftnref11http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref12%23_ftnref12http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref13%23_ftnref13http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref14%23_ftnref14http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref15%23_ftnref15http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref16%23_ftnref16http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref17%23_ftnref17http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref18%23_ftnref18http://www.un.org/UNRWA/newshttp://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref19%23_ftnref19http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref20%23_ftnref20


21/22

[21] Plan is detailed in "UNRWA at 60" , UNRWA publication, p.3

[22] The World Bank. "Palestinian Economic Prospects: Gaza recovery and West

Bank Revival." Economic Monitoring Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, June 8,

2009. 12.

[23] Webrelief document "UNRWA at 60" a concept paper.

[24] A workshop meeting: "The Future of UNRWA", held February 19-20 in Minster

Lovell, U.K.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Ibid,. Summary report, p.5

[27] Ibid,. Summary report, p.2

[28] Bob Bowker, "The Political Management of Change in UNRWA," presented at the

Workshop on the future of UNRWA, Minster Lovell (UK), pp. 3-5

[29] Workshop on the future of UNRWA, 19-20 of February, 2000, in Minster Lovell,

U.K. p.5

[30] That includes: $300 million for humanitarian aid to Palestinians in Gaza; $200

million in budget support for the PA; and $400 million to support the PA's Palestinian

Reform and Development Plan in the West Bank.

[31] Jim Zanotti, CRS Report, February 20, 2009, p.2

[32] UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Sunday, 12 April, 2009

[33] A World Bank publication, June, 2008, www.worldbank.org

[34] Unlike UNRWA, UNDP employs only 300 primarily Palestinian staff members and

the agency subcontracts its projects to local and international contractors.

[35] UNDP publication, 2008 (no date)

[36]See details see "UNRWA and the transitional period: A five year perspective on

the role of the Agency," UNRWA Horizon Report, Vienna, January 31, 1995.

[37] International law requires the host government to provide equal civil services to

citizens and legal non citizens.

[38] Interviews in Jerusalem, with PASSIA officials, (Palestinian Academic Society for

the Study of International Affairs) February, 2008

[39] Badil Information & Discussion Brief, Issue No. 6, July 2000, p. 1

[40] In an interview to a Canadian radio station, 2004. The Jerusalem Post, January

21
http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref21%23_ftnref21http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref22%23_ftnref22http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref23%23_ftnref23http://www.relief.int/rw/rwb.nsfhttp://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref24%23_ftnref24http://www.arts.mcgill.ca/MEPP/PRRN/papers/unrwa_role.htmlhttp://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref25%23_ftnref25http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref26%23_ftnref26http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref27%23_ftnref27http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref28%23_ftnref28http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref29%23_ftnref29http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref30%23_ftnref30http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref31%23_ftnref31http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref32%23_ftnref32http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref33%23_ftnref33http://www.worldbank.org/http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref34%23_ftnref34http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref35%23_ftnref35http://www.undp.ps/http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref36%23_ftnref36http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref37%23_ftnref37http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref38%23_ftnref38http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref39%23_ftnref39http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref40%23_ftnref40http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref21%23_ftnref21http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref22%23_ftnref22http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref23%23_ftnref23http://www.relief.int/rw/rwb.nsfhttp://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref24%23_ftnref24http://www.arts.mcgill.ca/MEPP/PRRN/papers/unrwa_role.htmlhttp://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref25%23_ftnref25http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref26%23_ftnref26http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref27%23_ftnref27http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref28%23_ftnref28http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref29%23_ftnref29http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref30%23_ftnref30http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref31%23_ftnref31http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref32%23_ftnref32http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref33%23_ftnref33http://www.worldbank.org/http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref34%23_ftnref34http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref35%23_ftnref35http://www.undp.ps/http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref36%23_ftnref36http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref37%23_ftnref37http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref38%23_ftnref38http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref39%23_ftnref39http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref40%23_ftnref40


22/22

31, 2009. www.jpost.com/servlet

[41] Matthew Levitt, "Broken aid to the Palestinian" January 30, 2009

[42] GAO Report, Washington D.C., November 17, 2003, 3

[43] James G. Lindsay, Repairing the UN's Troubled System of Aid to Palestinian

Refugee, p.32

[44] Jim Zanotti, "US Foreign Aid to the Palestinian., p. 3

[45] Bob Bowker . Workshop on the future of UNRWA, Minster Lovell (UK), p. 6

[46] See "UNRWA and the transitional period: A five year perspective on the role of

the Agency," UNRWA Horizon Report, Vienna, January 31, 1995.
http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref41%23_ftnref41http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/category/members/matthew-levitt/http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref42%23_ftnref42http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref43%23_ftnref43http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref44%23_ftnref44http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref45%23_ftnref45http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref46%23_ftnref46http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref41%23_ftnref41http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/category/members/matthew-levitt/http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref42%23_ftnref42http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref43%23_ftnref43http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref44%23_ftnref44http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref45%23_ftnref45http://www.meforum.org/2481/unrwa-at-60-better-alternatives#_ftnref46%23_ftnref46

Documents

Unrwa at 60 by Nitza Nachmias