US Fighting Code 1955

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THE U. S.FIGHTING MAN'S

CODE

Published by the

OFFICE OF ARMED FORCES

INFORMATION and EDUCATION

Department of Defense

November 1955

This publication includes the report of the

Secretary of Defense's Advisory Committeeon Prisoners of War

PROPERTY OF u.s. ARMYTHE JUDGE,ADVOCATE GENERAL S SCHOOl


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EXECUTIVE ORDER 10631

CODE OF CONDUCT FOR MEMBERS OF THE

ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES

By virtue of the authority vested in me asPresident of the United States, and as Com-mander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of theUnited States, I hereby prescribe the Code ofConduct for Members of the Armed Forcesof the United States which is attached to this·order and hereby made a part thereof.

Every member of the Armed Forces of theUnited States is expected to measure up tothe standards embodied in this Code ofConduct while he is in combat or in captivity.To ensure achievement of these standards,each member of the Armed Forces liable to

. capture shall be provided with specific trainingand instruction designed to better equip himto counter and withstand ll enemy effortsagainst him, and shall be fully instructed asto the behavior and obligations expected ofhim during combat or captivity.

The Secretary of Defense (and the Secretaryof the Treasury with respect to the CoastGuard except when i t is serving as part ofthe Navy) shall take such action as is deemednecessary to implement this order and todisseminate and make the said Code knownto all members of the Armed Forces of theUnited States.

THE WHITE HOUSE,

August 17, 1955.

In signing this order, the Presidentsaid: No American prisoner of war willbe forgotten by the United States.Every available means will be employedby our government to establish contactwith, to support and to obtain therelease of all our prisoners of war.Furthermore, the laws of the UnitedStates provide for the support and careof dependents of members of the ArmedForces including those who becomeprisoners of war. I assure dependentsof such prisoners that these laws willcontinue to provide for their welfare."


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CONTENTS

Letter of Transmittal

I. BackgroundII. Brief Look at History

i l l The American Fighting Man and KoreaIV. Code of Conduct for the FutureV. Korean Summary

VI. The Road Ahead for America and the Armed ForcesAddenda


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• • • • • • •

THE DEFENSE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ONPRISONERS OF WAR

MEMBERS

Mr. Carter L. Burgess, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Man-power, Personnel and Reserve)-Chairman.

General John E. Hull, USA (Retired)-Vice Chairman.Dr. Frank B. Berry, s s i s t ~ t Secretary of Defense (Health

and Medical).Mr. Hugh M. Milton, II, Assistant Secretary of the Army

(Manpower and Reserve Forces). .Mr. Albert Pratt , Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Personneland Reserve Forces).

Mr. David S. Smith, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force(Manpower and Personnel).

Lt. General Frank W. Milburn, USA (Retired).Vice Admiral C. A. Lockwood, USN (Retired).Lt. General Idwal H. Edwards, USAF (Retired).

Major General MerrittA.

Edson, USMC (Retired). Mr. Stephen S. Jackson-Committee Counsel.Mr. Theodore Roscoe-Special Advisor.Mr. Edward Wetter-Office of the Assistant Secretary of

Defense (Research 'and Development).

STAFF

Colonel Horace E. Townsend, USA-8tafl ' Director.Colonel John C. Steele, USA-Deputy Staff Director.Lt. Colonel Robert B. Rigg, USA-Member.Commander Fred W. Frank, Jr., USN-Member.Lt. Colonel Robert E. Work, USAF-Member.Lt. Colonel F. B. Nihart, USMC-Member.Major Donald B Churchman, USA-Administration.

*Died 14 August 1955

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEWASHINGTON 25, D. C.

uly S9 1955

Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War

Dear Mr. Secretary:Your Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War has

been in constant session for the past two months and is pleasedto submit this report of its deliberations and findings.

We are certain that many persons have expected this Committee to recommend courses of action which would be as 'revolutionar.yas the speed and techniques of the latest guidedmissile or jet aircraft.

However, our task deals with human beings and the Nation.We can find no basis for making recommendations other thanon the principles and foundations which have made Americafree and strong and on the qualities which we associate withmen of integrity and character. I t is in, this common beliefthat we have determined on courses of proposed action whichwe are convinced are best for the United States and f o ~ itsposition among free nations.

The Code of Conduct we recommend sets a high standardand a reasonable course for members of the Armed Forces ofthe future. The conscience and heart of all America are neededin the support of this Code, and 'the best of training that canbe provided in our homes, by our schools and churches and bythe Armed o r c ~ will be required for all who undertake 'to

, live by this Code. 'America no longer can afford to think in terms of a limited

number of our fighting men becoming prisoners of war and inthe hands of an enemy in some distant land. Modern warfarehas brought the challenge to the doorstep of every citizen, andso the Code we propose may well be a Code for all Americansi the problem of survival should ever come to our own mainstreets.

And then too the United States must constantly be awareof her high position of world leadership, and the Code wepropose must consider the standard of the Ten Commandmentsand of our Constitution, as well as our pledge to the UnitedNations.

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No Code should overlook the watermarks of America sgreatness or bow to the easier courses which might entrapmore easily our men as alleged war criminals and weakentheir fiber for the many ordeals they may face. We mustbear in mind the past and future significance of the reserva-

tion made by Soviet Russia and other Communist nations toArticle 85 of the· Geneva Conventions of 1949 on prisonersof war.

Past history, the story of Korea and the crises which facedour prisoners of war in that conflict from capture throughOperation Big Switch and after, were all carefully consideredand are presented in our report. The prisoner of war situa-tion resulting from the Korean War has received a great deal

of adverse publicity.As

is stated in our account, much ofthat adverse publicity was due to lack of information andconsequent misconceptions in regard to the problem.

A few statistics may prove reassuring to anyone who thinksthe Armed Forces were undermined by Communist propa-ganda in Korea.

A total of about 1,600,000 Americans served in the KoreanWar. Of the 4,428 Americans who survived Communist im-prisonment, only a maximum of 192 were found chargeablewith serious offenses against comrades or the United States.Or put i t another way. Only l o u t of 23 American POWs wassuspected of serious misconduct.

The contrast with civilian figures tells an interesting story.According to the lat e8t F B I statistics, 1 in 15 persons inthe United States has been mested and fingerprinted for thecommission, or the alleged commission, of criminal acts.

When one realizes that the Armed Forces come from a croSB-section of the national population, the record seems fine indeed.I t seems better than that when one weighs in the balance thetremendous pressures the American POWs were under.Weighed in that balance, they cannot be found wanting.

We examined the publicly alleged divergent action taken bythe Services toward prisoners repatriated from Korea. Thedisposition of all cases was governed by the facts and circum-stances surrounding each case, and was as consistent, equitableand uniform as could be achieved by any two boards· or courts.As legal steps, including appeals, are completed and in light ofthe uniqueness of the Korean War and the particular conditions

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surrounding American prisoners of war, the appropriate ServiceSecretaries should make thorough reviews of all punishmentsa.warded. This continuing review should make certain thatany excessive sentences, i f found to exist, are carefully considered and mitigated. This review should also take intoaccount a comparison with sentences meted out to other prisoners for similar offenses.

n concluding, the Committee unanimously agreed thatAmericans require a unified and purposeful standard of conduct for our prisoners of war backed up by a first class trainingprogram. This position is also wholeheartedly supported bythe concensus of opinion of all those who consulted with theCommittee. From no one did we receive stronger recommendations on this point than from the former American prisoners ofwar in o r e a ~ f f i c e r sand enlisted men.

n taking this position and recommending this Code, it waspointed out to the Committee, and the Committee agr-ees thatin return America must always stand behind every Americanupon whom befalls prisoner of war status and spare no reasonable effort in obtaining their earliest possible release back to ourside. /

Sincerely,

~ . l J s , . _ . ~ . ~

~ f E C/;fG"

The Honorable Charles E. WilsonThe Secretary of Defense

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I

BACKGROUND

The Fortunes of WarFighting men declare i t is neither dishonorable nor heroic to

be taken prisoner. In the sense that the victim does not covetit, but finds himself unable to avoid it, capture is an accident.Often, like a motor crash, i t comes as complete surprise. Often,too, i t is accompanied by injury. Nearly always the upshot ispainful and in the end i t may prove fatal. And, as is the casewith many accidents, i t is bad luck.

Fighting men speak of the fortunes of war. In combat,luck cannot smile on a participants. Some. are bound tolose. The man taken captive is one of the unlucky-a Soldierof Misfortune. That can be one definition for war-prisoner.

But the prisoner is always a soldier, adversity despite. Fortune can change. n theU. S. Submarine Service there is themaxim: Luck is where you find it. The POW must keep onsearching. t may come by way of chance for rescue or chancefor escape. Opportunity or luck may favor him through prisoner exchange. They also serve who only stand and wait. TheLord helps those who hustle in the meantime.

These are the views of fighting men. And of men who havebeen prisoners of war-those who have had it. Their convictions, derived from experience, serve to dispel a popularfallacy-the misconception that a prisoner of war is, perforce, ahero. Conversely, they do not chalk his capture down to inferior performance. Everything depends on the individual andthe circumstances involved.

