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US Policy towards Iran: roots of failures and a corrective perspective

By Hooshang Amirahmadi and Shahir ShahidSaless

AbstractThe objectives of this essay are threefold. First, to seek an answer to the question of why Iran and the US do not or cannot engage in a process of sustained dialogue aimed at dtente and minimal cooperation; second, to demonstrate that the current US policies towards Irans nuclear program will likely fail, leading to either nuclear weaponization of Iran or war; and third, to offer corrective policy adjustments aimed at dtente and ending the standoff over Irans nuclear program. There are several points of friction between the US and Iran. However, what is highly noteworthy is that the two countries are locked in a rare relationship: Their governments cannot talk in a meaningful and consistent way to each other. This pattern was not seen even during the Cold-War era between the US and its communist adverseries. If the factors contributing to the perpetuation of this state of non-communication (or failing engagement) continue to be ignored, it would be unreasonable to expect a negotiated solution.

The perilous state of US-Iran relations

The spiral conflict between the US and Iran is multifaceted. From the US perspective, major dimensions of the conflict include Irans nuclear program, threat to the security of Israel, sponsorship of terrorism, abuses of human rights, and inspiring anti-Americanism in the region. Currently, the US is focused on uranium enrichment and is determined to to prevent Iran from having nuclear weapons capability.

The Iranian governments perspective is given in its policy paper prepared in 2007:

America and the Westfrom the inception of the Islamic Republic of Iran, have assailed the existence, independence and sovereignty of our country by raising issues such as human rights, export of revolution, womens rights, minorities rights, sponsoring terrorism, opposition to the so-called Middle East peace process, efforts to destabilize Iraq and Afghanistan, and finally our peaceful nuclear technology as pretextAmerica, under the slogan of sponsoring democracy, explicitly talks about regime change in one of the most democratic countries in the region and the world[Therefore, at this point] Iran would adopt a new strategy[based on] confrontation with Americas unilateralism in all global stages.[endnoteRef:1] [1: Seyyed Mohammad Ali Hosseini, The Study of Successful Aspects of the Ninth-administrations Foreign Policy (Farsi), Presidential Center for Research and Documents, 2007, http://www.presidency.ir/Portal/File/ShowFile.aspx?ID=1cc470a7-74ac-41ed-ab55-1bbae424d3a8 (accessed viewed 10 May 2011). ]

Particular to the nuclear issue, Irans position is that it is simply doing what it is allowed to do under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Under the NPT, a signatory state has the right to enrich uranium to be used as fuel for civil nuclear power. Iran claims that the UN resolutions are politically motivated and as President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has said: The Iranian nation will not succumb to bullying, invasion and the violation of its rights. As admitted by the US officials, Iran is not yet building a bomb but the US remains concern that Iran is aiming at developing a military capability. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in its February 2012 report, also expressed concerns regarding possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear program. Unable to resolve their disputes through diplomacy, the two sides have increasingly resorted to confrontational policies.

To stop Iran from advancing in the military direction, the US has applied a policy of pressure and insists that Iran abide by the UN resolutions demanding a halt to uranium enrichment until all concerns about the nature of its nuclear program are addressed. The US has led international efforts in crafting and imposing sanctions (through the UN and the EU) and has unilaterally ratcheted crippling economic and financial sanctions against Iran. It has also sought to isolate Tehran, and it supports the Iranian political opposition and disgruntled ethnic groups.[endnoteRef:2] These pressures and several UN resolutions notwithstanding, the Islamic Republic has refused to suspend its uranium enrichment program. [2: William Lowther, US funds terror groups to sow chaos in Iran, The Telegraph, 25 February 2007, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1543798/US-funds-terror-groups-to-sow-chaos-in-Iran.html (accessed 20 June 2011).]

Aside from resisting pressures, Iran has also responded by punishing acts of its own. It has gradually increased the number of centrifuges spinning in the nations uranium enrichment plants from the initial 164 centrifuges in 2006 to around 8,000, and it is enriching uranium to 20 percent. As claimed by the Pentagon[endnoteRef:3], the Islamic Republic has used its Quds Force to make the US bleed in Iraq, and according to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader, Tehran has provided logistical supports to anti-Israeli forces in the region[endnoteRef:4]. Moreover, Khamanei has issued a new policy of threat against threat[endnoteRef:5]. This threat policy has been a major reason for the rise in oil prices in 2012. [3: William Branigin, Irans Quds Force was blamed for attacks on US troops in Iraq The Washington Post, 11 October 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/irans-quds-force-was-blamed-for-attacks-on-us-troops-in-iraq/2011/10/11/gIQAPqv0dL_story.html (accessed 2 March 2012).] [4: Thomas Erdbrink, Khamenei: Iran will back any nations, any groups fighting Israel, The Washington Post, 2 February 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/iran-says-it-launched-satellite/2012/02/03/gIQARNuDmQ_story.html (accessed 4 March 2012).] [5: Amir Mohebbian, Possible scenarios of threat against Iran (Farsi) 2011, http://farsi.khamenei.ir/others-note?id=17882 (accessed 15 December 2011).]

The US dual-track policy towards Iran

The US policy towards Irans nuclear program is aimed at making that country suspend uranium enrichment activities until all questions with regard to its nuclear project are addressed. To fulfill this objective, according to the State Department, the US is committed to a dual-track policy of applying pressure in pursuit of constructive engagement, and a negotiated solution. The policy, originally dubbed as carrot and stick, has overtime become a stick only dogma. Sanctions are central to this coercive diplomacy, which also includes the threat of military action under the mantra of all options are on the table.

Many Iran experts including Kenneth Pollack and Ray Takeyh support the dual-track policy. In a fall 2011 paper[endnoteRef:6] they write, the two of us were among the very first to propose this policy. They assert that the Obama administration started out with a passionate determination to emphasize carrots, and claim that the United States and the international community have offered Iran a path toward a responsible civilian nuclear program ... should it conform to its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations. They then admit that the current version of the two-track policy has failed and propose more biting measures directed at regimes security. [6: Kenneth Pollack & Ray Takeyh, Doubling Down on Iran, Washington Quarterly, 2011, vol. 34, no. 4, pp. 7-21.]

