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US POLICY IN INDIAN OCEAN:
IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN (1990-2014)
______________________________________________
SUPERVISOR
PROF. DR. UMBREEN JAVAID
By
KHUSHBOO EJAZ
Roll No: 06
Session 2007-2012
___________________________________________________________
CENTRE FOR SOUTH ASIAN STUDIES
UNIVERSITY OF THE PUNJAB, LAHORE
i
ii
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DECLARATION
I Khushboo Ejaz hereby state that PhD thesis titled “US policy in Indian Ocean: Implications
for Pakistan (1990-2014)” is my own work and has not been submitted previously by me for
taking any degree from University of the Punjab or anywhere else in the country/world.
At any time if my statement is found to be incorrect even after my Graduate the university has
the right to withdraw my PhD Degree.
Khushboo Ejaz
Date: --20-/12/2017
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PLAGIARISM UNDERTAKING
I solemnly declare that research work presented in the thesis titled
“US policy in Indian Ocean: Implications for Pakistan (1990-2014)”is solely my research work
with no significant contribution from any other person. Small contribution/help wherever taken
has been duly acknowledged and that complete thesis has been written by me.
I understand the zero tolerance policy of the HEC and University of the Punjab towards plagiarism.
Therefore I as an Author of the above titled thesis declare that no portion of my thesis has been
plagiarized and any material used as reference is properly referred/cited.
I undertake that if I am found guilty of any formal plagiarism in the above titled thesis even after
award of PhD degree, the University reserves the rights to withdraw/revoke my PhD degree and
that HEC and the University has the right to publish my name on the HEC/University Website on
which names of students are placed who submitted plagiarized thesis.
Student/Author Signature: ____________________
Khushboo Ejaz
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NOTIFICATION
No. ____________ Date: ___________
It is notified for the information of all concerned that Mr/Ms. ____________________________
Ph.D Scholar of ______________________________ of ________________________________
has completed all the requirements for the award of Ph.D degree in the discipline ____________
__________________________________________ as per detail given hereunder:
Ph.D in Education Cumulative Result
Registration
No.
Scholar’s
Name
Father’s
Name
Credit Hours Cumulative
Point Average
CGPA Course
Work
Research
Work
Total
Research Topic: ________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
Local Supervisor-I Name: ________________________________________________________
Local Supervisor-II Name: _______________________________________________________
Foreign/External Examiners:
a) Name: __________________________________________________________________
University: ______________________________________________________________
Address: ________________________________________________________________
b) Name: __________________________________________________________________
University: ______________________________________________________________
Address: ________________________________________________________________
Detail of Research Articles Published on the basis of thesis research work:
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
Note: This result is declaration as notice only. Errors and omissions, if any, are subject to
subsequent rectification.
Signed by
Controller of Examinations
CC:
1.
2.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AIP Air Independent Propulsion
ASEAN Association for South East Asian Nations
ASW Anti-Submarine Warfare
BIOT British Indian Ocean Territory
BJP Bharatia Janata Party
CENTO Central Treaty Organization
CINCPAC Commander in Chief Pacific
CPEC China Pakistan Economic Corridor
CTF -150 Combined Task Force-150
CTF -151 Combined Task Force-151
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone
ESM Electronic Support Measures
GDP Gross Domestic Product
IORAG Indian Ocean Rim Academic Group
IOR-ARC Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation
IORBF Indian Ocean Rim Business Forum
LOS Law of Seas
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LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam
MIDEASTFOR Middle East Force
MR/S Maritime reconnaissance/strike
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PLA People's Liberation Army
PPP Purchasing Power Parity
RDF Rapid Deployment Force
SAC Strategic Air Command
SEATO South East Asian Treaty Organization
SIGINT Signals Intelligence
SLBM Submarine launched Ballistic Missile
SLOC International Sea lines of communication
TF -88 Task Force- 88
UNCLOS United Nations Charter For law of Seas
US United States
USCENTCOM United States Central Command
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WGTI Working Group on Trade and Investment
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LIST OF MAPS
Map 1.1 Indian Ocean area 2
Map 2.1 Choke points of the Indian Ocean 30
Map 3.1 US Bases in Persian Gulf (Northern Indian Ocean) 37
Map 5.1 Chinese bases in Indian Ocean: Strings of Pearl 78
Map 6.1 Indian Ocean Port Development 137
Map 6.2 Chinese One Road, One Belt Initiative 148
Map 6.3 Gwadar Vs Chahbahar 149
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LIST OF TABLES
Table 3.1 Major Indigenous naval forces in South Asia and Indian Ocean 41
Table 3.2 Trends in Submarine Force 46
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
First and foremost, and with humble submission, I wish to thank my Allah.
I would like to thank Prof. Dr. Umbreen Javaid for her excellent supervision
throughout the work and for believing in me and for encouraging me every time I
lose hope.
I am also thankful to Dr. Hassan Askari Rizvi for suggesting me the topic of this
research. Much thanks to Dr .Khalid Javed Makhdoom and Dr. Jehangir Tamimi for
their cooperation and guidance.
It gives me great pleasure to thank Commodore Naveed Ahmed and Commander
Muhammad Azam for guiding me and providing access to Pakistan Navy War
College library.
I am grateful to Dr.Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Dr. Riffat Hussain, Dr. S.M. Rehman,
Brig. Shoukat Qadir , Dr. Nikhat Khan Saira Malik, Asma Awan,Dr.Iram Khalid,
Jaffer Kataria, Dr.Marium Kamal, Mir Waheed for their help, and intellectual
support, which they provided me whenever I needed it.
I would like to thank all staff of Centre for South Asian Studies, Quaid-e-Azam
library Lahore, Institute of Strategic Studies (ISS), Institute of regional Studies (IRS),
and Foundation for Research on International Environment, National Development
and Security (FRIENDS), Islamabad, Pakistan Navy War College and PILDAT for
their great cooperation and support for collection of useful material.
Cordial thanks to my dear friends, my colleagues in Kinnaird College for Women
and Fatima Jinnah Women University.
Last but not the least my Ammi Humaira Ejaz, Abbu (Ejaz Ahmed Khan),
Brothers: Muhammad, Muneeb, Bilal, Sisters: Mehak, Maham: son: Muhammad
Ahmed Kamil and my late husband Mueen Ahmed without these people continuous
support and help it could not have been possible
Khushboo Ejaz
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ABSTARCT The Indian Ocean has attained significance as center stage of world politics in current
century. The regions of Asia Pacific & Atlantic were the main theatres of warfare generally in
World Wars and specifically in cold war .Asia has emerged as epicenter of global politics in current
timeframe. Indian Ocean politics has greatly affected the US policy in post-cold war and post 9/11
period due to growing Chinese and Indian interests and presence in the region. This triangular
relationship between US, China and India has great implications on regional balance of power and
especially on Pakistan. The main purpose of this study is to analyze the United States Policy in the
Indian Ocean during post-cold war period from year 1990 to 2014. A comprehensive research has
been done to determine the implications of US approach on Pakistan’s foreign and maritime policy.
Although qualitative in nature but content analysis method has been adopted for research.
Analytical, historical and descriptive approach has been employed to understand strategic moves
from different angles. Apart from relevant primary data i.e. official reports and documents,
interviews from naval officers and experts have been effectuated in order to fathom the expert
view and to ample the study vision. It has been concluded that US reframed its policy through
offensive realist perspective especially in Iraq and Afghanistan. United States approach was to
subjugate Pakistan through coercive diplomacy in post- cold war and post 9/11 period. US have
revised its Cooperative Security Strategy of 2007 as Cooperative security Strategy for 21 century
in 2012: Forward, Engaged, Ready; it has shifted its focus to Asia Pacific after declaration of Asia
Pivot policy. Pakistan had no other option except to look towards China in order to counter balance
the growing Indo-US synergy in the Indian Ocean. US inclination towards India has turned into a
challenge for Pakistan’s foreign and maritime policy makers. The need of the hour is to re-visit
maritime and foreign policy of Pakistan keeping in view changing dynamics of Indian Ocean
geopolitics.
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TABLE OF CONTENT
Declaration ii
List of Abbreviations v
List of Maps vi
List of Tables vii
Acknowledgements ix
Abstarct x
CHAPTER 1 .................................................................................................................................. 1
INTRODUCTION 1
1.1 Geostrategic Importance of the Indian Ocean ...................................................................... 1
1.2 US Naval Supremacy ............................................................................................................ 3
1.3 United States Policy in the Indian Ocean in post-cold war period ....................................... 3
1.4 The new US maritime strategy ............................................................................................. 7
1.5 US Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century .......................................................................... 7
1.6 Response of Littoral and Hinterland States ........................................................................ 8
1.6.1 Chinese Interest in the Indian Ocean ...............................................................................8
1.6.2 Indian Interests in the Indian Ocean ..............................................................................9
1.7 Implications for Pakistan ........................................................................................................ 11
1.8 Literature Review.................................................................................................................... 11
1. 9 Justification and Likely Benefits ........................................................................................... 24
xiii
1.10 Research Questions ............................................................................................................ 25
1.11 Research Objectives ........................................................................................................... 25
1.12 Theoretical Framework ...................................................................................................... 26
1.13 Research Methodology ..................................................................................................... 26
1.14 Place of Work and Facilities Available ............................................................................ 27
1.15 Plan of Work ....................................................................................................................... 27
CHAPTER 2 ................................................................................................................................ 29
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND .................................................................................................. 29
2.1 US Policy in Indian Ocean from 1778-1945........................................................................... 30
2.2 US Policy in the Indian Ocean 1945-1990: Cold War era ...................................................... 31
2.3 Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace ............................................................................................ 32
2.4 Strategic Rivalry in Indian Ocean in Cold W………………………………………………..32
2.4.1 The Soviet Strategic Involvement in the Indian Ocean ..................................................... 34
2.5 Rivalry or Coexistence ............................................................................................................ 35
2.6 Implications for Pakistan 35
CHAPTER 3 ................................................................................................................................ 36
US POLICY IN INDIAN OCEAN IN POST COLD WAR ERA (1990-2001) .......................... 36
3.1 Indian Ocean in Post- Cold War Era ....................................................................................... 36
3.2 US Naval Supremacy .............................................................................................................. 38
3.3 Regional politics in Cold War ............................................................................................... 38
3.3.1 Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) ........................ 39
xiv
3.4 Trends in Naval Power in South Asia and the Indian Ocean .................................................. 39
3.5 Trends in Submarine Forces ................................................................................................... 42
3.6 Trends in Maritime Reconnaissance/Strike Capabilities ........................................................ 47
3.7 The Chinese Navy in the Indian Ocean .................................................................................. 49
3.7 The U.S. fifth fleet in the Indian Ocean .................................................................................. 51
3.8 The Indian Navy in Post -Cold War Era ................................................................................. 54
CHAPTER 4 ................................................................................................................................ 59
US POLICY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN (2001 -2014) ................................................................ 59
4.1 US Policy towards South Asia 2001-2014.............................................................................. 59
4.1.1India ................................................................................................................................ 60
4.1.2 Pakistan .......................................................................................................................... 62
4.2. Indo-US strategic partnership:engaging a power ................................................................. 64
4.2.1 India's new emphasizes on the Asian Scene ............................................................... 64
4.3 US revisited policy towards India ......................................................................................... 67
4.4. Developing relations and interests ........................................................................................ 68
4.5 Implications of Indo-US Naval Partnership ........................................................................... 68
CHAPTER 5 ................................................................................................................................ 71
US POLICY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN IN CURRENT AND PROJECTED TIMEFRAME ... 71
5.1 US policy Towards China in Indian Ocean ............................................................................ 71
5.1.1 US China relations in post 9/11 period .......................................................................... 71
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5.1.2 Sino-US Rivalry 72
5.1.3 Economic Rivalry 73
5.1.4 Major Rivalry 74
5.15 Extent Of Exchange ………………………………………………………………...75
5.2 Sources of Conflict in the Indian Ocean 76
5.3 China's Presence and Interests in Indian Ocean 77
5.4 US Interest In the Indian Ocean Region 79
5.5 Interests of Pakistan in the Indian Ocean 80
5.5.1 Gawdar Port………………………………………………………………… ……..80
5.5.2 Gwadar Port and China……………………………………………………………..81
5.6 Analysis and Options for Pakistan………………………………………………………….88
5.7 US Policy in Africa in Current Scenario……………………………………………………90
5.8 Chinese Challenge to US in Africa………………………………………………………….92
5.8.1 Strategic Facilities in Africa……………………………………………………….92
5.8.2 US Trade in Africa……………………………………………………………........93
5.8.3 Security imperatives………………………………………………………………93
5.8.4 Containment of big powers………………………………………………………..93
5.9 Strategic Rivalry in Africa 94
xvi
5.10 Application of offensive Realist Theory on US Policy in Indian Ocean (1990-2014) 95
5.10.1 Offensive Realism of US in Middle East in the post-war period…………………95
5.10.2 Offensive Realism of US towards China in the post-war period……………… 97
5.10.3 US offensive realist policies towards South Asia……………………………….. 98
5.10.4 US Offensive Realist Policy towards Pakistan in Post-Cold War Era..................100
CHAPTER 6 .............................................................................................................................. 103
IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN……………………………………………………………103
6.1 US-Pakistan relationship in post 9/11 period……………………………………………….103
6.1.1 Joining of Global War on Terror ………………………………………………...104
6.1.2 Crackdown on Religious Groups…………………………………………………108
6.1.3 Logistics – bases – intelligence…………………………………………………...110
6.1.4 Operation Rah-e-Rast……………………………………………………………..113
6.1.5 Operation Rah-e-Nijat…………………………………………………………….115
6.1.6 Kerry-Lugar Berman Act (Enhanced Partnership Act of 2009)………………….118
6.1.7 Drone attacks Mode of Threat……………………………………………………121
6.1.8 Raymond Davis case……………………………………………………………..125
6.1.9 Death of Osama-bin-Laden……………………………………………………….128
6.1.10 NATO attack in Pakistan 2011…………………………………………………..130
6.1.11 US allegations towards ISI over Haqqani network……………………………...133
6.2 Analysis of US Coercive diplomacy………………………………………………………..135
6.3 Maritime and Foreign Policy implications for Pakistan……………………………………137
6.3.1 Geo-Strategic Importance of Gwadar Port……………………………………….138
xvii
6.3.2 Major and Regional forces interests in the Gwadar port…………………………141
6.3.3 Importance of Gwadar port at local, regional and global level Local…………....143
6.3.4 Major Powers’ interests in Gwadar Port………………………………………….145
6.3.5 Policies adopted by different countries regarding Gwadar port………………….148
6.3.6 Major hindrances in Gwadars’s Success………………………………………….154
6.4 Implications of CPEC on Pakistan………………………………………………………….155
6.5 Implications for Pakistan Navy……………………………………………………………..162
6.6 Implications for Maritime Doctrine of Pakistan……………………………………………165
6.7 Maritime Security Imperatives of Pakistan…………………………………………………168
CHAPTER 7…………………………………………………………………………………...170
CONCLUSION AND REFLECTIONS ..................................................................................... 170
7.1 CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………………………..170
7.1.1 Reflection on US Policy in the Indian Ocean……………………………………………………………180
7.1.2 US Indian Ocean strategy in current time frame…………………………………187
7.1.3 Elements of a strategy…………………………………………………………….189
7.1.4 US Constraints……………………………………………………………………193
7.1.5 Impact on Maritime Security of Pakistan………………………………………...195
7.1.6 Implications for Foreign Policy of Pakistan……………………………………...197
7.2 LIMITATIONS ..................................................................................................................... 198
7.3 RECOMMENDATIONS ...................................................................................................... 199
a. Maritime Security.......................................................................................................... 199
b. Foreign Policy of Pakistan ............................................................................................ 200
REFERENCES …………………………………………………………………………..202
1
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The core objective of this study is to analyze the US policy in Indian Ocean during
post- cold war era from year 1990 to 2014. Furthermore, implications of US policy on
regional states as well as foreign and maritime policy of Pakistan has been critically
analyzed in this research. The Indian Ocean has attained the significance as center stage
of world politics in current century. The regions of Asia Pacific & Atlantic were the main
theatres of warfare generally in World Wars and specifically in cold war .Asia has
emerged as epicenter of global politics in current timeframe. Indian Ocean politics has
greatly affected the US policy in post-cold war and post 9/11 period due to growing
Chinese and Indian interests and presence in the region. This triangular relationship
between US, China and India has great implications on regional balance of power and
especially on Pakistan.
1.1 Geostrategic Importance of the Indian Ocean
In addition to third largest; this ocean is also comprised of 21% of world total sea
space. The Indian Ocean is considered as “cradle of civilizations”. Three ancient
civilizations i.e. Indus valley civilization, Nile valley civilization and Mesopotamian
civilization emerged in states neighboring this Ocean. Major religions of the world
originated in hinterland and littoral states of Indian Ocean area. It has been used for trade
and transportation since ancient times. The Ebla-Hamazi tablet that was found in the north
of Iran more than five thousand years ago strengthens above statement. However, it also
2
shows the evidence of proper diplomatic relations among states of Indian Ocean. Indian
Ocean is still the buzziest Ocean regarding movements of goods and products from one
place of the world to another. There are many strategically important choke points and
straits present in this region. The Strait of Hormuz connects Middle-East with West and
South Asia, Malacca strait connects South East Asia with the world and the Suez Canal
connects Europe with Asia. Other strategic points are Sunda strait, Lombok strait, Bab-el-
Mandeb, East of Madagascar, Mozambique Channel and the Cape of Good Hope. Almost
fifty four states of the world are present in Indian Ocean littoral and hinterland.
Map 1.1 Indian Ocean Area
Source: CIA Fact Book
3
1.2 US Naval Supremacy
Pirtle (2000) elucidated that US navy has become the major protector, user and
enforcer of maritime rights after the removal of soviet war ships from world oceans. It has
been using UNCLOS to extend its gun boat diplomacy (Pirtle, 2000). Currently, the US
retains unparalleled naval supremacy, but the physical base of this dominance is losing its
share. US naval ships were 568 in 1989 but the number was 346 in 1998 which is 40 %
less. According to US Department of Defense; in 2001, total battle force was just 313 in
form of battle ships (Pirtle, 2000). Military Balance stated in 2014 that the US Navy has
listed no battleship in reserves in 2014. The US marine-corps have already accepted that
fact the current naval and missile program cannot provide sufficient air support for an
amphibious assault to on-shore operations. All the US fleet used in the cold war has been
installed in the military museums for educational purposes.
1.3 United States Policy in Post- cold war Period
Green and Sherar (2010) investigated and clarified that US keenness in this region
is based on its strategic interest in three areas i.e. to secure Sea lines of communication
(SLOC) to have strategic advantage in the trade route especially in oil rich gulf region and
to have benefits from South Asian rising economies.
US influence is also subjected to hydrocarbons in this region and unsettling
influence in this course would have unfriendly effect on its economy and strategy. In past,
US moved its pacific fleet to manage the complications in South-West Asia, for example,
Operation Desert Storm held in 1991, Operations Enduring Freedom held in 2001 and
Iraqi Freedom of 2003. Chinese, Iranian or other sea control projection abilities are
4
restricted around them. US naval training has experienced unusual change since the
conclusion of cold war. The focal point of worldwide danger of cold war has moved to
local challenges and counter strategies. Cold war arrangements of Ocean war that were
supposed to counter soviet maritime power and other atomic powers have now been
changed. When analysts look into post war period; countries with maritime power
confined their efforts to affect the maritime policies of littoral states. However, other the
other hand, littoral states are endeavoring to guard and specifically control their Exclusive
Economic Zones (EEZ).
They are associated with the engagement of maritime expeditionary powers and
joint operation mission as Roy (1998) has explained clearly. The US policy since post -
cold war period can be well understood through a white paper published jointly by United
States Naval Force and the Marine Corps in September, 1992. Named as "From the
Sea”; the paper presented the idea of a joined vision for unusual administration in the
current century along with additional emphasize on maritime powers of US in light of the
fact that maritime powers will focus on littoral fighting rather than ocean combats (From
The Ocean, Militaryinfo.com).
The Naval Doctrine Command (NDC) was built up at Norfolk, Virginia in March
1993 to classify and guarantee consistency in naval force in view of incorporated maritime
regulations and to facilitate US Navy and Marines joint approach in training. The objective
was also to address maritime and joint conventions for preparations, instructions,
operations, activities, reenactments, and war games.
5
US Navy distributed a White Paper in September, 1994 named as, "Forward from
the Sea"; The paper focused on modernizing the key ideas articulated in White Paper
published earlier as indicated by Roy (1998).
The reason for US maritime power was entirely based on the idea to impact the
energy politics and the ability to affect the remote waters and states along the oceans in
US interest. Other objectives were related to maritime expeditionary powers in peace-time
operations, in reacting to emergencies, and in territorial clashes.
In March 1997, US presented “Navy Operational Concept”- this concept actually
set the tone of reaction in case of any resistance against balance of power in oceans and
also defined joint mission strategy and coalition plans for the future operation. This
concept was the continuation of “Forward From the Sea” with three layer strategy (Roy,
1998).
Along these lines Joint Vision 2010 provided the format to joint battle operations
according to the demands of this century and presented an idea for future joint battle
operations. As Diego Garcia that contains a vicinity to the hydrocarbon-rich conditions of
the western Indian Ocean has also a noteworthy American army installation. The
Installation has also termed extra military and maritime power.
Roy (1998) has strategically explained the military and maritime scope of Diego
Garcia and the way, it provides support to Navy in Indian Ocean. US Central Command's
Fifth Fleet has duty of operations in Red Sea, Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean, Its
headquarter is in Florida. Formally, it is known as RDF established in 1983.
6
Roy (1998) considers the withdrawal of US maritime and military power form the
eastern part of Indian Ocean. US expected that this considerable vacuum would be filed
by the territorial states like China, Japan and even India. US is rigid to keep up its bases
in the Western Indian Ocean yet a portion of the GCC states were facilitating it.
Since the 90s, US Navy has been led the targeted operations in the Persian
peninsula while 14 nations remained engaged with US navy on some sort of collaboration
in this regard. The end goal was to authorize United Nations sea sanctions against Iraq
(Roy, 1998). In November 1995 Brown amendment recommended the supply of military
hardware to Pakistan. The deal included maritime hardware including three P-3C Orion
aircrafts. In the aftermath of atomic tests different sort of bans and approvals were
imposed on Pakistan and the tests ended all further US military and maritime arms
exchanges. The Pentagon’s Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) in 2010 set the tone by
requiring a more ''incorporated way to deal with the region crosswise over military and
regular citizen associations'' and soliciting the rest from the U. S. government for an
appraisal of ' U. S. national interests, goals and power act suggestion.
Roy (1998) analyzed that US seventh Fleet is operating in Pacific Ocean, sixth in
Europe and fifth fleet as part of US Middle East force is present since 1949 to protect US
interests in Indian Ocean.
Tellis (2012) expounded that since WWII, US has tried to maintain its hegemony
in order to sustain its control on critical geopolitical regions and to prevent the rise of
different dangers to global commons. US wanted to extend the liberal political order
internationally and maintain an open economic regime. These fundamental goals have not
changed and are likely to change in future.
7
1.4 The new US maritime strategy
Erickson(2008) put the light on six noteworthy missions for ocean control for the
ultimate goal to adapt to dangers and protect U.S. interests; The sea control strategy based
on these missions; send conclusive ocean control in a forward position in restricted clashes
of regional scale; stop war between significant forces; win wars for the country; shield
country security from long-separate; advance and keep up agreeable associations with
more universal accomplices; and counteract or kill local annihilation before it influences
the worldwide framework. To achieve these six missions, U.S. ocean control must have
the relating six center abilities, including the capacity to be in a forward position (present
global arrangement), discouragement capacity, ocean control ability, constrain projection
ability, the ability to defend open request adrift, and compassionate help and catastrophe
reaction capacity.
1.5 US Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century
A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Sea power, the latest policy of the United
States, has major revision in US maritime strategy for the past two decades. The
Maritime Strategy of 1986 was essentially a Cold War era policy with war as the focus,
mainly for creating naval supremacy. The main objective was the global confrontation
with the Soviet Navy. With the Soviet Union's disintegration and the Soviet Navy's
decline, that maritime strategy became outdated. Faced with the new international
situation of counterterrorism following the 9/11incident and the wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq, as well as the rapid rise of developing nations and the formation of a multipolar
world, [and] as a result of over two years of debate and discussion by the U.S. Navy's
8
theoretical circle, the "2007 edition" of the maritime strategy, which brandishes the great
banner of "international cooperation" and a reasonable new face, was finally issued”(A
Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Sea power).
Former US president has given policy of Asia Pivot in 2011 which has great
implications for regional states .A combination of structural and policy impediments will
tend to keep the Indian Ocean region fragmented in the US policy lens. The United States
is likely to use the region as a staging area for counter-terrorism efforts in and around the
Persian Gulf, and as a secondary theatre in the deepening strategic competition with
China. Increasing tension with Iran could also sharpen US focus on the northwest corner
of the region.
1.6 Response of Littoral and Hinterland States
Response of littoral state is based on their interest. Interests of major littoral states
are as follows:
1.6.1Chinese Interest in the Indian Ocean
As per Collison (2013) to some degree, China Factor is one clarification behind
the current change of US–India relations as both US and India is on edge about Chinese
presence in Indian Ocean. Latest talks have concentrated on China's maritime desire in
region but through continuous rise of financial and military power; India is probably going
to receive more emphatic sea nearness in the Indian Ocean. China sees the district
encompassing the Indian Ocean as a crucial vitality and exchange course, not a front line
for control battle. Indian legislators and strategists are worried about the Indian Ocean and
9
India's national security. China’s economic design particularly the one belt ne road
initiative depends on the Indian oceans for its trade strategy. The Chinese sea port being
worked on and at Hambantota, Sri Lanka is a bit a kind of cold war like situation has been
built. A large portion of the supply to Asia passes through the southern sea range of Sri
Lanka. Sri Lanka in included in the Chinese strategy to build the chain of ports in the
Indian ocean to secure the supplies and exports ranging from middle east to Africa.
1.6.2 Indian Interests and the Indian sea
India needs a clever strategy to secure its interests. In Cold war, Due to its geo-
strategic location- India’s position and politics has made its position difficult; when its
closeness with Soviet Union – pushed the US and China to counter it with the help of
Pakistan. However, since the incident of 9/11 – The maritime collaboration between
Indiana and the US has helped India to choose it as it’s close political and strategic partner.
Pannikar (1940) pointed towards the significance of IO in Indian politics and its
global future and said that for other countries, Indian ocean is nothing more than a solitary
while for India, it a basic sea. Indian progress and life depends on this sea and its chances
for a global role are liable to it’s position in the sea. According to Panniker, without
secured shores, there would be no political structure, business development and
mechanical headway for India. Pannikar’s idea also resembles the report of Indian defense
ministry’s report of 2004-5 in which efficient opinion has been given on India’s position
in Asia and especially in the Indian Ocean.
10
If we look into the trade policies and economies, Muslim World and Russia are
getting more benefits from Indian Ocean than China and US. While according to Prakash
(2005) Indians live in vague conditions and brutal neighborhood.
According to Mearsheimer (2001) American outside approach all through the
nineteenth century influenced them to overreach objectives: fulfilling expert in the
Western Hemisphere. US Navy War College report revealed that Indian believe that their
maritime boundary extends from Strait of Malacca to Hurmuz and from boundaries of
Africa to Australia.
Pardesi (2005) believed the idea of rising India would not be fulfilled until the
influence is not maintained in South Asian sphere along with an additional strategic edge
in Middle East, Persian Gulf and Central Asia.
Pardesi also argued that Indian as a progressive nation would try to establish
organizations like riding power used to do since Napoleonic conditions. The whole
objective of these efforts would be to attain exceptional role as the strong country not only
in south Asia but in global world. Collector James Morris who worked as a collector in
colonial India, in his writing in 1978 wrote that the world saw India as a power in itself a
kind mpire, dynamic and latent.India is putting an extraordinary arrangement in Chabahar
port of Iran. It has given billions of dollars to coal production line and school and road
interfaces in Chabahar as it joins India with oil and gas rich Central Asia.
India has developed aggressive Maritime doctrine in 2004 and amended it in 2007
and 2015 keeping in view developments in the Indian Ocean.
11
1.7 Implications for Pakistan
Pakistan's key outside approach according to Hayvard is basically to keep the
relations with US on a stable level, keeping in view the need of developing relations with
China and to engage with India on equal terms. Comprehensive and healthy relationship
with Afghanistan would be the key to handle to internal fight against extremism especially
Taliban. Pakistan’s economy is dependent on maritime development. Pakistan is playing
important role in anti-piracy. Pakistan has developed its Gwadar port with the help of
China. Gwadar will be unmistakable preferred standpoint for entire area. China – Pakistan
Economic Corridor will offer opportunities to the two states and landlocked states of
Central Asia.US should approach with a particular true objective to modify Chinese
proximity and it will have phenomenal consequences for entire area. Pakistan has devised
maritime doctrine which t is yet to be implemented.
1.8 Literature Review
History, economics, politics and the strategic importance of the Indian Ocean have
been analyzed by many researchers. There is less work done on US policy in Indian Ocean
in the post-cold war period (1990-2014) which is the area of this study but little work has
been done on implications for Pakistan. Kaplan (2010) inspected important issues
impacting the approach of US in the region of Indian Ocean, including Pakistan, China,
Iran, Afghanistan, India, Indonesia, Thailand, Myanmar, Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam
and Sri Lanka. Kaplan also prescribed the region from the Middle East to the creating
urban zones of South and East Asia will transform into the nexus of world money related
advancement and military conflicts, as states fight to fulfill vote based framework,
12
essentialness independence, and budgetary movement. He highlighted their extending
geopolitical importance and the snappy changes in this one of a kind region, especially
China and India status as creating sea powers will affect US approach in the Indian Ocean.
Mohan (2010) elucidates that the Indian Ocean is an essential wellspring of
unrefined materials, and the home to a part of the world's most shaky zones, the incubator
of harsh radicalism, the key assembly room for the duplication of weapons of mass
destruction, the territory for a broad number of failed and crashing and burning
communicates.
In, Neglected no longer: the Indian Ocean at the forefront of world geopolitics and
global geo-strategy, Bouchard & Crumplin (2010)have also extensively studied
the possible geo political implications in the Indian Ocean have worked on various
developmental issues in small island countries and territories. The authors in this article
have explained that how the Indian Ocean which was once highly ignored by the world
big powers has now become very significant and has appeared as prominent policy issue
in the century. The Indian Ocean is often referred as a body of water between three
continents; Africa, Asia and Australia and enjoys the status of 3rd largest ocean. Its region
comprises 90of the Indian Ocean itself with all of its tributary water
bodies namely the Andaman Sea, the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea and the Malacca Strait. In
addition, the Indian Ocean Region consists of thirty-eight coastal states, thirteen
landlocked nations. The trade of these nations from sea entirely depends on the port along
this ocean. The population that this oceans cover is near to 2.6 billion and relevant area is
102,000,000 sq.km. The combine purchasing power of nation in its sphere is $ 10,813
billion which is 15.4 % of world GDP according to the estimates of 2009.
13
Moreover, an important feature of the Indian Ocean is its diversity and its region
is marked with significant diversification and contrasts with regard to culture,
environment, population, politics and economy. The resources present in the ocean also
vary significantly from one place to another, for instance, the mineral resources are found
in an excessive amount in South Africa, Indonesia and India and Australia while 55
percent of the world’s total oil and 40 % of the natural gas has its source in the personal
gulf.
In addition, India, South Africa and Australia possess large reserves of coal but a
vast quantity of affordable uranium resources is credited only to Australia and South
Africa. However, despite of the fact that the region possessed a vast area and a diverse
population, the ocean has long been neglected throughout the history of geostrategic and
world geopolitics. For most of the 20th century the Indian Ocean remained less relevant
due to the developments that were taking place in the rest of the world which were
considered more important and vital for world politics, economy and culture.
Nevertheless, the situation changed dramatically at the end of the 1960's as the
significance of the Persian Gulf oil, communication lanes and choke points of the Indian
Ocean attracted the attention of world. Moreover, the unstable socio-political
environment that includes social and political conflicts, economic challenges and
militarization led to US's military intervention in the ocean while China and India also
emerged as strong forces in the ocean with each state struggling to secure its own interest
in the region. In addition, lately Russia has also started to gain influence in the Indian
Ocean, however, their efforts are still on a lesser level because Russia does not want the
oil it itself contains vast energy resources. Nevertheless, it can be expected that Russia
14
might remain involve in the Indian Ocean and related area to maintain it influence in the
politics of Middle East and central Asia.
However, the Indian ocean region despite of being an area of key interest to so
many far- off states is also regarded as one of the most unstable and vulnerable part on
map. In 2009, almost 170 political clashes, 19 high intensity conflicts and seven wars were
reported in the region of Indian Ocean. Many observers stated that foreign military
intervention and their involvement in local politics is one of the reason behind the
instability of Indian ocean region, however, there are several local factors as well that
contribute to various political and social tensions in the region which include poverty,
environmental degradation, cultural intolerance, radicalism, terrorism, clashes over
resources, lack of democratic values and poor state capacity. Nevertheless, regardless of
its unstable nature, the region of Indian Ocean has emerged as an area of great significance
over the years as both the foreign powers and the states within the vicinity of oceans are
trying their best to maintain their national interests in the region. While India commands
a strong hold in the ocean, US and China are the two foreign powers that also have a great
influence in this region. As far as US is concerned it has been involved in this area of
oceans for increasing it influence in the oil politics of Persian Gulf.