Public Interests and MisconceptionsClearly one shoUld not generalize about POWs, lump them

all into a single slot, or jump from some to all conclusions.Public opinion tends to settle for generalities because they areconvenient. The single slot is easy to handle. The someequals-all deduction, quickly arrived at, does not entail bothersome thinking. But these handy and quick devices serve todistort factuality. Misconceptions result. If, in addition,there has been misinformation or lack of information, publicopinion may go far askew.

In the case of American POW s i n particular, those takenprisoner in Korea-misconceptions are abundant, For themost part they are based on erroneous generalities and someequals-all deductions. Too, for· reasons which will become

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clear, the public has heretofore not been fully informed on thedetails necessary for balanced judgment.

Definitions were and are unclear or lacking. To begin with,just what is a prisoner of war? The man and his situation maybe readily visualized. But what is his military status? What

conduct is required of ,the prisoner in regard to enemy interrogation? What rules and regulations must he follow during confinement? What are his rights and privileges as codified byvarious international conventions and protocols?

What treatment may the .prisoner of war expect from thedetaining power, his captors? What conditions are imposed

by the so-called laws of war? Can a POW be tried as awar criminal? What s a war criminal?

Did the American POW in Korea face some novel andalarming menace from his Communist captors? Were nearlyall prisoners tortured or brain washed? Did many POWsin Korea adopt Marxist doctrine? Were there hundreds ofsubverted turncoats, traitors, voluntary collaborators? npunishing such malefactors was there divergence in the militarySemces-some lenient; others Spartan?

On many of these and similar questions the citizen on thehome front has remained largely uninformed. Too often thePOW, himself, has not known the answers.

Appointment of the Defense Advisory CommitteeEvery war has its disturbing aftermath. There is always

another side to the Victory coin. f the victory is not clearlyimprinted and the war has ended in what seems a stalemate,the coin becomes suspect. n any event, there is usually apost-war inventory. f losses have been heavy and objectivesobscure, the coin may seem debased.

The inventory after the War of 8 2 was unpleasant. Therewere some rude reactions after the Spanish-American War.

n a great war, some battles are inevitably lost. Militaryleaders study these battles, determined to uncover .mistakes,i f any were made, 80 that errors in kind may be avoided in thefuture.

Correction of possible errors and the need for a unified planfor the future led the Department of Defense to examine closelythe prisoner-or-war situation in Korea. The Defense AdvisoryCommittee on Prisoners of War was organized to study theproblem.


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II

RIEF LOOK T HISTORY

From the Beginning of TimeFor a full understanding of today's prisoner of war problem,

background knowledge of the past is essential. History hasestablished precedents which provide the knowledge necessaryto shed light on preparation for the future.

Primitive man and his barbarian descendant annihilated orenslaved all foemen who were captured. In time i t occurred tothe conqueror to hold a captured headman or leader as hostage.Such a victim was Lot. According to Scripture he was freedby the forces of Abraham-perhaps the earliest prisoner-rescueon record.

But the vanquished of the ancient world usually faced extermination. One finds in Samuel thus saith the Lord of Hosts. . . go and smite Amalek and utterly destroy all they have, andspare them not." Saul was considered disobedient because hetook a few Amalekite prisoners. Six e n ~ u r i e s later Hemocritusof Syracuse was exiled for refusing to slaughter all Athenian

captives. But it seemed mankind had a conscience. n respectto humane treatment of captives, it found voice in India in theancient. Code of Manu (about 200 B. C.). The Hindu warriorwas enjoined to do no injury to the defenseless or to the subduedenemy.

Less humane, the Romans sported with their war-prisoners,often using them for target practice or gladiatorial shows.Captives were tortured for public amusement. Enslaved war

riors rowed Caesar's naval galleys to North Africa and Britain,and were killed when they could no longer pull an oar. "Slay,and slay on " Germanicus ordered his Rhineland invaders.

Do not take prisoners We will have no peace until all aredestroyed." Thumbs sometimes went up for the valiant foreign gladiator or the stalwart warrior who begged no quarter.But mercy to the conquered foe was usually a whim.

Medieval ConceptsChivalry developed in the Western World with the rise of

Christian civilization, the concept of Do Unto Others. nthe Dark Ages, soldiering remained savage, but the codes ofknighthood served to ten:per the "Yarrior's steel. The true

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knight refused to slay for slaughter's sake. Conquering, hecould be merciful to a gallant opponent. His prisoner was nota plaything for sadistic ente,tainment.

f the chivalric code was sometimes more honored in breachthan in observance, the ideal- the Golden Rule-was there.

t was threatened by intolerant ideologies and the fanaticismwhich fosters atrocities. Cruel pogroms and religious warsbloodied Medieval Europe. The Islamic conquests weresavagery untrammeled. Woe to the Unbeliever captured bythe stepsons of Abu Bekrl But even as i t clashed with thesword, the scimitar acquired tempering. Possessed of his owncode, the Moslem warrior could appreciate gallantry.

The knight was called upon to assume the obligations of

no lesse oblige Warrior or liegeman, facing battle, was pledgedto remain true to his king or cause, even i f captured. Underany circumstance treason would merit retributive punishment.Treachery, the disclosure of a trust or the deliverance of a friendto the enemy, was perfidious-the mark of Judas the Betrayer.

Thus rules for the fighting man in combat or in captivity werelinked to knightly concepts of duty, honor, loyalty to friend,and gallantry to foe.

Some time during the Crusades a rule evolved in regard toprisoner interrogation. The captive knight was permitted todivulge his name and rank-admissions necessitated by thegame of ransom. A necessity for prisoner identification, therule holds today, as iInposed by the modern Geneva o n v n ~ tions:

Every prisoner of war, when questioned on the subject, isbound to give only his name, rank, date of birth, and army,

regimental, personal or serial number.n Europe during the 17th Century the concept emerged thatprisoners of war were in custody of the capturing sovereign orstate. No rules for their treatment had yet been formulated,but they were protected from servitude and personal revenge.Later, during the 18th Century, captivity was considered 'means of preventing return to friendly forces. This was a stepforward. Military prisoners were no longer considered guiltyof crimes against the state.

The American RevolutionTo discourage desertions during the Revolution, the United

States established the death penalty for those. prisoners who,after capture, took up arms in the service of the enemy. Am-

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nesty was granted to deserters but not those who deserted tothe enemy. Duress or coercion was'recognized as mitigatingonly in event of threatened immediate death. This was thefirst American definition of requir¢ ,prisoner conduct. In theTreaty of 1785 no standa.rd of conduct was prescribed but

conditions of confinement, care and parole weredefine


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A Code of ConductAlthough all the Services had regulations, the U S. Armed

Forces have never had a clearly defined code of conduct applicable to American prisoners after capture. There are piecemeal legal restrictions and regulations but no comprehensivecodification. However, despite this lack of a code, Americantroops have demonstrated through all wars that they do notsurrender easily, they have never surrendered in large bodiesand they have in general performed admirably in their country scause as prisoners of war.

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III

TH MERIC N FIGHTING M N ND KORE

THE KOREAN BATTLE.Our cause was simple and just, but our objectives in the

Korean War were frequently confused in the public m n ~ The Korean War had three aspects. There was the Civil

War aspectr--Notth Koreans fighting South Koreans for control of a dhided country. There was the collective aspect-thefirst United Nations attempt to stop a treaty breaking aggres

sor. And there was the Cold War aspect-the Western powersblocking the expansion of Communist imperialism.The causes of the war, United Nations · objectives and the

need for American ·intervention were not clearly delineated inthe public mind. This lack of understanding prevailed amongcitizens and American.fighting men.

The Communists attempted to exploit to the fullest thiscondition in both international propaganda and in dealingwith our prisoners of war.

Armed with Soviet weapons, North Korean Communist forcesinvl\ded South Korea on June 25 1950. Six days later abattalion of. the U. S. 24th Infantry Division was rushed toKorea from Japan. The division was soon in action againstthe enemy on the outskirts of Seoul.

The United States began a piecemeal build-up of the fightingforces in Korea. The r s ~ units to reach Korea were not wellprepared for combat. Thousands of reserves were ·flown toKorea. Many were veterans of World War II, but five years·at a factory or office job can slow up a man s trigger finger.However, by Novem,ber 1950, the North Koreans had beencompletely beaten, their capital was in Allied hands, and theirremnant forceS were scattered and disorganized. The victorywas ahnost at its climax when the Chinese Red avalanchecrashed over the Yalu.

That was on October 25th. A month later the Chineseopened a massive counter-offensive hurling our forces intoretreat. Early in December, American and Allied Forces weretrapped at the Chang-Jin Reservoir. By fierce fighting theybroke the trap and fought their way to Htu;lgnam where theywere evacuated. There ensued a winter of back-to-wall

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battling in subzero cold. t was during this gruelling periodthat most of the American POWs were captured.

Jmprisonment, North KoreaDuring the Korean War a total t 7,190 Americans were

captured by the enemy. Of these, 6,656 were Army troops'263 wer.e Air Force men; 231 were Marines; 40 were Navy men:' fhe Army bore the heaviest burden of prisoner losses.