Contrary to assertions by Pollack and Takeyh, among others, the problem with the dual-track policy is not that it was not biting enough but that it is based on wrong arguments and understandings. For example, the rationale behind the US view that Iran may develop nuclear weapons is weak. First, no country has developed nuclear weapons while remaining a signatory to the NPT. If Irans plan were to build nuclear weapons, it could withdraw from the NPT by giving the IAEA a three-month advanced notice, as required, and then reconfigure its facilities for weapon production. Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) in 2003 withdrew from the NPT and in 2006 tested its first nuclear weapon underground.

Second, if Iran intends to acquire atomic weapons covertly, why then would it invite draconian sanctions and threat of war by stubbornly insisting on the continuation of its overt nuclear activities? Third, if we were to accept the view of many high-ranking Americans that the leaders in Iran are rational actors,[endnoteRef:7] then Tehrans insistence on pursuing its nuclear program under the IAEA watch does not pass a rational cost-benefit test. If Iran intends to acquire nuclear weapons, it cannot do so overtly because its recognized facilities are monitored by the IAEA and the country is under international radar. [7: Ben Armbruster, Obama Backs Dempsey, Thinkprogress, 2 Mar 2012, http://thinkprogress.org/security/2012/03/02/436357/obama-dempsey-iran/?mobile=nc (accessed 10 March 2012).]

Finally, the assumption that pressure works with Iran is also a misplaced understanding of the dual-track policy. The policy measures, including tough sanctions, can and have crippled Iranian economy and harmed the population, particularly those in the lower income brackets. A tightening and toughening of the sanction and other isolating measures can further worsen the life situation in the country. However, their impact on the regime will not be so devastating as to make it bent under the pressure and give up its rights to uranium enrichment. The following pages will explain why.

Why dual-track policy has failed in its core objective?

In their paper Pollack and Takeyh write:

Since taking office in 2009, the administration has patiently pursued a two-track policy which seeks to persuade the Iranian leadership to give up its nuclear weapons ambitions by creating a series of reinforcing positive and negative incentives. The administration started out, properly, by offering to repair relations through a process of engagement. When Tehran rebuffed these overtures, Washington switched over to the path of pressure

The authors justify Washingtons shift to an all-coercive policy by Obamas failed overture to Iran in March 2009. What they fail to offer is an in-depth explanation as to why Tehran turned down Obamas reconciliatory move. Logic dictates that in order to adjust a failed policy the cause(s) for the failure be carefully identified and explained. Pollack and Takeyhs passing reference to the rule of mistrust and ideology in the failure of Obamas overture could have provided an excellent analytical clue and formed logical basis for a more effective policy. However, they neglect to give any credence to their own correct diagnosis in recommending the next US policy direction.

Specifically, Pollack and Takeyh acknowledge that the strategy of engagement that we proposed and the Bush and Obama administrations implemented was bedeviled by its core intellectual misjudgment discounting ideology and mistrust of the United States as critical ingredients of Irans international relations. However, their analysis stops here and gives no explanation as to why mistrust and ideology are key problems in US-Iran relations. Neither is there any recommendation or indication in their new proposed policy to address these factors in bringing the Iranians to the negotiation table.

Contrary to the logic of their analytical contention, Pollack and Takeyh move in the direction of recommending a new tougher policy by suggesting more coercive measures and doubling down on Iran in order to directly harm the regime. If mistrust and ideology have been major factors in the failure of the previous policies, then obviously, intensifying pressures and directly targeting the survival of the ideological regime will elevate the level of mistrust and ideological conflict even higher, thus minimizing the likelihood of a cogent negotiation process.

It is our contention that a broader and deeper explanation of the causes of the conflict between Iran and the US and the prevailing state of non-communication between the two governments would logically lead to a new policy paradigm. The new perspective must at the least account for the important role that mistrust, perceptions, and misanalysis play in US-Iran relations. We further believe that unless US policy towards Iran takes the challenge and considers these factors in due manners, it will have no chance of changing Irans behavior.

Worst yet, with existing policies in place, despite their biting intensity, Iran will be moved toward nuclear weaponization, thus making a war with it inevitable. Only regime change or recognition of Irans right to uranium enrichment can prevent these eventualities. Given the state of the Iranian opposition, regime change is a remote possibility, leaving the right issue as a panacea. On the basis of this understanding, and in the interest of regional stability and world peace, in the pages that follow we are humbly calling for a paradigm change and have offered corrections to the dual-track policy.

The role of mistrust

Mistrust plays a key role in US-Iran spiral conflict. The admitted role of the US in the 1953 coup against Mohammad Mossadegh, Irans popular Prime Minister, is central to the debate on mistrust between Iran and the US. Following the coup, the Shahs repressive regime emerged as a major Cold-War ally of the US in its competition with the USSR. The Shahs modernization program, promoted by the US, would try to westernize Iran, and thus marginalize the traditional and Islamic cultures. In resistance to the Shahs policies, an Islamic movement under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini emerged.

In a 1964 fiery speech directed at the Shah, Khomeini had said, if [our] country is under American occupation then tell us.[endnoteRef:8] Shortly after the speech, he was expelled from Iran and sent to exile. Subsequently, the modernization program accelerated and attacks on the conservative political Islam represented by the Ayatollah increased. To downgrade Khomeini and his followers, the Shahs regime would call them with the derogatory term of erteja-e siah (black reactionaries). Thus, when the Islamic Republic of Iran came to exist, seeds of hostility between the two states had already been planted. [8: Imam Khomeini's Objection to Capitulation Bill and his disclosuring the regime's plans, 26 October 1964, http://www.tebyan.net/islam_features/islamic_world/muslim_scientists_and_thinkers/2005/10/29/27390.html(accessed 10 January 2012).]