Moreover, due to growing issues of nuclear proliferation, maritime security and
Islamic terrorism, the role of Americans has further increased. On the other hand, Chinese
participation has also begun which is growing at a fast pace and has led many to the
conclusion that the geopolitics in the 21st century is going to be shaped by this strategic
triangle which includes India, US and China.
15
Hence, according to Bouchard and Crumplin (2010), the region has gained
momentum mainly due to the vast energy resources that are present in its region,
the shipping routes, Indian economic rise, religious extremism, significant presence of US
and its western allies and the entry of China into the Indian Ocean region as another strong
player. However, considering the peace and security situation, the region will continue to
be a substantial challenge in the coming few decades for both the regional states and the
foreign powers who have a considerable interest in this region. However, it can be said
that now the Indian Ocean and the region surrounding it cannot be neglected by the world
and holds an important status in the world geopolitics.
Berlin( 2002) explained that the only region that would draw the maximum
attention in the 21st century will be the Indian Oceans because of the oil, Islam and the
China-India power tussle.
Kaplan (2009) conveyed a comparable idea and declared that 'the Indian Ocean,
the world's third greatest conduit; starting at now shapes the center of everybody's
consideration for the troubles of the twenty-first century'. The suggestion that China is
building a ''pearl accessory'' along key sea lines of communication in the Indian Ocean
has had the estimation of driving open a radical new verbal encounter .
Mohan (2010) delineates that the Indian Ocean is a vital wellspring of unrefined
materials, and the home to a segment of the world's most flimsy regions, the incubation
facility of savage enthusiasm, the standard performance center for the augmentation of
weapons of mass obliteration, the zone for a broad number of failed and crashing and
burning communicates, the littoral's noteworthiness for the overall economy and mind
blowing power relations has never been being referred to. Not in any way like Russia,
16
which tried to develop a choice money related model and purpose of restriction its contacts
with the world industrialist system, China and India are getting the opportunity to be
discernibly unique people from a financial demand that they once rebuked with some
vitality. The first is the possibility of the monetary change in China and India that is on an
exceptionally essential level not the same as that of Soviet Russia _ the past challenger To
some degree English American power on the planet.
Holmes and Yoshihara (2008) elucidate that the strings of pearl term has ended up
being customary discourse, for instance, among Indian sea control specialists. According
to John Mearsheimer US is ‘offshore balancer’ in various parts of the world.
Scott (1998) focuses on societal forces and institutional plans and structures to
track the move from the Nippy War climate to the post-Cold War period and its effect on
US outside approach making. The underlying article recognizes fair progressivism and
outlines American culture as libertarian, pluralist, and a model to duplicate. Scott also
battles that US outside game plan making is a clashing methodology held together by the
superseding mission to improve the world. He sees a test between moralism/positive
thinking and rationale/genuineness adjacent the doing combating remote procedure
presentation of apathy and internationalism. Scott battles that the American target of a
"law based peace," which guided the US through the Crisp War, was considerably more
direct than the present climate, in which US approach makers must adjust to more
individuals and issues. The result is a partitioned approach process that has made the task
of looking for after the American vision more contrasted and less evidently self-evident.
These subjects are examined through relevant examinations on US relations with China,
past Soviet states, Somalia, NAFTA, and the American experience of progressing
17
prominent government in a multilateral setting. The developments in internal structures
and systems are inspected as well.
Weimar (2013) battles that since the 50s, the relations between China and India
could find an equitable solution first because of 1962 war and second was the cold war
era – when China grouped with Pakistan and then with US to counter India. In the later
course, the post-cold war era has opened new challenges under the influence of energy
politics in the Persian gulf.
Lou (2012) clarifies that the Indian Ocean Territory (IOR) is winding up logically
immense on the planet field, with the Gathered States, India and China, the most basic
accomplices in the district accepting impressive parts. Since the three countries are
struggling for their own agenda of security and they go to battle at a sensible degree while
pushing forward with utilitarian coordinated effort. Because of the nearness of a
dependent relationship and typical security challenges, the future circumstance will be of
the dynamic and sensible competition, as opposed to unpreventable conflict and dispute.
Holmes and Yoshihara (2008) battled that a verifiably sea control objected to
China will neither haven latently in shoreline front waters, nor devote itself totally
to strategic resistance in the Pacific Ocean. Or, then again perhaps, Beijing would turn its
devotion to the Indian ocean and the south East Asian countries because of the enormous
energy recourses which will help it in its economic challenges. China will go for more but
sensitive kind of power show to settle the key issues in it ocean part e.g. with Taiwan and
to ensure its command on the resources that are not so close to Chinese coats.
18
Scott (2013) analyzed that India has logically high desires in the Indian Ocean, as
verbalized by lawmakers, sea figures and the broader five stars. These desires, its
indispensable talk, are of pre-qualification and activity. Indian Ocean technique for such
a self- conceded optional, constabulary and kind part is on a very basic level sea focused;
a six fold system of extending its sea spending, strengthening its establishment, growing
its sea limits, dynamic Ocean methodology, rehearsing in the Indian Ocean and keeping
open the smother centers. Through such strategy, and sensitive changing On Pakistan's
part/enthusiasm for global route, it is to take note of Pakistan coastline that has a length
of 900 km, Gwadar and the elite financial zone of 240,000 have a direct impact for
country’s economy for which Pakistan has to careful design its maritime policy. The
vision of Pak Naval force was shared. It expressed that an advanced powerful Naval force
kept an eye on by spurred experts that contribute adequately to discouragement and
national security over the full clash range and fit for transmitting impact region wide with
a worldwide standpoint. Pak Naval force's investment in sea activities and commitment
towards peace were likewise featured. Pak Naval force took part in a multilateral counter
psychological warfare practice named 'Amman', over the Indian Sea.
Volman (2012) has talked about that extraordinary power like China and India are
expanding their monetary and military exercises in Africa which are testing the place of
Joined States and European nations. As a reaction, the Unified States gives military
preparing to African military work force through a wide assortment of preparing and
training programs. These incorporate African Seaside and Fringe Security Program
(ACBS), Abundance Resistance Articles Program (EDA), Hostile to Fear mongering Help
Program (ATA) and Africa Possibility Operations Preparing and Help Program
19
(ACOTA). These policies help in capacity building of African States. Smith (1972) is of
the view that the essential enthusiasm of US in Africa is to contain awesome forces
competition and struggle in the landmass. The announcement of Secretary Rodgers has
been alluded that the worry is to dodge this landmass from turning into a position of
contention. As per the creator Africa is not seen from East-West battle point of view any
longer as it was done before. The respective relations with Africa are to be shielded from
communists' difficulties. In this way, US intrigue is delineated as positive and clear.
Pham (2016) opines that the contemporary circumstances have assumed a crucial
part for majority rule government in Africa which will be helpful for its financial and
political improvement. US system towards sub-Saharan Africa is to keep up practical
security of the universal group. Besides, it has specified as the obligation of Joined
Expressed to utilize discretionary strategies and HR keeping in mind the end goal to
guarantee straightforwardness and majority rule government in African legislative issues.
Greenery (2014) composed that Africa's significance is not restricted to oil or gold
but rather Nigeria's $500 billion economy has 6% yearly development. Alongside this,
Ethiopia and Rwanda are likewise blossoming because of which American organizations,
for example, General Electric has made interests in power, rail, and flight in Nigeria.
What's more, Walmart has likewise contributed to enter East and West Africa. They
additionally clarified that this place has for some time been dismissed. This District is
imperative for such a significant number of faraway states on the planet, for example, the
US, the European modern states, Japan and China. Amid Napoleonic Wars, the Indian Sea
was known as an English lake. The Indian Sea started to draw in the consideration of
the two superpowers US and USSR for key purposes. Toward the finish of the 1970s the
20
circumstance changed definitely. Amid the advancements, for example, the third Indo-
Pakistani war (1971), the fourth Israeli-Palestinian war (1973), Islamic unrest in Iran
(1979), Soviet control of Afghanistan (1979-1989) or Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), the
Indian Sea was of worry to superpower geo strategists and worldwide security experts. At
long last, with the fall of the comrade alliance (1989-1991) and the finish of the Cool War
again profoundly changed the Indian Sea geopolitical setting. This time of incredible
turbulence proceeded in the wake of the 9/11 fear monger assaults and the American-
drove military intercessions in Afghanistan since 2001 and in Iraq since 2003.
Malik (2010) enlightened that after the 9/11 incident, Bush coerced Musharraf to
join the US initiated global war on terror, threatened Pakistan that if we are not going to
join our hands they will take us to the stone age. Since then US is constantly delivering
threats to our nation - even after 10 years Pakistan is subjected to severe allegations of
mistrust, aiding and abetting anti -US network. He also examines the release of Raymond
Davis that how government sealed it lips on his release, on the other hand Dr. Aafia
Siddiqui's is sentenced to 86 year imprisonment in US. Due to Pakistan involvement in
the global war on terror, country lost thousands of military and civilian lives and the wave
of terrorism which hits country badly in the shape of unknown suicide attacks as a result
of being an ally of US. Pakistan is now facing a time of turmoil.
Iqbal (2011) has examined that Coercive diplomacy is valid and actual
mechanism in international politics. The scenario of Raymond Davis is a recent example
given where the unjust policy of the US authorities is witnessed. A series of events
depicted Raymond's mysterious stay in Pakistan even his identity of being a diplomat was
uncertain his purpose of stay in Pakistani boundaries was also unknown before the killings
21
took place. Iqbal has quoted visiting chairman of US foreign policy relations committee
John Kerry addressing to a press conference “that diplomats enjoy immunity we
cannot let that one incident destroy the relation between two countries", although he
wasn’t even admitted to the list of diplomats surveying in Pakistan before the incident and
right after the next day he was added to that revised list of diplomat. On the other hand
Aafia Siddiqui whose identity was known and was living a normal life was given the title
of a terrorist and her interrogation was nothing compared to Raymond Davis. Past
experiences prove that economic dependence on foreign countries brings political
dependence in its wake. Threats of US aid were given by Americans.70% of Pakistanis
consider US itself as a major threat to its sovereignty. This incident is an eye opener for
all the Pakistanis as the US government tried every diplomatic move to secure its national,
on the other hand Pakistan lost countless lives in drone attacks and still don't raise voice
against the silent invasion of US authorities in government. Controversial debate
continues between Pakistan and US in connection to coercive diplomacy.
Enemark (2011) criticized US policy of using drones to launch air strikes inside
Pakistan while Gardezi (2011) analyzed the ongoing drone attacks in FATA, resulted in
anger of the people and on the other hand government of Pakistan is expressing its concern
regarding the legality of such attacks. For last years the US has been using these drone
attacks to combat terrorist groups under the territory of Pakistan. Under the current era of
president Obama the intensity of such attacks increased. Many of the civilians died due to
such kind of inhuman attacks. Indeed the drone attacks by US violate not only the UN but
also the Geneva Convention. Moreover, US are also violating international Covenant on
Civil & Political rights (ICCPR) and which US has ratified. The UN special Reporter has
22
also criticized the drone attacks in Pakistan on the basis that they violate the
laws under the mentioned articles. In short, due to drone attacks many innocent civilians
including women and children lost their lives, US is not only violating International
Agreements but also involved in heartless activities. The good cop and bad team or the
administration setup to target terrorist extremist by the mutual collaboration of ISI and
CIA is having their own clashes inside. The US officials giving statements in opposing
manner towards Pakistani authorities cannot be compromised as a rift was widened
between PAK-US relations when after meeting General Kiyani, Admiral Mike Mullen
said that in the discussion he had pressed Pakistan to break its link with the Haqqani
network which is waging a’ proxy war' in Afghanistan with assistance of Pakistan ISI. On
the other hand the good cop which proves to be Hillary Clinton wants something given to
be worked with. This bad cop and good cop administration has affected the transactional
and strategic relation between US and PAK. Thus this is pure coercive diplomacy imposed
on Pakistan.
Zenko (2013) raised an important and under examined set of issues related to U.S.
Drone Strike Policies. Zenko analyzed the potentially serious consequences; both at home
and abroad, of a lightly overseen drone program and made recommendations for
improving its governance. Writer argues that the United States should end so-called
signature strikes, which target unidentified militants based on their behavior patterns and
personal networks, and limit targeted killings to a limited number of specific terrorists
with transnational ambitions.
Greenway (2011) analyzed that the relationship between US and Pakistan became
the transactional relationship. Obama administration considered Pakistan as an important
23
strategic partner but on the other hand, delivered constant threat and pressures to Pakistan
as their aid is depended on US, and it seems like here is your money, now do whatever we
say. Greenway also highlighted the double policy of Obama administration that at the
same time they blamed Pakistan and they are involved in the attack done by Haqqani
network in Kabul, but on the other side, they have been trying to negotiate with the leaders
of Haqqani network. The death of Osama bin laden under the territory of Pakistan is
hypocrisy. He also highlighted the reality of NATO attack that 24 soldiers of Pakistan
were killed by US planes and helicopters.
Ahmed (2011) analyzed the current situation of Pakistan, Pakistan is saving the
US core interests in Afghanistan, according to US Pakistan became an element that can
be easily influenced by Washington because of our absolute reliance on IMF and US, and
Pakistan is in a position to serve foreign interest better than our own. Even after the death
of America’s biggest threat Osama, Washington claims to have undeniable confirmation
that Osama’s companions are allegedly hidden in the territory of Pakistan and this is
proved after the death of Osama that United States would not simply let go of Pakistan
but subject it to intensifying coercive diplomacy.
Sethi (2011) examined that the conventional military is not the answer to the 21st
century menace of civilization. Admiral Mike Mullen told the congress that Haqqani
Network is a "veritable arm" of Pakistan’s ISI. The killing of Pakistani journalist Shahzad
Saleem was also blamed on Pakistani authorities. This infuriated the Pakistani nationals
and on the other hand the Pakistani leaders are busy to Condemn America for the
negligence of ISI .This situation is not going to last long as the Taliban are not going to
24
let the American troops rest. Coercive Diplomacy strongly exists in Pakistan and US
relation and America over powers Pakistan every time.
Khalid (2011) believes that Pakistan is a strong third world country emerging on
the forefront of the world but with a very negative image. America has been using every
inch of Pakistan in its Favor since its birth starting with being Pakistan as its non NATO
ally. Since 9/11 Pakistan has been facing problems and America instead of helping and
clearing the blame has always played a very diplomatic role. Thus coercive diplomacy
exists from the starting Instead of blaming Pakistan for the failure of American forces it
should be also remembered for its tremendous sacrifices. There have been a series of
incidents and issues recently that has been raising the friction between two countries.
1.9 Justification and Likely Benefits
Lots of work has been done to analyze the US policy in the post-cold war era, but
there is hardly any research undertaken to study the implications for Pakistan. Indian, Sri
lanka and Chinese researcher has conducted this type of research in order to study the
implications on their state but there is less work done in Pakistan. This study will help and
equip policy makers, students and think tanks in order to understand the changing
dynamics of geopolitics of the Indian Ocean and US policy and its implications for
Pakistan.
25
1.10 Research Questions
What was the US policy in the Indian Ocean region in the WWII and
especially in cold war?
What were the major trends of US policy in the Indian Ocean region in the
post-cold war period from 1990 to 2001?
What were the dynamics, factors and actors which shape US policy in the
Indian Ocean region in the post 9/11 period from 2001to2014?
What were the implications of US policies on littoral states and what was
the role of regional states in the post-cold war era?
What are the emerging trends in US Policy in the Indian Ocean Region and
what will be its implications for Pakistan?
Which maritime policy and strategic options are available to Pakistan?
1.11 Research Objectives
To analyze the US policy in the Indian Ocean in historical
perspective and super -power rivalry in the cold war era.
To identify major trends of US policy in the Indian Ocean region in
the post-cold war era (1990-2001)
To critically analyze continuity and change in US policy in the
Indian Ocean region in the post 9/11 period (2001-2014)
To analyze implications on littoral states and the role
of regional states in the post-cold war era
26
To identify the emerging US Policy in the Indian Ocean Region
and its implications for Pakistan.
To recommend maritime policy and strategic options available to
Pakistan
1.12 Theoretical Framework
1.12.1 Offensive Realist Theory has been employed to analyze the US policy in
the Indian Ocean in the post -cold war era. Different strategic events will be analyzed to
apply offensive realist policy to comprehend US policy in the Indian Ocean in the post-
cold war era.
1.12.2 Coercive Diplomacy Framework will be employed to analyze trends and
motives of the US in post-cold war and post 9/11 period with special emphasis on Indian
Ocean littoral and hinterland states especially Pakistan.
1.13 Research Methodology
This research has been qualitative in nature. Content analysis has been used as
research methodology. Historical, descriptive and analytical approach has been employed
in this research. Relevant primary data i.e. official reports and documents have been
analyzed. Interviews from naval officers and experts have been carried out in order to
remove the gaps in theory. Secondary sources i.e. books, journals, research articles,
official monuments, newspaper articles, Military Balance and proceedings of International
seminars has been utilized for this study.
27
1.14 Place of Work and Facilities Available
The data required for the research work was easily available in the libraries of
Lahore and Islamabad i.e. University of the Punjab Library, Library of Centre for South
Asian Studies ,Quaid-e-Azam Library Lahore, Library of Kinnaird College for Women
Lahore, Quaid-e- Azam University, Islamabad. National Library, Islamabad. Research
Organizations like the Institute of Strategic Studies (ISS), the Institute of Regional Studies
(IRS) Islamabad Policy Research Centre (IPRI) Islamabad and Foundation for Research
on International Environment, National Development and Security
(FRIENDS) Rawalpindi. American Centre based in Lahore and Pakistan Naval War
College has been accessed for primary data collection related to US policy in the Indian
Ocean in the post-cold war period. Digital library has plenty of journals on International
Relations and US policy which are easily accessible in Punjab University Library.
1.15 Plan of Work
First chapter: Introduction of the subject of research.
Second chapter: US Policy in the Indian Ocean in historical perspective and in the cold
war era.
Third chapter: Examination the major trends in the US Policy in the Indian Ocean in
the post-cold war era from 1990-2001
Fourth chapter: Dynamics, factors and actors which shaped US policy in the Indian
Ocean in the post 9/11period.
Fifth chapter: Identification of current and emerging US Policy in Indian Ocean Region
28
Sixth Chapter: Implications for Pakistan foreign policy and maritime policy.
Last chapter: Conclusion and recommendation for foreign policy and maritime security
options available for Pakistan.
29
CHAPTER 2
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Indian Ocean is encompassed by the landmass of Asia to its north, Africa to its
west and South East Asia and Australia to its East. It is basically a land bolted Ocean.
Access to this Ocean is controlled by a few choke points, for example, The Cape of Good
Hope, Strait of Hormuz , Suez Canal, Babel-Mandeb ,Malacca Strait ,Sunda Strait and
Lombok Strait. The universal vitality is dependent on transport. The blockage of a
chokepoint can prompt considerable increment in all out vitality costs. Indian Ocean's
primary essentialness in world topography is because of its populace that is 39.1% of the
total populace. As far as economy is concerned, its worldwide significance is significantly
less with a 15.4% of the world GDP and a 14.2% of world global exchange. Be that as it
may, its significance to the world economy is critical as it is one of the busiest ocean
courses.
The critical qualities of this region are that right off the bat, the Indian Peninsula
ventures India towards the center of the Ocean, giving it an outstanding position inside
the Indian Ocean. Another vital trademark is that ethno-social divisions have energized
many clashes. The Islamic world covers an awesome piece of the region. Thirdly, the
vitality assets that pull in consideration. As per the World Energy Outlook 2009, 55% of
the world's demonstrated oil stores and 40% of the world's petroleum gas saves are found
in the Persian Gulf. Australia, India and Southern Africa additionally have vast stores
of coal while Australia and South Africa separately have the world's first and
fourth biggest reasonable uranium. Fourthly, the differentiation is gigantic between the
30
wealthiest and the poorest nations because of which advancement issues will long stay of
basic significance in the district. At long last, it is likewise essential to bring up the more
noteworthy relative significance of a few states in the Indian Ocean Region. As indicated
by the Geo-Socio-Economic Index a gathering of 12 states together record for 62% of the
region's territory, 73% of its populace, 85% of its GDP-PPP and 83% of its worldwide
exchange.
Map 2.1 Choke points of the Indian Ocean
Source:CIA Fact book
2.1 US Policy in Indian Ocean from 1778-1945
US approach in Indian Ocean amid the season of Monroe Doctrine was just to
have magnanimous exercises in these regions that are South Asia, Middle East and Africa.
31
2.2 US Policy in the Indian Ocean 1945-1990: Cold War period
Amid the season of Cold War; US moved its consideration regarding all conditions
of fringe as it was following the approach of Spykman which express that "which state
manage the outskirts, govern the world”. US set up military partnerships in this area and
its monetary guide is additionally coordinated to these districts as its arrangement was to
contain previous USSR and spread of socialism. It set up South East Asian Treaty
Organization SEATO in 1954 for control of socialism in South East Asia. It created
Baghdad settlement for control of socialism in Middle East in 1955, which was renamed
as MEDO and afterward CENTO Central bargain Organization when Iraq left this
Organization. Amid the season of Cold war, US strategy towards South Asia was given
in the command of Under-secretary of the State. US congress constantly favored India and
they used to rate Indian parliament significantly higher as they have accomplished
autonomy through quiet equitable way.
Pakistan wound up plainly critical for US after Pentagon surveyed it as an
imperative state in light of its geostrategic area and closeness with equal Soviet Block. In
a counter move to Pakistan’s participation in SEATO and CENTO, India moved toward
becoming pioneer of Non Aligned Movement (NAM). Nehru used to reprimand US for
getting to be plainly neo - royal power and he declined to sign all demobilization and Non-
atomic multiplication bargain NPT. He pronounced it as most prejudicial settlement which
had separated the world into atomic haves and atomic those who lack wealth. In all this
era, Iran was considered as a police man of US in this area. Shah of Iran was viewed as
close partner and manikin of US before the Iranian revolution of 1979.
32
2.3 Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace
The Declaration of the “Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace” (IOZP) by the United
Nations General Assembly made mandatory to 8ll states to consider the Indian Ocean as
a zone of peace particularly the two superpowers US and USSR.
According to Bouchard (2010), this deceleration expected from great power to
abandon their greater part of army bases and logistic support offices and also to boycott
warships utilizing the Indian Oceans for any danger or utilization of power against any
sway beyond the UN charter. In 1972, the General Assembly settled the Ad Hoc
Committee on the Indian Ocean with an order to think about the ramifications of the
Declaration of the IOZP yet its work was truly undermined. United States is blamed
for playing the round of misusing neighborhood ethno- social contrasts and energizing
nearby question in the quest for its own national advantages. Another explanation behind
all emergencies is the absence of majority rules system, destitution, joblessness and the
absence of instruction which constitute extremely ripe justification for criminal posses
and vicious radical gathering enlistment. There are a few clashes inside the Islamic world
on issues identifying with modernization, for example, Shiites and Sunnites in the Persian
Gulf and ethnic or tribal divisions in Afghanistan. Besides, because of the new global
jihadist development, the peace and security is tested.
2.4 Strategic Rivalry in Indian Ocean in Cold War
Main regional organizations are not potent e.g. SAARC and ASEAN. Main
confrontation in the Indian Ocean is between India, China and the United States and
every one of the three needs to secure access to the Persian Gulf oil and in addition key
33
ocean paths. China is developing maritime powers and setting up military offices in the
Indian Ocean Region. While, India is likewise extending its maritime abilities to secure
its own national advantages and in addition responding to China's Strings of pearl
strategy.The immense power, incredible diversion amongst India and China is of
developing criticalness. Because of America’s incredible enthusiasm for the region, a vital
triangle is developing in the area. In this manner, US-India-China relations will to a great
extent shape the eventual fate of Indian Ocean geopolitics in
the 21st Century. Furthermore, numerous different states are of some essentialness to
the progressing geopolitical adjustment in the Indian Ocean.
Russia is required to stay engaged with the area as it remains a fundamental player
in the Israeli-Palestinian clash, Iranian Atomic inquiry, and keeps up vital association with
India. Other powerful states are South Africa, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Israel, Australia
and Pakistan. Persian Gulf oil’s significance would increase in coming decades but for
now, it has a specific importance for the oil-subordinate expansive economic forces of
Japan, the United States, Europe, China, and India. In 1942, US established its based in
Asmara, Ethiopia. In agreement with the Australian Govt. US set up an effective low
recurrence correspondence station at Learmonth, or Exmouth Gulf, South of North West
Cape in 1967. The station can speak with submerged submarines. In 1974 US handed over
it to Australia. In an agreement with Bahraini government, US took the control of a
maritime base in Jufair near Manama harbor of Bahrain in December 1971. The base was
earlier set up by the British government but U.K. decided to abandon the base. The US
saw this opportunity as a chance to empower itself in region. The units of Middle eastern
34
force frequently collaborates with different US ships and military installments especially
in exercises in the Indian ocean.
Rocque (1974) and Vali (1976) have mentioned number of events when apart from
regular trips, US navy visited Indian oceans for global emergencies like 1971 Indo-Pak
War. Aircraft carrier Enterprise, which incorporated the land and/or water capable
ambush, transported 800 marines to Tripoli. During 1973 Arab Israel war – warship
Hancock under the escort of four destroyers sent to Indian ocean - However, US decided
to call back Hancock in later decision. During Iranian revolution and Iran Iraq War US
navy Rapid Development Force (RDF) frequently visited north Indian Ocean. Under
Carter Doctrine in January 1983, the US Central Command (USCENTCOM) became
active in Indian Ocean to have eye on Middle East. (Kaplan 1981) believes that US current
maritime power and military installations in the Indian oceans permit it to practice
hindrance without the deployment of atomic submarines.
2.4.1 Former USSR Strategic interests in the Indian Ocean
After the dismantling of Soviet Union, the Russian strategy in the Indian Ocean
has changes somehow. Before the 70s, the soviet strategy was to influence nations with
redesigning the model of security in ocean. Soviet interest to reach warm waters was
enunciated by Admiral Sergei Gorehkov in 1945 – According to him; USSR wanted
access to oceans to promote communism (Sallance, 1979).
In the Indian Ocean, other than trim the immature littoral states for kinship, the
Soviet need was to relieve the American impact, particularly in the Gulf States. The
Soviet maritime development in the Indian Ocean, happened amid the stature of
35
détente, seemed to have been inspired much more by its want to upgrade its
political impact, to counter China, and to set up political equality with the US in the region,
as opposed to key contemplations including the American.
2.5 Rivalry or Coexistence
According to Vali (1976), the exercises by Soviet Union and the US in the Indian
Ocean were destructive in nature for each other’s goals in the region along with the
legality; under international law or from political perspective. A clear range of normal
enthusiasm for Moscow and Washington was the interest with the expectation of
complimentary route. They required free entry for merchants and naval vessels.
2.6 Implications for Pakistan
Before partition US was only involved in philanthropic activities in South Asia.
After independence of Pakistan in 1947, during cold war Pakistan played the role of
middle man in Sino -US rapprochement in 1970. Pakistan joined western block by joining
SEATO and CENTO but US put sanctions on Pakistan after Indo- Pak war of 1965. US
gave assurance to Pakistan that it will send Enterprise an air craft carrier to rescue Pakistan
military in East Pakistan during Indo- Pak War of 1971. It never came to help Pakistan.
Furthermore, Pakistan supported US in Afghan war. ISI and CIA worked in close
collaboration to fight war against soviet forces. Pakistan –US relations are based on their
national interests.
36
CHAPTER 3
US POLICY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN IN POST COLD
WAR PERIOD (1990-2001)
3.1 Indian Ocean in Post-Cold War Period
After disintegration of USSR, US emerged as a sole super power. Macfarlance
(1999) composed that Russian Navy is in port; its blue water capacity is rusting without
end as the Soviet task force has vanished from the world Oceans in post icy war period.
Most extraordinary states with sweeping maritime powers, for instance, Australia South
Asia and the world past. Pakistan has participated global world to counter the A.Q. Khan
arrange and has continually provided data from its own examination, including data got
from Dr. Khan to US. States with sweeping maritime powers, for instance, Australia, Italy,
Japan and China, are either littoral or hinterland powers without an overall access. To be
seen as an overall sea control a state must be able to expand sea control anywhere at any
oceans at any time in the name of national security. Some states consider the need for
direct action in the name of power rather the indirect moves for resisting the danger. After
the collapse of Soviet Union – Russia is nothing more than water from controlling state
while US, France and U.K. have their sea power much better than the remaining world.
However, Britain and France’s capability for any action individually is much lower than
that of U.S.
37
Map 3.1 US Bases in Persian Gulf (Northern Indian Ocean)
Source : US Congress Library
38
3.2 US Naval Supremacy
Pirtle (2003) considers that US is the only superpower which has ability to dictate
its policies on other states. Colson (1995) considers the convention as the core defender
of U.S. Military interested in Oceans worldwide to guarantee its national security or in
other language; the treaty guarantees the U.S. interests. According to Schachte (1995),
The Convention (UNCLOS) contains various basic rule that are solid and predictable with
these interests, however the deal does not guarantee the defense or security of U.S.S
interests in world oceans. The international laws hinders the U.S. strategic designs as
Convention describes the advancement and operational benefits of seaborne forces will
be secured in the new thousand years. According to Pontecorvo (1986) UNCLOS III and
its role as a mediator was undermined in conflict between super powers. Military exercises
remained unregulated (Dyke, 1993).
Churchill and Lowe (1998) criticized the UNCLOS III for its inability to address
the issues of military operation in sea and the relative standards. It only gives limits of
Exclusive Economic Zone.
3.3 Regional politics after the cold war
Under the world wide circumstances and examples set by the powerful states – all
remaining states set their sea methodologies without exchanging the national preferences.
As regional economic viewpoints intrigues ended up being more fundamental than
regional so the states in Indian oceans preferred to depend on regional powers.
39
3.3.1 Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC)
IOR-ARC- formed in March 1997 is basically an association of 19 countries with
ocean sedge location- The aim was to put more focus on trade in the regions.
IOR-ARC practices fuse a couple on-going topical exercises and work
programs coordinated by part countries of shared premiums, all of which under the
umbrella of 3 separate working social events, to be particular the Working Group on Trade
and Investment (WGTI), the Indian Ocean Rim Business Forum (IORBF), and the Indian
Ocean Rim Academic Group (IORAG). The goals of IOR-ARC are according to the
accompanying:
a. To progress supportable advancement and balanced change of the region and
Member States;
b. To focus on those zones of financial cooperation which give most outrageous
open entryways make; shared interests and get basic prizes; and
c. To propel movement, oust snags and lower limits towards a more freed and
enhanced stream of stock, organizations.
3.4 Trends in Naval Power in South Asia and the Indian Ocean
During the past few years there was no change in the order of naval forces in South
Asia and the Indian Ocean, in terms of the strengths of their principal combatants (Table
I). Amongst the twelve indigenous navies of the region possessing major surface and sub-
surface combatants, India continued to remain the largest, followed by Pakistan, Australia,
Indonesia, Iran, and Thailand. In view of the number and nature of major warships planned
40
to be acquired in the near future by countries such as Australia, Thailand, and Singapore,
the position of naval forces is expected to change in coming years.
The most notable will be that of the Royal Thai Navy, which is planning to launch
its first aircraft carrier. The 11,500-tonne carrier, build in Spain, commissioned into the
Thai Navy in July 1997. This result in the possession of carriers by two countries of the
Indian Ocean littoral. The most significant aspect of the expansion/modernisation of South
Asian and Indian Ocean navies in past years was in terms of submarine forces. As clearly
evident from Table 3.1, major submarine acquisitions have been planned, and are
presently being implemented. In effect, a dramatic increase is expected to take place in
the number of patrol submarines operated by the littoral states of the Indian Ocean in
future.
The maritime reconnaissance/strike capabilities of the navies in South Asia and
the Indian Ocean also underwent major developments during the past years. This was
primarily in relation to the formalisation of the new international Law of the Sea in late
1994. During the past year, China continued to maintain a keen interest in the seas around
India. The nature and extent of Chinese activities in Myanmar could lead to a Chinese
naval presence in the Indian Ocean in the near future. Amongst the extra-regional naval
forces in the Indian Ocean, the most important development was the creation, for the first
time ever, of a permanently deployed American fleet for a part of the Indian Ocean. These
developments have serious implications for Indian security and the Indian Navy. Simply
put, the declining force levels of the Indian Navy are clearly in contradiction to the major
trends apparent for naval forces in the Indian Ocean.