The captives were marched off to various prison camps in theNorth Korean interior. Altogether there were 20 of thesecamps.

Death MarchesThe first ordeal the prisoner had to suffer-and· often the

worst-was the march to one of these camps. The NorthKoreans frequently tied a prisoner's hands behind his back orbound his arms with wire. Wounded prisoners were jammedinto trucks that jolted, dripping blood, along broken roads.Many of the wounded received no medical attention until theyreached the camp. Some were not attended to until daysthereafter.

The marching prisoners were liable to be beaten or kickedto their feet i f they fell. A number of the North Korean officerswere bullwhip barbarians, products of a semi-primitive environment. Probably they had neTer heard of the GenevaConventions or any other code of war. The worst of this breedwere responsible for the murder of men who staggered out ofline or collapsed at roadside. They were particularly brutalto South Korean captives. Evidence indicates that manyROK prisoners were forced to dig their own graves before theywere shot (an old Oriental custom applied to the execution oferiminals). Some Amencans, with hands tied behind back,were shot by the enemy.

So the journeys to the prison camps were death marches."EspeciaJIy in the winter of. 1950-1951 when the trails wereknee-deep in snow and polar winds flogged the toiling column.On one of these marches, 700 men were headed north. Beforethe camp was reached, 500 men had perished.

Facilities, Food, and Care Were PoorThe camps were what might be expected in a remote corner

of Asia. Prisoner rations were scanty-a basic diet of riceoccasionally leavened with Bome foul kind of soup. The Red

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Chinese and Korean authorities pointed out that this larderconformed with the rules of the Geneva Conventions-theprisaner received the same food as the soldiery holding himcaptive. 1 course, the Chinese were inured to a rice diet.The average American could not stomach such fare. Sicknessbroke out in the camps. Many of the men suffered long sieges

of dysentery.The men suffered much from cold in winter and heat insummer. Water was often scarce; bathing became difficult.Barracks were foul and unsanitary.

In the best of the camps the men behind the barbed wire~ r som?times i ~ n tobacco, a few morsels of candy, occaSIOnal mail. As will be noted, such items were usually offeredas rewards for cooperative conduct.;

A fewR:ed

Cross paclP,iges got through. However, theenemy consIStently refused to permit the International RedCross to inspect prisoner of war camps. There was good reason.

Camps Varied from Bad to WoneIn the worst of the camps, the prisoners existed by the skin

of their teeth and raw courage. Men in the bad campswere knoWn to lose 50 pounds weight in a matter of weeks.

The bad camps included the so-called Bean Camp nearSuan, a camp known as Dea.th Valley near Pukchin, anothercamp called The Valley, apparently in the vicinity ofKanggye. Among the worst camps were the InterrogationCenter near Pukchin and a neighboring disciplinary centercalled The Caves. This ~ t was literally composed ofcaverns in which the men were confined. Here they wereforced to sleep without blankets. Their food was thrown atthem. There were no latrine facilities. In The Cavesthe prisoners were reduced to a degree of misery and,degradationalmost unbelievable. Those sent to The Caves were prisoners accused of insubordination, breaking camp rules, attempting to escape, or committing some other crime (so-called).The testimony of survivors suggests that the crime wasseldom fitted by the punishment. Some mEm who refused t ·talk to military interrogaters were threatened with, or sent to

The Caves.

Pak's Was No PalacePossibly the worst camp endured by American POWs in

Korea was the one knoWn as Pak's Palace. This was a highly

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specialized interrogation center located near the city of Pyongyang. The place was a brickyard flanked by Korean h6uses.I t waS a North Korean establishment dominated by a chiefinterrogator, Colonel Pak. Pak was ably assisted by a henchman who came to be called Dirty Pictures Wong by the

POWs.The camp was under the administration of a Colonel Lee,and there were several other interrogators on the team. ButPak and Wong were symbolic of the institution. Pak was asadist, an animal who should have been in a cage. The teamemployed the usual questionnaires, the carrot-alid-prod techniques to induce answers. .Failing to induce them, they contrived to compel them. The Palace wanted military infor

mation. Coercion was used as the ultimate resort. And forPak, coercion began soon after a prisoner refused to talk.Then Pak would use violence. Abusive language would .befollowed by threats, kicks, cigarette burns, and promises offurther torture.

Several U. S. Army and Navy officers were questioned atPak's Palace. A few Army enlisted men went through this

brickyard mill. The great majority of POWs held there wereir Force officers. They took a bad beating from Colonell'ak.But the prisoners found ways to get around the beating.

One way was to convince the captors' that you were dumb,stupid, the low man in your class. Undergoing interrogation,one officer convinced his inquisitors that he was the stupidestofficer in the service.. He was awarded a contemptuous slap,and that was about all.

To the surprise of some prisoners at the Palace, the interrogation team would sometimes open up with a wild politicalharangue. Then came the word that the enemy had establisheda system of indoctrination c o u r s ~ s The prisoner might startthe hard way-and be punisheqrby restricted rations and other

.privations. f he began to show the proper spiri t - to cooperate with his captors-he was lectured and handed Communist literature. A docile prisoner who read the literatureand listened politely to the lectures, was graduated to a betterclass. Finally he might be sent to Peaceful Valley. In thislenient camp the food was relatively good. Prisoners mighteven have tobacco. And here they were given all sorts ofMarxian propaganda. .The graduates from Peaceful Valleyand others who accepted Communist schooling were called

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Progressives' Prisoners who refused to go along with theprogram often remained in tougher circumstances. They wereconsidered Reactionaries.

But the enemy followed no rigid system. Rather, his treatment of prisoners was capricious. Sometimes he showedcontempt for the man who readily submitted to bullying.The prisoner who stood up to the bluster, threats and blows ofan interrogator might be dismissed with a shrug and sent toquarters as mild as any- i f any prison barracks in North Koreacould be described as mild.

All in all, the docile prisoner did not gain much by hisdocility-and sometimes he gained nothing. The prisoner whodefied Pak and his breed might take a beating, but again hemight not. The ordeal was never easy. But things weren't

easy either for the combat troops battling out there in thetrenches.

Progressives nd ReactionariesThe POW political schools in North Korea were, of course,

patterned after the Soviet Russian design. They were part of amass program to spread Marxian ideology and gain converts forInternational Communism. The Progressives were called uponto deliver lectures, write pamphlets, and make propagandabroadcasts. Progressive leaders were sent among Reactionarygroups to harangue the men. They wrote speeches condemningCapitalism and uAmerican aggression in Korea. Theyorganized e group known as IlPeace Fighters.

Fortunately, only a few officers were Progressives. However, their in:fluence was unfortunately strong on the enlistedmen. f the Captain can do it, why can't I? f the Colonelsigns a peace petition and orders the rest of us to do it , we have tofollow orders, don' t we? Altogether the enlisted men were on aspot. That many of them refused to join the Progressives (andrejected a promise, sometimes unfulfilled, of better food, minorluxuries, and mail call) says something for the spirit of privatesand non-corns. The men who gave the Progressives an argument- the active Reactionaries-were a rugged group.

Breakdown of leadership was exactly what the enemy desired. Officers were usually segregated. Then as soon as a

natural leader stepped forward in a camp, he was removed.Progressives were usually placed in leadership positions. Andif they weren't obeyed by the other POWs, punishments werein store for the insubordinate prisoners.


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By design and because some officers refused to assumeleadership responsibility, organization in some of the POWcamps deteriorated to an every-man-for-himself situation.Some of the camps became indescribably filthy. The menscuffied for their food. o ~ d e r s grabbed all the tobacco.Morale decayed to the vanishing point. Each man mistrusted

the next. Bullies persecuted the weak and sick. Filth breddisease and contagion swept the camp. So men died for lackof leadership and discipline.

Ordeal by IndoctrinationWhen plunged into a Communist indoctrination mill, the

average American POW was under a serious handicap. Enemypolitical officers forced him to read Marxian literature. He was

compelled to participate in debates. He had to tell what heknew about American politics and American history. Andmany times the Chinese or Korean instructors knew moreabout these .subjects than he did. This brainstorming caughtmany American prisoners off guard. To most of them itcame as a complete surprise and they were unprepared. Lec

tures study g r o u p s ~ i s c u s s i o n groups a blizzard of propaganda and hurricanes of violent oratory were all a part of

the enemy technique.A large number of American POWs did not lmow what theCommunist program was all about. Some were confused byit. Self-seekers accepted it as an easy out. A few may havebelieved the business. They signed peace petitions and peddledCommunist literature.' t was not an inspiring spectacle. I tset loyal groups against cooperative groups aild broke up camporganization and discipline. t made fools of some men and

tools of others. Andi t

provided the enemy with stooges forpropaganda shows.Ignorance lay behind much of this trouble. A great many

servicemen were 'teen-agers. At home they had thought ofpolitics as dry editorials or uninteresting speeches, dull asditchwater. They were unprepared to give the commissars anargument.