Just months after the victory of the Iranian revolution, the American Embassy in Tehran was seized by a group of radical Muslim students, intensifying already tense relations between the two countries. In an in-depth study of the hostage crisis, David Houghton examines several competing explanations of why Iranian students seized the US embassy in Tehran. The hostage crisis developed into a much larger episode than the students had envisioned: the religious ruling elite used it to consolidate power and eliminate political rivals. However, according to Houghton, the initial motivation for hostage-taking came from a feeling of deep insecurity for the revolution originating from a strong sense of mistrust of the US.[endnoteRef:9] [9: David Houghton, US foreign policy and the Iran hostage crisis, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). ]

Around the date that the Shah entered the US, Ayatollah Khomeini, in an interview with a Western journalist, said, When we have been bitten by a snake, we are even afraid of a piece of rope which from afar looks like a snakeWe fear you socially and politically.[endnoteRef:10] As one of the hostage-takers years later explained, with the admission of the Shah to the United States, we thought the countdown for another coup dtat had begun.[endnoteRef:11] Backed by an array of evidence, Houghton concludes that the best explanation for hostage taking is that the radical Muslim students had reached the conclusion that the revolution was threatened and wanted to prevent a repeat of the 1953 coup. [10: Donette Murray, US foreign policy and Iran: American-Iranian relations since the Islamic revolution, (Routledge, New York, 2010), pp. 28-29.] [11: Stephen Kinzer, All the Shahs men: an American coup and the roots of Middle East terror, 2nd edn., (Hoboken, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2008), p203.]

Nikki Keddie, a scholar of Iranian studies, maintains that for every strange-seeming character trait [of the Iranians], as with mistrust or paranoia, one can nearly always find partially explanatory causes in Iranian history.[endnoteRef:12] According to Houghton, the students misperception of the admission of the Shah to the United States, coupled with the meeting between the liberal Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan and Zbigniew Brzezinski, were the immediate causes of the seizure of the embassy. The Shah was admitted to the US because he was extremely ill, but students and the leaders supporting them thought the US was plotting another coup. [12: Nikkie Keddie & Yann Richard, Roots of revolution: an interpretive history of modern Iran, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), p. 275.]

The hostage crisis was also caused by misreading of the Iranian reality. Specifically, President Jimmy Carter failed to detect the deep anti-Americanism of the revolution and that the 1953 coup was not an ancient history in Iran. It was on the basis of this understanding that he allowed the Shahs admission to the US for cancer treatment, triggering the hostage crisis. As a former American hostage correctly put it, Americas role in the collapse of the Mossadegh government in 1953 was as immediate and alive to the people as if it had occurred yesterday.[endnoteRef:13] Iranians have a long historical memory. [13: Murray, US foreign policy and Iran (note 16), p. 30. ]

The 444-day long hostage crisis has created a lasting mistrust of the Iranian regime in the American political realm. In the words of Gary Sick, the underlying belief [was] that we were dealing not only with a government that had flouted the laws of nations ... but with a regime that was historically illegitimate, unfit, despicable.[endnoteRef:14] The American view of Iran became even more negative as a result of events like bombing of American embassies in Beirut and Africa, the Khobar terrorist attack against the Americans in the Saudi Arabia, and attacks against the American troops in Iraq. The revelation of years of clandestine nuclear activities in 2003 took the Americans mistrust of Iran to new heights. [14: Gary Sick, All fall down: Americas faithful encounter with Iran, (London: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 1985), p.168.]

The Center for Strategic and International Studies asserts that mistrust now affects every aspect of US-Iranian competition over energy, economics, trade, sanctions and the nuclear issue.[endnoteRef:15] Under the situation, it seems odd that policy-makers and analysts have remained silent about the fact that no measure has been taken to address this state of extreme mistrust. On the contrary, the adopted policies to date have largely contributed to the intensification of mistrust between the US and Iran. It could be argued, as Pollack and Takeyh do, that President Obama tried to address the issue but was rebuffed by the Supreme Leader of Iran. As we shall argue below, this assertion is deeply flawed. [15: Anthony H. Cordesman, Bradley Bosserman, Jordan D'Amato, and Andrew C. Gagel, US and Iranian Strategic Competition: The Sanctions game: Energy, Arms Control, and Regime Change , Center for Strategic and International Studies, 6 October 2011, http://csis.org/publication/us-and-iranian-strategic-competition-sanctions-game-energy-arms-control-and-regime-chang (accessed 11 January 2012).]

Fear of regime change

Fear of regime change is another important factor in US-Iran spiral conflict. High level of mistrust reveals itself mainly as fear of regime change by the Islamic regime. Since the time of the Shahs admission into the US, Tehran has perceived regime change as the real aim of US policies. This perception has overtime become solidified in the mind of the Iranian Islamic leaders because of President Bushs axis of evil characterization, the articulation of the preventive war doctrine, the US support for the opposition to destabilize the regime, and the imposition of sanctions. Reporting by the international media on alleged US covert operations to sow chaos in Iran have further fueled the Iranians suspicions.[endnoteRef:16] [16: Lowther, US funds terror.]

Since Khamenei's perception is that the US strategy is regime change, he strongly holds that under bullying and intimidation, the way to success is to not retreat from the enemy, not even one step.[endnoteRef:17] He has been quoted as saying: If the ofcials of a country get daunted by the bullying of the arrogant powers and, as a result, begin to retreat from their own principles and make concessions to those powers, these concessions will never come to an end! Indeed, the end to US pressure and intimidation will only come when Iranian ofcials announce they are ready to compromise Islam and their popular Islamic Republic and the United States may bring to power in this country whoever it wants![endnoteRef:18] [17: Khamenei: The way to success is to not retreat from the enemy, not even one step, 14 February 2012, http://www.irandailybrief.com/?m=20111018&paged=2, (accessed 15 February 2012).] [18: Karim Sadjadpour, Reading Khamenei: The World View of Irans Most Powerful Leader, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/sadjadpour_iran_final2.pdf (accessed 20 December 2011).]