41
Table 3.1 Major Indigenous naval forces in South Asia and Indian Ocean
Country Carriers
Patrol
Subs
Destroyers Frigates Copters Aircraft Manpower
INDIA 2 16(2) 5(3) 14(3) 63 68 54000
PAKISTAN 0 6(3) 3 8(?) 13 15 22800
AUSTRALIA 0 3(6) 3 8(8) 29 129 13670
INDONESIA 0 2(2) 0 17 47 43 30000
IRAN 0(1) 2(1) 2 3 32 11 18000
THAILAND 0 0 0 12(3) 33 33 43000
SAUDI
ARABIA
0 0 0 4(2) 42 0 12000
BANGLADESH 0 0 0 4(1) 0 0 8050
MALAYSIA 0 0 0 2(2) 12 4 12000
SOUTH
AFRICA
0 3 0 0 10 20 5034
IRAQ 0 0 0 1 0 0 2000
SINGAPORE 0 0(1) 0 0 0 8 4000
Reference :Military Balance
42
3.5 Trends in Submarine Forces
In post-cold war era, significant developments have taken place to enhance
submarine capabilities in the Indian Ocean. These relate to the modernisation and
expansion of existing submarine forces, as well as the acquisition of submarines by navies
of the region for the first time. In effect, a dramatic increase is expected to take place in
the number of patrol submarines operated by the littoral states of the Indian Ocean within
the next six or seven years (Table 3.2). At present, six Indian Ocean littoral states maintain
active submarine arms in their navies. The largest is that of the Indian Navy, which
consists of sixteen diesel-electric submarines. This is followed by the six conventional
submarines of the Pakistani Navy, those of Australia (3), South Africa (3), Indonesia (2),
and Iran (2).
Amongst these navies, Pakistan and Australia maintained active submarine
construction programmes in 1995, while South Africa carried out a major upgrade
programme. Meanwhile, Singapore finally decided to start a submarine arm for its navy,
and India planned to build additional submarines in the country.
Pakistan's submarine construction programme was the result of a substantial naval
arms agreement with France in late September 1994, worth about a billion U.S. dollars.
This contracted for the construction of three advanced technology Agosta 90-B diesel-
electric submarines for Pakistan. These new 1,700-tonne boats are to possess a vast
amount of sophisticated technology, including a closed-cycle steam turbine MESMA Air
Independent Propulsion (AIP) system to enhance the submerged endurance of the
submarine, as well as a number of lethal Exocet SM-39 underwater launched anti-ship
43
missiles. Both the AIP system and the anti-ship missiles are to be exported by France for
the first time.
In terms of the agreement, the first submarine is to be built in France; the second
will be built in France but assembled in Pakistan, while the third boat will be built in
Pakistan with the transfer of a substantial technology package. The keel of the first
submarine was laid at the DCN shipyard in Cherbourg in France in the autumn of 1995.
Meanwhile, the Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works (KSEW) also began making
preparations for the work to be carried out on the second and third submarines. This will
entail building considerable specialised infrastructure for submarine assembly and
construction. The second and third submarines were commissioned into the Pakistani
Navy in 1999 and 2002. Pakistan Navy’s four old Daphne-class submarines had begun to
decommission.
During 1995, Australia launched the second of its planned six Collins-class
submarines, and continued to carry out the sea trials of the first boat of this class. Although
it is believed to have performed well in the trials conducted so far, difficulties relating to
the software of its highly sophisticated combat system have been reported. The
construction of these Swedish Kockums Type 471 submarines in Australia, as a
replacement for the ageing Oberon-class boats, was the result of a major naval arms
agreement in June 1987. All the six submarines, to be armed with torpedoes and anti-ship
missiles,into the Australian Navy by the end of the decade. This would coincide with the
decommissioning of the Navy's three remaining Oberon submarines.
During 1995, the South African Navy carried out a major upgrade programme to
improve the combat effectiveness of its three Oberon-class submarines. In the wake of the
44
1988 upgrade programme, which focused on electronic systems, the 1995 programme
emphasised the full integration of the boats' system, as well as improved supportability.
The upgrade programme underway emphasises the use of software-driven systems as well
as commercial off-the-shelf components. This includes the total revamp of the sonar
system, the modernisation of the search and attack periscopes, and extensive work on the
Electronic Support Measures (ESM) sub-system. In addition, new action information
systems, navigation systems, and communications suite, have been acquired for the
submarines. The first completely upgraded system in the Navy's Oberon-class submarine
continues to undergo operational test and evaluation.
Over the years, Singapore's plans for the acquisition of submarines appeared to be
the most ambitious amongst the Indian Ocean littoral states of South-east Asia. At various
times in the past, it had conveyed an interest in leasing two small 800-tonne boats, in
addition to buying four larger new construction boats, by the end of the decade. Finally,
in late September 1995, Singapore decided to purchase a second hand 1200-tonne diesel
electric submarine from Sweden. This is the first time that Singapore will be operating a
submarine in its navy. The Kockums Type A-12 submarine, launched in 1967, is armed
only with torpedoes, not anti-ship missiles. In view of this decision, Singapore is not
expected to acquire any German HDW Type 206 submarines for the time being.
Meanwhile, in 1995 the Thai government came close to giving final approval to a
programme for the purchase of two or three modern submarines for the Navy. Quite
unexpectedly, this proposal ran into some difficulty, with the budgetary request being
delayed in Cabinet. Later in the year, the proposal for the submarines appeared to be ready
for approval. These comprised DCN of France, HDW of Germany, Kockums of Sweden,
45
and RDM-VSEL of the Netherlands and Britain. In addition, Russia's Kilo-class
submarines are also expected to compete for the order. Moreover, the submarines finally
chosen are expected to be equipped with American technologies and sub-systems. The
American administration eased restrictions on American companies seeking to provide
such items to South-East Asia. As a result, companies like the Loral Corporation have
already begun to market submarine fire control and navigation systems to Thailand.
The Malaysian government approved the acquisition of four patrol submarines for
its navy - two new construction and two older boats in 1990.
The construction of two additional HDW submarines would commence at the
country's Mazagon shipyard in Bombay. This would, in effect, complete the abruptly
concluded 1981 order with HDW for six submarines (in view of the financial scandal
which erupted in the late 1980s). According to the United Nations Conventional Arms
Register, a full submarine kit had already been transferred from Germany to India in 1992.
This decision of the government will rejuvenate submarine construction facilities at the
shipyard, lying idle for nearly four years, since the launch of the second indigenously
constructed HDW submarine in 1992. As the year ended, considerable speculation
remained over the transfer of possibly two, but as many as six, additional Kilo-class Type
636 submarines were transferred from Russia to India.
In view of the diesel-electric submarines planned (including those currently being
built) or those projected, some 24-30 boats are expected to be commissioned into the
navies of the Indian Ocean littoral in near future. This could increase to 53 the number of
submarines operated by these countries alone, from the 32 at present.
46
Table 3.2 Trends in Submarine Force
TRENDS IN SUBMARINE FORCES
Figures are for Conventional Diesel Powered Submarines
COUNTRY 1995 *Planned/Projected
**Total in
2002-03
INDIA 16 2 14
PAKISTAN 6 3 5
AUSTRALIA 3 6 6
SOUTH AFRICA 3 0 3
INDONESIA 2 3 5
IRAN 2 1 2(3)
SINGAPORE 0 4 to 6 4(6)
THAILAND 0 3 3
MALAYSIA 0 2 to 4 2(4)
SAUDI ARABIA 0 2 to 4 2(4)
TOTAL 32 26 to 32 46(53)
* SSKs Planned (and Projected) by the Year 2002/3
** SSKs in 2002-03
Reference: Military Balance1995,2002
47
3.6 Trends in Maritime Reconnaissance/Strike Capabilities
The past few years were the most important in the tumultuous thirteen-year history
of the Law of the Sea. It was during this period that the International Seabed Authority
(ISA) came into existence, and the maritime zones of littoral countries could be further
extended in less than ten years to 300 nautical miles from the 200 nautical miles delineated
so far.
These developments came in the wake of the formalisation of the international law
of the Sea in late 1994. The ISA was of special importance to India as it was the only
littoral country of the Indian Ocean to have marked a 150,000 sq. km. site in the area, off
Cochin, for the exploitation of polymetallic nodules from the seabed in the future. On the
other hand, the potential extension of a country's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) by 100
nautical miles, on the basis of a preliminary exploration of the additional zone, focused
considerable attention on the maritime reconnaissance/strike (MR/S) capabilities of a
number of countries of the Indian Ocean region. At present, eight littoral states of the
Indian Ocean maintain dedicated MR/S capabilities in their Air Force or Navy. The largest
is that of Australia, which operates a fleet of 19 Lockheed P-3C Orion Maritime Patrol
Aircraft (MPA), armed with lethal anti-ship missiles, in its Air Force. This is followed by
the maritime strike capabilities of the Pakistani Navy, the Royal Thai Navy, and the
Iranian Navy.
Other countries possessing maritime reconnaissance/Anti-Submarine Warfare
(ASW) capabilities include the Indian Navy, the Indonesian Navy, the Malaysian Navy,
and the Sri Lankan Navy. Amongst these countries, both Pakistan and Thailand expanded
their maritime MR/S capabilities in 1995, while Australia prepared for an extensive
48
refurbishment of its Orion MPAs. The Pakistani Navy's MR/S force of four Dassault
Breguet Atlantic aircraft since late 1988, expanded in 1995 through the order for French
submarines, as well as the passage of the Hank Brown Amendment in the American
Congress. In a bid to induce Pakistan to acquire French submarines in late 1994, France
agreed to supply three additional Atlantic aircraft to Pakistan. Although these aircraft were
ostensibly to be used for spares for the Atlantics already in the Pakistani Navy, it appears
that this did not take place. Reports in 1995 indicated that the aircraft were in store and
available for use when required.
In addition, the most important and lethal of the American arms and equipment
provided to Pakistan through the Brown Amendment in late 1995 consisted of three P-
3C-II Orion MPAs, along with their complement of Harpoon anti-ship missiles. Pakistani
pilots have already been trained on this aircraft prior to 1990, when their transfer was
barred in view of the Pressler Amendment. It is expected, therefore, that these aircraft will
commence patrolling the Arabian Sea soon after transfer. In effect, Pakistan's MR/S
capability more than doubled in 1995, from a force of four aircraft to that of ten. Moreover,
the Orions provide major advantages over the Atlantics in terms of both reach and strike
capability.
These factors essentially enable the Pakistani Navy to conduct offensive maritime
air operations on a far greater scale and depth than ever before. During 1995, the Royal
Thai Navy also acquired two more P-3A Orion MPAs for its naval air force. This brought
the total number of Orions in the Thai navy to five. Meanwhile, the Australian Air Force
began preparing for a major avionics and structural upgrade of all its P-3C Orion MPAs.
This would be carried out in batches from 1997 to about the year 2001, and is expected to
49
extend the life of the force till at least the year 2015. The programme also includes the
purchase of associated ground-based facilities, and three ex-U.S. Navy P-3Bs that are
being converted to training aircraft. The upgrade programme will involve the employment
of new radar; a modern acoustic processing system; and a new data management system.
3.7 The Chinese Navy in the Indian Ocean
During the past year, warships of the People's Liberation Army-Navy (PLA Navy)
did not venture into the Indian Ocean, nor pay goodwill visits to ports in the area, which
they had done twice in the recent past - in 1986-1987 and 1993. Nonetheless, other
developments in the region continued to indicate increased Chinese interest in the seas
around India, which could lead to sustained Chinese naval activity in the area in the near
future. These developments essentially focus on China's assistance in the construction and
use of naval facilities in Myanmar. These facilities would augment considerably, the
ability of the PLA Navy to operate in the Indian Ocean.
They could permit shipping in the area to be monitored, and provide Chinese
warships docking, resupply, and maintenance facilities, thereby enhancing their combat
capability in the Indian Ocean. Since the middle of 1992, reports have persistently
indicated Chinese assistance in the construction of naval and electronic facilities in
Myanmar, Island at the mouth of the Bassein River, the modernization of existing naval
facilities at Akyab and Mergui, and the establishment and operation of a Signals
Intelligence (SIGINT) station at Great Coco Island. Although early assessments indicate
that the Hianggyi base, when finally completed, will be too small to host Chinese surface
warships of the size required for effective operations in the Indian Ocean, it may just be
too soon to reach such a conclusion.
50
Moreover, the activities being carried out could be used to support diesel-electric
submarines being transferred from Russia in a major naval arms agreement finalized. In
terms of the agreement, China initially plans to acquire four, but possibly as many as ten,
Kilo-class submarines at a rate of one to two boats a year. The submarines of these types
were transferred to China. Chinese activities on the strategically located Great Coco
Island, at a distance of only some 30 nautical miles from the Indian Andaman chain of
islands, are of particular concern. In 1993, some 70 Chinese naval and engineering
personnel are believed to have arrived on the island to assist in the installation of a new
radar facility. This could enable China to monitor Indian naval communications in the
area, and possibly even India's missile tests off its eastern coast. China is also upgrading
Myanmarese naval facilities at Akyab, and port facilities at Mergui.
In addition, Myanmar has agreed to the presence of Chinese military instructors
on its territory to provide training to its armed forces personnel. The strong defence
relationship between the two countries can also be seen from the nature and extent of
Chinese arms transfers to Myanmar recently. The initial 1 billion U.S. dollar arms deal in
1992 was followed by a further deal of 400 million U.S. dollars in 1994. This new
agreement includes six Hainan-class patrol ships and a number of small gunboats for its
Navy. Myanmar already operates 10 ex-Chinese Hainan-class ships, and is reportedly
negotiating with China for the purchase of two missile-armed Jianghu-class frigates. If
this naval transfer does come through, it will represent the first time that Myanmar will
operate warships of this size and nature.
Intensification of Chinese activity in the Andaman Sea can also be seen from the
success of the Indian Coast Guard in August 1994, when it apprehended three Chinese
51
trawlers, flying the Myanmarese flag, in Indian waters off Narcondam Island. Aboard the
trawlers were several detailed charts clearly identifying hydrographic details of the waters
around the Andaman Islands. The trawlers were believed to have been heading towards
the Great Coco Island. It is clearly not perceived that China has granted exclusive control
over the naval base in Hanggyi or the SIGINT facility on Great Coco Island. However, in
view of its military relationship with Myanmar, it is expected to be granted some sort of
access to the former, and receive data from the latter. The extent to which Myanmar at
present is sharing India-related intelligence data with China is not known.
3.8 The U.S. fifth fleet in the Indian Ocean
The establishment of an independent U.S. fleet for operations in the Persian Gulf
is of considerable strategic importance to the naval balance in the Indian Ocean. This is
the first time ever that the U.S. has especially created a permanently deployed fleet for
any part of the Indian Ocean. The force levels and capabilities of the Fifth Fleet, along
with associated infrastructure and logistical support facilities, has increase American
naval and military presence in the area. Since the end of the Second World War, warships
drawn from both the Second Fleet in the Mediterranean Sea, and the Seventh Fleet in the
Pacific Ocean, have been deployed for operations in the Indian Ocean. During the 1971
Indo-Pakistani war, for instance, the American aircraft carrier led naval task force that
entered the Bay of Bengal was drawn from the Seventh Fleet.
The Fifth Fleet for the Persian Gulf has now reinforced the American naval
presence in the Indian Ocean; warships of the Seventh Fleet deployed in the Indian Ocean,
additional rotationally deployed forces, and forward stationed forces in the area. The Fifth
Fleet created is quite different from the fleet of the same name, which operated in the
52
Pacific Ocean, but was disbanded soon after the conclusion of the Second World War.
The new Fifth Fleet was activated in July 1995, with its headquarters located at Mina
Sulman in Bahrain. It will come under the operational jurisdiction of the Commander of
U.S. Naval Forces, Central Command, Vice-Admiral John S. Redd. Its area of
responsibility includes the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the western part of the Indian
Ocean. The United States has officially justified the creation of the fleet on the basis that
it is essentially symbolic in nature, to reinforce America's long-term military commitment
to the region. It is stated, therefore, that American military force levels in the region will
not increase, but simply be consolidated. However, in view of American naval strategy
and shifting force levels, this explanation does not appear credible. A major aim of
American policy, as enunciated in the February 1995 document on "U.S. National Security
Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement", is to enhance the security of the country, to
be achieved by the maintenance of a strong defence capability and the promotion of
cooperative security measures.
In this endeavour, American naval doctrine in the post-Cold War world has
undergone a dramatic transformation. From its focus on open-Ocean war fighting on the
sea, it has increasingly shifted to one of power projection and the employment of naval
forces from the sea, in order to influence events in the littoral regions of the world. This
strategic concept has been further expanded to encompass the employment of naval
expeditionary forces and joint operation missions. In essence, therefore, the creation of
the Fifth Fleet represents this fundamental aspect of American naval policy, and ought not
to be seen simply as a symbolic act. This is especially true for the two countries in the
region with which it has hostile relations, Iraq and Iran.
53
Moreover, the nature and extent of the force level associated with the Fifth Fleet
has not been clearly defined. In effect, over the years there has been a major increase in
the number of warships and naval aircraft associated with Central Command in the Persian
Gulf. While the U.S. Central Command, with Headquarters at MacDill Air Force Base in
Florida, clearly did not have a fleet under its command till less than a year ago, it used to
take over command of naval forces deployed in the region. On average, this comprised a
single carrier battle group, consisting of five principal surface combatants (including an
aircraft carrier), two nuclear-powered submarines, and one support ship. On the activation
of the Fifth fleet in July 1995, it comprised 15 warships including the aircraft carrier USS
Abraham Lincoln. US force had doubled to comprise 31 ships, this increase was due partly
to the arrival of seven military sealift vessels, which arrived in the Gulf at the end of
August as part of the US deployment. They carried heavy weapons and equipment for a
17,000 man Marine expeditionary force and 5,000 man mechanised army brigade.
American naval forces in the Gulf had increased to some 43 warships, including
support ships; albeit on a temporary basis, in view of the joint exercises held with Kuwaiti
forces. The departure of the single American aircraft carrier from the Persian Gulf, for just
over a two month period, was compensated for by the deployment of an additional five
warships in the area, along with under 30 fighter and transport aircraft at Sheik Eissa
airbase in southern Bahrain. Moreover, the inherent firepower of the warships in the Gulf,
in terms of their capability to launch guided weapons such as the Tomahawk cruise
missile, had increased by 200% since the end of the Gulf war in 1991 (Chaudhury, 1995).
54
3.9 The Indian Navy in Post -Cold War Era
During the past few years, the only major ship acquired by the Indian Navy was
an old Leander-class frigate from Britain for training purposes. This appeared consistent
with the pattern of naval acquisitions in the past few years. Since the beginning of 1988,
the Navy has not acquired a single principal surface combatant, either from abroad or the
shipyards within the country. In terms of the sub-surface force, only four submarines have
been commissioned into the Navy in past years. This situation is due primarily to the
severe budgetary crisis faced by the armed forces, and particularly the Navy, since 1990-
1991. This will result in a massive decrease in the number of principal combatants of the
Navy in the near future. According to a reliable estimate, this could be as much as a fifth
of the total force of principal combatants; from 37 at present to 29 in the next four years
by the year 2000, if no major warships are acquired from abroad.
The scheduled decommissioning of the two aircraft carriers (the first towards the
end of the year, and the second in six or seven years) in the absence of any replacement
in place will effectively end the Navy's balanced force structure, and capacity for blue
water operations. In effect, a major change in naval doctrine and tactics will have to be
thought out, prior to a major compensatory programme of naval acquisitions. The major
trends in submarines and maritime reconnaissance/strike forces in the Indian Ocean point
to the need to maintain a carrier arm in the Indian Navy for effective Anti-Submarine
Warfare (ASW) and naval air operations. The modernization of the submarine arm is
clearly another priority concern.
The interest displayed by China in the Indian Ocean, especially in terms of the
construction and use of naval facilities in Myanmar, indicates the possibility of a Chinese
55
naval presence in the area in the near future. Initially, the Indian Navy would primarily
need to be prepared to deal with Chinese submarines in the Bay of Bengal. In the absence
of any effective carrier-launched ASW force, this task would assume nightmarish
proportions. The U.S. Fifth Fleet in the Indian Ocean will remain a potential source of
concern to the Indian Navy. While it may not directly attempt to influence Indian naval
operations, the permanency of its presence signifies highly sophisticated weapon systems
and far superior firepower in proximity to Indian waters. The nature of the political
relationship between the two countries will determine the level of rhetoric to which the
Fifth Fleet will periodically be subjected to in public. Nonetheless, further developments
in relation to it need to be watched carefully in India.
After the general elections, major acquisitions for the Navy are expected to be
decided, including that of a replacement aircraft carrier
The Chinese are quite miffed about Indian ships operating in the South China Sea,
literally, their backwaters. PLA Navy, which was invited to parade a ship during the first
ever International Fleet Review (IFR) in India, has, after some prevarication, indicated its
unwillingness to join the IFR. But it said it would send a ship sometime next year on a
reciprocal goodwill visit.
The Indian Navy (IN) has concluded its annual commemoration of naval victories
against East and West Pakistan in 1971. No one has forgotten how it was able to deter
Pakistan from escalating its foolhardy military adventure during the Kargil war. For the
first time, in a quiet show of strategic reach, a naval flotilla of six capital ships, one
submarine and a tanker entered and operated in the South China Sea, visiting ports from
Singapore to South Korea including China, Vietnam, Japan and Indonesia. The Chinese
56
media made some mild noises about this. But INS Delhi and Kora were warmly received
in Shanghai. In fact China released a First Day Cover commemorating the arrival of the
two ships. INS Mysore, the Navy's showpiece destroyer, also took part in the US
Millennium Fleet Review in New York presided by Bill Clinton.
The Indian Navy is propagating two other themes: building bridges of friendship
across the seas and self-reliance through indigenization. Multiple bridges had been
launched, during India's first ever IFR at Mumbai in which ships from 23 countries
including a nuclear submarine from France were reviewed by President KR Narayanan
from the Gateway Of India.
After figuring on the cover of Newsweek in 1988, the Navy had reached the dumps
in 1995. For ten years, while ships were being phased out there was not a single order for
a new ship. Enraged by this operational decline, then CNS, Admiral V Shekhawat, went
public and blamed the government for neglecting the Navy. This had the desired effect
but it is only current government that appreciated the role and requirement of maritime
power in an age of globalization.
The IN is the imbalance between big quality ships and a larger fleet of smaller
craft. Both these discrepancies are being addressed. The Navy will have more frigates,
destroyers and submarines. In the past, IN's share of the defence budget used to hover
between 11 and 13 per cent. This has increased to14.04 percent this year (Rs 8228.02
crore). The most striking feature of the budget is its balanced utilization: the ratio between
revenue and capital expenditure is 50:50 which means whopping Rs 4100 crore for
modernization. In case of the army, with nearly 82 per cent of its budget accounting for
revenue, only 18 per cent is available for modernization.
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Of the three services IN excels in indigenization. More than 20 ships are on order
or under construction at Indian shipyards. These include an Indian-designed stealth
frigate, an air defence ship (aircraft carrier bigger than INS Viraat) submarines, missile
vessels, fast attack craft, destroyers, survey ships and a nuclear powered submarine
codenamed ATV. In addition, three Talwar Class frigates are being built by Russia. The
fate of the decommissioned Russian aircraft carrier Gorshkov is in the balance as the
government has yet to begin price negotiations.
India, which today has only one aircraft carrier, requires three: one under refit, and
one for each seaboard. This is no divine thought but the legacy of a1964 emergency
cabinet committee decree which, for the first time, estimated IN's force levels. The other
good news is that two key infrastructure projects held in animated suspension have also
been revived - the Naval Academy at Ezhimala in Kerala and the new naval harbor -
Operation Seabird - at Karwar. This will ensure decongestion and dispersal of the
Bombay-based Western Naval Fleet.
While the Chinese remain away from IFR, they may well bag the contract for
dredging of the Mumbai port. Although China Harbor Engineering Company which had
quoted the lowest rates against a global tender is the obvious choice, IN has raised serious
objections on grounds of security as its offices and installations are close by. This is a
ticklish issue, reminiscent of Indian pique at Nepal subcontracting projects to Chinese
companies in the sensitive Terai region. The other irritant is the Pakistan Navy, which can
pose merely a sea denial threat by its maritime reconnaissance aircraft and missile firing
submarines. Unlike India, Pakistan has no sea-control capability. The Chinese Navy is six
times the size of the IN. It has nuclear-powered and ballistic missile firing submarines is
58
importing destroyers from Russia and building new frigates. It has no aircraft carrier,
though, but is trying reverse engineering on some decommissioned Russian models. For
the first time since 1958 two Chinese ships transited through the Indian Ocean on their
way to Tanzania and South Africa. The IN monitored their move. Such is the growing
reach and ambition of the IN. Sea power is coming of age in blue waters, both as a means
of coercive diplomacy and building the bridges of friendship across the seas (Indian Ocean
Rim Association For Regional Cooperation).
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CHAPTER 4
US POLICY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN (2001 - 2014)
4.1 US Policy towards South Asia 2001-2014
US objective is to advance solidly and irreversibly on ways to strength, vote based
system, control and success in South Asia According to Rocca, Former President Bush
came to office in 2001 perceiving the developing significance of South Asia to the United
States. He coordinated that the United States constructed more grounded associations with
the majority of the nations in the region. Amid his second organization, the President
influenced his aim to clear that they expand on these officially solid connections and move
to the following level. There are critical difficulties to overcome, however the prizes —
for South Asia and the United States — certainly endeavor advantageous”. As respective
objectives are purposeful association with every South Asian nation .There is additionally
a thought on territorial approach on a few issues, for instance looking to enhance
steadiness by urging states to beat their disparities. Since more prominent thriving and
financial relationship would brace steadiness and balance, we look for solid monetary
development in South Asia through more noteworthy intra-local exchange and
collaboration in regions, for example, vitality. Being strong of the endeavors by the
SAARC nations to set up the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA).
US is giving help to these endeavors through a USID subsidized abnormal state
group of specialists who are working with partners in the region to create a SAFTA
concentrate to help the procedure. More grounded vote based establishments are a focal
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objective for US in South Asia. Every single South Asian knows about popular
government, and most have some level of involvement with it. However, vote based
organizations are genuinely tested in parts of the region. The United States is creating vote
based devices, for example, the administer of law, autonomous media, grass roots
activism, great administration and straightforwardness through which these countries can
address the major issues of radicalism, security, and advancement. Accomplishment of
regional states will support solidness all through the region. Advance in South Asia will
have worldwide outcomes as per US.
4.1.1 India
Since the visit of Secretary Condoleezza Rice to New Delhi - a development of
visits by senior authorities from the two nations, including ex Minister of External Affairs
Natwar Singh, have underscored the significance of US creating more grounded ties. In
reply to PM Singh’s visit to Washington, President Bush came to India .US is quickening
the change of its association with India, with various new activities. US is taking part in
another key discourse on worldwide issues, and on barrier and extended propelled
innovation collaboration. US proceeds with exchange on the worldwide issues gathering,
which incorporates talk of how it can together address such issues as popular government,
human rights, trafficking in people, condition and economical improvement, and science
and propelled innovation. India and the United States have started an abnormal state
exchange on vitality security, to incorporate atomic wellbeing, and a working gathering
to reinforce space participation.
The United States association with India and our sense of duty regarding grow
significantly more profound political, financial, business and security ties have never been
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more grounded. As Secretary Rice once stated, US sees India turning into a politically
influential nation in the 21st century, and our exchange with India now addresses wide
issues around the district and the world. The United States is strong of India's developing
part as a majority rules system that is venturing onto the world stage to go up against
worldwide duties. India joined the United States as a contract individual from the center
gathering of nations framed to facilitate tidal wave help, and assumed a noticeable part in
giving prompt guide to influenced South Asian nations. US is counseling intimately with
the Indians on the most proficient method to help the Nepalese purpose their current
political emergency, and India has been strong of the peace procedure in Sri Lanka.
The U.S.- India Economic Dialog activity is centered around improving
participation in four territories: fund, exchange, business and the earth. The April 2005
marking of a point of interest Open Skies common flight understanding demonstrates our
mutual sense of duty regarding fortifying our monetary relationship. US is supporting
India as it pushes ahead with money related, exchange, vitality, water, and horticulture
changes intended to maintain and hoist India's noteworthy rate of development and lessen
destitution. Changes in these regions would permit quest for new open doors with the
United States in an assortment of innovative fields and would permit Indian purchasers a
more noteworthy selection of products and enterprises. Furthermore, Building this more
grounded financial and business connection between the U.S. what's more, India confronts
challenges, be that as it may. Our fares have expanded, however critical tax and non-levy
boundaries that remain are an issue for U.S. organizations keen on India's market.US will
utilize our abnormal state exchanges to address contrasts in exchange and venture issues.
In the region of licensed innovation security, India's 2005 sanctioning of another patent
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law to give patent insurance to pharmaceuticals and biotechnology creations is a
promising development for both Indian and U.S. companies.US need to expand on this
exertion so India's licensed innovation laws and authorization endeavors against robbery
and falsifying wind up plainly world-class, adding to encourage financial advancement
and improving purchaser decisions and inventiveness in India. To help finish US common
monetary goals for the Indian individuals likewise need to give our close term
thoughtfulness regarding extra exchange debate including particular organizations, for
example, U.S. financial specialists in the power part. US additionally need to manage
more broad "strategy" issues, for example, Indian government appropriations for compost
and LPG and non-straightforward norms (Rocca).
4.1.2 Pakistan
According to Rocca, In the course of recent years, Pakistan's pioneers have made
the strides important to make their nation a key partner in the war on psychological
oppression and to show it the way to turning into a present day, prosperous, fair state.
Because of ground breaking and acting, Pakistan is presently headed the correct way.
Pakistan has upheld U.S. operations in Afghanistan. Pakistan is finding Al-Qaida and its
fear monger partners in its tribal territories at the cost of more than 200 of its own warriors.
It has executed or caught a few hundred remote psychological oppressors and aggressors.
Pakistani law authorization is pursuing a counter-fear mongering effort in different parts
of the nation confining a few hundred suspects including Khaled Sheik Mohammad, Abu
Zubaydah, and as of late Abu Faraj al-Libbi. US noticed Pakistan's proceeded with
collaboration in building a steady and majority rule Afghanistan and countering atomic
proliferation. In past, Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan have made strides. Former
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President Musharraf and former President Karzai were moving in the direction of a more
heartfelt individual relationship. Exchange between the two nations keeps on developing
significantly, and they could together receive colossal reward by Afghanistan filling in as
a land connect amongst Central and South Asia and the world past. Pakistan is
participating with the universal group's endeavors to destroy the A.Q. Khan arrange and
is imparting to us data from its own examination, including data got from Dr. Khan. US
anticipated that this collaboration will proceed (Rocca).
Democratization is another point of convergence of its relationship. US expected
Pakistan's 2005 nearby and 2007 general decisions to be free and reasonable all through
the whole procedure. This is a message that US will keep on emphasizing, as it trust that
vote based system, flexibility and control of law are the best counters to contempt,
fanaticism, and psychological warfare. Pakistan's economy has moved from emergency
to adjustment and then to huge development. Giving the guarantee of a superior future for
Pakistanis will be an essential part in the nation's achievement in defeating radicalism.
Extended monetary relations between the United States and Pakistan are vital to our
general relationship. US were arranging a two- sided venture arrangement with Pakistan
to reinforce our business and monetary relationship. US proceeded with its endeavors to
enhance licensed innovation insurance, as a method for fortifying guideline of law,
cultivating monetary advance and pulling in outside interest in Pakistan. Pakistan's sense
of duty regarding supporting authorization and finishing indictments against robbery and
forging, and also proceeding to modernize its IP administration, is imperative to Pakistan's
improvement goals, too US long term monetary relationship. The centerpiece of the U.S.
sense of duty regarding a long haul association with Pakistan is the President's vow to
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work with Congress to give Pakistan $3 billion in military and monetary help from 2005
through 2009. The security help will reinforce Pakistan's abilities to battle the war on
dread — including killing Al-Qaida remainders in the tribal zones — and in addition meet
Pakistan's honest to goodness safeguard needs. Our financial help bolsters Pakistan's
endeavors to strike at the main drivers of radicalism by changing and extending access to
public instruction and social insurance and by lightening destitution through advancement.
US have reported that we plan to advance with the offer of F-16 warrior air ship to
Pakistan.
4.2 Indo-US Strategic Partnership: Engaging a rising power
Indian position is the 21st in more than any European states. As it have a stable and
rising economy, an atomic power capability and its ability to assume more decisive role
in Asia’s future politics. Therefore, the US has bit by bit come to view India as a
developing force in Asia.
4.2.1 India's new emphasizes on the Asian Scene
Following quite a while of halfway arranged financial strategies, India began to
grasp free-advertise changes in the mid 1990s. For sure, New Delhi was faced with a
noteworthy adjust of installment emergency in June 1991 and had in this way to leave on
a remarkable program of financial advancement. From that point forward, maintained 6
%+ growth of GDP has positioned India in the row of fast growing economies.
Position regarding PPP; India fulfills all the requirements that a fast growing
economy should have. Apart from its dynamic programming industry that has
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strengthened its credibility on global level – India also has the world largest programming
engineers’ force.
India;s GDP growth in the course of the most recent decade has been joined by
another sober mindedness in the lead of its outside arrangement and a broadening of its
geopolitical desire (Ramesh, 1994).
Sandy (1994) argues that after the cold war – New Delhi has re visited it strategy
for diplomatic relations and working for new connections for the control.
It has additionally led different maritime activities with other nations of the region.
ASEAN countries believe in the peace and stability, India could bring in the Asia pacific
region.
ASEAN regional forum invited India to join the organization I 1996. Graver
(2001) argues that after the 1962 war and Chinese superiority, Indian decided to engage
with Japan. The bilateral relations have been come into a betterment phase. However,
India concerns are at their place regarding China’s support to Pakistan’s atomic program.