Some of the POWs among them men who became defectors had heard of Communism only as a name. Many hadnever before heard of Karl Marx. And here was Communismheld up as the salvation of the world and Marx as mankind'sbenefactor.

The Committee heard evidence which revealed that many


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of the POWs knew too little about the United States and itsideals and traditions. So the Chinese indoctrinators had theadvantage.

The uninformed POWs were up against it. They couldn'tanswer arguments in favor of Communism with arguments infavor of Americanism, because they knew very little. about their

America. The Committee heard a number of ex-POWs whostated that a knowledge of Communism would have enabledthem to expose its fallacies to their camp-mates. The Redindoctrinators tried hard to win the support of factory workers.But as one of them put it, We'd heard all that guff before.Back home. We knew their line. Knowledge was a defenseweapon.

While it might be argued that few·of the men became sincere

converts to Communism-indeed, the percentage seems tohave been infinitesimal-the inability of many to speak upfor Democracy distressed loyal POWs. Active collaboratorsaside, there were other passive prisoners that went along.They lacked sufficient patriotism because of their limited knowledge o i ~ m e r i c n Democracy.

I t seemed that these POWs in question had lost their battlebefore they entered the Service. Good citizens-loyal Americans-the responsibility for their building lies with the home,the school, the church, the community. When men enter t ~Armed Forces, the Military Services must carryon with thISdevelopment.

The Committee, stressing the need for spiritual and educational bulwarks against enemy political indoctrination, recommends that the Assistant Secretary of Defens.e (Manpowerand Personnel) be directed to initiate exploratory conferenceswith the Department of Health, Education, and WelCare, andother agencies and institutions on pre-service training.

Brainwashing and Indoctrination

The Committee made a thorough investigation of the brainwashing question. In some cases this time consuming andcoercive technique was used to obtain confessions. In these.cases American prisoners of war were subjected to mental andphysical torture, psychiatric pressures or Pavlov Dogs treatment.

Most of the prisoners, however, were not subjected to brainwashing, but were given a high-powered indoctrination forpropaganda purposes.

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n either' case the members of our Armed Forces should begiven the best education and training possible in the future sothat t.hey can resist and cope with these practices.

The Committee also learned that POWs in Korea were notdrugged. Other methods such as denial of food or sleep wereequally effective and more practical.

Behind the Barbed-Wire CurtainPerhaps the Red enemy worked harder on the Americans

than he did on the other prisoners. An American who signed. propaganda leaflet, a peace petition, or a germ warfare con

fession, was a big feather in the enemy's hat. Many Americansin. Communist POW camps signed something or wrote some

thing. Out of 78~

under various forms ofd u r e s s ~

38 signedgerm warfare confesslOns. Forty others did not. Both groupswere under coercion. Why did some men break, and some refuseto bend?

Many servicemen exhibited pride in themselves and theirunits. This was particularly pronounced where they had bel?nged to the same unit for years. They stood»y one anotherlike t ~ a t u ~ a n d of brothers" inspired by NelSon. f a soldier~ a s sIck, hIS fellow soldiers took care of him. They v l l s h ~ d ~ s .clothes, bathed him, and pulled him through. They exhibIted true fraternal spirit comradeship, military pride.These soldiers did not let each other down. Nor could theKorean Reds win much cooperation from them.

nterrogation went' hand in glove with indoctrination. AprIsoner was questioned for military information. He was also~ u e r i e d on his home life and educational background. Themterrogator made him put it in writing-a biographical sketch.

e ~ d o m did the brief autobiography prove sufficient. Thep r l s ~ n e r u ~ u a l l ycompelled to write more, and in greaterdetail. f his lIterary efforts were painful, the d.iscomfort wasonly a. b e g i n n i ~ gHis autobiography was used against him.T ~ e s l I ~ h t e s t dIscrepancy, and he was accused of lying. HemIght discover thp,t he had written a confession of some kind~ d in any case, the information supplied t h i n t r r o g t o WIth a useful leverage for more pressure. The author's mistakewas in taking pen in hand.

Only a handful of the POWs in Korea were able to maintainabsolute silence under military interrogation. Nearly ll of the

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American prisoners went beyond the absolute name, rank,number, date of birth restriction.

Reviewing the inteITogation matter, the Defense AdvisoryCommittee felt that the steps taken up to now by the ArmedForces had been decidedly inadequate.

The Committee recommends that the Department of Defensedevise a special training program to teach American servicemen the ways and means of resisting enemy interrogators.

What Can e Done?

In a war for the minds of men, the enemy's methods can besuccessfully combatted by military training and civilian education. In battle and in captivity the fighting Ameriean is nobetter than his training and education. Military schooling can

teach him combat skills. Such know-how is a t'must.The Committee recommends that the Military Servicesinitiate a coordinated training program including

First, general training. This is motivational and informational training to he conducted throughout the career of allservicemen during active and reserve duty. Second, specifictraining. This is designed for and applied to combat-readytroops. Acode of conduct must apply wiiformly to all Services,

arid training must be uniform among the Services to the greatest degree practicable.In all Services training should be adapted to cover the needs

of all ranks from the enlisted man to the commander. t mustbe realistic as well as idealistic. Above all, it must be presentedwith understanding, skill and devotion sufficient to implanta conviction in the heart, conscience, and mind of the serviceman that full and loyal support of the code is to the best interestsof his country, his comrades, and himself.

But skill must be reinforced by will by moral character andby basic beliefs instilled in home and classroom long before alad enters the Military Service. Pride in a country and respectfor its principles a sense ot honor a sense of responsibility-such basics should be established long before ubasic training,and further developed after he enters the Armed Forces.

The Committee recommends that the Services find aneffective means of coordinating with civilian educationalinstitutions, churches and other patriotic organizations to~ r o v i better understanding of American ideals.

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W a r h a s b e e n d e fin e d as a c o n te s t ' o f w il ls . A t r a in e d

h a n d h o ld s t h e w e a p o n . B u t t h e w ill, t h e c h a r a c te r , t h e s p i r i t M o r e th a n e v e r ,o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l- t h e s e c o n tro l t h e h a n d .

i n t h e w a r .f o r t h e in in d s o f m e n m o ra l c h a ra c te r , w ill, s p i r i t

a r e i m p o r t a n t .A s a s e r v i c e m a n t h i n k e th so is h e .

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IV

ODE OF ONDU T FOR THE FUTURE

he Services oice heir pinionsThe leaders of the American Armed Forces-the Joint Chiefs

of Staff-The Department of Defense Committees-the variousplanning and policy-making boards-reach decisions throughdiscussion and debate based on facts In striving to designa Code of Conduct for United States fighting men, the DefenseAdvisory Committee weighed opposing points of view in regard

to the name, rank, serial number and date of birth' provisionembodied in the Geneva Conventions.The traditional view is that the POW stockade is only an

extension of the battlefield where the prisoners must be taughtto carry on the struggle with the only weapons remainingfaith and courage.

The absolute restliction-name, rank, number, date of birth,and nothing more, has been called the Spartan Code.

To some persons, such a restrictive code seemed unrealistic.Especially in the light of modern interrogation methods.Authorities on the subject of interrogation insisted that theiron-bound nothing more of the Spartan Code was impossible.They pointed out that Communist interrogators had bent suchmen of steel as Cardinal Mindszenty. Doctors and psychiatristsgenerally conceded that every man has a breaking point.Many prisoners in World War I I were forced beyond name,rank and serial number. And nearly every prisoner in Koreadivulged something. Why, then, the dissenters asked, should aman endure purgatory when his breaking was inevitable?This view was publicized in an article in a popular magazine.

t was the author 's opinion that American servicemen should betold that they may sign any document the Communists wantthem to, or appear on TV and deliver any script the Reds handthem.

Referring to the case of a Marine colonel, the author pointed

to a fine officer who had been coerced into signing a germ warfare confession. Why not let American captives sign anythingat all? The United States could announce that all such confessions were obtained under duress, and therefore invalid.

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In addition to the Spartan view and the let them talkview there were numerous advocates of in-between measurestalk, but don't say anything.

In Axis cainps and in Korea many prisoners had stood upagainst interrogation. Many had refused to sign on any dottedline. The idea that an officer or enlisted man might stand upto a microphone and denounce his country, his President, orhis faith, remained repellent. Moreover, the man who signeda germ warfare or some other confession let himself in for a

war criminal charge. Having obtained such a confessionthe unscrupulous enemy labeled him a war criminal and claimedthat he was beyond the protecting Geneva Convention.

The Committee believes that this practice is another strongreason for our prisoners of war adhering to a wen definedcode of conduct in any future conflict.

Pro and Con. There was much to be said on both sides. Andthere was something to be said by experienced officers who feltthat a man could be taught to hold his own in the battle of witsagainst enemy inteITogators. Authorities pointed out that theGeneva Conventions did not impose absolute silence on theinterrogated war,,:,prisoner. There were clauses indicating thathe might discuss his employment, his finances, or his state

of health, or conditions of captivity i f necessity demanded.In short, he did not have to remain mute.The Committee agreed that a line of resistance must be drawn

somewhere and initially as far forward as possible. The llame,rank and service number provision of the Geneva Conventionsis accepted as this line of resistance.