Resisting pressure is a broadly shared view among the ruling hardliners in Iran, layman and clergy alike. They believe that the suspension of the nuclear program under coercion would open the door to more coercion and demands of concessions by the US. Grand Ayatollah Makarem once remarked that even If the nuclear issue is resolved they (foreign powers) will start making claims about human rights, freedom of the press . . . We have to be careful and never accede to their demands.[endnoteRef:19] The fear of regime change, next to the mutual mistrust, is a key obstacle to a solution to the nuclear dispute. [19: Ayatollah Makarem meeting with the board of directors of The Followers of Imam and the Leader, The G. Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi Official Website, 12 November 2009, http://www.makaremshirazi.org/persian/news/?nid=635&sw= ( accessed 24 March 2012). ]

The pride and right factors

The carrot-and-stick policy was not a solution and the current stick-only approach is even less promising. Tehran perceives the policy as extremely disrespectful. A joint report on Irans nuclear issue, prepared by the US Institute of Peace and United Nations Association in 2009, noted that in the Iranian cultural context, terms such as carrots and sticks are understood to apply to donkeys rather than countries or leaders. The report recommended that the US leaders should cease threats and intimidation and replace it with a respectful discourse.[endnoteRef:20] Mohamed ElBaradei, when heading the IAEA, had also repeatedly reminded the American leaders that carrot and stickis a policy suitable for a donkey but not for a proud nation.[endnoteRef:21] [20: Daniel Brumberg & Erkis Berzins 2009, US-Iranian Engagement: Toward A Grand Agenda?, A joint report by: US Institute of Peace and United Nations Association of the USA, 2009, http://www.unausa.org/Document.Doc?id=438 (accessed 17 January 2012).] [21: 'You Cannot Treat Iran Like a Donkey', Newsweek Magazine, 30 January 2009, http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/01/30/you-cannot-treat-iran-like-a-donkey.html (accessed 20 January 2012).]

Pride has a significant place in the construction of Irans national identity. Iranians have been characterized as proud or very proud people by numerous scholars of Iranian studies. This sentiment is rooted in their long civilization and cultural heritage. Iran experts such as George Perkovich and Shahram Chubin[endnoteRef:22] have posited that national pride drives Irans nuclear program. Kamal Kharrazi, Irans former Foreign Minister, was once quoted as saying no government can relinquish a program that has gained it national pride.[endnoteRef:23] In Iran national pride is more important than national interest because pride directly connects to the right factor, that is, national right and national pride is often used interchangeably. [22: George Perkovich & Shahram Chubin, Iran's Nuclear Ambitions, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 18 September 2006, http://carnegieendowment.org/2006/09/18/iran-s-nuclear-ambitions/906 (accessed 1 March 2012).] [23: Glenn Segell, Axis of evil and rouge states: the Bush administration, 2000-2004, (London, Glen Segell, 2005), p.189.]

An opinion poll conducted by the RAND Corporation in 2011 showed that 87 percent of Iranians strongly favor Iranian development of nuclear energy for civilian use, while 98 percent believed that the possession of nuclear energy is a national right.[endnoteRef:24] When Iranians say that nuclear energy is their national right, they are not making a legal statement only but a pride sentiment as well. Yet, [T]he so-called carrot and stick policy ignores the immense value that Iranians have always placed on their pride and prestige.[endnoteRef:25] Given that pride and right are driving forces of Irans nuclear program, it is only logical that they receive due consideration in formulating solutions to the deadlock. [24: Sara Beth Elson & Alireza Nader 2011, What do Iranians think? A survey of attitudes on the United States, the nuclear program, and the economy, The RAND Corporation, 2011, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2011/ RAND_TR910.pdf (accessed 27 January 2012)] [25: Hooshang Amirahmadi 2009, Toward an Obama policy for better US-Iran relations, The American Iranian Council (AIC), 2009, http://www.americaniranian.org/sites/default/files/pdf/AmericanIranianCouncil_WhitePaper.pdf (accessed 12 July 2011).]

This powerful sentiment concerning pride and its pervasive role in Irans nuclear program is incomprehensible to the Western analysts and policy-makers alike. It is no surprise that the US policies toward Iran almost unreservedly discount the influence of national pride. ElBaradei had reportedly reminded the Obama administration that in seeking a solution to Irans nuclear impasse, it is necessary to design an approach that is sensitive to Irans pride.[endnoteRef:26] Indeed, the Iranian political leaders, the Supreme Leader in particular, would incur a high cost if they were to back down from the nuclear issue, given that they have constantly linked it to national pride and right, often comparing the program to the oil nationalization in 1950s. [26: David Sanger, US may drop key condition for talks with Iran, The New York Times, 13 April 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/14/world / middleeast/14diplo.html (accessed 16 January 2012).]

The official US explanation as to why Iran refuses to suspend uranium enrichments is that it is seeking to develop a nuclear weapon capability. Should not they also consider the national pride issue as an alternative explanation? A perception adjustment of that nature has the consequence of accepting that the Iranian leadership cannot agree to conduct negotiations which have no regards for Iranians pride and right. This then can logically make the US officials consider changing their tones and approach. The adjustment can certainly help given that the Iranian political leaders often accuse the US officials of speaking in tones that are disrespectful and derogatory. True, the Iranians also often speak in undiplomatic language but reciprocating such behavior has only worsened the problem.

Given the role of pride in the Iranian culture, Tehrans rejection of President Barak Obamas 2009 televised message for a new beginning was predictable. Yet, the American officials and most Iran experts saw the reaction as a vicious rebuff of Obamas conciliatory move. It is true that the message included an unprecedented overture, but it is also true that it implicitly accused the Iranian regime of supporting terror and building nuclear arms. In Khameneis view once again the carrot and stick policy was in display. He immediately criticized Obama saying they congratulate the Iranian New Year, but, at the same time, accuse Iran of supporting terrorism and efforts to gain access to nuclear weapons. Our nationhates [the policy of] threat and enticement.[endnoteRef:27] [27: Speech for the pilgrims to Imam Rezas shrine (Iranian New Year) 2009, The Center for preserving and publishing the works of Ayatollah Sayyed Ali Khamenei (Farsi), 21 March 2009, http://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=6082 (accessed 10 July 2011). ]

Islamic culture of resistance

In the Muslim Middle East, particularly in Shiite Iran, resistance is a key characteristic of the traditional culture. The Shiite culture urges Muslims to resist when they are put under pressure. Drawing on Islamic teachings, Khamanei has constantly preached about the superiority of believers (momenin) over worldly people (aafiat-talaban) in defending their values (arzeshha), honor (sharaf) and dignity (ezzat). Besides, Khamanei himself has become a symbol of resistance to the US and Israel, a position that provides him with authority (eghtedar) and stature (jaaygah) as the Guardian Jurist (vali-e faqih). There is a serious concern that his position will be ruined if he were to surrender Irans inalienable rights, as he has often put it, to nuclear energy under humiliating conditions.