India want to have two folded engagement with Beijing.
Accordingly, there has been a swarming feeling of contention between these two
incredible hopefuls to control since the mid 90s (Singh, 1994). The truth of the matter is
that New Delhi turned out to be more secure amid the time of the 90s, Indian objective
has been to become an important powers in Indian Ocean and Asian context. New Delhi
has tired of a systematic diplomatic puzzle to place it with Pakistan which undermines it’s
authority as an Asian power.
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Its great target all through the 90s progressed toward becoming a individual Asian
powers rather than sub territorial modern economy.
The way Indian look towards East depicts its geo political strategy and
affirmatively to secure the energy interest in the oceans. Indian diplomatic efforts since
the 90 s were to have more sensible tie with the central Asian countries and especially the
sates in Persian peninsula. The rise of BJP in 90s further strengthened this vision as a part
of patriotic objective.
The May 1998 choice to explode five atomic gadgets starts for the most part from
this want to be perceived as a noteworthy player on the mainland” (Subramanyam, 1998).
“With regards to this desire, New Delhi referred to the risk from China and the support of
peace, strength and adjust in Asia to vindicate its choice. At the end of the day, India
looked to extend itself as a noteworthy settling post in the Indian Ocean and in Asia
everywhere”(Government of India, 2001). Notwithstanding the universal commotion that
took after the atomic testing, India has figured out how to bit by bit force to assert more
regional status. Under the mission to become to clear itself from the sub territorial power
status; Indian invested heavily in its military to remove the tag of Pakistan and to share
the stage with China in the region.
China strive to secure its position in northern Ocean Part has led India to for a
difficult relationship with Russia for the necessary Hardware. New Delhi concern is the
development of its Navy as the Indian dream to assert it power far from it shores depends
on a powerful navy. A compared to Air Force and Army, Indian Navy has more structural
funding and a plane carrying warship. In 2002, India completed the trial if its ocean to
surface Rocket, Danush. India also has tested Brahmos, a hostile to send journey rocket
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in June 2001. At long last, in the late 90s, the Indian Navy made another powerful the Far
Eastern Command-in the Andaman Islands, which have a basic vital area on account of
their vicinity to Indonesia, Burma and Thailand.
The improvement by placing a maritime officer in Andaman and Nocibar islands
shows the plans to strengthen the legs near the East Asian area.
4.3 US revisited policy towards India
India economic rise course of the most recent decade significantly encouraged
another engagement with the US. From one perspective, Indian pioneers recognized that
the US was a key accomplice in their take a stab at financial improvement as it is a
noteworthy supplier of capital and innovation; then again, the US began to see India as a
major developing business sector and it has from that point forward turn into India's
biggest remote speculator and exchanging accomplice (Kux, 2002). Personal stakes have
step by step developed with the private parts of the two nations getting associated with the
general advancement of the reciprocal relationship. In addition, the Indian Americans
have played a significant role in bringing the two nations closer from people to strategic
level. With 1.7 million Populations, Indian community in US has some of the effective
positions and it was their campaigns that result in the current level of partnership between
two nations. India economic rise was the Turing point that actually reinforced the need to
change the policy towards India
Barrier Secretary Perry propelled at that point, a "key exchange" on his visit to
India in January 1995. Be that as it may, a few problematic components stayed there amid
the 90s, as the Clinton Administration was exceptionally centered on moving back India's
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atomic and rocket programs, other than its propensity to demand an answer for the
Kashmir question. Considerably additionally perturbing for Indian was the US denial to
accept Indian as a regional power out from the previous policy of putting India in equation
with Pakistan (Limaye, 2001).
4.4 Developing relations and interests
The US has accepted the vitality on Indian cooperation for securing the interests
in the oceans and in battling fear mongering lastly in making a deliberately stable Asia
(White House, 2002). The recognizable proof of these common interests has prompted a
rising security organization.
4. 5 Implications of Indo-US Naval Partnership
US showed its interest with collaboration with India when in February 2001, NUS
navy decided to participate in the world wide fleet review by the India Navy. New Delhi
has already presented its offices for logistic support in Afghanistan. US warships are
already using the Indian ports. In Dec 2001, India jointed the US navy for search and
rescue practice. After the atomic tests in May 1998 . This was the time when two forces
came so close to each other. In Malabar exercise in 2002; 750 US Navy personals took
part in two week long exercise.
From April to October 2002, Indian Navy was sent to Malacca Strait for securing
the US shipper vessels. The thought for joint escort obligations was disclosed not
long after September 11, as Washington wound up plainly worried about the assurance of
the ocean paths of correspondence (SLOC) against transnational dangers, for example,
theft or psychological warfare. The security of the crucial sea exchange courses in the
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Indian Ocean has in this way developed as a typical vital enthusiasm for the two India and
the US. In fact, with regards to the war in Afghanistan, the two nations have been anxious
to ensure business sending in the district against potential fear based oppressor assault. In
addition, India and US have to put extra attention to the potential in robbery in northern
Indian oceans. Apart from Malacca strait, South China Sea and Bay of Bengal have to be
secured under the collaboration. Without tackling these non-conventional dangers; any
possibility for a significant role would be a dream for India and US. Malacca strait is the
busiest sea route in the world. The primary USge of this route is to deliver the extracted
oil from Persian Gulf to Asia-pacific states. All these states are concerned about their route
security and same is the case for India as It has secure its SLOC for exports and energy
import (GOI 2002).
Under all these circumstances; US has accepted the importance of India’s geo
strategically positional as the distance between Indian ports and the energy rich personal
gulf is just 600 miles and Andaman and Nicobar islands are close of gulf. This position
has motivated US after 9/11 to re change its stance over India as it had to deploy the forces
at key position in Afghanistan, west and central Asia.
In this regard, the Indian Navy serves as balancing out power, occupied with
another organization with Washington to secure the region. Indo –US Joint exercises in
the Indian oceans have also been seen y other states in the region trough their own
narrative e.g. Japan that believes that the SLOC have to be secured for the smooth. Japan
has already coordinated with Indian in this regard and various kinds of cooperation have
been observed in the past years.
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Indeed, India and ASEAN have been cooperating in a few territories of maritime
collaboration, including Search and Rescue and hostile to robbery. New Delhi
has additionally centered on advancing nearer maritime connections Indonesia and
Vietnam.
As the Indo-US joint escort mission occurred, the concurrence with Indonesia by
one means or another causes the Indian Navy to keep up its essence in the region of the
Malacca Strait. Without a doubt, Indian Navy ships have directed a few section
practices in the South China Sea and went by many ports in East Asia in the course of the
most recent two years. With respect to China, it has watched out for India actions in the
zone which it considers critical. Both countries want to enhance their influence in
neighborhood. Through this equation, the Indo-US joint exercise and coordination has
turned this region as an area of competition. After May 1998 tests - the relations between
China and Indian were also turned volatile due to the India’s claim that It has rational
security risk from China.
Since 90s Indian China India relations seen a phenomenal abnormal state
engagement and have concentrated on financial participation. By the by, there is an
imbued doubt and a basic feeling of rivalry between these two incredible Asian forces.
India stays exceptionally worried at any Chinese endeavor.
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CHAPTER 5
US POLICY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN IN CURRENT
AND PROJECTED TIMEFRAME
5.1 US policy Towards China in Indian Ocean
5.1.1 US China relations in post 9/11 period
To the degree that stable Sino-US relations constitute a basic premise to more
extensive steadiness in Asia Pacific (Holbrooke, 2002), occasions since 9/11 have
positively affected that incredible force nexus, in the wake of the past instability set apart
tribulation Taiwan Strait pressure and Gunboat strategy, the May 1999 incidental US
besieging of the Chinese international safe haven in Belgrade and the crash of US EP-
E3 spy airplane to Chinese plane warrior on to South China Sea in April 2001. The arrival
of a measure of quiet to Sino-US ties took after developing Chinese mindfulness that
Washington's worldwide safety interests had moved far from the China danger variable.
The way that China has, for the present, turn into a minus basic business for the United
States harmonizes with Beijing's enthusiasm for maintaining a strategic distance from
outside intricacies during an era when it is both experiencing a residential authority move
and trying to increase worldwide acknowledgment as a dependable huge force. Beijing
has along these lines been careful about any occurrence that may confound Sino-US
relations (Wah, 2003). Both sides had been looking to enhance at any rate the air of their
relationship, and 9/11 gave an auspicious chance to the producing of another Sino-US
understanding and a premise for some type of constrained security participation as
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opposed to encounter. For sure, China's backing for the Washington-drove struggle
against terrorism (which reverberates with Beijing's battle versus professedly Al Qaeda–
linked terrorist exercises by Muslim protesters in its western territory of Xinjiang,
particularly since Washington kindly marked the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement in
Xinjiang as a terrorist association) has inserted knowledge sharing, backing at the United
Nations, and mindful yet remarkable backing for US military operations in a third nation,
to be specific, the war on terror. China has likewise vowed recreation help to Afghanistan,
adding up to US$150 million, while quieting its reaction to the new US military vicinity
in Central Asia and the arrival of a US military profile to the Philippines. All things
considered, keeping in mind that they ought to show up as being too in advance in
embracing Washington's arrangements, China's pioneers have been wary to fence their
judgment of the terrorist assaults and backing of the United States with calls for limitation
and a multilateral methodology (Pei, 2001; Sanger, 2001). This Chinese position was
maintained in the resulting American hurry to war in Iraq(Wah, 2003).
5.1.2 Sino-US Rivalry
It is nothing unexpected that China's ascent lately has driven the US to attempt
activities accordingly (Te and Liu, 2011). For Washington, its union with Beijing persistly
ruled by the nervousness about China's succeeding growth. China stands conundrum for
the US, as Washington necessitates Beijing's backing and participation on many subjects,
for example, North Korea, against terrorism and environmental transformation , yet
Washington keeps on being on edge and stays careful over China's goal to build up another
world request (Art, 2010). Another world request involves the decay of US political and
financial impact on the planet, conceivable changes to the Bretton Woods framework and
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the offering of energy to in any event another hegemonic body China. As the supposed G-
2 proposition missed the mark because of China's hesitance to go into the association, the
US has motivations to theorize on Beijing's aims (Lu, 2010). At the end of the day, Sino-
US relations are maybe the most vital arrangement of relations sooner rather than later
and about every single other arrangement of state relations can be considered under the
Sino-US structure. Southeast Asia is the primary testing ground of Sino- US relations in
the new century as the effect of China's ascent is most significantly shown in the district.
Combined with Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEANs) extraordinary force
adjusting technique, rivalry in the middle of Beijing and Washington is liable to be
unavoidable.
5.1.3 Economic Rivalry
As far as Sino-US financial rivalry in Southeast Asia, improvements can
be analyzed through the point of local mix. As a consequence of the early reap program
concurred in the middle of China and ASEAN after the Asian money related emergency,
exchange has enormously expanded, with China as of now serving as ASEAN's greatest
exchange accomplice barring exchange among ASEAN individuals (The ASEAN
Secretariat, 2011). Conversely, the US is ASEAN's fourth greatest exchange
accomplice behind China, European Union (EU) and Japan and scarcely makes up 10%
of ASEAN's aggregate exchange, which remains in stamped stand out
from Washington's driving status in exchange with ASEAN in 2007.Likewise, as
per ASEAN figures, ASEAN import from China adds to 17% of aggregate exchange while
import from the US adds to 12% of aggregate exchange 2009 (The ASEAN
Secretariat, 2011). As the US keeps on showing itself as a financial force on the planet
74
regardless of household issues, ASEAN nations might fence in the middle of Washington
and Continuing so as to Beijing its backing for ASEAN in addition to while going into the
TPP in the meantime? (Liu, 2010; Sheng, 2010).
Malaysia, Vietnam and Brunei are at present set to enter the TPP. It is evident that
the US expects to build its impact in Southeast Asia through the TPP
and test China's extending impact in the region (Te and Liu, 2011).
5.1.4 Major Rivalry
Other than endeavors towards the expansion in territorial monetary impact, the US
has additionally made moves to the adjusting of China's rising impact in Southeast Asia.
Beside lucid financial ramifications, the TPP additionally exemplifies key measurement
which relates to customary US center point and-talked procedure in Asia(Song and Li,
2008).
Then again, taking after Clinton's underlying state visits to East Asia, the US and
ASEAN came to Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in Southeast Asia in Thailand
in July 2009. Washington's activity might be taken as reaction to Beijing's enhancing
dealings with ASEAN, with China coming to the TAC with ASEAN in 2003. In addition
to eight instruments serves as parity of force procedure for these two ASEAN and the
US. In particular, for Washington, ASEAN in addition to eight gives gathering to open
examinations on territorial security with Beijing and an approach to secure China's local
aspirations by quadrilateral foundation (Liao, 2011).
Regardless of concurrence on behavior in the South China Sea, mounting strains
have grown again as of late because of China's expanding ability. Beijing's enthusiasm for
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the South China Sea is to subservient region under its impact and has its mastery
perceived and acknowledged by the universal group (Vaughn and Morrison, 2006; Ott,
2006; Percival, 2007).
When Beijing holds the South China Sea, China might accomplish less demanding
access to the basic Ocean paths promote south and conceivably put Southeast Asia beneath
its impact. As a few spectators call attention to, China might be applying its own
particular Monroe Doctrine in Southeast Asia, which would try to remove any non- Asian
(and Japanese) military vicinity from the district and make a key domain in
which nations in the region comprehend that they were not to settle on any real choices
influencing Chinese intrigues or the area without first counseling and getting the
endorsement of Beijing (Ott, 2006).
Former Secretary of States Hilary Clinton in the 7th meeting reported that serene
determination of contending sway cases toward the South China Sea is a US "civil hobby
and Washington strengthens a community oriented political strategy by all inquirers for
determining the different regional debate without pressure" (Thayer, 2010). US claim
serene determination of debate in the South China Sea has produced rehashed
challenges and notices from China to hold off the question.
5.1.5 Extent of Exchange
The extent of exchange directed through sea is likewise noteworthy. Cycle 30%
of worldwide exchange is directed into Indian Ocean. There are most critical stifle focuses
of this sea. The most vital are Hormuz, Malacca, and Bab el Mandeb. It is a result of this
exchange and key significance; there is steady vicinity of various additional regional states
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of Indian Ocean. It’s a result of inordinate monetary action into sea and developing rivalry
for assets the Ocean leading group of Sub-Saharan Africa has been additionally getting
unmistakable quality. India and China are especially turning into significant competitors
in Africa (Ranasinghe, 2011). Close to this real Western super bodies are additionally
demonstrating expanding enthusiasm for the area. The area and action occurring in this
sea has made it clear purpose of gravity both for local and worldwide performing artists.
The riches and the assets of the Indian seas have altogether included the additional local
performers in the sea. This inclusion of additional territorial performers and the opposition
between the local forces has formed the strategies and outlines of worldwide political
settings in regards to Indian Ocean (Khalid, 2013).
5.2 Sources of Conflict in the Indian Ocean
In the Indian Ocean, the threats by the Somali pirates have provided a challenge
to the states. In addition to robber, the sea based terrorism have put the security of
transportation ships in question.
Van der Putten et al.(2014) analyzed that the other primary wellspring of
instability identifies with the ascent of new maritime forces. In any case, the potential
impacts of Great Power contention are more essential and achieve more distant than
demonstrations of terrorism or theft. As far as this contention, two noteworthy issues
emerge. China has so far dispatched seventeen sequential counter- robbery teams to the
Gulf of Aden. In the meantime, the relentless ascent of India as a monetary force furnishes
it with a developing ability to assume a part in the Oceanic area. India appears to be
worried about the likelihood of expanded Chinese maritime vicinity later on adrift and in
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spots. China has close political and financial ties with a substantial number of littoral states
in East Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and South-East Asia. China has sold arms
to a large portion of these countries, and has put resources
into port development in nations, for example, Pakistan, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and
Bangladesh( van der Putten et al., 2014). China's scope of sea action develops
much further west than the Indian Ocean.
5.3 China's Presence and Interests in Indian Ocean
Chinese financial system had witnessed fast ascent. China acknowledged
centrality of the Ocean. China is searching for innovative acting ways to more secure its
financial system. Because of this association Indian Ocean has been turning into the
Frontier Strategy into Chinese outside approach. The opening of Southwest China has
railroad new beach front area. This area join in the middle of Myanmar and Yunnan are
imperative for China to fortify exchange and take care of vitality issue. These beach front
states have possessed noteworthy spot in the methodology of the rising monetary forces of
this area (Zheng, 2012). China is enlarging impact to the little island countries
specking the Indian Ocean and the impact is endeavored by strategic. The upbringing
impact and movement of China is turning into a genuine test to India. The consonant
rivalry has been gone ahead amid the countries Southeast Asian lands. There purposes of
anxiety are the spots of islands in East and South China Sea. Maldives
is coliseum a boiling challenge in the middle of India and China. This state is exceptionally
noteworthy as a result of its geopolitical position. This position on the back of vital Ocean
margins of correspondence which is a major appreciation for these two, India and China
are acting their greatest to win this impact. (Khalid, 2013). Then again the part of China
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towards Gwadar port in Pakistan is exceptionally critical, which based at the edge of
Indian Ocean near the Iranian fringe and near the passage to the Persian Gulf. In spite of
the fact that it has gone off camera because of the Bloch revolt and security circumstance
yet at the same time it has parcels here after doing this task in future. China, likewise, has
the Karachi port for a successful utility. The critical part of China is going to go ahead the
facade with bring off US powers from Afghanistan. China means to launch supply courses
interfacing Gwadar to focal Asia and at last to China. This will facilitate China's reliance
onto Malacca strait. China is trying to get all around arranged to undertake financial
charge because of now constructing streets and railroads in the Central Asia. These kinds
of game plans unmistakably exhibit China's expectation of developing its exchange
movement in the Middle East, South Asia by Karakoram and to Central Asia via Gwadar
port. (Agnihotri, 2010).
Map5.1 Chinese bases in Indian Ocean: Strings of Pearl
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5.4 US Interest In the Indian Ocean Region
In this unipolar time of 21st centennial the most hegemonic body belonging an
extraordinary arrangement to trouble in every aspect of the round. Indian Ocean has an
unmistakable essentialness as a result of its zone and key settings. Indian Ocean would
get the chance to be 'the point of convergence of the gathering of people' for the 21st
century (Kaplan 2010). Indian Ocean what's more caught the best lion's share of Asian
people. Indian Ocean has dependably been in interest of US system however the mass
unverifiable figure is the India in the US considering. Insightfully Indian
contemporaneous place in the US framework is to recommend that India has an impressive
measure to do around there for point of confinement of US assurance assistant. US most
prominent notice is war on fear (WOT) at display time; in any case, a smart technique in
the IOR is also matter of prudent discourse. There is broad assortment of growing perils
there in a significant part of Indian Ocean Region (IOR). There are running from state
situated threats to additional states performing specialists (Khalid, 2013). China is a
honest to goodness stress in US strategy in the Indian Ocean and in the entire Indo-Pacific.
China is not being viewed as a speedy and passing threat, it is, to some degree, being taken
as waiting pull and unclear hazard in the US system. In spite of the way that India is blue
in view of ' strings of pearl strategy ' of China yet US doesn't pay it incredible conviction
and does not adopt a gander at Chinese strategy of setting up its sea focuses over the Indian
Ocean with enormous unsettle. China's creating bonds in the region are being viewed as
the trap of up and coming powers quality. US is pleasing in this district to the degree its
leisure activities into IOR are protected and constant. US is despite to make a think to
hack monitor costs and decline of qualities into the Indian Ocean.
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5.5 Interests of Pakistan in the Indian Ocean
Close by this present country's topographical zone has being filling in as
fundamental thought at the back these conditions. Pakistan gives waiting edge to India
and Afghanistan; it is associated with China and Indian Ocean. On the other hand
Pakistan's geographical range offers a couple of open entryways as well. While discussing
Pakistan's plan and framework in regards to Indian Ocean area, it is basic to explore
bosses of Gwadar Port and Chinese help in its development (Ahmed, 2011).
5.5.1 Gawdar Port
The declaration of making a harbor was set apart amidst China and Pakistan in
2002 at the calculating town 'Gwadar'. That has masterminded at Arabian Sea shoreline of
Baluchistan. This town is at the division of 72 km from Iran, cycle 400 km from the Strait
of Hurmuz. Strait of Hurmuz is crucial hint for the travel development for a few states of
the region (Yousaf, 2005). Gwadar port can without quite a bit of an extend trade for the
travel development of port of Abbas and Chabahar of Iran. Meanwhile it can make many
scratches on the money related of United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Oman. The
advancement undertaking the port started with the cost of $1.16 billion and its underlying
stage completed in 2005 and China majored offer into making utilization. This port can
act Chinese imperativeness trades all the more safely. Starting at now 80% of crude oil,
China is gone from the cove arrives by Strait of Malacca and Hurmuz that are for the most
part that nearly underneath the US and Indian effect ( Yousaf, 2005).
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5.5.2 Gwadar Port and China
This port is of criticalness to China for tow -trade and politico- fundamental
viewpoint. Pakistan has unmistakably incorporate China into Gwadar reach out from most
punctual beginning stage and ubiquity based organization from 2008-13 has made gigantic
progress in such way. There was an authentic yell from India on the decision of CPEC.
China has in like manner rejects India's dissensions. India consider China as main
threat in the region. Most of Strategists in US also consider that China is following policy
of encirclement of India. (Parera, 2013). China following policy of strings of pearl with
posrts like Chittagong in Bangladesh, Hambantota in Sri Lanka and Gwadar port in
Pakistan to encircle India .(Kaplan, 2013). Administrative issues and methods are constant
phenomena. Sino-US seaward adjusting of sea interests is an example of incredible power
governmental issues in the Indo-Pacific region. It depends on the pragmatist point of view
to contend that conflict or cover of Sino-US oceanic interests conveys a monstrous effect
on Pakistan's security advantages. The contention depends on verifiable relationship
holding that incredible forces' contribution has been an affair of convenience, advantage
and here and now pick up in South Asia which the solid have forced on the powerless
(Riaz, 2015). Curiously, the 5present Indian Ocean's security design is set apart
with association cooperations (Tellis, 2014). The Indian Ocean, to the extent concerned,
gained off the shore operational ability.
The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) expands its compass the
extent that the Gulf of Aden and the shores of Libya with Chinese warships making routine
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port brings in the Middle East. China tries to manufacture blue water naval force which
is upheld through its operational long haul nearness in the Indian Ocean.
At the same time, China has additionally expanded its interest in
multilateral establishments.
Burki (2015) composed that China's total national output (GDP) ($18.96 trillion)
has outperformed that of the US ($18.12 trillion) in 2014, a hole which is probably
going to increment to 25.3 percent by 2020.
Hanling (2014) examined that "China's neighbors progressively see Beijing's
maritime projection as an impressive hostile power. Washington has considered Beijing's
maritime modernization as a potential risk to dependability in the Indo-
Pacific area. Chinese researchers, be that as it may, safeguard Chinese methodology of
maritime development, 'as determining out of China's exchange advantages
requiring support of blue water naval force in the High Seas and not because of any mala-
fide expectations of competition with the US. On 8 April 2014, Chuck Hagel, the US
former Defense Secretary, while tending to a question and answer session on US-
China's guard summit expelled Beijing’s claims .
White House (2014) advised on a public interview with Japanese Prime Minister
Shinzo Abe on 24 April, that the US President Barack Obama repeated
American responsibility regarding Japan's security as total. The US
president proclaimed that Article V of US-Japan's resistance bargain conferred the US
to protect all regions under Tokyo's organization, including the Senkaku islands, rejecting
one-sided change. Emphasizing Beijing's 'undeniable power' over the islands, the
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Chinese remote service representative, Qin Gang, cautioned that the US-
Japan organization together ought to be mindful so as not to encroach on China's regional
rights. The announcement prompted the US 'to regard realities, talk and act circumspectly,
without taking sides on an area and sway issues and assume a useful part in regional peace
and strength. Chinese pioneers have guarded the Chinese maritime development as
being protectively situated, naming it Far Sea Defense holding that the
Korean landmass, Japan, Taiwan, Philippines and Vietnam are China's First Island Chain
of Defense in the Western Pacific. Beijing's 'Second Island Chain of Defense'
contains archipelago augmentation of Guam and Northern Mariana Islands (Kaplan,
2010).
Different issues surfaced from 2009 to 2014 lighting up the Sino-
US oceanic power asymmetry (Riaz, 2015). Confined as of now to waterfront fringe,
China has fabricated seaward Oceanic ability with blue water naval force being past its
regional outskirts (O'Rourke, 2013) China has looked for maritime development in two
key ways. To start with, past the 'Main Island Chain' alluded to as Washington's
'Forward Defense Perimeter', for the most part alluded to as the 'US extraordinary divider
in turn around'. Begat by Dean Acheson and Douglas MacArthur in the 1950s, the term
infers Japan, Taiwan, Philippines and the islands in the middle. The US forward barrier
arrangement along the fringe area has given to conservation of sea authority in the Asia-
Pacific. In 2010, “China's projection of energy to the extent Guam has been a horrendous
pragmatist drive to shield its own particular lawn. Strikingly, Henry Kissinger
has commented on the Chinese hostile oriental methodology called Wei Qei,
which begins from the Chinese Confucius belief system (Kissinger, 2011). Directing
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arrangement decisions since supreme administrations, the system calls for counteractive
action of China's key circle.
Chinese oceanic technique depicts Mearshiemer's hostile pragmatist procedure i.e.
limiting holes for one's own, while expanding holes as for the foe. China's sea system can
be seen from neo- basic authenticity that can be deciphered as a characteristic of hostile
pragmatist. China's indigenous impulse of picking up vitality security and
exogenous impulse of procuring security underlie the Chinese drive
for maritime modernization ( Riaz, 2015). “China's maritime modernization expects to
accomplish predominance in oceanic vital atomic powers. The advancement of the
believable second strike atomic capacity relies upon diminishing the likelihood of
location, upgraded maritime ocean preparing and atomic order and control. Jin class JL-2
submarines can sidestep the US rocket protection capture attempt, if propelled from
certain watch territories of operation. Equivocalness continues with respect to the quantity
of Sub-Surface Ballistic Nuclear (SSBNs) China intends to fabricate, their bastions
for organization, order and control if there should arise an occurrence of emergency and
precariousness. Nonetheless, the US Office of Naval Intelligence and
Quadrennial Defense Review express that China intends to assemble an armada of five
Jin class SSBNs to accommodate a close consistent nearness adrift, forestalling
reconnaissance of region of operations through organization at Xiaopingdao, Huludao and
Yalong Bay(O'Rourke, 2013).
The US forward safeguard system over the previous years laid effectively on three
bearer teams situated in the Western Pacific (O'Rourke, 2013). “China's naval
modernization strains the US to keep up 11 to 12 expansive deck atomic fueled
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bearers for sea strength. China's improvement of long range supersonic oceanic assault air
ship upheld by atomic fueled submarines kills a great part of the US Fleet bearers and
expeditionary strike gatherings' maritime capacity. In addition, China's advancement of
the Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs)named the US Fleet bearers destroyer would
be a definitive maritime weaponry which would conceivably change the key condition
(Erickson and Yang, 2009). China has depended on Land-Based Strategic Missiles and
SLBMs for atomic deterrent. “In any case, the US knowledge sources express that Beijing
has 1500 km in addition to extend 4DF-21/CSS-5 strong charge Medium Range Ballistic
Missiles (MRBM). China intends to create ASBMs, making it a high need for its
military 'Innovative work program' (Erickson and Yang, 2009).
ASBMs could hold the US transporter strike bunches in danger in the Western
Pacific. It tries to accomplish chain of comman including precision important to hit
a quick moving target. This requires an endorsed edge of effect to soften up a bearer's
defensive covering or protection. AnASBM with an atomic warhead tackles the precision
issue. The US Navy actualizes a strategy of Air and Sea Battle idea to make
prevention. The US plane carrying warship striking powers are ever prepared to react to
Chinese forceful activities against partners in the area (Holloway III, 2011). Asia Pivot
involves the US maritime support to guard partners by encompassing China along the
eastern and southern flanks of the 'Principal Island Chain' outskirts. Moving in Central
Command (CENTCOM) from Iraq and Afghanistan notwithstanding the Pacific
Command (PACOM) (Woodward, 2010).The US has positioned battle ships at Singapore,
the Bay of Bengal in eastern Indian Ocean, and upper east into the South China Sea.
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It watches Seventh Fleet to demonstrate flexibility to China in its help of partners in the
region (Kurlantzick, 2011).
With a specific end goal to contain China, the US has
attempted to construct a key ring to surround China. The US did this through
the development of its resistance settlements. The US moves have been a piece of the
Indo-Pacific war intend to contain China. Western researchers have referred to authentic
confirmation to monitor partners against Beijing's coercive strategies (Kurlantzick, 2011).
The US restores barrier bargains with partners for arrive operations in
the area, which Beijing has deciphered as vital ring of circle (Riaz, 2015). Based at
Hawaii, the US Pacific Command screens the Indo-Pacific. The
US intends to over 60 extra maritime armadas and six more plane carrying warships to
the district (Scott, 2012).
The vital point of the Indo-Pacific nexus , the South China Sea, Strait of Malacca,
and the Bay of Bengal, the US anticipates control at Australia's north-
western drift. It fortifies the US marine nearness at Darwin, Australia, sending
2,500 extra troops in 2011. It bases US P-8 reconnaissance planes and automatons at
Australia's Coco islands. The US has extended its joint maritime activities with Japan and
the Vietnamese naval force, the Obama organization has sold arms to the Philippines
and manufactured resistance ties with India, Singapore, Indonesia and New Zealan( Khan,
2007).
The contours of Sino-US rivalry in the Indo-Pacific identify with the South China
Sea regional debate and the Sea Lines of communication. Khan (2014) investigated
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that "Indo-US support to the development of Chabahar, would strain Pakistan's relations
with India and Iran". Gwadar would influence the Indo-US strangulation risk. The US
fifth armada practices an aggregate geo-political control over China's hydrocarbon life
saver in the Persian Gulf. Subsequently, Beijing's basis for maritime nearness in the
Arabian Sea is to secure vitality interests in Africa and the Middle East.
Pakistan might be enticed to give berthing rights to PLAN warships. Facilitating PLAN
bases would be to Islamabad's greatest advantage. Be that as it may, change of
business ports into defendable forward maritime bases would require abnormal
amounts of specialized, calculated and vital mastery for Beijing,an errand well past
Chinese ability for at any rate one more decade for the present. Gwadar has in
store various ship prepared choices for China's possible maritime extension. Then again,
drive projection, joint operations and reconnaissance have all the earmarks of being a hard
squeezed assignment for China similarly as air guard fortress, mine clearing resources or
weapons storerooms and so forth.
The port would permit China a vital a dependable balance through
the arrangement of coordination, supplies and repairing offices to support long
time oceanic operations on the ocean. Be that as it may, China may think that its hard to
guard disengaged maritime bases from the US or Indian voyage rocket strikes or
airborne assaults amid wartime.
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5.6 Analysis and Options for Pakistan
There is no doubt that US has been driven to undertaken action in response due to
the rise of China during recent years. For US, its relationship with China to be dominated
by the anxiety over future development of China. US policy makers and experts along
with the observers across the world, are continuously with its new found power
and its status in international system and as well as about counter
strategies that Washington should adopt in the light of the development of China is
the riddle for US as it wants support and co-operation of Beijing on certain issues such as
North Korea, climate change and anti-terrorism. To establish a new world order, US is
anxious and remains watchful over the intentions of China. In other words it can be said
that the Sino-US relations are perhaps the most vital relation in the coming future among
all other sets of relations among the states will be consider under the Sino-US framework.
In the new century, Southeast Asia in the first testing ground of Sino-US relationship
as the rise of China is most profoundly demonstrated in the territory.
China has somber alarm in US system into Indian Ocean. China is not being seen
as a prompt and transient danger. It is fairly being taken as extensive haul and vague risk
in the US methodology. Despite the fact that India is sad because of 'strings of Pearl
system of China however US doesn't pay it a large amount assurance and does not take a
gander at Chinese strategy of building up its maritime points over the Indian Ocean
with enormous worry. China's developing ties in the district are seen as
the matter of outlook infantry quality. US is agreeable in this area to the extent its hobbies
in the Indian Ocean Region are sheltered and continuous.
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US is notwithstanding idea to hack safeguard costs and decrease of strengths in
the Indian Ocean. It is by all accounts more slanted to East Asia than in Indian Ocean.
These hacks and decreases are principally found in the floor strengths and Air Forces. To
the degree that stable Sino-US relations constitute a basic premise to more extensive
soundness in Asia Pacific, occasions since 9/11 have positively affected that incredible
force nexus, in the wake of the past instability set apart by cross-Taiwan Strait pressure
and Gunboat strategy, the May 1999 unplanned US besieging of the Chinese international
safe haven in Belgrade, and the crash of a US EP-E3 surveillance air ship with a Chinese
plane contender onto South China Sea in April 2001. The arrival of a gauge of quiet to
Sino-US union took after the developing Chinese mindfulness that Washington's
worldwide security concerns had moved far from the China risk element. The way that
China has, for the present, turn into a fewer basic matter for the United States corresponds
with Beijing's enthusiasm for maintaining a strategic distance from outside complexities
during a period when it is both experiencing a local authority move and looking to increase
universal acknowledgment as a dependable huge force. Beijing has in this manner been
careful about any occurrence that may confuse Sino-US relations.