However, in the face of experience, it is recognized that thePOW may be subjected to an extreme of coercion beyond his

ability to resist.f

in his battle with . the interrogator he isdriven from his first line of resistance he must be trained forresistance in successive positions. And, to stand on the. finalline to the end-no disclosure of vital military information andabove all no disloyalty in word or deed to his country, his serviceor his comrades.

Throughout, the serviceman must be responsible for all of hisactions. This in brief is the spirit and intent of the Code ofConduct which the Defense Advisory Committee recommends.

Prominent Civilians Stated Their View5. The Committee discussed sociological and educational prob

lems with leading educators. t consulted with labor leaders.The religious problem .was discussed with leaders of various18


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faiths. The Comr.nittee also sought and received the invaluable views of the leaders of the nation' s veterans organizations. All contrib.uted worthwhile suggestions. All helped toselect a code compatible- with American precepts of honor andjustice.

The Recommended Code of Conduct (See Addenda 2)After long study and earnest deliberation, the Committee

came to its decision. That decision is found in the Code ofConduct now proposed ·for all members of the Armed Forces.

The Committee recommends that the proposed Code ofConduct be promulgated in the form of an Executive Order.The Code demands high standards. To ensure achievement ofthese, each member of the Armed Forces liable to capture must

be provided with specific .training designed to equip him betterto cope with all enemy efforts against him. He will be fullyinstructed as to his behavior and obligations in combat and inthe event of capture.

No prisoner of war will be forgotten by the United States.The support and care of dependents of prisoners of war is prescribed by law. Every practical means will be employed toestablish contact with, to support and to gain the release of allprisoners of war.

The United States serviceman, by his service is protectinghis nation. Any shirking of this responsibility or any unwillingness to do his full part weakens this defense and invites disaster.

am an American fighting man. serve in the forces whichguard my country and our way of life. am prepared to givemy life in their defense.

A member of the Armed Forces is always a fighting man.As such, i t is his duty to oppose the enemies of the United Statesregardless of the circumstances in which he may find himself,whether in active participation in combat, or as a prisoner ofwar.

f individuals and commanders were permitted to surrenderwh.enever a situation seems to be desperate i t would become an

open invitation to all weak of will or depressed in spirit.I will never surrender of my own free will. f in commandwill never surrender my men while they still have the means

to resist.

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As an individual, a member of the Armed Forces may nevervoluntarily surrender himself When isolated and he can nolonger inflict casualties on the enemy, i t is his duty to evadecapture and rejoin the nearest friendly forces.

The responsibility and authority of· a commander neverextends to the surrender of his command to the enemy while i t

has power to resist or evade. When isolated, cut off or surrounded, a unit must continue to fight until relieved, or able torejoin friendly forces by breaking out or by evading the enemy.

III

The fight is everywhere. Even in the prison camp. Whenthe use of physical weapons is denied, the mental and moral

will to resist must be kept alive in every prisoner.H I am captured I will continue to resist by aU means avail

able. I will make every effort to escape and aid others toescape. i will accept neither parole nor special favors fromthe enemy.

The duty of a member of the Armed Forces to continueresistance by all means at his disposal is not lessened by themisfortune of capture. Article 82 of the Geneva ConventionsRelative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12,1949, pertains, must be explained, and covered in the trainingprograms to be carried out by the Services.

Article 82 provides as follows:A prisoner of war shall be subject to the laws, regulations

and orders in force in the armed forces of the DetainingPower; the Detaining Power shall be justified in takingj ~ d i c i l or d i s i p ~ r y measures respect of any o f f ~ n c e committed by a pnsoner of war agamst such laws, regulatIOnsor orders. However, no proceedings or punishments contraryto the provisions of this Chapter shall be allowed.

IIIf any law, regulation or order of the Detaining Powershall .declare acts committed by a prisoner of war to bepunishable, whereas the same acts would not be punishableif committed by a member of the forces of the DetainingPower, such acts shall entail disciplinary punishments only.He will escape i f able to do so, and w ll assist others to escape.

Parole agreements are promises given the captor by a prisonerof war upon his faith and o n o rto fulfill stated conditions, suchas not to bear arms or not to escape, in consideration of specialprivileges-usually release from captivity or lessened restraint.He will never sign or enter into a parole agreement.

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IVThe most despicable act an American can commit is to give

aid and comfort to the enemy by informing or otherwiseharming fellow prisoners. Failure to assume responsibilitiescommensurate with rank is equally reprehensible.

f I become a prisoner of war, I will keep faith with myfellow prisoners. I will give no information nor take part inany action which might be harmful to . my comrades. f I amsenior, I will take command. It not, I will obey the lawfulorders of those appointed over me and will back them up inevery way.

Informing, or any other action to the detriment of a fellowprisoner, is despicable and is expressly f?rbidden. ~ r i s o n e r s ofwar must avoid helping ihe enemy identIfy fellow pnsoners whomay have Ioiowledge of particular a h ~ e to the e ~ e m yahd maytherefore be made to suffer eoerClve mterrogatlOn., ,

Strong' leadership is essential to discipline. W i t ~ o u t dis-cipline, camp organization, resistance and ~ v e ? survIval maybe impossible. Personal hygiene, camp samtatlOn, and care .ofsick and wounded are imperative. Officers and non-comUllSsioned officers of the United States will continue to carry outtheir responsibilities and exercise their a l t h o r i t ~ s ~ b s e q u e n t tocapture. The senior line officer or n o n c o m m 1 8 S 1 ~ n e d o f f i c ~ r

within the prisoner of war camp or group of pnsonex:s willassume command according to rank (or precedence) WIthoutregard to Service. This responsibility and a c c o ~ ~ a b i l i t y maynot be evaded. f the senior officer or non-comm18S10ned officeris incapacitated or unable to act for any reaso?, commS?d Y illbe assumed by the next senior. f the foregomg o r g a m z ~ t l o n cannot be effected an organization of elected representatIves,as provided for in Articles 79-81 Geneva Conven.tion e l ~ i v e to Treatment of Prisoners of War, or a clandestme organIZation, or both, will be formed.

VEvery serviceman possesses some i m p o r t ~ t ~ i t a r y in-

formation of value to the enemy. y revealing It they maycause the death of comrades or disaster to' their unit, or eventhe defeat of major forces of the nation.

When questioned, sholild I become a prisoner of war, I ambound to give only name, rank, service number, and date ofbirth. I will evade answering further questions to the utmostof my ability. I will make no oral or written statements dis

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loyal to my country and its allies or harmful to their cause.When questioned, a prisoner of war is required by the Geneva

Conventions and permitted by this Code to disclose his name rank, service number, and date of birth. A prisoner .of warmay also communicate with the enemy regarding his individualhealth or welfare as a prisoner of war and, when appropriate,on routine matters of camp administration. Oral or writtenconfessions true or false, questionnaires, personal history state-ments, propaganda recordings and broadcasts, appeals to otherprisoners of war, signatures to peace or surrender appeals selfcriticisms or any other oral or written communication on ~ h l f of the enemy or critical or harmful to the United States itsallies, the Armed Forces or other prisoners are forbidden. '

t is a violation of the Geneva Conventions to place a prisonerof war under physical or mental torture or any other form ofcoercion to secure from him information of any kind. fhowever, a prisoner is subjected to such treatment he w llendeavor to avoid by every means the disclosure. of any in-formation, or the making of any statement or the performanceof any action harmful to the interests of the United States orits allies or which will provide aid or comfort to the enemy.

. Russia and t ~ Communist Bloc nations have made a sig-nificant reservatIOn to Article 85 of the Geneva Conventions of1949: Under this reservation a prisoner of war who may beconVlcted of an alleged war crime under the laws of the captors,loses the protection afforded a prisoner of war by these Con-ventions. Therefore the signing of a confession or the makingof a statement by a prisoner is likely to be used·to convict himas a war criminal" and thus, according to this CommunistBloc device, deny to him any protection under the ~ r m s of the

Geneva Conventions, including repatriation until his sentenceis served.

VIn American is responsible and accountable for his actions.

Prisoner of war status doesn't change this nor does it changethe obligation to remain faithful to the United States and to theprinciples o r ~ which i t stands. Throughout his captivity a

prisoner should look to his God for strength to endureh t e ~ e r

may befall. He should remember that the United States of~ e r i wi} neither forget, nor forsake him, apd that i t willWID the ultlIDate victory.

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I will never forget that I am an American fighting man,responsible for my actions, and dedicated to the principleswhich made my country free. I will trust in my God and inthe United States of America.

The provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justicewhenever appropriate continue to apply to members o theArmed Forces while they are prisoners of war. The conduct ofprisoners is subject to examination as to the Circumstances ofcapture and through the period of detention with due regardfor the rights of the individual and consideration for theconditions of captivity.

A member of the Armed Forces who becomes a prisoner ofwar has a continuing obligation to remain loyal to his country,his Service and his unit.

The life of a prisoner of war is hard. e must never give uphope. e must resist enemy indoctrination. Prisoners of warwho stand firm and united against the enemy will aid oneanother in surviving this ordeal.