It is no wonder that the coercive policy, which ignores the Iranian traditional resistance culture, has been a powerful source of blockage to negotiations between the two states. Under coercion and humiliation, we believe, the Iranian Supreme Leader could act suicidal. First, because he believes in martyrdom and, if need be, in becoming a martyr for Islam, his beloved religion; and second, he and the power elite tend to believe that Iran is powerful enough to defeat the US by harming its interests in the region in an irregular warfare. General Qassem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force, repeatedly cites Hezbollahs 33-day war and Hamass 22-day war with Israel as examples of how the spirit of martyrdom (roohe shahid talabi) can defeat powerful armies.

The Role of Misanalysis

Another factor that has negatively impacted US policy towards Iran is the misanalysis of domestic political struggle. Irans 2009 contested presidential elections is a case in point. The dispute over who won the race prompted street protests and violent oppression by the government. In the West, the US in particular, the Green Movement became a new source of hope for regime change and halting Irans nuclear program. For example, Ray Takeyh would argue that the only thing standing between the mullahs and the bomb is the Green Movement;[endnoteRef:28] Richard Haas would posit that control [over Irans nuclear program] wont be won at the negotiating table, but on the streets. The West must make clear its support for the protesters;[endnoteRef:29] and Pollack and Takeyh in their 2011 article, argued that making connections with the Green Movement would be a critical component of any strategy. [28: Ray Takeyh, The US must empower the Green Movement, Council on Foreign Relations, 17 February 2011, http://www.cfr.org/iran/us-must-empower-green-movement/p24155 (accessed 4 August 2011).] [29: Richard Haas, Enough is enough, News Week Magazine, 21 January 2010, http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2010/01/21/enough-is-enough.html (accessed viewed 3 August 2011).]

These arguments are based on a serious misanalysis and have already complicated the relations, making constructive communication between the two states even more unlikely. In sharp contrast to the widespread view among Western political pundits and policy-makers, the Green Movement is not a struggle of the people against the regime. Rather, it is mainly a struggle between two factions: the religious conservatives (traditionalists) who support the regime and the principle of absolute guardianship of the jurist (velayat-e motlaghe faqih), and their opponents consisting of Islamic and secular liberals. Former President Mohammad Khatami, Mahdi Karubi and Mir Hossein Mousavi are notable representatives of the liberal Islam. They still support the Islamic system but demand the full execution of the constitution (ejraye bedoone tanazol ghanoone asasi). The secular liberals, who wish to overthrow the system, have no comparably popular leaders. Both groups lack credible organizations.

Among supporters of the Green Movement, many intellectuals, writers, artists, and academics (secular and religious) are found, but the young middle and upper-middle class form its backbone. This particular class composition of the movement explains the fact that no economic demand was raised during and after the protests; instead it suggests that the uprising was an essentially civil rights movement. In other words, the Green Movement reflects the will and demands of the liberal middle and upper-class faction of the society (about 30 percent of the population[endnoteRef:30]) rather than the will of the whole population (75 million). It is no wonder that the Washington Posts should report from Tehran reads[endnoteRef:31]the following: [30: Federal Research Division, Iran: a country study, Glenn E. Curtis & Eric Hooglund, 5th ed., 2008, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/pdf/CS_Iran.pdf (accessed 1 March 2012).] [31: Thomas Erdbrink, In Iran, couch rebels prefer Facebook The Washington Post, 14 June 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/in-iran-couch-rebels-prefer-facebook/2011/06/10/AGB9FpTH_story.html (accessed 27 June 2011).]

Two years ago, Iranian activists used social media sites as engines to organize massive anti-government demonstrations. But nowinstead of marching in the streets, the same doctors, artists and students who led the demonstrations in 2009 are playing internet gamesconfining their political debates to social media sites such as Facebook, where dissent has proved less risky.

According to a report on the website of Mir Hossein Mousavi, the real number of votes was 21.3 million for Mousavi and 10.5 million for Ahmadinejad[endnoteRef:32]. Taking these figures at face value, the conservative power elite that rule Iran has at least 10 million supporters. In addition, given that Mousavi was also approved by the ultraconservative Guardians Council, a portion of the conservatives must have voted for him. Therefore, while the street demonstrators were representing a good portion of the population, the regime also enjoyed considerable support. Besides, in contrast to the supporters of the Green Movement, followers of the conservatives are organized, in power, ready to use brute force, and are prepared to make sacrifices for the Islamic system. Thus, in our humble opinion, the 2009 protests did not reflect a struggle between the people and the regime but the revival of a fight between the forces of tradition and modernity,[endnoteRef:33] a battle that dates back to the end of the 19th century. [32: Real June 12 election results leaked, Mowge Sevvom (Farsi), 14 June 2009, http://www.mowj.ir/ShowNews.php?7229 (accessed 20 June 2011).] [33: Ramin Jahanbegloo, Iran: between tradition and modernity, (Lanham: Lexington Books 2004).]

The discussion of who won the election is beyond the scope of this article.[endnoteRef:34] The election was rigged; there is no doubt about it. However, before drawing any conclusion, considering the expert opinion of Walter Mebane, who performed a mathematical analysis of the 2009 election, can be critically helpful. He writes: [34: We found three more extensive statistical analyses on the 2009 election. Ansari points to widespread fraud and casts doubt on the results (Ansari et al. 2009). Ansaris report is refuted by Bozogmehr and Esfandiari (2010). In their analysis they conclude that the outcome of the election is a genuine reflection of the will of the Iranian people. In another statistical analysis, Brill concludes that Ahmadinejad has been the actual winner of the election (Brill 2010).]