Indo-US collusion of maritime security interests has inflated the role of Indian
navy in the Indian Ocean region. The move compels Pakistan’s counter balancing
response to neutralize Indian preponderance along its coastal belt. It has allowed Pakistan
to increase its maritime collaboration with China as a strategic necessity. The Indo-US
maritime and strategic collaboration increases the propensity for armed polarization along
the long stretch of Indo-Pak coastal periphery ( Institute of Regional Studies). Civil
military leadership in Pakistan is showing real political will to give full security to Chinese
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in Gwadar. Recently, they have given Gwadar on Lease to China for 40 years. The country
of Pakistan wants friendly ties with all the neighboring countries including India.
China- Pak strategic partnership offers joint prospects for dealing with the formidable
challenges of hegemony, regional harmony and also the cross-border terrorism in the
region. CPEC will prove a game-changer and it would empower 3 million people of the
wider hinterland Central Asian and Southwest regions. This partnership also offers the
prospects for mutual development, growth and regional prosperity.
5.7 US Policy in Africa in Current Scenario
The status of Africa has risen tremendously after the end of the Cold War
and especially during the past decade. This continent was treated as a battlefield in the
global rivalry between the United States and Soviet Union as neither of
them had a vital interest at stake on the continent. However, this gloomy picture has been
altered as it is an important source of energy supplies and raw materials. This has led to
an increased US interest in the region along with other great powers such as China,
India and Russia. Their political, economic and military involvement has increased.
The main reason for this is to have greater access over supplies of oil, natural gas,
uranium, copper, cobalt, gold, platinum, diamonds, and other strategic resources.13In
response, the United States has dramatically increased its military presence in Africa and
created a new military command known as the Africa Command or AFRICOM to
protect as it has defined as its strategic national interests in Africa. This has ignited what
has come to be known as the new scramble for Africa and is transforming the security
architecture of Africa .The continent is believed to hold 90% of the world's cobalt, 90%
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of its platinum, 50% of its gold, 98% of its chromium, 70% of its tantalite, 64% of its
manganese and one-third of its uranium (Hoare, 2002).
In recent years, China has built stronger ties with African nations and is largest
trading partner. (Mansur, 2012). Whereas, India is also expanding its military presence in
Africa. It is also strengthening its naval presence as in Indian Ocean through
which Indian Oil imports can be carried (Xavier, 2010).
After the end of Cold War, Russia withdrew from Africa. However, it took new
initiatives under President Putin and President Medvedev. In 2008, Russia’s state natural
gas company, Gazprom, signed a memorandum of understanding with the state-owned
Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation for oil and gas exploration, production, and
transportation, processing of gas, and construction of power plants in Nigeria. In doing
so, Gazprom expects to spend between $1 billion and $2.5 billion on these projects in the
coming years (Hellyer, 2015).
As a response, to the growing presence of the above mentioned powers, the ninth
unified and sixth regional US military command AFRICOM has been justified on the basis
of threat to US interest by weak states. It was established after the Second World War
with the purpose of bringing peace, security and economic development in Africa. Due to
this military partnerships have expanded to assist African armed forces. Nevertheless, it
has been criticized for an inversion of the Triple D policy, prioritizing defense before
development and diplomacy. American interest has more to do with Africa’s natural
resources than containing terrorism. The United States currently gets about 20% of its
imported oil from Africa, which is expected to rise to 25% in few years (Meltzer, 2016).
In addition to this, West African oil has the advantage of having shorter transport routes
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to US refineries. According to World Bank’s Global Economic Prospects report, out of
the thirteen countries with the highest projected compounded annual growth rate from
2014 through 2017, six are in Africa.
5.8 Chinese Challenge to US in Africa
The Chinese have expanded their economic activities in Africa due to its abundant
resources. Chinese trade with the continent has grown from around three billion dollars
annually in 1995 to over 100 billion in 2008( Ulrichsen, 2011). China provides African
countries with aid packages, trade, and assistance to build key infrastructures such as roads
and power plants in exchange for energy and raw material supplies. In addition, China has
provided large amounts in developmental loans to African states, which are non-
conditional and south-south solidarity is also claimed. In the past five years, Angola
received US$22 billion and Congo received US$13 billion (O’Brien, 2014).
5.8.1 Strategic Facilities in Africa
There are unmatched naval facilities in South Africa. NASA tracking stations and
communication stations are present in Madagascar and Kagnew and Ethipoia (Efferink,
2015).Liberia has ports and airfield rights in emergency times (Maina, 2015). It is of
strategic importance to US navy that South Africa is astride the Cape of Good Hope and
France and Ethiopia are present on the Red Sea. In the Indian Ocean, Mauritius offers port
and airport facilities.
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5.8.2 US Trade in Africa
The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) was signed into law by
President Clinton in 2000 to expand trade relations with sub-Saharan Africa. Recently,
President Obama welcomed African leaders for U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit. In 2013,
about 91 percent of U.S. imports from AGOA-eligible countries entered duty-free (Keck,
2014). Moreover, private equity firms have generated African funds such as, Carlyle and
Blackstone. Small US companies are also looking for avenues in West Africa such as
Precision Tune Auto Care, for higher returns.
5.8.3 Security imperatives
United States faces threat from cross-border terrorism and criminal networks. Al-
Qaeeda and other extremists groups are reported in Somalia and across Sahara desert.
5.8.4 Containment of big powers
Oil is used as an economic weapon and identifying Africa as a source of mineral
wealth. China has agreements with Sudan to provide oil through its Block 7 and Block 4
concessions (Serumaga, 2015).India and African countries are concerned to strengthen
their maritime security being trading nations on sea(Harshe, 2014) .India intervened to
counter Somalian pirates in Indian Ocean. Russia is not only focusing on economic
diplomacy but is reported to construct a nuclear reactor in Tanzania for scientific research
and medical purposes. Modi has visited Mozambaique and China is investing in Tanzania.
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5.9 Strategic Rivalry in Africa
The growing interest of foreign players has provided African governments and
private businesses with loans and other financial assistance. It has increased the market
for African energy supplies and other resources. It has infuriated internal political conflicts
as external powers want to strengthen their position and assist different African political
groups accordingly against rival groups. It is of strategic interest to US to employ military
force to ensure free flow of oil and have access to its market and natural resource. Many
states and regional organizations remain skeptical about the formation of AFRICOM as
African Union was not duly consulted during its formation. It is also viewed as an
attempt to become the most important decision making body on African security which
shall alter the balance of power. US will continue to pursue militarization policy for the
furtherance of its interest in Africa. The main purpose for AFRICOM’s formation was to
protect US oil interests in the continent and contain foreign players especially China. With
increased geopolitical completion on the continent, the security architecture of the African
continent is transforming. This new scramble for Africa has made this a theatre of the
New Great Game. New Actors have emerged on the stage and multipolarity is emerging
in contemporary economic relations. The geostrategic position of South Africa entitles it
the gateway to sub-Saharan Africa due to which trade liberalization is at the forefront.
Moreover, the South-South cooperation strategy is also anchored on the Brics partnership
mechanism with China, India, Brazil and Russia.
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5.10 Application of offensive Realist Theory on US Policy in Indian
Ocean (1990-2014)
5.10.1 Offensive Realism of US in Middle East in the post-war period
The theory of offensive realism belongs to the “neorealist school of thought” and
states that a turbulent global scenario leads to combative state behavior in the international
political system in which the world great powers who have the ability to carry out military
offensive and are doubtful of other country’s intentions, struggle to survive. Talking about
US’s foreign policy during Iraq war, it is said that the invasion of Iraq in 2003, was the
first vital military action of US after the cold war and is regarded as the first experience
of US s an occupying force in a Middle Eastern state. In realist terms, the occupation of
Iraq was a wise decision made by US to demonstrate its potential to its allies as well as its
competitors and to restrain Iraq’s actual or potential use of weapons of mass destruction
and oil reserves that endangered America and to halt Iraq’s possible partnership with any
anti-America militant groups.
The invasion of Iraq could be credited to the shift that happened in the
international world after the end of the cold war from bipolarity to unipolarity. This shift
eradicated all the checks on US actions and also compelled US to advocate its military
and political supremacy against any symbolic or material challenges. Another reason
behind US decision to invade Iraq from a realist aspect, could be to strengthen the security
of Israel that was an eminent regional partner of US. America’s deputy defense secretary
of that time Wolfowitz and some other officials believed that the loss of Iraqi patronage
would decrease the power of Palestinian militancy in their dispute with Israel and will
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lead to a pact between Palestine and Israel on terms acceptable to Israel. The government
of US also anticipated that their existence in Iraq would exert pressure on Syria, which
was considered an enemy state both by US and Israel. In addition, the military of US
hoped that it could establish its bases in Iraq post war and then along with its existing
bases in Afghanistan could pressurize Iran to finish its nuclear program.
Hence, according to the US administration, the invasion of Iraq was meant to fulfill
their goal of establishing their supremacy in the world and to reinforce their power in
Southwest Asia and beyond, thus facilitating to restrain and pressurize unfriendly
governments. Moreover, the realists point out that one of the reason behind US invasion
of Iraq was its geostrategic location, which had an impact on numerous security concerns
of US and Iraq’s oil reserves also became a reason behind the invasion, which US thought
could be used against their interests. Hence according to US administration, military bases
in Iraq would help them to exert its influence further into the Middle East, Africa, and
Central Asia. However, the reasons mentioned above to support the stance of US for
invading Iraq from a realist perspective are often criticized on the ground that US over
exaggerated the extent of the threat they claimed that they faced from Iraq. Many argue
that the US military had enough capabilities to deter any attack from Iraq and the
government warnings about Iraq’s potential or motivation to supply anti-America
militants with weapons of mass destruction were based largely on suppositions.
Nevertheless, it can be said that the administration of US genuinely believed that their
security depended on a successful occupation of Iraq, and therefore overemphasized on
the magnitude of threat posed by Iraq in order to attain domestic and global assistance.
Hence, while this explanation fits the theory of realism, the conclusion that American
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leaders were convinced by ideological and psychological factors of a forthcoming danger
when none existed in reality does not comports with realism.
5.10.2 Offensive Realism of US towards China in the post-war period
Offensive realism theory was brought by the neo-realistic school of thought that
basically means that the structure of the world politics; comprising of one superpower
leading the world politics, is basically responsible for the aggressive state politics in the
international political affairs. Now that offensive realism has been defined, the offensive
realism of US (which is the current hegemony state) towards China in the post war period
is going to be illustrated. Ever since the cold war, US has successfully managed to keep
its rival Russia mellowed down, and attain the power of being recognized as a unipolar
state. Furthermore since the war, many small powers did try to rise but they were
successfully defeated and suppressed by US, who used its power to its advantage example
war against Iraq, Bosnia, Kozovo, Afghanistan. However, the rise of China has appeared
to be threatening towards US’s hegemony, for it has shown development which has
potential to change the international structure of world politics. Hence, in this post war
period, US have used offensive realism to deal with China. It has adopted the policy of
containing China by sending 100000 troops to East Asia, in order to provide securities to
its rivals; Japan and South Korea. Also, it has favored, and due to these additional
advantages, the rivals of China are able to form a barrier, in order to restrict it from
becoming a regional hegemony. Furthermore, US have tried to alienate China, causing
China to be nudged towards Russia. Also, China is lacking behind because of its less
impressive military force, so US, while using offensive realism will continue suppressing
the military of China. Hence, these are the current steps taken by US, in which future is
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uncertain that will China continue to rise or not. However, if China does manages to rise
in the future, and attempts to dominate US, then US 87will work hard to contain China,
and weaken it to the point where it is no longer a threat. Currently US’s military is known
to be the strongest in the world. For a nation to become a super power, it has to be
economically, socially, and military-wise strong. China is an introvert nation, mostly
focusing on its economy, so its military is not up to the mark. In order to truly become
successful, China has to focus on its military, if not US will fully use this to their
advantage. Also, other offensive realism technique used by US is that it has formed allies
with many Asian States such as India, etc. Pakistan, too, is highly indebted to US because
of aid they receive from US. So, with many countries in Asia siding with US, at the time
of war, they can be easily used to enact as a barrier, when China starts fighting for
dominance
5.10.3 US offensive realist policies towards South Asia
Before coming towards the offensive neorealist policies of US towards South Asia,
it is very important to discuss the term offensive realism. Basically the term was used as
a part of neo realism, based on structural approach. Presented by John Mearsheimer, this
term says that the aggressive behaviour of states are due to anarchic nature of international
system. The central assumptions of this theory are following. The international system is
anarchic in nature and all the great powers are main actors in this system. Secondly all the
states have military capability which shows their offensiveness. All the states have
uncertainty regarding the intentions of states. The primary goal of states is survival. Last
but not the least is that states are the rational actors and are capable of making new
strategies and achieving their goals. It differs from Kenneth Waltz neorealism in a way
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that the later focus on the fact that states need power to maintain its security and it devise
strategies to maintain certain level of security, while offensive neorealism focuses on the
fact that it is basically the competition between the major powers that urge them to attain
maximum power to rule as a hegemony. Thus offensive realists hold the view that it is
significant for the major powers to ensure their security by achieving the hegemony so
that no other state can compete or threaten them.
Analyzing the offensive neorealist policies of US towards South Asia, it won’t be
wrong to say that US had always adopted the offensive neo realistic approach. Despite of
his claims of practicing the liberal foreign policy, there could be given certain examples
which could prove the US claims wrong or questionable. US attack on Afghanistan after
9/11 incident could be quoted as one of the examples. The approach adopted towards
Afghanistan was very aggressive which left the country in state of chaos. Instead of
making Afghanistan self-sufficient, US made him more dependent on its armed troops as
a result of which the Taliban issue had enrooted more deeply in Afghanistan and had
repercussions for its neighbouring states as well. Basically in order to achieve its national
security, US declared Taliban as a threat to the global security and initiated operations
against them in Afghanistan and Iraq with the aim of achieving long term goals. Other
than that US have adopted aggressive policies towards Pakistan too. It carried out
operation in Pakistan in 2011 to capture Osama Bin Laden without informing the Pakistani
government and army thus leaving them in embarrassment. This incident proved to be as
one of the major sources of tension between both the countries.
Recently president of US, Donald Trump has also commented aggressively against
Pakistan and its policy against Taliban but it is yet to be seen that what approach he would
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adopt against Pakistan. US is trying to keep its influence and dominance in the South
Asian region so that he could contain China’s progress in the respective region. He had
declared India as its ally and had signed a nuclear deal with him as well. Although that
nuclear deal is declared to be used for peaceful domestic purposes but in actual US is
supporting India to balance the threat of China. By concluding the debate US had basically
four major national security concerns in South Asia which are tensions between India and
Pakistan, threat of misuse of nuclear weapons by the non- state actors, re-emergence of
terrorist groups in the region and assisting India without aggravating Pakistan and China.
In order to fulfil these security interests, US has to adopt a realistic thus rational and
balanced approach towards this region.
5.10.4 US Offensive Realist Policy towards Pakistan in Post-Cold War Era
Realism is always the driving force behind the revolution of US policy
towards 101South Asia. Realists argue that there is no eternal friend or eternal enemy,
only eternal national interest. US eternal interest is to preclude a hostile power from
dominating Europe or Asia. Though US wanted to have strong relations with India but to
the strategic importance of Pakistan, both countries made strong relations with each other
but US was looked for India for better diplomatic friendly relations. 124U.S. established
diplomatic relations with Pakistan on October 20, 1947. These relations developed against
the backdrop of the Cold War and since then this relationship has been based on economic
and military assistance. During the Cold War period Pakistan became a wholehearted ally
which undertook real responsibilities and risks by giving the land to US which was of
extreme importance to the national security of US.
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In Post-Cold War, the US policy changed towards Pakistan to a great extent. It
was both offensive and defensive at the time of need. During the 1971 war, US turned its
back on Pakistan and gave double the number of military alliance to India. Back at that
time US never wanted to become very good friends with Pakistan, it was due strategic
location of Pakistan that US had to make good ties with it. Even though the relation
between US and Pakistan was more like a “Pseudo-Friendship” one, in which US was
getting more benefit than the later. But due to US being superpower, Pakistan was under
the pressure of US. In U-2 incident, Russia even accused Pakistan of giving land to US
and breaking rules, instead of US supporting Pakistan, it left the situation there which lead
to critical situation between Russia and Pakistan and they could not develop good relation
with each other. US relations with Pakistan after 1971 war were characterized as poor
communication between both the countries and a state of confusion between both nations.
Pakistan even felt betrayed when US was supporting India and did not try to make peace
between both countries. But after that diplomatic relations between both the countries
were normal. Even when Pakistan was making nuclear bomb, US put sanctions on
Pakistan and refused to give any military aid to Pakistan and it was suspended for a long
time. Pakistan also realized that US was helping India more than them, but still Pakistan
tried to maintain good stable relations with them.
Though, after Cold war period it was considered as Pakistan would be of no use
to US. And the Bush Administration before 9/11 had adopted the policy of “India first”.
But due to the 9/11 terrorist attack in America; US again had to make strong ties with
Pakistan because of its strategic importance. Due to the offensive statement and heavy
pressure lead by US towards Pakistan, the later had to change its foreign policy just to be
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safe from America. Before that US and Pakistan were not having very friendly relations
with each other. But since then US and Pakistan have good military and economic ties.
And US have been using Pakistan strategic location for its own purpose even though US
had given offensive realist policy against Pakistan.
Even after giving territory to US and fighting the war against terror with them,
there were still some times when US policy offended Pakistan’s interest. Such as when
Pakistan was giving nuclear aid to North Korea and US suspected this activity, they put
sanctions and imposed strict rules against the laboratory instead of the government. This
gave Pakistan some edge towards continuing relations with US despite of the statement
and restrictions imposed on Pakistan. United States interest in Pakistan is only due to its
extreme significant strategic location. Other than that they have to interest in making ties
with Pakistan instead they wanted to have strong relations with India that is the dominant
nation in South Asia. But Obama gave his statement that America will be a strong
supporter of Pakistan in providing aids and national security. In the current time frame,
President Trump had tried to give his statements against Pakistan and other Muslim
countries, he also called Pakistan and some other Muslim countries as terrorist countries
which are not only offensive but these policies related to this statement could create a
havoc in the World. US- Pakistan relations have been on its up and down since a long time
but the fact is US cannot abandon Pakistan just now because of its strategic value in South
Asia and because Pakistan have been helping America fighting a 16 years’ war in
Afghanistan. Despite of the offensive realist policies US had put on Pakistan the
diplomatic relation between both the countries will never come to an end.
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CHAPTER 6
IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN
6.1 US-Pakistan relationship in post 9/11 period
In post 9/11 period US developed anti-Muslim sentiments and pressurized all
muslim states as declaring war on terror as “Crusade against the evil-doers”(Shaukat,
2001). After 9/11 Pakistan became a main ally in the war on terror with the US as Bush
called Musharaf and said, “either you are with us or terrorists”. In 2001, US former
President George Bush pressured the government of Pakistan to join the war on
terror. 9/11 did not only changed the nature of Pak –US relationship but also Pakistan’s
security policy completely (Aziz, 2011). Pakistan has suffered a lot since 2001 in fighting
against terrorism but could n;t get the praise for world especially the US. US still done
snot want consider the role Pakistan in curbing the militancy in Pak – Afghan area.
Pakistan media and people have been tired up with US usual demand of DO-MORE.
The US accusation creates troubles when it comes to Pakistan’s image in
international community. Killing of Osama has further created a tensed situation which
brought US-Pakistan relationship under intense consideration. The people of Pakistan
have given more sacrifices as comparison to NATO/US troops in
Afghanistan. The community of Pakistan is already fed up by the mess created by Afghan
war wants US to end this menace. Amidst national, economic, social, religious crisis,
unstable political regime, increasing drone attacks, loss of civilian lives and news of
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Osama’s downfall has created trouble, which is scattering like a wild fire. This situation
is showing the widening of gap between US and Pakistan’s interest.
Pakistan being the most-allied ally of the US in war on terror, has extended
political, diplomatic and logistic support to the US; captured Al-Qaeda operatives,
launched highly successful military operation in Swat and Waziristan; shared intelligence
reports, the most importantly has deployed more troops than ever to the western border of
the country. US kept on demanding ‘Do More’, created mistrust between two states.
6.1.1 Joining of Global War on Terror
Threat
To join hands in war on terror otherwise, US will take
back us to Stone age. “Every nation in every region
now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or
you are with the terrorists”. These are the words by
George W. Bush as US wants our support in global war
against terrorism and without the support of Pakistan it
is not possible.
Date
October 7,2001
Mode of Threat
Former US Secretary of State Colin Powell on a phone
called Musharraf. He said "You are either with us or
against us. The next day, Powell's then deputy, Richard
Armitage, telephoned the chief of Pakistan's top spy
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agency, and threatened to bomb Pakistan back to the
Stone Age.On the pressure abovementioned,
Musharraf agreed all the seven points, set before him
as demands, by Colin Powell(War on terror).
Political Implications
It was purely the decision of Musharraf to join hands in
global war on terror, Except Lt. General Mehmood and
Lt. Gen. Muzaffar Hussain Usmani
Social Implications
Soon after joining war against terrorism, Pakistan is
facing internal disturbance i.e., terrorism, extremism
and sectarianism. Moreover, Pakistan has already faced
more than two thousand terrorist attacks and numerous
civilians lost their lives in these acts of terrorism. Even
in current phase, terrorist attacks continue to take place
in Pakistan. The security condition in Pakistan is
worsening day by day.
Economic Implications
Initially at the start of global war on terror, in the fiscal
year 2001-2002, $2.669 billion estimated its cost to
Pakistan and $13.6 billion in 2009-2010 and rose to
$17.8 billion in the year of 2011. Moreover, Pakistan is
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continued a pay a heavy price since it had joined war
on terror in terms of economy and security terms In
prior 10 years of war on terror, the direct and indirect
cost of global war on terror is $63.93 billion ( economic
survey 2010-2011)
US delivered a severe threat to Pakistan to become an important ally of war on
terror and if Pakistan would not agree to join global war on terror. US would take Pakistan
back to Stone Age. Even in the memorable speech of US former President Bush, delivered
an open threat to Pakistan that “you have to decide whether you are with US or with
terrorist”. The initial conversation between Richard Armitage (Deputy Secretary of State)
and General Mehmood (Director General ISI) was confrontational, while the Former
Pakistan President Musharraf 14was on his visit to Washington to convince the US to
support Taliban and Pakistan role in capturing Osama. From the above mentioned threat
and constant pressure from US, the Former Pakistan president Musharraf was presented a
list of seven demands from US to Pakistan to comply with and He consented to all of these
demands moreover, agreed to join global war on terror. Except Lt. General Mehmood
Ahmed and Lt. Gen. Muzaffar Hussain Usmani, all the corps commanders consented to
Musharraf’s decision to side with the US and to renounce the Taliban. These two generals
held important position in his government, as these two had played significant role in
toppling previous government of Mian Nawaz Sharif. General Mehmood was reportedly
sent to Afghanistan to talk to Mullah umer in desertin Osama bin laden and not to resist
operation in Afghanistan, but he allegedly asked Mullah Umer to resist the US and assured
107
him with ISI’s support. On his return, both the generals were removed from their positions
by former President Musharraf. Finally having consent of all the Lieutenants, Former
President Musharaf 14delivered a speech “renouncing the Taliban, and assuring the US
Pakistan’s support in the global War on Terror. The main consideration of this decision
was US assurances to ensure Pakistan security, long term economic growth, settlement of
Kashmir dispute and protection of Pakistan’ s nuclear arsenal”. Soon after joining global
war on terror, Pakistan is facing internal disturbances, extremism, unstoppable terrorism
and problems of sectarianism. The term of suicide bombings was introduced and become
very common in Pakistan. A large number of civilians have lost their lives in these attacks.
After joining war on terror Pakistan is paying a heavy price in terms of economy and
security. And US keeps on say saying do more do more.
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6.1.2 Crackdown on Religious Groups
Threat
Clear out entire militant Jihadi and sectarian cults which had
close linkages with the Taliban and al-Qaeda and other
terrorists groups.
Date
An official ban was imposed on the Jihadi groups on January
12,2002
Mode of Threat
On 19, September 2001, Former President Musharraf stated
that, though he opposed military tactics against the Taliban,
“Pakistan risked being endangered by an alliance of India and
the US if it did not cooperate and support US”. In 2006,
Musharraf again testified that this stance was pressured by
threats from the US, and present in his memoirs that he had
"war-gamed" the US as an adversary and a hug challenger,
and decided that it would end in a loss for our nation Pakistan.
Political Implications
The religious political parties in Pakistan started country wide
anti US campaigns and protests started criticizing the
administration of diminishing its support to the Taliban
administration in Afghanistan and became the alley of US led
alliance against global terrorism. They were also concerned
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over the US increasing Influence in Pakistan, which forced
the country’s capital to transform its policies not only towards
the Taliban’s, but as well as on the matter of Kashmir, nuclear
program and the Madrasahs in the entire country
Social Implications
In Pakistan, numerous Pakistani Muslims were angry because
the Government of Pakistan has joined forces with the US to
hunt down Muslims.
This also results in the rift in alliance between the State, dominated by
the religious-political parties and military. The rift forced the religious political parties of
Pakistan to get them involved into politics. The religious political parties also unite
politically together and they formed (MMA) Muttahida Majlis-e-Aml in January 2002. In
2002, government of under the former Presidency of Mushaarf took a firm and rigid stand
against all the jihadi organizations and groups that were promoting terrorism extremism,
and arrested the following persons;
Maulana Masood Azhar, (head of the Jaish-e-Mohammed)
Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, (chief of the Lashkar-e-Taiba)
Moreover, took dozens of activists into custody - Zayn al-Abidn Muhammed Hasayn Abu
Zubaydah was also arrested
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6.1.3 Logistics – bases – intelligence
Threat
After 9/11 attacks US made a number of Demands to Pakistan,
these were to give logistic support, intelligence and air and naval
bases.
Date
2001
Mode of Threat:
Without any uncertainty, Pakistan accepted all these above
demands. US Former President George Bush said that “it looks
like you got it all.” Pakistan’s support was central for the US in
every manner. Pakistan gave its logistics and its air bases to
support the attack against in Afghanistan.
Bases given to US
Pakistan gave its air bases at Jocbabad and Pasni to US operations
in the Afghanistan. Another air base which is being used by
Americans is at Dalbandin.
Logistics given to
US
Pakistan has also signed an agreement with the US in which
Pakistan have pledged to give America all out support in
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logistics. More than 75% US and NATO supplies passes through
Pakistan boarders.
Intelligence Given to
US
“Pakistan has also provided US with talented intelligence for the
fulfillment of their operations against the Taliban, because
without Pakistan’s support US would have been unable to target
the Al-Qaeda and Taliban members” (Defence Journal).
The support that Pakistan promised to provide to the US in the global War on
Terror included Intelligence sharing, bases right and logistics support and
assistance. Pakistan’s geographical location played a vital role in the Global War on
Terror as it shares its border with Afghanistan. US had selected Pakistan for logistics,
intelligence support, bases for operations in Afghanistan. Pakistan gave all the support to
the alliance forces against the Taliban’s organization. Pakistan gave all the required
demands of US regarding logistics bases and intelligence to US to attack against
Afghanistan. Pakistan gave their bases to us at Jacobababad, Pasni and Dalbandin. All
these above three air bases are used for the support and logistics in Afghanistan.
Dalbandin base used as a refueling base for US particular Operations helicopters operating
in Afghanistan. These bases have been very important for US because of their proximity
to Afghanistan. Pakistan has also given logistic to US on the basis of an agreement
according to that agreement more than 75% US and NATO supplies passes through
Pakistan which consists of gas, food, military equipment and other logistics. Pakistan has
been key player in logistic support. Pakistan has also provided talented intelligence to US
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and the important achievement by the intelligence agencies of Pakistan was the arrest of
Ramzi Bin Al Shibh, who was allegedly involved in 9/11 attacks. In 2003 Core suspect of
9/11 Khalid sheikh had been arrested by the ISI agents. In 2002 Former American
President Bush administration announced that more than 2700 militants
allegedly associated with Al Qaeda were arrested in 60 countries, Pakistan
have captured 500 Al Qaeda linked militants which was more than any other country. In
2004 Amjad Hussein Farooqi who was involved in the killing attempt of Ex-President
Musharraf and he had also close linkages with the Mullah Umer and Osama bin Laden,
was arrested by the Pakistan police. Pakistan handed over about 369 of the
689 arrested militants to the US”. Despite of Pakistan’s never-ending efforts, ISI is still
being scrutinized by the US( ISPR).
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6.1.4 Operation Rah-e-Rast
Threat
US and all other western countries claimed that Taliban soon
will take over the country as it is just 60 miles, 97 kilometer
away from the country’s capital i.e., Islamabad. Under the
coming threats and pressure from US, the country’s
administration decided to take back the areas which were
being captured by the terrorists and extremists
Date
It commenced on April, 26 2009 and ended on June, 14 2009
Description
Operation Rah-e-Raast is also called operation Back
thunderstorm. It commenced on April, 26 2009 and ended
on June, 14 2009. Operation Rah-e-raast was the forceful
aggressive military operation against the Taliban’s
conducted by the Pakistan army.
Political Implications
Current prime Minister of the country, YoUSf Raza Gilani
in an address to the nation said, “We will not bow down
before terrorists and extremists and force them to lay down
arms” and he declared that the scenario reached on critical
situation and it is essential to take a decisive step in order to
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combat Taliban’s. therefore it was necessary for the
government of Pakistan to take a powerful step with the help
of Pakistan’s army and the primary aim of this operation was
to take back the control of Buner, Lower Dir, and Swat and
Shangla districts
Results of the operation
One of the major result of this operation is that, Sufi
Muhammad, Who is the founder of TNSM (tehreek-e-nafaz-
e-shariat-e-Mohmmadi), arrested in Amandarra with many
other militant leaders. The Pakistan army declared that
Muslim Khan and other 4 senior members of TNSM were
arrested near Mingora.
Operation Rah-e-Rast was conducted because, “the girls were being stopped from
going to their educational institutions, private and public properties were occupied and
damaged and women of Swat were subjected to harsh and shameless treatments, it is
necessary or the government of Pakistan to take a powerful step with the help of Pakistan’s
army and the primary aim of this operation was to take back the control of Buner, Lower
Dir, and Swat and Shangla districts. As there was a constant threat coming from the US
and other western nations that extremists or Taliban’s were just 97 kilometer away from
the country’s capital Islamabad. Pakistan army conducted an aggressive operation against
the Taliban’s”.
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6.1.5 Operation Rah-e-Nijat
Threat
Hillary Clinton's, US (Secretary of State) deliver threat of
severe and cruel consequences that if one more terrorist attack
would takes place on the territory of US having traces in
Pakistan, is a indicator to my anxiety that Washington wants
the maximum and unlimited deployment of Pak Army in the
boundary areas that shares its boundary lines with
Afghanistan, rather than the eastern border where the real
threat to our existence lies(Pak Observer).
Date
Operation Rah-e-Nijat began on June 19, 2009 on the location
of South Waziristan Division and Fata and ended on
December 12, 2009.
Mode of threat
An understanding for the completion of the transaction was
reached during a visit to “Pakistan of US Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton and the President of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Admiral Michael Mullen. News says that the Pakistani
leadership has succumbed to a long-standing American
request to launch an offensive in North Waziristan, in
exchange for receiving a clean chit to Clinton on whether or
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not senior Pakistani officials may were complicit in harboring
Osama bin Laden inside Pakistan, although this assertion
cannot be verified (Critical threats).
Description
After 9/11 incident, US blamed that Afghanistan is the
epicenter of international terrorism and Pakistan was to
account for all the afghan refugees on its territory. As Pakistan
joined its hands towards global war on terror and facing
enormous world pressure and threats, in march 2004 Pakistan
started cleansing operation to find out all the wanted Taliban’s
and various terrorist groups which were hiding on the Pak-
Afghan border .In 2004 Initially Pakistan army started
operation in the South Waziristan area to capture all the
militants in the South Waziristan area.
Results of the operation
According to the Pakistan army there were 500-600 foreign
militants in the South Waziristan area 400 of them have either
been killed or arrested and the rest 200 of them moved to
North Waziristan
Operation Rah-e-Nijat was conducted in South Waziristan and it was also
conducted due to US demands and pressure. This is another case where US used once
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again Coercive Diplomacy. In view of the fact that Faisal Shahzad, the botched Times
Square bomber, reported to his investigators that he was actually trained in Waziristan.
As this situation portrays the fact that US continues to say Do more! Do more! to
Pakistan.
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6.1.6 Kerry-Lugar Berman Act (Enhanced Partnership Act of 2009)
Threat
Hafiz Saeed, who is regarded as the mastermind behind
Mumbai attacks, the head of Lashkar-e-taiba. The reason
behind the provisions of Kerry Lugar Bill as the US believes
that although Pakistan has banned all the Jihadi organizations
for example Laskar-r-Tiaba and Jaish-e-Mohammad, the army
still considers them strategic assets that can be used against
India. The US through Kerry Lugar bill desires to pressurize
the government of Pakistan, to take additional actions
regarding such incidents. Kerry Lugar Berman Act includes
certain provisions to be met by Pakistan.