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VKOREAN SUMMARY

Misconduct by a MinorityA total of 4,428 American fighting men were recovered from

enemy prison camps in Korea. The prisoner exchanges beganwith Operation Little Switch" in April 1953-significantlyenough, the ~ o t after Stalin died and Malenkov assumedSoviet leadership The war was almost over. Some 600Allied prisoners were returned in exchange for ten times thatmany Communist Chinese and North Koreans. During subsequent Operation "Big Switch" most of the American prisonerswere recovered. At this time it was learned that 2,730 Americans had died in Korean prison camps. This ghastly deathto l l -38%-was the worst since the Revolutionary War. .

By joint actIon of the services, all of the prisoners recoveredwere screened by military intelligence agencies. Of the 565whose conduct was questioned, 373 were cleared or droppedafter investigation. Of the remaining 192 suspects, 68 wereseparated from the services; 3 resigned; 1 received reprimand;2 were given restricted s s i g n m e n ~ s6 were cOllvicted by courtsmartial. As· of July 20, 1955, 112 cases are pending. Thecases pending are in various stages of investigation. Manymay never come to trial for various reasons. Others will "bedisposed of by miMr disciplinary action or may be· l e r ~ dHowever, it is fairly certain that thenwnber brought to trialwill be substantially less than the 112 pending, perhaps lessthan half that many. Some of these last are men who weredischarged soon after war's end and now have a civili"an status.Information which came to light after their separation madefurther action indicated. The Committee feels that justicemust be done in these cases-the men who kept faith with theircoUntry· and fellow prisoners need have no fear-:"'but thosewho did not should be brought 19 trial.

The Committee recommends that separated servicemen bebrought to trial if.they are charged with crimes .similar to thosewhich brought about the prosecution of other servicemen.

Obviously a change from uniform to civilian clothes does notdivest a guilty wrong-doer of responsibility for a crime.. A

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civilian criminal would not be permitted to wear Army uniformas protective coloration. f action is indicated, the dischargeesshould be prosecuted in civil courts. When they cannot betried in civili8in courts and the evidence warrants it, they canbe brought to trial under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

The Committee finds the Uniform Code of MilitaryJustice adequate for the prosecution of misconduct cases ofprisoners of war in Korea. The Committee recommends thatthe Uniform Code of Military Justice should govern the final,adjudication of cases stilI pending.

None Were Tried UnjustlyEstablishing fscts n the case against a prisoner charged with

misconduct is a lengthy process. Evidence must be studiedand assessed. Witnesses must be produced. Depositionsmust be obtained. In the Armed Forces this amounts to theequivalent of the work a District Attorney's office must dobefore i t presents a case to a Grand Jury. Consequently,there may seem to be a long delay before an accused serviceman is brought to formal trial. The Army has not been dilatory in trying the present cases. Rather i t has been thoroughand exacting in its research and investigation.

The Committee finds that those servicemen who have beenprosecuted and those who are facing trial were charged withserious crimes. Charges included homicide, and treasonablecollaboration with the enemy, combined with informing onfellow prisoners. No man of any service-Army, Air Force,Navy or Marines-who might have .been charged with suchcrimes would have escaped disciplinary action. As in the past,the crimes enumerated are major offenses in the Armed o r e s ~

(Of course, such alleged misconduct must be substantiated byevidence before disciplinary action is taken.)While the six thus far tried and sentenced to prison have been

enlisted men, one officer was also disciplined; one was tried andacquitted; and other cases' coming up involve officers. Theydo not make pleasant r,eading.

A typical case involves an officer who is accused by 180POWs of delivering anti-D. S. speeches, informing on fellow

prisoners,hoarding food, teaching' classes in Communism, andordering men to sign peace petitions. There is no evidence hesuffered duress.

Another case involves a sergeant accused by many witnesses, of ratting on his prison-mates, beating a sick prisoner, stealillg

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a wallet from a dying man, forcing a fellow prisoner out intothe snow and leaving him there to die, and drowning threeU. N. prisoners crossing a stream.

There was an officer who allegedly courted favors of his cap·tors as soon as he reached prison camp. He is charged withconfiscating the small tobacco ration dealt to the other menand eating more than his share of the food. It is recorded thathe made the heartless remark, The more men who die here,the more food for the rest of us." He signed peace petitions,made propaganda broadcasts, and evidently ratted on otherprisoners. There is no evidence that he was coerced.

There is evidence that an enlisted man informed on fellowprisoners planning to escape. He wrote Red literature for hiscaptors. He was put in charge of a spy system which resultedin the punishment of "Reactionaries" in his camp. He askedfor the job. No "brainwashing" here.

Many of the accused informed on their prison-mates, some·times with dire consequences for the victims who were usuallyseverely punished. The man who tried to escape and wasvictimized by "ratting" was indeed a Soldier of Misfortune.Illvariably he was accused of breaking camp rules-a violation

. which "entitled" his captors to punish him. He might beplaced in a hole in the ground and forced to endure an animalexistence. He might be sent to The Caves." He might becompelled to stand for hours n a latrine.

To the combat veterans, ratting was a crime as unforgiv.able as treason.

The TurncoatsThe 21 turncoats who decided to stay with the Communists

here was another group of "exceptions." Their number n·eluded men accused of informing-which suggests a good reasonfor electing to remain in the enemy's country. Evidence iridiccates that few of these 21 were "sincere" converts to o ~ munism. Expediency, opportunism, and fear of reprisal doubt·less influenced some of the group.

Promises Were Not BrokenIt has been stated that men were Illured" back to the Ameri·

can side by promises of clemency. This misconception, like

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many others concerning the POWs, is far from the truth. TheArmy possesses a tape recording of the broadcast made to themen in question. No promise to the effect that they would notbe prosel;uted was offered. What the broadcast said in. substance was this: f the men returned they would not be chargedwith -desertion. Ratting was another matter entirely. Alsoother crimes which were subsequently revealed by investigation.

Finally the Uniform Code of Military Justice is devised fordefense as well as prosecution. A military court often bendsover backward in the interest of the accused. The man isassured a conscientious defense. f he cares to, he may procure civilian lawyers. There is nothing star chamber abouta modern military trial. After witnessing t h ~ r i l of a confessed Progressive charged with collaborating (and confessingto the charge), a reporter for the Christian Science Monitorwrote: c • perhaps a word of advice is not amiss; make atrip to one of your local, federal, state, or municipal courts;watch the procedures, then look in at a general court-martial.

The reporter went on to observe: The (military) code provides for post-trial procedure, including automatic reviews bythe Staff Judge Advocate of the First Army and a specialboard of review in the Pentagon. f this does not satisfy theprisoner-and he can show good cause-the conviction andsentence can go to the Court of Military Appeals, composed ofthree civilian judges appointed by the President. Andclemency is possible through the Executive branch of ourgovernment.

Service Action Not DivergentThe public has been under the misapprehension that some of

the men court-martialed and sentenced for misconduct while inPOW camps had the book thrown at them while others wentfree.

Each of the Services thoroughly investigated all alleged cases oj-misconduct They used generally identical criteria in determining the disposition of each case. Criteria considered t l ~ ofmisconduct, duress, and indications of informing or ratting.

The Department of Defense :maintaiped, surveillance overcases brought to trial.

The disposition of all cases was governed by the facts andcircumstances surrounding each case. and was as consistent,equitable, and uniform as could be achieved by any two or :moreboards or courts.


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, No case was brought for court-martial actlonin which therewas evidence of duress, brainwashing or any other type ofcoercion.

The Committee Onds that there was no divergent actionamong the services. The relatively large number of ArmyPOWs naturally shifted the largest number of misconduct

cases into the Army's column. All services employed thesame screening procedures in examining repatriated POWs.All services applied the same standards in weighing allegedcharges of misconduct. Resultant service actions were basedon the evidence in each case.

Prisoners Unrecovered

The Korean Annistice Agreement contained a proviso that

each side would directly repatriate all those prisoners of warwho desired repatriation. The Communists did not honorthis agreement. After repatriation operations were concluded,the U. N. command listed 944 servicemen as missing andpresumably in enemy hands. Nineteen of this number werefinally accounted for by the Communists. By our own U. S.efforts this list has been reduced to 470, some of whom we havereason to believe were at some time in the hands of the enemy.In the United Nations, the United States has consistentlydemanded an accounting for t.hem.

The Committee believes that the Communists should be heldstrictly accountable for the 470 men still missing in action.Information indicates they were at one time or another inCommunist hands.

All have been declared legally dead. Nevertheless, the Communists should account for them in accor(l.ance with a signedagreement with the United States.

The Communists admitted holdtng 15 Air Force men and twoDepartment of Defense civilian employees. Their detainmentwas in direct violation of the Armistice Agreement and theGeneva Conventions.

Concern o Ex-Prisoners

The Committee also concerned itself with the question of

service men who were discharged at the close of the KoreanWar-men who have been returned to civilian status. Alsorepatriated POWs who may have remained in uniform.