It is important to be clear that none of the estimates or test results in this report is proof that substantial fraud affected the 2009 Iranian election. The results suggest very strongly that there was widespread fraud in which the vote counts for Ahmadinejad were substantially augmented by artificial means. But it is possible that Ahmadinejad actually won, supported by many who might have voted for [the other two candidates] Karubi or Rezaei instead voting for Ahmadinejad. [endnoteRef:35] [35: Walter Mebane JR., Note on the presidential election in Iran, June 2009, http://www-personal.umich.edu/~wmebane/note29jun2009.pdf (accessed 10 July 2011).]

Our assertions by no means suggest that the U.S. government should be indifferent to human rights violations in Iran. It should speak out against such abuses loud and clear. However, supporting the human rights of the Iranian people is one thing and relying on the Green Movement to change the behavior of the regime or overthrow it is another thing. Ignoring the theocratic and revolutionary nature of the Iranian government and belittling its staying power have been most counterproductive for both US-Iran relations and the reform movement in Iran. Specifically, the consequences of those ignorance and policies have been twofold: first, contrary to expectations, it has justified more repression and tougher restrictions on socio-political liberties in Iran since 2009; and second, it has solidified and heightened mistrust in a relationship already dominated by suspicion.

It may be argued, as some do, that even if the Green Movement cannot change the regime or its behavior, supporting it can still be justified for it can weaken the regime by delegitimizing it. But this argument is problematic for at least three reasons: first, internationally, the more the regime is discredited the more difficult it will be for the U.S. to pursue engagement with it; second, to enter into dialogue with a repressive and illegitimate regime would also be a hard sell domestically for any US administration whether Democrat or Republican as it has indeed become; and third, using the movement as an instrument of US policy will indeed strengthen the regime in its fight against the reformist groups including those inside the Green Movement.

Will dual-track policy ultimately work?

Proponents of the dual-track policy might argue that, regardless, under tightening sanctions, once the Iranian regimes survival is threatened, the leadership would have no choice but to surrender. The validity of this argument can be challenged on a number of grounds. First, an endangered Islamic Republic will be ready to take retaliatory actions. The radicalized regime has already adopted a policy of threat for threat and may adopt other measures such as destabilizing Iraq and the Persian Gulf (Strait of Hormuz). Iran could particularly create troubles in Iraq through its Quds Force now that the US is leaving the country and Iraq is becoming a rival oil producer. The Quds Force is well entrenched in Iraq and works closely with its anti-American allies there. Against Iranian retaliatory measures, the US may be forced to exercise its last resort option of war as Secretary Panetta put it.

Second, it could be argued that sanctions would work in the long run when crippling hardship would move moderate conservatives away from the regime towards the Green Movement, making it easier for the opposition to overthrow the ruling elite. This is a possibility but experts are warning that the US government has a limited timeframe to disrupt Irans nuclear program with sanctions before it must consider military options.[endnoteRef:36] Indeed, prolonged sanctions with no concrete outcome may provide the Iranian regime with enough time to develop nuclear arms if in fact it intends to do so. [36: Ariel Cohen, James Phillips & Owen Graham, Irans energy sector: a target vulnerable to sanctions, The Heritage Foundation, 14 Feb 2011, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/02/irans-energy-sector-a-target-vulnerable-to-sanctions (accessed 7 May 2011)]

Third, protracted crippling sanctions can also create a moral dilemma: while the US says it supports the human rights of the Iranian people, it cannot justify prolonged sanctions that would harm the ordinary Iranians, particularly its jobless youth. Finally, it is a mistake to assume, as Americans do, that economic and financial pressures would make the development of nuclear weapons difficult for Iran. The lesson to be learned from the cases of Pakistan and North Korea is that even a poor country can produce an atomic bomb.

To conclude, the dual-track policy will not work as sanctions and isolation would fail to change Irans behavior or its regime. Under life-threatening pressure, the Islamic Republic could be pushed toward nuclear weaponization and retaliatory actions against the US, especially in Iraq and the Persian Gulf. As Vali Nasr has aptly put it at some point sanctions become an act of war. The regime could also use the enemy factor to uproot liberal forces and the opposition in the nation. As sanctions fail and Iran becomes more belligerent, patience in Israel and the US for diplomacy will wane, making the US exercise its last resort- war option.

What is to be done?

At the heart of the problem with the US policies towards Iran is the assumption that the Islamic regime will respond favorably to coercion. The lack of an in-depth knowledge about Iranian society, culture, and politics is significantly responsible for this wrong assumption and policy. Former US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice once remarked that Iran is a very opaque place and its a political system I dont understand very well. Pollack and Takeyh also admit that Iran is a land that revels in ambiguity, opacity, and complexityit [is] exceptionally difficult for outsiders to perceive Iranian motives and intentions...the best that outside observers can do is guess at Tehrans motives, and they should be duly humble given our incomplete understanding of Irans politics or the policies which emerge from them. These assertions are true.

This lack of a better understanding has its roots in many factors, notably in the fact that only a few American analysts and policy-makers know Farsi, and not many Iranian-American analysts visit Iran. Worst yet, of those who travel to that country only a handful ever come in contact with the ordinary Iranians from different walks of life, and even less have ever interacted with the ruling elite, influential clergy, and high ranking officials to acquire first-hand knowledge of their views and motivations. Reliance on Irans internet users and social networks has been particularly problematic since they do not represent the whole society. According to reports, internet users [in Iran] are predominantly urban middle and upper class[endnoteRef:37] groups who form the backbone of the opposition and are often, as expected, unreliable and biased. [37: Freedom House, Report on internet freedom in Iran 2011, United States Institute of Peace, 3 May 2011, http://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2011/may/03/report-internet-freedom-iran-2011 (accessed 15 August 2011). ]

While understanding an historical and cultural country like Iran is a difficult task, it does not need to become daunting to policy makers and analysts who are often narrowly focused on US-Iran relations or on a particular aspect of that relationship such as the nuclear dispute. This essay has argued that by enriching their understanding of a few troubling factors and accounting for them in their pronouncements and policies, Americans can make a huge difference in their entanglements with Iran. These factors are mistrust of the US, fear of regime change, the place of pride and right in Irans identity formation, the Islamic resistance culture, and the misanalysis of Irans domestic politics. While many other factors are at work in US-Iran spiral conflict, the ones that we have identified are the most critical.