Date
Kerry Lugar Berman Act is also commonly known as
Enhanced Partnership Act of 2009 commenced on 6 January,
in Washington D.C. It was passed on 15th October, 2009 by the
US president before that it was passed by Senate on 4th
September and by House of Representatives on 1st October
Description
The provisions of Kerry-Lugar Burmen Act, includes such as
denying support and assistance to the terrorist and extremists
groups that have performed attacks against US and to dismantle
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their bases, to exercise efficient and useful control of the
Pakistan’s military by the civilian government and “oversight
and approval of our military budget, the chain of command, the
process of promotion for senior military leaders”. Furthermore,
not to distract US support and assistance towards its nuclear
weapon program, “eliminate safe heavens”, close Laskar-e-
taiba and Jiash-e-Mohammad terrorist camps”, prevent attacks
into neighboring countries, close Madressahs linked to Taliban.
Pakistan’sArmy
implications
On the other hand, Pakistan’s army refused the view of the
Government, and the army believed that several clauses of
Kerry Lugar Berman Act is a threat to the country’s security
and sovereignty. Pakistan’s army also used media as a tool to
aware the masses of the country.
Kerry Lugar Berman act was a bill which includes certain provision to be met with
Pakistan. The reason behind drafting Kerry Lugar bill was Hafiz Saeed. The reason behind
the provisions of Kerry Lugar Bill as the US believes that although Pakistan has banned
all the Jihadi organizations for example Laskar-r-Tiaba and Jaish-e-Mohammad, the army
still considers them strategic assets that can be used against India. The US through Kerry
Lugar bill desires to pressurize the government of Pakistan, to take additional actions
regarding such incidents. From the Kerry Lugar Berman Act it can realize that the element
of trust deficit comes into the relationship between US and Pakistan. US believe that
Pakistan army is supporting extremists and Taliban’s and therefore this bill included
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control of army under civilian government. As a reaction Pakistan army claims that Kerry
Lugar Berman act is a threat to Pakistan’s sovereignty and security.
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6.1.7 Drone attacks Mode of Threat
Mode of Threat:
Under US current President Obama administration, the
intensity of drone attacks has been increased and he continued
the policies of Former US president Bush.US officials
considers drone strikes as a very successful tool to combat al-
Qaeda and other terrorist groups. Leon Panetta (director of
CIA) signified that the drone strikes will continue. Harold Koh
(US State Department Legal Advisor) stated that drone attacks
were legal because they have the right to self-defense.On 30
January, 2012 US president Barak Obama admitted that US
conducting Drone strikes on Pakistan. He gave extensive
explanation regarding Drone strikes on April, 2012 concluding
that it was “legal, ethical and wise”.
Date:
Drone attacks were started from 18 June, 2004.
No. of drone strikes
under Bush Administration
No. of drone strikes
under Obama
Administration
52 267
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Under Bush administration, there was a US drone attacks in
Pakistan every 43 days but under Current president of US,
Barak Obama there is a drone strike every four days.
Number of civilians and
children killed
No. of civilians killed No. of children killed
467-815 178
According to United
Nations Charter
US violate the UN charter which prohibits willful
killing, article 2(4) of the UN charter prohibits “the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state”
According to Geneva
Convention of 1949 and
theirAdditional
Protocols I and II
Provisions of these Conventions have accomplishes the
status of Customary International law and the main goal of
these provisions is to resolve the matters of humanitarian
concerns began from armed conflict whether of international
or non-international nature.
Additional Protocol I was to deal with the issues raised by the
changing trends of armed conflict. In January 2006, one of the
US indiscriminate drone attack was taken place which
launched 10 missiles in the Damadola village located in Bajaur
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tribal area. This attack was to counter a top Al-Qaeda
operative, Aymanal-Zawahiri, who was attending a dinner in
the celebration of Eid-ul-Azha the outcome of this attack
demolished three houses and the death toll was as high as 22.
This attack violated Additional protocol I, article 51(5), 52(2),
57(2) (a) (I), 57(4).
International
convention on civil and
political rights (ICCPR)
US has also violates provisions of ICCPR which the US itself
ratified. Article 6(1) state “every individual has the inherent
right to life and no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his
right”. Moreover, aticle6 (2) declares that penalty of death can
only be rendered by a competent court of law.
Drone attacks violates
the sovereignty of
Pakistan
Pakistan has frequently protested the drone attacks as they are
a violation of its sovereignty and because civilian deaths have
also resulted, including a large number women and children,
which has further angered the Government of Pakistan and
people. The drone attacks continue, in spite of repeated
requests made byformer Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari
via different channels.
US continues drone
attacks
US would not stop its drone, another drone attack done by US
on 30 April, 2012 in Dray nishtar area of Shawal tehsil of North
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Waziristan. Leon Panetta (US Defense Secretary) said that US
continues to launch its drone strikes against militants in
Pakistan even if the Government of Pakistan kept on opposing
them.
Drone attacks is another case of US coercive diplomacy despite of the requests
made by Pakistan President Ali Asif Zardari and Pakistan Prime Minister YoUSf Raza
Gillani, US continues to violates the sovereignty of Pakistan through drone attacks.
Pakistan has lost a large number of civilians which includes women and children in the
ongoing drone attacks. According to US they could not stop drone attacks because they
have the right to self-defense. Under the US President Barak Obama, the intensity of such
attacks has been increased considerably as compare to US former President Bush. The
masses of Pakistan continue to protest against US to stop Drone attacks and to stop killing
our civilian. The US is not only violating the UN charter but also Geneva Convention and
additional Protocol I & II. Furthermore US also violates the provisions of ICCPR which
US itself has ratified.
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6.1.8 Raymond Davis case
Threat
Pakistan’s ambassador in the US embassy was summoned and
intimidated by the National Security Advisor of US that he will be
kicked out if Davis is not handed over to the US. Threats of
suspension of economic aid and future cooperation and assistance
were given amid indications that the strategic alliance between the
two countries was also at risk. In a press conference, which was
held in February 15, 2001 President Barak Obama described
Raymond Davis as being our Diplomat (Daily mail).
Date
On 27 January 2011, Raymond Davis killed Zeeshan and Faheem
which were civilians of Pakistan in the city of Lahore at a crowded
place i.e., Mozang Chowk
Mode of Threat
The Government of Pakistan was under intense and extreme
pressure from the US to release Raymond Davis instantly. Several
News reports specify that the Pakistani Embassy in Washington
cut off all the communications with the US Department of State
over this case. Notes sent by the US to Pakistan's Foreign Office
influencing them to grant diplomatic immunity to Raymond Davis.
A severe threat was conveyed by the delegation of the US House
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Committee on Armed Services that the Pakistan-US defense
cooperation could be under cloud if they argued persisted on the
issue of diplomatic immunity for Davis.
According to US,
Raymond Davis
hold Diplomatic
immunity
In a press conference that is held at Lahore, John Kerry has pointed
out the issue of Raymond Davis and said,
Davis has nothing to do with local courts as diplomats enjoy
immunity…we cannot allow that one incident can break the strong
relationship between the two countries.
Raymond Davis
released
On 16 March, after having closed-door negotiations, He was
released and flown out of the country, In accordance of a principle
of Islamic law Sharia a pledge of $2.3 million has been given to
the victim’s families, blood money allows murder charges to be
vanished if blood money (diyyat) is paid to the victim's family (the
required condition is if they agreed without any pressure), it is an
arrangement which is legal and common.
US had used Coercive diplomacy even in Raymond Davis case, despite of the fact
that he killed two civilians of Pakistan; he was release because the government of Pakistan
is under severe and intense pressure of US. US was delivering constant threat that if
Raymond would not realized then US would cut off Pakistan’s economic and military aid.
As US defended Raymond Davis and proclaimed that he has diplomatic immunity on the
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basis of his immunity he must be released. Two Pakistani officials declare that
the Pakistani ambassador to the US Husain Haqqani, received threats from the Tom
Donilon (US National Security Advisor) of being removed if action was not taken place on
the Raymond Davis case. However, Haqqani denied the above allegation. According to
the same report Tom Donilon also notified of US consulates closing down in Pakistan and
the forthcoming visit by President Asif Ali Zardari to Washington being discarded and
Obama’s planned visit to Pakistan cancelled. In another daylong meeting, which was held
between Pakistan military Officers and senior US officers in Oman, the main goal of the
meeting is to solve the Raymond Davis case, soon after that meeting CIA started direct
negotiations with the ISI in order to release Raymond Davis. As above mentioned ongoing
threats of US, finally Raymond Davis was released after paying Diyat to the families of
the victims.
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6.1.9 Death of Osama-bin-Laden
Date
Under the territory of Pakistan, US killed Osama bin laden on May
2, 2012.
Description
The former head of Al-Qaeda militant group, Osama bin laden
killed in his compound which was in place of Abottabad which was
conducted by US, without informing Pakistan and its army. This
operation was ordered by US President Barak Obama, with the
coalition of CIA and US Naval Special Welfare Department Group.
After the killing US took the body of Osama bin laden for
identification to Afghanistan and within 24 hours buried the body
at sea.
Death of Osama bin
laden is a case of
Coercive diplomacy
Death of Obama Bin Laden is entirely a case of coercive diplomacy
as US forces entered into the territory of Pakistan, without
informing the Government of Pakistan, Pakistan’s Army and ISI.
Pakistan and US
communications
regarding the
operation
According the officials if US Current President Barak Obama
administration, they did not share any kind of information about the
operation with Pakistan until it was ended. Michael Mullen called
Ashaq Pervez Kiyani at 3am to inform about the operation.
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Allegations of
Pakistan after death
of OBL
The locality and situation of Osama bin Laden death worsen many
doubts about Pakistan’s commitment to apparently shared aims of
defeating religious extremism, and brought calls to curtail US
assistance to Pakistan. The news of Osama bin laden leads to
immediate questioning of Pakistan’s responsibility and potential
complicity in his refuge. John Brennan (President Obama’s chief
counterterrorism advisor), told reporters it was “inconceivable that
Osama bin Laden did not have a support system” in Pakistan.
Death of Osama bin laden who was the face of global terrorism and behind 9/11
attacks in short the largest threat and enemy of US, under the territory of Pakistan by the
US forces even without informing the Government, military and intelligence of Pakistan
is another case of Coercive Diplomacy of US. There was no communication regarding
this operation between US and Pakistan officials. This operation put Pakistan under
several allegations of mistrust and doubts. According to Abottabad Commission report, it
is confirmed that Osama had been killed in the US raid. Death of Osama bin Laden under
the territory of Pakistan one again destroyed the image of Pakistan and after that raid.
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6.1.10 NATO attack in Pakistan 2011
Date
This incident was taken place on 26 November 2011
Description
The 2011 NATO attack in Pakistan occurred during the US led
NATO forces engaged the Pakistani security forces at two Pakistani
military checkpoints beside the Afghan-Pakistan border. The check-
posts were located 200 meters within Pakistan from the border with
Afghanistan in the field of Salala subdivision of the Mohmand tribal
region in FATA, Pakistan. The two check-posts were themselves
separated by a distance of one kilometer on the top of the mountain
Salala.
Violates the
Sovereignty of
Pakistan
NATO attack in Pakistan considered as unprovoked and
Indiscriminate firing, irresponsible act and violates the sovereignty
of country. According to the military officials this attack was pre-
planned. Pakistan has rejected all the lame excuses that was given by
NATO and declared that no fired was opened from our side, infect
the soldiers were resting and sleeping when NATO launched the
assault at night.
Political
implications
After NATO attack, Pakistan instantly closed all NATO supplies to
Afghanistan, leaving the blockaded supply trucks vulnerable to
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attacks. NATO trucks used supply routes, in Khyber Agency
(through the Khyber Pass at Torkham) and Balochistan (near
Chaman), to supply US and global forces fighting in Afghanistan. In
March 2012, A US military official affirmed that the US would have
to use routes through India and the Northern Distribution Network
(NDN) for supplies to Afghanistan if Pakistan rejected to revive its
supply lines. Though, he agreed the high costs of these routes”
(NATO attack).
NATO attack on Salala military Check post portrays another case of US Coercive
Diplomacy. The attacks have killed twenty-four Pakistani soldiers, which consisted of two
officers one is or Mujahid Hussain and another is Captain Usman Ali. Thirteen other
soldiers were injured in this attack. Again US violate the sovereignty of Pakistan by
attacking under the territory of Pakistan. After this attack Pakistan has rejected all the
lame excuses of US and put a ban on the NATO supplies to Afghanistan. In order to revive
US-Pakistan relations and in order to repair bilateral relations, the Pakistani parliament
agreed to reopen the NATO supply lines over to the government in April 2012.Later the
parliament has postponed this decision as due to forthcoming general elections and
demanded that US have to positively respond to the demands which were recovery of
Shamsi airbase. While addressing a Senate committee, the Minister of Foreign Affairs
Hina Rabbani Khar warned that a replicate attack would end Pakistan's support and
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assistance to the US in its war against terrorists and extremists. Enough is enough; the
government will not tolerate any incident of spilling even a single drop of any civilian or
soldier's blood. The role of Pakistan in the War on Terror must not be overlooked."
She further said that "the sacrifices rendered by Pakistan in the war on terror are more
than any other country. But that does not mean we will compromise on our
sovereignty. From the above statement given by Hina Rabbani Khar, it is clear that the
US is using Coercive diplomacy with Pakistan, again and again US violates the
sovereignty of Pakistan and Pakistan would not anymore tolerates these violations,
Pakistan has played a vital role in global war on terror and US must
appreciate its concerns with US, despite of asking for do more! Do more!. Pakistan gave
a number of sacrifices after joining war on terror but it does not mean that we will
compromise on our country’s sovereignty.
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6.1.11 US allegations towards ISI over Haqqani network
Description
After the attacks on 13 September at NATO headquarters
and US embassy in Kabul (Afghanistan), US started
acquiring questions about Haqqani network to Pakistan. At
a NATO conference, Mike Mullen pressurized General
Kiyani that Investigations should be done related to
Haqqani network and on the other hand in a three hours
exhaustive meeting, former foreign minister Hina Rabani
Khar was pressurized by Hillary Clinton. Mullen said it
clearly that ISI is using Haqqani network for its proxy war.
Secretary Clinton message was apparent that something
had to be done against Haqqani network.
Mode of threat
Putting pressure on Pakistan, the US has asked ISI, to cut
off all the affiliations with the Haqqani network of Taliban
and asked for "strong and immediate action" against the
group.
llegations Against ISI
In September 2011 the Barak Obama’s government had
warned Pakistan that it has to do more that is to cut off ties
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with the Haqqani network in order to remove the leaders of
Haqqani network. Moreover, adding that "the United States
will act unilaterally if Pakistan does not comply."
Several US senior officials claim that the ISI supports and
directs the Haqqanis. Furthermore (US Secretary of State)
said that they do not have any evidence of “Pakistani
involvement in attacks on the US embassy in Kabul”
After the death of Osama Bin Laden, Haqqani network emerges as a strong threat
to US. US continue to impose several allegations regarding the ISI of Pakistan and
believed that ISI has close linkages with Haqqani network and ISI supports Haqqani
network. This is an additional case of US coercive diplomacy in which US believes, that
Haqqani network in collaboration with ISI is behind Kabul attacks at US embassy and
NATO headquarters. US demands ISI to cut off all of its communication with Haqqani
network otherwise US threatens Pakistan that it would itself take action unilaterally.
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6.2 Analysis of US Coercive diplomacy
The diplomacy between US and Pakistan is a genuine case of Coercive diplomacy.
Before discussing why the United States successfully executed coercive diplomacy it is
necessary to present a theoretical account of coercive diplomacy to distinguish it from
deterrence. Alexander George in his famous book Force and Statecraft describes coercive
diplomacy as “attempts to reverse actions that are already occurring or have been
undertaken by an adversary”. He sets it apart from deterrence “which attempts to dissuade
an opponent from undertaking action that has yet been initiated”. Coercive
diplomacy “tries to initiate behavior by fear of consequences” on the other hand
while deterrence “tries to inhibit behavior by fear of consequences”. From this case it is
obvious and clear that the US is trying to initiate a change in the behavior of Pakistan,
Moreover US trying to convincing Pakistan to prevent its support to the Taliban
and support the US against global war on terror, which is basically against Al-Qaeda and
other terrorist groups. George describes coercive diplomacy which clearly describes that
there was a threat of force from US "essentially a diplomatic strategy backed by the threat
of force.” So there is clearly a case of coercive diplomacy over deterrence. After analyzing
the following case studies of coercive diplomacy of US Joining of War on terror,
Crackdown on religious groups, Given logistics-bases-intelligence to US, Operation rah-
e-Rast, Operation Rah-e-Nijat, Kerry Lugar Beman Act, Ongoing Drone attacks,
Raymond Davis incident, Death of Osama bin laden, NATO attack on Salala check post
and US allegation towards ISI over Haqqani network. It is clear and obvious that Coercive
diplomacy strongly exists between US and Pakistan and US over powers Pakistan every
time. US used coercive diplomacy in the pre 9/11 period towards Pakistan to some extent
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but after the post 9/11 period, US is using Coercive diplomacy towards Pakistan to great
extend. Even after 11 years of 9/11, Pakistan is subjected to several severe allegations
Pakistan has lost its numerous civilians in the wave of terrorism. After joining war on
terror Pakistan continues to face terrible terrorism, problems of sectarianism, extremism,
poverty, inflation and so many other ills. The 9/11 incident in the US sent shock
waves in the whole world from which Pakistan has still not recovered. Indeed,
Pakistan’s involvement in what former President George W. Bush called the “global war
on terror” has formed overwhelmingly negative consequences and it is proved far more
expensive than expected.
It created tension within Pakistani society. Moreover, Former
President 60Musharraf allowed his country’s airspace to be used for launching attacks on
Afghanistan. It made its road network available to US and NATO forces to transport
supplies into its landlocked neighbor. The souring affairs with US
when American commandos penetrated deep into Pakistan to kill Bin Laden was the
culmination of both countries’ mutual disappointment. Hence we can conclude that US
coercive diplomacy is likely to continue as John Kerry said that Pakistan have to cooperate
with us in order to eliminate terrorism otherwise we would take place an action. Otherwise
US coercive diplomacy is likely to continue and possibly increase in coming
decades, the reason behind strained relationship between US and Pakistan is the breach of
Pakistan’ s sovereignty, allegations against military, ISI for supporting the Taliban, and
conjectures that Pakistan’s nukes could fall in the hands of terrorists. On the basis of the
above case studies, this study concludes that US coercive diplomacy effects Pakistan
peace and integrity.
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6.3 Maritime and Foreign Policy implications for Pakistan
Keeping in view major developments in Indian Ocean there are serious
implications on maritime security and foreign policy of Pakistan regarding Gwadar and
CPEC which require detail analaysis.
Map 6.1.Indian Ocean Port Development
Source: Council on Foreign Relations
138
6.3.1 Geo-Strategic Importance of Gwadar Port
Gwadar is the combination of two Baloch words "Guad" and "Dur” which
means"Doorway of Wind." A conflict was going ahead between Khan of Kalat and Sultan
of Masqat before the parcel of Sub-mainland in light of the fact that the limits of Gwadar
were not checked (Historical letters of Gwadar). Before Pakistan came into being, Gwadar
was given to Sultanate of Oman by its ruler Khan of Kalat as blessing to his little girl on
her marriage with ruler of Muscat. Thusly the matter of Gwadar was settled (Jafar, 2013).
Gwadar port is situated on Arabian Sea drift in Balochistan. It is an angling town 12267
west of Karachi at the mouth of bay of Oman. It is 672 km from the Iranian fringe (Shahid,
2009). The Southern piece of Gwadar port is T-formed segment of land around five miles
in length and half to one mile wide anticipating from the fundamental drift in the north in
the Arabian Sea and consummation in the south with six to seven hundred feet high reef
called "Koh-Batail"(Historical letters of Gwadar). Because of its area and significance
India additionally needed to buy this port however all Indian malice plans were fizzled.
On 8 September 1958, administration of Pakistan acquired Gwadar once again from
Government of Oman for $3 million, and it formally turned out to be a piece of Pakistan
(Jafar, 2013).
At the time, Gwadar was a little and undersized angling town having the number
of inhabitants in a couple of thousand. On 1 July 1977 Pakistan announced Gwadar as a
major aspect of Balochistan. In 1993 Pakistan created Gwadar in a noteworthy port city
and associated it with Pakistan's thruways and railroads organize. On March 2007
previous leader of Pakistan General Pervaz Mushraff had introduced the port (Shahid,
2009). Gwadar is the area base camp of Gwadar locale and considered the winter capital
139
of Baluchistan in 2011. It alongside Faisalabad and Islamabad has been created under
urban all- inclusive strategy. But Gwadar port Pakistan has just two business ports Karachi
port and Bin Qasim port. After 1971 war requirement for another port was felt because of
the obliteration of Karachi port. So this Gwadar port can possibly fill in as substitute port
in future. Subsequently this port is imagined to end up plainly a provincial center point
serving wage and active business movement to Middle East and Gulf nations. Gwadar
port is likewise the immediate course to landlocked Central Asian States, Afghanistan
and passage to Central China
.Gwadar port has capacity to produce 2.5 million employments and billions of
dollars in benefits. In this manner Pakistan has proclaimed it an obligation free port and
free financial zone. Gwadar has finished its initially period of development. A different
allotment of one billion rupees was made in the financial plan of 2004 – 05
for development, for trade zone and for Gwadar modern city. This port has enormously
profited the hundred percent advancement, assess occasions for a long time, possession
prize, adaptable work controls, endowment on utilities, and opportunity of expenses on
imported products and accessibility of employments (Shahid, 2009).
By making Gwadar a focal point of provincial exchange and through various
ventures like banks, lodgings, storage facilities and production lines Pakistan will rise as
an alluring spot for outcasts. Through this Gwadar port arrangement Pakistan will likewise
get the consideration of outside contribute guides and utilize their huge speculations into
its most immature areas for the development of streets and railroads which interface
Pakistan with the locale. Gwadar won't just help in financial lift however will likewise
change Pakistan's naval force into a power that can contend local naval forces. It is
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Gwadars' key geological area, which will help Pakistan Navy not to be get obstructed if
there should arise an occurrence of any significant war in future. Like Karachi port
Gwadar port is around 450 kilometers far from Indian Border (Shahid, 2009).
Gwadar port has finished its initially period of development in 2002-
2006. Presently second stage is under development. After the fruition of first stage Gwadar
port started its freight dealing with and first ship conveying 60,000 tons
wheat securely from this port. This port task is enhancing the expectations for everyday
comforts of nearby and giving openings for work to the general population of Balochistan.
It will likewise give huge incomes to national economy to address the difficulties
looking by the nation. A bill was presented in National Assembly of Pakistan with respect
to Gwadar port which is called as Gwadar port specialist act 2010 (Shahid,
2009). The development of Gwadar port is only one component of the Greater
Gwadar design. System of streets which interface the Gwadar port with Karachi, Pasni,
Ormara and Turbat are additionally part of this arrangement. Expressways
connecting Karachi with Gwadar, Pesni to Gwadar, and Ormara to Gwadar and Turbat to
Gwadar will be worked in stage two of this more
noteworthy Gwadar design. This system of streets will at long last associate with China
through Indus Highway (Anwar, 2011). Balochistan which is rich in normal assets
yet poor in financial improvement is the biggest area of Pakistan. Gwadar is the primary
real universal undertaking of Balochistan territory which picks up the consideration of
world and in future will assume imperative part in the advancement of Balochistan. It is
the principal super undertaking and center of remote direct speculation (FDI) in
Balochistan (Anwar, 2011).
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6.3.2 Major and Regional forces interests in the Gwadar port
Gwadar isn't critical for Pakistan yet additionally holds a vital position globally
and uniquely for real powers like US, China, Iran and India. US and Saudi Arab
appreciated solid two-sided and conciliatory relations all through the history. Be that as it
may, these relations were influenced over a few issues like not long after Arab oil ban in
1973-74. Principle purpose for this ban is Arab-Israeli war of 1973 when Arab individuals
from Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) reported and bar against US
support of Israeli military. This stoppage represented an incredible risk to US economy in
this way US set up a Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) on the grounds that it's financial
flourishing and security for the most part relies upon persistent supply of oil. The
September 11 assaults likewise put inquiries on their long-standing kinship. Losing
control over Middle Eastern area would likewise mean losing its hold over Middle Eastern
oil. Because of this US needs a substitute of Middle Eastern oil, and regular assets
consequently Pakistan's Gwadar port was the best decision for US.
US and local players are probably going to see China's contribution in Gwadar
port venture with doubt (Shahid, 2009). China utilized Strings of Pearl system to improve
its oil supply. Under this technique, China’s vision is to secure its position at numbers of
key points and ports and to create exceptional conciliatory and respective relations with
nations of the locale (Ramachandran, 2005).
As indicated by Pehrson "String of Pearl, policy portrays
the declaration ofChina's rising geopolitical impact through endeavors to expand access
to ports and landing strips, create uncommon discretionary connections, and modernize
military powers that stretch out from south China sea to Persian gulf. China’s strategy and
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growing military and maritime powers in Middle East and Africa provides the greatest
risk and test for US oceanic power. Since this “string of pearl" comprises of various port
and maritime offices which will assist China's naval force to contend or counter US
obstructions in this district. This system will likewise try to ensure the exchange courses
amongst China and Middle East or absolutely Europe. Not only a port but as a Naval Base,
Gwadar supports the String of Pearl vision.
As extraordinary powers dependably outline noteworthy plans to
counter alternate states interests and impedances so China is likewise utilizing this
procedure in Gwadar port. (Ramachandran, 2005). China and Gwadar are related as the
expert of Gwadar port has been exchanged to China. China is additionally holding the
position of new rising force. It gives specialized and budgetary help to Gwadar port which
fortifies relations in this worldwide town. China likewise gets a reward of exchange course
to Central Asian republics in light of its assistance. It additionally fills in as a vitality
center to give an oil pipeline. Gwadar port is more recipient than Shanghai port because
of less separation as Shanghai port is 16000 km and Gwadar is just 2500 km from Chinese
modern ranges. Gwadar port additionally empowers Beijing to screen India and US sea
collaboration. It likewise empowers China to counter US impedance and dominion of
India. Because of this China helps in development of Gwadar port (Anwar, 2011).
Pakistan Iran relations have dependably been great yet now India is impacting Iran to
influence Pakistan. Iran is likewise worried about its monetary advantages related with
Indian Ocean. There is additionally a view that because of the Iran's new port of Chabahar
strains could be made amongst Iran and Pakistan. Afghanistan is an asset center in this
locale. Yet at the same time it has few fares i.e. steel, agribusiness, materials and so forth
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and the nation is as yet subordinate upon the outside guide and on Pakistan. Pakistan gives
a protected exchange course through Gwadar.
Gwadar port is vital for Afghanistan as it provide shortest route to Indian Ocean
and its Pashtuns have religious and monetary associations with Pakistan. It gives
Afghanistan a direct access to water
6.3.3 Importance of Gwadar port at local, regional and global level Local
Local Importance Located in naturally rich in resources
Balochistan
Provide jobs for locals of this province
First mega project and hub of foreign direct
investment (FDI) in Balochistan.
serve as substitute port in future
Bring socio-economic revival and boost in
Pakistan
Network of roads will connect all cities of
Pakistan
Regional
Importance
Strong diplomatic and bilateral relations
established with emerging super power China
Direct route to landlocked Central Asian
States, Afghanistan and gateway to Central China
Regional hub serving income and outgoing
commercial traffic to Middle East and Gulf countries
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Transform Pakistan’s navy into a force that
can compete with regional navies.
Global
Importance
Located between Middle East, South Asia and
Central Asia
China’s naval base in Gwadar is great threat
and challenge for US maritime power.
Great challenge to Chahbhar port, Dubai port
and Bandar Abbes port
Enables China to monitor India and US
maritime cooperation.
Provide direct access to Central Asia, Russia,
Europe, Japan and Korea.
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6.3.4 Major Powers’ interests in Gwadar Port
US interests in
Gwadar port
Oil embargo of 1974 and 9/11 attacks raised
questions on US-Arab long-standing relations and it had
negative effect on US continuous supply of oil
Gwadar port is best choice to access Middle
Eastern oil
After withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014 US
want to continue its presence in this region
Gwadar give direct access to Middle East which
is important for US for his economy, prosperity and
security
US showed great resistance because now to
capture the resources of Central Asia is the main goal of
US foreign policy
China’s naval base in Gwadar is great threat and
challenge for US maritime power.
US want to counter the emerging super power
China
China’s
interests in
Gwadar port
. Gwadar port connect the Great Asian Dragon
(China) with oil rich Arabs.
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Strengthen the diplomatic and bilateral relations
between Pakistan and China
Compete or counter US interferences in this
region
China is establishing its naval bases in Indian
Ocean due to Pakistan’s Gwadar port.
China’s Indian Ocean policy directly linked with
India’s hegemonic designs to control this region.
Pakistan’s Gwadar deep sea port is a pearl of
China’s Strings of Pearl Strategy
Gwadar is just 2,500 kilometer away from China
Gwadar is on the Central part of the China’s
Foreign Trade route in future
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India’s
interests in
Gwadar port
India considered Indian Ocean and its recourses
essential for their expansion
India considered Chinese step in Indian Ocean a
threat
to their strategic encirclement policy
India is the major critic who raised concerns
over Gwadars’s handover to China
India considered it a threat to India’s maritime
security
Chahbhar port is considered a strategic alliance
between India and Iran
Gwadar port minimized the importance of Iran’s
Chahbhar port
Both India and US are not satisfied with China’s
presence in this region
Both countries can make an alliance to counter
the China’s interests in this region
Both countries can make an alliance to counter the China’s interests in this region
In this chapter the researcher has discuss the policies of India, China and US regarding
Indian Ocean and Gwadar port. A comparison would also be analyzed concerning the
policies of India and China for Indian Ocean.
148
Map 6.2 .Chinese One Road, One Belt Initiative
Source: China US focus
6.3.5 Policies adopted by different countries regarding Gwadar port
China's regional position was changed amid the most recent decade in this manner
China is moving towards the improvement of its military quality and economy. Because
of its developing financial power China assumes critical part not in local governmental
issues but rather likewise in universal issues. It is the China's definitive objective to end
up noticeably the superpower by 2050 so for the achievement of this objective China is
improving its military, financial and exchange. Significant piece of China's advancement
is relying upon oil. Because of China's oil expended as assessed 7.8 million barrels for
each day making it the second- biggest oil client on the planet after United States of
America (US). Oil and crude materials which are required for China's development
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exchange through the Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs) that go through the Indian
Ocean along these lines it has incredible vital significance for China (Mohanan, 2010).
Map 6.3: Gwadar Vs Chahbahar
Source: Stratagem Magazine
150
India China
India’s Indian Ocean Policy China’s Indian Ocean Policy
India considered Indian Ocean and its
recourses essential for their expansion so
India sees every entrance in Indian Ocean
with suspicion.
On the other hand China is establishing its
naval bases in Indian Ocean due to
Pakistan’s Gwadar port.
India considered Chinese step in Indian
Ocean a threat to their strategic encirclement
policy.
China’s Indian Ocean policy is directly
linked with India’s hegemonic designs to
control this region.
According to Indian External Affairs
Minister Mr. S.M. Krishna,
“TheGovernment of India has come to
realize that China has been showing more
than the normal interest in the Indian Ocean
affairs. So we are closely monitoring the
Chinese intentions” (Jafar, 2013).
According to General Zhao Nanqi “We can
no longer accept the Indian Ocean as only an
ocean of the Indians”(Mohanan, 2010).
India is the major critic who raised concerns
over Gwadars’s handover to China because
India considered it a threat to India’s maritime
security. Indian military analysts are of the
opinion that the port’s only objective for
China is to encircle India in the sea through
China has political, economic and strategic
interests in Indian Ocean. China’s interests in
Indian Ocean were started when China felt
US presence in Indian Ocean as a threat for
their safety. For this purpose China used
Strings of Pearls strategy. So China took
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the famously known concept of String of
Pearls.
Pakistan’s Gwadar deep sea port a pearl of
their Strings of Pearl Strategy.
By this Gwadar port China also keeps a check
on US
movement in the Persian Gulf, Indian action
in the Arabian Sea and Indo-US maritime
cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region
(IOR).
Gwadar port also minimized the importance
of Iran’s Chahbhar port in this region.
Chahbhar port is considered a strategic
alliance between India and Iran.
Pakistan is also in process to construct a
Gwadar Naval Base (GNB) with Chinese
assistance in Gwadar port which will play
significant role in Pakistan’s future security
programme.
Gwadar is considered the main barrier in
Indian, Iran and Russia’s strategic partnership
of establishing multi-model transport which
link Mumbai with St. Petersburg and
providing Europe and the former Soviet
republics of Central Asia
Access to Asia(Mohanan, 2010).
Gwadar port handover to China is also
criticizes in the same way as Pakistan’s
motorway project was criticized in 1998. Like
motorway Gwadar also provide direct access
This Gwadar port would also connect the
Great Asian Dragon (China) with oil rich
Arabs.