Because of the misconduct charges brought against a smallnumber of POWs, and the accusations of misconduct levelled at

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a slightly larger number some of the former POWs may havegrown uneasy about the matter. The Committee considersthat no man with a clear conscience need worry about a possiblecharge.

The repatriated POW has been entitled to special com

pensation for the period of his confinement. Every repatriated POW could receive this money by applying for it, withthis exception:· The war-prisoners who voluntarily, knowingly,and without duress gave aid to, collaborated with, or in anymanner served the enemy, are excluded. All repatriatedprisoners who receive this compensation have been clearedof any such misconduct charge.

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V

THE ROAD AHEAD FOR AMERICA AND THEARMED FORCES

Total War for the Minds of Men

America must view the Communist treatment of captives asbut another weapon in the world-wide war for the minds ofmen. The nation must recognize the duplicity of an enemy

which pays no more than lip service to the Geneva Conventions.However, the United States cannot oppose duplicity with a

similar policy. To do so might be fighting fire with fire. Butthe United States refuses to saerifice principle for expediency.Such a justification of means for end would mean the abandonment of the cause for which America fights. The nationalconscience would revolt at such a sohltion.

The nation must continue to oppose Communism, or any

other threat to Democracy, with American weapons and principles. The machines of war are assured by American enterprise, science and industry. The principles, home-forged byAmerica s founders, are more than an heirloom heritage for

.showcase display. They are precepts which must be practicedif the nation is to remain the guardian of man s liberties thatit is.

The responsibility for the maintenance and preservation of

the United States and all i t stands for is one which must beshared by every citizen. Every American is n the front linein the war for the minds of men.

Code of American Conduct

The battlefield of modern warfare is all inclusive. Todaythere are no distant front lines, remote no man s lands, far-offrear areas. The home front is but an extension of the fightingfront. In the dreaded event of another all-out w a r a thermonuclear war- the doorstep may become the Nation s first lineof defense. Under such circumstances, the new code of conduct for the American serviceman might well serve the Americancitizen.

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The Code s high standards will serve as guides for Americansin uniform. Backed by adequate training and educatioll, theywill support the assurance of Armed Forces leaders that Amer-ican fighting men will be fully prepared to meet the enemy oany front.

The Korean story must never be permitted to happen again.

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ADDENDA

1. Terms of Reference2. Code of Conduct3. Citizens, Former Prisoners of War, and Government

Representatives Who Consulted with the DefenseAdvisory Committee on Prisoners of War

4. The Mind and the Spirit in National Security5. Prisoners of War in History6. Bibliography7. Charts

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DDEND NO 1

TERMS OF REFEREN E

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEWASHINGTON

May 17 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE ADVISORY

COMMITTEE ON PRISONERS OF WARSUBJECT: Terms of Reference

I am deeply concerned with the importance to our national securityof providing Americans who serve their country in battle with everymeans we can devise to defeat the enemy's techniques. To assum thesuccess of our Armed Forces i t is equally as essential to arm them withthe best weapons of the mind and body as i t is to provide them with themachines of war.

Our national military needs must be met. This requires that each

member of the Armed Forces be thoroughly indoctrinated with a simple,easily understood code to govern his conduct while a prisoner of war.However, this military need must be met in a manner compatible withthe principles and precepts basic to our form of government. Enforcement must be accomplished with justice and understanding.

I have appointed this Committee to advise me on this matter I requestthat you consider the methods we may expect our potential enemy to employ, the obligation which national military needs impose on members ofthe Armed Forces and the obligation of the United States to afford protection to its citizens in the custody of a foreign power. I direct your

deliberation t w ~ r the development of suitable recommendations for aCode of Conduct and indoctrination and training on preparation forfuture conflict. You will also consider certain other related Prisoner ofWar Problem areas which I will make known.

Staff support will be supplied in the form of a Secretariat, with theStaff Director from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense(M&P), the Deputy Staff Director from the Office of the Joint Chiefs. ofStaff, and one officer each from the Army, Navy, Air Force and MarineCorps for full-time staff duty

Legal counsel w ll be provided by the Office of the General Counsel

(OSD), and research assistance will be supplied through the Office of theAssistant Secretary of Defense (R&D).

Liaison between this Committee and government agencies outside theDepartment of Defense will be conducted with the help of the appropriate office in the Office of the Secretary of Defense as coordinated bythe Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (M&P).

I t is desired that this Committee submit. its recommendations withint.wo months after its first meeting.

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ADDENDA NO.2

CODE OF CONDUCT

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ODE O CONDUCTFor f, lembm of the Armed Forces of the United Slales.

By virtue of the authority vested in me asPresident of the United Statel , and as Com-mander in Chief of the Armed Forces of theUnited States, hereby prescribe the Codeof Conduct for Members of the Armed ForceIof the United States which is attached tothis order and hereby made a par t thereof.

Every member of the Armed Forces of theUnited States is expected to measure lip to thestandards embodied in this Code of Conductwhile he is in combat or in captivity. Toensure achievement of these standard , eachmember of the Armed Forces liable to eaptureshall be provided with specific training andinstruction designed to better equip him tocounter and withstand all enemy effortsagainst him, and shall be fully instructed asto the behavior and obligations expected ofhim during combat or captivity.

The Secretary of Defense (and the Seere-

tary of the Treasury with respect to the CoastGuard except when i t is serving as par t of theNavy) shall take such action as is deemednecessary to implement this order and todisseminate and make the said code knownto all members of the Armed Forces of theUnited States.

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I am an American fighting man.I serve in the forces which guardmy country and our way of life.I am prepared to give my life intheir defense.

II

I will never surrender of my ownfree will. I f in command, I willnever surrender my men whilethey still have the means to resist.

IIII f I am captured I will .continueto r.esist by all means available.I will make every effort to escapeand aid others to escape. I willaccept neither parole nor specialfavors from the enemy.

V

I f I become a prisoner of war, Iwill keep faith with my fellowprisoners. I will give no informa-tion nor take part in a ny act ionwhich might be harmful to m ycomrades. I f I am senior, I willtake command. . I f not, I willobey the lawful orders of thoseappointed over me and will backthem up in every way.

4

INSTRUCTION L M TERI L

A member of the Armed Forces isalways a fighting man. As such, i t is hisduty to oppose the enemies of the UnitedStates regardless of the circumstances inwhich he may find himself, whether inactive participation in combat, or as aprisoner of war.

As an individual, a member of theArmed Forces may never voluntarilvsurrender himself. When isolated and

he can no longer inflict casualties on theenemy, i t is his duty to evade captureand rejoin the nearest friendly. forces.

The responsibility and authority of acommander never extends to the sur-render of his command to the enemvwhile i t has power to resist or evade.When isolated, cut off or surrounded, aunit must continue to fight until relieved,or able to rejoin friendly forces, by break-ing out or by evading the enemy. .

The duty of a member of the ArmedForces to continue resistance bv all meansa t his disposal is not lessened y the mis-fortune of capture. Article 82 of theGeneva Convention pertains and must beexplained. He will escape if able to doso, and will .assist others to escape.Parole agreement,s are promises given thecaptor by a prisoner of war upon his faithand honor, to fulfill stated conditions,such as not to bear arms or not to escape,in consideration of special privileges,usually release from captivity or lessened·restraint. He will never sign or enter intoa parole agreement.

Informing or any other action to thedetriment of a fellow prisoner is despicableand is expressly forbidden. Prisoners ofwar must avoid helping the enemyidentify fellow prisoners who may haveknowledge of particular value to theenemy, and may therefore be made tosuffer coercive interrogation.

Strong leadership is essential to disci-pline. Without discipline, camp organiza-tion, resistance and even survival may beimpossible. . Personal hygiene, cafnp sani-tation, and care of sick and wounded areimperative. Officers and noncommis-sioned officers of the United States willcontinue to carry out their responsibjlitiesand exercise their authority subsequentto capture. The senior line officer or non-


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IV

(continued)

When questioned, shoulO: I be.come a prisoner of war, I ambound to give only name, rank.service number and date ofbirth. I will evade answering

further questions to the utmostof my ability. I will make nooral or written statements disloyal to my country and its alliesor hal'inful to their cause.


commissioned officer within the prisoner

of war camp or group of prisoners willassume command according to rank (orprecedence) without regard to Service.This responsibility and accountabilitymav not be evaded. f the senior officeror -nonco'mmissioned officer is incapacitated or unable to act for any reason, command will be assumed by the next senior.

f the foregoing organization cannot beeffected, an organization of elected representatives, as provided for in Articles79-81 Geneva Convention Relative toTreatment of Prisoners of War, or acovert organization, or both, will beformed.