Beginning from this basis of understanding, moving forward with Iran should not be difficult. The good news for the troubled relations is that both sides are rational actors. While no one has questioned American rationality, few until recently believed that the leaders in Tehran are rational players. This misunderstanding is gradually but surely changing among officials in the US, Israel and Europe. Indeed, Iranian leaders in many crisis occasions have shown that they understand and apply the so-called cost-benefit principle. For instance, despite intense animosity between Iran and the US, Ayatollah Khamanei, the founding father of the Islamic Republic, and his successor Ayatollah Khamanei has both allowed relations with the US when they become beneficial.

In the nuclear enrichment dispute, too, Iran has shown that it is a rational player as well by staying with the NPT even if the IAEA sent its dossier to the UN Security Council. North Korea left the Treaty when it came under pressure. Let us not forget that Iran once suspended uranium enrichment under President Mohammad Khatami. Then, just as now, the same Supreme Leader was in charge of the decision. Unfortunately, Europeans missed that opportunity by offering Iran an incentive package that the reformist Khatami characterized as an insult to the Iranian nation. Thereafter, Iran renewed enrichment at an expanded scale, demonstrating that the Iranian pragmatism and cost-benefit analysis fades away under humiliation.

Despite increasing coercion in the form of sanctions and other crippling and destabilizing measures, Iran has continued to keep its doors open for a possible respectful settlement of its problems with the US. For example, in November 2011, in an unprecedented manner, an article by an Iranian conservative analyst, Amir Mohebbian, was posted on Khamaneis website. The article stated that the Supreme Leader will consider a rational change in American behavior toward Iran. This last March, Ayatollah Khamenei welcomed comments by US President Obama damping down talk of war against Tehran, saying This talk is good talk and shows an exit from illusion". Iran now seems to be looking for any opportunity to reduce tension.

One place the tension has been very high is over Irans nuclear program. Here, too Iran has been looking for ways to reduce tension. The successful talks in Istanbul this last April is an example of a new confidence-building environment that Iran is trying to promote. Even before this meeting, Iran had allowed the IAEA visit Irans most sensitive nuclear sites including R&D sites for centrifuges and heavy water (these visits fall outside the NPT). An Iranian official told one of the authors of this paper that last summer Iran also accepted the Russian plan for incremental resolution of the nuclear dispute and within that framework accepted to implement the Additional Protocol of the Safeguard Agreement and the code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to the Safeguard Agreement.

The will for better relations and a solution to the nuclear impasse has always existed[endnoteRef:38]. However, the two sides have not been able to communicate and compromise. As the US former Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates has aptly put it, the history of outreach [to Iran] that was very real, under successive presidentsdid not yield any results. It is true that resolving the US-Iran spiral conflict is not going to be easy given the extent of issues involve, but it is also true that neither side can afford to shy away from a resolution to the conflict given that the no-war no-peace status quo is shaky. To improve relations, the current level of political will in that direction on both sides must be enhanced. What is also needed is a concrete road map similar to the Whitepaper that the American Iranian Council produced a few years ago.[endnoteRef:39] [38: 1986 McFarlane, key advisor to President Reagan, goes to Tehran carrying a cake with a key on top to represent the opening of a new era and a Bible inscribed by President Reagan (Coughlin 2009, p. 230).1989 George H.W. Bush inaugural address referring to Iran: Good will begets good will. Good faith can be a spiral that endlessly move on.1990 Iranian Ambassador to the UN repeated his governments interest in improving relations with the US.1990 Scowcroft sends a message informing Tehran that the US would accept talks in any setting .1991 Baker informs the UN Secretary General, de Cuellar, that the US is prepared to restore relations and requests to meet secretly with the Iranian Foreign Minister.1993 Rafsanjani, the Iranian President, calls for the unfreezing of assets and the resumption of relations.1998 Khatami, the Iranian President, proposes dialogue of civilizations to break the bulky wall of mistrust. 1998 Albright proposes a road map for normalization of relations.2003 Iran offers a grand bargain backed by the Iranian Leader.2004 George W. Bush offers to talk personally with an authorized person from Iran to prevent the problems remain unresolved. The message was being passed to Iran through El Baradei according to Hassan Rowhanis new book titled "National Security and Nuclear Diplomacy [Farsi]. Rowhani is the former Irans chief negotiator on its nuclear issue.2009 Obamas call for a new beginning.] [39: Amirahmadi 2009, Toward an Obama policy for better US-Iran relations.]

As Charles Kupchan, in How enemies become friends has correctly argued, in order to turn former enemies in international politics into friends, the first step is the most crucial one and that step should be a unilateral act taken by the stronger power. He contends that this is essential to build the trust of the weaker competitor to engage in dialogue and cooperate toward reaching a compromise. Kupchan posits that diplomatic engagement with rivals, far from being appeasement, is critical to conflict resolution. Mediation is another helpful idea in the context of US-Iran conflict where misunderstanding plays a major role. The potential mediator must be familiar with both the Iranian and Western cultures and must have friendly relations with both countries. According to Jacob Bercovitch, a highly regarded expert on international conflict resolution, mediation may well be the closest thing we have to an effective technique for dealing with conflicts in the twenty-first century[endnoteRef:40]. [40: Jacob Bercovitch, Mediation in international conflict: theory, practice, and developments, in IW Zartman (ed), Peacemaking in international conflict: methods and techniques (revised edition), (Washington DC.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007). ]

The role of a mediator is to educate the parties about the nuances of each others actions and perceptions, and correct chronic misunderstandings. It is a fact that leaders in Iran and in the US are unfamiliar with the other sides political culture and its nuances. Let us illustrate with an example. In February 2012, ahead of Chinese Vice Presidents visit to the US, Vice President Joe Biden met with several Chinese human rights activists. In that meeting Biden called on China to address the deterioration of its human rights situation. A few days later the Chinese Vice President, Xi Jinping, who is expected to take power in China this year, met with Biden and Obama, shook hands, talked about human rights issues in China, and left the US without promising anything about human rights - live went on, presumably, unchanged.