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For the fulfillment of China’s environmental
protection, growth and economic needs China
will built an oil Pipeline from Gwadar to
China. Because Gwadar is just 2,500
kilometer away from China. It is logically
visualized that Gwadar Port will be on
Central part of the China’s Foreign Trade
route in future.
Therefore big powers of world like China, US and India are trying
to enhance their power and influence by capturing more and more waters. Because Alfred
Mahan said “the country who rules the sea rules the world”. Pakistan’s Gwadar port is
becoming very much important now days for the world because this port has power and
to Central Asian Republics (CARs) but on the
other hand powers of world considers the
Central Asia as their sphere of influence
therefore they did not accept any effort which
threats their interests in this region. As
Gwadar port gives direct access to CARs by
other countries so US showed great resistance
because now to capture the resources of
Central Asia is the main goal of US foreign
policy (Jafar, 2013).
In future Gwadar port will attract over twenty
countries including Srilanka, Bangladesh,
Oman, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Iraq and
Iran. Therefore it is expected that these
countries may open their storehouses in
Gwadar for import and export purposes.
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potential to turn into world’s biggest trading port. In current scenario the country that
possesses more ports will control most of the world’s trade. This Gwadar port will prove
economy changer not only for Pakistan but for all worlds. Therefore it became a
playground for all great powers where they are trying to secure their international interests.
Pakistan officially handed over this port to China from Singapore authority. As China is
emerging super power so US and India showed suspicions on this handover because both
US and India want to curtail the China’s power. Both US and India considered China a
threat in regional and international perspective. China’s controls on Gwadar port will
result in lessen the Indian interest in this region. So both India and US are following the
strategy of alliances to defeat the Chinese control and interest in this region. In modern
times ports are one of the important sources to enhance a states power and influence
in international politics. To survive in this world power is the main requisite therefore
states trying to capture more and more ports because these ports played important role in
world trade so the country that possesses more ports will be more active in shaping or
influencing the international politics. Gwadar port has become a play ground where all
big powers are playing New Great Game of their interests. The main goal of every state
is to secure its own interests like both US and India want to defeat the China’s emerging
power because they feel China as great threat for their position not in regional perspective
but in international politics too. Pakistan provides China oil supply port due to which
China can compete with super power US. In 2010 US President Barack Obama visited the
four Asian countries of India, Indonesia, South Korea and Japan to attend the G20
summit which was held in Seoul. This visit of Asia was called a part of “Job Strategy” to
increase the US exports and its global economy. During this visit Obama did not visited
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the China but “China Shadow” was prominent in his speeches. The main objective of this
was revival of “returning to Asia” policy because US is worried about China’s rise in
Asia because US foreign policy focus on Middle East and ignored Asia “the most dynamic
region of world”.
This is the main threat face by the US that China is establishing’s stronger relations
with Asian countries will dominate the Asian region and send away US from this region.
China’s peaceful rise will prove a open challenge for world’s sole super power despite his
economic, military and technological advancement. China understands that power can be
increased by economy and sea ports therefore China’s aim is to secure more and more
ports in friendly countries like Pakistan and Burma to import oil from Middle East and
Africa. China would face energy crisis if its oil supply routes were block or disrupted.
Due to Indian navy’s occupation at the mouth of Strait of Malacca and US naval base
presences in Indian Ocean China feels a sense of insecurity therefore China is building
strategic relationship along sea lanes from the Middle East through Gwadar port and the
Indian Ocean to the South China Sea to protect China’s energy interests.
6.3.6 Major hindrances in Gwadars’s Success
Unfortunately Gwadar port of Pakistan which has capability to serve as jewel not
only in Pakistan’s economy but for whole region has not lived up to its potential. There
are several reasons due to which Gwadar port did not achieved its desire status. The
various hurdles can be listed as:
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Security
Lack of infrastructure
Unreliable transport route
Emergence of new cold war
If these hurdles are analyzed it can be seen that Balochistan is facing serious
security issues as there are lot of attacks, kidnappings and threats due to which the
foreigners and engineers avoid to work here. This security issue is due to lack of
communication with the officials. The main purpose of rebels to create these disturbances
is to turn Baloch into minority. There is a new cold war emerging between US, China
and India over the benefits of Gwadar port. And they are playing great game in this port
to access the power and control on this region.
6.4 Implications of CPEC on Pakistan
Pakistan has seen a new glimmer of hope with the advent of China Pakistan
Economic Corridor. After years of having no foreign investors in Pakistan due to power
failures and terrorism, CPEC is of utmost importance for Pakistan. This plan was
announced by the president of China himself in his visit to Islamabad in April 2015. The
magnitude of this project is quite large for Pakistan due to the investment being done of
$46 billion dollars by China. This project is further of more significance due to the fact
that it outsells all the U.S aid provided to Pakistan in the period of 2002 till 2015. The
project basically aims at making a direct route between the port Gwadar and China’s city
Kashgar located in China’s Xinyang Uyghur autonomous region. China is known to be
the rising super power of the world. It has good relations with Pakistan but that is not the
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only reason of the interest of China in Pakistan. Rather China is developing its terms
globally. Other than CPEC being a good investment, there are some geopolitical interests
as well. The reason for good relations between China and Pakistan are their mutual
differences with India. Both the countries have disputed territories with India.
Having a common enemy has future strengthened the relationship between China
and Pakistan in all spheres including economy and military and diplomatic relations?
When analysing the history of Pakistan, we have seen that whenever U.S has betrayed us
or placed sanctions on us, China has been a saviour. It has provided us with weapons and
aid in the time of need. China has also helped in development of Pakistan. It has in past
as well helped in developing Karakorum highway and now the Gwadar port both projects
are helping in economic development of Pakistan. The term used for China and Pakistan’s
relationship is “All-weather friendship”. However, China is developing itself on a global
level with their various projects and technological advancement. On the contrary Pakistan
is still a developing country. Pakistan is still facing internal instability and lacks economic
development. Pakistan still has issues with India, Kashmir being the main one, but China
is globalizing themselves rather than being fixated on land issue with India. The people
of Pakistan have somewhat accepted China in their country through vigorous advertising,
and media campaigns but China has not yet been so welcoming for Pakistan. China
starting CPEC project in Pakistan and making themselves known to the world through
their various ventures is an important dimension. This shows that China doesn’t only want
extend its influence on Pakistan rather it has focus on broader picture. China is not only
interested in Pakistan just because there have been cordial relations between the states
rather, China has other motives too. Besides increasing trade and providing economic
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support, CPEC will also help in connecting with the west which will help in creating
influence in the west.
Due to increased interest of U.S.A, in India, China is supporting its long term
instable ally, Pakistan, through economic support. This is to create a balance as China is
emerging as a second most economically developed country. Therefore, the project CPEC
has been launched in Pakistan. The support of U.S to India is bound to boast the economy
of India, to neutralize this, China since shares a common enemy with Pakistan, wants to
demonetize the effect of U.S and India. Pakistan is not only getting economic aid from
China rather it also has brought eight submarines from China. Since Pakistan is going
through energy crisis, CPEC will provide with $37 billion for energy projects. This will
help in starting energy projects and also to cover energy crisis in Pakistan. Furthermore,
terrorism is now a global phenomenon, terrorism is evident in China as well as Pakistan.
The extremist Muslim group In China is said to have bases in Pakistan. Therefore,
China is also of the view that major economic investment may helping in curbing terrorism
and providing stability in Pakistan. Another reason for the project CPEC is the fact that
China has to trade through routes where U.S has its naval forces present. Mainly, Indian
Ocean and South China Sea. China has developed good relations with energy rich states
in Central Asia. This increases their dependency on the trade routes where U.S military is
present. It is expected that a blockade may be placed on China through these routes by
U.S.A so the development of Gwadar port is advantageous for China as it will be
exclusively for the trade belonging to China. These trade routes will be used for energy
transfer as well which will further be provided through pipelines. The Karakorum highway
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is also planned to be promoted. In addition to this China has also offered to pay for the
Iran-Pakistan natural gas pipeline.
This is also why Pakistan stayed out of the Saudi led coalition in Yemen despite
having close military relations in Riyadh. Since this is a globalizing world and the sole
super power is U.S.A, China has global ambitions which are not limited to Pakistan, rather
Pakistan is just a pawn for China to expand their influence worldwide. Pakistan is a
country which is facing terrorism, political instability and lack of economic development,
China is not interested in Pakistan just because of their close ties, instead China wants to
expand themselves to other areas of the world in particular to Europe. China’s geopolitical
ambitions are not limited to Pakistan, the matter is only important because of Pakistan’s
strategic location and trade routes. However, China still views Pakistan as an important
ally.
The friendship between the two states and their economic ventures are a part of
‘flagship project’ under ‘One belt, One road ‘. China wants to develop more friendships
in Southeast Asia to create its influence in Europe as well. It is also believed that in future
the Gwadar port will also be used for China’s military force. It is evident that China itself
has many incentives for building CPEC in Pakistan. The implications and
recommendations evaluates that the investment Chinese plan is about 46 million dollars
into the plan CPEC clearly has implications for US policy makers .As it is seen in the
Chinese long term strategic objectives. That is being said, this kind of plan on this scale
uncertainly faces significant hurdles, lowest of Pakistan which are own weakening the
environment of security and complex domestic political dynamics.
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Moreover, the evolving regional landscapes promote US strategists with goals,
also as challenges to make it clear that our interest remain protected, of all the displayed
investments they face significant hurdles, including weak Pakistani environment. Protests
have been sparked against of CPEC project by local and provincial leaders in Baluchistan
and Peshawar. Baluchistan region has been site of patriot and rebel rebellions which
Pakistan asserts are bolstered by Indian insight administrations, as gave confirmation to
the United Nations on claimed Indian covert agent Kulbhushan Yadav got on Pakistan
soil of Baluchistan territory on 3 March 2016 Exiled Baloch patriot Hyrbyair Marri in
2016 cautioned the wellbeing of Chinese nationals dealing with the venture couldn't be
ensured, however viciousness in the district topped in 2013 preceding pointedly declining.
The Pakistani government announced that more than 800 Baloch activists surrendered to
security powers in 2016 after the dispatch of a compromise program including more than
200 at a solitary service in November 2016 Balakh Sher Badini, a senior aggressor
authority of the Baluchistan Liberation Army, surrendered to Pakistani powers in January
2017.
Another 21 aggressors from another activist group, the Baluchistan Republican
Army, surrendered presently alongside 3 aggressor administrators A couple of days after
the fact, high positioning activist authority Lal Din Bugti surrendered to Pakistani security
powers, alongside 6 different leaders. Dissident inhumanity had diminished in the territory
such a great extent by 2017, which such gatherings had turned out to be considerably less
of a danger contrasted with Islamist aggressors. CPEC has impressively 29irritated both
US and India which fears dangerous results of the task over the long pull.
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US weakened and minimized its ties with Pakistan more because of the China
Pakistan Economic Corridor venture offering China significance in the location than the
US murder of Osama Bin Laden. The CPEC in certainty murders Asia Pivot of
US. Thus Americans are irate with Pakistan, calling for cutting military guide bundle. An
ascent in viciousness might be the best approach to frighten Beijing away
the aspiring arrangement. Furthermore, Islamabad has more than once 29blamed India
and different enemies for CPEC of inciting assaults on account of simply that objective. In
2013, Pakistan fixed operational contract of Gwadar port to China in the core of American
strain to search for adoptions. This port is an essential for China's fantasy of OBOR,
philanthropic the Maritime Silk Road with a linking to the Arabian Marine.
The harbor 66at the mouth of the Persian Gulf provides China the short-lived
course to the lubricant rich Middle East, Africa, and the bulk of the Western half of the
globe. Gwadar will have the evaluated capacity to deal through to 19
million lots of untouched petroleum every time, which will be sent to China in the wake
of being refined at the port. As the Chinese companies hiring only their people not giving
jobs to Pakistani or other people will create only political conflict. As the political chaos
is not the only main reason of CPEC project facing issues in its development the ongoing
problems in Baluchistan, where the protesters have attacked the Chinese workers in past
and also not to forget the Pakistan’s consistent battle with Islamic extremists which create
challenges to environment of security. Pakistan has appointed more than twelve thoUSnd
solders force to give protection to Chinese workers. If Chinese are attacked by protestors
than diplomatic relations can face issues. In the past no project has started on this level,
and also its China’s sincerity that they are working hard for Pakistan to make it global
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influence. This clearly presents trials for the United States problems that are top met by
remaining to engage with area partners (India) and allies, while endorsing commitments
to boost the US’s.
Improving US relationship with Iran, mainly now that a nuclear unit has been
reached, it might be an important part in endorsing regional strength. As building ties
across South Asia subcontinent, it is clearly said by China to sign up and agreement to
build a pipeline of natural gas from Iran to Pakistan. And Washington would be clever to
engage with Tehran for work in same way expanding energy trading between Iran,
Pakistan and India. Creating energy linkages between South and Central Asia can be
important step as reducing central reliance on Russia and cines markets by providing other
markets for regions exports of energy. Also diplomatic relation would be improved. US
policy makers accept it as a problems, regarding sharing US China interests, Chinese
interest go far beyond Pakistan’s constancy and economic growth , this does not means
that the diplomats and defense officials cannot explore areas of ‘’trilateral’’ collaboration
including in the field of counter terrorism. The United States of America should not see
complicit in unjust sidelining and oppression of China and Pakistan’s respective Uyghur
and Baloch minorities.
China has deliberate finance in Pakistan by many features including toughen the
useful regional partner and building advantageous trading routes that cross hostile waters.
Most important as Pakistan is being utilize in China’s growing power ambition for US
policy makers this can be useful way to create balance to Asia pacific and building new
partnership also finding ways to build regional relations which supports US interests.
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6.5 Implications for Pakistan Navy
India has effectively fashioned another association with Washington and Indina
needs US hand in hiking its positon in the asian region.
Concerning the U.S, they are progressively intrigued by systems administration
with a nation that may rise as a settling shaft in a quickly developing Asian key condition.
Be that as it may, Washington has figured out how to unite its participation on security
with New Delhi, particularly in the Indian Ocean region. Indeed, even in the adjusted
territorial situation of post 9-11, an organization with India keeps on fitting admirably into
the US bigger geopolitical plans. India is a measure to check the kind o extent China goes
to fulfill its geo-political designs.
Henceforth, while restricting another US-drove war in the Persian Gulf
and supporting the multilateral course, New Delhi has not been as vocal as some
US partners in Europe in regards to Washington's anticipates Iraq. Maybe New Delhi has
so far attempted to stay away from straightforwardly estranging Washington, in order to
maintain its rising key organization with the sole superpower on the planet. All the more
as a rule, the connection between New Delhi and Washington is by all accounts driven by
a developing joining of perspectives on worldwide legislative issues that burdens the
significance of complete national quality and adjust of energy .
Pakistan is a creating nation with restricted assets yet is being constrained to spend
a considerable measure of her profit on keeping up a reasonable resistance, inferable from
the plans and goals of its vast and forceful neighbor. The strained situation is basically a
direct result of India's bellicose state of mind towards her little neighbors. Pakistan only
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strategic port is Karachi while the other one (Bin Qasim) is also situated at some distance
– both are utilizing nearly a similar foundation. As a part of CPEC, the port of Gwadar
has gotten the Chinese investment. For Pakistan’s national safety, the ports have to be safe
and adequate efforts should be done for the minimum presence in the Indian Ocean region
especially in reply to the rising sea power of India. Although Pakistan is a land based
power but can’t remain distant with the ongoing energy politics of the Indian oceans. As
a sovereign state – it must put more emphasize on its ocean strategy.
Part of Pakistan Navy ,Armed forces win wars, however during a time in which
the auditorium of contention is worldwide inferable from the shrinkage of separation
caused by the progression of innovation naval forces and flying corps are more precise
markers of national power".Over the previous decade or somewhere in the
vicinity, Pakistan Navy (PN) has been a torchbearer in a few global coalitions leading
maintained operations in the western Indian Ocean district to guarantee arrange
adrift. Since 2004, it has busted a few criminal cartels working in the region and has been
in the vanguard of hostile to theft operations off Somalia's harried drift. Its
key universal and national activities have included AMAN arrangement of biennial
multinational activities aligned with International Maritime Conference (IMC), setting up
of a Coastal Command and additionally a Joint Maritime Information and Coordination
Center (JMICC). PN has quickly reacted to a few nearby and regional level normal
catastrophes. Pakistan Navy has other than included various surface soldiers, rocket
corvettes, privately built F-22 P frigates and power multipliers50 incorporating UAVs in
its stock. It has test let go different rockets comprehensive of a land assault variant. To
strengthen key discouragement, PN has established the framework of a Naval Strategic
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Force Command (NSFC) and is developing key capacity adrift. A spearheading exertion
is in progress to uncover the first of its kind Maritime Doctrine of Pakistan. The recently
characterized Vision of Pakistan Navy in the mean time peruses:
An advanced intense power kept an eye on by roused experts 4that
contributes successfully to discouragement and national security over the full clash
range and equipped for transmitting impact area wide with worldwide standpoint" In CTF
150 To dissuade and counter the risk of fear based oppression and other unlawful exercises
in the space, Pakistan Navy joined the US drove multi-national Combined Task Force-
150 of every 2004. The Task Force named Coalition Maritime Campaign Plan (CMCP)
was set up as the sea segment of Operation ‗Enduring Freedom'. The mission of TF 150
is to work with local naval forces and lead theater level Maritime Security Operations.
Its range of obligation (AOR) covers Gulf of Aden, the Gulf of Oman, the Arabian Sea,
and the Red Sea. Pakistan Navy has since been the most profitable regional member”(
Pakistan Navy). PN has effectively finished six charge visits. In CTF 151 In January
2009, with the ghost of theft expecting threatening extents, the 10Coalition Maritime
Forces Headquarters in Bahrain collected a devoted Task Force (CTF 151) involving
boats and flying machine from more than 20 nations. It planned to help global drive
against the threat of piracy. Pakistan Navy joined this effort. It has since had five order
visits with many PN ships taking part in these operations. Pakistan Navy assumed a focal
part in the 2010 terrific discharge and save of MV SUEZ from Somali privateers
requesting a payment of USD 2.1 million . PN has moreover started number of measures
to pre-empt any demonstration of piracy around Pakistan's EEZ. In such manner, a counter
Piracy Patrol is set up.(Pakistan Navy)
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6.6 Implications for Maritime Doctrine of Pakistan
Pakistan is developing its maritime doctrine in response to ‘disturbing
developments’ in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) to protect its maritime interests and
respond to conventional and sub-conventional threats emerging there.
The draft doctrine is being reviewed at different levels in the navy and government
ahead of adoption.
Senior Research Fellow of Pakistan Navy War College and author of the doctrine
retired Commander Muhammad Azam Khan during an interview said that the doctrine
aimed at developing coherence and uniformity of thought and action within Pakistan Navy
and promoting cooperation with Army, Air Force, allied navies and coalition partners. He
said the doctrine would further give contextual clarity to all stakeholders and observers of
maritime developments in Pakistan.
Cdr Khan gave an overview of the doctrine and said its formulation had been
necessitated by the evolving threat matrix and maritime environment in the IOR.
“With the regional environment of IOR being marred by uncertainty and political
instability, Pakistan has to maintain its maritime security, be cognisant of its security
interests and put forth its doctrinal assumptions based on concepts governing application
of maritime forces, the command and control structures and a carefully crafted role for its
naval forces,” he added.
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Besides the security element and development of better ties with allied navies, the
doctrine also envisages protection of shipping and commercial interests and addressing
issues like climate change and rise of sea level.
Sea-blindness in Pakistan’s doctrinal thinking — an inability to appreciate the
central role the oceans and naval power play in securing strategic security and economic
prosperity is the main cause of the problem.
The two areas that required special attention in the debate on maritime doctrine
were development of an assured second-strike capability and the increasing need for
delving into cooperative mechanisms as a tool for crisis management.
Up till 1965, it had acquired several destroyers (Example:- PNS Badr) and a
cruiser. In this way, it was all around masterminded the 1965 war. Regardless, after
noteworthy triumphs in this war, the pace of modernization supported off and the maritime
power was neglected by the then president, Ayub Khan. Yahya Khan tried to give the
Navy more noteworthy commitment, in any case, it was an occurrence of shy of what was
normal, and the maritime power was resoundingly beaten in the 1971 war, paying little
mind to having had the high ground in 1965. After this failure, the Navy was also
disregarded, as its part was by and by reduced to affirmation of conveyance courses. The
maritime power bit by bit made a consistently expanding number of acquisitions anyway
it was never a bona fide doing combating power. Regardless, in the 1980's, with extended
guide from the US, the Navy furthermore broadened its task force and part, and began
encircling a dynamic defensive zone around Karachi. This was regardless, passed on to
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an end before the complete of the Cold War and US subsidizing. In 2010, in any case,
Admiral Noman Bashir remarked,
The Pakistan maritime power (PN) is adjusted on the unstable edge of a change. It
was here that it was hailed that the piece of the Pakistan maritime power extended from
essentially guaranteeing the shores of Pakistan, to an obliged offense with the purpose of
destroying key oceanic workplaces of India. That is the educating of the Pakistan Navy,
and its point. The attainment of the PNS Alamgir and the PNS Saif in prior years showed
that the Navy was totally serious about these focuses. The rule that has been outlined out
above has expected an imperative part in the acquisitions that the Navy has made starting
late. Recalling that one of the huge focuses has reliably been refUSl of district, the
submarine stock has been broadened. Starting at now, Pakistan has two Agosta 70's, three
Agosta 90B's and three MG110 little subs. The purpose of these submarines is to give
Pakistan an edge and to protect essential area, if there ought to emerge an event of war
against India. As drafted as of late, another point is maritime perception and a confined
offense against the Indian Navy. Looked in that particular condition, the P-3C Orion is a
perfect fit for the Pakistan Navy. Its upgrades outfit it with more noticeable determination,
speed, stealth and constancy. Pakistan has moreover been wanting to upgrade the Navy,
to the extent Surface Warfare, and remarkable undertakings have been made to get more
frigates. To this end, the PNS Zulfiqar, PNS Shamseer and PNS Saif have been
exceptionally useful.
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6.7 Maritime Security Imperatives of Pakistan
Pakistan has 1001 km long coastline which make it 74th largest out of 142 littoral
states in world. It is blessed with 290 145,000 sq. km of Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ) which can be considered as fifth province of Pakistan. Lack of strategic maritime
vision and land-lock thinking of leadership, policy makers, research analysts, business
community and general public is main cause of underdeveloped and ignored maritime
sector of Pakistan. Word “Maritime” is missing in the document of Vision 2025. There is
not a single party which has incorporated maritime policy in its manifesto.
First maritime policy document has been written and presented in 2002, but
unfortunately it has not been approved and implemented till date. Private sector should be
encouraged to participate in maritime economy by buying new ships for fishing and
transportation. Marine pollution, piracy , illegal poaching and fishing in its EEZ is major
problem faced Pakistan .Pakistan Navy has very limited role to play that is regarding
security but they are involved in Karachi port trust, Karachi shipyard port authority,
Gwadar Development Authority and development of infrastructure in coastal areas of Sind
and Balochistan. Maritime Security Agency and Coastal Guards are playing effective role
but they lack most sophisticated weapon system and infrastructure to control terrorism.
Pakistan needs to develop more economic zones like other states of Indian Ocean.
Provision of drinking water and electricity should be primary objective of government for
development of coastal areas which can work as engine of growth in Pakistan. Ports in
Pakistan should adopt modern concept of multimodal destinations in order to meet future
requirements .Pakistan Navy has raised TF-88 for providing security to China Pakistan
Economic Corridor and its related infrastructure and personals. Co- ordination among all
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stake holders is highly required in projected scenario. There is dire need to establish
Maritime Authority or to change the name of Ministry of Ports and Shipping to Ministry
of Maritime Affairs.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION AND REFLECTIONS
7.1 CONCLUSION
Vital US objective is to maintain the economic and military pre-prominence in the
world. Its essential foreign policy objectives are to safeguarding continued US hegemony
in contemporary geopolitics, using strategy, co-operation, organizations and remote guide
to guarantee bolster for its interests and the universal framework as a rule. US want to
ensure the security of US interests and resources while preventing "rebel states"
from debilitating its interests. Reducing or wiping out the exercises of rebel groups
or people and any remote help they may get, especially al-Qaida. It want to safeguard the
proceeded with accessibility of, and access to, assets and markets. US Indian Ocean
objectives are to safeguarding that US targets are not imperiled by states, for
example, China and Iran. It wants to prevent new or set up radical gatherings from
hurting the interests of the US or unified Indian Ocean littoral states. It want to ensure
the security of sea chokepoints and Sea lines of Communications (SLOCs).
Particular US foreign policy objectives for key actors in the Indian Ocean
region are as follows: US is working with China as proper to keep up regional
and worldwide strength (however not to the detriment of US interests or vital
predominance).it is encouraging Beijing's proceeding with responsibility regarding the
worldwide framework which has created China's financial ascent. It is engaging
in certainty building measures with the Chinese military, yet additionally acting to contain
Chinese military expansionism (real or saw).
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US want deepening key ties with India and supporting it as a stabilizer to
China while encouraging it as regional power. It is encouraging India's "Look East"
policy to expand Indian clout in East Asia.
US policy towards Afghanistan is to support its endeavors to make the change to
a steady, popularity based economically effective state. If fundamental, keeping
Afghanistan as "isolated" as conceivable to keep unsteadiness from spreading
to neighboring states.
US is following the policy of preventing the advancement of an Iranian atomic
ability and containing the spread of its impact.
US is encouraging Indonesia as a rampart against Chinese extension in South-East
Asia while supporting Indonesia's developing part as a regional pioneer and utilizing it as
a conceivable methods for securing impact in South-East Asia and the Muslim world. It
want to securing the Sea lines of correspondence through the Indonesian
archipelago, especially in help of imperative US partners, for example, Japan, Taiwan and
South Korea.
US is following policy of maintaining Australia as a key territorial accomplice
and partner while working with it to deliver dangers to the global framework. It want to
ensure that Australian arrangements are thoughtful to US interests, especially as to China.
US policy towards Pakistan is to support mainstream, majority rule governments
to guarantee a steady, more prosperous Pakistan with a master US standpoint.US is using
coercive diplomacy towards Pakistan as it wants to dismantle extremist bases in it. US
want to disrupt, destroy and vanquish al-Qaida. US is increasing the Pakistani
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Government's capacity to address the issues of its nationals, in this way diminishing the
interest of extremists. It want to prevent radicals from accessing Pakistan's atomic
ammunitions stockpile while ensuring that radicals can't undermine US endeavors in
Afghanistan (and the other way around).
The key goals of the United States in the Indian Ocean region
mirror a vital national target that is supported by a more extensive outside approach
viewpoint. That standpoint is, thus, impacted by various center territorial and nation
particular targets, by Washington's view of what may undermine those destinations and
how it will try to reduce or dispense with those dangers.
As the area, in addition to other things, of a significant part of the world's energy
supplies, key exchange courses, the nascent Sino-US and Sino-
Indian competitions, a pugnacious Iran focused on an atomic program of dubious reason,
Islamist radicals, and various fizzled and coming up short expresses, the Indian Ocean
region will, in the coming decade, order the consideration of US policymakers and
strategists in a way that will be coordinated by couple of different districts. Now, in any
case, exactly what capacities will be apportioned to the district stays vague. The overall
US go for the Indian Ocean area is for key pre-prominence, as opposed to strength.
The United States point as Hilary Clinton has noted to be pushed out of East Asia
by no one; that slant will apply similarly to the Indian Ocean area, regardless of the
possibility that strategy ways to deal with the district are as yet 6being worked through
and drive levels and spending plans are at present unverifiable.
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The US may leave Afghanistan, for example, however it won't leave the district
since it is excessively essential, making it impossible to the United States'
national advantages (and neither do the greater part of states in the area need it to take
off). Then again, making a solitary Indian Ocean arrangement would be gigantically
troublesome, especially in perspective of the a wide range of organizations and bureau
that are in charge of different parts of strategy 6in the district. There is a sure
level of inactivity to be overcome if an Indian Ocean strategy in that capacity is to be
made. A widely inclusive Indian Ocean arrangement along these lines appears to 6be some
way off yet. Other key Indian Ocean targets are to keep up the global request in a way
which best suits the US, to internationalize the security of the universal request, and
to guarantee the stream of vitality supplies over the area Sea lines of communication and
through its chokepoints. There are contrasting schools of thought with
regards to pondering the significance to the vital targets of the United States of the Indian
Ocean district in the years to 2020. One battles that the district will turn out to be more
critical to the US due to its proceeding with reliance 6n oil imports from the Middle East
and the related need to keep up key pre- prominence despite expanding Chinese action in
the area and endeavors by Iran to extend its impact. In case of a contention with China,
the Indian Ocean would unquestionably expect extraordinary centrality, especially as far
as supply lines. Another says that the Indian Ocean district will really turn out to be less
essential to the United States after the 2014 Afghanistan drawdown, significantly more so
if relations with Pakistan are permitted to debilitate. It might then end up noticeably
simpler for different states to challenge the pre- prominence of the US in the Indian
Ocean, especially concerning its maritime power; unless, obviously, US sway or security
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is straightforwardly undermined. As far as what remote association it has, the US
will endeavor to move its concentration from the Middle East and the Afghanistan-
Pakistan theater to South-East Asia. An accentuation will stay on India, which will
have proceeding with significance to the US, regardless of the possibility that it isn't totally
certain exactly how close India wishes the relationship to be. A third speculation offers
an intriguing union of the over two schools of thought. That will be that, while
the area will keep on attracting the consideration of policymakers in Washington,
the genuine assets apportioned to it won't increment and may even be diminished. In spite
of an expanding center around the Indian Ocean district later on, the development of new,
significant resources into the region does not appear to be likely.
Present day innovation helps such considering, as it is never again important to
have vast quantities of bases in the district, in any event with a specific end goal to screen
it. More prominent utilize will be made of UAVs to lead oceanic
observation, for example, while a sensible utilization of automaton strikes may be made
in help of US partners. The above contemplations aside, it creates the impression that there
will be a more prominent utilization of multilateral courses of action by the US, which
will see Washington looking to work carefully with chose accomplices on specific issues.
This likewise mirrors the (present) mindfulness that it isn't possible
– or maybe even attractive – for the US to be associated with all issues. So also, the US
could be faced sooner rather than later by issues of supportability. Is it moving toward the
time when it is not any more ready to manage its key advantages? The situating and nature
of US resources and capacities in the Indo-Pacific district is probably going to change and
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Australia might be in a position to profit by that.The US may yet
be compelled to downsize its presence.
US remote approach, especially as it identifies with the 6Indian Ocean region
and, particularly India, Pakistan and China, can be compressed in the accompanying
order of center destinations. Two essential focuses should now be noted. To begin with, in
the US, as in numerous different nations, residential and remote contemplations can be
very interlinked and outside approach declarations can now and again be outlined
essentially in light of a local group of onlookers. Second, the United States' present
monetary conditions will have repercussions for outside and barrier arrangement for quite
a while to come. At last, notwithstanding the expanding significance of the Indian Ocean
region, no single district wide arrangement exists up 'til now. It is a situation which isn't
bound to the United States.
As the US Defense Department's 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review
Report noticed,'An evaluation that incorporates US national
interests, destinations, and stance suggestions would give a valuable manual for
future resistance planning. A move of American remote strategy in the course of the most
recent couple of years is unmistakably obvious under President Barack Obama. The walk
of Idealism to defeat Realism as the predominant worldview or viewpoint characterizing
contemporary U.S. outside approach is gradually arriving at an end. In political talk, it is
regularly asserted that the glasnost and perestroika approaches founded by Gorbachev
were instrumental in starting the finish of the Cold War. All the more particularly,
Reagan's Brandenburg discourse in 1987 imprints the immediate move from an outside
approach of angry brinkmanship even under the least favorable conditions, and guarded
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armistice, best case scenario, to the begin of the absolutist advancement of the talk of
"flexibility." It was the start of the widely inclusive thought of liberal majority rules
system, all the more particularly Romanticism in remote strategy. Throughout the
following two decades, remote arrangement of real Western forces had two diverse
directional methodologies, neither of which can be characterized plainly under Liberalism
or Realism. For instance, the quick outcome of the Cold War and the vast majority of the
nineties was set apart with hopefulness of amazing magnitude energized by the confidence
in the certainty of the Western esteem framework and liberal vote based administration as
a definitive route to the future, multilateralism, and the developing idea of helpful
intercession.
The advantages of globalization were for the general public's viewing pleasure,
and the state-based power structures were apparently lessening and on their approach to
haziness. The main decade of this century smashed the shallow feeling of good faith with
the 9/11 assaults, a standout amongst the most venturesome assaults ever. Multilateralism,
as a multilateral coalition or agreement development with UN order, was bit by bit
disposed of and customary UN wariness and unilateralism came back to American
political idea, as was found in the Iraq war.
Multilateralism blurred despite the fact that this time there were significant
fractures inside the Western coalition not at all like the quick post-Cold War days. The dim
sides of globalization, the ascent of non-state on-screen characters and specialists,
campaign gatherings, and the since quite a while ago stifled under a developed amnesia
however never completely overlooked hypothesis of the conflict of human advancement
progressively began to overwhelm the worldwide story. The confidence in the
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predominance of the Western esteem framework, free enterprise and liberal majority rule
government, and its certainty to get by as a definitive way was shaken, however not
disposed of. It was still observed as the legitimate path; not as something unavoidable, but
rather something that ought to be battled for, a casualty of the conflict of human
advancement. The talk still all things considered continued as before, and the
advancement of majority rules system was still observed as a definitive wonderful answer
for every single worldwide issue. In any case, the points of confinement of the
arrangements were seen consistently, and the obscure and greatly flexibility thought of
the worldwide "war on fear" was commandeered by various performers over the globe to
advance their own plans.