When questioned, a prisoner of war isrequired by the Geneva Convention andpermitted by this Code to disclose hisname, rank, service number and date ofbirth. A prisoner 'of war may also communicate with the enemy regarding hisindividual health or welfare as a prisonerof war and, when appropriate, on ron tinematters of camp administration. Oralor written confessions t rue or false, questionnaires, personal history statements,propaganda recordings and broadcasts,appeals to other prisoners of war, signatures to peace or surrender appeals,. selfcriticisms or any other oral or writtencommunication on behalf of the enemyor critical or harmful to the UnitedStates, its allies, the Armed Forces orother prisoners are forbidden.

t is a violation of the Geneva Convention to place a prisoner of war underphysical or mental torture or any otherform of coercion to secure from him information of any kind. I f however, aprisoner is subjected to such t reatment,he will endeavor to avoid by every meansthe disclosure of any information, or themaking of any statement or the performance of any action h r m ~ u l to ~ h e intere;otsof the United States or Its allles or WhI h

. will provide aid or comfort to the enemy.Under Communist Bloc reservations to

the Geneva Convention, the signing of aconfession or the making of a statementby a prisoner is likely to be used to convicthim as a war criminal under the laws ofhis captors. This conviction h ~ theeffect of removing him from the prisonerof war status and according to thisCommunist Bloc device denying him anyprotection under terms .of. the e ~ e vConvention and repatriatIOn untIl aprison sentence is served.

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V

I will never forget that I am. anAmerican fighting man responsi-ble for my actions and dedicatedto the principles which made mycountry free. I will trust in myGod and in the United States ofAmerica.


The provisions of the Uniform Code ofMilitary Justice whenever appropriatecontinue to apply. to members of theArmed Forces while prisoners of war.Upon repatriation the conduct of pris-oners will be examined as to the circum-stances of capture and through the periodof detention with due regard for therights of the individual and considerationfor the conditions of captivity.

A member of the Armed Forces whobecomes a prisoner of war has a continuingobligation to remain loyal to his countryhis Service and his unit.

The life of a prisoner of war is hard.He must never give up hope. He mustresist enemy indoctrination. Prisoners ofwar who stand firm and united againstthe enemy will aid one another insurviving this ordeal.


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ADDENDA NO 3

CITIZENS FORMER PRISONERS OF WAR AND GOVERN·MENT REPRESENTATIVES WHO CONSULTED WITH THEDEFENSE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PRISONERS OFWAR

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CITIZENS FORMER PRISONERS OFWAR AND

GOVERN·MENT REPRESENTAliVES WHO CONSULTED WITH THEDEFENSE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PRISONERS OF

,WAR

D R ARTHUR S. ADAMSPre8ident, American Council on Education

andChairman, Re8erve Force8 Policy Board

HONORABLE ROBERT B. ANDERSONDeputy Secretary of Defen8eMAJOR CLARENCE L ANDERSON, U. S. ArmyMedical Corp8M R . MAC ASBELL, J R .Chairman, Subcommittee for Military Affair8 Peace and PreparedMI8

CommitteeAmerican Veteran8 of World WarCOMMANDER RALPH M BAGWELL, U S Navy

D R . A . BIEDERMANOjficer8 Education and Re8earch LaboratoryAir Research and Development CommandU. S. Air ForceM R . GEORGE BROWN

A88i8tant to the PresidentAmerican Federation of LaborHONORABLE HERBERT BROWNELL, JR .

The Attorney General of the United Statell

HONORABLE WILBERM

BRUCKERthen General Coun8el, Department of Defense, nowSecretary of the ArmyD R . LEONARD CARMICHAEL

Secretary, Smithsonian InstitutionCOLONEL A . P. CLARK, U. S. Air ForceChief, Promotions Separations DivisionDirector of Military .Per80nnelST AFF SERGEA.NT RODERICK G CONN, U. S. Air ForC4GENERAL ORVAL R COOK,

U. S. Air ForceDeputy Commander in Chief BuropeD R . MEREDITH P. CRAWFORDDirector, Human Re80urce8 Rellearch OifiuGeorge Washington Univer ityCAPTAIN BI lRT CUMBY, U S Army

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M A J O R G E N E R A L W I L L I A M F . D E A N , U. S. ArmyD R . H A R O L D W . D O D D S

President, Princeton UniverBityM R . ALLYN DONALDSON

Director, Office of Special Counselor ServicesDepartment of State

CAPTAIN R AYM

D O W E , J R . , U. S. ArmyADMIRAL D O N A L D B. DUNCAN, U. S. NavyVice ChieFof Naval OperationsL I E U T E N A N T G E N E R A L G . B . E R S K I N E , U. S. Marine Corps (Ret.)Director, Special OperationsOffice of the Secretary of DefenseCAPTAIN J . S. F AHY, U. S. NavyOfficer Personnel BranchBureau of Naval PersonnelM R . C H A R L E S E . F O S T E R

Assistant Director of LegislatiooDisabled American VeteransR E A R ADMIRAL D. V. GALLERY, U. S. NavyChief, Air Reserve TrainingR E A R ADMIRAL E LTO N W. GRENFELL, U. S. NavyAssistant Chief for Personnel Control andACNO for Military Personnel SecurityBureau of Naval PersonnelL I E U T E N A N T C O L O N E L MONROE J . HAGOOD, U. S. ArnwChief, Returnees SectionG-2 Intelligence, General StaffCORPORAL J A M E S L . H A L E , U. S. Marine CorpsFAT H E R T H E O D O R E HESBURGH

President, Notre Dame UniversityD R . LAWRENCE H I N K L E

New York HospitalBRIGADIER G E N E R A L S . W. JONES, U. S. ArmyAssistant Judge Advocate General for Military JusticeM R . M I L E S K E N N E D Y

Director, National Legislative CommissionThe American LegionM R . OMAR B . KETCHUM

Director; National Legislative ServiceVeterans of Foreign WarsM A J O R G E N E R A L A . M . KUHFIELD, U. S. Air ForceThe Assistant Judge Advocate GeneralCOLONEL H. S. L E Vi E , U. S. ArmyChief, International Affairs DiviBionOffice of the Judge Advocate GeneralAMBASSADOR H E N RY CABOT LODGE, J R .

United States Representative to the United Nations

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COI.ONEL K. K. LOUT HER, U. S. Marine Corps-Assistant Director of PersonnelPersonnel DivisionLIEUTENANT COLONEL DAVID F. MACGHEE, U S. Air ForceM R . S . L . A . MA.RSHALL

Chief Editorial WriterThe Detroit News

R E V E R E I D WILLIAM MARTIN

Presiding Bishop of Methodist Churches, Dallas, TexasD R . CHARLES MAYO

The Mayo ClinicRochester, MinnesotaLIEUTENANT COLONEL JAMES L . MONROE, U S. Air ForceDefense Prisoner OfficerOffice of the Director of PlansR E A R ADMIRAL 1 H. NUNN, U S. NavyThe Judge Advocate GeneralLIEUTENANT GENERAL EMMETT O D O N N E L L , J R . U S. Air ForceDeputy Chief of Staff, PersonnelCAPTAIN PA U L T. O D O W D , U S. ArmyD R . WINFRED OVERHOLSER, M . D .

Superintendent, St. Elizabeths HospitalWashington, D. C.HOSPITALMAN 3D CLASS T E D PAILLETTE, U. S. NavyGENERAL W . B. P. \LMER, U S. ArmyVice Chief of StaffMAJOR MARION R . P ANELL, U S. ArmyG S Operations, General StaffRABBI DAVID D E SOLA POOL

National Jewish Welfare BoardADMIRAL ARTHUR W . RADFORD, U S NavyChairman, Joint Chiefs of StaffM R . VICTOR R E U T H E R

Assistant to the PresidentCongress of Industrial OrganizationsD R . SCOVEL RICHARDSON

Chairman, U. S. Board ·of Pa.roleDepartment of JusticeHONORABLE ROBERT T R I P P R o s s

Assistant Secretary of Defense(Legislative and Public Affairs)D R . H . J . SANDER

Officers Education and Research LaboratoryAir Research and Development CommandU. S. Air ForceD R . CARLETON F. SCOFIELDHuman Resources Research OfficeGeorge Washington University

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D R . J U L I U 8 S E Q A L

Human Resources Research OfficIGeorge Washington UniversityM A J O R H E N RY A SEGAL U S. ArmyMedical CorpsG E N E R A L L E M U E L C SHEPHERD JR .

Commandant, U S. Marine CorpsD R . F R A N K STANTON

President, Columbia Broadca lting SystemH O N O R A B L E ROBERT T STEVENIl

then Secretary oj the ArmySERGEANT M A RV I N E TALBERT U S. ArmyHONORABLE H A R O L D E; TALBOTTSecretary oj the Air ForceLIEUTENANT COLONEL WILLIAM G . THRA8H U S Marine Corps

HONORABLE CHARLES S . THOMASSecretary oj the NavyLIEUTENANT COLONEL C H THURSTON U S. ArmvG l Personnel, General StaffG E N E R A L N AT H A N F T W I N I N G U S. Air ForeeChieJ oj StaffM R . BERNARD W E I T Z E R

National Legislative Dir.ctorJewish War Veterans oj U S. A.

DB HAROLD W O L FDepartment oj MedicineCorneU University

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ADDENDA NO 4

THE MIND AND THE SPIRIT

IN NATIONAL SECURITY

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THE MIND ND THE SPIRITIN N TION L SE URITY

(An address by Admiral Arthur Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefsof Staff, before the Sccond National Conference on Spiritual Founda-tions, Washingt,

Documents

US Fighting Code 1955