To the Iranian leaders, this sort of relationship is absolutely incomprehensible. They do not understand that the US president or its Vice President is constrained by the US Congress, interest groups, and public opinion. It is then no wonder that when Obamas message for a new beginning contains implicit condemnations about terrorism and nuclear weaponization, Khamenei perceives it as deceitfully offering an "iron hand inside a velvet glove." American leaders, too, are very unfamiliar with Iranian domestic political games and are often confused as to why so many voices speak in so many seemingly contradictory directions. They have a hard time to penetrate into the Iranian soul and its decision-making dynamics. Both sides require education and one way to address the problem immediately is through the use of educated and reliable mediators.

Nuclear dispute has become the focal point of US-Iran conflict and it is one dispute that is most influenced by mistrust. Indeed, a mutually acceptable peaceful resolution to Irans nuclear issue has the potential to create a strong starting point for a comprehensive settlement between the two states. By the same token, any settlement on the nuclear issue would be unstable unless the two countries reach a comprehensive settlement that would include issues ranging from terrorism, Middle East peace and human rights. A settlement of the nuclear dispute to follow with a global settlement is the key to not only better US-Iran relations but also for regional stability and peace. The stronger-power first step and mediation approaches are particularly useful in the conflict over Irans nuclear program.However, to resolve the nuclear dispute, the parties must also be prepared to make compromises. First, the US should abandon the language of threat and intimidation. This unrelenting attitude provokes sharp reactions from Tehran, escalates the conflict, and blocks the formation of negotiations. The issue of pride and its role in Irans politics cannot be ignored. Iran, through numerous direct and indirect channels, has repeatedly demanded that the US change its tone. Hooshang Amirahmadi, who has acquired a wealth of knowledge about the views, motivations and sensitivities of the Iranian leaders through years of track-two diplomacy between the two countries, has said that there is only one way to encourage Iran to cooperate with the US and that is for the US to assume a new attitude towards Iran. Second, for the reasons discussed in this paper, Iran will not concede to a complete halt in its enrichment program. The US can agree to let Iran continue enriching uranium up to 5% purity, in exchange for strict monitoring and the implementation of Additional Protocol including unannounced inspections. Mohammad Javad Larijani, key foreign policy advisor to Ayatollah Khamenei, has announced that Iran is prepared to accept even permanent human monitoring in exchange for Western cooperation[endnoteRef:41]. If this plan is complemented by a proposal to sell Iran the necessary amount of 20 percent uranium rods for its medical purposes, then Iran can be persuaded to transfer to a third country any uranium enriched beyond 5 %. Iran may also be persuaded to deactivate its Fordow underground plant as a step in the direction of building trust with the US. [41: Christiane Amanpour, Iran Official Offers 'Permanent Human Monitoring' of Nuclear Sites, ABC News, 15 March 2012, http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/iran-official-offers-human-monitoring-nuclear-sites/story?id=15930677#.T6gpdOuXRid (accessed 16 March 2012).]

Third, were Iran to make such concessions, the US should reciprocate by easing the sanctions and abandoning the mantra of all options are on the table. A reversal of the sanctions trend could be a major step towards trust building. Such a move can help advance the principle of a step-by-step approach and reciprocity" that was discussed and implicitly agreed upon during the Istanbul II meetings. The all options on the table mantra has done nothing positive to a resolution of the conflict. In fact, in the eyes of the Iranian leaders it is a clear manifestation of bullying by the arrogant powers. The mantra and the fact that the US has consistently refused to offer Iran any security assurances,[endnoteRef:42]solidifies Irans fear of regime change and leads to its non-compromising and hostile posture. [42: Douglas K. Daniel, No security guarantee for Iran, Rice Says, Washington Post, 21 May 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/21/AR2006052100369_pf.html (accessed 10 March 2012).]

Fourth, the US must seriously consider stopping its clandestine operations inside Iran as they are a major source of Irans hostility towards the US. The New York Times has reported[endnoteRef:43] the existence of a Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force Execute Order that was signed in September 2009 by General David Petraeus then CENTCOM commander and now head of the CIA. The Executive Order authorizes the sending of U.S. Special Operations personnel to Iran to gather intelligence about the countrys nuclear program and identify dissident groups that might be useful for a future military offensive. Also, some news reports have revealed that dangerous false flag operations have been conducted by the Israeli Mossad inside Iran.[endnoteRef:44] Iranians would not believe that these operations have been conducted without Washingtons approval. [43: Mark Mazzetti, U.S. Is Said to Expand Secret Actions in Mideast, The New York Times, 24 May 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/25/world/25military.html (accessed 10 April 2012).] [44: Mark Perry, False flag,Foreign Policy, 13 january 2012, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/13/false_flag?page=full (accessed 10 March 2012).]

Finally, the US government must not take a neutral stance toward human rights violations in Iran, but it must not also use it as a policy instrument towards regime change. Contrary to expectations, the US human rights policy towards Iran has justified more repression and tougher restrictions on social and political liberties in Iran. This has been particularly the case since 2009 elections when the US has more explicitly called for regime change. Secretary Clinton, referring to the post-elections protests, boasted that behind the scenes, we were doing a lot". The US human rights policy toward Iran is also counterproductive for the double standard that Washington applies in this respect to various repressive states in the region. For example, right after the Saudi crackdown on pro-democracy protestors in Bahrain, Ms. Clinton announced new sanctions on Iran to hold accountable those governments and officials that violate human rights.To conclude, the current no war, no peace status-quo is unstable and cannot be sustained for any length of time. The US and Iran have arrived at a crossroad of peace and war. They must now choose between the two roads in front of them. War is a costly option for both sides (and indeed all sides) and is hardly advisable in the current political-economy environment in the two countries, in the region, and globally. The peace option, while tougher as it require courageous compromises, is surely a less costly option. The imperative for peace are obvious: mounting frustration from the absence of any tangible progress in resolving the nuclear issue may eventually lead to military action; and the current open-ended process may grant Iran the time it needs, should it seek to develop nuclear weapons. In order to break through this impasse, it is necessary for the two states to engage in sustained dialogue.

Hooshang Amirahmadi is a professor at Rutgers University and President of the American Iranian Council. Shahir ShahidSaless is a political analyst and free-lance journalist.