Tremors were felt from 2008 because of some sudden and radical changes over
the world. The worldwide monetary emergency, which brought about the huge,
uncommon and continuous challenges the world over, the disappointment of the
"worldwide war on dread," lastly the Arab Spring developments constrained the west to
take a sharp, long look in a mirror. The resulting activities by Western forces show an
alternate course and ideological stage. There were less assertions of significant wars with
gigantic troop activations, an expansion in "irreverent and pragmatist" ramble strikes and
the spread of shadow wars and secret operations, for example, "driving from behind" in
Libya. The non-contribution in Syria up until this point, evading showdown with Russia
at any cost, even despite residential and universal incitement, and the pronounced strategy
of "Asia Pivot," while empowering Japan, India, Australia and ASEAN countries to
"fleeting trend" and "adjust" a rising China, focuses to an alternate level of development.
While our general surroundings is ending up more Hobbesian ordinary with the ascent of
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various performing artists joining the shred, the remote strategy of real powers is reclining
on its pragmatist roots. With the coming of professional Islamist parties in both post-upset
Tunisia, and Egypt and in addition post-mediation Libya, the Obama organization
appeared to understand that expectation of a blossoming Middle Eastern vote based
system must be surrendered, and a strategy of cautious efficient association with the new
administrations ought to be the objective. The new approach will be founded on
objectivity, and not the fare of qualities. Regulation of al Qaeda and the Taliban in
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen, without society and country building, is the second
center of a similar approach.
The Kissingerian pragmatist in Obama comprehended that nothing spells peace
like Russian conveyed SAMs in Syria. U.S. endeavors in connecting with India in
Afghanistan, empowering Burma, and pushing Japan, India, Vietnam, Australia, New
Zealand and Philippines to temporary fad and standardize relations amongst Japan and
South Korea underlines a cautious "seaward adjusting" part. It represents an exemplary
come back to Realist propensities, as China confronts a "security problem" in the South
and East China Sea. Sentimentalism in workmanship and writing is a development that
underscores the unreasonable, enthusiastic, and liberal. It is an unconstrained development
that rejects request, adjust, and objectivity. Maybe we can discover these viewpoints in
U.S. activities. Unreasonableness is shown in dealings with post-Soviet Russia, treating it
more like a vanquished enemy that is uniquely not quite the same as post-Second World
War treatment of Japan or Germany. There was a passionate response in Afghanistan in
which immense quantities of troops were prepared, and the U.S. initiated battling a blocks
and mortar war against a shadowy non-state on-screen character in an uneven fighting.
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There was additionally the liberal advancement of popular government in Iraq and Libya
without understanding the ground substances in either circumstance. The dismissal of
request in Egypt offered approach to turmoil, and the dismissal of a feeling of adjust was
clear in the exceptionally far from being obviously true NATO extension which weakened
the organization together and made ready for Russia to be more revanchist. Obama's win
may be viewed as an order and vindication of the continuous hands-off mentality. Albeit,
remote approach improvements are regularly startling, and one may contend that a
considerable measure additionally relies upon the real performing artists, for example,
Iran and Russia, those in the liquid, unpredictable Middle East, and those in the Asian
erupt zones.
The romanticized idea about the world, vote based system and country building is
gradually biting the dust. The condition of outside undertakings is as yet transforming and
liquid, and like any examination there is dependably an extent of mistake with the
likelihood of sudden changes. Nonetheless, one can contend that a sweeping thought
which was a piece of both liberal and neo- traditionalist talk, named here as Romanticism,
is apparently while in transit to be disposed of totally. Just with the advantage of insight
into the past will we have the capacity to unmistakably break down the bearings of the
transcendent military power on the planet, however one thing is without a doubt, wide
adventurism or troop activation and showdown is not any more a reasonable decision for
Washington. Despite the fact that the powers of geopolitics are extremely solid to release
America back to the neutralist days of the post-First World War, it is similar strengths of
geopolitics, the obscure and unfamiliar performers that prompted the demise of the
Romantics, and return of Realists in the United States.
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7.1.1 Reflection on US Policy in the Indian Ocean
The US at first settled itself in the Middle-east in 1948 through an ocean station in
Bahrain. They by then acquired the British ocean base there, which is still under their use
to keep up a sensible closeness in the Gulf itself. The US Navy at first showed up in the
Indian Ocean in November 1963 with respect to the CENTO Naval Exercise MIDLINK
'63 held off Karachi, in which the US transporter Essex taken an excitement near to several
submarines and different vessels. It by then tirelessly began joining its position utilizing
liberal ports-of-get the region and wound up being all around settled in with the difference
in its Bahrain and Diego Garcia bases. US relationship in Afghanistan and Iraq and all the
all the more beginning late its atomic impasse with Iran has obliged it to meander up
its drive levels in the territory.
The US fifth Fleet, alongside keeping up upwards of ten gatherings for different
operations in the region, moreover screens territorial sea advancement through
different groupings: Combined Task Force 158 This drive watches the Northern piece of
the Persian Gulf till Kuwait .Combined Task Force 152 This drive watches the lower some
piece of the Persian Gulf till the Strait of Hormuz. Combined Task Force 150 This drive
handles operations identified with sea security endorsement in help of the Coalition
Maritime Campaign Plan (CMCP) in the regions outside and bordering the Persian Gulf.
Combined Task Force 151 Diego Garcia, one of the Chagos islands having a
zone of around 11 sq miles, was leased to the United States in 1966. From the
US viewpoint, the zone of their base at Diego Garcia is impeccable as dismissing its
remoteness.
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The US in like way created a trades site on the island in 1971 and continued to
build up an essential ocean port and air base, which moreover plays host to US key planes.
Scarcely two months after the British introduction concerning its withdrawal from East of
Suez, a Soviet ocean amass unintentionally showed up in the Indian Ocean in March
1968, going by different ports earlier coming back to the Pacific three months at some
point later. From the spring of 1969 onwards, the Soviet Navy kept up an endless 3surface
vessel closeness in the Indian Ocean, its shot of headway being curtailed to some degree as
it just enjoyed base working environments in Ethiopia, Aden and in Somalia till 1977,
when it was constrained out by the Somalian President underweight from the US and
Saudi Arabia.
After its surrender of the bigger piece of its East of Suez having a place, Britain
has been depended to the bit of a bit player. Its nearness right now is on a very basic level
as for the coalition, NATO or EU affiliations. Most by a long shot of the
regional ocean powers like Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Oman
are mainly in view of the check of 3their own buoy and Oceanic interests. It is India alone
which, inferable from its size, individuals and key region, had always harbored
destinations of changing into a typical Oceanic heavyweight. From each point, US is
before long trying to reduce its impression in the Indian Ocean by propping up India as
a go between typical power.
The interloper of China is utilized by both to legitimize the Indian
Navy's effort. Two segments of the Indian Navy's progress designs especially seem to
have irritated goes for the region allowed to move around voluntarily: The first is the
ballistic rocket submarine program. As far back as the demonstrated quiet atomic trial
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of 1974, India has been attempting to satisfy a submarine-based key limit. It had as
necessities be rented a Soviet Charlie I class atomic submarine INS CHAKRA in 1988
fora long time however another CHAKRA II early this year on a 10
year rent. Russian focused and preparing help has been instrumental in the difference
in India's first indigenous atomic submarine INS ARIHANT which is apparently going to
be dispatched at some point or another one year from now, with four others of the class
to take after. Such submarines as a class are proposed for key incapacitation as a moment
strike restrain. For India's situation it will in all probability do with the distinction of being
a man from a particular club of countries that keep up an entire atomic get-together of
three. The Financial conditions have compelled the US to strip itself of a part of the
security obligations that it has passed on since the finish of the Second World War.
All together not to lose its effect in the Indian Ocean Region, it has
attempted to make associations and coalitions with regional vote based frameworks and
states whose objectives are agreed with its own. An essential potential accessory in the
Indian Ocean Region is India which, with its strong and up 'til now making maritime
power, could alter China's intrusions into the domain. The US has two critical security
stresses in the Indian Ocean and a couple of likewise minor ones. The two critical concerns
are the consistent conflicts and strains in the littoral states of the Middle East and China's
growing proximity in the ocean. Washington's standard accomplices, for instance, Saudi
Arabia are concerned over Iran's nuclear and rocket programs. Of course, while China
legitimizes its creating proximity in the Indian Ocean as an imperative attempt to secure
its Sea lines of correspondence, this elucidation does not induce either the US or diverse
states, conspicuously India, that periphery the ocean.
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The US should keep an eye out for the creating contention among China and India
in the Indian Ocean Region. Afresh, the US will wish to hold a military closeness in the
Indian Ocean to guard its own particular trade and imperativeness SLOCs and, no less
altogether, to ensure its energy and to oblige future security essentials in the region. Each
of these bases can consider between five hundred and five thousand resources. The
territories of these bases frees the US from the need to look for after more determined
goals in the region as the potential power inherent in them is sufficient to settle it. There
are no enduring armed force establishments in Jordan yet the US conducts many getting
ready practices with Jordanian qualities. "Despite these bases, there have been reports of
secret bases in Saudi Arabia from where meanders are used to strike "Dread based
oppressor social occasions" in Yemen.
The US bases in the Persian Gulf are home, everything considered, to immense
amounts of warrior and other plane and oceanic pontoons, including workplaces to
consider ebb and flow plane conveying warships. As the guide underneath delineates, Iran,
which is up 'til now observed as a mighty regional power, nuclear comprehension or not,
is enveloped by these bases. Given the possibility of the bases and their incentive in
securing the district, it is questionable if they will be closed anytime sooner rather than
later, paying little mind to the likelihood that the US military spending continues
decreasing. Another armed force establishment is masterminded in the unassuming
African region of Djibouti. Camp Lemonnier is the greatest US armed force establishment
in Africa, and has around four thousand personnel.
The volume of development attracts privateer attacks, generally from Somali
privateers, therefore a significant limit of this base lies in countering those strikes in
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conjunction with French and Japanese work drive who are moreover arranged in Djibouti.
All the more starting late, China has begun building its own base there. The US base in
Djibouti is ideally organized to keep an eye out for the war in Yemen, which lies
somewhat more than thirty kilometers over the strait, and besides on a fretful Somalia
toward the south. The covered up, yet sketchy, armed force establishment at Diego Garcia
in the British Indian Ocean Territory, which shapes some bit of the Chagos Archipelago,
engages the US to keep a close-by watch on the genuine trade and imperativeness SLOCs
from and to China, and moreover ocean action between the base and the east bank of
Africa. This base, named Camp Justice, was moreover used to keep watch over South Asia
in the midst of the Cold War. There could in like manner be, despite the developed armed
force establishments noted above, plans for future bases. One of the more incredulous of
these could be masterminded on the Cocos Islands. There have been reports that the
islands could be used by the US to dispatch meanders.
In November 2011, Defense Minister Stephen Smith articulated, after President
Obama had gone to Australia to report with Prime Minister Julia Gillard that up to 2,500
US Marines would handed over Darwin, that the islands could be used as a joint Australia-
US flight based military base. If an armed force establishment is based on these islands,
it could supplement the one on Diego Garcia, the lease of which runs out in the not so
distant future.
While the base on Diego Garcia could track, say, Chinese conveying that goes
among it and Sri Lanka on its way to the Strait of Malacca in travel toward the South
China/ West Philippine Sea, a similar build organized as for the Cocos Islands could keep
watch over transportation that evades the Strait of Malacca to use the more profound
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channel Sunda Strait or the Lombok Strait. By working up a base on the Cocos Islands,
the US would be correspondingly excessively set, making it impossible to end Chinese
essentialness and trade SLOCs that endeavor to experience the Sunda or Lombok Straits.
India has influenced it to clear that it doesn't wish to be drawn into any collaboration or
coalition that way to contain China however thinks about China's extending development
in the Indian Ocean, an area that India sees as its zone of effect. Exactly when a Chinese
submarine docked in Sri Lanka in September 2014 Indian agents forewarned this could
announce closer ties between Sri Lanka and China. Since around seventy for each penny
of Sri Lanka's transshipment action starts from India, New Delhi felt it could lose
financially and besides stand up to lost effect in its courtyard.
A comparable submarine again docked in Colombo in November 2014, under
scoring India's stresses. China had its aides significantly embedded into Sri Lanka, which
uses around 33% of its earnings to profit a US$8 billion Chinese commitment. It realizes
that China is bit by bit however plainly extending its impression in the Indian Ocean.
Couple these progressions with the way that China purportedly instructed India that it
would begin watches in the Indian Ocean using its nuclear powered submarines and the
clarifications behind India's swing to the US twist up recognizably obvious.
Clearly, it searches for advancement trades from the US, incorporating military
development related to drifts, watched out for plane and plane conveying warships. It is
likely that their joining preferences will see India and the US end up being close assistants,
paying little heed to the likelihood that not completely accomplices, in the Indian Ocean.
This, unmistakably, suits Washington's system of passing a part of the commitment with
respect to keeping up security in the Indian Ocean Region to commonplace
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associates. For India, the affiliation will engage it to get to development that it would find
hard to get elsewhere and enable it to moreover develop its own security methods,
including setting up an amassing division that could convey weapons structures and stages
that utilization these advances, in this way diminishing its dependence upon various
countries.
Subsequently the Indian Ocean has advanced toward getting to be, starting here
of view no not as much as, an extension of the South China Sea. It has acclimated to its
changed conditions by making relationship of moving degrees with nearby accomplices
to ensure that its preferences in the Indian Ocean, for this circumstance, are not
unfavorably impacted. Following Kargil war, US Naval War College, Newport Rhode
Island, led a recreated war diversion in view of "restricted war" hypothesis. The two sides
in the war amusement spoke to India and Pakistan, the South Asian atomic neighbors.
Four unique syndicates achieved a similar decision there remains an unmistakable
probability of "constrained war" between the two growing into an atomic trade .
Pakistan has enough legitimization for its TNWs as effectively called attention to
in your section. We don't have to persuade the world on this any longer. The regularly
developing hole in key dependability and growing association amongst India and the US
in any case just loans it advance assurance. The Indo - US nuclear arrangement has
permitted New Delhi an eager shopping of "uranium" from abroad. Work on a "mystery"
atomic office at Karnataka, believed to be Asia's biggest once finished additionally
proceeds with expediently and India as of late effectively test let go "Ashwin", a
supersonic interceptor rocket (some portion of ballistic missile defense shield). That
reality aside, maybe the most impressive disintegration of atomic security comes not
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ashore but rather at Sea-Arihant SSBN now completely operational and outfitted with
3500Km K-4 SLBM, debilitates dependability in IOR as at no other time. Since 1987
Indian Navy has sharpened its aptitudes working rented Russian atomic submarines
SSGN/SSN (Chakra and Nepra, another Akula expected in the not so distant future).
7.1.2 US Indian Ocean strategy in current time frame
Elements of the US government, when referring to the Indian Ocean in policy or
strategy documents, have lately taken to using the phrase ‘Indo-Asia-Pacific’. This
nomenclature represents the latest in a long line of variations that either ignore the region
or combine it with something else. This reflects Washington’s inclination to regard the
Indian Ocean region as a theatre in a larger geostrategic struggle, or as a route to
somewhere more important. The US Navy strike forces that ply the Indian Ocean to reach
the strategically vital Persian Gulf are the most visible symbol of the latter. A former US
ambassador to a country in the region called the Indian Ocean ‘Interstate I-95’, referring
to the crowded, drab highway that courses through the United States’ northeast corridor –
that is, an uninteresting but useful avenue to other places vital to US interests. During the
Cold War, the Indian Ocean was just one more theatre of confrontation with the Soviet
Union and its allies, and did not become important until the Soviet Navy began to sail
there, or until the United States used it to channel arms through Pakistani ports to the
Afghan mujahedeen. More recently, the Indian Ocean has been a corridor and a launching
point for tracking and attacking terrorist organizations. In sum, apprehending the Indian
Ocean region as a distinct geostrategic whole and establishing an integrated strategy for it
has been understandably difficult for the United States.
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Current policy statements and priorities point to a continuation of this trend –
namely, the absence of an Indian Ocean strategy per se, and the subsuming of strategy
towards the region into one or more higher-priority frameworks. While Washington’s
approach has gained some coherence in the past two decades, and the Trump
administration has yet to release its National Security Strategy or its National Defense
Strategy, a mix of structural and policy impediments will tend to keep the region
fragmented in the US policy lens. The US will likely continue to see the Indian Ocean
region (IOR) as part of something larger or as a series of sub-regions. More specifically,
the United States will use the IOR to stage counter-terrorism efforts in and around the
Persian Gulf, and as a secondary theatre in the deepening strategic competition with
China. A third area of priority, Iran, may also enhance focus on the northwest corner of
the region.
Even in a globalized, internet-connected world, the Indian Ocean is as far from the
United States as one can get. The antipode to Washington lies in the southern Indian
Ocean, far from population centers or major shipping lanes. Even the headquarters of US
Pacific Command (PACOM) in Hawaii, which its senior commanders consider as within
the Indo-Asia-Pacific, is physically far removed from the region, and PACOM fixes its
gaze more regularly on the western Pacific Ocean and the states bordering it. Even if
PACOM wanted to spearhead the development and implementation of a coherent US
strategy, it has bureaucratic responsibility for only a portion of the Indian Ocean and the
states on its littoral. The US government has had, and continues to have, organizational
‘seams’ that make coherent policy and strategy formulation for the IOR difficult. Four
different regional combatant commands – PACOM, Central Command (CENTCOM),
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European Command and Africa Command have portions of the Indian Ocean in their
areas of responsibility. One seam runs right along the border between the region’s two
fiercest and most strategically critical rivals ,India and Pakistan. The US State Department
also divides up the IOR, but its organizational allocation does not correspond to that of
the Department of Defense. Policy and strategy coherence has therefore suffered, and
continues to do so.
Even if Washington were to reorganize its bureaucratic frameworks for the IOR,
it might not succeed in developing a single, coherent strategy for the simple reason that
the region itself does constitute a strategic whole. What binds the region together are
maritime trade routes that hug the northern littorals. While the US interest in the unfettered
flow of this trade is often cited in policy statements and strategy documents, the threats to
that trade vary widely across the region. Other geopolitical and security issues, and US
interests in them, vary just as widely along the littorals. Some states are plagued by poor
governance, which spills over into the maritime realm. Other areas are sites of proxy wars
backed by regional rivals. Still other parts of the IOR are host to long-standing rivalries
in which the antagonists have recently taken nuclear weapons to sea.
7.1.3 Elements of a strategy
Despite these impediments to strategic coherence, it is possible to ascertain how
the United States is approaching the region currently and how elements of its approach
might ultimately be shaped into something like an integrated strategy. Perhaps the most
comprehensive and best developed element of Washington’s approach to the region, and
the one with the greatest potential to mature into a regional strategy, is its growing
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relationship with India. Washington’s strategic attitude towards New Delhi centrally
involves promoting and supporting its rise as a net security provider in the IOR. The
Obama administration coined this language, and it represents the most likely and fruitful
path forward in framing the relationship. New Delhi wants to retain autonomy in its
foreign and security policy, but desires a closer relationship with Washington. India also
views the IOR as its strategic backyard, so it wishes to play the predominant security role
there. The United States, for its part, would like a stronger and more active India to take
up regional security burdens that strain or exceed limited US capacity. This can be seen
most recently in the Trump administration’s call for India to play a more active role in
Afghanistan’s economic development activities.
The US–India relationship may evolve more rapidly in the near future in response
to China’s growing political, economic and military presence in the IOR. Washington will
likely approach this as a new theatre of competition with China, albeit with very different
characteristics from the one taking shape in the Western Pacific. In East Asia, Washington
has treaty allies Japan and South Korea to defend and assure; in the Indian Ocean it merely
has ‘strategic partners’, as well as a shared interest with China – a strategic rival – in
keeping sea lanes open for commerce. Yet both New Delhi and Washington are concerned
about China’s growing influence and its increasingly regular military presence in the
region, in the form of continuous navy flotillas performing counter-piracy operations and,
recently, the opening of a permanent Chinese military base in Djibouti. In addition, with
the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, China is seeking to connect China to the Indian
Ocean through Gwadar port in Pakistan’s Baluchistan province.
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Even so, increased momentum towards closer American-Indian security ties is
largely a function of New Delhi’s policy preferences, rather than those of Washington. In
the past, India has shied away from activities that could be seen as signaling a US-led
bilateral effort to contain China. This reluctance may well fade if India judges that it can
keep pace with Chinese capabilities in the region only by upgrading its security
relationship with the United States. In this connection, Australia and Japan could be
important US and Indian partners. Although New Delhi turned down Canberra’s request
to participate this year, the United States, India and Japan last July expanded their
annual Malabar exercise in the Indian Ocean, amid growing concerns about Chinese
activity there. Some Indian observers surmised that Indian External Affairs Minister
Sushma Swaraj, in a trilateral meeting with her American and Japanese counterparts Rex
Tillerson and Taro Kono on the sidelines of UN General Assembly session, would support
increased security cooperation among the US, India, Japan and Australia – the so-called
‘Security Diamond’. Public statements also indicated that the three officials agreed to
develop strategically important ports and other infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific region,
presumably to balance China’s efforts to increase its regional influence.
While Washington waits for New Delhi to decide on the pace and scope of their
growing security cooperation, the United States will continue to utilize the IOR as a
platform for its global counter-terrorism operations, in particular against the Islamic State,
also known as ISIS or ISIL, and al-Qaeda. In recent policy statements and speeches,
Trump has focused on striking terrorist groups worldwide and denying those groups safe
havens in less-governed spaces. For the United States, then, the Indian Ocean region
looms as both a location where terrorist groups operate – ranging from Somalia to Yemen
192
to Afghanistan and Pakistan – and as a place where the United States has bases and
operational access from which to monitor and attack them. The US priority will be to keep
that access intact, even in cases in which there is some dissonance in its policy. One
example is the United States’ determined effort to maintain its vital air base in Qatar,
despite the Trump administration’s disenchantment with the policies of the Qatari
government, which supports the Muslim Brotherhood and has established a closer
relationship with Iran. Similarly, Washington criticizes Pakistan for its role in harboring
terrorist groups, but is also cultivating ties strong enough to allow use of ground lines of
communication through Pakistan to bring supplies to a growing US force presence in
Afghanistan.
Finally, increased US antipathy towards Iran could reinforce American reliance on
bases in the IOR to enable forces transiting the region to reach locations near the Persian
Gulf. The United States has long utilised bases and forces in the region to deter Iran and
to monitor its military and intelligence activities. The US military is now also directly
supporting Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in their operations against the
Iranian-backed Houthi coalition in Yemen. The Trump administration has signalled that
it is going to confront Iran more directly with respect to a range of Iranian activities in the
Middle East, necessitating continuing access to bases and use of the seas, as well as
sustained support for partners in the region. Although a more robust anti-Iran policy is not
an Indian Ocean strategy per se, it relies on access to and through the region to make it
viable.
193
7.1.4 US Constraints
The disparate elements of the United States largely instrumental approach to the
region are difficult to make into a coherent whole and are likely to remain that way. Some
distinct aspects of US strategy are mutually supportive – for instance, combatting terrorist
groups, and deterring Iran and countering its influence in places like Yemen and Syria –
in that both require military access and basing in the northwest corner of the IOR. But
advancing these objectives calls for focus mainly on a sub-region of the IOR, with the
remainder of the ocean acting largely as a thoroughfare for the movement of forces.
Furthermore, from a narrowly logistical standpoint, the distance of the Indian Ocean from
US ports on either the East Coast or the West Coast, and even from forward-deployed US
forces, makes getting on station in the greater Middle East a long sail or flight. Since the
US is looking to maintain or possibly augment its presence in the northwest portion of the
Indian Ocean, availability for other missions elsewhere in the region will remain spotty at
best. Carrier strike groups and amphibious groups often make port calls and conduct
exercises on the way to or from the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea, with little time for
extended stays or other operations. The two recent collisions involving US forward-
deployed surface ships in the Western Pacific are harbingers of relative ship scarcity as
the US Navy seeks to improve safety and readiness by increasing training, crew rest and
maintenance.
Resource limitations are the main constraints to the US focusing its Indian Ocean
strategy on countering China’s growing role and presence in the region. But other factors
are also important. First, India’s growing wariness of China’s hovering presence has yet
to overcome New Delhi’s longstanding reluctance to move more quickly on enhancing its
194
military-defence relationship with Washington. In the decade it took New Delhi to
negotiate and sign what the US considers a basic foundational agreement on mutual
logistics support, China went from possessing neither permanent access to the Indian
Ocean, nor regular naval experience in it, to running a sustained series of surface
operations by counter-piracy units in far-seas waters while also opening a permanent
military base in Djibouti. If the United States is relying on India’s cooperation for an
Indian Ocean counter-China strategy, differing views of the threat China poses and how
best to respond to it will be a severe limitation.
Finally, the United States’ interests in the region are competing and difficult to
harmonise. Even the slow but steadily improving pace of defence cooperation between
the United States and India potentially threatens Washington’s relation with Pakistan. A
more rapid or enhanced level of cooperation to constrain China would strain US–Pakistan
ties. Yet Pakistan is critical to Washington’s goals, both in Afghanistan and in countering
transnational terrorist organisations. The tension between these policy priorities – on the
one hand, constraining China, and on the other, stabilising Afghanistan and countering
terrorism – is compounded by the fact that India is in PACOM’s area of responsibility,
while Pakistan is in that of CENTCOM. This raises significant coordination challenges
within the US government. Theoretically, Washington could ease the strategic dilemma
by adopting a more coercive approach to Pakistan in advancing its goals in Afghanistan
and vis-à-vis terrorist groups. Recent US pronouncements indicate that Washington is
leaning that way. But practically speaking, Pakistan’s indispensability to the overall effort
limits Washington’s leverage. Furthermore, a closer US–India strategic relationship could
195
induce China to ramp up its support for Pakistan and its presence in the region, stretching
US resources and forcing India to divert time and attention to an emboldened Pakistan.
Pulling the various threads of US interests in the region together, overcoming
dilemmas, solving resource scarcity issues, and working through competing bureaucratic
approaches and imperatives would be required to develop a coherent, holistic US strategy
for the IOR. The fact that the US administration – which has been slow to form a fully
staffed and cohesive foreign and defence policy team – faces a raft of urgent policy issues
in other parts of the world makes this unlikely in the near-to-medium term. As a result,
US strategy toward the Indian Ocean will remain one that treats the IOR as a fragmented
regional theatre subordinate to more global priorities.
7.1.5 Impact on Maritime Security of Pakistan
In October, 1947 while responding to the question of an American journalist about
the future Pakistan, Quaid e Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah said, “Pakistan is the pivot of
the world, placed in a location around which the future politics of the world will revolve”
and today it is proved to be true. CPEC and Gwadar has transformed Pakistan from a
terrorism ridden to a progressing country. Robert Kaplan in his article said,”Gwadar has
the potential; to be the hub of new Silk Road, Gwadar has the potential to be the Rotterdam
of Arabian Sea, Gwadar will link Pakistan with Samarkand, Astana, Ashkbad, Bishkek,
Tashkent, Bukhara, Kashgar and Orminch. Gwadar qualifies to be the great place name
of the future.This Potential of Pakistan is to be realized and Gwadar is concentrated for
actions to pave way for connectivity among different corridor. Geo-Strategy Importance
of Gwadar. Gwadar is the next big thing for Pakistan. It is the vital part of China’s
196
Maritime Silk road projects. It has a potential to generate billions of dollars of revenue
also it creates around 40000 new job opportunities and provide a sea trade route to Central
Asian States. It is Pakistan’s future trading hub and special economic zones are planned.
It provides China a shorter access to Middle East, Africa and Central Asia.
This strengthens the case for additional ports along Pakistan’s coast.
a) Gwadar – A New Lifeline for Regional Maritime Connectivity
China mainly procures oil from Iran. Russia and Saudi Arabia which is transported
through the strait of Hormuz, strait of Malacca and reaches eastern side of China
after passing through many disputed and geopolitically sensitive territories after
covering a distance of 11,000 kms. Distance between Gwadar and Strait of
Hormuz is about 600 kms. This can potentially help China to shift all of its oil
import requirements that the bypass the Strait of Malacca. Gwadar ideally located
near the Strait of Hormuz where 17 mn barrels oil passes each day.CPEC will be
helpful in reduction in route by at least 5,000 km as well as boost Development of
western China Region
b) Gwadar – Natural Transshipment Hub of the Region
Considering the additional distance ships have to travel to reach Dubai the Indian
Ocean. Hence, Gwadar has the prospects to be developed into a full-fledge port in
future. Shifting of ship traffic from Dubai to Gwadar could make it among the top
5 transshipment hubs globally. UAE handles over 21mn TEUs (20 foot equivalent
units) each year; this signifies the opportunity that lies ahead for Gwadar. Being a
tax free port coupled with no port congestion, after full development. Gwadar has
197
leverage over other regional ports China exports ~36 mn TEUs of containerized
cargoes annually which open up avenues for tax collection.
c) Gwadar – A Port for Land-Locked Regions & Beyond
Apart from serving the needs of China and Pakistan, Gwadar would play an
integral part in connecting the region and assisting trade.
d )Prioritizing Maritime Security of CPEC
Maritime security should be prioritized to ensure Pakistan can counter any attempt
to sabotage CPEC. Pakistan’s 1,005 km coastline requires round the clock
protection for which Pakistan Navy should be required with modern vessels.
Pakistan and Chinese Navy are jointly working to secure CPEC from threats. More
funds should be allocated for this purpose given sensitive nature of installments.
7.1.6 Implications for Foreign Policy of Pakistan
Pakistan has to re –visit its foreign policy and should act like maritime nation. It
has to leave its landlocked thinking and must develop strong naval partnership with China
to become potent maritime nation of Indian Ocean. It should resolve all conflicts with
Afghanistan, Iran and Gulf States to achieve complete benefits of Gwadar port regarding
interregional and intra- regional connectivity.
198
7.2 IMITATIONS
This study focuses primarily on secondary data as access to sensitive official
documents of US navy operating in the Indian Ocean was not possible for the researcher.
It was impossible to have access to official naval documents of Pakistan as well. However,
interview has been conducted from officials of Pakistan navy who have been involved in
writing draft of maritime doctrine of Pakistan for this study. Future research can be done
on implementation of Maritime Doctrine of Pakistan keeping in view US policies in Indian
Ocean in current and projected scenario.
199
7.3 RECOMMENDATIONS
a. Maritime Security
1. The presence of foreign navies in Indian Ocean is expected to increase in the time to
come, therefore, Pakistan needs to develop its Naval Capacity.
2. Pakistan is more concerned about its interest in North Arabian Sea but its efforts to be part
of Combined Task Force-150,Counter Piracy Task Force-
151 and such overall engagements of Indian Ocean Navies should proceed .
3. CPEC will be power settler in the region in should be open and accessible to all states as
it is not advisable to have counterproductive competition. Government of Pakistan should
allocate more budget to Naval administration for enhancing the capability of security
especially at Gwadar port.
4. Development of full fledge Naval Base at Gwadar is the need of the hour, so that security
can be provided to Gwadar Port and shipping plying on Sea Lines of communications in
the area.
5. Pakistan should have strong naval muscles.
6. Pakistan should expedite Maritime economy as coastal economy could substantiate land
based economy.
7. Karachi and Bin Qasim Port should be modernized.
8. Legislation needs to be done for the protection of the rights of the people of Baluchistan.
200
9. Establishment of ship construction and repair yards through public and private
partnership must be encourage in order to boost Maritime activities and to make Gwadar
a Maritime hub of the region.
10. A capacity building through education and training of local people and establishment of
university of Maritime Education is the need of the hour.
11. Continuous and integrated efforts of all government, private, military and civil
institutions are required to change the landlocked thinking into making Pakistan a true
Maritime State.
12. In order to exploit under water resources and minerals of Arabian Sea ,it should be
considered as fifth province of Pakistan.
13. Researchers, scientists, politicians, academia and media should play significant role in
developing Maritime outlook of Pakistan and to change the landlocked thinking of this
nation.
b. Foreign Policy of Pakistan
1. Pakistan should take bold step to counter terrorism.
2. Ownership of CPEC is essential for development of infrastructure within Pakistan and
especially in Gwadar.
3. Government and security agencies should take bold steps to fight subversive activities
i.e. controlling spin from friends and foes.
4. Pakistan should try to form new alliances in order to have new equilibrium in the world
politics.
201
5. Pakistan should reach Africa and develop good ties with African states as it has limited
orientations to Africa.
6. Pakistan should develop good ties with Europe and Russia as it is time to leave unilateral
foreign policy and move towards multilateral foreign policy in world politics.
7. In order to become real estate in global politics and to attract multinational companies
Pakistan should develop its coastal areas.
8. Pakistan should develop good ties with western neighbors, Afghanistan and Iran, in order
to achieve benefits from Chahbahar and Gwadar for regional connectivity.
202
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